**3.1 Beirut a fragmented city in (re)construction**

Beirut, along with Belfast, Nicosia, Sarajevo, is one of the cities of the world that is most associated to the image of division. Fifteen years civil war (1975-1990) largely contributed to this image: division of the city along a demarcation line into two large communitarian hemispheres (Christian communities to the East, Muslim communities to the West), displacement of large numbers of people from all communities and emergence of a mosaic of fiefs controlled by different warring communitarian militias. In these years, the already existing fragmentation (Farah, 2011) reached unprecedented levels. Due to security reasons people's mobility fell sharply making the local neighbourhoods the everyday horizon of most of the population. The pre-war economy, focused on a large service sector in Beirut central areas and industrial activity in the suburbs, was completely destroyed. A new economy of services, largely financed by expatriates and war money, was developing in each militia territory. Pre-war socioeconomic socio-spatial differentiations took an even greater magnitude with special high-end developments booming in the "safer" peripheries of the agglomeration.

In the post-war era, the new central government put on the table an ambitious reconstruction strategy. The strategy aimed at one hand to "reconnect" and open up the territories of the war and, on the other, to turn Beirut into an important business platform of globalization in the Middle East. This strategy was not presented as a whole as one project and debated as such. It was rather a combination of different projects managed by

Bricolage planning is hence an actor-networks building and stabilizing operation. It relies on small direct operations, mainly urban development operations that could be more or less easily put together by mobilizing ad-hoc resources. At the same time it has long-term ambitions in dealing with an issue, a community or a territory. These ambitions are not necessarily clearly stated, and the way to reach them hardly obvious. This makes the analogy with the laboratory very interesting. The actors are there, but they may come and go in the network depending on projects' availability. It is from the accumulation of different experiences that a general scheme, a larger vision – a "theory" in the laboratory's world – could emerge and be defended as a strategic option guiding the actor-network activity. This is how different autonomous urban development initiatives could lead to an urban planning strategy, which in turn guides the orchestration of other urban development actions. As in a laboratory, it is communication that is at the core of the bricolage planning

In this study, we use some Beirut suburbs' municipal actor-networks as case studies for developing our 'bricolage' planning approach. We believe that in these suburbs municipal actor-networks have worked for the last twelve years as bricoleur, using their universe of tools to put together number of urban development initiatives, while some of them are moving now to become "engineers" in planning larger scale territories. We'll try to analyse how agencies of local actors, spaces and projects in fragmented cities emerge as actornetworks, how they experiment different actions and put together and coordinate different development initiatives, how capitalization of experiences may lead them to developing

**3. Beirut as a case study for analysing actor networks in urban planning** 

Beirut, along with Belfast, Nicosia, Sarajevo, is one of the cities of the world that is most associated to the image of division. Fifteen years civil war (1975-1990) largely contributed to this image: division of the city along a demarcation line into two large communitarian hemispheres (Christian communities to the East, Muslim communities to the West), displacement of large numbers of people from all communities and emergence of a mosaic of fiefs controlled by different warring communitarian militias. In these years, the already existing fragmentation (Farah, 2011) reached unprecedented levels. Due to security reasons people's mobility fell sharply making the local neighbourhoods the everyday horizon of most of the population. The pre-war economy, focused on a large service sector in Beirut central areas and industrial activity in the suburbs, was completely destroyed. A new economy of services, largely financed by expatriates and war money, was developing in each militia territory. Pre-war socioeconomic socio-spatial differentiations took an even greater magnitude with special high-end developments booming in the "safer" peripheries

In the post-war era, the new central government put on the table an ambitious reconstruction strategy. The strategy aimed at one hand to "reconnect" and open up the territories of the war and, on the other, to turn Beirut into an important business platform of globalization in the Middle East. This strategy was not presented as a whole as one project and debated as such. It was rather a combination of different projects managed by

actor-network's activity and stability.

larger urban planning strategies.

of the agglomeration.

**3.1 Beirut a fragmented city in (re)construction** 

governmental agencies directly depending of the prime minister: the Council for Development and Reconstruction. The strategy was based on road infrastructures to boost mobility and link the different war territories. It also decreed a number of large urban development projects in the suburbs and the city-centre in order to bring in a new dynamic of investment in the real-estate and service sector.

