Naturalizing Neuroethics? A Syncretic Approach

*John R. Shook and James Giordano*

### **Abstract**

Neuroethics is uniquely situated to socially interpret what brain sciences are learning about social and moral cognition while helping society hold neuroscientific research and neurotechnological applications to firm moral standards. Both tasks, if they are to be pursued successfully, must find ways to closely relate the "neuro" with the "ethical." Keeping them apart has been the objective of nonnaturalist worldviews worried about scientism and reductionism, and now they complain about "neuroessentialism" and similar labels for dissolutions of agency and responsibility into mere brain activity. A nonnaturalistic neuroethics, on whatever metaphysical basis, insists that the biology of brains could not explain moral decisions or ground moral norms. We agree on that much, since the methodology of brain sciences presumes, and cannot replace, behavioral and psychological attributions of moral capacity and conduct. But the social and the neurological are always related through the anthropological; and that common basis is, not coincidentally, also where the ethical is grounded, as humanity upholds persons as bearers of moral worth and moral capacity. Neuroethics, by focusing on persons, need never resort to nonnaturalism to uphold what ultimately matters for ethics, and "naturalizing" neuroethics is also unnecessary for a humanity-centered neurobioethics.

**Keywords:** neuroethics, neurobioethics, naturalism, nonnaturalism, neuroscience, psychology, ethics

#### **1. Introduction**

In this chapter we present a syncretic approach to neuroethics, opening a conciliatory and convergent path forward for this interdisciplinary area. This approach can (1) align neuroethics with cognitive and social neuroscience as well as neurology and (2) situate neuroscience within a capacious philosophical naturalism. Keeping "neuro" primary to neuroethics for its perspective on humanity and keeping "ethics" for humanity central to neuroethics and its mission are paramount goals. Yet, those goals anticipate that neuroethics will have sufficient generality and applicability for all humanity. If the "neuro" and the "ethical" cannot be somehow harmonized, any such universality for neuroethics is unattainable. To that end, we argue here that relationships and continuities connecting (neuro)science and (neuro)ethics should be traced through domains of (natural) philosophy.

## **2. Metaethics and philosophy**

Elsewhere, we have labeled the higher goal of universal relevance for humanity as a "cosmopolitan" aim, to solicit ethical wisdom from many cultures and elicit principles fostering ethics across societies. That aim falls under the purview of ethical theorizing, but it cannot be beholden to any particular ethical theory (such as deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and so forth) or to the perennial debates among them. By setting a high methodological standard for ethical theorizing, a cosmopolitan approach enters the area of metaethics as well. However, cosmopolitan ethics, due to its attentiveness to humanity, strongly doubts that metaethics by itself is oriented toward human universality. Metaethics can easily amount to validations bestowed on one society's conventional morality over other societies or fixations with some country's linguistic habits about moral matters or a meditation upon a single culture's moral tradition.

Just as metaphysics eventually lost its credibility as an adjudicator of moral norms, skepticism toward metaethics as a lone arbiter of moral concepts and truths has also been warranted. Will further refinements to metaphysics, or metaethics, at last permit deductions of binding moral principles? That also seems dubious, as proffered derivations continue to be a plentiful source of diverse and inconsistent results. That profligacy, at least, could be reasonably expected. No narrow intellectual base could sufficiently support broad practical norms.

Looking to metaethics to adjudicate ethical theorizing and deliver a principled moral framework relevant to humanity cannot be encouraged, unless a different kind of metaethics is engaged—one that is based upon and employs a metaphysics that consults other areas of philosophy and is informed by fields across the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences. Tentative efforts and initial results on our part illustrate how such a broadly informed metaethics can yield a cosmopolitan ethical framework, which in turn suggests some principled ethical guidelines [1, 2]. We do not replicate that work here. Instead we address certain metaethical and philosophical issues of neuroethics, as it develops as an interdisciplinarity of several scientific fields. Analyses and inquiries of a philosophical nature seem inescapable, and likewise, we regard them as essential to the success of neuroethics.

But taking neuroethics to be fundamentally indebted to philosophy would not be apparent upon a survey of the many fields contributing to neuroethical concerns and inquiries [3]. The centrality of philosophical inquiry comes into view with the primary assignments given to neuroethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise (consult [4, 5]). In brief, neuroethics (i) ponders the brain's functions that are involved with personal identity, autonomy, and moral judgment/action and (ii) evaluates ways that neuroscience and technology (i.e., neuroS/T) can be developed and implemented while respecting human dignity and ethical norms. Indeed, as many have begun to acknowledge, each assignment yields information and actionable assessments that are relevant to the other assignment.

