**2. Paradigms of risk, hazards and danger**

#### **2.1 Man proposes, god disposes?**

Since the cultural revolution of the Renaissance, we have arrogated power over our world and have come to believe that we can influence future events. From lotteries and stock markets through to diarised work meetings, we always try to increase the certainty of success. We expect to manage the future, based on past events. This belief in our potential to manage our future can be captured as follows:

Pessimistic tendencies are thought to be related to our survival instinct—the better you can foresee a misfortune, the better your chances—optimism can lead to ignoring past experiences. According to this theory, pessimists should live longer and more stable lives.

At the level of the individual, medicine does not corroborate this theory, and the adverse psychological effects of pessimism on the health might be at play. However at the collective level, pessimism in the form of careful assessment of reality, hazards, the future and the associated risks, appears to be the dominant modus operandi.

We may form the following observations based on **Figure 1**:


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**Figure 1.**

*Determinants of risk management decisions.*

*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

considered.

and not the foundation of decision-making.

more past events and identify scenarios more accurately.

and circumstances (**Table 1**).

the terrorist drove the lorry into the crowd [1, 2]. Any method comprising creative combinations of analysis and intuition could have allowed such a scenario to be imagined and prepared for. Stock market analysis is another good example: the more complex the model, the better the analyses—which still does not rule out error. Share prices, as a collective expression of human actions, are variable and frequently unpredictable. However, if we consider the

4.Known scenarios (as expressions of the applied computational feasibility) will be appropriate to the degree to which past experiences and possible events are

5.If, at the stage of future event assessment (identifying scenarios), we fail to consider possible events not based on experience, our analysis will be flawed.

It is impossible to avoid the limiting influence of experience; therefore, no risk assessment is fully rational. Managers should regard risk assessment as ancillary

The above statement may be illustrated by considering catastrophes. The list below consists only of incidents caused by ignoring known and predictable events

The disasters were caused by events and circumstances which were not past experiences but were nevertheless predictable. The disasters themselves may be deemed unpredictable because the events which led to them slipped out of control. It is possible to identify analogous events elsewhere which were rectified because the processes remained under control—for example, in the 1979 incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania, USA. The effects of human actions may be deemed unpredictable, even though the scenarios which ensue were predictable. Does only God dispose what man proposes? We can only blame gods or fate if our risk assessment model is limited to analysing known past events. As our computational capabilities grow, we are able to analyse more and

possibility of both a rise and a fall of share prices, we will survive.

<sup>1</sup> According to the second law of thermodynamics, every system and process will suffer energy dispersion tending towards disorder, or entropic equilibrium, simply because disorder is more probable. If we connect two vessels, one containing oxygen and the other containing nitrogen, it is improbable that after connecting, both gases will remain in their original vessels. Such an event is possible, but it is more probable that the atoms of both gases will disperse across the two vessels.

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

**2. Paradigms of risk, hazards and danger**

noticing that no such thing exists.

**2.1 Man proposes, god disposes?**

follows:

operandi.

and more stable lives.

identify individual events.

a toaster; we get the picture—observe it—after the event and blame fate without

Since the cultural revolution of the Renaissance, we have arrogated power over our world and have come to believe that we can influence future events. From lotteries and stock markets through to diarised work meetings, we always try to increase the certainty of success. We expect to manage the future, based on past events. This belief in our potential to manage our future can be captured as

Pessimistic tendencies are thought to be related to our survival instinct—the better you can foresee a misfortune, the better your chances—optimism can lead to ignoring past experiences. According to this theory, pessimists should live longer

At the level of the individual, medicine does not corroborate this theory, and the adverse psychological effects of pessimism on the health might be at play. However at the collective level, pessimism in the form of careful assessment of reality, hazards, the future and the associated risks, appears to be the dominant modus

1.Possible events are not unlimited, and the number of possible events depends on the correlations between the relevant factors, with varying threshold limit values to each combination. It is also possible to define threshold properties of events, based on their combinations, although it is not always possible to