Even though the government could count on a centralized state structure, the backing of a large business community and the general enthusiasm for reconstruction, the majority of the large urban development fell behind the expectations of their promoters and mobility did not prove to be synonym of openness. Physical barriers that cut Beirut into different sectors in the war were progressively pulled out. Still mobility across the across demarcation lines between communities' territories was kept limited. The communitarian distribution of the population in the post-war era was similar to that of the war. Communitarian political parties or traditional leaders were still very influent in different zones of the city and continued to act on "their" zones of influence through a wide variety of affiliated NGOs offering services to the population – services that came to be more precious with the extensive economic neoliberal policies of the government.

As of the mid-nineties the reconstruction project was in a bottleneck. The peace in the Middle East did not come. The continuing external and even internal confrontation jeopardized the chances of Beirut to emerge as a central business platform for the region. Most developments faced the political resistance of the dominant communitarian parties and leaders in the regions where they were planned to be constructed.

The different communitarian political groups on the national level saw in the "return of the municipalities" a way to break out of this stalemate situation. Municipal elections were organized in 1998 after 35 years of break out. Municipalities were seen as a way to partially compensate the retreat of the central state from a lot of social issues that it had no longer the finances nor the needed structures to deal with.

#### **3.2 Municipal building in Beirut post-war suburbs: Sharing a similar history and facing the same challenges**

The agglomeration of Beirut is a large urban continuum covering 468 km2, stretching over 60 km along the Mediterranean coastline and reaching 25 km to the east (Faour et al., 2005). It includes around 121 municipalities. The area called the suburbs of Beirut comprises a number of municipalities in the peri-central areas of the agglomeration. This area is where fragmentation dynamics are the most developed. We can see near to each other, however in almost complete autarchy, informal settlements, high-end neighbourhoods, an airport, a large university campus, various large scale public buildings, a golf club, industrial zones, populous communitarian neighbourhoods, hotel resorts and large malls. It is somehow the perfect example of Dear's (2000) chessboard model of a fragmented city.

The localities of the suburbs share practically the same historical path. These suburbs are not the mere extension of the old city-centre of Beirut. They always had their own economical and political development that, though linked with the city-centre, was not dependent of it. Back in the early fifties of the last century, the suburbs were still made of dispersed middlesized to large localities organized by municipalities where the traditional family clans competed for the municipal council. Each village was separated from the other by large

Bricolage Planning: Understanding Planning in a Fragmented City 107

partisan structures, nature of the leadership at the head of the actor-network (party or clan affiliated), existence of dynamic entrepreneurial vs. traditional notabilarian leadership, diversity of the core actors in the actor-network, reach of the network horizontally (number of actors) and vertically (number of scales). Needless to say that these variables are not independent. Our analysis is based on a sample of three municipalities: Ghobeiri, Chiyah and Furn AlChebbak. These are three contiguous localities that share practically the same history but at the same time represent these three very different situations. Each case could further be considered an archetype representative of many similar situations in the suburbs

Ghobeiri is a locality with a population dominantly of one community (Shiite). It has large informal settlements covering half of the municipal perimeter, and a neighbourhood that was particularly affected by the war since it is locqted on the demarcation line. Two large communitarian parties (Hezbollah and Amal) are present in this locality and are very active through their own networks of NGOs. The municipal council is dominated by a communitarian party (Hezbollah). The municipal actor-network leadership has a very entrepreneurial and dynamic attitude with strong experience in social and associative sectors. Its core actors are all directly affiliated to the Hezbollah. Despite its lack of diversity the municipal actor-network, has a large number of members (mainly the NGOs of the party), has access to the national political sphere (again through the party) but also

Chiyah is a locality heavily affected by the war. It is cut in two by the war demarcation line with heavy damages in its physical structure. Still today two zones can be identified in its perimeter: an area with a population dominantly of the Christian communities to the east of the demarcation line and an area with a population dominantly of the Shiite community to the south and west of the demarcation line. Until 2005, the only major party structure active on the ground Amal in the neighbourhoods at the west of Chiyah. Registered voters are mainly from the Christian communities. The municipality is held by a family clans' coalition from the Christian communities. The municipal actor-network is characterized by a very entrepreneurial and ambitious leadership coming from the business world. It has a relatively diverse structure of core actors including family clans and a community parish. It has access to a large and diverse number of actors at the local level, but also at other scales, like the minister

of interior, the presidency of the Republic and a large part of the business community.

