Mexico Early Waring System

**75**

**Chapter 5**

**Abstract**

of Mexico is put forward.

**1. Introduction**

mention a few.

to react to warnings" [20, 21].

The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico

This paper reviews the risk of tsunamis in Mexico. It is highlighted that the Pacific coast of the country forms part of the so called "Ring of fire." Overall, the risk of tsunami that has the potentiality to affect communities along the Pacific coast is twofold: (a) local tsunami; that is, those triggered by earthquakes originating from the "Cocos," "Rivera," and the "North American" plates (high risk) and (b) the remote tsunamis, those generated elsewhere (e.g., Alaska, Japan, Chile) (low risk). Further, a preliminary model for "tsunami early warning" system for the case

A *tsunami* has been defined as "a series of travelling waves of extremely long length and period, usually generated by disturbances associated with earthquake occurring below or near the ocean floor… Volcanic eruptions, submarine landslides, and coastal rock falls can also generate tsunamis, as can a large meteorite impacting the ocean" [1]. Also, tsunamis may be regarded as low frequency events but with high impacts in terms of human/infrastructure/economic losses. Their power of destruction has been more than evident in recent years [2–11]. It is believed that from the time period between 1998 and 2017, the losses inflicted by tsunami disasters were a total of US\$280 billion and 251,770 causalities, in damages [7]. Moreover, the authors argue that the impact from this period has been 100 times

Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, there has been a large amount

Recent tsunamis have highlighted the need for an effective early warning system. An early warning is defined as "the provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response" [20]. Moreover, the United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) argues that an "effective early warning system" should include the following four key elements: "the knowledge of risks," "the technical monitoring and warning service," "dissemination & communication of meaningful warnings to those at risk," and "the public awareness and preparedness

of literature published on several topics associated with tsunami science. For example, research has been conducted on the physics of tsunami waves [12], tsunami's impact and characteristics [1–3, 11, 13], tsunami early warning systems [14, 15], tsunami risk assessment [8, 10, 11, 16], geology's perspective [17–19], to

*Jaime Santos-Reyes and Tatiana Gouzeva*

**Keywords:** tsunami, earthquake, Mexico, tsunami early warning

higher than during the time period 1978–1997.

### **Chapter 5** The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico

*Jaime Santos-Reyes and Tatiana Gouzeva*

#### **Abstract**

This paper reviews the risk of tsunamis in Mexico. It is highlighted that the Pacific coast of the country forms part of the so called "Ring of fire." Overall, the risk of tsunami that has the potentiality to affect communities along the Pacific coast is twofold: (a) local tsunami; that is, those triggered by earthquakes originating from the "Cocos," "Rivera," and the "North American" plates (high risk) and (b) the remote tsunamis, those generated elsewhere (e.g., Alaska, Japan, Chile) (low risk). Further, a preliminary model for "tsunami early warning" system for the case of Mexico is put forward. Cancelled

**Keywords:** tsunami, earthquake, Mexico, tsunami early warning

#### **1. Introduction**

A *tsunami* has been defined as "a series of travelling waves of extremely long length and period, usually generated by disturbances associated with earthquake occurring below or near the ocean floor… Volcanic eruptions, submarine landslides, and coastal rock falls can also generate tsunamis, as can a large meteorite impacting the ocean" [1]. Also, tsunamis may be regarded as low frequency events but with high impacts in terms of human/infrastructure/economic losses. Their power of destruction has been more than evident in recent years [2–11]. It is believed that from the time period between 1998 and 2017, the losses inflicted by tsunami disasters were a total of US\$280 billion and 251,770 causalities, in damages [7]. Moreover, the authors argue that the impact from this period has been 100 times higher than during the time period 1978–1997.

Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, there has been a large amount of literature published on several topics associated with tsunami science. For example, research has been conducted on the physics of tsunami waves [12], tsunami's impact and characteristics [1–3, 11, 13], tsunami early warning systems [14, 15], tsunami risk assessment [8, 10, 11, 16], geology's perspective [17–19], to mention a few.

