**1. Introduction**

The concepts of *hybrid threat* and *hybrid warfare* are, presently, key concepts within strategic studies1 and intelligence studies2 , with a core relevance in the new defense and security context that was enabled by the twenty-first century's Fourth Industrial Revolution, driven by the synergization of *cyberspace* and *artificial intelligence* (AI), fueled by the accelerated and disruptive exponential expansion of machine learning (ML) [1–3]. Cyber operations, presently, constitute a key determinant component of *hybrid strategies* and *tactics* that configure the profile of *hybrid threats* and *hybrid warfare* [1]. *Hybrid strategies*, in the twenty-first century, involve the use of *Information and Communication Technology* (ICT) and AI tools to

<sup>1</sup> Strategic studies involve the study of strategy, crossing different disciplines, including military science, decision science, political science, and even systems science, and cognitive sciences.

<sup>2</sup> By *intelligence* we mean all the activities involved in the production of knowledge necessary to strategic and/or tactical decision. Intelligence studies are, then, the area of research that addresses all activities involved in such production of knowledge, including but not restricted to spying. The current chapter crosses, in permanent dialog, cyberspace studies, strategic studies, and intelligence studies.

#### *Cyberspace*

combine conventional and unconventional operations, amplifying the impact of these operations [1–3].

In the current context of hybrid operations, there are, presently, three major dimensions of *hybrid strategic power*, understood as the ability to achieve one's strategic goals through *hybrid operations*, and these are:


The first type of power is enabled by social networks and the ability to use cyberspace for propaganda, disinformation, and viral campaigns in what constitutes a form of information-based warfare as well as for implementing cyberattacks that can disrupt different sectors as well as stealing (and possibly leaking) of critical data.

The second type of power involves the use of AI, in particular ML tools, as support tools for different cyber operations that may, in turn, support hybrid strategies. The range of AI applications can go from operations that take advantage of network power to cyber disruption of key infrastructures.

The third type of power is specific of today's defense and security environment, involving the cooperation of different state and non-state entities, the latter which include, for instance, organized criminal groups and terrorist groups that can cooperate with each other, supporting and enhancing each other's operations.

In the present work, we address the relevance of cyberspace-based operations and AI for the implementation of hybrid strategies and reflect on what this cyber dimension of hybrid operations implies for the concept of what constitutes a cyberweapon, as well as strategies that take advantage of the weaponization of cyberspace. We also address the concept of human intelligence (HUMINT) operations and their role in hybrid operations, in particular, how HUMINT was used in the past to support hybrid operations and can play a key role in the present; this leads us to the conceptualization of *hybrid HUMINT*.

In Section 2, we review main concepts linked to hybrid operations and address the strategic profile of hybrid operations in its different dimensions.

In Section 3, we focus on *cyber psychological operations (cyops)* as a major part of *hybrid strategies* and address how the use of AI and ML in *cyops* can be employed for the operationalization of hybrid strategies, targeted at weaponizing social networks, showing that AI constitutes a central driver of the future of these operations and allowing us to produce an assessment of the near future of hybrid threats, including a new face of *cyber terrorism*.

In Section 4, we address another dimension of hybrid operations and hybrid threats which is the role of HUMINT and the concept of *hybrid agent*, reviewing how HUMINT was used in the past for the implementation of hybrid operations and how it can be used in the present as a nexus for the successful implementation of these operations. In Section 5, we conclude with a final reflection on the role of cyberspace and the need for an extended concept of *hybrid resilience* as a way to face hybrid threats.

