*3.2.5.3 Perturb generation phase*

The perturbation enforces first level of security on the data. It is used to remove semantic pattern caused by wide variation in the transmitted data. The perturbation uses a novel additive noise generation method to perturb the data M. Primary source and destination nodes independently generate a set of perturb *λ* for session *τ* as follows:


### *3.2.5.4 Signature and perturbation phase*

Primary source node signs and perturbs the data packet through the following process:

*Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs): Security and Privacy Issues and Solutions DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84989*

	- i. SN and destination nodes uniquely generate κ<sup>1</sup> and κ2, respectively.
	- ii. SN extracts the two-way distribution parameter of destination node βds to compute *ϕsn* ! *ds* as *ϕsn* ! *ds* = *κ1βds*.

## *3.2.5.5 Authentication phase*

ii. Each node *i* randomly selects a unique *ri* ∈*Z* <sup>∗</sup>

*Wireless Mesh Networks - Security, Architectures and Protocols*

decrypt the received encrypted pseudonym.

*αds* by randomly selecting a unique *m*<sup>1</sup> ∈*Z* <sup>∗</sup>

*n* � 1||*Fds*) ⊕ *ϑ*] with [(*λn*||*m1*||*n*||*Fds*)⊕ *ϑ*].

perturbation seed *ϑ* as *ϑ* ¼ *m*1*αds*.

following steps (i)-(iii).

*3.2.5.4 Signature and perturbation phase*

pseudonyms of the primary source node *Fsn*, and destination node *Fds*.

other nodes in the network.

(*Fi*) to node *i*.

*3.2.5.2 Secure data exchange phase*

*3.2.5.3 Perturb generation phase*

as follows:

process:

**24**

distribution parameter *β<sup>i</sup>* as *β<sup>i</sup>* = (*ri* + *μ*)*P mod q*, and broadcasts its *β<sup>i</sup>* to

registered node as *Fi* ¼ *H Ni*k*s*k*ψ<sup>i</sup>* ð Þ. It extracts the distribution parameter *β<sup>i</sup>* of the node *i* in order to compute its node-base station shared key *γbs*!*<sup>i</sup>* as *γbs*!*<sup>i</sup>* = *ρ β<sup>i</sup>* and sends the symmetrically encrypted node's *Fi* and *Ni* as *E<sup>γ</sup>bs*!*<sup>i</sup>*

iv. On the receipt of its encrypted pseudonym, each node then generates its corresponding node-base station shared key as *γ<sup>i</sup>* ! *bs* = *riφ* and uses it to

To send data M, the primary SN signs M and generates perturb to secure M. It then encrypts the obfuscated message packet as *σ*, using its node-destination shared key *ϕsn*!*ds*. The message packet *σ* contains the signature *δ*, perturbed data *Pp*,

The perturbation enforces first level of security on the data. It is used to remove semantic pattern caused by wide variation in the transmitted data. The perturbation uses a novel additive noise generation method to perturb the data M. Primary source and destination nodes independently generate a set of perturb *λ* for session *τ*

i. The SN and its destination node generate their perturbation parameters *αsn*,

ii. Using the destination perturbation parameter *αds* for session, SN computes

perturbation parameters of perturb index *n* � 1 in its memory for session *τ* and destination node of pseudonym *Fds*. It replaces its former encrypted perturbation parameters with the new one, that is, replaces [(*λ<sup>n</sup>* � *<sup>1</sup>*||*m1*||

iv. Primary SN computes new perturb for every new data transmission of the same session by repeating step c using the previously used perturb *λ<sup>n</sup>*�1. However, for a new session and destination node, SN generates a new *ϑ* by

Primary source node signs and perturbs the data packet through the following

iii. For session, SN generates the perturbation chain as *λ* ¼ f g *λ*1, *λ*2, *λ*<sup>3</sup> … *λ<sup>k</sup>* , where *λ<sup>1</sup>* = *Hϑ*(*ϑ*|| *Fsn*), *λ<sup>n</sup>* = *Hϑ*(*λ(n* � *1)*) for *n* ¼ 2 … *k*. Clear all the

*αsn* ¼ ð Þ *m*<sup>1</sup> þ *μ P mod q* and *αds* ¼ ð Þ *m*<sup>2</sup> þ *μ Pmod q*, respectively.