Recent tsunamis have highlighted the need for an effective early warning system. An early warning is defined as "the provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response" [20]. Moreover, the United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) argues that an "effective early warning system" should include the following four key elements: "the knowledge of risks," "the technical monitoring and warning service," "dissemination & communication of meaningful warnings to those at risk," and "the public awareness and preparedness to react to warnings" [20, 21]. Cancelled

The objective of the paper is to highlight the tsunami risk in Mexico. The data showed in the paper are based on previous studies on tsunamis in the country [15, 22]. Further, a preliminary "tsunami early warning" system which aims at integrating, for example, the four key elements proposed by the UNISDR [20] for the case of Mexico is presented.

#### **2. The risk of tsunamis in Mexico**

The "Pacific ring of fire" belt covers a vast area of highly active tectonic plate boundaries where most of the earthquakes originate and active volcanoes (**Figure 1**). It is believed that three quarters of all the volcanoes in the world are in the ring [23]. Cancelled

Moreover, the Ring of fire runs through several countries, such as Canada, USA, Russia, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, and Mexico.

Regarding the tsunami risk in Mexico, studies based on tsunami historical data showed that there are two zones of tsunami threat: local (i.e., generation of tsunamis) and remote (i.e., arrival of tsunamis) (**Figure 2**) [15, 22]. The authors defined these two zones by considering the nature of the faulting and tectonic plate interaction. In the subsequent subsection, each of these will be addressed.

#### **2.1 Local tsunami risk**

According to [15, 22] at the west of the "Rivera plate" and along the "Middle America trench," the "Cocos plate" subduction beneath the "North American plate" at rates of 2.5–7.7 cm/year (**Figure 2**). Given the fact, that large earthquakes occur in this region; therefore, the zone has been regarded as a generator of tsunamis (**Table 1** and **Figure 3**).

According to the historical data, the generated tsunamis that produced the highest wave heights were those that occurred in 1925 (7–11 m), 1932 (9–10 m), 1995 (2.9–5.10 m), and 1985 (1–3 m). For example, the 1985 earthquake of 8.1 Ms of

**77**

*The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico*

**Figure 2.**

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91364*

*Mexico's local and remote tsunami threat [15, 22].*

**Year Region Magnitude Tsunami (places hit, Mexico) Max. height waves (m)**

Pochutla

San Pedrito

Ixtapa Zihuatanejo Playa Azul Acapulco Manzanillo

Zihuatanejo

4.0 4.0

2.0 3.0

2.5 3.0 2.5 1.1 1.0

1.2 2.5

1732 Guerrero — Acapulco 4.0 1754 Guerrero — Acapulco 5.0 1787 Guerrero >8.0 Acapulco 3–8

 Guerrero 7.6 Acapulco 4.0 B. C. — Río Colorado 3.0 Guerrero 7.6 Acapulco 2.0 Guerrero 7.0 Zihuatanejo 7.0–11.0

1932 Jalisco 7.8 Manzanillo 1.0 1932 Jalisco 6.9 Cuyutlán 9.0–10.0 1948 Nayarit 6.9 Islas Marias 2.0–5.0 1957 Guerrero 7.8 Acapulco 2.6 1973 Colima 7.6 Manzanillo 1.1 1978 Oaxaca 7.6 Puerto Escondido 1.5 1979 Guerrero Acapulco 1.3

1787 Oaxaca — Juquila

1932 Jalisco 8.2 Manzanillo

1985 Michoacán 8.1 Lázaro Cardenas

1985 Michoacan 7.8 Acapulco

**Figure 1.** *The "Ring of fire" [23].*

#### **Figure 2.**

*Tsunami - Damage Assessment and Medical Triage*

**2. The risk of tsunamis in Mexico**

is presented.

the ring [23].

**2.1 Local tsunami risk**

(**Table 1** and **Figure 3**).

Mexico.