2.Human experience is based on concrete past events, recorded in the individual and the collective memory. Describing history as it does, this data set also informs us about the possible futures: the greater the set, the more possibilities for consideration. However, the set is never complete—giving rise to the black swan phenomenon, as well as Sod's/Murphy's law at lesser scales. This appears

3.Identification of future scenarios is a combination of empirical and creative endeavours, and it used to be assumed that computational feasibility has little influence over it. However, if we consider historical data and threshold properties of possible future events, our calculations will give us the edge in preparing for identified possible outcomes. The 2016 Bastille Day lorry attack in Nice, France, may serve as an example of the cognitive deficit in analysing future events: security services were well prepared for potential terrorist attacks before and during the fireworks display, but not after the display; that is when

<sup>1</sup> According to the second law of thermodynamics, every system and process will suffer energy dispersion tending towards disorder, or entropic equilibrium, simply because disorder is more probable. If we connect two vessels, one containing oxygen and the other containing nitrogen, it is improbable that after connecting, both gases will remain in their original vessels. Such an event is possible, but it is more prob-

.

We may form the following observations based on **Figure 1**:

to be congruous with the wider laws of physics1

able that the atoms of both gases will disperse across the two vessels.

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the terrorist drove the lorry into the crowd [1, 2]. Any method comprising creative combinations of analysis and intuition could have allowed such a scenario to be imagined and prepared for. Stock market analysis is another good example: the more complex the model, the better the analyses—which still does not rule out error. Share prices, as a collective expression of human actions, are variable and frequently unpredictable. However, if we consider the possibility of both a rise and a fall of share prices, we will survive.


It is impossible to avoid the limiting influence of experience; therefore, no risk assessment is fully rational. Managers should regard risk assessment as ancillary and not the foundation of decision-making.

The above statement may be illustrated by considering catastrophes. The list below consists only of incidents caused by ignoring known and predictable events and circumstances (**Table 1**).

The disasters were caused by events and circumstances which were not past experiences but were nevertheless predictable. The disasters themselves may be deemed unpredictable because the events which led to them slipped out of control. It is possible to identify analogous events elsewhere which were rectified because the processes remained under control—for example, in the 1979 incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania, USA. The effects of human actions may be deemed unpredictable, even though the scenarios which ensue were predictable. Does only God dispose what man proposes? We can only blame gods or fate if our risk assessment model is limited to analysing known past events. As our computational capabilities grow, we are able to analyse more and more past events and identify scenarios more accurately.

**Figure 1.** *Determinants of risk management decisions.*


#### **Table 1.**

*Industry incidents.*

#### **2.2 Hazard or danger?**

The terms danger, hazard and risk are frequently used interchangeably. The first two are especially prone to confusion: in most European languages, they are treated as synonyms.

Risk is also considered a synonym to danger and hazard. A home owner will speak of avoiding the risk of fire or the hazard of fire or the danger of fire. However, the insurer will assess the risk, but not the hazard of fire, using a more precise language. Nevertheless, the distinctions are vague and lead to inadequate risk assessment and management procedures. Let us consider the following example.

In many countries, including the European Union, every job requires to have its risks assessed, and employees responsible for this task use different assessment methods. In all these methods, the activities and settings of the job are described, and the risk is calculated in percentages or degrees; we learn, say, that a given job's risk is low or, elsewhere, that damages are acceptable. What does it mean?

Will the employee in the assessed job not have an accident? Or if they do, will the damage be acceptable? Unfortunately, it does not work like that. I have participated in many post-accident procedures in workplaces. Usually the situation pans out as follows: the accident takes place; we have injuries and damages. In all analysed events, the documented risk assessment deemed the risk low and the damages acceptable. Since the accident happened, what was the goal of the assessment?

Majority of assessment methods use statistical models in which we are required to define the probability of an event taking place and the severity of its effects. Looking back at the determinants of risk management decisions shown in **Figure 1**, our work will be purely theoretical and past-focused. Instead, the probability of describing real events which will take place can be calculated with the help of Bernoulli's principle, as shown in **Figure 2**.

