**5.5 Integration of UAV into national airspace**

Though UAVs are employed in segregated areas at present, there is a consensus view within the aerospace industry that the time is ripe when both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles will share the common airspace. Thus, the process of integrating the manned aircraft and UAV in the national airspace has to be accepted and regulated. This needs to regulate the operation of UAV on the one hand, and at the same time, the UAVs themselves have to be certified to be airworthy by regulatory organizations. Further, regulatory activities of air traffic management for integrating UAV in non-segregated airspace operations have to be considered:

	- Emergency recovery capability
	- Communication link and link loss criticality
	- Level of autonomy
	- Human-machine interface (UAV pilot is deprived of the physical senses and feeling of flying as in manned aircraft pilots)

**15**

*Military Aviation Principles*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.87087*

Vstall in the event of loss of control.

**5.7 Emergency recovery system**

consequences of inadvertent operation are acceptable.

**6.2 Airworthiness and flight safety in military aviation**

**6. Airworthiness and flight safety**

**6.1 Airworthiness**

a.Design for low collateral damage—by designing with high precession and accuracy in striking the target using high-accuracy sensor and doing proper mission planning to hit the target and not the structure/people around (third party).

b.Approach for damage prevention—the damage is proportional to the kinetic energy (KE) during the impact. The KE depends on the mass and velocity at the time of impact. The Vimpact will be based on the cause of the failure, namely, engine or control failure. The general rule is to assume Vimpact = 1.3 times the Vstall for the case of unpremeditated descent or engine failure and Vimpact = 1.4

c.Design safety consideration—the basic safety criterion should be that catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable and, for all other failure conditions, the probability of occurrence of the event should be inversely proportional to the damage potential of the failure. From airworthiness point of view, the risk to third parties on the ground would become the most severe risk to be minimized. Depending on the 'hit' probability on the ground (a function of population density and UAV lethal area), some opera-

tional limitation with regard to 'overflown zone' may be imposed.

Flight termination systems (FTS) should be installed as a means of recovering UAVs from system failures. FTS can be an automatic flight guidance system which navigates the aircraft to a suitable location and completes a normal landing or devices which bring the aircraft down immediately, e.g. by deployment of a parachute, e.g. JAR 1309 (ballistic recovery system (BRS)). It is noteworthy that BRS has been fitted for some time to certain manned civil aircraft, notably microlights. The current CAA policy on such systems is that they may be installed on a 'no hazard, no benefit' basis only. A parachute may be fitted if desired, but it is not to be relied upon to prevent an accident. Applicants for the approval of aircraft embodying FTS have to show that the system is protected from inadvertent operation or that the

Airworthiness in a simple term can be defined as 'fit to fly'; however, in an actual sense, it is defined as 'demonstrated capability of an airborne store to perform satisfactorily and fulfil the mission requirements, throughout the specified life in the prevailing environments with acceptable level of safety and reliability'*.* The 'Federal Aviation Administration' (FAA) declares an aircraft is airworthy if it conforms to its type design and if it is in a condition for safe flight. The first part of the FAA definition describes the airworthiness requirement for 'certification', and the second part of the definition refers to the 'continued airworthiness' which regulates the repair, maintenance and operation throughout the life span of the aircraft [11–27].

The phrase 'acceptable level of safety' in the definition of airworthiness is a complex consideration as absolute safety is hypothetical and can be achieved only at

• Ground control system and launch and recovery system should be subjected to functional hazard analysis and accordingly certified.
