Preface

Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentional violence for political purposes. It is primarily used to refer to violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants. The use of living organisms as a weapon has been seen throughout the history of humankind. But due to increasing trade wars between countries, the risk of biological terror attacks has become more real and more alarming. Bioterrorism is terrorism involving the intentional dissemination of biological agents. As in biological warfare, bioterrorism agents can be viruses, fungi, bacteria, toxins, insects or any other number of naturally occurring or synthetic agents.

Before the start of Chinese New Year, the first patient with COVID-19 was diagnosed in Wuhan, China. Within a couple of days, the virus had spread all over China and infected more than 90,000 people. In instances such as this, it can be challenging for clinicians to discriminate between an act of terrorism and a naturally occurring outbreak. Therefore, this book discusses the effects of bioterrorism and terrorism on the socioeconomic sustainability of different countries around the globe.

I would like to thank the contributors to this book for their hard work in crafting their valuable and innovative chapters. I would also like to thank IntechOpen and Author Service Manager Lada Bozic for their coordination and support in facilitating this project.

#### **Syed Abdul Rehman Khan, PhD**

Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

**Zhang Yu** School of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an, China

**1**

Section 1

Bioterrorism and

Terrorism

Section 1

## Bioterrorism and Terrorism

**3**

**Chapter 1**

in 2020

**1. Death and terror**

**2. World factory shutdown**

what next?—It is terrible.

demand has already been started to unbalance.

Introductory Chapter: The

(COVID-19) - Death and Terror

Until now, the world still has been experiencing challenges, such as weapon war, poverty, and bombing attacks for different reasons, which almost makes the people living in peace accustomed to the continuous bad news from other places. However, we cannot act as outsiders when trade war and bioterrorism become the new mem-

In December 2019, the first patient of coronavirus diagnosed in Wuhan city of China's Hubei province [1]. According to the Centers for Disease Control, after we stepped into 2020, the coronavirus, causing never-before-seen respiratory illness, started spreading fast inside and outside the border of China. Further, the World Health Organization [2] declared the coronavirus a public health emergency of "international concern." So far, the virus has infected more than 90,000 people

China is known as "The World Factory" for that China has been using mass manufacturing strategy, continuing to improve production technology, making other countries their stable clients (**Figure 1**). It has created a world dependency on China [3]. The virus that has hijacked China for months is severely affecting the logistics and supply chain operations. In fact, the worst is yet to come. As per our prediction, the real impact of coronavirus on global supply chains will occur during March [4]. Because, due to the Chinese New Year festival, multinational firms usually stored materials for a couple of weeks for their smooth manufacturing operations. Also, due to long lead-time between China and European markets, there were in-transit shipments, which will arrive late February/Beginning of March. But

In the upcoming days, the prices of products in international markets will hike due to the shortage of supply. The most vulnerable firms are those who depend solely on Chinese suppliers [5]. Since last months, Chinese manufacturers are hardly fulfilling the domestic demand. Besides, the equilibrium of supply and

Outbreak of Coronavirus

*Syed Abdul Rehman Khan and Zhang Yu*

bers of the world challenges, especially when they are combined.

around the globe and entered in 50+ countries (see **Table 1**).

#### **Chapter 1**

## Introductory Chapter: The Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Death and Terror in 2020

*Syed Abdul Rehman Khan and Zhang Yu*

#### **1. Death and terror**

Until now, the world still has been experiencing challenges, such as weapon war, poverty, and bombing attacks for different reasons, which almost makes the people living in peace accustomed to the continuous bad news from other places. However, we cannot act as outsiders when trade war and bioterrorism become the new members of the world challenges, especially when they are combined.

In December 2019, the first patient of coronavirus diagnosed in Wuhan city of China's Hubei province [1]. According to the Centers for Disease Control, after we stepped into 2020, the coronavirus, causing never-before-seen respiratory illness, started spreading fast inside and outside the border of China. Further, the World Health Organization [2] declared the coronavirus a public health emergency of "international concern." So far, the virus has infected more than 90,000 people around the globe and entered in 50+ countries (see **Table 1**).

#### **2. World factory shutdown**

China is known as "The World Factory" for that China has been using mass manufacturing strategy, continuing to improve production technology, making other countries their stable clients (**Figure 1**). It has created a world dependency on China [3]. The virus that has hijacked China for months is severely affecting the logistics and supply chain operations. In fact, the worst is yet to come. As per our prediction, the real impact of coronavirus on global supply chains will occur during March [4]. Because, due to the Chinese New Year festival, multinational firms usually stored materials for a couple of weeks for their smooth manufacturing operations. Also, due to long lead-time between China and European markets, there were in-transit shipments, which will arrive late February/Beginning of March. But what next?—It is terrible.

In the upcoming days, the prices of products in international markets will hike due to the shortage of supply. The most vulnerable firms are those who depend solely on Chinese suppliers [5]. Since last months, Chinese manufacturers are hardly fulfilling the domestic demand. Besides, the equilibrium of supply and demand has already been started to unbalance.

#### *Terrorism and Developing Countries*


*Significance of italicized values 1. Virus started to spread from China; 2. The greater numbers of affected people in Chinese region.*

*Source: National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China (Last updated on February 29, 2020).*

#### **Table 1.**

*List of top coronavirus infected countries.*

#### **3. Coronavirus in emerging economies of Asian region**

China, Japan, and South Korea contribute to 25% of the world economy, but due to coronavirus, the production lines have stopped, which disrupted the global supply chain [6]. These countries' yearly trading volume is more than US720 billion, and have the most integrated international economic blocs.

**5**

*Introductory Chapter: The Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Death and Terror in 2020*

Due to the risk of decoupling from the United States, Chinese firms have been attempting to boost investment and trade with South Korea and Japan. Further, because of the "trade war" between China and the US, Chinese firms have started to import their supplies and material from Japan and South Korea. However, unfortunately, the epidemic already spreads in South Korea and Japan, which probably will bring the second shock to the downstream manufacturers in China and multiplier

According to the Chinese customs data, in 2019, Japan was fourth largest trade partner of the mainland China, behind the EU, the ASEAN economic block, and the US, with annual bilateral exports and imports valued at US\$315 billion approximately, with South Korea sixth at US\$285 billion. On the other hand, during 2019, they also both ranked in the top five for imports into mainland China. Both the countries (South Korea and Japan) export chemical and electrical components,

According to Chinese analysts, due to the faster spread of coronavirus in South Korea and Japan, more firms are reducing their manufacturing or even shut down. Chinese firms heavily import steel, shipbuilding, electronics, and automotive equipment from Japanese and South Korean suppliers [6]. There is no doubt that China is exporting and fulfilling the demand of global customers with its "mass customization" strategy. It is expected that in upcoming weeks, the consequences of coronavirus will spread from the Asian region toward American and European regions. Due to the shortage of supply from China, the world economy already started to shake. Many analyses compare the current coronavirus with the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic 2002–2003, which created just a small breakdown in the global supply chain and financial markets [4]. This comparison is dangerous and misleads to the facts because the relative significance of mainland China in the global economic ecosystem has amplified massively in the past 18 years: China has more than doubled its share of trade with the rest of the world between the SARS epidemic and today, and many more industries are now heavily dependent on China.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91955*

effects into the global supply chain.

**Figure 1.**

*China export to the world.*

which are essential for China's massive manufacturing.

*Introductory Chapter: The Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Death and Terror in 2020 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91955*

**Figure 1.** *China export to the world.*

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

**S. no Country Cumulative diagnosis Total cure Total death** *China 79,968 41,849 2873* Korea 3526 27 18 Italy 1128 50 29 Japan 947 41 11 Iran 593 123 43 Singapore 102 72 — France 100 12 2 Germany 99 16 — U.S.A 64 3 1 Spain 58 2 — Kuwait 45 — — Thailand 42 28 1 Bahrain 41 — — Australia 26 15 1 Malaysia 25 20 — Switzerland 24 — — England 23 8 — United Arab Emirates 21 5 — Canada 20 6 — Vietnam 16 16 — Norway 15 — — Sweden 13 — — Iraq 13 — — Austria 10 — — Israel 9 3 — Netherlands 7 — — Greece 7 — — Oman 6 — — Croatia 6 — — Russia 5 2 — Mexico 4 — — India 3 3 — *Significance of italicized values 1. Virus started to spread from China; 2. The greater numbers of affected people in* 

**4**

*Chinese region.*

*List of top coronavirus infected countries.*

**Table 1.**

**3. Coronavirus in emerging economies of Asian region**

and have the most integrated international economic blocs.

China, Japan, and South Korea contribute to 25% of the world economy, but due to coronavirus, the production lines have stopped, which disrupted the global supply chain [6]. These countries' yearly trading volume is more than US720 billion,

*Source: National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China (Last updated on February 29, 2020).*

Due to the risk of decoupling from the United States, Chinese firms have been attempting to boost investment and trade with South Korea and Japan. Further, because of the "trade war" between China and the US, Chinese firms have started to import their supplies and material from Japan and South Korea. However, unfortunately, the epidemic already spreads in South Korea and Japan, which probably will bring the second shock to the downstream manufacturers in China and multiplier effects into the global supply chain.

According to the Chinese customs data, in 2019, Japan was fourth largest trade partner of the mainland China, behind the EU, the ASEAN economic block, and the US, with annual bilateral exports and imports valued at US\$315 billion approximately, with South Korea sixth at US\$285 billion. On the other hand, during 2019, they also both ranked in the top five for imports into mainland China. Both the countries (South Korea and Japan) export chemical and electrical components, which are essential for China's massive manufacturing.