Harmony between these two assignments is hardly automatic or straightforward. Consider again the hazardous intersections of ethics and neuroscience where neuroethics has offered its supervision: first, the growing responsibility to advise or even adjust social views about psychological and neurological processes involved in moral and immoral conduct and second, the expanding ability to alter cognitive processes in ways affecting conceptions of the self and moral capacity. Unless neuroethics can coordinate the advice to society with an assessment of neuroscientific interventions, neuroethics will be unable to distinguish itself amid the cacophony of opinions about what brain science does and means.

**37**

*Naturalizing Neuroethics? A Syncretic Approach DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81829*

For example, what neuroethical advice and guidance will be offered about these matters in the area of criminal justice? Imagine a defense lawyer making this argument during a trial: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, my client cannot be guilty because neuroscience shows that no brain is really capable of moral responsibility." And then imagine another trial, where a judge imposes this sentence: "The court requires this convicted criminal to undergo neurological treatment to restore the capacity for moral responsibility." As discourses in neurolaw are already indicating, such scenarios may not remain as fictional as they once seemed [6]. But it appears that a forced choice lies ahead: moral responsibility is either "in the brain" or it is not. Criminal law and legal theory require consistency and try to eliminate confusion. And many other civic institutions, social structures, and cultural frameworks will encounter conflicting interpretations of new neuroS/T. If and when neuroethi-

One might think that the aforementioned kinds of confusing scenarios would be preventable, or at least manageable, if neuroethics is steered in a less naturalistic direction. Assertions that "We are not just our brains!" have an appealing clarity. Disparaging labels for an excessive fixation upon brain functions now include "neurocentrism" and "neuroessentialism" to join the oft-heard charges of "reductionism" and "scientism" [7]. Such labels conceal more than they expose. How does a blanket rejection of scientific reductionism enlighten legal theory about utilizing empirical evidence that adjusting neurological functioning in a brain region actually makes a person less indifferent to hurting other people? How does a scornful repudiation of neuroessentializing illuminate a better definition of moral responsibility, while societies dispute different conceptions of culpability? Deeper

The counterpart to naturalism would presumably be nonnaturalism, as a catchall classification. Any alternative to naturalism sets up its opposition by pointing out selected matters that are (allegedly) unaccounted for and left inexplicable, by the resources of naturalism. A nonnaturalistic neuroethics therefore is a neuroethical approach taking the view that authentic moral responsibility and moral decisionmaking are matters requiring something unnatural about human beings. As unnatural, that feature cannot be generated or directly affected by natural causes, although natural causes may be able to interfere with human capacities (e.g., "free will" is held to be necessary for moral responsibility). In addition, a nonnaturalistic neuroethics would hold that authentic moral responsibility and moral deeds must meet normative standards that remain independent of physiological/neurological/ cognitive processes, although such processes can help explain human behaviors

In sum, nonnaturalistic neuroethics rejects what it takes to be the opposed position of "naturalistic neuroethics" and the neuro-reductionism and ethical naturalism which naturalistic neuroethics could foster. Such a nonnaturalistic perspective has its own distinctive stance on the two tasks assigned to neuroethics. For nonnaturalistic neuroethics, psychological matters needed for one's moral capacity and moral conduct cannot be explained by any amount of information about the structures and functions of brains; and ethical norms needed for judging someone's morality cannot be grounded by any amount of information from biology or neurology. Neuroscientific reductions or replacements of moral capacity are severely questioned (NB: for a current survey, see [8]), and attempts to ground ethics directly upon nature

cal consultation is sought, will it be able to speak with one voice?

philosophical investigations are evidently necessary.

**3. Naturalistic and non-naturalistic neuroethics**

(e.g., "ethical rules" must prevail as normatively binding).

have long been scrutinized (a recent analysis is offered by [9]).

