**2.4 What is the risk that the cat is dead?**

The act of observation affects the observed: the accuracy of this famous pronouncement goes beyond quantum mechanics. In psychology, ideas to which we

**179**

**Figure 8.** *Risk analysis.*

*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

boost the cat's chances (**Figure 8**).

following premises and correlations:

to achieve the desired outcome.

checks, repairs and part replacements.

in negative outcomes.

**2.5 The theory of inertia in risk management**

Further, we note the following correlations:

give greater attention tend to become exaggerated and push other ideas out: we think of ourselves as lucky or unlucky, holding a cup that is half-empty or half-full, even though no matter what we think, the reality is one and the same, and only our focus is elsewhere. This focus, as the result of a whole life's experience (see **Figure 1**), may become a major limiting factor for us, the perceivers. Until we open Schrödinger's chamber, the cat may be in any possible state, and so, in the physics of the infinitesimal as much as in risk assessment, it could be both dead and alive. Of course, we can describe the dangers lurking in the chamber, for the cat and for us, and we can also point out the hazards. The moment we open the chamber, we will know whether the cat is dead or alive, but it will be too late to do anything about it. The probability of the cat's death as the result of radiation will range from 0 to 100% (or 0.0 to 1.0). This number is a meaningless statistic. However, if we use the risk matrix to assess risk, we will note that both the level of goal attainment certainty and the level of goal attainment (the goal being the puss's survival, presumably) are in fields 2, 3 and 4, and so corrective measures are required if we want to

If we interpret risk as the influence of uncertainty on goals, we can use the theory of inertia [10] to manage risk effectively. This model is informed by the

Premise 1. The probability of positive and negative outcomes of our actions is

Premise 2. Since we cannot influence the actual event which will pass as the result of our actions, any focus on this event will be futile. The outcome for our enterprise will be the result of our preparation for the event and not of actions taken

Premise 3. Preparation for all possible outcomes (negative as well as desired) should be the goal of our actions. Lack of preparation is a decision which will result

Correlation 1. Negative outcomes are the result of three classes of factors: human error, machine malfunction and other technical shortfalls and factors out of our control. The risk of negative outcomes can be minimised through multilevel monitoring and controls within the human and machine classes of factors, which would verify that decisions are taken based on sound assumptions, that actions are followed through and that machinery is kept in a working condition with timely

always 50%. We have no influence over the outcome of our actions.

#### *Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

hour, one of the atoms decays but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer that shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed.

The act of observation affects the observed: the accuracy of this famous pronouncement goes beyond quantum mechanics. In psychology, ideas to which we

The first atomic decay would have poisoned it [9].

**2.4 What is the risk that the cat is dead?**

**178**

**Figure 7.**

*Risk matrix—practical application.*

**Figure 6.** *Risk matrix.* give greater attention tend to become exaggerated and push other ideas out: we think of ourselves as lucky or unlucky, holding a cup that is half-empty or half-full, even though no matter what we think, the reality is one and the same, and only our focus is elsewhere. This focus, as the result of a whole life's experience (see **Figure 1**), may become a major limiting factor for us, the perceivers. Until we open Schrödinger's chamber, the cat may be in any possible state, and so, in the physics of the infinitesimal as much as in risk assessment, it could be both dead and alive. Of course, we can describe the dangers lurking in the chamber, for the cat and for us, and we can also point out the hazards. The moment we open the chamber, we will know whether the cat is dead or alive, but it will be too late to do anything about it.

The probability of the cat's death as the result of radiation will range from 0 to 100% (or 0.0 to 1.0). This number is a meaningless statistic. However, if we use the risk matrix to assess risk, we will note that both the level of goal attainment certainty and the level of goal attainment (the goal being the puss's survival, presumably) are in fields 2, 3 and 4, and so corrective measures are required if we want to boost the cat's chances (**Figure 8**).

#### **2.5 The theory of inertia in risk management**

If we interpret risk as the influence of uncertainty on goals, we can use the theory of inertia [10] to manage risk effectively. This model is informed by the following premises and correlations:

Premise 1. The probability of positive and negative outcomes of our actions is always 50%. We have no influence over the outcome of our actions.

Premise 2. Since we cannot influence the actual event which will pass as the result of our actions, any focus on this event will be futile. The outcome for our enterprise will be the result of our preparation for the event and not of actions taken to achieve the desired outcome.

Premise 3. Preparation for all possible outcomes (negative as well as desired) should be the goal of our actions. Lack of preparation is a decision which will result in negative outcomes.