According to Chinese analysts, due to the faster spread of coronavirus in South Korea and Japan, more firms are reducing their manufacturing or even shut down. Chinese firms heavily import steel, shipbuilding, electronics, and automotive equipment from Japanese and South Korean suppliers [6]. There is no doubt that China is exporting and fulfilling the demand of global customers with its "mass customization" strategy. It is expected that in upcoming weeks, the consequences of coronavirus will spread from the Asian region toward American and European regions. Due to the shortage of supply from China, the world economy already started to shake.

Many analyses compare the current coronavirus with the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic 2002–2003, which created just a small breakdown in the global supply chain and financial markets [4]. This comparison is dangerous and misleads to the facts because the relative significance of mainland China in the global economic ecosystem has amplified massively in the past 18 years: China has more than doubled its share of trade with the rest of the world between the SARS epidemic and today, and many more industries are now heavily dependent on China.

#### *Terrorism and Developing Countries*

In 2019, the GDP (gross domestic product) of China represented 16% of the global GDP. However, in 2003, the GDP of China represented only 4.31% of the global GDP, an almost four-fold increase. Due to the dependence on Chinese manufacturers, we cannot imagine the consequences and adverse effects on the global supply chain. The time will speak louder than words.

#### **Author details**

Syed Abdul Rehman Khan1 \* and Zhang Yu<sup>2</sup>

1 School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

2 School of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an, China

\*Address all correspondence to: sarehman\_cscp@yahoo.com

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

**7**

*Introductory Chapter: The Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Death and Terror in 2020*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91955*

[1] Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. COVID-19 Prevention and Control. 2020. Available from: http://www.chinacdc.cn/en/ [Accessed:

[3] Khan SAR, Zhang Y. Strategic Supply Chain Management. Switzerland AG: Springer Nature; 2019. ISBN: 978-3-030- 15058-7. Available from: https://www. springer.com/gp/book/9783030150570

[4] Haren P, Simchi-Levi D. How coronavirus could impact the global supply chain by mid-march. Harvard Business Review. 2020. Available from: https://hbr.org/2020/02/howcoronavirus-could-impact-the-globalsupply-chain-by-mid-march [Accessed:

[5] Meyer C. Economic effects of coronavirus to be felt for months. Arab News. 2020. Available from: https:// www.arabnews.com/node/1622551 [Accessed: 29 February 2020]

[6] Wang O. Coronavirus: China, Japan, South Korea supply chains under threat from 'second wave' of disruptions. South China Morning Post. 2020. Available from: https://www. scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3052646/coronavirus-chinajapan-south-korea-supply-chains-under

[Accessed: 01 March 2020]

[2] WHO. Rolling Updates on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). 2020. Available from: https:// www.who.int/emergencies/ diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/

events-as-they-happen

01 March 2020]

**References**

01 March 2020]

*Introductory Chapter: The Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Death and Terror in 2020 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91955*

#### **References**

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

supply chain. The time will speak louder than words.

**6**

**Author details**

Syed Abdul Rehman Khan1

\* and Zhang Yu<sup>2</sup>

\*Address all correspondence to: sarehman\_cscp@yahoo.com

provided the original work is properly cited.

1 School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

In 2019, the GDP (gross domestic product) of China represented 16% of the global GDP. However, in 2003, the GDP of China represented only 4.31% of the global GDP, an almost four-fold increase. Due to the dependence on Chinese manufacturers, we cannot imagine the consequences and adverse effects on the global

2 School of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an, China

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

[1] Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. COVID-19 Prevention and Control. 2020. Available from: http://www.chinacdc.cn/en/ [Accessed: 01 March 2020]

[2] WHO. Rolling Updates on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). 2020. Available from: https:// www.who.int/emergencies/ diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/ events-as-they-happen

[3] Khan SAR, Zhang Y. Strategic Supply Chain Management. Switzerland AG: Springer Nature; 2019. ISBN: 978-3-030- 15058-7. Available from: https://www. springer.com/gp/book/9783030150570

[4] Haren P, Simchi-Levi D. How coronavirus could impact the global supply chain by mid-march. Harvard Business Review. 2020. Available from: https://hbr.org/2020/02/howcoronavirus-could-impact-the-globalsupply-chain-by-mid-march [Accessed: 01 March 2020]

[5] Meyer C. Economic effects of coronavirus to be felt for months. Arab News. 2020. Available from: https:// www.arabnews.com/node/1622551 [Accessed: 29 February 2020]

[6] Wang O. Coronavirus: China, Japan, South Korea supply chains under threat from 'second wave' of disruptions. South China Morning Post. 2020. Available from: https://www. scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3052646/coronavirus-chinajapan-south-korea-supply-chains-under [Accessed: 01 March 2020]

**9**

**Chapter 2**

**Abstract**

displacement

**1. Introduction**

provided by the 2,500,000 km2

*Cecilia Idika-Kalu*

displaced persons camps depend on aid.

The Socioeconomic Impact of the

The Lake Chad Basin (LCB), in West Africa, is surrounded by three countries with shared borders. In the previous years, the Lake Chad Basin was a flourishing area, as a result of the opportunities presented by the lake for livelihood, agriculture, tourism, and access to markets and trade. Severe drought has since decimated the socioeconomic potential of the Lake Chad Basin, but more recently, it has worse impact with the Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgency that started in 2002 from Maiduguri town, Borno State in Nigeria, has spread to the Chad and Cameroon leaving destruction, displacement, and the demise of a once-virile economy in its wake. The insecurity that plagues the region has forced millions to flee their homes and abandon their livelihood and trade around the lake. Major trade routes and markets in the area now have greatly reduced activity, as poverty and deep deprivation hold sway and inhabitants who have migrated or live within internally

**Keywords:** Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, economy, insurgency, poverty,

this insurgency on the LCB and surrounding states at the macro-level.

Conflict ravaging the Lake Chad Basin region (LCB), driven by the Boko Haramled insurgency, has taken monstrous proportions. The direct impact of this reflects in the socioeconomic state of populations and countries in the environs. This chapter discusses the socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region. In analyzing the current situation, we will take into cognizance the historical antecedence of the region and the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as the group tactics and strategy in understanding the socioeconomic impact on the area. A microlevel analysis, studying violent extremism and the economic survival of people affected by the conflict, will be engaged. This is followed by the impact of

Over time, the LCB has suffered various issues, from drought, severe effects of climate change, desertification, and poor governance that have contributed to deep poverty in the region. The LCB is encapsulating borders of Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad. About 30 million people derived their means of livelihood from the resource

lake annually reduces from the south (more than 1000 mm yr. − 1) to the north

lake in this semiarid area [1]. Precipitation in the

Boko Haram Insurgency in the

Lake Chad Basin Region

#### **Chapter 2**

## The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region

*Cecilia Idika-Kalu*

#### **Abstract**

The Lake Chad Basin (LCB), in West Africa, is surrounded by three countries with shared borders. In the previous years, the Lake Chad Basin was a flourishing area, as a result of the opportunities presented by the lake for livelihood, agriculture, tourism, and access to markets and trade. Severe drought has since decimated the socioeconomic potential of the Lake Chad Basin, but more recently, it has worse impact with the Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgency that started in 2002 from Maiduguri town, Borno State in Nigeria, has spread to the Chad and Cameroon leaving destruction, displacement, and the demise of a once-virile economy in its wake. The insecurity that plagues the region has forced millions to flee their homes and abandon their livelihood and trade around the lake. Major trade routes and markets in the area now have greatly reduced activity, as poverty and deep deprivation hold sway and inhabitants who have migrated or live within internally displaced persons camps depend on aid.

**Keywords:** Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, economy, insurgency, poverty, displacement

#### **1. Introduction**

Conflict ravaging the Lake Chad Basin region (LCB), driven by the Boko Haramled insurgency, has taken monstrous proportions. The direct impact of this reflects in the socioeconomic state of populations and countries in the environs. This chapter discusses the socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region. In analyzing the current situation, we will take into cognizance the historical antecedence of the region and the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as the group tactics and strategy in understanding the socioeconomic impact on the area. A microlevel analysis, studying violent extremism and the economic survival of people affected by the conflict, will be engaged. This is followed by the impact of this insurgency on the LCB and surrounding states at the macro-level.

Over time, the LCB has suffered various issues, from drought, severe effects of climate change, desertification, and poor governance that have contributed to deep poverty in the region. The LCB is encapsulating borders of Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad. About 30 million people derived their means of livelihood from the resource provided by the 2,500,000 km2 lake in this semiarid area [1]. Precipitation in the lake annually reduces from the south (more than 1000 mm yr. − 1) to the north

of the basin (less than 100 mm yr. − 1) [2]. The Chari/Logone River system may account for 90% of water inflow to the LCB, which has shrunk from 22,000 km<sup>2</sup> to approximately 300 km2 between the 1960s and the 1980s [3]. This loss has been attributed to climate change and drought among other factors and has created a significant socioeconomic impact on the area [4].

The violent extremist activities started in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, by Boko Haram which spread into adjacent Lake Chad and became a regional problem. In 2002, Boko Haram came to the limelight in Nigeria as an Islamist terrorist group of the Sunni strain for preaching Jihad. Its formal name in Arabic is Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād, which is translated from Arabic to mean, "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad" [6]. The phrase Boko Haram is, however, the widely accepted name of the group or more recently the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).

The group has unleashed violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, mostly in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It was founded by Muhammed Yusuf, but the mantle of leadership was taken by Abubakar Shekau, the current leader after Yusuf was killed [7]. Translated from Hausa, "Boko Haram" means "Western education is sinful," and this reflects the group's two main aims: the opposition of what it considers to be the secular westernization of Nigeria, especially coeducational learning and democratic elections, and the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria or at least in the country's majority-Muslim northern states [8].

