**4. The longer term future of Saudi Arabia**

Given the level of change in the broader world it is almost certain the Kingdom will change significantly. So what are the kinds of possibilities?

One possibility is it will revert from currently being only the fifth most authoritarian regime in the world and return to its former status as the most authoritarian regime in the world. As modern ideas creep into the kingdom, the number of beheadings will probably increase. The talented Saudis will seek to leave. Most of the positive accomplishments in Vision 2030 mentioned above will be lost. The country will experience difficulty finding partners to support and participate in its major projects: NEOM, the Red Sea Resorts, the "Davos of the Middle East" ideas, etc. The religious leaders may resist moves toward liberalization: democratic councils at the local level, women's sports teams, etc. The Shi'a who live around the oil fields might find themselves even more tightly controlled. Women will still have men control their movement, dress and acceptable occupations … if they work.

Another possibility is the Saud family would turn on the country's religious leaders and openly push them out of the government to demonstrate their bonafides as a worthy member of the community of nations. This would probably trigger a civil war, marked by terrorist attacks led by religious leaders who are currently being sheltered and funded by true Saudi believers across the countryside. The government would be hard pressed to control the Shi'a in the East who would likely rise in rebellion, fight the religious terrorists, and discipline the now secretive reformers likely to demand more civil rights. The internet which was used effectively to organize the Arab Spring in Cairo would be shut down or be tightly controlled. Tourist traffic to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina would remain steady unless there were safety concerns. Tourism to the Red Sea resorts would decline. Non-Saudis in NEOM and other advanced learning and research sites would likely leave. Even the country's enormous oil revenues could hardly sustain such disruption. Which group would win is impossible to predict. The only thing very likely to happen (without US intervention) would be Shi'a success in taking many of the oil fields away from the Saudis, probably with the help of the Iranians. It is unlikely they would become a province of Iran, but they could operate their own small country, like Kuwait.

A final possibility would be to continue gradual liberalizations. This would require forgoing dramatic killings (e.g. Jamal Khashoggi) and winding down the war in Yemen. There should be a program that allows the non-citizen Muslims to become citizens of Saudi Arabia. Perhaps granting birthright citizenship would make the process of merger between the two groups gradual. To solve the cousin marriage problem, a bonus program might be established wherein a marriage contracted by an immigrant family member and a Saudi family member would earn a \$100,000 bonus. The money flowing to the descendants of King Saud could be curtailed significantly perhaps by the total of the \$100,000 bonuses paid above. Perhaps the Crown Prince might set up an elected national advisory council with 10 advisories from each million population. Electing these advisors might get the people used to debating the qualifications of candidates and to the idea of going to the polls regularly to vote. The Kingdom might very gradually evolve into the structure found in England with a figurehead monarch and an "advisory council/ parliament" eventually holding the real power.

#### **5. Conclusion**

The role of the Islamic religion is the major variable in this situation because conservative religious leaders do not like being forced to simply advise or urge people to do what their religion promotes and proscribes. Such leaders like the state to assist them in gaining compliance. In Western Europe there was a bloody war fought for 30 years when the Lutherans of Northern Germany wanted to be free of Catholic proscriptions. It will require a firm leadership style to liberalize Saudi Arabia without causing the religious leaders to go into open revolt and take their conservative followers with them. It should be noted that neither Catholics nor Lutherans could find an authority for the Catholic demands and proscriptions in their holy book, the Bible. However, in Saudi Arabia both the progressives and the religious conservatives acknowledge their Holy Book, the Quran, contains the demands and proscriptions that the religious leaders advocate. In addition, the Catholics of Europe had a method for revising their many "questionable" requirements (e.g. Councils of the Church, statements by the Pope, etc.) whereas the Islamic world has no definitive way or process to revise the rules found in the Qu'ran. It is very difficult to "modify" the exact words of God as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. Such modifications are unlikely to occur. Who is man to reinterpret the word of God?

