**6. Climate change and financial stability**

Estimates of the aggregate economic impacts of climate change and the costs of mitigation both vary widely and are highly dependent on factors such as core assumptions, model design, sectoral coverage, and scenario selection [45]. On the one hand, available estimates suggest that physical damage from climate change could reach one tenth, or even one fifth, of global GDP by the end of this century, with considerable uncertainties around amplifying dynamics. In terms of current global output, this would amount to USD 8–17 trillion. On the other hand, some estimates suggest the transition to a low-carbon economy will require investment of between USD 1 trillion and USD 4 trillion in constant terms when considering the energy sector alone, or up to USD 20 trillion when looking at the economy more broadly [11].

Dietz et al. [46] employed standard integrated assessment model (IAM) and the climate value-at-risk (VAR) framework to quantitatively investigate the physical impact of climate change on the financial system. They found that without mitigation efforts, physical risks related to climate change could lead to a loss of USD

2.5–24.2 trillion of the value of global financial assets. For the transition risks, estimate by Mercure et al. [47] put the discounted global wealth losses from stranded fossil fuel assets may amount from USD 1–4 trillion.

Physical impacts of climate change as well as the transition toward a resilient low-carbon economy pose significant challenges for macro-financial management, as they can damage the balance sheets of governments, households, firms, and financial institutions due to the adverse and possibly abrupt impacts on investment and economic growth, fiscal revenue and expenditure, debt sustainability, and the valuation of financial assets. In turn, macro-financial risks translate into weakened resilience to physical climate risks and constrained capacity for climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. Transition risks are particularly high for countries that generate a significant share of public revenue from carbon-intensive industries. Lower-income and conflict-affected oil and gas exporters (mostly in Africa and the Middle East) are more vulnerable and less able to manage a low-carbon transition. They have not yet converted hydrocarbon rents into other sources of export revenues needed to grow and diversify [48].

For banks, climate-related risk factors manifest as increasing credit, market, and operational risks [49]. Climate-related financial risks may weaken financial sector balance sheets and induce or amplify macro-financial risks, particularly in the case of shocks. Such shocks could stem from disasters or sudden changes in policy, technology, or consumer preferences. The resulting financial sector losses and volatility in financial and commodity markets can adversely impact funding, liquidity, and lending conditions and weaken financial sector balance sheets, giving rise to negative feedback loops with macro-fiscal implications. Emerging markets and developing economies may be particularly affected, given that their financial markets are less resilient to such shocks [48]. By destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability and liquidity, climate change is likely to increase the rate of default of corporate loans that could harm the stability of the banking system [19]. A recent survey by the Bank of England on the preparedness of UK banks for climate change found their planning horizons averaged 4 years, likely too short even to account for likely physical and liability risks [50].

Climate change also has implications for insurance companies on both sides of the balance sheet: as investors and as underwriters. As institutional investors, insurance companies face largely similar transition and physical risks as other asset managers. They are disproportionally affected due to the long-term nature of their equity and infrastructure investments. As underwriters, pricing risks may arise from changing risk profiles to insured assets [48]. According to Lloyd's of London, damages from weather-related losses around the world have increased from an annual average of USD 50 billion in the 1980s to close to USD 200 billion in the past 10 years [51].

Institutional investors will be disproportionately affected by climate change, given their much longer-term investment horizons. In addition to the climaterelated risks that affect financial stability, second-tier impacts from climate change (such as food security, social, and political unrest, and biodiversity loss) are likely to be nonlinear, characterized by tipping points, and material over the long term [48]. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) [52] put the value of global stock of manageable assets at risk from climate change till the end of the century at USD 4.2–43 trillion (in 2015 value terms).

Climate change qualifies as a systemic event. A systemic event is defined in economics by three essential elements: a shock, which can be a broad shock simultaneously affecting a wide range of institutions, or a limited shock followed by an important domino effect; contagion effects through a web of interrelations; and the endogenous nature of this shock, meaning that it is caused by cumulated disequilibria over time [53].