The crises are now raging along the borders of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Between 2014 and 2015, the group held full control over large areas in northeast Nigeria. Later in 2015, however, Nigeria and the other countries affected in coalition succeeded in taking back many of those territories captured by Boko Haram. The insurgents have morphed their tactics to a guerrilla war-type, using suicide attacks, especially with women as lethal weapons. Their refuge being in areas around the Lake Chad hills around the Nigeria-Cameroon border and forests in Borno State [5].

#### **2. History**

The founder of the movement which became Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was heavily influenced by the ideology and writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Salafi scholar [9] explained some of Yusuf's beliefs thus, "…quoting copiously from Ibn Taymiyyah, Mohammed Yusuf describes as taghut (idolatory) any form of executive, legislative or judicial function derived from a secular constitution rather than from Islamic Shariah Law." This is at the root of his opposition to secularism, democracy, and partisan politics as practiced in Nigeria [8].

After the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Army, Boko Haram became less visible in debate and discussion and greatly manifested in violence. The post-Mohammed Yusuf Boko Haram that evolved displayed a very violent agenda of political domination and establishment of a Sharia state. To attain this lofty goal, all elements of modern government reflective of western civilization had to be destroyed. All people unsympathetic to the sect's ideology must also be exterminated. The *modus operandi* of the group is to use brutal force, combat, and suicide terrorism to achieve its objectives. All these have manifested in the activities of the members and have also been communicated to the general public through the use of social media, precisely through consistent YouTube videos of their spokesman and current leader, Abubakar Shekau [8].

**11**

**strategy**

*The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region*

The group has modified its tactics through the years. Old methods like killing security officials, village heads, and security operatives changed to bombing infrastructure, market places, and kidnap [9]. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 and split into two factions. Abubakar Shekau continues to lead the Boko Haram faction and Umar Al barnawi, the IS-West Africa faction as they are known.

Boko Haram, like many terrorist groups, are not static but can alter their mission and approaches, to take on different shapes as they move from one location to the next—much as a sand dune does. They should be described and understood according to how they evolve and what their internal and external organizational patterns are, rather than what they happen to be at a given moment [10]. Instead of seeing these organizations as networks or hierarchical structures, it is described as a dunelike organization which shifts with the wind and is continually reshaped [11]. These key characteristics are evident in Boko Haram as well as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas which include adherence to a grand vision like a global jihad, no institutional presence, giving a ghost-like organizational reality based on its disappearance when necessary, and dynamic activity that sticks to sequential reasoning, among others. Using the association between networks' density, centrality, and their outputs to evaluate the operational success of terror networks, [12] came up with conclusions that apply to Boko Haram today. He says the group's success in operations and resilience in its ability to survive and to continue to generate a systematic campaign of violence or, more specifically, its durability and productivity describe its success [12]. The significant use of women from kidnapping to suicide bombing seems to show a pattern that reflects Faure and Zartman's [10] description of stages in terrorist activities. This phase is described as the commercialization phase, using strategic violence, follows the incubation stage in the organizational life cycle of the group. For Boko Haram, this strategy would supposedly help deliver on their mission and goals. It would hold the attention of their target audience (government, public as

Boko Haram has deployed different tactics in driving terrorist activities in the LCB region. In analyzing factors using quantitative tools that lead terrorist organizations to attack undefended civilians, which they called "soft targets," Asal et al. examined two distinct processes in choosing to attack soft targets. The first one being the one-time decision to begin attacking soft targets and, second, being the continued use of violence against such targets. The analysis pointed to ideology specifically religion—as the main factor in using civilians as targets, while organizational factors like group size and network centrality are related to the number of incidents perpetrated [13]. According to Bloom and Matfess [14], as Boko Haram shifted in its demography and prioritizing in terms of suicide operations, it adopted

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

**2.1 Boko Haram's structure and strategy**

well as the rest of the world).

**2.2 Boko haram and multiple tactics**

the "unexpected bomber" profile of women and children.

**2.3 Female suicide bombers, kidnappings, and media in the evolution of** 

The year 2013 showed an evolution in Boko Haram's tactics. Boko Haram carried out kidnappings, in which one of the main characteristics was the instrumental use of women. From data and reports from Mendelboim and Schweitzer [15], in 2017,

#### *The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

The group has modified its tactics through the years. Old methods like killing security officials, village heads, and security operatives changed to bombing infrastructure, market places, and kidnap [9]. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 and split into two factions. Abubakar Shekau continues to lead the Boko Haram faction and Umar Al barnawi, the IS-West Africa faction as they are known.

#### **2.1 Boko Haram's structure and strategy**

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

to approximately 300 km2

northern states [8].

Borno State [5].

**2. History**

significant socioeconomic impact on the area [4].

the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).

of the basin (less than 100 mm yr. − 1) [2]. The Chari/Logone River system may account for 90% of water inflow to the LCB, which has shrunk from 22,000 km<sup>2</sup>

attributed to climate change and drought among other factors and has created a

The group has unleashed violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, mostly in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It was founded by Muhammed Yusuf, but the mantle of leadership was taken by Abubakar Shekau, the current leader after Yusuf was killed [7]. Translated from Hausa, "Boko Haram" means "Western education is sinful," and this reflects the group's two main aims: the opposition of what it considers to be the secular westernization of Nigeria, especially coeducational learning and democratic elections, and the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria or at least in the country's majority-Muslim

The crises are now raging along the borders of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Between 2014 and 2015, the group held full control over large areas in northeast Nigeria. Later in 2015, however, Nigeria and the other countries affected in coalition succeeded in taking back many of those territories captured by Boko Haram. The insurgents have morphed their tactics to a guerrilla war-type, using suicide attacks, especially with women as lethal weapons. Their refuge being in areas around the Lake Chad hills around the Nigeria-Cameroon border and forests in

The founder of the movement which became Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was heavily influenced by the ideology and writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Salafi scholar [9] explained some of Yusuf's beliefs thus, "…quoting copiously from Ibn Taymiyyah, Mohammed Yusuf describes as taghut (idolatory) any form of executive, legislative or judicial function derived from a secular constitution rather than from Islamic Shariah Law." This is at the root of his opposition to secularism,

After the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Army, Boko

Haram became less visible in debate and discussion and greatly manifested in violence. The post-Mohammed Yusuf Boko Haram that evolved displayed a very violent agenda of political domination and establishment of a Sharia state. To attain this lofty goal, all elements of modern government reflective of western civilization had to be destroyed. All people unsympathetic to the sect's ideology must also be exterminated. The *modus operandi* of the group is to use brutal force, combat, and suicide terrorism to achieve its objectives. All these have manifested in the activities of the members and have also been communicated to the general public through the use of social media, precisely through consistent YouTube videos of their spokes-

democracy, and partisan politics as practiced in Nigeria [8].

man and current leader, Abubakar Shekau [8].

The violent extremist activities started in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, by Boko Haram which spread into adjacent Lake Chad and became a regional problem. In 2002, Boko Haram came to the limelight in Nigeria as an Islamist terrorist group of the Sunni strain for preaching Jihad. Its formal name in Arabic is Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād, which is translated from Arabic to mean, "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad" [6]. The phrase Boko Haram is, however, the widely accepted name of the group or more recently

between the 1960s and the 1980s [3]. This loss has been

**10**

Boko Haram, like many terrorist groups, are not static but can alter their mission and approaches, to take on different shapes as they move from one location to the next—much as a sand dune does. They should be described and understood according to how they evolve and what their internal and external organizational patterns are, rather than what they happen to be at a given moment [10]. Instead of seeing these organizations as networks or hierarchical structures, it is described as a dunelike organization which shifts with the wind and is continually reshaped [11]. These key characteristics are evident in Boko Haram as well as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas which include adherence to a grand vision like a global jihad, no institutional presence, giving a ghost-like organizational reality based on its disappearance when necessary, and dynamic activity that sticks to sequential reasoning, among others.

Using the association between networks' density, centrality, and their outputs to evaluate the operational success of terror networks, [12] came up with conclusions that apply to Boko Haram today. He says the group's success in operations and resilience in its ability to survive and to continue to generate a systematic campaign of violence or, more specifically, its durability and productivity describe its success [12]. The significant use of women from kidnapping to suicide bombing seems to show a pattern that reflects Faure and Zartman's [10] description of stages in terrorist activities. This phase is described as the commercialization phase, using strategic violence, follows the incubation stage in the organizational life cycle of the group. For Boko Haram, this strategy would supposedly help deliver on their mission and goals. It would hold the attention of their target audience (government, public as well as the rest of the world).

#### **2.2 Boko haram and multiple tactics**

Boko Haram has deployed different tactics in driving terrorist activities in the LCB region. In analyzing factors using quantitative tools that lead terrorist organizations to attack undefended civilians, which they called "soft targets," Asal et al. examined two distinct processes in choosing to attack soft targets. The first one being the one-time decision to begin attacking soft targets and, second, being the continued use of violence against such targets. The analysis pointed to ideology specifically religion—as the main factor in using civilians as targets, while organizational factors like group size and network centrality are related to the number of incidents perpetrated [13]. According to Bloom and Matfess [14], as Boko Haram shifted in its demography and prioritizing in terms of suicide operations, it adopted the "unexpected bomber" profile of women and children.