The objective of the paper is to highlight the tsunami risk in Mexico. The data showed in the paper are based on previous studies on tsunamis in the country [15, 22]. Further, a preliminary "tsunami early warning" system which aims at integrating, for example, the four key elements proposed by the UNISDR [20] for the case of Mexico

The "Pacific ring of fire" belt covers a vast area of highly active tectonic plate boundaries where most of the earthquakes originate and active volcanoes (**Figure 1**). It is believed that three quarters of all the volcanoes in the world are in

Moreover, the Ring of fire runs through several countries, such as Canada, USA, Russia, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, and

Regarding the tsunami risk in Mexico, studies based on tsunami historical data showed that there are two zones of tsunami threat: local (i.e., generation of tsunamis) and remote (i.e., arrival of tsunamis) (**Figure 2**) [15, 22]. The authors defined these two zones by considering the nature of the faulting and tectonic plate interac-

According to [15, 22] at the west of the "Rivera plate" and along the "Middle America trench," the "Cocos plate" subduction beneath the "North American plate" at rates of 2.5–7.7 cm/year (**Figure 2**). Given the fact, that large earthquakes occur in this region; therefore, the zone has been regarded as a generator of tsunamis

According to the historical data, the generated tsunamis that produced the highest wave heights were those that occurred in 1925 (7–11 m), 1932 (9–10 m), 1995 (2.9–5.10 m), and 1985 (1–3 m). For example, the 1985 earthquake of 8.1 Ms of

tion. In the subsequent subsection, each of these will be addressed.

**76**

**Figure 1.**

*The "Ring of fire" [23].*

*Mexico's local and remote tsunami threat [15, 22].*



#### **Table 1.**

*Local tsunamis-only those with height >1.0 m is shown [22].*

**Figure 3.** *Local tsunamis in the pacific coast of Mexico [24].*

magnitude generated a tsunami that affected several communities in this zone. It is believed that a key infrastructure port was affected with waves of 2.5 m and flooded the area about 500 m inland [15]. Also, several tourist resorts were affected by the tsunami; for example, waves for up to 2.5 m high were observed in Playa de Azul [15].

Interestingly, a day after the main earthquake, a 7.5 Ms aftershock hit the zone; it is thought the generated tsunami affected a local fishing community with waves ranging from 2 to 3 m high [15].

#### **2.2 Remote tsunami risk**

It is believed that on the Northwest of the "Rivera plate" (**Figure 2**), along the Gulf of California where the Pacific Plate slides north with respect to the North American plate, generation of tsunamis in this zone is unlikely [15, 22]. This is consistent with historical data (**Table 2**); it can be seen that data on "small" and "moderate" tsunamis generated by remote sources; for example, the two most recent 2010 Chile and the 2011 tsunamis (**Figure 4**) were the maximum wave heights registered were <1.0 m. Cancelled

**79**

**Table 2.**

*in 2018.*

However, it is worth mentioning that the historical data showed that there were two tsunamis that registered the height of waves up to 2.4 and 2.5 m; that is, those

2018 Indonesia 7.5 — —

tsunami

*Remote tsunamis-historical data taken from [22] with the exception of the last two tsunamis that occurred* 

generated in Chile (1960) and Alaska (1964), respectively (**Table 2**).

*The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91364*

**Date Region Magnitude Tsunami (places hit,** 

1957 Aleutian Islands 8.3 Ensenada, B.C. 1.0

1960 Peru 6.8 Acapulco 0.10

1952 Kamchatka, USSR 8.3 La Paz, BCS

1960 Chile 8.5 Ensenada, B.C.

1963 Kuril, Islands, USSR 8.1 Acapulco

1964 Alaska 8.4 Ensenada, B.C.

1968 Japan 8.0 Ensenada, B.C.

1975 Hawaii 7.2 Ensenada, B.C.

1976 Kermadec Islands 7.3 San Lucas, B.C.S.

2004 Indonesia 9.0 Manzanillo

2010 Chile 8.8-9.0 Manzanillo

2011 Japan 9.0 Ensenada, B.C.

2018 Indonesia AK Vulcano

1995 Chile 7.8 Cabo San Lucas <1.0

**Mexico)**

Salina Cruz

La Paz, B.C.S. Mazatlán Acapulco Salina Cruz

Salina Cruz Mazatlan La Paz, B.C.S.