### **2. Cyberspace and the strategic profile of hybrid operations**

Hybrid operations can be defined as the use of military and nonmilitary means to achieve one's strategic goals [1–3]. This means that rather than open battle,

**57**

*Cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence: The New Face of Cyber-Enhanced Hybrid Threats*

one may use intelligence activities, subterfuge, and subversion in order to gain an

Hybrid operations find a deep tradition in strategic thinking that can be traced back to the classics of strategic studies, in particular, to two of the main military classics of Ancient China [1, 4]: *Sun Tzu's Art of War* and *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings*. These two works also inspired Japanese classical thinking about unconventional warfare and espionage and the use of specialized operatives that also implemented what can be considered today as hybrid operations. Operations with strategic and tactical dimensions were recorded during the transition from the Warring States period to the Edo period in different works. Of these different works, the *Sandai Hidensho* stands out, which consists of the scrolls that include the *Bansenshukai* [5], the *Shoninki* [6] and the *Shinobi Hiden* [7], these are three classical works on spying and on how to conduct subversive, covert, and unorthodox warfare, which also recognize the influence of *Sun Tzu's Art of War* and *T'ai Kung's* 

While there is a deep tradition for hybrid operations in both Chinese and Japanese classics on warfare and spying, it is also important to stress that a thinking that is convergent with the Asian classics is also found in European Philosophical thinking about strategy and war, in particular in Machiavelli's *The Art of War* [8], which also addresses what are considered today as operations that fall within the

In *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings*, hybrid operations included corrupting key officials, using diplomacy as a weapon, compromising a kingdom's economy, alienating the ruler from the people, spreading rumors, and using propaganda and what is known today as psychological warfare [4]; similar operations are also described in

In what regards hybrid operations, the strategic action is not, thus, restricted to the battlefield but rather includes acting on the economic, financial, social, and political levels as a way to avoid open warfare or to weaken the adversary so that if

Specifically military hybrid operations are covered in the *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings*, particularly in the *Dragon Secret Teaching*, in the section corresponding to the *unorthodox army*, and in the section addressing the *civil offensive*, in the *Martial Secret Teaching* [4], which is convergent with both the Japanese classics [5–7] and the

One lesson that comes out of these classics of strategic studies and intelligence studies is the need for good governance and public policies as a way to guard against hybrid operations [4, 5], a point to which we will return in the last section of the present chapter. Disrupting governance goes to the key role of hybrid operations in classical strategy and intelligence thinking to undermine a country's governance

This is a point that is recovered in today's defense and security environment, present in different countries' military thinking. On the Russian side, as stressed by Chekinov and Bogdanov [9], two Russian Defense specialists, information technologies make the new face of warfare to be dominated by information and

The central driving forces behind the twenty-first century's hybrid operations are *cyber psychological operations* (*cyops*), where *information superiority* plays a key role [1, 3, 9]. As stressed in [9], the new face of conflict is such that nonmilitary actions and measures are employed with ICTs used in order to target *all public institutions in a target country*. While this illustrates the Russian perspective on the twenty-first century conflict [1], we get a similar standpoint from Treverton [3], who is a former Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council. Treverton

scope of hybrid operations in books six and seven of this work.

the main Japanese classic on the art of spying, the *Bansenshukai* [5].

and to make the people turn against the policymakers.

open warfare does take place, one can easily win over that adversary [4, 5].

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88648*

advantage over the adversary.

*Six Secret Teachings* [5–7].

European thinking [8].

psychological warfare.

#### *Cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence: The New Face of Cyber-Enhanced Hybrid Threats DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88648*

one may use intelligence activities, subterfuge, and subversion in order to gain an advantage over the adversary.

Hybrid operations find a deep tradition in strategic thinking that can be traced back to the classics of strategic studies, in particular, to two of the main military classics of Ancient China [1, 4]: *Sun Tzu's Art of War* and *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings*. These two works also inspired Japanese classical thinking about unconventional warfare and espionage and the use of specialized operatives that also implemented what can be considered today as hybrid operations. Operations with strategic and tactical dimensions were recorded during the transition from the Warring States period to the Edo period in different works. Of these different works, the *Sandai Hidensho* stands out, which consists of the scrolls that include the *Bansenshukai* [5], the *Shoninki* [6] and the *Shinobi Hiden* [7], these are three classical works on spying and on how to conduct subversive, covert, and unorthodox warfare, which also recognize the influence of *Sun Tzu's Art of War* and *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings* [5–7].