#### **2.3 Female suicide bombers, kidnappings, and media in the evolution of strategy**

The year 2013 showed an evolution in Boko Haram's tactics. Boko Haram carried out kidnappings, in which one of the main characteristics was the instrumental use of women. From data and reports from Mendelboim and Schweitzer [15], in 2017,

a record of 126 women and girls accounting for 92% of the global figures of female suicide bombers were of the Boko Haram sect, carrying out attacks in Africa. It has been argued, and logically so, that Boko Haram's recognition by global media gained from the Chibok kidnappings in April 2014 helped establish this pattern [16, 17]. The #BringBackOurGirls campaigns, after the group abducted about 276 school-age girls from a school in Chibok, Northeastern Nigeria, caused an increase in the use of women in waging war. Understandably, Boko Haram realized the potency of gendered dimensions, especially in media for its campaign. This is evidenced in terms of its current strategy and notoriety and continued pattern. Looking at the trend of actions between 2002 when the group started in 2019, the use of women only picked up after the Chibok case. It is crucial to note the specific role the media played.

#### **3. Boko haram, welfare, and development: What is the existing evidence?**

#### **3.1 Development and socioeconomic situation**

Generally, inhabitants of the LBC live with relatively high poverty rate and population pressure, with about 50 people per km<sup>2</sup> [19]. The human population in the area is expected to grow annually by an estimated 2.5–3.0% [18]. The area is also prone to intense water scarcity with access to less than 550 m3 of water per year [20]. Their challenges include poor medical facilities, human literacy, and inadequate water supply [21]. The critical factor to the economy of this region is the level of displacement resulting from the conflict and the consequent unemployment and deprivation. As Boko Haram continues its attacks in the area, thousands are forced to flee across the borders between the countries around the LCB, and within the states [22], records of thousands of refugees fleeing Nigeria to Cameroon when insurgents sacked Rann, one of the border towns, recorded. The same was the case with over 5000 inhabitants of Baga, another city on the border of Chad, fleeing across the Lake into Ngouboua village in Chad. This new demographic is dependent on aid and accounts for a swelling vulnerable population and fragile economy in the LCB.

The main points for trade and access to local markets for inhabitants, which are the borders are mostly closed for security. Some livestock farmers move their herds through longer routes passing Niger, from Chad to sell at higher prices at the border markets. Commercial activities from fishing and agriculture have become restricted. Counter-terrorism endeavor by joint task force has been recorded to involve "clearing out" areas around the border, surrounding forests, and the lake shores. This military style operations targeted at flushing out insurgents have the side effect of destabilizing the lives of local fishermen and farmers [5]. Maiduguri, in Borno State, Nigeria, has an ancient history of serving not only as a cultural and religious hub but as the commercial heartbeat of the LCB region. Going back to thousands of years culturally, the Kanem-Bornu Empire and Kanembu of Chad are akin to the Kanuri in Nigeria in the way of life and language. The threat of constant Boko Haram activities over the last few years in the area has negatively affected business in the region and the rest of Northeastern Nigeria.

#### **3.2 Poverty and ripe recruits**

Following the high levels of displacement and refugee status, inhabitants of the LCB seeking a means of generating income and employment engage in hawking agric produce and menial tasks. Many send their children to Koranic schools,

**13**

*The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region*

like Zedalis [28], regarding this point poverty does breed terrorism.

entrusting their children whom they are unable to care for to religious teachers. In many cases, this leads to radicalization of the children and the perpetuation of extremism [23]. Scholarly work on reasons why insurgency and terrorism may thrive shows that the socioeconomic environment is a critical predictor. The response of people, especially women, to this is participation in these organizations [24, 25]. Governance failure, corruption, economic marginalization leading to poverty, unemployment, inequality, and hunger are challenges faced by people in Nigeria and the LCB in varying degrees. According to Matfess [26], and corroborated by Walker [27], some Boko Haram women exercised agency in joining the ranks to make their quality of life better. Contrary to the argument of some scholars

Radicalization is associated with poverty in some cases [29], in the context of Northeastern Nigeria and the LCB, radical groups offer economic prospects. A *Time* magazine publication [30] giving an account of victims of Boko Haram tells of Fatima G. She narrates how 15 of her female friends accepted to be suicide bombers after being feted with treats and stories of martyrdom. Sen [31], in his seminal work on development as freedom, alludes to the fact that women's agency and wellbeing are critical to political and social action. The study showed women's agency and voice through independence and empowerment in literacy, education, earning power, and property rights as necessary. These same factors, or just put, the lack of their availability, cause the exercise of agency in mass violence by suicide bombing.

The history and culture of an area influence the nature of insurgency in the area. The long history of drought, for example, had left the LCB and Northeast Nigeria in poverty, before the insurgency started. Colonization played a part in the history and origins of conflict in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the colonial masters—Britain—left a historical legacy of social fractures in the northeast, making it easier for Boko Haram to recruit followers in the 2000s. The colonialists handpicked the mountain people from Gwoza, made them the elite class and the larger group—the Dgwhede who felt marginalized and are currently some of the most militant Boko Haram fighters [27]. The Kanuri-speaking people, covering Gwoza, Dgwhede, Borno, and Northeast Nigeria, also had a culture of *purdah* (seclusion of women) and *mubaya* (oath of secrecy). The culture alligns with religion practiced in the area now, as well as commonly held beliefs around patriarchy, polygamy, divorce, and women's work in the farms [32, 26]. Meagher [24] argues that the specific interaction of culture, agency, and power in social contexts and how they relate to economic networks and political process affect outcomes in an area. History has evolved with a strong culture of structural violence against women in places like Northeastern Nigeria. This oppression manifests itself in limited opportunities and repressive norms for them. It informs their participation with radicalized groups in a way that mixes coercion,

Consistent across findings from the previous study, development reports, and media analysis are the facts of a socioeconomic crisis in the LCB. Various policy recommendations have been made on improving the human and economic conditions of life in the LCB from academia to development experts. The World Bank, in building resilience for the area, initiated the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to engage with the challenges and developed a plan. The purpose of the LCBC is

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

**3.3 History, culture, and colonization**

consent, and autonomy [26].

**4. Where do we go from here?**

*The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

entrusting their children whom they are unable to care for to religious teachers. In many cases, this leads to radicalization of the children and the perpetuation of extremism [23]. Scholarly work on reasons why insurgency and terrorism may thrive shows that the socioeconomic environment is a critical predictor. The response of people, especially women, to this is participation in these organizations [24, 25]. Governance failure, corruption, economic marginalization leading to poverty, unemployment, inequality, and hunger are challenges faced by people in Nigeria and the LCB in varying degrees. According to Matfess [26], and corroborated by Walker [27], some Boko Haram women exercised agency in joining the ranks to make their quality of life better. Contrary to the argument of some scholars like Zedalis [28], regarding this point poverty does breed terrorism.

Radicalization is associated with poverty in some cases [29], in the context of Northeastern Nigeria and the LCB, radical groups offer economic prospects. A *Time* magazine publication [30] giving an account of victims of Boko Haram tells of Fatima G. She narrates how 15 of her female friends accepted to be suicide bombers after being feted with treats and stories of martyrdom. Sen [31], in his seminal work on development as freedom, alludes to the fact that women's agency and wellbeing are critical to political and social action. The study showed women's agency and voice through independence and empowerment in literacy, education, earning power, and property rights as necessary. These same factors, or just put, the lack of their availability, cause the exercise of agency in mass violence by suicide bombing.

#### **3.3 History, culture, and colonization**

The history and culture of an area influence the nature of insurgency in the area. The long history of drought, for example, had left the LCB and Northeast Nigeria in poverty, before the insurgency started. Colonization played a part in the history and origins of conflict in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the colonial masters—Britain—left a historical legacy of social fractures in the northeast, making it easier for Boko Haram to recruit followers in the 2000s. The colonialists handpicked the mountain people from Gwoza, made them the elite class and the larger group—the Dgwhede who felt marginalized and are currently some of the most militant Boko Haram fighters [27].

The Kanuri-speaking people, covering Gwoza, Dgwhede, Borno, and Northeast Nigeria, also had a culture of *purdah* (seclusion of women) and *mubaya* (oath of secrecy). The culture alligns with religion practiced in the area now, as well as commonly held beliefs around patriarchy, polygamy, divorce, and women's work in the farms [32, 26]. Meagher [24] argues that the specific interaction of culture, agency, and power in social contexts and how they relate to economic networks and political process affect outcomes in an area. History has evolved with a strong culture of structural violence against women in places like Northeastern Nigeria. This oppression manifests itself in limited opportunities and repressive norms for them. It informs their participation with radicalized groups in a way that mixes coercion, consent, and autonomy [26].

#### **4. Where do we go from here?**

Consistent across findings from the previous study, development reports, and media analysis are the facts of a socioeconomic crisis in the LCB. Various policy recommendations have been made on improving the human and economic conditions of life in the LCB from academia to development experts. The World Bank, in building resilience for the area, initiated the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to engage with the challenges and developed a plan. The purpose of the LCBC is

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

**evidence?**

fragile economy in the LCB.

**3.2 Poverty and ripe recruits**

a record of 126 women and girls accounting for 92% of the global figures of female suicide bombers were of the Boko Haram sect, carrying out attacks in Africa. It has been argued, and logically so, that Boko Haram's recognition by global media gained from the Chibok kidnappings in April 2014 helped establish this pattern [16, 17]. The #BringBackOurGirls campaigns, after the group abducted about 276 school-age girls from a school in Chibok, Northeastern Nigeria, caused an increase in the use of women in waging war. Understandably, Boko Haram realized the potency of gendered dimensions, especially in media for its campaign. This is evidenced in terms of its current strategy and notoriety and continued pattern. Looking at the trend of actions between 2002 when the group started in 2019, the use of women only picked up after the Chibok case. It is crucial to note the specific role the media played.