**83**

**Figure 3.**

*Relationship between climate and financial fragilities [53].*

*Climate Change, Credit Risk and Financial Stability DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93304*

around the provision of the ultimate liquidity [53].

monetary reform [53].

of default probabilities [54].

Three fundamental reasons at least can justify this transposition of the financial concept of systemic risk to climate change. First, climate change impacts are systemic in nature. They affect the whole planet, in most of its dimensions. They have the ability to profoundly change the earth system as we currently know it. The second is the radical uncertainty. Historical data provide no useful guidance to future climate events or/and outcomes. Finally, the notion of a climate systemic risk at world scale provides a powerful new rationale in the debate on international

Climate and financial fragilities reinforce each other. They are intertwined into positive feedback loops so that climate systemic risks also incur financial systemic risks. Financial fragility to external risks may increase climate fragility through negative externality effects. Conversely, climate fragility incurs new risks that may reinforce financial fragility, as **Figure 3** illustrates. The realization of a climate systemic risk translates into potential financial turmoil and this in turn can increase

Physical and transition risk drivers impact economic activities, which in turn impact the financial system. This impact can occur directly through, for example, lower corporate profitability or the devaluation of assets, or indirectly, through macro-financial changes [28]. Climate-related risks—in particular, transition risks—are actually closer to being in a state of uncertainty. Further uncertainty is created by the highly interconnected nature of the modern financial system. Interlinkages among financial institutions—both banks and nonbanks—can amplify both positive and negative shocks and significantly decrease the accuracy

Physical risks can cause economic costs and financial losses across different financial portfolios (e.g., loans, equities, and bonds) and also affect the expectation of future losses, which can threaten the solvency of households, businesses, and governments and therefore financial institutions [18]. The exposure of

financial institutions to physical risks can trigger contagion and asset devaluations propagating throughout the financial system [18]. Rapid and ambitious transition to low-carbon economy will lead to transition risks with large fractions of proven reserves of fossil fuel becoming stranded assets, with potentially systemic consequences for the financial system. Other fossil fuel-dependent sectors will probably be impacted indirectly as a consequence [55]. The size of the impact depends on the assumptions made about when and how the transition happens and which sectors it affects. The risk is that a sharp reassessment of climate change risks could

#### *Climate Change, Credit Risk and Financial Stability DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93304*

*Banking and Finance*

2.5–24.2 trillion of the value of global financial assets. For the transition risks, estimate by Mercure et al. [47] put the discounted global wealth losses from stranded

Physical impacts of climate change as well as the transition toward a resilient low-carbon economy pose significant challenges for macro-financial management, as they can damage the balance sheets of governments, households, firms, and financial institutions due to the adverse and possibly abrupt impacts on investment and economic growth, fiscal revenue and expenditure, debt sustainability, and the valuation of financial assets. In turn, macro-financial risks translate into weakened resilience to physical climate risks and constrained capacity for climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. Transition risks are particularly high for countries that generate a significant share of public revenue from carbon-intensive industries. Lower-income and conflict-affected oil and gas exporters (mostly in Africa and the Middle East) are more vulnerable and less able to manage a low-carbon transition. They have not yet converted hydrocarbon rents into other sources of export rev-

For banks, climate-related risk factors manifest as increasing credit, market, and operational risks [49]. Climate-related financial risks may weaken financial sector balance sheets and induce or amplify macro-financial risks, particularly in the case of shocks. Such shocks could stem from disasters or sudden changes in policy, technology, or consumer preferences. The resulting financial sector losses and volatility in financial and commodity markets can adversely impact funding, liquidity, and lending conditions and weaken financial sector balance sheets, giving rise to negative feedback loops with macro-fiscal implications. Emerging markets and developing economies may be particularly affected, given that their financial markets are less resilient to such shocks [48]. By destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability and liquidity, climate change is likely to increase the rate of default of corporate loans that could harm the stability of the banking system [19]. A recent survey by the Bank of England on the preparedness of UK banks for climate change found their planning horizons averaged 4 years, likely too short even

