**2.4 Using mass media for risk communication**

The recent trend for urgent information dissemination is using on-line based technology, such as SNS. Government agents are also using SNS such as Facebook (**Figure 11**), Twitter, YouTube, and others [7]. Especially, depending on the people and their culture, specific SNS site is more actively used; for example,

#### **Figure 9.**

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

depicted in different colors (as cited, [44]).

*2.3.3 The unique city with diversity*

**Figure 8.**

*the public directly.*

epidemic, flood, fuel/natural gas supply disruption, and extreme heat. Risk assessment is followed by the Ontario's risk assessment matrix (**Table 3**). Risk severity is

*Public weather alerts for Ontario, which provide real-time watch/awareness, alert, or no alert information to* 

The City of Toronto with diverse races holds 51.5% of visible minority of population, and 51.2% of immigrants were born outside of Canada. Among them, 132,765 people reported that they cannot speak English or French (which are the official language of Canada). This is an important fact to keep in mind, as Toronto is a city that is home to many immigrants and refugees, in addition to many tourists each year. So the City of Toronto must also consider about their vulnerability due to language or cultural barriers. Looking at the data of ethnic demography [45], in 2006, 126 ethnic origins were increased to 278. The different mother tongue (language first learned at birth) users are scattered in Toronto which counted to 89 in 2011, and 85 in 2016; 14 visible minority groups were counted in 2016. Nonvisible minority is indicated as groups from countries in Europe; however, it does not indicate that they use English or French. Some ethnic neighbors are living together in a community that makes Toronto hosts a diverse set of towns such as Koreatown, Little India, Greektown, Corso Italia, Chinatown, and Little Jamaica. The City of Toronto offers to the public its diversity by categories in the 2016 thematic maps where not a visible minority or multiple visible minorities reside as their home, for example

*Risk assessment matrix of Ontario, which the City of Toronto shall follow as a standard to assess and determine* 

**48**

**Table 3.**

*the risk's level.*

*The 2016 thematic maps where not a visible minority or multiple visible minorities are distributed in Toronto.*

*Wellbeing index (map); information is displayed using query function over spatial map.*

**Figure 11.**

*Each government's official Facebook page: Tokyo (left), Seoul (middle), and Toronto (right). Each city tries to communicate with the public; individuals, agents, volunteers, media, and each other.*

Facebook is widely used in the Philippines. As revealed by the 2011 earthquake in Japan and the Philippine Typhoon Haiyan [6, 7], the government, the family and the volunteer groups all used social networking services to communicate information.

Such sophisticated technologies require internet access to use; thus, it would be a fatal weakness for areas with little or no internet, such as remote areas or even urban areas with decommissioned internet. In a highly developed IT city, the disconnection of internet would be a temporary inconvenience, as the public would assume that the service will be recovered quickly because it is considered as one of top priorities. Urban residents, who tend to be more globalized people due to frequent connection to the outside world, use personal IT devices not just to stay connected to the world but also to look for better tools and information to make themselves feel safe and calm.

#### **3. Conclusion**

In terms of disaster risk communication, three cities have been developing effective methods and have attempted to provide accurate information to the public. Tokyo, Seoul, and Toronto have different disaster threatening aspects, population characteristics, cultural background, scale, and complexity of the city with physical infrastructures (such as subway system or electricity supply system), so the approach to response to emergencies is differently developed.

In disaster risk management, the disaster cycle has response phase, recovery phase, and preparedness phase. In response phase, there are rescue, supply (materials, equipment, medication, etc.), and support. In recovery phase, there are reopening of the school, repairing of the transportation system, and hard (that is, physical and structural) reconstruction and recovery of infrastructure. In preparedness phase, there are development of manuals, evacuation drills, public education, and so on. Historically, Japanese rely on their government for the entire cycle of a disaster. In the case of Tokyo, despite the many efforts Tokyo makes for the safety of its residents, the information it provides seems to be closer to risk governance than to risk communication. Information that Tokyo provides is mostly preparedness stage information against natural disasters rather than human-related risks, and in general, the government tends to be more prompt with its communication on natural disasters. Therefore, the public most likely depends more critically on broadcasts, media, SNS, and other sources to obtain accurate real-time information on topics about earthquake, tsunami, and typhoon more than risks of terrorism and global political threats.

**51**

Seoul.