Two probabilities coexist here:

P1—the probability of identifying the scenario which will take place.

P2—the probability of identifying the scenario which has taken place.

The joint probability will be a sum:

P1 + P2.

The probability that an event will occur *k* times following *n* attempts, where *k* = *n*, can be described as follows:

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*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

the scenario which will take place.

P1(1) = 0.5.

P2(1) = 0.25.

assert this to be true, and that is it.

the hazard becomes a danger (**Figure 4**).

scenario which will take place.

and the probability of failure equals

and the probability of failure equals

happened and the event was a success (1/2) or failure (1/2).

we can calculate the risk to equal, at best, 0.5\*0.25 = 0.75.

crocodile's physical features, behaviours and habits (**Figure 3**).

quantified in terms of injury or damage, it is only a hazard.

Therefore, we can assume the following values for the probability of identifying

We assume that every time the probability of success (the answer "yes") equals

We can assume the following values for the probability of identifying the

We assume that every time the probability of success (the answer "yes") equals

Four variants are possible: where the predicted scenario has happened and the event was a success (1/2) or failure (1/2); and where an unpredicted scenario has

There is a causal relationship between events and scenarios, and consequently

Our margin of error is, therefore, 25%, which necessitates eliminating mistakes. Hazard is the subjective property of a situation or an object. It is independent of the environment and does not need to interact with it. It is describable. A crocodile in a pond will serve as the perfect example: we know that it is alive, a predator, and that meeting it will not be pleasant or neutral to our wellbeing. We can describe the

The fact of the crocodile's existence implies nothing. Yes, it is a hazard; we can

As soon as the hazardous object or situation begins to interact with our activity,

A planned or undertaken activity may, on contact with a hazard, cause danger to arise. The danger can be expressed as the measure of injury or damage. As we can see, it is important to differentiate between hazard and danger: if it cannot be

Going back to job risk assessments, we should focus on describing hazards and pointing out dangers caused by the employee's specific activities. Unfortunately, since these concepts are not easily aligned with our image of reality, they rely on

(1)

(3)

(5)

, (2)

, (4)

*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

$$P\mathfrak{n}(k) = \left(\frac{\pi}{k}\right) p^k p^{\pi-k} \tag{1}$$

Therefore, we can assume the following values for the probability of identifying the scenario which will take place.

We assume that every time the probability of success (the answer "yes") equals

$$q = \frac{l}{2},\tag{2}$$

and the probability of failure equals

$$p = \frac{1}{2} \tag{3}$$

P1(1) = 0.5.

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

injuries

6.1 m

**Event Identified cause Real cause**

Coal dust explosion 1099 deaths

Methyl isocyanate leak 15,000 dead, 560,000 nonfatal

Uncontrolled reactor conditions caused core meltdown

Tsunami protection measures. Historically waves did not exceed

31 direct casualties, 350,000 people resettled, fallout area of 140,000 km2

The terms danger, hazard and risk are frequently used interchangeably. The first two are especially prone to confusion: in most European languages, they are treated

Use of naked-flame miners' lamps [3]

Backflow of water into a leaky methyl

testing the cooling system negligently [5]

Flooding of fuel tanks for nuclear reactor

Planned safety test delay due to temporary electricity supply cut from

isocyanate tank [4]

another power plant,

cooling generators [6]

14-metre wave

Will the employee in the assessed job not have an accident? Or if they do, will the damage be acceptable? Unfortunately, it does not work like that. I have participated in many post-accident procedures in workplaces. Usually the situation pans out as follows: the accident takes place; we have injuries and damages. In all analysed events, the documented risk assessment deemed the risk low and the damages acceptable. Since the accident happened, what was the goal of the assessment?

Majority of assessment methods use statistical models in which we are required

to define the probability of an event taking place and the severity of its effects. Looking back at the determinants of risk management decisions shown in **Figure 1**, our work will be purely theoretical and past-focused. Instead, the probability of describing real events which will take place can be calculated with the help of

P1—the probability of identifying the scenario which will take place. P2—the probability of identifying the scenario which has taken place.