**3. Boko haram, welfare, and development: What is the existing** 

is also prone to intense water scarcity with access to less than 550 m3

business in the region and the rest of Northeastern Nigeria.

Generally, inhabitants of the LBC live with relatively high poverty rate and

in the area is expected to grow annually by an estimated 2.5–3.0% [18]. The area

per year [20]. Their challenges include poor medical facilities, human literacy, and inadequate water supply [21]. The critical factor to the economy of this region is the level of displacement resulting from the conflict and the consequent unemployment and deprivation. As Boko Haram continues its attacks in the area, thousands are forced to flee across the borders between the countries around the LCB, and within the states [22], records of thousands of refugees fleeing Nigeria to Cameroon when insurgents sacked Rann, one of the border towns, recorded. The same was the case with over 5000 inhabitants of Baga, another city on the border of Chad, fleeing across the Lake into Ngouboua village in Chad. This new demographic is dependent on aid and accounts for a swelling vulnerable population and

The main points for trade and access to local markets for inhabitants, which are the borders are mostly closed for security. Some livestock farmers move their herds through longer routes passing Niger, from Chad to sell at higher prices at the border markets. Commercial activities from fishing and agriculture have become restricted. Counter-terrorism endeavor by joint task force has been recorded to involve "clearing out" areas around the border, surrounding forests, and the lake shores. This military style operations targeted at flushing out insurgents have the side effect of destabilizing the lives of local fishermen and farmers [5]. Maiduguri, in Borno State, Nigeria, has an ancient history of serving not only as a cultural and religious hub but as the commercial heartbeat of the LCB region. Going back to thousands of years culturally, the Kanem-Bornu Empire and Kanembu of Chad are akin to the Kanuri in Nigeria in the way of life and language. The threat of constant Boko Haram activities over the last few years in the area has negatively affected

Following the high levels of displacement and refugee status, inhabitants of the LCB seeking a means of generating income and employment engage in hawking agric produce and menial tasks. Many send their children to Koranic schools,

[19]. The human population

of water

**3.1 Development and socioeconomic situation**

population pressure, with about 50 people per km<sup>2</sup>

**12**

to reduce poverty and address climate change and food security. Furthermore, the LCBC, in cooperation with the French Development Agency, affected countries, and the World Bank, plans on allocation of about \$1 billion to this cause. The priority themes for allocating the funds, however, show a paltry 8% for managing conflicts in the area [33].

The impact of Boko Haram activity in the area may require a direct or indirect significant allocation of resource in policy design, to defeat the insurgency, for meaningful progress to take place. Some have advocated for better cooperation between the countries in the LCB instead of closing borders, which increases poverty [5]. This approach may have a better potential for socioeconomic development in the region but has to take into account the large migrant flows between the countries as a result of the insurgency. The recommendation made by Okpara, Stringer, and Doughill [34] is vital to this end. They state that interventions should aid cohabitation as well as income opportunities for mixed migrants in the area.

Migrant populations displaced by the insurgency live as IDP's in camps within the northeast of Nigeria. These people, in their millions, have lost access to farmlands, tools, and markets to create a livelihood for themselves or contribute to the local economy. Many have fled across the national borders into Chad and Cameroon depending on aid for food and shelter and putting further stress on scarce natural and economic resources. The existing background of deep lack and deprivation in the LCB accelerated by Boko Haram attacks calls for solutions proffered with security implications well considered. While the shrinking lake and harsh climate have left a hitherto agrarian region severely affected by drought and lack of water, the impact of conflict concludes the disaster scenario. This triad of devastation can be engaged at different levels; however, for socioeconomic improvement to proceed, peace has to return as a precursor to investment, employment, and trade.

Proposed interventions with strategic components addressing security in the area directly as a step to socioeconomic change may be more impactful. In this regard, Angerbrandt [35] states the need for coordinating regional demobilization plans for vigilante members and stopping conflicts before they escalate. Enobi and Johnson-Rokosu [36] posit that eliminating terrorist finances or considerable reductions to their illicit financial flows by the government, and global effort is the direction to take. Providing water and food in critical parts of the LCB will remove an essential recruiting tool from Boko Haram. This is because 1.9 million displaced people and 2.7 million people with food insecurity live in the area according to the displacement tracking matrix of the IOM [37]. These people whose needs are as essential as food and water would succumb to offers that would offer these seeming benefits [38].

#### **5. Conclusion**

Meaningful intervention in the socioeconomic development of the LCB should not exclude significant investments in security, counter-terrorism measures, and food programs. Shelter, infrastructure, access to markets, and gender-informed policies are necessary to guide aid as well as policy and infrastructure that are gender-informed. The possibility of reviving trade in spite of the damage already done to the economy will have to entail more than military effort [5].

A clear strategy that considers the multilevel intersectionality of factors that drive the Boko Haram strategy and informs the economic condition in the area should be the basis of interventions. These factors are the unique historical, sociocultural, and development context of the Lake Chad Basin as well as the effect of climate change on the lake and livelihood. Policy implementation that will defeat

**15**

*The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region*

the insurgency and direct investment into the region and boost socioeconomic development in the short- and long-term may not be easy to enact. This is because of the governance problems, corruption, and structural patriarchy that are common to the countries in the LCB. The gains, however, are essential and worth the effort—

In making recommendations, an essential point to note is the question of responsibility. In whose hands does the buck of responsibility regarding socioeconomic development of the Lake Chad basin rest? The perspective of state sovereignty will suggest Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, maybe Mali, and other interested West African nations to bear the brunt alone—regardless of their capacity to do so. A world polity theory perspective however will suggest differently [39, 40]. This framework highlights the global system as one social system with a cultural framework referred to as "world polity." This takes into account every actor in the world system and influences international organizations like the UN, states as well as individuals affected by both. This social system is governed by principles and models that shape the course and objectives of social actors and what they do [39, 40]. From this perspective, the security situation in the LCB, negatively impacting the economy and adversely affecting the lives of millions, does have

Changing the socioeconomic situation in the region and turning the fortunes of its inhabitants should give attention to the global and local nature of the causes and proposed solutions. Independently, and in collaboration, the affected states and global actors, like development organizations, nonprofits and other states within the region, can gradually effect change. Insecurity from insurgency affecting the region is a global phenomenon so is climate change causing drought in the LCB. Interventions designed around intelligence, capacity building, foreign direct investment, and environmental protection driven locally and influenced globally

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

the equivalent of saving human lives.

will be key to restoration in the Lake Chad Basin.

University of Massachusetts, Lowell MA, United States

provided the original work is properly cited.

\*Address all correspondence to: unenwojo123@gmail.com

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

grave global import.

**Author details**

Cecilia Idika-Kalu

#### *The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

the insurgency and direct investment into the region and boost socioeconomic development in the short- and long-term may not be easy to enact. This is because of the governance problems, corruption, and structural patriarchy that are common to the countries in the LCB. The gains, however, are essential and worth the effort the equivalent of saving human lives.

In making recommendations, an essential point to note is the question of responsibility. In whose hands does the buck of responsibility regarding socioeconomic development of the Lake Chad basin rest? The perspective of state sovereignty will suggest Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, maybe Mali, and other interested West African nations to bear the brunt alone—regardless of their capacity to do so. A world polity theory perspective however will suggest differently [39, 40]. This framework highlights the global system as one social system with a cultural framework referred to as "world polity." This takes into account every actor in the world system and influences international organizations like the UN, states as well as individuals affected by both. This social system is governed by principles and models that shape the course and objectives of social actors and what they do [39, 40]. From this perspective, the security situation in the LCB, negatively impacting the economy and adversely affecting the lives of millions, does have grave global import.

Changing the socioeconomic situation in the region and turning the fortunes of its inhabitants should give attention to the global and local nature of the causes and proposed solutions. Independently, and in collaboration, the affected states and global actors, like development organizations, nonprofits and other states within the region, can gradually effect change. Insecurity from insurgency affecting the region is a global phenomenon so is climate change causing drought in the LCB. Interventions designed around intelligence, capacity building, foreign direct investment, and environmental protection driven locally and influenced globally will be key to restoration in the Lake Chad Basin.

#### **Author details**

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

conflicts in the area [33].

to reduce poverty and address climate change and food security. Furthermore, the LCBC, in cooperation with the French Development Agency, affected countries, and the World Bank, plans on allocation of about \$1 billion to this cause. The priority themes for allocating the funds, however, show a paltry 8% for managing

The impact of Boko Haram activity in the area may require a direct or indirect significant allocation of resource in policy design, to defeat the insurgency, for meaningful progress to take place. Some have advocated for better cooperation between the countries in the LCB instead of closing borders, which increases poverty [5]. This approach may have a better potential for socioeconomic development in the region but has to take into account the large migrant flows between the countries as a result of the insurgency. The recommendation made by Okpara, Stringer, and Doughill [34] is vital to this end. They state that interventions should aid cohabitation as well as income opportunities for mixed migrants in the area. Migrant populations displaced by the insurgency live as IDP's in camps within the northeast of Nigeria. These people, in their millions, have lost access to farmlands, tools, and markets to create a livelihood for themselves or contribute to the local economy. Many have fled across the national borders into Chad and Cameroon depending on aid for food and shelter and putting further stress on scarce natural and economic resources. The existing background of deep lack and deprivation in the LCB accelerated by Boko Haram attacks calls for solutions proffered with security implications well considered. While the shrinking lake and harsh climate have left a hitherto agrarian region severely affected by drought and lack of water, the impact of conflict concludes the disaster scenario. This triad of devastation can be engaged at different levels; however, for socioeconomic improvement to proceed,

peace has to return as a precursor to investment, employment, and trade.

