**3.4 Public awareness and political support**

Political support for anything, including biotechnology application, is difficult to gauge, and has to be inferred, for example, from specific deliberate actions. Based on such inferences, therefore, political support for biotechnology application in SSA is varied across countries. The presence of a policy and law on biotechnology and biosafety can be interpreted as evidence of political support, except cases where these laws are enacted to prohibit the use of biotechnology. Due to controversy surrounding GMO in agriculture across SSA, there is more public scrutiny of the application of this technology. This can explain why the media is awash with articles and stories demonstrating, on the one hand, the usefulness of biotechnology to farmers, and on the other, skepticisms and outright opposition, specifically to GMO [3]. Unfortunately, the perceptions and misrepresentations on GMO are often extended to any conversation about agricultural biotechnology as a whole. With the exception of South Africa, there are no calibrated national surveys assessing the public understanding, perception, and acceptance of biotechnology in Africa. The Agricultural Biotechnology Programme of the University of Nairobi has data from an opinion survey on awareness and willingness to use genetically engineered products, and another on actual use of these products in the manufacturing sector. The survey showed more than 90% of raw materials for millers and manufacturers in Kenya to be sourced both from East Africa and countries such as Southern Africa, USA, Europe, and others known to predominantly grow genetically engineered crops such as corn. The South African study [8] reveals a very high level of ignorance about biotechnology among the general population, and favorable support for biotechnology among the informed respondents. Thus, public awareness remains a gap even in countries that rank high in the policy environment for agricultural biotechnology. Thus, despite the perception that the public is aware about biotechnology and what it can do or not do, much of the paranoia can be attributed to lack of understanding, political and business contests.

As explained earlier, development and adoption of agricultural biotechnology require both regulatory and promotional systems. Political will and support can drive agricultural biotechnology even in the absence of NBFs. One of the latest examples where strong political support has been demonstrated is Uganda. In Uganda, a Biotechnology and Biosafety Bill, which has been awaiting enactment

**167**

patronizing biopesticides [12].

*Biotechnology in Agricultural Policies of Sub-Saharan Africa*

for achieving some of the goals envisioned in the legislation.

NPT, a pathway to commercialization of *Bt* maize.

since 2012, was passed in Parliament in October 2017 but referred back by the President for some amendments. It was passed again in 2018, but this time with strict liability clauses that will definitely retard biotechnology development in the country. However, the country has a presidential order allowing GMO R&D, awaiting enactment of a biosafety law. Somalia (which has had frequent civil strife since 1991) has also shown a strong political will—as seen in many laws in draft stage but is operational (such as the Veterinary Code—Law No. 34/2006 & 2008 implemented in draft form since 1997). Perhaps the presence of fewer experts (many have fled the country) and a less secure environment for foreign experts to operate have contributed to the slower pace of policy development to support agricultural biotechnology. It is obvious that if a technology is not being applied, then enactment of laws is never urgent. In the neighboring Djibouti, there are some laws and regulations, including those aimed at positioning her for adoption of modern biotechnologies including genetic engineering. However, there lacks specific roadmaps

The Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) *Bt* maize adoption in Kenya provides a context to understand the complex political environments that can impede biotech adoption. Kenya is one of the countries with many genetically engineered products at various stages of development: Insect-protected *Bt* maize and *Bt* cotton have both undergone confined field trials (CFTs), and are awaiting the last stages before commercialization—National Performance Trials (NPTs). To prepare the ground for agricultural technology uptake, the government of Kenya put in place legal, structural, and other regulatory frameworks including human capacity to manage GMOs by 2009. This heavy investment in legal, human, and infrastructural capacity for GM research was expected to improve capacity to develop and manage processes for detecting, testing, and assessing the safety of GM foods and products. Four regulations that implement the Biosafety Act have been gazetted (2011–2013) to ensure compliance with all activities undertaken within a field, introduction into the environment, labeling, and import, export, and transit of GMOs. Despite this preparedness, the adoption of GM crops and products has been hampered by political and regulatory bottlenecks that have delayed farm deployment and entry into market systems. In disregard of the provisions of the act and implementing regulations, together with existing infrastructure to manage GMO, the country imposed a ban on GMO in 2012. This ban has undermined efforts to even conduct

