**Table 3.**

*Variables description and summary statistics.*

#### *Corporate Social Responsibility*

For the percentage of women's presence on the board, we register an average of 23.7%. After the Copé-Zimmermann enacted law in 2011, this average has increased considerably compared to prior periods. Nevertheless, the female directors occupy rarely executive positions. The board average age is 58.57 years old. It is also a positive signal on the degree of expertise of the directors as most of them have been board members in the past or have a business experience. However, with such a


*Values between the parentheses presents the standard errors of the estimated coefficients.*

*\* p-value < 10%.*

*\*\*p-value < 5%. \*\*\*p-value < 1%.*

#### **Table 4.**

*The innovation effects on the CSR proxies.*

*CSR and Innovation: Two Sides of the Same Coin DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94344*

high average age, modern trends might not be appreciated. On one hand, this might reduce conflicts during the decision making process. On the other hand, it risks neglecting the youth population trends and views. Concerning the board independency, on average more than half of the boards' members are independent (53.8%), which reflect a great level of transparency. Besides, this help to open the companies view and have an outsider perception.

To reach the aim of this investigation, **Table 4** as well as **Figures 1**–**4** reflect the innovation effect on the CSR proxies.

**Figure 1** presents the innovation effect on the global ESG score. According to its result, we underline the generally positive impact of innovation on the CSR scores, which is consistent with **Table 4** coefficient (significant at the 10% level). Indeed, this graph can be divided into three main parts based on the innovation intensity

**Figure 1.** *Innovation effect on the ESG scores.*

**Figure 2.** *Innovation effect on the Environmental scores.*

**Figure 3.** *Innovation effect on the Social scores.*

**Figure 4.** *Innovation effect on the Governance scores.*

(when Ln \_PA + 1 less than 4; between 4 and 5, and higher than 5). In the first part, an increase in corporate innovation enhances CSR slightly. Firms belonging to the first category of innovation intensity tend to consider ESG matters while innovating. The second part reflects a negative association between CSR and innovation. Companies in the second category are inventing without focusing on the ESG issues quite the contrary their innovation might reduce their ESG scores. In other words, those companies are not applying CSR strategically. They only focus on CSR matters if it grants financial benefits. Finally, the last category is where innovation can boost ESG scores. At this level of innovation, we found a remarkable positive effect of the corporate innovativeness on CSR. The most innovative companies are those that apply CSR strategically. They put CSR in the core of their innovation process. We might assume their adoption of open innovation, which allow companies to

#### *CSR and Innovation: Two Sides of the Same Coin DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94344*

share knowledge and better understand stakeholders, consequently improves ESG scores. The positive effect of this third category is confirmed not only for the ESG global score but also its components. Nevertheless, it is not the case of the two first categories. While **Figure 3** supports the linear shape between social engagement and innovation, **Figures 2** and **4** show similar curves' shapes with different flattening level. Innovation is always socially beneficial.

Concerning the controls' linear effect on the CSR scores, we should drive attention to the positive influence of the board diversity and boar size in enhancing the CSR engagement. Moreover, the ESG remuneration fosters the ESG scores. Its effect is more pronounced in the governance score. Besides, we find a non-significant influence of the board duality and the financial variables. Furthermore, foreign ownership only increases social commitment. The family ownership decreases it while enhancing the governance scores. Finally, we point out the state and institutional ownership effect on boosting environmental engagement.