*Functional and Technical Methods of Information and Risk Communication*

Won and Kim [47] identified problems by reviewing the disaster and accident scenarios of Seoul and suggested new recommendations for risk communication. By this study, Seoul needs to realize the uncertainties of the disaster incidents and accidents, especially in highly developed complex urban areas. Earthquake and tsunami are not probable natural disasters for Seoul residents, but fine particle dust, such as PM2.5 or yellow sand storm containing heavy metals from China are more realistic risks. Their suggestion emphasizes that initial response is extremely important, and in this early response time stage, every individual should be able to judge the current situation and take their own initiative action. This is a particularly important point in that it can critically affect the life of oneself at an early point in time. On the other hand, the residents in Seoul are dealing with not only high population density, but also complicated transportation system and social services. However, the public is limited in their awareness and knowledge for disaster response in their daily lives—when a crisis occurs, this lack of public awareness/knowledge amplifies the extent of the catastrophe or casualties. Nevertheless, manuals and suggestions are still deployed in governmental agencies and/or organizations, including public

Considering the hierarchical social work structure in Tokyo and Seoul, topdown control/command, and bottom-up report system, especially, governmental office workers are hired through the employment qualification and hired for a permanent position, but because of the culture of rotating the positions, the work environments hardly accept flexible self-decision-making with one's own

Furthermore, there is no manual for residents of Seoul who may not fully understand the government's purpose, intention on disaster drills, or their messages to the public. There may be many well-made drills, policies, and procedures developed by the government, but much of this information do not end up with the public who need these to deal with the emergencies because the channels for the information to reach these end-users are often broken, incomplete, or complex. Thus, these well-developed recommendations and manuals by different government agencies would be "floating in the air", or locked in the storage. This is one of many typical examples of the risk communication being unilateral between decision-makers, field workers, and the victims, which may be a cause of major controversies in

The unique character of Toronto is the mosaic society with various races and cultures. Still, Canadian government is willing to accept new immigrants from other countries and is open to refugees, as well. The diversity of Toronto society members may characterize the different vulnerability compared to Tokyo and

Three cities developed many materials to communicate between governmental agencies and public including manuals and documentary forms, and the clarified relationship between those who command and those who report. According to information on the official websites of the cities, despite the development of IT functions, Toronto seems to have problems communicating with groups with diverse cultural backgrounds and language limitations. Because most information requires a fairly high level of English or French and/or IT knowledge or fluency, it seems that the public experiences difficulty accessing information easily unless particular attention is paid. Moreover, understanding the risks depends on their past experiences, for example, if refugees came from a country in a civil war who will be more aware of the risks of war and terrorism than natural disasters. This can be even more difficult if the amount of information is large. Thus, providing a booklet or pamphlet in different languages is an effective way for public understanding and education depending on the community's ethnic population.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84488*

and private, and educational sectors.

responsibility.

bureaucratic administrators.

#### *Functional and Technical Methods of Information and Risk Communication DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84488*

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

Facebook is widely used in the Philippines. As revealed by the 2011 earthquake in Japan and the Philippine Typhoon Haiyan [6, 7], the government, the family and the volunteer groups all used social networking services to communicate

*communicate with the public; individuals, agents, volunteers, media, and each other.*

*Each government's official Facebook page: Tokyo (left), Seoul (middle), and Toronto (right). Each city tries to* 

Such sophisticated technologies require internet access to use; thus, it would be a fatal weakness for areas with little or no internet, such as remote areas or even urban areas with decommissioned internet. In a highly developed IT city, the disconnection of internet would be a temporary inconvenience, as the public would assume that the service will be recovered quickly because it is considered as one of top priorities. Urban residents, who tend to be more globalized people due to frequent connection to the outside world, use personal IT devices not just to stay connected to the world but also to look for better tools and information to make

In terms of disaster risk communication, three cities have been developing effective methods and have attempted to provide accurate information to the public. Tokyo, Seoul, and Toronto have different disaster threatening aspects, population characteristics, cultural background, scale, and complexity of the city with physical infrastructures (such as subway system or electricity supply system), so the

In disaster risk management, the disaster cycle has response phase, recovery phase, and preparedness phase. In response phase, there are rescue, supply (materials, equipment, medication, etc.), and support. In recovery phase, there are reopening of the school, repairing of the transportation system, and hard (that is, physical and structural) reconstruction and recovery of infrastructure. In preparedness phase, there are development of manuals, evacuation drills, public education, and so on. Historically, Japanese rely on their government for the entire cycle of a disaster. In the case of Tokyo, despite the many efforts Tokyo makes for the safety of its residents, the information it provides seems to be closer to risk governance than to risk communication. Information that Tokyo provides is mostly preparedness stage information against natural disasters rather than human-related risks, and in general, the government tends to be more prompt with its communication on natural disasters. Therefore, the public most likely depends more critically on broadcasts, media, SNS, and other sources to obtain accurate real-time information on topics about earthquake, tsunami, and typhoon more than risks of terrorism and global political threats.

approach to response to emergencies is differently developed.