Apart from its effect on high-tech biotechnologies (genetic engineering— GMO), lack of political support can hamper even low-end biotechnologies such as biopesticides. For example, synthetic chemical pesticide (lindane) was first introduced in Nigeria in the early 1950s. Adverse effects resulting from excessive utilization of synthetic chemicals have become widely reported (e.g. [9]). Several studies have identified plant-based sources of pesticide in Nigeria, including *Cannabis sativa*, *Eucalyptus globules*, *Balanites aegyptiaca*, *Khaya senegalensis, Nicotiana tabacum* [10] and neem leaf water extract, and aqueous tobacco extract [11], and demonstrated that tissues from these plants contain bioactive pesticide agents. The broad anthology of living and non-living entities present in biopesticides vary considerably in their properties, mode of action, fate, composition, and behavior within their surroundings. As a result, the government needs to set strict health, safety, and environmental monitoring regulations before granting approval for the production and handling of biopesticides. However, the lack of governmental interest, support, and advocacy, and clear policies on biopesticide development, regulation, and implementation in Nigeria has hampered progress, investments, development, and accessibility to biopesticides, and has deterred farmers from

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.85567*

#### *Biotechnology in Agricultural Policies of Sub-Saharan Africa DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.85567*

*Elements of Bioeconomy*

is the critical starting point.

**3.4 Public awareness and political support**

well as research and application of low to medium level forestry biotechnology. It is perhaps in the crops sector that the CGIAR centers have made the greatest contribution, with several centers including ICRISAT, CIMMYT, the International Potato Centre (CIP), and IITA contributing substantially in the research and application of medium- to high-level biotechnology for maize, potato, cassava, and sorghum, among other crops. Further, African regional research organizations such as AGRA and AATF, among others, have played a part in research and development as well as

There is a close relationship among existing capacities, level of application, and enabling policy environment for biotechnology. Higher capacities correspond with higher levels of application and enabling policy environment. A relationship cycle can explain this observation—a stronger enabling policy environment promotes higher capacity and hence enables technology development and application. On the other hand, a country cannot regulate "nothing"—a robust biotechnology research and application would require and hence catalyze the development of regulation, policy, and laws, for example. Policies and legislations on biotechnology in a country with no research on, or application of, biotechnology is meaningless unless it is part of a plan. However, overall, having a critical mass of requisite human capacity

Political support for anything, including biotechnology application, is difficult to gauge, and has to be inferred, for example, from specific deliberate actions. Based on such inferences, therefore, political support for biotechnology application in SSA is varied across countries. The presence of a policy and law on biotechnology and biosafety can be interpreted as evidence of political support, except cases where these laws are enacted to prohibit the use of biotechnology. Due to controversy surrounding GMO in agriculture across SSA, there is more public scrutiny of the application of this technology. This can explain why the media is awash with articles and stories demonstrating, on the one hand, the usefulness of biotechnology to farmers, and on the other, skepticisms and outright opposition, specifically to GMO [3]. Unfortunately, the perceptions and misrepresentations on GMO are often extended to any conversation about agricultural biotechnology as a whole. With the exception of South Africa, there are no calibrated national surveys assessing the public understanding, perception, and acceptance of biotechnology in Africa. The Agricultural Biotechnology Programme of the University of Nairobi has data from an opinion survey on awareness and willingness to use genetically engineered products, and another on actual use of these products in the manufacturing sector. The survey showed more than 90% of raw materials for millers and manufacturers in Kenya to be sourced both from East Africa and countries such as Southern Africa, USA, Europe, and others known to predominantly grow genetically engineered crops such as corn. The South African study [8] reveals a very high level of ignorance about biotechnology among the general population, and favorable support for biotechnology among the informed respondents. Thus, public awareness remains a gap even in countries that rank high in the policy environment for agricultural biotechnology. Thus, despite the perception that the public is aware about biotechnology and what it can do or not do, much of the paranoia can be attributed to lack of understanding, political and business contests. As explained earlier, development and adoption of agricultural biotechnology require both regulatory and promotional systems. Political will and support can drive agricultural biotechnology even in the absence of NBFs. One of the latest examples where strong political support has been demonstrated is Uganda. In Uganda, a Biotechnology and Biosafety Bill, which has been awaiting enactment

