**Author details**

Simon Smith British Personalist Forum, University of Surrey, Haslemere, United Kingdom

\*Address all correspondence to: simon.smith@surrey.ac.uk

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

**33**

*Doing and Being: A Metaphysic of Persons from an Ontology of Action*

[14] Jasper D. A Short Introduction to Hermeneutics. Kentucky: Westminster

Christianity. Translated by George Eliot.

[16] Farrer A. In: Conti C, editor. Causes' in Reflective Faith. London: SPCK; 1972.

[17] Farrer A. Does god exist? In: Conti C, editor. Reflective Faith. London:

[18] Whitehead AN. In: Griffin DR, Sherburne DW, editors. Process and Reality, Corrected Edition. New York:

[19] Austin JL. A Plea for excuses. In: Urmson JO, Warnock GJ, editors. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon; 1961. pp. 123-152

Oxford: Clarendon; 1995

pp. 47-56

pp. 107-120

International; 1991

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[21] Findlay JN. Can God's existence be disproved? In: Flew AGN, MacIntyre AC, editors. New Essays in Philosophical Theology. London: SCM Press; 1955.

[22] Waismann F. Verifiability. In: Parkinson GHR, editor. The Theory of Meaning. Oxford: OUP; 1968. pp. 35-60

[23] Waismann F. The resources of language. In: Black M, editor. The Importance of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall; 1962.

[24] Macmurray J. Persons in Relation.

[25] Farrer A. Thinking the trinity. In: Houlden L, editor. A Celebration of

New Jersey: Humanities Press

[15] Feuerbach L. The Essence of

New York: Harper & Row; 1957

John Knox Press; 2004

SPCK; 1972. pp. 39-47

Free Press; 1978

pp. 200-218

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82837*

[1] Farrer A. Finite and Infinite. 2nd ed.

[3] Byrne P. God and Realism. Aldershot:

[4] Farrer A. Metaphysics and analogy. In: Conti C, editor. Reflective Faith. London: SPCK; 1972. pp. 82-90

[6] Hampshire S. Thought and Action. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

[7] Farrer A. Faith and Speculation. London: Adam & Charles Black; 1967

[8] Farrer A. The Freedom of the Will (The Gifford Lectures for 1956-1957). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; 1960

[9] Strawson PF. Individuals. London:

[10] Spaemann R. Persons: The Difference between 'Someone' and 'Something'. Translated by Oliver O'Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006

[11] Cottingham J, Stoothoff R, Murdoch D, translators. Descartes Selected Philosophical Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993

[12] Feuerbach L. The Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. Translated by M.H. Vogel. Cambridge: Hackett

[13] Wartofsky MW. Feuerbach,

Methuen & Co.; 1959

Publishing Co.; 1986

Cambridge: CUP; 1982

[5] Michael P. Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1962

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[2] Einstein A. In: Seelig C, et al., editors. Ideas and Opinions, Based on Mein Weltbild. New Translations by Sonja Bergmann. New York: Crown

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*Doing and Being: A Metaphysic of Persons from an Ontology of Action DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82837*

## **References**

*Neuroethics in Principle and Praxis - Conceptual Foundations*

**32**

**Author details**

Simon Smith

provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

British Personalist Forum, University of Surrey, Haslemere, United Kingdom

\*Address all correspondence to: simon.smith@surrey.ac.uk

[1] Farrer A. Finite and Infinite. 2nd ed. Westminster: Dacre Press; 1959

[2] Einstein A. In: Seelig C, et al., editors. Ideas and Opinions, Based on Mein Weltbild. New Translations by Sonja Bergmann. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc.; 1960

[3] Byrne P. God and Realism. Aldershot: Ashgate; 2003

[4] Farrer A. Metaphysics and analogy. In: Conti C, editor. Reflective Faith. London: SPCK; 1972. pp. 82-90

[5] Michael P. Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1962

[6] Hampshire S. Thought and Action. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press; 1983

[7] Farrer A. Faith and Speculation. London: Adam & Charles Black; 1967

[8] Farrer A. The Freedom of the Will (The Gifford Lectures for 1956-1957). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; 1960

[9] Strawson PF. Individuals. London: Methuen & Co.; 1959

[10] Spaemann R. Persons: The Difference between 'Someone' and 'Something'. Translated by Oliver O'Donovan. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006

[11] Cottingham J, Stoothoff R, Murdoch D, translators. Descartes Selected Philosophical Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993

[12] Feuerbach L. The Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. Translated by M.H. Vogel. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co.; 1986

[13] Wartofsky MW. Feuerbach, Cambridge: CUP; 1982

[14] Jasper D. A Short Introduction to Hermeneutics. Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press; 2004