While there is a deep tradition for hybrid operations in both Chinese and Japanese classics on warfare and spying, it is also important to stress that a thinking that is convergent with the Asian classics is also found in European Philosophical thinking about strategy and war, in particular in Machiavelli's *The Art of War* [8], which also addresses what are considered today as operations that fall within the scope of hybrid operations in books six and seven of this work.

In *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings*, hybrid operations included corrupting key officials, using diplomacy as a weapon, compromising a kingdom's economy, alienating the ruler from the people, spreading rumors, and using propaganda and what is known today as psychological warfare [4]; similar operations are also described in the main Japanese classic on the art of spying, the *Bansenshukai* [5].

In what regards hybrid operations, the strategic action is not, thus, restricted to the battlefield but rather includes acting on the economic, financial, social, and political levels as a way to avoid open warfare or to weaken the adversary so that if open warfare does take place, one can easily win over that adversary [4, 5].

Specifically military hybrid operations are covered in the *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings*, particularly in the *Dragon Secret Teaching*, in the section corresponding to the *unorthodox army*, and in the section addressing the *civil offensive*, in the *Martial Secret Teaching* [4], which is convergent with both the Japanese classics [5–7] and the European thinking [8].

One lesson that comes out of these classics of strategic studies and intelligence studies is the need for good governance and public policies as a way to guard against hybrid operations [4, 5], a point to which we will return in the last section of the present chapter. Disrupting governance goes to the key role of hybrid operations in classical strategy and intelligence thinking to undermine a country's governance and to make the people turn against the policymakers.

This is a point that is recovered in today's defense and security environment, present in different countries' military thinking. On the Russian side, as stressed by Chekinov and Bogdanov [9], two Russian Defense specialists, information technologies make the new face of warfare to be dominated by information and psychological warfare.

The central driving forces behind the twenty-first century's hybrid operations are *cyber psychological operations* (*cyops*), where *information superiority* plays a key role [1, 3, 9]. As stressed in [9], the new face of conflict is such that nonmilitary actions and measures are employed with ICTs used in order to target *all public institutions in a target country*. While this illustrates the Russian perspective on the twenty-first century conflict [1], we get a similar standpoint from Treverton [3], who is a former Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council. Treverton

*Cyberspace*

these operations [1–3].

• Network power

• Cooperation power

• AI power

combine conventional and unconventional operations, amplifying the impact of

The first type of power is enabled by social networks and the ability to use cyberspace for propaganda, disinformation, and viral campaigns in what constitutes a form of information-based warfare as well as for implementing cyberattacks that can disrupt different sectors as well as stealing (and possibly leaking) of critical data. The second type of power involves the use of AI, in particular ML tools, as support tools for different cyber operations that may, in turn, support hybrid strategies. The range of AI applications can go from operations that take advantage

The third type of power is specific of today's defense and security environment, involving the cooperation of different state and non-state entities, the latter which include, for instance, organized criminal groups and terrorist groups that can cooperate with each other, supporting and enhancing each other's operations. In the present work, we address the relevance of cyberspace-based operations and AI for the implementation of hybrid strategies and reflect on what this cyber dimension of hybrid operations implies for the concept of what constitutes a cyberweapon, as well as strategies that take advantage of the weaponization of cyberspace. We also address the concept of human intelligence (HUMINT) operations and their role in hybrid operations, in particular, how HUMINT was used in the past to support hybrid operations and can play a key role in the present; this

In Section 2, we review main concepts linked to hybrid operations and address

In Section 3, we focus on *cyber psychological operations (cyops)* as a major part of *hybrid strategies* and address how the use of AI and ML in *cyops* can be employed for the operationalization of hybrid strategies, targeted at weaponizing social networks, showing that AI constitutes a central driver of the future of these operations and allowing us to produce an assessment of the near future of hybrid threats,