application of biotechnology especially in the crop sector [7].

**166**

since 2012, was passed in Parliament in October 2017 but referred back by the President for some amendments. It was passed again in 2018, but this time with strict liability clauses that will definitely retard biotechnology development in the country. However, the country has a presidential order allowing GMO R&D, awaiting enactment of a biosafety law. Somalia (which has had frequent civil strife since 1991) has also shown a strong political will—as seen in many laws in draft stage but is operational (such as the Veterinary Code—Law No. 34/2006 & 2008 implemented in draft form since 1997). Perhaps the presence of fewer experts (many have fled the country) and a less secure environment for foreign experts to operate have contributed to the slower pace of policy development to support agricultural biotechnology. It is obvious that if a technology is not being applied, then enactment of laws is never urgent. In the neighboring Djibouti, there are some laws and regulations, including those aimed at positioning her for adoption of modern biotechnologies including genetic engineering. However, there lacks specific roadmaps for achieving some of the goals envisioned in the legislation.

The Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) *Bt* maize adoption in Kenya provides a context to understand the complex political environments that can impede biotech adoption. Kenya is one of the countries with many genetically engineered products at various stages of development: Insect-protected *Bt* maize and *Bt* cotton have both undergone confined field trials (CFTs), and are awaiting the last stages before commercialization—National Performance Trials (NPTs). To prepare the ground for agricultural technology uptake, the government of Kenya put in place legal, structural, and other regulatory frameworks including human capacity to manage GMOs by 2009. This heavy investment in legal, human, and infrastructural capacity for GM research was expected to improve capacity to develop and manage processes for detecting, testing, and assessing the safety of GM foods and products. Four regulations that implement the Biosafety Act have been gazetted (2011–2013) to ensure compliance with all activities undertaken within a field, introduction into the environment, labeling, and import, export, and transit of GMOs. Despite this preparedness, the adoption of GM crops and products has been hampered by political and regulatory bottlenecks that have delayed farm deployment and entry into market systems. In disregard of the provisions of the act and implementing regulations, together with existing infrastructure to manage GMO, the country imposed a ban on GMO in 2012. This ban has undermined efforts to even conduct NPT, a pathway to commercialization of *Bt* maize.

Apart from its effect on high-tech biotechnologies (genetic engineering— GMO), lack of political support can hamper even low-end biotechnologies such as biopesticides. For example, synthetic chemical pesticide (lindane) was first introduced in Nigeria in the early 1950s. Adverse effects resulting from excessive utilization of synthetic chemicals have become widely reported (e.g. [9]). Several studies have identified plant-based sources of pesticide in Nigeria, including *Cannabis sativa*, *Eucalyptus globules*, *Balanites aegyptiaca*, *Khaya senegalensis, Nicotiana tabacum* [10] and neem leaf water extract, and aqueous tobacco extract [11], and demonstrated that tissues from these plants contain bioactive pesticide agents. The broad anthology of living and non-living entities present in biopesticides vary considerably in their properties, mode of action, fate, composition, and behavior within their surroundings. As a result, the government needs to set strict health, safety, and environmental monitoring regulations before granting approval for the production and handling of biopesticides. However, the lack of governmental interest, support, and advocacy, and clear policies on biopesticide development, regulation, and implementation in Nigeria has hampered progress, investments, development, and accessibility to biopesticides, and has deterred farmers from patronizing biopesticides [12].