Further, we note the following correlations:

Correlation 1. Negative outcomes are the result of three classes of factors: human error, machine malfunction and other technical shortfalls and factors out of our control. The risk of negative outcomes can be minimised through multilevel monitoring and controls within the human and machine classes of factors, which would verify that decisions are taken based on sound assumptions, that actions are followed through and that machinery is kept in a working condition with timely checks, repairs and part replacements.

**Figure 8.** *Risk analysis.*

The risk of negative outcomes can be minimised through multilevel monitoring and controls which would verify that decisions are taken based on sound assumptions, that actions followed through and that machinery is kept in working condition with timely checks, repairs and part replacements.

Correlation 2. If the outcome of our actions does not result from human or machine factor, we have no influence over it. In such cases we must develop contingency procedures for all outcomes beyond our influence.

### **3. Conclusion**

The concepts of risk, danger and hazard lend themselves to statistical treatment, but the customary use of statistics for risk assessment leads to flawed conclusions, due to limited predictability of events and scenarios.

Risk management, understood as an attempt to influence the certainty of goal attainment, cannot be treated as an exercise in statistics. Instead, we ought to describe the level of certainty of goal attainment by considering costs and benefits of alternatives.

Risk assessment ought to identify the threshold parameters for accepting the costs and the level of goal attainment. The result of the assessment should identify if the goals can be achieved, to what degree and at what costs associated with adverse developments.

Every risk analysis must consider information available from documented past experiences and from identifiable future events. Their identification must be thorough and use all available tools to generate all possible scenarios.

Risk cannot be assessed without identifying the goals of the analysed process or situation. If the goals cannot be identified, we ought to limit ourselves to describing the hazards and, in the case of taking actions, the associated dangers. Additionally, we can supply historic rates of recurrence. Ultimately, statistical analysis ought not to be the primary goal of risk assessment.

When goal identification is difficult or impossible, we ought to identify the worst-case scenario and prepare for it. In the event, activities which induce danger in a hazardous situation should only be undertaken after comprehensive preparation for the identified possible effects. We ought to strive to eliminate danger arising from lack of preparation.

There are three reasons, or classes of events, which require preparation: effects of human error, effects of machine error and other events over which we have no influence. Preparation ought to comprise scenarios for each of these classes of events. The aim of the above considerations has been to suggest effective and falsifiable methods for risk assessment and for identification of hazards and dangers.

**181**

**Author details**

Marek Różycki

provided the original work is properly cited.

*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

M/D/R/K Trusted Adviser Group Sp. z o.o., Mikołów, Poland

\*Address all correspondence to: m.rozycki@mdrk.eu

*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

tion with timely checks, repairs and part replacements.

gency procedures for all outcomes beyond our influence.

due to limited predictability of events and scenarios.

**3. Conclusion**

of alternatives.

adverse developments.

from lack of preparation.

to be the primary goal of risk assessment.

The risk of negative outcomes can be minimised through multilevel monitoring and controls which would verify that decisions are taken based on sound assumptions, that actions followed through and that machinery is kept in working condi-

The concepts of risk, danger and hazard lend themselves to statistical treatment, but the customary use of statistics for risk assessment leads to flawed conclusions,

Risk management, understood as an attempt to influence the certainty of goal attainment, cannot be treated as an exercise in statistics. Instead, we ought to describe the level of certainty of goal attainment by considering costs and benefits

Risk assessment ought to identify the threshold parameters for accepting the costs and the level of goal attainment. The result of the assessment should identify if the goals can be achieved, to what degree and at what costs associated with

Every risk analysis must consider information available from documented past experiences and from identifiable future events. Their identification must be

When goal identification is difficult or impossible, we ought to identify the worst-case scenario and prepare for it. In the event, activities which induce danger in a hazardous situation should only be undertaken after comprehensive preparation for the identified possible effects. We ought to strive to eliminate danger arising

There are three reasons, or classes of events, which require preparation: effects of human error, effects of machine error and other events over which we have no influence. Preparation ought to comprise scenarios for each of these classes of events. The aim of the above considerations has been to suggest effective and falsifiable methods for risk assessment and for identification of hazards and dangers.

Risk cannot be assessed without identifying the goals of the analysed process or situation. If the goals cannot be identified, we ought to limit ourselves to describing the hazards and, in the case of taking actions, the associated dangers. Additionally, we can supply historic rates of recurrence. Ultimately, statistical analysis ought not

thorough and use all available tools to generate all possible scenarios.

Correlation 2. If the outcome of our actions does not result from human or machine factor, we have no influence over it. In such cases we must develop contin-

**180**