Proposed interventions with strategic components addressing security in the area directly as a step to socioeconomic change may be more impactful. In this regard, Angerbrandt [35] states the need for coordinating regional demobilization plans for vigilante members and stopping conflicts before they escalate. Enobi and Johnson-Rokosu [36] posit that eliminating terrorist finances or considerable reductions to their illicit financial flows by the government, and global effort is the direction to take. Providing water and food in critical parts of the LCB will remove an essential recruiting tool from Boko Haram. This is because 1.9 million displaced people and 2.7 million people with food insecurity live in the area according to the displacement tracking matrix of the IOM [37]. These people whose needs are as essential as food and water would succumb to offers that would offer these seem-

Meaningful intervention in the socioeconomic development of the LCB should not exclude significant investments in security, counter-terrorism measures, and food programs. Shelter, infrastructure, access to markets, and gender-informed policies are necessary to guide aid as well as policy and infrastructure that are gender-informed. The possibility of reviving trade in spite of the damage already

A clear strategy that considers the multilevel intersectionality of factors that drive the Boko Haram strategy and informs the economic condition in the area should be the basis of interventions. These factors are the unique historical, sociocultural, and development context of the Lake Chad Basin as well as the effect of climate change on the lake and livelihood. Policy implementation that will defeat

done to the economy will have to entail more than military effort [5].

**14**

ing benefits [38].

**5. Conclusion**

Cecilia Idika-Kalu University of Massachusetts, Lowell MA, United States

\*Address all correspondence to: unenwojo123@gmail.com

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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[26] Matfess H. Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, Weapons, Witnesses. London, UK: Zed Books;

[27] Walker A. Eat the Heart of the Infidel: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram. London,

[28] Zedalis D. Female Suicide Bombers. Hawaii, United States: University Press

England: Hurst & Co; 2016

of the Pacific; 2004

degradation, livelihood, and conflicts: A focus on the implications of the diminishing water resources of Lake Chad for North-Eastern Nigeria. African Journal on Conflict Resolution.

23 February 2016]

2009;**8**:35-61

report

Basin1. 2016

James Currey; 2015

*The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89905*

Development. 2015. Available from: http://report.hdr.undp.org/ [Accessed: 23 February 2016]

[20] Mekonnen DT. The Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan (Summary). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group; 2016

[21] Onuoha F. Environmental degradation, livelihood, and conflicts: A focus on the implications of the diminishing water resources of Lake Chad for North-Eastern Nigeria. African Journal on Conflict Resolution. 2009;**8**:35-61

[22] Available from: https://www. unhcr.org/afr/publications/ fundraising/5a0c05027/unhcrglobal-appeal-2018-2019-full-report. html?query=unhcr%202019%20%20 report

[23] Ogbozor E. Resilience to Violent Extremism: The Rural Livelihood Coping Strategies in the Lake Chad Basin1. 2016

[24] Meagher K. Leaving No one behind? : Informal economies, economic inclusion, and Islamic extremism in Nigeria. Journal of International Development. 2015;**27**:835-855

[25] Mustapha AR. Sects and Social Disorder: Muslim Identities and Conflict in Northern Nigeria. Rochester, NY: James Currey; 2015

[26] Matfess H. Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, Weapons, Witnesses. London, UK: Zed Books; 2017

[27] Walker A. Eat the Heart of the Infidel: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram. London, England: Hurst & Co; 2016

[28] Zedalis D. Female Suicide Bombers. Hawaii, United States: University Press of the Pacific; 2004

[29] Shmidt A. Terrorism-the definitional problem. Case Western Reserve University School of Law. World Quarterly. 2004;**31**(7):1145-1160

[30] Baker A. Time Magazine. Magnum for Time. Maiduguri, Nigeria. June 2017. Available from: http://Time.Com/ Boko-Harams-Other-Victims/

[31] Sen A. Development as Freedom. 1st ed. New York, United States: Anchor Books; 2000. pp. 190-203

[32] Cohen R. The Kanuri of Bornu. Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology. The United States: Northwestern University; 1967

[33] The World Bank. Feature Story. Investing in Resilience and Development in Lake Chad. 2016. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ feature/2016/02/11/investing-inresilience-and-development-in-lakechad [Accessed: 11 February 2016]

[34] Okpara UT, Stringer LC, Dougill AJ. Lake drying and livelihood dynamics in Lake Chad: Unravelling the mechanisms, contexts, and responses. Ambio. 2016;**45**:781. Springer Netherlands

[35] Angerbrandt H. Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region Beyond Boko Haram Policy Note No 3:2017. The Nordic Africa Institute, June 2017

[36] Enobi AL, Johnson-Rokosu SF. Terrorism financing. The socioeconomic and political implications of Boko haram insurgency in Lake Chad Basin. Academic Journal of Economic Studies. 2016;**2**(2):25-41. Editura Universitară & ADI Publication. Available from: https://www.ceeol.com/search/ article-detail?id=467107

[37] Available from: https://www. iom.int/news/new-report-outlinesdisplacement-human-mobility-figureslake-chad-basin

**16**

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

[1] Sarch MT. Fishing and farming at Lake Chad: Institutions for access to natural resources. Journal of Environmental Management.

Diplomacy. Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press; 2011

[11] Mishal S, Rosenthal M. Al Qaeda as a dune organization: Toward a typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

[12] Perliger A. Terrorist networks' productivity and durability – A comparative multi-level analysis. Perspectives on Terrorism.

[13] Asal V, Hoffman AM. Media effects: Do terrorist organizations launch foreign attacks in response to levels of press freedom or press attention? Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2016;**33**(4):381-399

[14] Bloom M, Matfess H. Women as symbols and swords in Boko Haram's terror. PRISM: The Journal of Complex

[15] Mendelboim A, Schweitzer Y. (Rep.). Institute for National Security Studies. 2018. Available from: http:// www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17031

[16] Oriola T. "Unwilling cocoons":

[17] Nwaubani AT. Killing for Airtime: How Boko Haram's Abubakar Shekau manipulates media. World Policy Journal. 2018;**35**(2):58-62. Dukes

briefing/2019/1/5c46e6854/thousandsnigerian-refugees-seek-safety-chad.html

Development Report. Work for Human

Operations. 2016;**6**(1):104

Boko Haram's war against women. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2017;**40**(2):99-121. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1177998

University Press

[18] Available from: https:// www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/

[19] United Nations Human

2005;**28**(4):275293

2014;**8**(4):36-52

[2] Niel H, Leduc C, Dieulin C. Spatial and temporal variability of annual rainfall in the Lake Chad basin during the 20th century. Hydrological Sciences

[3] Singh A, Diop S, M'mayi PL. Africa's

[4] Sarch MT, Birkett C. Fishing and farming at Lake Chad: Responses to lake-level fluctuations. The

Geographical Journal. 2000;**166**:156-172

[5] International Crisis Group. Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures. Report 246/The Boko Haram Insurgency, March 8, 2017. Available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/ africa/central-africa/chad/246-fightingboko-haram-chad-beyond-military-

[6] Mauro R. FACTSHEET—Boko Haram: Nigerian Islamist Group. Prepared by Clarion Project. 2014. Available from: www.clarionproject.org

[7] Tonwe DA, Eke SJ. State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria. African Security Review. 2013;**22**(4):232-243

[8] Alkali F. The Travails of Combating Insurgency: With Reference to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Nigeria:

[9] Mohammed K. The Message and Methods of Boko Haram. Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security, and the state in Nigeria; 2014. pp. 9-32

[10] Faure G, Zartman WI. Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and

University of Abuja; 2017

2001;**62**:185-199

**References**

measures

Journal. 2005;**50**:223-243

Lakes: Atlas of our Changing Environment. Nairobi: UNEP; 2006 [38] Piesse M. Boko Haram: Exacerbating and Benefiting from Food and Water Insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin. Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme. Strategic Analysis. Future Directions International, Australia. 2017

[39] McNeely C. World polity theory. In: The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization. World Polity Theory. Blackwell Publishing. 2012. DOI: 10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog834

[40] Boli J, Thomas G. World culture in the world polity: A century of international non-governmental organization. American Sociological Review. 1997;**62**(2):171-190

**19**

**Chapter 3**

Extremism

building resilient communities.