In Section 4, we address another dimension of hybrid operations and hybrid threats which is the role of HUMINT and the concept of *hybrid agent*, reviewing how HUMINT was used in the past for the implementation of hybrid operations and how it can be used in the present as a nexus for the successful implementation of these operations. In Section 5, we conclude with a final reflection on the role of cyberspace and the need for an extended concept of *hybrid resilience* as a way to face

Hybrid operations can be defined as the use of military and nonmilitary means

to achieve one's strategic goals [1–3]. This means that rather than open battle,

strategic goals through *hybrid operations*, and these are:

of network power to cyber disruption of key infrastructures.

leads us to the conceptualization of *hybrid HUMINT*.

including a new face of *cyber terrorism*.

the strategic profile of hybrid operations in its different dimensions.

**2. Cyberspace and the strategic profile of hybrid operations**

In the current context of hybrid operations, there are, presently, three major dimensions of *hybrid strategic power*, understood as the ability to achieve one's

**56**

hybrid threats.

identified, in the pattern of hybrid operations, typical information *cyop*-based warfare tactics, using propaganda, fake news, strategic leaks, funding of organizations and supporting political parties, organizing protest movements (taking advantage of social networks), using cyber tools for espionage, attack and manipulation, economic leverage, use of proxies and unacknowledged war and supporting paramilitary organizations.

While deeply rooted in the past thinking of strategic studies and in past military practice, the above references [1–3, 9] show that the renewal of the concept of hybrid operations and the relevance of this concept in the twenty-first century strategic thinking and doctrine come from the fact that these operations now have an effectiveness amplified by the use of cyberspace, which is a determinant factor in the change of the profile of the defense and security threats coming from hybrid operations; more properly, as it is addressed in [1], the twenty-first century hybrid operations can be implemented by both state and non-state agents, and this implies a major shift in strategic power, where individuals and groups, which may not be state-sponsored, can use cyberspace and even AI-based systems to implement hybrid operations that can have significant impact on a given country's governance [1, 2].

This adds a new dimension to hybrid threats, making the profile more complex from a defense and security standpoint, in the sense that we can have three types of hybrid operations' profiles:


These three types of operations are key for the characterization of hybrid operations. The *type 1 operation profile* has always been an integral part of strategic thinking and doctrine regarding unorthodox strategies and tactics and the way in which one may win one's goals without using conventional military forces, an approach that is considered in high regard within the context of the Chinese classics [4] and that is recovered also in the Japanese context of the employment of specialized operatives called *shinobi no mono* that were used as spies and specialists in covert operations, subversion, information warfare, and what are considered in the *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings* as unorthodox ways [5–7]. Currently, however, cyberspace has amplified the effectiveness potential of these unorthodox ways, making hybrid operations a core dimension of military doctrine and the twentyfirst century conflict, a point argued extensively in [1–3, 9].

However, the state-sponsored hybrid operations, implemented by a country's armed forces, intelligence agencies, or even specific *cyber warfare units* and, possibly, *hybrid warfare units*, are just part of the three types of hybrid operation profiles.

The *type 2 operation profile* is characteristic of a change in the strategic power dynamics due to cyberspace and availability of AI systems and is specific of the new defense and security framework of hybrid threats, namely, small groups, or even

**59**

*Cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence: The New Face of Cyber-Enhanced Hybrid Threats*

a sufficiently knowledgeable individual, with sufficiently sophisticated hacking skills, can perform hybrid operations, taking advantage of cyberattacks and AI tools and target a country's governance, significantly disrupting that country with the same effectiveness as any state-sponsored attack. The threat ecosystem is, thus, no longer just one of the countries fighting each other but also of countries' governments and infrastructures being threatened by non-state agents that can implement