Manzanillo Acapulco Salina Cruz

Manzanillo Acapulco

Manzanillo Puerto Vallarta Acapulco

Puerto Vallarta Manzanillo Acapulco

Lazaro Cardenas Zihuatanejo

Cabo San Lucas Acapulco

Huatulco Puerto Angel Acapulco

— —

**Max. height waves (m)**

> 0.5 1.2

2.5 1.5 1.1 1.9 1.6

<1.0

2.4 1.2 1.1 0.8

<1.0

<1.0

<1.0

1.22 0.24 0.60

0.32 0.36 0.62

0.70 0.70 0.29 0.72


#### *The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91364*

*Tsunami - Damage Assessment and Medical Triage*

*Local tsunamis-only those with height >1.0 m is shown [22].*

1995 Colima 8.1 Boca de Iguanas

magnitude generated a tsunami that affected several communities in this zone. It is believed that a key infrastructure port was affected with waves of 2.5 m and flooded the area about 500 m inland [15]. Also, several tourist resorts were affected by the tsunami; for example, waves for up to 2.5 m high were observed in Playa de Azul [15]. Interestingly, a day after the main earthquake, a 7.5 Ms aftershock hit the zone; it is thought the generated tsunami affected a local fishing community with waves

**Year Region Magnitude Tsunami (places hit, Mexico) Max. height waves (m)**

2003 Colima 7.8 Manzanillo 1.22 2017 Chiapas 8.1 Salina Cruz 1.10

Barra de Navidad San Mateo Melaque Cuastecomate El Tecuán Punta Careyes Chamela Pérula Punta Chalacatepec 5.10 5.10 4.90 4.50 4.40 3.80 3.50 3.20 3.40 2.90

It is believed that on the Northwest of the "Rivera plate" (**Figure 2**), along the Gulf of California where the Pacific Plate slides north with respect to the North American plate, generation of tsunamis in this zone is unlikely [15, 22]. This is consistent with historical data (**Table 2**); it can be seen that data on "small" and "moderate" tsunamis generated by remote sources; for example, the two most recent 2010 Chile and the 2011 tsunamis (**Figure 4**) were the maximum wave

**78**

**Figure 3.**

**Table 1.**

ranging from 2 to 3 m high [15].

*Local tsunamis in the pacific coast of Mexico [24].*

heights registered were <1.0 m.

**2.2 Remote tsunami risk**

However, it is worth mentioning that the historical data showed that there were two tsunamis that registered the height of waves up to 2.4 and 2.5 m; that is, those generated in Chile (1960) and Alaska (1964), respectively (**Table 2**).

**Figure 4.** *The 2010 Chile tsunami (left) and the 2011 tsunami in Japan (right) [25].*

#### **3. A Mexican tsunami early warning system**

The previous section and the most recent tsunami events [2–4] have highlighted the need for an effective tsunami early warning system (TEWS). A system should include "tsunami early warning coordination centres (TEWCC)" covering the whole of the Pacific coast of Mexico. Moreover, the system should also include earthquake early warning (EEW) systems. Furthermore, these systems should be explicitly "people-centered" [21, 26]. However, only those aspects associated with the features of a TEWS will be discussed in some detail. The proposed model is based on previous research on issues related to safety and disaster management systems [27–29].

**Figure 5** shows what is called a "structural organization" of the model, which comprises essentially a set of five highly interrelated subsystems (systems 1–5).

