**5. Biosemiotics, markedness, and autopoiesis: precursors to understanding the importance of multimodalities and embodied cognition**

*…experience is moored to our structure in a binding way. We do not see the "space" of the world; we live our field of vision….we invariably find that we cannot separate our history of actions – biological and social – from how this world appears to us. ([66], p. 23)*

The impact of Maturana and Varela's formulation and examination of *autopoiesis* (a neologism) on linguistics, semiotics, and later on the cognitive sciences is quite significant. The term itself was the result of a search for a word without a history that could adequately define what they considered to be the essence of the organization of the living system—autonomy, self-reference, and "circular organization" ([66], p. xvii). In his introduction to *Biology of Cognition* ([66, 67], p. xv), Maturana describes how his work on vision and visual perception led him to two specific conclusions—one being the "nervous system [is] a closed network of interaction neurons" and the second being the realization that the study of cognition is "a legitimate biological problem" (ibid.). As a result, a new set of research questions emerged: how do organisms obtain information about their environments, and how is it that organisms have structures that allow them to operate in their existing environments ([66], p. xvi)?8

One of the significant outcomes of the epistemological approach of *autopoiesis* for semiotics and the cognitive sciences is the reinforcement of semiotic principles that were articulated in a different context by Jakob von Uexküll [68, 69] and Yury Lotman [28, 70], which include Uexküll's *Umwelt* and functional circle

**21**

changes) ([66], pp. 80–81).

*Semiotic Principles in Cognitive Neuroscience DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89791*

*Universe of the Mind,* 1990).9

the brain.

outcome:

operating in a physical universe (1992, p. 82).

transmodal association network" [72].

circle, and Lotman's semiosphere, see Andrews [10].

and Lotman's *semiosphere*. In Beer's preface to Maturana and Varela's book ([66], pp. 63–72), he clearly articulates the importance of the new approach as a metasystemic synthesis that is NOT interdisciplinary; rather, this new approach transcends disciplines ([66], p. 65). This is very much in keeping with the modeling proposed by Lotman (see Umberto Eco's introduction to Shukman's translation of Lotman's

While we cannot provide here a full articulation of Maturana and Varela's important work, there is one other major point that must be noted in this context—their definition of the *observer*. One of the two guiding principles given in their 1990 and 1992 books is "everything said is said by an observer" (1990, pp. xxii, 8; 1992, p. 26). For Maturana and Varela, the observer is defined as a living system who can only be accounted for when cognition is seen as a biological phenomenon (1990, p. 9). This statement, along with their definition of four consequences of autopoietic organization (1990, pp. 80-81),10 takes us to the brink of the twenty-first century cognitive neuroscience methods and analysis as defined by perspectives that are more multimodality-oriented than modular and that give a prominent place to sensory-motor systems in explaining language processing in

**6. By way of conclusion: frames of interaction and understanding**  *functional connectivity and neural networks (DMN and others)*

In the end, it is clear that cognitive neuroscience and neuroimaging continue to incorporate important ideas, even if it is more often than not in a nonconscious and unarticulated manner, from a range of anthroposemiotic and biosemiotic models described in the previous sections. One of the most powerful and recent outcomes of this important interaction of research methods and concepts is seen in the move away from focusing imaging analysis within *regions of interest* to understanding the networks and *functional connectivity* in operation during not only task-based fMRI but resting state fMRI. The first network that was identified is known as the default mode network (DMN) [57, 59, 60]. Current research demonstrates that there are multiple such interactive networks and the details of these networks are clearest in studying intrinsic functional connectivity in individuals, not groups [72]. The recognition of neural functional connectivity and networks is in keeping with the autopoietic approach given by Maturana and Varela, where they foresee such an

The fact that we can divide physical autopoietic machines into parts does not reveal the nature of the domain of interactions that they define as concrete entities

As fMRI imaging methods shift to include individual and group data analysis and protocols expand from task-based to include resting state, there will be more evidence contributing to our understanding of the default network as "the apex

<sup>9</sup> C.H. van Schooneveld [71] draws important connections between autopoiesis and his definition of *semantic dominants* in human languages. For an in-depth discussion of Uexküll's *Umwelt*, functional

<sup>10</sup> The four major outcomes of autopoietic organization according to Maturana and Varela (including their definition of "autopoietic machines," which include living systems ([66], p. 76)) are autonomy, individuality, unities, and no inputs or outputs (only perturbations that lead to internal structural

<sup>8</sup> Maturana ([66], p. xviii) discusses a concession he made in the *Biology of Cognition* that he now regrets he did not explicitly say that causal relations are not relevant in autopoiesis; rather, they are only relevant in the *metadomain*.