Furn AlChebbak is a locality with a population dominantly of the Christian communities. It was affected by the war, however, far less than in the two other localities. It even developed during the war with the resettlement of a large part of the commercial activity in the southeastern suburbs in its souk. The municipality is held by a family clans' coalition from the Christian communities. The leadership of the municipal actor-network could be described as traditional notabilarian, cautious and not keen to ambitious projects. Its core actors are notables from the family clans. In fact, the whole actor-network is restrained with only few

We will not present systematically the different cases. Instead we will use these cases to stress different aspects of the municipal governance, policies and actions in these localities that are directly relevant to our discussion of planning in a fragmented city and more

occasionally to development institutions at the international level.

actors mainly at the local level.

particularly, to bricolage planning.

of Beirut.

agricultural fields. This situation was heavily altered by the tremendous urbanization and industrialization of the sixties and seventies and later by the civil war. The urbanization transformed these areas into a dense urban continuum. The municipal limits are no more recognizable. The population also changed due to massive migration and immigration. The civil war further destroyed the old village centres, displaced populations, brought others and set demarcation lines between warring zones. In the aftermath of the war, the suburbs were a heavily fragmented area characterized by an important identity crisis.

On a political level these transformations also had common impacts on the different localities. The suburbs of Beirut have shown ancestral resistance to the extension of the central city on what they considered their territory and refused any kind of political integration to the city. However, the traditional family clans and the municipalities have been shunned aside by centralized communitarian parties and militias who took control of large areas in the suburbs of Beirut during the war and maintained this control politically after the war. On the other hand, immigration – brought by the continuous rural exodus and the displacement of populations during the war – posed another serious problem. The wide majority of the population in the suburbs did not vote in the locality where it was living but in the locality of origin where usually it kept strong social ties. There is hence a strong dissociation between the geography of vote and the geography of residency in these suburbs adding an important layer of complexity to the identity crisis of the localities.

A first challenge for these municipalities are facing in post-war Beirut is, on one hand, how to carve a place for the municipal affairs in the face of large metropolitan projects like the reconstruction strategy of the central government or the communitarian territorialisation of political and religious groups covering large areas in the agglomeration. Another challenge consisted in articulating different dynamics and projects in various neighbourhoods within a single overarching policy.

As of 1998 – date of the first municipal elections after the war, and first elections in 35 years – all the municipalities have proven to be an important actor in the production of urban spaces in the suburbs of Beirut. Despite their lack of means and the heavy control procedures imposed by the central authorities, the municipal actors have frequently succeeded in building large local networks that helped them bring in important resources to engage in substantial urban development activities. Faced with the urge to respond to pressing needs in equipment, infrastructures and services in large populated areas heavily damaged by the civil war, these networks have demonstrated genuine creativity in putting together audacious projects, sometimes in concordance with the central authorities and sometimes, as we will see, in clear defiance to it.

#### **3.3 Local divergences as explicative variables**

All municipalities of the suburbs of Beirut have engaged in a certain form of bricolage planning in rebuilding their municipal space. The degree to which they succeeded in doing so is depending on the specificities of each locality. These divergences may well provide some aspects of the "why" next to the "how" that ANT will allow to grasp.