**83**

*Will Saudi Arabia Move toward Democracy as Socialism Falters?*

So which path is likely to emerge in Saudi Arabia? The gradual liberalization path seems the most likely to continue going forward. The only questions are the tempo of change and the degree of change. The central question is will the change include some democracy at the national level? The Crown Prince seems to be a very proud, strong willed, self-confident man who is not afraid of enacting violence. He has one wife and four children. This speaks to the respect he has for his wife who is also a member of his tribe. Today he is relatively young and he has the confidence of his failing father, King Salman. In the present with the King living and supporting him, Mohammed bin Salman is continuing to move quickly to embrace change. With this in mind, the changes are likely to continue, but they are more likely to be focused on social areas and avoid governmental structures. There will be push back from the religious leaders. As the Crown Prince grows older, these two forces of social and governmental structures are likely to slow the tempo of change and to be less dramatic. Will the other interested groups be generating counter forces to keep the progressive changes coming? It is not likely but possible. There are three such counter force groups: the Shi'a, the Muslim immigrants, and the important new arrivals with special skills that Vision 2030 will bring to the country in the coming decades. These will represent perhaps 50% of the people present in the land, but they will have few effective ways to communicate with each other or existing forums through which they might be heard such as Rotary, political parties or the

A warning is needed should some national level democracy develop. A participatory democracy requires such things as the education of voters in government, civics, and the history of democratic successes and failures. This sort of education is completely lacking in Saudi Arabia today. Any democratic change should be implemented slowly so the educational component can be infused into the schools completely. The failure to educate the common men and women will lead to a credulous electorate that can be easily misled by propaganda and unrealistic politi-

A few concluding thoughts on perhaps the most intractable problems

1.To move from authoritarian (kingdom) government to democratic government (particularly a fully participatory democracy) requires not only the historical and civics education of the people, but at an even more basic level, there must be at least a general feeling of mutual self-respect for "the other", a basic feeling of equality among all people (e.g. of the Sunni for the Shi'a, of men for women, of the Crown Prince for Jamal Khasogghi, of the rich Muslim student for her visiting Christian teacher, etc.). Islam, as a world force, achieved its greatest success in the seventh through the sixteenth centuries by actualizing an opposite sense (i.e. of Muslims over non-Muslims, of men over women, etc.). The current educational system reinforces loyalty to the King, Islam and tribal superiority. Equality is not fostered in the government, religion, social or

2.To reduce the increase of physical and mental abnormalities within the nation's gene pool, the nation will have to instigate a major push to get citizens to at least think about marrying people that their parents would never consider appropriate. This "push" could take the form of stipends or social status. Because Islam sanctions cousin marriage, the religious leaders will have to be involved.

3.Will Saudi Arabia move toward democracy as socialism falters? The interaction of lower oil prices and growing number of Saudi's receiving stipends is sustainable in

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91384*

Chamber of Commerce.

cal promises.

described above:

educational systems.

#### *Will Saudi Arabia Move toward Democracy as Socialism Falters? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91384*

*Education, Human Rights and Peace in Sustainable Development*

parliament" eventually holding the real power.

The role of the Islamic religion is the major variable in this situation because conservative religious leaders do not like being forced to simply advise or urge people to do what their religion promotes and proscribes. Such leaders like the state to assist them in gaining compliance. In Western Europe there was a bloody war fought for 30 years when the Lutherans of Northern Germany wanted to be free of Catholic proscriptions. It will require a firm leadership style to liberalize Saudi Arabia without causing the religious leaders to go into open revolt and take their conservative followers with them. It should be noted that neither Catholics nor Lutherans could find an authority for the Catholic demands and proscriptions in their holy book, the Bible. However, in Saudi Arabia both the progressives and the religious conservatives acknowledge their Holy Book, the Quran, contains the demands and proscriptions that the religious leaders advocate. In addition, the Catholics of Europe had a method for revising their many "questionable" requirements (e.g. Councils of the Church, statements by the Pope, etc.) whereas the Islamic world has no definitive way or process to revise the rules found in the Qu'ran. It is very difficult to "modify" the exact words of God as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. Such modifications

are unlikely to occur. Who is man to reinterpret the word of God?