**50**

information.

**Figure 11.**

**3. Conclusion**

themselves feel safe and calm.

Won and Kim [47] identified problems by reviewing the disaster and accident scenarios of Seoul and suggested new recommendations for risk communication. By this study, Seoul needs to realize the uncertainties of the disaster incidents and accidents, especially in highly developed complex urban areas. Earthquake and tsunami are not probable natural disasters for Seoul residents, but fine particle dust, such as PM2.5 or yellow sand storm containing heavy metals from China are more realistic risks. Their suggestion emphasizes that initial response is extremely important, and in this early response time stage, every individual should be able to judge the current situation and take their own initiative action. This is a particularly important point in that it can critically affect the life of oneself at an early point in time. On the other hand, the residents in Seoul are dealing with not only high population density, but also complicated transportation system and social services. However, the public is limited in their awareness and knowledge for disaster response in their daily lives—when a crisis occurs, this lack of public awareness/knowledge amplifies the extent of the catastrophe or casualties. Nevertheless, manuals and suggestions are still deployed in governmental agencies and/or organizations, including public and private, and educational sectors.

Considering the hierarchical social work structure in Tokyo and Seoul, topdown control/command, and bottom-up report system, especially, governmental office workers are hired through the employment qualification and hired for a permanent position, but because of the culture of rotating the positions, the work environments hardly accept flexible self-decision-making with one's own responsibility.

Furthermore, there is no manual for residents of Seoul who may not fully understand the government's purpose, intention on disaster drills, or their messages to the public. There may be many well-made drills, policies, and procedures developed by the government, but much of this information do not end up with the public who need these to deal with the emergencies because the channels for the information to reach these end-users are often broken, incomplete, or complex. Thus, these well-developed recommendations and manuals by different government agencies would be "floating in the air", or locked in the storage. This is one of many typical examples of the risk communication being unilateral between decision-makers, field workers, and the victims, which may be a cause of major controversies in bureaucratic administrators.

The unique character of Toronto is the mosaic society with various races and cultures. Still, Canadian government is willing to accept new immigrants from other countries and is open to refugees, as well. The diversity of Toronto society members may characterize the different vulnerability compared to Tokyo and Seoul.

Three cities developed many materials to communicate between governmental agencies and public including manuals and documentary forms, and the clarified relationship between those who command and those who report. According to information on the official websites of the cities, despite the development of IT functions, Toronto seems to have problems communicating with groups with diverse cultural backgrounds and language limitations. Because most information requires a fairly high level of English or French and/or IT knowledge or fluency, it seems that the public experiences difficulty accessing information easily unless particular attention is paid. Moreover, understanding the risks depends on their past experiences, for example, if refugees came from a country in a civil war who will be more aware of the risks of war and terrorism than natural disasters. This can be even more difficult if the amount of information is large. Thus, providing a booklet or pamphlet in different languages is an effective way for public understanding and education depending on the community's ethnic population.

Insurance and financial support allow the victims to return back to their home—their original place—easier and quicker. People returning back to their communities is a very crucial aspect of the society recovering from an event. People return to their communities because of many reasons—memories, assets, land, and other aspects of their lives that are precious to them. This allows the community to rebuild itself, and thus, stand back on its feet and contribute to the society, both economically and culturally. Insurance offered by governmental agencies may potentially give a feeling and sense of safety and hope.

Lessons from 2011 Japan Earthquake and tsunami show that victims were suffering to bring back their original level of quality of life prior to the disaster. Many victims never got their original life back because they did not purchase the earthquake and tsunami combination insurance. The victims could not get the full support from the government up to their expectations. Depending on their original level of quality of life, some victims suffered from the feeling of relative deprivation and decreased financial flexibility. This suggests that mental care of the victims is as important, and having more available options of insurance may reduce or prevent further sufferings of their own people and help them get back on their feet. This highlights an element that is critical in community recovery, resilience, and necessity that were absent in the governance of the three cities.

Depending on the city and their culture, the disaster cycle is often a spiral motion rather than a complete "circle"—as time goes on, as people review and learn from their experiences. As technologies improve, many systems and infrastructures are either repaired or replaced by faster, cleaner, safer, smarter, or better technologies and alternative materials, thus improving the system it replaced with a longerlasting or more resilient model, leading to a better quality of life for its people and social systems.