**1. Introduction**

extremist groups (VEOs).

violent extremism, resilience, Kenya

*Wilson Muna*

**Abstract**

Family-Based Networks: Soft

This chapter explores the vital role played by family-based networks, not only as a facilitative function in support of violent extremism (VE) activities but also more importantly as a preventative policy instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth into violent extremist groups. It draws from social facilitated theory that identifies family as key in dissuading young minds from violent radical behavior and proposes acceptable alternatives. Mothers have been identified to have significant moral authority that shapes behavior and influences decision among their children, while father figures are seen to be vital in building and strengthening the character, identity, and confidence. It is argued that families have the potential to build and strengthen attitudes toward non-violence, identify signs of possible radicalization to violence among their own, and prevent and intervene in the course of the radicalization process. It is concluded here that in a bid to design effective long-term counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies to VE, stakeholders must re-affirm the role of family-based community networks as crucial pillars in

**Keywords:** family-based community networks, soft power, radicalization,

It is not surprising to find that after analyzing the family history of an individual

who is at risk, or susceptible to radicalization or radical extreme ideologies, that such persons would have suffered neglect from their families or absent parental figures, particularly in their early years of growth. Drawing from four, eight-member focus group discussions conducted among Muslim youth drawn from Kangemi slums in Nairobi, and from already published empirical evidence, this work aims to demonstrate how family and those within its close networks act not only as a facilitative function in support of VE activities but also more importantly as a preventative instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent

It is argued that family is considered as the prime institution that transmits fundamental values and beliefs to their children in the following ways: it teaches

Policy Tools in Countering

Radicalisation to Violent

#### **Chapter 3**

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

[38] Piesse M. Boko Haram: Exacerbating and Benefiting from Food and Water Insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin. Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme. Strategic Analysis. Future Directions

International, Australia. 2017

[39] McNeely C. World polity theory. In: The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization. World Polity Theory. Blackwell Publishing. 2012. DOI: 10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog834

[40] Boli J, Thomas G. World culture in the world polity: A century of international non-governmental organization. American Sociological

Review. 1997;**62**(2):171-190

**18**

## Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism

*Wilson Muna*

### **Abstract**

This chapter explores the vital role played by family-based networks, not only as a facilitative function in support of violent extremism (VE) activities but also more importantly as a preventative policy instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth into violent extremist groups. It draws from social facilitated theory that identifies family as key in dissuading young minds from violent radical behavior and proposes acceptable alternatives. Mothers have been identified to have significant moral authority that shapes behavior and influences decision among their children, while father figures are seen to be vital in building and strengthening the character, identity, and confidence. It is argued that families have the potential to build and strengthen attitudes toward non-violence, identify signs of possible radicalization to violence among their own, and prevent and intervene in the course of the radicalization process. It is concluded here that in a bid to design effective long-term counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies to VE, stakeholders must re-affirm the role of family-based community networks as crucial pillars in building resilient communities.

**Keywords:** family-based community networks, soft power, radicalization, violent extremism, resilience, Kenya

#### **1. Introduction**

It is not surprising to find that after analyzing the family history of an individual who is at risk, or susceptible to radicalization or radical extreme ideologies, that such persons would have suffered neglect from their families or absent parental figures, particularly in their early years of growth. Drawing from four, eight-member focus group discussions conducted among Muslim youth drawn from Kangemi slums in Nairobi, and from already published empirical evidence, this work aims to demonstrate how family and those within its close networks act not only as a facilitative function in support of VE activities but also more importantly as a preventative instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent extremist groups (VEOs).

It is argued that family is considered as the prime institution that transmits fundamental values and beliefs to their children in the following ways: it teaches acceptable behavior, it provides an individual with a personal identity and a sense of national loyalty (belonging), and the child also becomes aware of ideologies associated with the authorities and learns obedience to the state or political authority. By forming basic loyalties and identifying with political systems, "the child also learns to sort people into social categories—linguistic, racial, class, tribal, occupational, or geographical. Children learn to classify people according to certain characteristics and to behave differently toward them depending on how they are classified, and the bond (or lack thereof) between the parent and the child plays an extremely important role in developing a person's self-esteem, sense of identity, personality, and emotional health" [1]. Thus, individual radicalization is not sparked just by external factors but also internally through environments in which they develop. In this case, the family plays a fertile space in an individual's growth, development, and eventual life choices [1].

#### **2. Theoretical model**

This work goes beyond implicit linear, sequential models that explain the radicalization process in support of socially based design. Specifically, this work draws from social facilitated theory, which establishes that an individual's introduction to radical ideologies and becoming extremists is often traced back to their social environment, particularly family and kinship networks. By and large, social institutions, particularly family, become instrumental in playing a facilitative function in pushing their own toward adopting violent extremist ideologies. Thus, it is determined that ideologies (and group support for them) breed around the social ecology of nested contexts and systems—including family networks [2]—and hence a relevant and most suitable point of intervention.

Bauman et al. [3] tried out different intervention measures (like the use of school curricula, vending machine control, cigarette tax increase, and age restriction enforcement on sales) as an attempt to prevent adolescent from tobacco and alcohol use and found them to have recorded dismal success away from the desired goal. Instead, they turned to families of these adolescents and evaluated their influence of their children's choices. They were of the assumption that families do have a substantial impact on their children's behavior, since characteristics of individual families were found to be correlated with the adolescent's use of alcohol, tobacco, and other abusive substances. Drawing from their findings, the influence of families after implementing the Family Matters program showed significant success in involving families in the prevention program [3].

In their results, following the assessment of the impact of family systems intervention on recidivism and sibling delinquency, Klein et al. found that the family systems approach, when equated to other conditions, yielded substantial improvements in process measures and a significant reduction in recidivism [4]. According to Bailey et al. [5], effective adaptation of design and implementation of family-centered approaches is critical in bringing about change among children in the early stages of their development.

#### **3. Discussion and analysis of findings**

The emerging question in the field of CVE is who is likely to be among the first to notice, and be willing to intercede, with individuals beginning to radicalize and having affinity with ideologies and activities associated with VE? This study argues that families and individuals close to such families are best position to detect such

**21**

an extremist group, saying:

*Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism*

signs and respond. On the contrary, other findings indicate that "the family is the last to know. They only know when the person is in trouble" [6], meaning that such individuals may want to really hide their engagements from their kin and families

However, I argue that it is unlikely that members of the family remain in the blind spot since they are the first to encounter the at-risk individual when they begin to change their behavior, unless the individual physically detaches and relocates from his/her familiar location. It is important to acknowledge that family members may want to remain in denial in an effort to save themselves from public embarrassment. Vidino and Hughes [7] have argued that before individuals made initial attempts toward radicalization, there must have a family member, or at least a friend close to the family, who witnessed the individual embarking on the journey toward VE. Williams et al. [6] are of the view that from the start, family members are the first to notice change of behavior in one of their own but often remain reluctant to dissuade them from the choice of violence due to fear that this might

Although volumes of literature and empirical evidence have been published about how individuals are recruited into terrorist networks and activities, little research has focused on the role of family-based community networks (FBCNs), not only as a facilitative function in support of VE activities but more importantly as a preventative instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent extremist groups (VEOs). In a case in point, a respondent in the focus group discussion (FGD) expressed that the major reason he had joined gangs, commonly hired by politicians to cause violence, was the inability of his family to provide for his needs (house rent, clothing, food, and other basic needs). Another respondent indicated that after he completed high school, he was forced to suspend his pursuit for higher education to allow younger siblings to complete school. This pressure from family increased his vulnerability and desperation. Respondents agreed that high demands for survival on jobless youth, created by family's financial inability to support their children to acquire critical skills, remain a critical push factor toward violent extremism. However, the phenomenon of material lack is not to be generalized, since most of the militant individuals have in fact originated from middle-class families, with college-level education, and often had jobs in both formal and informal sector [2]. Other results [8] have shown that among young people with affinity to terrorism,

students from middle-class families were particularly involved.

Families are argued to be the most defining element in character formation. In fact,

as teenagers attempt to find their space and create their identity, away from family frames, they become vulnerable to being recruited into VEOs. The decisions they make eventually are shaped by their family background, whereby those who may have lived a neglected childhood, or lived in families or parents with unhealthy conflicts and tensions, may seek affirmations outside the family ties. In the end, any chance to engage in an extraordinary group or activity is attractive for this group of youth, particularly those that do not enjoy support from their kin [9]. The case of Kemunto, one of those believed to have been the instigators of the deadly attack that left 21 people dead at 14 Riverside Drive in Nairobi, is illustrative. She, a Muslim convert, came from a broken family and an absent father who was rarely home due to drinking problems [10]. According to the observation made by Sikkens et al. [11] in their case study research, more than 70% of youth that had joined radical violent groups came from families that had been afflicted with divorce, health and mental health problems, and extreme financial constraints. In this case, this undesirable condition may have played a role in the radicalization process. In their case study, they cite expression from Daniel—not real name—a Muslim who had disengaged from

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

only get to know at an advanced stage.

negatively affect their relationships.

#### *Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

signs and respond. On the contrary, other findings indicate that "the family is the last to know. They only know when the person is in trouble" [6], meaning that such individuals may want to really hide their engagements from their kin and families only get to know at an advanced stage.

However, I argue that it is unlikely that members of the family remain in the blind spot since they are the first to encounter the at-risk individual when they begin to change their behavior, unless the individual physically detaches and relocates from his/her familiar location. It is important to acknowledge that family members may want to remain in denial in an effort to save themselves from public embarrassment. Vidino and Hughes [7] have argued that before individuals made initial attempts toward radicalization, there must have a family member, or at least a friend close to the family, who witnessed the individual embarking on the journey toward VE. Williams et al. [6] are of the view that from the start, family members are the first to notice change of behavior in one of their own but often remain reluctant to dissuade them from the choice of violence due to fear that this might negatively affect their relationships.

Although volumes of literature and empirical evidence have been published about how individuals are recruited into terrorist networks and activities, little research has focused on the role of family-based community networks (FBCNs), not only as a facilitative function in support of VE activities but more importantly as a preventative instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent extremist groups (VEOs). In a case in point, a respondent in the focus group discussion (FGD) expressed that the major reason he had joined gangs, commonly hired by politicians to cause violence, was the inability of his family to provide for his needs (house rent, clothing, food, and other basic needs). Another respondent indicated that after he completed high school, he was forced to suspend his pursuit for higher education to allow younger siblings to complete school. This pressure from family increased his vulnerability and desperation. Respondents agreed that high demands for survival on jobless youth, created by family's financial inability to support their children to acquire critical skills, remain a critical push factor toward violent extremism. However, the phenomenon of material lack is not to be generalized, since most of the militant individuals have in fact originated from middle-class families, with college-level education, and often had jobs in both formal and informal sector [2]. Other results [8] have shown that among young people with affinity to terrorism, students from middle-class families were particularly involved.