[15] Feuerbach L. The Essence of Christianity. Translated by George Eliot. New York: Harper & Row; 1957

[16] Farrer A. In: Conti C, editor. Causes' in Reflective Faith. London: SPCK; 1972. pp. 200-218

[17] Farrer A. Does god exist? In: Conti C, editor. Reflective Faith. London: SPCK; 1972. pp. 39-47

[18] Whitehead AN. In: Griffin DR, Sherburne DW, editors. Process and Reality, Corrected Edition. New York: Free Press; 1978

[19] Austin JL. A Plea for excuses. In: Urmson JO, Warnock GJ, editors. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon; 1961. pp. 123-152

[20] Conti C. Metaphysical Personalism. Oxford: Clarendon; 1995

[21] Findlay JN. Can God's existence be disproved? In: Flew AGN, MacIntyre AC, editors. New Essays in Philosophical Theology. London: SCM Press; 1955. pp. 47-56

[22] Waismann F. Verifiability. In: Parkinson GHR, editor. The Theory of Meaning. Oxford: OUP; 1968. pp. 35-60

[23] Waismann F. The resources of language. In: Black M, editor. The Importance of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall; 1962. pp. 107-120

[24] Macmurray J. Persons in Relation. New Jersey: Humanities Press International; 1991

[25] Farrer A. Thinking the trinity. In: Houlden L, editor. A Celebration of

Faith. London: Hodder & Stoughton; 1970. pp. 72-77

[26] Farrer A. You want to pray? In: Houlden L, editor. A Celebration of Faith. London: Hodder & Stoughton; 1970. pp. 141-144

[27] James K. Bible. 1 Corinthians. 1611;**15**:10

[28] O'Neill E. The Great God Brown and Lazarus Laughed. London: Jonathan Cape; 1960

[29] Buber M. I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Edinburgh: T&T Clark; 1996

**35**

philosophy.

**Chapter 3**

**Abstract**

Naturalizing Neuroethics? A

Neuroethics is uniquely situated to socially interpret what brain sciences are learning about social and moral cognition while helping society hold neuroscientific research and neurotechnological applications to firm moral standards. Both tasks, if they are to be pursued successfully, must find ways to closely relate the "neuro" with the "ethical." Keeping them apart has been the objective of nonnaturalist worldviews worried about scientism and reductionism, and now they complain about "neuroessentialism" and similar labels for dissolutions of agency and responsibility into mere brain activity. A nonnaturalistic neuroethics, on whatever metaphysical basis, insists that the biology of brains could not explain moral decisions or ground moral norms. We agree on that much, since the methodology of brain sciences presumes, and cannot replace, behavioral and psychological attributions of moral capacity and conduct. But the social and the neurological are always related through the anthropological; and that common basis is, not coincidentally, also where the ethical is grounded, as humanity upholds persons as bearers of moral worth and moral capacity. Neuroethics, by focusing on persons, need never resort to nonnaturalism to uphold what ultimately matters for ethics, and "naturalizing" neuroethics is also unnecessary for

**Keywords:** neuroethics, neurobioethics, naturalism, nonnaturalism, neuroscience,

In this chapter we present a syncretic approach to neuroethics, opening a conciliatory and convergent path forward for this interdisciplinary area. This approach can (1) align neuroethics with cognitive and social neuroscience as well as neurology and (2) situate neuroscience within a capacious philosophical naturalism. Keeping "neuro" primary to neuroethics for its perspective on humanity and keeping "ethics" for humanity central to neuroethics and its mission are paramount goals. Yet, those goals anticipate that neuroethics will have sufficient generality and applicability for all humanity. If the "neuro" and the "ethical" cannot be somehow harmonized, any such universality for neuroethics is unattainable. To that end, we argue here that relationships and continuities connecting (neuro)science and (neuro)ethics should be traced through domains of (natural)

Syncretic Approach

*John R. Shook and James Giordano*

a humanity-centered neurobioethics.

psychology, ethics

**1. Introduction**

## **Chapter 3**

*Neuroethics in Principle and Praxis - Conceptual Foundations*

Faith. London: Hodder & Stoughton;

[26] Farrer A. You want to pray? In: Houlden L, editor. A Celebration of Faith. London: Hodder & Stoughton;

[27] James K. Bible. 1 Corinthians.

[28] O'Neill E. The Great God Brown and Lazarus Laughed. London: Jonathan

[29] Buber M. I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Edinburgh: T&T

1970. pp. 72-77

1970. pp. 141-144

1611;**15**:10

Cape; 1960

Clark; 1996

**34**