The key to the issue is the fact that cyber tools and even AI systems are freely available and the exponential trend linked to AI and ML and the increased usage of connected devices and smart government solutions open up the way for an exponential increase in the ability and opportunities to attack a country's governance with a low budget, this increases the disruptive potential of *type 2 operation profile*, which can be evaluated in terms of the increasingly low cost availability of means (including freely available bots and open-source malicious code dispersal), the increased dispersal of targets (due to the exponential trend associated with the Internet of Things (IoT)), and the ability to use cyberspace, including the dark web, to connect with like-minded individuals that are willing to support viral campaigns

Given the Fourth Industrial Revolution's foreseeable trend, the *type 2 operation profile* is typically a profile that involves most operations in cyberspace, given the high impact and low cost of these operations. The ability of sufficiently motivated individuals and groups, sometimes involved with criminal organizations, to successfully implement a hybrid operation with the same level of impact as a state-sponsored campaign is a point that only recently has been addressed in the literature on hybrid threats [1, 3, 10, 11], a point raised in [10]. This is a gap in that literature since there may be an underestimation of rapidly emergent threats. The main problem lies in the fact that hybrid operations can be implemented with significantly less investment, especially if their main component is cyberspace-based, and this can be considered as low-cost warfare or, as stated in [11], *war on the cheap*. The Fourth Industrial Revolution has opened up the ability for weaker opponents, both state and non-state, to effectively engage opponents with stronger military forces, decreasing the comparative advantage of these stronger opponents. The network power and AI power allow for a non-state agents to launch a hybrid campaign on a targeted country from anywhere in the world, such that one may have difficulty in ascribing a given physical/national territory to the attacker and single out that attacker's country for a targeted conventional military response. A sufficiently sophisticated group can remain anonymous and even be transnational in the composition of its members, transitioning the defense problem from the traditional military dimension to a more complex response nexus of defense, intel-

While *type 2 operation profile* is now being recognized as an increasing threat [1, 10, 11], with the tendency to increase in disruptive ability in the years to come, the *type 3 operation profile* has the potential for the most damage in that it involves the joint cooperation between state and non-state agents. This last operations' profile takes advantage of the cooperation power; cooperation in hybrid operations can take the form of cooperation between different non-state agents,

including terrorist groups and different criminal organizations; between different

The cooperation between state and non-state agents may become a main source of state-sponsored hybrid threats [10, 11]; rather than engaging in large-scale stateon-state conflict, different states can support non-state agents or act in a timing that is confluent with the actions of non-state agents, enhancing the ability of non-state

agents to produce a large disruption on a targeted country's governance.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88648*

against specific targets.

ligence, and law enforcement.

countries; and between state and non-state agents.

hybrid operations as disruptive as any *type 1 operation*.

#### *Cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence: The New Face of Cyber-Enhanced Hybrid Threats DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88648*

a sufficiently knowledgeable individual, with sufficiently sophisticated hacking skills, can perform hybrid operations, taking advantage of cyberattacks and AI tools and target a country's governance, significantly disrupting that country with the same effectiveness as any state-sponsored attack. The threat ecosystem is, thus, no longer just one of the countries fighting each other but also of countries' governments and infrastructures being threatened by non-state agents that can implement hybrid operations as disruptive as any *type 1 operation*.

The key to the issue is the fact that cyber tools and even AI systems are freely available and the exponential trend linked to AI and ML and the increased usage of connected devices and smart government solutions open up the way for an exponential increase in the ability and opportunities to attack a country's governance with a low budget, this increases the disruptive potential of *type 2 operation profile*, which can be evaluated in terms of the increasingly low cost availability of means (including freely available bots and open-source malicious code dispersal), the increased dispersal of targets (due to the exponential trend associated with the Internet of Things (IoT)), and the ability to use cyberspace, including the dark web, to connect with like-minded individuals that are willing to support viral campaigns against specific targets.