In the context of this case study, the overall function of systems 2–5 (MTEW-SMU) is to establish the key tsunami safety policies aiming at maintaining tsunami risk within an acceptable range; this implies allocating the necessary resources, for example, to build response capabilities at national and community levels. System 1, on the other hand, embraces the TNZO (Tsunami Northern Zone Operations) and TSZO (Tsunami Southern Zone Operations) with their associated management units (TNZ-SMU and TSZ-SMU). These two operations of system 1 were considered given the fact that the risk of tsunamis comes from local and remote tsunami sources as mentioned in Section 2. See Section 2.

It is important to highlight that one of the key functions within the MTEW-SMU is that related to system 2, which is associated with what it is called here MTEW-CC (Mexican Tsunami Early Warning Coordination Centre); its key function is the monitoring of the TSZ-CC (Tsunami Southern Zone-Coordination Centre) and TNZ-CC (Tsunami Northern Zone Coordination Centre), as shown in **Figure 5**. The process of the flow of key information and decision making is described in **Table 3**. Cancelled

Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the need for a tsunami warning system (TWS) was more than evident; however, it may be argued that the existing TWS may be deficient in dealing with the mitigation of impacts of such events; moreover, there are still regions worldwide without such systems (**Table 4**).

Recent tsunami disasters have highlighted some of these deficiencies; for example, in the case of the 2010 tsunami in Chile, the entity in charge of issuing a tsunami warning failed to do so [24] (see "action point" "2"and "7" in **Figure 5**

**81**

**Figure 5.**

"2" and "2A"

"3" and "4"

*and action points.*

**"Action-points" (Figure 2)**

**Description**

Tsunami Warning Centre) [30].

system 3, as shown in **Figure 5**.

*A Mexican tsunami early warning system (MTEWS). Source: Tables 3 and 4 present details of the acronyms* 

"1" Data on key variables monitored by the TNZ-CC (pressure sensors, tide gauges, etc.)

warning to the TSZ-CC, even if the risk is low (Section 2)

"4A" It communicates the measures taken to the response of the tsunami to the MTEW-CC,

evacuate the vulnerable communities within TNZO.

It should also be mentioned that this information is provided by the PTWC (Pacific

"Actions points" "3" and "4" plan and devise measures to respond to the tsunami warning, for example, design of risk maps, plans to conduct drills, plans to warn and

Action point "3" also issues the tsunami warning to MTEW-SMU, that is, to system 3.

where it may devise further actions given its synergistic view of the total system through

In "2," the tsunami risk is assessed, if key variable not within the acceptable criteria (e.g., a tsunami), then it issues the warning of a tsunami to "2A," which in turn issues the

*The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91364*

*Tsunami - Damage Assessment and Medical Triage*

**3. A Mexican tsunami early warning system**

*The 2010 Chile tsunami (left) and the 2011 tsunami in Japan (right) [25].*

sources as mentioned in Section 2. See Section 2.

The previous section and the most recent tsunami events [2–4] have highlighted the need for an effective tsunami early warning system (TEWS). A system should include "tsunami early warning coordination centres (TEWCC)" covering the whole of the Pacific coast of Mexico. Moreover, the system should also include earthquake early warning (EEW) systems. Furthermore, these systems should be explicitly "people-centered" [21, 26]. However, only those aspects associated with the features of a TEWS will be discussed in some detail. The proposed model is based on previous research on issues related to safety and disaster management

**Figure 5** shows what is called a "structural organization" of the model, which comprises essentially a set of five highly interrelated subsystems (systems 1–5). In the context of this case study, the overall function of systems 2–5 (MTEW-SMU) is to establish the key tsunami safety policies aiming at maintaining tsunami risk within an acceptable range; this implies allocating the necessary resources, for example, to build response capabilities at national and community levels. System 1, on the other hand, embraces the TNZO (Tsunami Northern Zone Operations) and TSZO (Tsunami Southern Zone Operations) with their associated management units (TNZ-SMU and TSZ-SMU). These two operations of system 1 were considered given the fact that the risk of tsunamis comes from local and remote tsunami