**5. Conclusion**

Another possibility is the Saud family would turn on the country's religious leaders and openly push them out of the government to demonstrate their bonafides as a worthy member of the community of nations. This would probably trigger a civil war, marked by terrorist attacks led by religious leaders who are currently being sheltered and funded by true Saudi believers across the countryside. The government would be hard pressed to control the Shi'a in the East who would likely rise in rebellion, fight the religious terrorists, and discipline the now secretive reformers likely to demand more civil rights. The internet which was used effectively to organize the Arab Spring in Cairo would be shut down or be tightly controlled. Tourist traffic to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina would remain steady unless there were safety concerns. Tourism to the Red Sea resorts would decline. Non-Saudis in NEOM and other advanced learning and research sites would likely leave. Even the country's enormous oil revenues could hardly sustain such disruption. Which group would win is impossible to predict. The only thing very likely to happen (without US intervention) would be Shi'a success in taking many of the oil fields away from the Saudis, probably with the help of the Iranians. It is unlikely they would become a province of Iran, but they could operate their own small country, like Kuwait. A final possibility would be to continue gradual liberalizations. This would require forgoing dramatic killings (e.g. Jamal Khashoggi) and winding down the war in Yemen. There should be a program that allows the non-citizen Muslims to become citizens of Saudi Arabia. Perhaps granting birthright citizenship would make the process of merger between the two groups gradual. To solve the cousin marriage problem, a bonus program might be established wherein a marriage contracted by an immigrant family member and a Saudi family member would earn a \$100,000 bonus. The money flowing to the descendants of King Saud could be curtailed significantly perhaps by the total of the \$100,000 bonuses paid above. Perhaps the Crown Prince might set up an elected national advisory council with 10 advisories from each million population. Electing these advisors might get the people used to debating the qualifications of candidates and to the idea of going to the polls regularly to vote. The Kingdom might very gradually evolve into the structure found in England with a figurehead monarch and an "advisory council/

**82**

So which path is likely to emerge in Saudi Arabia? The gradual liberalization path seems the most likely to continue going forward. The only questions are the tempo of change and the degree of change. The central question is will the change include some democracy at the national level? The Crown Prince seems to be a very proud, strong willed, self-confident man who is not afraid of enacting violence. He has one wife and four children. This speaks to the respect he has for his wife who is also a member of his tribe. Today he is relatively young and he has the confidence of his failing father, King Salman. In the present with the King living and supporting him, Mohammed bin Salman is continuing to move quickly to embrace change. With this in mind, the changes are likely to continue, but they are more likely to be focused on social areas and avoid governmental structures. There will be push back from the religious leaders. As the Crown Prince grows older, these two forces of social and governmental structures are likely to slow the tempo of change and to be less dramatic. Will the other interested groups be generating counter forces to keep the progressive changes coming? It is not likely but possible. There are three such counter force groups: the Shi'a, the Muslim immigrants, and the important new arrivals with special skills that Vision 2030 will bring to the country in the coming decades. These will represent perhaps 50% of the people present in the land, but they will have few effective ways to communicate with each other or existing forums through which they might be heard such as Rotary, political parties or the Chamber of Commerce.

A warning is needed should some national level democracy develop. A participatory democracy requires such things as the education of voters in government, civics, and the history of democratic successes and failures. This sort of education is completely lacking in Saudi Arabia today. Any democratic change should be implemented slowly so the educational component can be infused into the schools completely. The failure to educate the common men and women will lead to a credulous electorate that can be easily misled by propaganda and unrealistic political promises.

A few concluding thoughts on perhaps the most intractable problems described above:


the near future. However, the social and Islamic religious structures argue against a participatory democracy. Socialism may falter but a turn toward democracy would threaten the power of the King, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the religious leaders.

And finally, the authors of this chapter come to their task with internal "frames of reference" that have been heavily influenced by the enlightenment and western Christianity. They have attempted to understand the Saudi Arabian mind set through study and interpersonal contacts both in America and, in the case of the lead author, in the Middle East as well. However, they know they can never fully predict the impact of the culture, the religion, and the effect of extended family relationships which have been internalized by the people of Saudi Arabia. These factors will, in the long run, have the greatest impact on Saudi Arabia's future.