Given the Fourth Industrial Revolution's foreseeable trend, the *type 2 operation profile* is typically a profile that involves most operations in cyberspace, given the high impact and low cost of these operations. The ability of sufficiently motivated individuals and groups, sometimes involved with criminal organizations, to successfully implement a hybrid operation with the same level of impact as a state-sponsored campaign is a point that only recently has been addressed in the literature on hybrid threats [1, 3, 10, 11], a point raised in [10]. This is a gap in that literature since there may be an underestimation of rapidly emergent threats. The main problem lies in the fact that hybrid operations can be implemented with significantly less investment, especially if their main component is cyberspace-based, and this can be considered as low-cost warfare or, as stated in [11], *war on the cheap*.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution has opened up the ability for weaker opponents, both state and non-state, to effectively engage opponents with stronger military forces, decreasing the comparative advantage of these stronger opponents. The network power and AI power allow for a non-state agents to launch a hybrid campaign on a targeted country from anywhere in the world, such that one may have difficulty in ascribing a given physical/national territory to the attacker and single out that attacker's country for a targeted conventional military response. A sufficiently sophisticated group can remain anonymous and even be transnational in the composition of its members, transitioning the defense problem from the traditional military dimension to a more complex response nexus of defense, intelligence, and law enforcement.

While *type 2 operation profile* is now being recognized as an increasing threat [1, 10, 11], with the tendency to increase in disruptive ability in the years to come, the *type 3 operation profile* has the potential for the most damage in that it involves the joint cooperation between state and non-state agents. This last operations' profile takes advantage of the cooperation power; cooperation in hybrid operations can take the form of cooperation between different non-state agents, including terrorist groups and different criminal organizations; between different countries; and between state and non-state agents.

The cooperation between state and non-state agents may become a main source of state-sponsored hybrid threats [10, 11]; rather than engaging in large-scale stateon-state conflict, different states can support non-state agents or act in a timing that is confluent with the actions of non-state agents, enhancing the ability of non-state agents to produce a large disruption on a targeted country's governance.

*Cyberspace*

paramilitary organizations.

hybrid operations' profiles:

state.

identified, in the pattern of hybrid operations, typical information *cyop*-based warfare tactics, using propaganda, fake news, strategic leaks, funding of organizations and supporting political parties, organizing protest movements (taking advantage of social networks), using cyber tools for espionage, attack and manipulation, economic leverage, use of proxies and unacknowledged war and supporting

While deeply rooted in the past thinking of strategic studies and in past military practice, the above references [1–3, 9] show that the renewal of the concept of hybrid operations and the relevance of this concept in the twenty-first century strategic thinking and doctrine come from the fact that these operations now have an effectiveness amplified by the use of cyberspace, which is a determinant factor in the change of the profile of the defense and security threats coming from hybrid operations; more properly, as it is addressed in [1], the twenty-first century hybrid operations can be implemented by both state and non-state agents, and this implies a major shift in strategic power, where individuals and groups, which may not be state-sponsored, can use cyberspace and even AI-based systems to implement hybrid operations that can have significant impact on a given country's governance [1, 2]. This adds a new dimension to hybrid threats, making the profile more complex from a defense and security standpoint, in the sense that we can have three types of

• **Type 1:** state-sponsored operations implemented by a specific country or countries: these are implemented by countries and involve the human and

• **Type 2:** non-state-sponsored operations: these are implemented by non-state agents and groups, not supported financially, politically, and logistically by any

• **Type 3:** state-sponsored operations implemented by non-state agents: the use of hackers and techno-mercenarism, the political, financial, and logistic support to non-state agents and groups opens up the way for the implementation of joint operations that involve non-state agents and different countries (with

These three types of operations are key for the characterization of hybrid operations. The *type 1 operation profile* has always been an integral part of strategic thinking and doctrine regarding unorthodox strategies and tactics and the way in which one may win one's goals without using conventional military forces, an approach that is considered in high regard within the context of the Chinese classics [4] and that is recovered also in the Japanese context of the employment of specialized operatives called *shinobi no mono* that were used as spies and specialists in covert operations, subversion, information warfare, and what are considered in the *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings* as unorthodox ways [5–7]. Currently, however, cyberspace has amplified the effectiveness potential of these unorthodox ways, making hybrid operations a core dimension of military doctrine and the twenty-