Climate change also has implications for insurance companies on both sides of the balance sheet: as investors and as underwriters. As institutional investors, insurance companies face largely similar transition and physical risks as other asset managers. They are disproportionally affected due to the long-term nature of their equity and infrastructure investments. As underwriters, pricing risks may arise from changing risk profiles to insured assets [48]. According to Lloyd's of London, damages from weather-related losses around the world have increased from an annual average of USD 50 billion in the 1980s to close to USD 200 billion in the past 10 years [51]. Institutional investors will be disproportionately affected by climate change, given their much longer-term investment horizons. In addition to the climaterelated risks that affect financial stability, second-tier impacts from climate change (such as food security, social, and political unrest, and biodiversity loss) are likely to be nonlinear, characterized by tipping points, and material over the long term [48]. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) [52] put the value of global stock of manageable assets at risk from climate change till the end of the century at USD

Climate change qualifies as a systemic event. A systemic event is defined in economics by three essential elements: a shock, which can be a broad shock simultaneously affecting a wide range of institutions, or a limited shock followed by an important domino effect; contagion effects through a web of interrelations; and the endogenous nature of this shock, meaning that it is caused by cumulated

fossil fuel assets may amount from USD 1–4 trillion.

enues needed to grow and diversify [48].

to account for likely physical and liability risks [50].

4.2–43 trillion (in 2015 value terms).

disequilibria over time [53].

**82**

Three fundamental reasons at least can justify this transposition of the financial concept of systemic risk to climate change. First, climate change impacts are systemic in nature. They affect the whole planet, in most of its dimensions. They have the ability to profoundly change the earth system as we currently know it. The second is the radical uncertainty. Historical data provide no useful guidance to future climate events or/and outcomes. Finally, the notion of a climate systemic risk at world scale provides a powerful new rationale in the debate on international monetary reform [53].

Climate and financial fragilities reinforce each other. They are intertwined into positive feedback loops so that climate systemic risks also incur financial systemic risks. Financial fragility to external risks may increase climate fragility through negative externality effects. Conversely, climate fragility incurs new risks that may reinforce financial fragility, as **Figure 3** illustrates. The realization of a climate systemic risk translates into potential financial turmoil and this in turn can increase around the provision of the ultimate liquidity [53].

Physical and transition risk drivers impact economic activities, which in turn impact the financial system. This impact can occur directly through, for example, lower corporate profitability or the devaluation of assets, or indirectly, through macro-financial changes [28]. Climate-related risks—in particular, transition risks—are actually closer to being in a state of uncertainty. Further uncertainty is created by the highly interconnected nature of the modern financial system. Interlinkages among financial institutions—both banks and nonbanks—can amplify both positive and negative shocks and significantly decrease the accuracy of default probabilities [54].

Physical risks can cause economic costs and financial losses across different financial portfolios (e.g., loans, equities, and bonds) and also affect the expectation of future losses, which can threaten the solvency of households, businesses, and governments and therefore financial institutions [18]. The exposure of financial institutions to physical risks can trigger contagion and asset devaluations propagating throughout the financial system [18]. Rapid and ambitious transition to low-carbon economy will lead to transition risks with large fractions of proven reserves of fossil fuel becoming stranded assets, with potentially systemic consequences for the financial system. Other fossil fuel-dependent sectors will probably be impacted indirectly as a consequence [55]. The size of the impact depends on the assumptions made about when and how the transition happens and which sectors it affects. The risk is that a sharp reassessment of climate change risks could

**Figure 3.** *Relationship between climate and financial fragilities [53].*

lead to a financial market reassessment, leading to a spiral of persistent tightening of financial conditions as losses ensue [18].

A wholesale reassessment of prospects, as climate-related risks are reevaluated, could destabilize markets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallization of losses, and lead to a persistent tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky moment—involving a rapid, system-wide (downward) repricing of carbon assets which would threaten financial stability [56].

The economic effects of bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability [57]. This calls for a collective prudential approach—monetary policies and banking regulations, which intend to act on eliminating possible future outcomes more than on internalizing externality, because of radical uncertainty [53].