These specificities are the following variables: homogeneity of the population of the locality vs. co-existence of groups with strong identities (community, ethnicity, class), physical state of the locality (in need of urgent and major interventions or not), presence of powerful

agricultural fields. This situation was heavily altered by the tremendous urbanization and industrialization of the sixties and seventies and later by the civil war. The urbanization transformed these areas into a dense urban continuum. The municipal limits are no more recognizable. The population also changed due to massive migration and immigration. The civil war further destroyed the old village centres, displaced populations, brought others and set demarcation lines between warring zones. In the aftermath of the war, the suburbs

On a political level these transformations also had common impacts on the different localities. The suburbs of Beirut have shown ancestral resistance to the extension of the central city on what they considered their territory and refused any kind of political integration to the city. However, the traditional family clans and the municipalities have been shunned aside by centralized communitarian parties and militias who took control of large areas in the suburbs of Beirut during the war and maintained this control politically after the war. On the other hand, immigration – brought by the continuous rural exodus and the displacement of populations during the war – posed another serious problem. The wide majority of the population in the suburbs did not vote in the locality where it was living but in the locality of origin where usually it kept strong social ties. There is hence a strong dissociation between the geography of vote and the geography of residency in these suburbs

A first challenge for these municipalities are facing in post-war Beirut is, on one hand, how to carve a place for the municipal affairs in the face of large metropolitan projects like the reconstruction strategy of the central government or the communitarian territorialisation of political and religious groups covering large areas in the agglomeration. Another challenge consisted in articulating different dynamics and projects in various neighbourhoods within

As of 1998 – date of the first municipal elections after the war, and first elections in 35 years – all the municipalities have proven to be an important actor in the production of urban spaces in the suburbs of Beirut. Despite their lack of means and the heavy control procedures imposed by the central authorities, the municipal actors have frequently succeeded in building large local networks that helped them bring in important resources to engage in substantial urban development activities. Faced with the urge to respond to pressing needs in equipment, infrastructures and services in large populated areas heavily damaged by the civil war, these networks have demonstrated genuine creativity in putting together audacious projects, sometimes in concordance with the central authorities and

All municipalities of the suburbs of Beirut have engaged in a certain form of bricolage planning in rebuilding their municipal space. The degree to which they succeeded in doing so is depending on the specificities of each locality. These divergences may well provide

These specificities are the following variables: homogeneity of the population of the locality vs. co-existence of groups with strong identities (community, ethnicity, class), physical state of the locality (in need of urgent and major interventions or not), presence of powerful

some aspects of the "why" next to the "how" that ANT will allow to grasp.

were a heavily fragmented area characterized by an important identity crisis.

adding an important layer of complexity to the identity crisis of the localities.

a single overarching policy.

sometimes, as we will see, in clear defiance to it.

**3.3 Local divergences as explicative variables** 

partisan structures, nature of the leadership at the head of the actor-network (party or clan affiliated), existence of dynamic entrepreneurial vs. traditional notabilarian leadership, diversity of the core actors in the actor-network, reach of the network horizontally (number of actors) and vertically (number of scales). Needless to say that these variables are not independent. Our analysis is based on a sample of three municipalities: Ghobeiri, Chiyah and Furn AlChebbak. These are three contiguous localities that share practically the same history but at the same time represent these three very different situations. Each case could further be considered an archetype representative of many similar situations in the suburbs of Beirut.

Ghobeiri is a locality with a population dominantly of one community (Shiite). It has large informal settlements covering half of the municipal perimeter, and a neighbourhood that was particularly affected by the war since it is locqted on the demarcation line. Two large communitarian parties (Hezbollah and Amal) are present in this locality and are very active through their own networks of NGOs. The municipal council is dominated by a communitarian party (Hezbollah). The municipal actor-network leadership has a very entrepreneurial and dynamic attitude with strong experience in social and associative sectors. Its core actors are all directly affiliated to the Hezbollah. Despite its lack of diversity the municipal actor-network, has a large number of members (mainly the NGOs of the party), has access to the national political sphere (again through the party) but also occasionally to development institutions at the international level.

Chiyah is a locality heavily affected by the war. It is cut in two by the war demarcation line with heavy damages in its physical structure. Still today two zones can be identified in its perimeter: an area with a population dominantly of the Christian communities to the east of the demarcation line and an area with a population dominantly of the Shiite community to the south and west of the demarcation line. Until 2005, the only major party structure active on the ground Amal in the neighbourhoods at the west of Chiyah. Registered voters are mainly from the Christian communities. The municipality is held by a family clans' coalition from the Christian communities. The municipal actor-network is characterized by a very entrepreneurial and ambitious leadership coming from the business world. It has a relatively diverse structure of core actors including family clans and a community parish. It has access to a large and diverse number of actors at the local level, but also at other scales, like the minister of interior, the presidency of the Republic and a large part of the business community.