However, the state-sponsored hybrid operations, implemented by a country's armed forces, intelligence agencies, or even specific *cyber warfare units* and, possibly, *hybrid warfare units*, are just part of the three types of hybrid operation profiles. The *type 2 operation profile* is characteristic of a change in the strategic power dynamics due to cyberspace and availability of AI systems and is specific of the new defense and security framework of hybrid threats, namely, small groups, or even

technical resources of that country's Armed Forces.

an added level of plausible deniability for countries).

first century conflict, a point argued extensively in [1–3, 9].

**58**

#### *Cyberspace*

We are reaching a strategic context where both state and non-state agents can engage any given country by means of cyber operations, sabotage, espionage, and subversion [11], a point that also circles back to *Sun Tzu's Art of War* [4]. Hybrid operations, whatever their profile, allow an opponent or opponents to produce an imbalance of power, acting on the target's weaknesses, without engaging in conventional direct conflict and, possibly, even hiding their identities in the process.

The imbalance of power is linked, in Sun Tzu's thinking, to the concept of power as the ability to exercise one's authority and deliberative autonomy toward effective action; in this case, hybrid operations directly target a state's power by undermining its governance.

These operations can, in particular, take advantage of:


The above three targeted state-level weaknesses match what Margolis in [11] identified, respectively, as sources of three types of crises:


These three types of crises can occur in a given country and be triggered by hybrid operations or amplified by well-timed hybrid operations, in particular, those that use information and cyberspace as a weapon.

Connecting the three profiles and crises, in **Figure 1**, we synthesize, in scheme, the links between the profiles of hybrid operations and the three types of crises identified by Margolis [11].

The *type 1* and *type 2 operations* are confluent with each other in the cooperation involved in *type 3 operations*. It is important to notice that, in some cases, a *type 1* or a *type 2 operation* can lead to a *type 3 operation*, and that the timing of a *type 1* with a *type 2 operation* can lead to a *type 3 operation* due to synchronized hybrid tactical actions. The three types of operations can all target the three weaknesses, authority, resilience, and legitimacy, amplifying state instability and leading a country into a crisis situation that may, in the limit, produce the fall of a government.

Now, regarding the means and vulnerabilities, it is important to stress that the Fourth Industrial Revolution also opens up the way for cyber-physical attacks, including attacks using drones and drone swarms, as well as cyberattacks on automated systems and cyber-physical systems; all these are dimensions of the wider cyber-enhanced synergy of conventional and unconventional operations that constitute the strategic and tactical ground for hybrid operations and that may predictably characterize the new level of hybrid operations in years to come.

**61**

**Figure 1.**

*Hybrid operations profiles and crisis profiles.*

*Cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence: The New Face of Cyber-Enhanced Hybrid Threats*

The other side, which we are already seeing today, is situated in the virtual space

Platforms, in particular social networks, the manipulation of contents, and the use of AI, ML, and data science to manipulate people's behavior, online and offline, are a major component in these operations, and it is the subject of the next section.

The strategic level of hybrid operations involves the definition of the main objectives for hybrid operations, the targets, and possible collaboration networks. The choice of resources and ways to combine them to operationalize the hybrid strategy depends upon the strategic deliberation. On the other hand, the means also condition the set of available tactics that may allow one to operationalize a given strategy. The strategic power of hybrid operations in allowing for a state or non-state agents to achieve their strategic objectives has increased due to the resources available that allow for high yield with low investment; these resources are linked to the network power and AI power, defined at the beginning of the present chapter. In what regards hybrid operations, the network power and AI power cannot presently be considered separately, since it is precisely the synergy of cyberspace and AI, in particular through ML, that determine the present strategic and tactical momentum of hybrid operations and that allow one to anticipate the future of hybrid threats. We now address one of the major components of hybrid operations, namely, information warfare and psychological operations using cyberspace.