#### **7. Climate-related risk management**

Risk management has increasingly become a well-established tool for climate change adaptation, given the significant uncertainty about future impacts and the inability to rely on historic data as a basis for current action [58, 59]. Risk management is part of a comprehensive suite of tools for climate change adaptation, with international and national standards being developed to assist governments, businesses, and communities [59].

ISO 14090:2019: Adaptation to climate change—Principles, requirements and guidelines specifies the principles, requirements, and guidelines for adaptation to climate change. These include the integration of adaptation within or across organizations, understanding impacts and uncertainties, and how these can be used to inform decisions. ISO 14091:2019 provides guidance for assessing the risks related to the potential impacts of climate change. It describes how to understand vulnerability and how to develop and implement a sound risk assessment in the context of climate change. It can be used for assessing both present and future climate change risks.

As part of their overall internal control framework, organizations should have an institution-wide risk management framework that extends across all business lines and internal units, including internal control functions [28]. The risk management framework should encompass financial and nonfinancial risks, on-balancesheet risks, and off-balance-sheet risks, including risks that the institution is currently exposed to and for risks that the institution may be exposed to going forward [28].

Eceiza et al. [43] enumerate five principles of climate-related risk management to include formulation of climate-related risk governance, to ensure the board focuses on the risks and for climate-risk management, and to cascade throughout the organization; tailor strategic plans and business models toward embedding climate-related risks in risk frameworks and capital allocation processes; inject climate-related risk considerations into all risk-management processes to align climate-related risk exposure with risk appetite; periodic scenario analysis and stress tests to assess the organization's resilience; and focus on enablers and build capacity, including technology, data, and talent to manage climate-related risks.

A strategic approach to managing the financial risks from climate change developed by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (Bank of England) entails governance, risk management, scenario analysis, and disclosure. A firm's board should understand and assess the financial risks from climate change that affect the firm and should be able to address and oversee these risks within the firm's overall business strategy and risk appetite. Firms are expected to employ their existing business strategy and risk

**85**

**8. Conclusion**

**Figure 4.**

are associated with uncertainty.

*Elements of climate-related risk management [60].*

*Climate Change, Credit Risk and Financial Stability DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93304*

management frameworks to address financial risks from climate change, in line with their board-approved risk appetite. Firms should identify, measure, monitor, manage, and report on their exposure to these risks to their stakeholders. Material exposures should be included in their Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) or Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA). Where appropriate, the PRA expects firms to consider a range of quantitative and qualitative tools and metrics to monitor their exposure to financial risks from climate change. Firms should provide evidence of how material risks will be mitigated and have credible plans or policies to manage these exposures. The management information should enable the board to discuss, challenge, and take decisions relating to the firm's management of the financial risks from climate change. Scenario analysis should also be used to explore the resilience and vulnerabilities of a firm's business model to a range of outcomes, based on different transition paths to a low-carbon economy, as well as a path where no transition occurs. Disclosures should be as insightful as possible, reflecting the firm's evolving under-

Similar good practices of governance and climate-related risk management recommended by the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (Banque de France) [61] include the following: integration of climate-related risks, including their implementation and monitoring, into the strategy of institutions; the internal organization of institutions, both in terms of the allocation of responsibility over all business lines, and in terms of the structuring of climate risk control, should align with the institutions' strategic orientations; full integration of the material risks induced by climate change into the risk appetite framework of the institution, and also mobilization of appropriate tools to allow for a thorough assessment of these risks; and disclosure of the institution's strategy and its risk management mechanisms with regard to climate change to ensure both a better

Climate change is rapidly proceeding, and climate-related risks are being exacerbated. While the mechanisms of physical climate change and the possible impacts are scientifically well understood, the specific estimates of these impacts

Climate change will affect all sectors of the economy, and it is relevant to investors and financial institutions, posing an unprecedented challenge to the governance of global socioeconomic and financial systems. Climate-related risks touch on the interests of a broad range of stakeholders across the private and public

understanding and a better integration of climate-related risks.

standing of the financial risks from climate change (**Figure 4**) [60].

#### *Climate Change, Credit Risk and Financial Stability DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93304*

*Banking and Finance*

financial stability [56].

because of radical uncertainty [53].

nesses, and communities [59].

change risks.

forward [28].