It is important to highlight that one of the key functions within the MTEW-SMU is that related to system 2, which is associated with what it is called here MTEW-CC (Mexican Tsunami Early Warning Coordination Centre); its key function is the monitoring of the TSZ-CC (Tsunami Southern Zone-Coordination Centre) and TNZ-CC (Tsunami Northern Zone Coordination Centre), as shown in **Figure 5**. The process of the flow of key information and decision making is described in

Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the need for a tsunami warning system (TWS) was more than evident; however, it may be argued that the existing TWS may be deficient in dealing with the mitigation of impacts of such events; moreover, there are still regions worldwide without such systems (**Table 4**). Recent tsunami disasters have highlighted some of these deficiencies; for example, in the case of the 2010 tsunami in Chile, the entity in charge of issuing a tsunami warning failed to do so [24] (see "action point" "2"and "7" in **Figure 5**

**80**

**Table 3**.

systems [27–29].

**Figure 4.**

#### **Figure 5.**

*A Mexican tsunami early warning system (MTEWS). Source: Tables 3 and 4 present details of the acronyms and action points.*



#### **Table 3.**

*Description of the key actions points of the model in* **Figure 3***.*


#### **Table 4.**

*Examples of the key players who/what perform some of the functions of the systems of the model.*

and **Table 3**). The failure to perform this action contributed to fatalities in the coastal communities. More recently, the 28 September Sulawesi tsunami and the 24 December Anak Krakatau (AK) volcano tsunami, both in Indonesia, illustrate deficiencies in TWS too. In the former case, the tsunami warning was issued but the warning was lifted over 30 minutes [4]. However, the city of Palu, located in a narrow bay, was hit hard with waves reaching 6 m of height; why were not they Cancelled

**83**

*The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91364*

should be "people-centered" [21, 26].

**4. Conclusions**

**Acknowledgements**

SIP-IPN-20201790.

**Conflict of interest**

warned? The head of the BMKG (Indonesia Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics) argued that "we have no observation data at Palu…," "If we had a tide gauge or proper data in Palu, of course it would have been better" [4]. The tsunami (and earthquake) killed over 2000 people [2]. Finally, regarding the AK volcano tsunami, it is thought that there was not a tsunami warning system for the

It may be argued that a TWS should not be only concerned with the technical aspects (e.g., tidal gauge, network of buoys, etc.), but also the organizational and human components. In other words, there is a need for an effective tsunami early warning system that is able to consider all these components in a coherent manner, such as the system being proposed in here and elsewhere. Moreover, these systems

This paper has presented the risk of tsunamis in Mexico. The approach has been a review of existing literature on historical data of tsunami occurrence in Mexico. The literature survey showed that the tsunami threat comes from local and remote zones. Overall, the review showed that the highest tsunami risk comes from tsunamis induced by earthquakes occurring in the Southern zone of the country (i.e., local zone). The paper has also put forward a preliminary model of a TEWS (Tsunami Early Warning System) for the case of Mexico. However, it needs further research to design the whole networks of the flows of information not only for the

case of tsunamis, but also for the case of earthquake early warning system.

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

This research was supported by the following grants: CONACYT-No:248219;

case of volcano-induced tsunamis, the tsunami killed 437 people [3].

#### *The Risk of Tsunamis in Mexico DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91364*

warned? The head of the BMKG (Indonesia Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics) argued that "we have no observation data at Palu…," "If we had a tide gauge or proper data in Palu, of course it would have been better" [4]. The tsunami (and earthquake) killed over 2000 people [2]. Finally, regarding the AK volcano tsunami, it is thought that there was not a tsunami warning system for the case of volcano-induced tsunamis, the tsunami killed 437 people [3].

It may be argued that a TWS should not be only concerned with the technical aspects (e.g., tidal gauge, network of buoys, etc.), but also the organizational and human components. In other words, there is a need for an effective tsunami early warning system that is able to consider all these components in a coherent manner, such as the system being proposed in here and elsewhere. Moreover, these systems should be "people-centered" [21, 26]. Cancelled

#### **4. Conclusions**

*Tsunami - Damage Assessment and Medical Triage*

**Description**

points "8" and "7A."

action pint "2A."

