**3.4 The governance challenge in intergenerational justice**

At this juncture it could also be asked if there are any positive factors in SRM towards facilitating intergenerational justice. After all there are voices claiming that SRM would promote equity as it is capable of avoiding the tragedy of the commons by doing away with the various forms of injustice caused by anthropogenic climate changes. It is also argued that the present generation empowers the future generation to contain the dangers of climate change by SRM [45, 46]. There are arguments that SRM would shield the future generations from otherwise future catastrophe. This is termed as the buying-time argument implying that SRM allows sufficient time for this generation and future generations to combat climate change. Thus proper governance mechanism would ensure intergenerational justice.

This observation, thought seemingly positive, is loaded with major practical challenges. The study by Burns [48] and Svoboda et al. [11] show that even in such scenarios SRM will be incompatible with intergenerational justice. Given the nature of the present international treaties on climate and environment, no law or convention is capable of absorbing the possible complexities posed by SRM ensuring a consensus on the deployment of SRM in a manner compatible with intergenerational justice. Treaties such as UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), ENMOD (United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques*),* and CBD (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity) are not framed for geoengineering and as such they enjoy no comprehensive governance over it. Burns [48] opines that even if UNFCCC may claim certain authority, the lack of political determination will not ensure the just deployment of SRM. Since the very need for SRM is caused by the lack of political will, it cannot be assumed that the same would be present in ensuring justice in its deployment. Although ENMOD permits interventions with environment for peaceful purposes, the limited number of signatories to it does not give a credible mandate for ENMOD over SRM. Similarly, though CBD may be invoked in SRM or CDR, the terms of the CBD have no binding force on the parties as they are only recommendations to parties. The absence of proper governance mechanism seems to confirm that there is no way of deploying geoengineering in a manner compatible with intergenerational justice though some authors tend to think so.

As the critique so far had been around the challenges of SRM to intergenerational justice, one might be inclined to consider CDR to be compatible with intergenerational justice. It is clear that CDR does not invoke concrete problems like sudden termination. At the same time CDR is not freed from the possible moral hazard that it may cause. The moral hazard issue of alleviating the aggressive commitment to mitigation is equally present in CDR projects too. Besides, the required sustained deployment of CDR techniques "would deny them (future generations) the full panoply of options that the principle of intergenerational equity demands" ([48], p. 218). It may be granted positively that on a comparative scale, CDR schemes are not as challenging as the SRM schemes in regard to intergenerational justice. It should be noted alongside, that despite the reduced challenges to justice from CDR, the almost exclusive focus in the debate is on the SRM techniques with very little research being done along the CDR line. A full-blown commitment to the issues of intergenerational justice would require that this strategy needs serious rectification. Burns' [48] formulation that SRM "sows the seeds of a major peril for future generations" ([48], p. 209) may sum up the gist of the discussion on intergenerational justice in the context of geoengineering.

#### **4. Procedural justice in geoengineering**

Perhaps what is most rewarding at this stage of the debate on justice in geoengineering is the discussion on procedural justice. It is to the merit of the ethicists that the challenges of procedural justice have been brought to the forefront at the deliberative level itself. As it stands, the discussion on the choice of technologies can be significantly influenced by the concerns with justice.

An untested technology in search of its ethical normativity, but confronted with looming uncertainties about side-effects, will warrant a clear articulation on the procedures towards policy decisions on the choice of technologies, governance mechanism, field tests, etc. Accordingly, the leading issues pertaining to procedural justice coined today are participation and consent, moratorium on field tests, evaluation of the results of technology, security threats stemming from the deployment of technology, etc.

**229**

*The Ethical Desirability of Geoengineering: Challenges to Justice*

The principle of informed consent emphasized by ethicists for the safety of the research subjects is a universal norm in research ethics. It ensures that the subject who voluntarily partake in a research is adequately informed about the risks involved in such a participation and the subject's consent is obtained only after imparting sufficient information. The issue of consent presents itself as the leading contender challenging procedural justice in geoengineering [4, 5, 10, 50, 56, 59]. Preston [10] has rightly identified informed consent to be a formidable challenge in geoengineering at the level of research and deployment. "If the problems of participation and consent first arise in the context of research, there is no doubt whatsoever that their reappearance in the context of implementation is one of the biggest ethical challenges geoengineering faces. As an engineering project promising global impacts, some form of consent—at least from the representatives of those affected—would appear to be a non-negotiable requirement of just procedure"

While informed consent is essentially significant for geoengineering researches, obtaining such a consent is extremely problematic given the complexities involved in geoengineering. The conventional models of informed consent are no longer useful in the geoengineering context. The principle of informed consent meets challenges such as identifying the victims of the research and deployment, the huge number of population who will be affected by the technology, the difficulties of representative consent, etc. The conventional practice of obtaining representative

The solution proposed by Morrow et al. [9], upholding the principle of respect as a motivation towards ensuring consent for geoengineering, does uphold the values of procedural justice. Morrow et al. [9] suggest that "[…] the scientific community secure the global public's consent, voiced through their governmental representatives, before beginning any empirical research [on geoengineering]" ([9], p. 1). This norm does prevent the public from having to accept a policy to

Another problematic that is anticipated in regard to procedural justice is the issue of a single nation most hit by the dangers of climate change unilaterally deciding to deploy geoengineering in a desperate situation. Even in this regard, procedural challenges cannot be ignored as the impact of the deployed technology is not limited to the nation under consideration. Informed consent cannot be assumed

The scope for the unilateral deployment is a central challenge to procedural justice in SAG [27, 45, 61–65]. The leading approach among ethicists is to caution

Assessing procedural justice in geoengineering against the theoretical frame of Rawls does not give nod to research and development. From the Rawlsian point of view of procedural justice, in the present state of affairs with geoengineering, there is no deliberation let alone agreement among all stakeholders and those who would be affected by it. Such a consensus is central to the Rawlsian procedural justice. As such the projected fear about unilateral deployment of SAG should not occur in the Rawlsian context. Analysis by Svoboda et al. [11] showed that these conditions cannot be met in unilateral deployment, particularly as there is no governance

consent look impractical in a technology with global impact.

**4.2 Unilateral deployment and issue of consensus**

which they have given no consent.

even in a such a desperate scenario [60].

against unilateral deployment.

mechanism for appeal against SAG.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94889*

**4.1 Consent and participation**

([10], p. 29).