The probability that an event will occur *k* times following *n* attempts, where

Bernoulli's principle, as shown in **Figure 2**. Two probabilities coexist here:

The joint probability will be a sum:

*k* = *n*, can be described as follows:

Risk is also considered a synonym to danger and hazard. A home owner will speak of avoiding the risk of fire or the hazard of fire or the danger of fire. However, the insurer will assess the risk, but not the hazard of fire, using a more precise language. Nevertheless, the distinctions are vague and lead to inadequate risk assessment and management procedures. Let us consider the following example. In many countries, including the European Union, every job requires to have its risks assessed, and employees responsible for this task use different assessment methods. In all these methods, the activities and settings of the job are described, and the risk is calculated in percentages or degrees; we learn, say, that a given job's

risk is low or, elsewhere, that damages are acceptable. What does it mean?

**2.2 Hazard or danger?**

Courrières mine disaster 10 March 1906

Bhopal gas tragedy 3 December 1984

Chernobyl nuclear

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster 11 March 2011

disaster 26 April 1986

**Table 1.** *Industry incidents.*

as synonyms.

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P1 + P2.

We can assume the following values for the probability of identifying the scenario which will take place.

We assume that every time the probability of success (the answer "yes") equals

$$g = \frac{1}{2} \tag{4}$$

and the probability of failure equals

$$p = \frac{1}{2} \tag{5}$$

Four variants are possible: where the predicted scenario has happened and the event was a success (1/2) or failure (1/2); and where an unpredicted scenario has happened and the event was a success (1/2) or failure (1/2).

P2(1) = 0.25.

There is a causal relationship between events and scenarios, and consequently we can calculate the risk to equal, at best, 0.5\*0.25 = 0.75.

Our margin of error is, therefore, 25%, which necessitates eliminating mistakes.

Hazard is the subjective property of a situation or an object. It is independent of the environment and does not need to interact with it. It is describable. A crocodile in a pond will serve as the perfect example: we know that it is alive, a predator, and that meeting it will not be pleasant or neutral to our wellbeing. We can describe the crocodile's physical features, behaviours and habits (**Figure 3**).

The fact of the crocodile's existence implies nothing. Yes, it is a hazard; we can assert this to be true, and that is it.

As soon as the hazardous object or situation begins to interact with our activity, the hazard becomes a danger (**Figure 4**).

A planned or undertaken activity may, on contact with a hazard, cause danger to arise. The danger can be expressed as the measure of injury or damage. As we can see, it is important to differentiate between hazard and danger: if it cannot be quantified in terms of injury or damage, it is only a hazard.

Going back to job risk assessments, we should focus on describing hazards and pointing out dangers caused by the employee's specific activities. Unfortunately, since these concepts are not easily aligned with our image of reality, they rely on

#### *Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

#### **Figure 2.**

*Probability of identifying the event predicted in risk analysis.*

**Figure 3.** *Visualisation of a hazard: a crocodile in a pond.*

**Figure 4.** *Visualisation of danger: activity reveals the destructive potential of the hazard.*

being understood by risk assessors who frequently reach false conclusions regarding our influence over future events.

#### **2.3 Risk**

Risk is the potential variability of events [7] or, to put it another way, the influence of uncertainty on goals [8]. Uncertainty can be positive (expected) or negative (unexpected), and goals can concern any human or organisational activity. Certainty is defined as the lack of uncertainty; uncertainty is a mental state characterised by the lack of information which would allow understanding of an event,

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*goals.*

**Figure 5.**

*Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

• It refers to potential events, their results or both.

be considered separate from this factor (**Figure 5**).

statistic (e.g. as the quotient of effects and probability).

Let us assess risk for the following situation:

require corrective measures (**Figure 7**).

and probability).

characteristics:

its results or situational probability. Lack of information is not tantamount to the absence of an event, but results from flawed decision determinants (see **Figure 1**). Risk, understood as the influence of uncertainty on goals, has the following

• It is the combination of an event's probability and its results (including any circumstance changes), and as such it admits the use of statistical tools.