#### *Semiotic Principles in Cognitive Neuroscience DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89791*

*Cognitive and Intermedial Semiotics*

the advantages of empirical data and analysis that includes behavioral "can do" data in opposition to more traditional experiments that put more emphasis on static,

1.Study participants demonstrate ability (i.e., dynamic) using empirical

2.Usage of internationally recognized proficiency measurements provides

3.Behavioral study data enhances the CONTEXT for framing the analysis and

4.Given the challenges of understanding and interpreting the hemodynamic response and activations acquired in fMRI, MANCOVA and other statistical methods strengthen the validity of the analysis and emerging conclusions.

5.Essentialist categories are static, do not provide empirical data for analysis, do not reflect the importance of learning, and are not supported by neurological

essentialist characteristics of the experimental subjects:

models of brain development and cognition.

**5. Biosemiotics, markedness, and autopoiesis: precursors to** 

**understanding the importance of multimodalities and embodied** 

*…experience is moored to our structure in a binding way. We do not see the "space" of the world; we live our field of vision….we invariably find that we cannot separate our history of actions – biological and social – from how this world appears to* 

The impact of Maturana and Varela's formulation and examination of *autopoiesis* (a neologism) on linguistics, semiotics, and later on the cognitive sciences is quite significant. The term itself was the result of a search for a word without a history that could adequately define what they considered to be the essence of the organization of the living system—autonomy, self-reference, and "circular organization" ([66], p. xvii). In his introduction to *Biology of Cognition* ([66, 67], p. xv), Maturana describes how his work on vision and visual perception led him to two specific conclusions—one being the "nervous system [is] a closed network of interaction neurons" and the second being the realization that the study of cognition is "a legitimate biological problem" (ibid.). As a result, a new set of research questions emerged: how do organisms obtain information about their environments, and how is it that organisms have structures that allow them to operate in their existing

One of the significant outcomes of the epistemological approach of *autopoiesis* for semiotics and the cognitive sciences is the reinforcement of semiotic principles that were articulated in a different context by Jakob von Uexküll [68, 69] and Yury Lotman [28, 70], which include Uexküll's *Umwelt* and functional circle

<sup>8</sup> Maturana ([66], p. xviii) discusses a concession he made in the *Biology of Cognition* that he now regrets he did not explicitly say that causal relations are not relevant in autopoiesis; rather, they are only relevant

interpretation of empirical data.

**cognition**

*us. ([66], p. 23)*

environments ([66], p. xvi)?8

measurement tools relevant to establishing baselines.

quantitative data that can be understood across studies.

**20**

in the *metadomain*.

and Lotman's *semiosphere*. In Beer's preface to Maturana and Varela's book ([66], pp. 63–72), he clearly articulates the importance of the new approach as a metasystemic synthesis that is NOT interdisciplinary; rather, this new approach transcends disciplines ([66], p. 65). This is very much in keeping with the modeling proposed by Lotman (see Umberto Eco's introduction to Shukman's translation of Lotman's *Universe of the Mind,* 1990).9

While we cannot provide here a full articulation of Maturana and Varela's important work, there is one other major point that must be noted in this context—their definition of the *observer*. One of the two guiding principles given in their 1990 and 1992 books is "everything said is said by an observer" (1990, pp. xxii, 8; 1992, p. 26). For Maturana and Varela, the observer is defined as a living system who can only be accounted for when cognition is seen as a biological phenomenon (1990, p. 9). This statement, along with their definition of four consequences of autopoietic organization (1990, pp. 80-81),10 takes us to the brink of the twenty-first century cognitive neuroscience methods and analysis as defined by perspectives that are more multimodality-oriented than modular and that give a prominent place to sensory-motor systems in explaining language processing in the brain.