Psychological operations (*psyops*) involve the use of different means and tactics in order to influence the behavior of target audiences. While, traditionally, *psyops* were employed by countries and constitute an integrating part of military doctrine, the expansion of cyberspace has led to the possibility of groups that are not part of

but still able to severely affect countries' governance; as stated above, this is the weaponization of cyberspace, using social networks and AI for hybrid operations. In this case, the actions are situated only in the virtual space, but they can have

severe social, (geo) political, and economic consequences.

**3. Cyber psychological operations and hybrid threats**

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88648*

*Cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence: The New Face of Cyber-Enhanced Hybrid Threats DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88648*

**Figure 1.** *Hybrid operations profiles and crisis profiles.*

*Cyberspace*

its governance.

disruptions

identified by Margolis [11].

We are reaching a strategic context where both state and non-state agents can engage any given country by means of cyber operations, sabotage, espionage, and subversion [11], a point that also circles back to *Sun Tzu's Art of War* [4]. Hybrid operations, whatever their profile, allow an opponent or opponents to produce an imbalance of power, acting on the target's weaknesses, without engaging in conventional direct conflict and, possibly, even hiding their identities in the process.

The imbalance of power is linked, in Sun Tzu's thinking, to the concept of power as the ability to exercise one's authority and deliberative autonomy toward effective action; in this case, hybrid operations directly target a state's power by undermining

• Internal challenges to a state's governance by certain groups that wish to

lems, environmental problems, and social and political problems

• A view in a country's society that a regime has lost its legitimacy to rule

The above three targeted state-level weaknesses match what Margolis in [11]

• *Crises of resilience* that result from a state's inability to adapt to different

These three types of crises can occur in a given country and be triggered by hybrid operations or amplified by well-timed hybrid operations, in particular, those

Connecting the three profiles and crises, in **Figure 1**, we synthesize, in scheme, the links between the profiles of hybrid operations and the three types of crises

The *type 1* and *type 2 operations* are confluent with each other in the cooperation involved in *type 3 operations*. It is important to notice that, in some cases, a *type 1* or a *type 2 operation* can lead to a *type 3 operation*, and that the timing of a *type 1* with a *type 2 operation* can lead to a *type 3 operation* due to synchronized hybrid tactical actions. The three types of operations can all target the three weaknesses, authority, resilience, and legitimacy, amplifying state instability and leading a country into a

Now, regarding the means and vulnerabilities, it is important to stress that the Fourth Industrial Revolution also opens up the way for cyber-physical attacks, including attacks using drones and drone swarms, as well as cyberattacks on automated systems and cyber-physical systems; all these are dimensions of the wider cyber-enhanced synergy of conventional and unconventional operations that constitute the strategic and tactical ground for hybrid operations and that may predictably characterize the new level of hybrid operations in years to come.

crisis situation that may, in the limit, produce the fall of a government.

• *Crises of authority* that result from a state's inability to enforce its rule, not being able to control all of its territory, or becoming unable to enforce all its laws

• *Crises of legitimacy* that result from society's view that *a regime has lost its right* 

• Failure of a state in adapting to society's concerns and its people's problems, being unable to respond to disruptions to the state's finances, economic prob-

These operations can, in particular, take advantage of:

identified, respectively, as sources of three types of crises:

undermine a state's authority

*to rule because it is wrong or unjust*

that use information and cyberspace as a weapon.

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The other side, which we are already seeing today, is situated in the virtual space but still able to severely affect countries' governance; as stated above, this is the weaponization of cyberspace, using social networks and AI for hybrid operations. In this case, the actions are situated only in the virtual space, but they can have severe social, (geo) political, and economic consequences.

Platforms, in particular social networks, the manipulation of contents, and the use of AI, ML, and data science to manipulate people's behavior, online and offline, are a major component in these operations, and it is the subject of the next section.