*<sup>q</sup>* and *m*<sup>2</sup> ∈*Z* <sup>∗</sup>

*<sup>q</sup>* , and compute

iii. BS then computes *Ni* as *Ni* ¼ *H ρ* ⊕ *ψ<sup>i</sup>* ð Þ and pseudonym *Fi* for each

*<sup>q</sup>* , computes its two-way

After the signature and perturbation phase, the source node initiates the PoP authentication with the IN as follows:


### *3.2.5.6 Verification and decryption*

Destination node extracts and authenticates the received data M by following this procedure:

i. Destination node extracts the two-way distribution parameter of SN and *βsn* and computes destination of the used perturb *P*.

ii. Destination node regenerates the used perturb *λ*<sup>0</sup> *<sup>n</sup>* by checking the value on the perturb index *n*. If *n* = 1, it indicates that the source is new to the destination node, and destination node then executes perturbation generation phase in order to obtain the perturb seed, which would be used to recompute the used perturb. However, if *n* > 1, it indicates that the session is for old destination node. The destination node retrieves the encrypted last perturb for the source node from its memory, decrypts it, and uses it to obtain the used perturb by executing step 3 of the perturbation generation phase. Extract the *n* message by unperturb *PP* as: *M*<sup>0</sup> = *PP* � *λ*<sup>0</sup> *n.*

**References**

2019;**9**(Pt 4)

(Pt 5):16-27

[1] Oladayo O, Abass A. A secure and energy-aware routing protocol for optimal routing in mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSNs). International Journal of Sensors, Wireless Communications and Control.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84989*

*Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs): Security and Privacy Issues and Solutions*

in wireless sensor networks. In: Paper

[9] Olakanmi O, Dada A. An efficient point-to-point security solution for multi-hop routing in wireless sensor networks. Security and Privacy. 2018

[10] Oladayo O, Adama P. An efficient

decentralized wireless sensor networks for mission and safety-critical systems. International Journal of Sensors, Wireless Communications and Control.

multipath routing protocol for

[11] Jamil I, Imad M. A secure hierarchical routing protocol for wireless sensor networks. In: Paper

Presented on the 10th IEEE International Conference on

Communication Systems; Singapore;

[12] Du X, Xiao Y, Chen H-H, Wu Q. Secure cell relay routing protocol for sensor networks. Special Issue on Network Security. 2009;**6**(Pt 3):

[14] Manjeshwar A, Agrawal DP. TEEN: A routing protocol for enhanced efficiency in wireless sensor networks. In: Proceedings of 15th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium; IPDPS; 2009-2015; San

[15] Patil M, Biradar RC. A survey on routing protocols in wireless sensor networks. In: Paper Presented at the

[13] Masruroh SU, Sabran KU. Emergency-aware and QoS based routing protocol in wireless sensor network. In: Paper Presented at the IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Autonomous Agents, Network and Systems; 2014

2019;**9**(Pt 4)

2006

375-391

Francisco; 2001

Presented at the International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security; 2008

[2] Sohrabi K, Gao J, Ailawadhi V, Pottie GJ. Protocols for self-organization of a wireless sensor network. IEEE Personal Communications. 2000;**7**

[3] Villalba LJG, Orozco ALS, Cabrera AT, Abbas CJB. Routing protocols in wireless sensor networks. International Journal of Medical Sciences. 2009:8399-8421

[4] Messaoudi A, Elkamel R, Helali A, Bouallegue R. Cross-layer based routing protocol for wireless sensor networks using a fuzzy logic module. In: Paper Presented at the 13th International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC); 2017

[5] Huei-Wen DR. A secure routing protocol for wireless sensor networks with consideration of energy efficiency. In: IEEE National Taiwan University of

Science and Technology; 2012.

[6] Murugaboopathi G, Khaana V. Reliable communications in sensor networks. Journal of Engineering and Applied Science. 2008;**3**:911-917.

[Accessed: 10 July 2017]

Available from: https://medwelljournals. com/abstract/?doi=jeasci.2008.911.917

[7] Saraswati M, Prabhjot K. Energy efficient neighbor selection for flat wireless sensor networks. Information Technology and Management. 2013:

[8] Lv S, Wang X, Zhao X, Zhou X. Detecting the Sybil attack cooperatively

pp. 224-32

518-523

**27**

iii. Destination node verifies the signature by re-signing the unblinded message *M*<sup>0</sup> using its *ϕds* ! *sn* as *δ*<sup>0</sup> = *Hϕds* ! *sn* (*M*<sup>0</sup> ). If *δ*<sup>0</sup> = δ, then the perturb, data, and the source node are all valid, and destination node then accepts the data, otherwise rejects the data. Encrypt the perturbation parameter as *λ<sup>n</sup>* ⊕ *ϑ, m2* ⊕ *ϑ, n* ⊕ *ϑ, Fsn*. Clear all the previously encrypted perturbation parameters stored for *Fsn* in its memory, and replace it (*λn*||*ϑ*||*m*2||*ϑ*||*n*).