Furn AlChebbak is a locality with a population dominantly of the Christian communities. It was affected by the war, however, far less than in the two other localities. It even developed during the war with the resettlement of a large part of the commercial activity in the southeastern suburbs in its souk. The municipality is held by a family clans' coalition from the Christian communities. The leadership of the municipal actor-network could be described as traditional notabilarian, cautious and not keen to ambitious projects. Its core actors are notables from the family clans. In fact, the whole actor-network is restrained with only few actors mainly at the local level.

We will not present systematically the different cases. Instead we will use these cases to stress different aspects of the municipal governance, policies and actions in these localities that are directly relevant to our discussion of planning in a fragmented city and more particularly, to bricolage planning.

Bricolage Planning: Understanding Planning in a Fragmented City 109

The construction of the locality's identity in Ghobeiri is at the extreme opposite of that of Chiyah. The history of the locality is that of the resistance. A resistance that goes beyond Hezbollah's fight against Israeli occupation, to be "that of the oppressed, against any occupation". This discourse allows to aggregate a large majority of the population of Ghobeiri while at the same time ridicules the claims of the family clans opposition that seem reactive and egocentric in front of such a national and noble cause. Two other aspects of Ghobeiri history are emphasized. On one hand, the "religious piety" of its population and the number of clerics and religious scholars born here, to emphasize a continuity with the conservatism and religiosity of the party. On the other hand, the picturesque village and green areas before the massive urbanization of the 60s and the "irresponsible urban

This last point, emphasizing a geographical reading of the historical identity of Ghobeiri, is linked to the central challenge for the municipal actor-network: the Elyssar project. Elyssar is a large urban development project in the suburbs of Beirut, one of the development projects of the metropolitan reconstruction strategy of the central government. It is put under the jurisdiction of a special public agency specially created for this purpose. The political stalemate on the national level in the late nineties gave a stop to the project but kept the project zone under the authority of Elyssar public agency. However, this zone includes very large areas of Ghobeiri, its main real-estates reserves and the seashore. It is also composed of large informal settlements. The municipal actor-network depicts this as in the continuity of "irresponsible policies" of the national authorities, especially since it leaves the informal settlements with no

In Furn AlChebbak, the locality's identity is constructed pretty much as that of Chiyah: family clans' history, a prominent place for the Maronite parish and a resuscitation of the old toponymies. Here too the toponymy is a way for local actors to reclaim the different neighbourhoods. However, the actor-network core actors have gone a step further than Chiyah's actor-network, by changing the name of the locality in order that the three large neighbourhoods that form Furn AlChebbak find their place in it. This would be anecdotic if it wasn't one of the first measures of this municipality. This is related to the fact that family clans are much linked to one or the other neighbourhoods. Those family clans, at the centre of the actor-network want to stress this linkage and to confirm symbolically the geography they're promoting. This "federalization" of the geography of the locality had then its rationale in the structure of the municipal actor-network and its governance. However, it had its impact on the way this actor-network will construct its urban planning agenda.

In fact, the new geographies promoted by the three actor-networks have a similar impact on urban planning. They aim to transform the municipal perimeter that lost all significance in the war into a territory. This situation is different from the first historical development of the municipalities in Lebanon at the turn of the twentieth century. Back then, the family clans were the only political actors in the localities and their claim on the municipal perimeter was unquestioned. The new municipal actor-networks in these suburbs faced a multitude of conflictual appropriations and actors contesting their representativeness. Negating the existing territorialisations and imposing a new top-down territorialisation is here much in the continuity of the normative physical planning that modernizing nation-states tried to impose on their national territory. This implicates a holistic vision of the territory and a

large systemic project to develop it.

policies" of the central authorities that destroyed this "haven of peace".

assistance and deprives the municipality from intervening in this strategic sector.