**"Action-points" (Figure 2)**

"7" and "7A"

"8" and "9"

**Table 3.**

**82**

**Table 4.**

and **Table 3**). The failure to perform this action contributed to fatalities in the coastal communities. More recently, the 28 September Sulawesi tsunami and the 24 December Anak Krakatau (AK) volcano tsunami, both in Indonesia, illustrate deficiencies in TWS too. In the former case, the tsunami warning was issued but the warning was lifted over 30 minutes [4]. However, the city of Palu, located in a narrow bay, was hit hard with waves reaching 6 m of height; why were not they

*Examples of the key players who/what perform some of the functions of the systems of the model.*

**System Acronym Example-SMU Example-operations**

"5" It issues the tsunami warning to the affected communities within this zone (e.g., B.C,

of the tsunami risk, for example, evacuation to safe areas, etc. "6" In contrast with the case of action point "1," the monitoring system in place should

large earthquake could trigger a local tsunami (Section 2.1).

"9A" As with the case of "4A," it communicates the measures taken to the response of the

of the total system through system 3, as shown in **Figure 5**. "10" Similarly, as in "5," it issues the tsunami warning to the affected communities within

affected people to safe areas if necessary.

B.C.S., Sinaloa, Manzanillo, etc.). It implements all the measures to mitigate the impact

assess all the data being received from the key variables in real time, given the fact that a

Data analysis, if the risk of a tsunami is being detected, then it issues the warning action

By receiving the information, action point "7A" communicates it to "TNZ-CC" through

It is here where the planning of effective actions or measures aiming at mitigating the impact of the tsunami within the TSZO; for example, educating communities on what actions to take in case of a tsunami, design of risk maps, plans for drillings, etc. Action point "8" also issues the tsunami warning to MTEW-SMU, that is, to system 3.

tsunami to the MTEW-CC, where it may devise further actions given its synergistic view

this zone (e.g. Acapulco, Oaxaca, Manzanillo, Zihuatanejo, etc.). Most importantly, it implements all the necessary measures to mitigate the impact of the tsunami, for example, evacuation to safe areas, etc. Moreover, it also implements plans to relocate the

> Head of the Mexican Navy, Civil protection personnel, etc.

Control centers Control centers

Control centers Control centers Control centers

Local infrastructure (gauges, pressure sensors, etc.) Local communities in

Local infrastructure (gauges, pressure sensors, etc.) Local communities in

the zone

the zone

Systems 2–5 MTEW-SMU ("Mexican Tsunami Early Warning-SMU")

*Description of the key actions points of the model in* **Figure 3***.*

System 1 TNZ-SMU ("Tsunami Northern Zone- SMU")

Operations")

TSZO

Coordination Centre)

Coordination Centre)

System 1 TSZ-SMU ("Tsunami Southern Zone-SMU")

MTEW-CC ("Mexican Tsunami Early Warning Coordination Centre")

TNZO ("Tsunami Northern Zone

TNZ-CC ("Tsunami Northern Zone-

("Tsunami Southern Zone Operations") TNZ-CC ("tsunami Southern Zone-

This paper has presented the risk of tsunamis in Mexico. The approach has been a review of existing literature on historical data of tsunami occurrence in Mexico. The literature survey showed that the tsunami threat comes from local and remote zones. Overall, the review showed that the highest tsunami risk comes from tsunamis induced by earthquakes occurring in the Southern zone of the country (i.e., local zone). The paper has also put forward a preliminary model of a TEWS (Tsunami Early Warning System) for the case of Mexico. However, it needs further research to design the whole networks of the flows of information not only for the case of tsunamis, but also for the case of earthquake early warning system.

#### **Acknowledgements**

This research was supported by the following grants: CONACYT-No:248219; SIP-IPN-20201790.

#### **Conflict of interest**

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