#### *Naturalizing Neuroethics? A Syncretic Approach DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81829*

*Neuroethics in Principle and Praxis - Conceptual Foundations*

Elsewhere, we have labeled the higher goal of universal relevance for humanity as a "cosmopolitan" aim, to solicit ethical wisdom from many cultures and elicit principles fostering ethics across societies. That aim falls under the purview of ethical theorizing, but it cannot be beholden to any particular ethical theory (such as deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and so forth) or to the perennial debates among them. By setting a high methodological standard for ethical theorizing, a cosmopolitan approach enters the area of metaethics as well. However, cosmopolitan ethics, due to its attentiveness to humanity, strongly doubts that metaethics by itself is oriented toward human universality. Metaethics can easily amount to validations bestowed on one society's conventional morality over other societies or fixations with some country's linguistic habits about moral matters or a meditation upon a single culture's moral

Just as metaphysics eventually lost its credibility as an adjudicator of moral norms, skepticism toward metaethics as a lone arbiter of moral concepts and truths has also been warranted. Will further refinements to metaphysics, or metaethics, at last permit deductions of binding moral principles? That also seems dubious, as proffered derivations continue to be a plentiful source of diverse and inconsistent results. That profligacy, at least, could be reasonably expected. No narrow intellec-

Looking to metaethics to adjudicate ethical theorizing and deliver a principled moral framework relevant to humanity cannot be encouraged, unless a different kind of metaethics is engaged—one that is based upon and employs a metaphysics that consults other areas of philosophy and is informed by fields across the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences. Tentative efforts and initial results on our part illustrate how such a broadly informed metaethics can yield a cosmopolitan ethical framework, which in turn suggests some principled ethical guidelines [1, 2]. We do not replicate that work here. Instead we address certain metaethical and philosophical issues of neuroethics, as it develops as an interdisciplinarity of several scientific fields. Analyses and inquiries of a philosophical nature seem inescapable, and likewise, we regard them as essential to the success

But taking neuroethics to be fundamentally indebted to philosophy would not be apparent upon a survey of the many fields contributing to neuroethical concerns and inquiries [3]. The centrality of philosophical inquiry comes into view with the primary assignments given to neuroethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise (consult [4, 5]). In brief, neuroethics (i) ponders the brain's functions that are involved with personal identity, autonomy, and moral judgment/action and (ii) evaluates ways that neuroscience and technology (i.e., neuroS/T) can be developed and implemented while respecting human dignity and ethical norms. Indeed, as many have begun to acknowledge, each assignment yields information and actionable

Harmony between these two assignments is hardly automatic or straightforward. Consider again the hazardous intersections of ethics and neuroscience where neuroethics has offered its supervision: first, the growing responsibility to advise or even adjust social views about psychological and neurological processes involved in moral and immoral conduct and second, the expanding ability to alter cognitive processes in ways affecting conceptions of the self and moral capacity. Unless neuroethics can coordinate the advice to society with an assessment of neuroscientific interventions, neuroethics will be unable to distinguish itself amid the cacophony

tual base could sufficiently support broad practical norms.

assessments that are relevant to the other assignment.

of opinions about what brain science does and means.

**2. Metaethics and philosophy**

tradition.

of neuroethics.

**36**

For example, what neuroethical advice and guidance will be offered about these matters in the area of criminal justice? Imagine a defense lawyer making this argument during a trial: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, my client cannot be guilty because neuroscience shows that no brain is really capable of moral responsibility." And then imagine another trial, where a judge imposes this sentence: "The court requires this convicted criminal to undergo neurological treatment to restore the capacity for moral responsibility." As discourses in neurolaw are already indicating, such scenarios may not remain as fictional as they once seemed [6]. But it appears that a forced choice lies ahead: moral responsibility is either "in the brain" or it is not. Criminal law and legal theory require consistency and try to eliminate confusion. And many other civic institutions, social structures, and cultural frameworks will encounter conflicting interpretations of new neuroS/T. If and when neuroethical consultation is sought, will it be able to speak with one voice?

One might think that the aforementioned kinds of confusing scenarios would be preventable, or at least manageable, if neuroethics is steered in a less naturalistic direction. Assertions that "We are not just our brains!" have an appealing clarity. Disparaging labels for an excessive fixation upon brain functions now include "neurocentrism" and "neuroessentialism" to join the oft-heard charges of "reductionism" and "scientism" [7]. Such labels conceal more than they expose. How does a blanket rejection of scientific reductionism enlighten legal theory about utilizing empirical evidence that adjusting neurological functioning in a brain region actually makes a person less indifferent to hurting other people? How does a scornful repudiation of neuroessentializing illuminate a better definition of moral responsibility, while societies dispute different conceptions of culpability? Deeper philosophical investigations are evidently necessary.