Risk should be expressed as a combination of the level of goal attainment certainty (from 0%, no chance of attainment, to 100%, certain attainment) and the level of goal attainment (where 100% means the goal has been fully achieved).

The most desirable state is when both the level of goal attainment certainty and the level of goal attainment exceed 50% **although, in the case of negative outcomes in safety or mission-critical domains, the tolerability levels are often set by regulators and may be below 50%**. That's field 1 of the matrix. Any other risk level, captured above in fields 2, 3 and 4, should not be acceptable and should

It is easy to see that the area of acceptable risk is quite small. In the matrix above, it is less than 20%, though the level may vary depending on situation. In majority of cases, however, risk assessment will require corrections to the original assumption. It would be wrong to assess risk merely as a statistic (e.g. as the quotient of effects

We must therefore assume that in over 80% of cases, risk assessment will require corrections to the original assumptions. It would be wrong to assess risk merely as a

Schrödinger's cat, Erwin Schrödinger's famous 1935 thought experiment, will be

A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter, there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the

*Visualisation of risk: the influence of the uncertainty of danger (the destructive potential of the hazard) on* 

an excellent example to illustrate the inadequacy of statistics in risk assessment.

When we bring these factors together, we get the risk matrix (**Figure 6**).

Risk assessment should inform us about the level of uncertainty and should not

#### *Paradigms of Risk, Hazards and Danger DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80822*

*Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms*

being understood by risk assessors who frequently reach false conclusions regarding

*Visualisation of danger: activity reveals the destructive potential of the hazard.*

Risk is the potential variability of events [7] or, to put it another way, the influence of uncertainty on goals [8]. Uncertainty can be positive (expected) or negative (unexpected), and goals can concern any human or organisational activity. Certainty is defined as the lack of uncertainty; uncertainty is a mental state characterised by the lack of information which would allow understanding of an event,

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**2.3 Risk**

**Figure 4.**

**Figure 3.**

**Figure 2.**

our influence over future events.

*Visualisation of a hazard: a crocodile in a pond.*

*Probability of identifying the event predicted in risk analysis.*

its results or situational probability. Lack of information is not tantamount to the absence of an event, but results from flawed decision determinants (see **Figure 1**).

Risk, understood as the influence of uncertainty on goals, has the following characteristics:


Risk assessment should inform us about the level of uncertainty and should not be considered separate from this factor (**Figure 5**).

Risk should be expressed as a combination of the level of goal attainment certainty (from 0%, no chance of attainment, to 100%, certain attainment) and the level of goal attainment (where 100% means the goal has been fully achieved). When we bring these factors together, we get the risk matrix (**Figure 6**).

The most desirable state is when both the level of goal attainment certainty and the level of goal attainment exceed 50% **although, in the case of negative outcomes in safety or mission-critical domains, the tolerability levels are often set by regulators and may be below 50%**. That's field 1 of the matrix. Any other risk level, captured above in fields 2, 3 and 4, should not be acceptable and should require corrective measures (**Figure 7**).

It is easy to see that the area of acceptable risk is quite small. In the matrix above, it is less than 20%, though the level may vary depending on situation. In majority of cases, however, risk assessment will require corrections to the original assumption. It would be wrong to assess risk merely as a statistic (e.g. as the quotient of effects and probability).

We must therefore assume that in over 80% of cases, risk assessment will require corrections to the original assumptions. It would be wrong to assess risk merely as a statistic (e.g. as the quotient of effects and probability).

Schrödinger's cat, Erwin Schrödinger's famous 1935 thought experiment, will be an excellent example to illustrate the inadequacy of statistics in risk assessment.

Let us assess risk for the following situation:

A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter, there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the

#### **Figure 5.**

*Visualisation of risk: the influence of the uncertainty of danger (the destructive potential of the hazard) on goals.*

**Figure 7.** *Risk matrix—practical application.*

hour, one of the atoms decays but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer that shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic decay would have poisoned it [9].