**7. Climate-related risk management**

of financial conditions as losses ensue [18].

lead to a financial market reassessment, leading to a spiral of persistent tightening

The economic effects of bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability [57]. This calls for a collective prudential approach—monetary policies and banking regulations, which intend to act on eliminating possible future outcomes more than on internalizing externality,

Risk management has increasingly become a well-established tool for climate change adaptation, given the significant uncertainty about future impacts and the inability to rely on historic data as a basis for current action [58, 59]. Risk management is part of a comprehensive suite of tools for climate change adaptation, with international and national standards being developed to assist governments, busi-

ISO 14090:2019: Adaptation to climate change—Principles, requirements and guidelines specifies the principles, requirements, and guidelines for adaptation to climate change. These include the integration of adaptation within or across organizations, understanding impacts and uncertainties, and how these can be used to inform decisions. ISO 14091:2019 provides guidance for assessing the risks related to the potential impacts of climate change. It describes how to understand vulnerability and how to develop and implement a sound risk assessment in the context of climate change. It can be used for assessing both present and future climate

As part of their overall internal control framework, organizations should have an institution-wide risk management framework that extends across all business lines and internal units, including internal control functions [28]. The risk management framework should encompass financial and nonfinancial risks, on-balancesheet risks, and off-balance-sheet risks, including risks that the institution is currently exposed to and for risks that the institution may be exposed to going

Eceiza et al. [43] enumerate five principles of climate-related risk management to include formulation of climate-related risk governance, to ensure the board focuses on the risks and for climate-risk management, and to cascade throughout the organization; tailor strategic plans and business models toward embedding climate-related risks in risk frameworks and capital allocation processes; inject climate-related risk considerations into all risk-management processes to align climate-related risk exposure with risk appetite; periodic scenario analysis and stress tests to assess the organization's resilience; and focus on enablers and build capacity, including tech-

A strategic approach to managing the financial risks from climate change developed by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (Bank of England) entails governance, risk management, scenario analysis, and disclosure. A firm's board should understand and assess the financial risks from climate change that affect the firm and should be able to address and oversee these risks within the firm's overall business strategy and risk appetite. Firms are expected to employ their existing business strategy and risk

nology, data, and talent to manage climate-related risks.

A wholesale reassessment of prospects, as climate-related risks are reevaluated, could destabilize markets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallization of losses, and lead to a persistent tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky moment—involving a rapid, system-wide (downward) repricing of carbon assets which would threaten

**84**

management frameworks to address financial risks from climate change, in line with their board-approved risk appetite. Firms should identify, measure, monitor, manage, and report on their exposure to these risks to their stakeholders. Material exposures should be included in their Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) or Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA). Where appropriate, the PRA expects firms to consider a range of quantitative and qualitative tools and metrics to monitor their exposure to financial risks from climate change. Firms should provide evidence of how material risks will be mitigated and have credible plans or policies to manage these exposures. The management information should enable the board to discuss, challenge, and take decisions relating to the firm's management of the financial risks from climate change. Scenario analysis should also be used to explore the resilience and vulnerabilities of a firm's business model to a range of outcomes, based on different transition paths to a low-carbon economy, as well as a path where no transition occurs. Disclosures should be as insightful as possible, reflecting the firm's evolving understanding of the financial risks from climate change (**Figure 4**) [60].

**Figure 4.** *Elements of climate-related risk management [60].*

Similar good practices of governance and climate-related risk management recommended by the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (Banque de France) [61] include the following: integration of climate-related risks, including their implementation and monitoring, into the strategy of institutions; the internal organization of institutions, both in terms of the allocation of responsibility over all business lines, and in terms of the structuring of climate risk control, should align with the institutions' strategic orientations; full integration of the material risks induced by climate change into the risk appetite framework of the institution, and also mobilization of appropriate tools to allow for a thorough assessment of these risks; and disclosure of the institution's strategy and its risk management mechanisms with regard to climate change to ensure both a better understanding and a better integration of climate-related risks.
