**5. Conclusion**

The importance of CG implementations has increased in the business environment especially after the financial crises: The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2008. Poor CG of financial institutions is considered to be one of the main causes of the financial crisis of 2008, and this CG weakness was not limited to the CBs, but IBs also suffered from this problem because their implementation of CG practices is still weak. Indeed, CG structure of IBs differs from its conventional counterparts as it follows *Shari'ah*-compliant characteristics and is closely guided by the SSBs. This extra layer of governance in the IBs modifies their governance structure from "single-layer" as in the conventional ones into "multilayer" governance. This makes the establishment of an SSB essential for the IBs. Providing an efficient *Shari'ah* supervision is crucial to the IBs as failing to do so may give negative impact on the Islamic finance industry as a whole.

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However, studies investigating the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 in the SSB context are very little, and hence, this chapter aims to examine SSBs'supervision effect on IBs' performance during the financial crisis of 2008. Based on the GMM estimation, the findings indicate that IBs with strong SSB supervision are likely to improve IBs' performance during the crisis and non-crisis periods.

It is expected that providing empirical evidence on this issue would help the IBs in developing their strategies to adopt appropriate SG structure that can enhance their performance during crisis and non-crisis periods. Therefore, the IBs, policymakers and practitioners should consider the strong SSB supervision when aiming to improve SG practices in the Islamic banking industry. More specifically, the IBs, policymakers and practitioners should give due importance to SSB (size, cross-membership, educational qualification, reputation and expertise) in enhancing the performance of IBs during the crisis and non-crisis periods. However, the main limitation of the study is that it only focuses on a sample of 66 IBs over 18 countries due to lack of data.