Families are argued to be the most defining element in character formation. In fact, as teenagers attempt to find their space and create their identity, away from family frames, they become vulnerable to being recruited into VEOs. The decisions they make eventually are shaped by their family background, whereby those who may have lived a neglected childhood, or lived in families or parents with unhealthy conflicts and tensions, may seek affirmations outside the family ties. In the end, any chance to engage in an extraordinary group or activity is attractive for this group of youth, particularly those that do not enjoy support from their kin [9]. The case of Kemunto, one of those believed to have been the instigators of the deadly attack that left 21 people dead at 14 Riverside Drive in Nairobi, is illustrative. She, a Muslim convert, came from a broken family and an absent father who was rarely home due to drinking problems [10].

According to the observation made by Sikkens et al. [11] in their case study research, more than 70% of youth that had joined radical violent groups came from families that had been afflicted with divorce, health and mental health problems, and extreme financial constraints. In this case, this undesirable condition may have played a role in the radicalization process. In their case study, they cite expression from Daniel—not real name—a Muslim who had disengaged from an extremist group, saying:

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

and eventual life choices [1].

a relevant and most suitable point of intervention.

in involving families in the prevention program [3].

the early stages of their development.

**3. Discussion and analysis of findings**

**2. Theoretical model**

acceptable behavior, it provides an individual with a personal identity and a sense of national loyalty (belonging), and the child also becomes aware of ideologies associated with the authorities and learns obedience to the state or political authority. By forming basic loyalties and identifying with political systems, "the child also learns to sort people into social categories—linguistic, racial, class, tribal, occupational, or geographical. Children learn to classify people according to certain characteristics and to behave differently toward them depending on how they are classified, and the bond (or lack thereof) between the parent and the child plays an extremely important role in developing a person's self-esteem, sense of identity, personality, and emotional health" [1]. Thus, individual radicalization is not sparked just by external factors but also internally through environments in which they develop. In this case, the family plays a fertile space in an individual's growth, development,

This work goes beyond implicit linear, sequential models that explain the radicalization process in support of socially based design. Specifically, this work draws from social facilitated theory, which establishes that an individual's introduction to radical ideologies and becoming extremists is often traced back to their social environment, particularly family and kinship networks. By and large, social institutions, particularly family, become instrumental in playing a facilitative function in pushing their own toward adopting violent extremist ideologies. Thus, it is determined that ideologies (and group support for them) breed around the social ecology of nested contexts and systems—including family networks [2]—and hence

Bauman et al. [3] tried out different intervention measures (like the use of school curricula, vending machine control, cigarette tax increase, and age restriction enforcement on sales) as an attempt to prevent adolescent from tobacco and alcohol use and found them to have recorded dismal success away from the desired goal. Instead, they turned to families of these adolescents and evaluated their influence of their children's choices. They were of the assumption that families do have a substantial impact on their children's behavior, since characteristics of individual families were found to be correlated with the adolescent's use of alcohol, tobacco, and other abusive substances. Drawing from their findings, the influence of

families after implementing the Family Matters program showed significant success

The emerging question in the field of CVE is who is likely to be among the first to notice, and be willing to intercede, with individuals beginning to radicalize and having affinity with ideologies and activities associated with VE? This study argues that families and individuals close to such families are best position to detect such

In their results, following the assessment of the impact of family systems intervention on recidivism and sibling delinquency, Klein et al. found that the family systems approach, when equated to other conditions, yielded substantial improvements in process measures and a significant reduction in recidivism [4]. According to Bailey et al. [5], effective adaptation of design and implementation of family-centered approaches is critical in bringing about change among children in

**20**

My mother has had psychological problems all her life, and my sister required a lot of attention and care. She had to run the household all by herself, and so she was hardly able to get a handle on the situation.

In line with the foregoing, Spalek [12] posits that families are viewed as surprisingly able to play two conflicting roles in the field of countering/violent extremism (C/VE), both "as potentially being risky, as well as potentially being a source of protection and rehabilitation." This is not to purport that the wider society, away from the family networks, have a little role to play in de-/radicalization. This study is designed to explore how FBCNs reorient and instill behavioral change among the youth as they chose to join or detach from radicalization to VE and terror-related activities. A growing body of research links parental influence to radicalization.

To this end, Hoeve et al. posit that "lack of support, supervision, harsh disciplining, inconsistent parenting, delinquent family members, and problems within the family would enhance the chances of young people developing deviant behavior" [13]. However, little is known of the extent to which the role played in bringing up a child may influence radicalization and de-radicalization to, or from, violent extremism [11]. On the other hand, it is believed that sound parental support for the child goes a long way toward the enhancement of their moral development. Proper parental guidance assists children to establish prosocial moral internalization [14].

Apart from parents, siblings, especially between male brothers, play an important role in the de-/radicalization process. Particularly in large families, younger siblings look up to their older siblings as role models. According to Kumar [15] the late terrorist attacker Amrozi Nurhasyim came from a very big family and was inspired by his elder brother Mukhlas, with who they conspired to commit the Bali attack in 2002. Other cases in point include the Paris attacks in 2005, the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013, and the 2014 Mpeketoni massacre, among others, which were planned and carried out by siblings. Sisters too have their own share of influence in radicalization to VE. For example, two of the three attackers at a police station in Mombasa were identified as biological sisters.

In a bid to prevent Australian youth from joining VEOs or traveling to become foreign fighters in countries at the center of terror insurgency like Syria and Iraq, a program sponsored by the Norway Action Plan against violent extremism organized conversations between parents and young people who conducted themselves in a manner that demonstrated signs of radicalization [16]. In Berlin, a program that gained international reputation is "Hayat." This is a CVE initiative established in the last decade by the Center for Democratic Culture. The sole aim of this effort was to respond to the more contemporary threat of foreign youth fighters traveling to countries at the center of terrorism and VE. Over time, the program has brought together families and communities of youth who had become part of, or intended to join, VE groups in foreign countries. Families and communities are oriented to the process of identifying signs of radicalization among the youth and were facilitated to create an environment around individuals at risk and dissuade them from being further involved [17]. Above all, the initiative provided a 24-hour counseling hotline to members of families with such youth at risk of joining VEOs and sometimes brought small groups of families together to share experiences [18]. In 2015, the Extreme Dialog project (sponsored by the Kanishka Project under the management of the Institute of Strategic Dialog) was launched. They used family members of those involved in VE activities to deliver messages against VE and terrorism as their main strategic approach.

Noting the influence that family-based community networks have on individual and social relationships, governments across the world are beginning to focus their attention on families as a critical point of intervention. Notably, research has shown that the overwhelming majority of individuals continue to radicalize through the

**23**

toward violence.

University:

*Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism*

influence of close social or family relationships [19] and just as importantly, that personal relationships provide the primary vehicle for disengagement [20]. At the backdrop of the foregoing, part of the \$13.4 million dollars allocated by the Australian government for CVE intervention was designed to enhance support for families by strengthening their capacity to perform the intervention work. According to Haris-Hogan et al. [16], this was a move away from generic community interventions to a more individually focused and purposeful response strategy

In the last decade, governments across the globe have increasingly shifted focus from broad-based CVE interventions and are introducing individual specific approaches [7]. In 2012, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate had made recommendations to the executive branch to establish a system to address the fate of radicalized individuals who were yet to be mobilized to violence. This was proposed as an alternative approach to security agencies besides arrest. In the proposed plan, they suggested to bring key actors, such as family, who would be co-opted to dissuade at-risk individuals and disengage

The US government needs to develop options within constitutional and statutory constraints for situations in which federal law enforcement, such as the FBI, comes in contact with an individual who is radicalizing. It is not law enforcement's or the intelligence community's role to seek to change an individual's beliefs protected by the First Amendment, as opposed to focusing on criminal conduct. An individual's family, friends, and local community and religious leaders are best suited to dissuading the individual from criminal activity as well as rolling back the radicalization. The US government needs to resolve the extent to which federal law enforcement can share information concerning radicalized individuals with family,

In the US government, more senior administrators seemed to have been convinced by this proposal. It is recorded that a year after the Boston Marathon bombing, Lisa Monaco, the deputy to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, addressed this topic on her public lecture at Harvard

Parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home becoming confrontational. Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences. Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas. Or friends might notice a new interest in watching or sharing violent material. The government is rarely in a position to observe these early signals, so we need to do more to help communities understand the warning signs, and then work together to intervene before an incident can occur [22]. To this end, Vidino and Hughes [7] argued for the establishment of a wellcrafted system of interventions that provide options for families, communities, and law enforcement agencies to develop workable alternatives to prosecution of at-risk

In tandem with the foregoing, Williams et al. [6] consider public institutional approach as one component of developing CVE design interventions, such as law enforcement agencies, school systems, faith-based organizations, social service agencies, psychological services, and more. They argue that the second component is comprised of individuals [also known as gatekeepers], such as family members, who are willing and able to connect potentially at-risk persons to relevant institutions for professional assistance. Family members and those within their close networks most likely detect signs among at-risk individuals as they embrace radical ideologies and refer them to institutions that dissuade them from pursuing the path

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

to the problem of radicalization to VE.

them from being radicalized into VE.

friends, and local community and religious leaders [21].

individuals or in the path of radicalization to VE.

#### *Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

influence of close social or family relationships [19] and just as importantly, that personal relationships provide the primary vehicle for disengagement [20]. At the backdrop of the foregoing, part of the \$13.4 million dollars allocated by the Australian government for CVE intervention was designed to enhance support for families by strengthening their capacity to perform the intervention work. According to Haris-Hogan et al. [16], this was a move away from generic community interventions to a more individually focused and purposeful response strategy to the problem of radicalization to VE.

In the last decade, governments across the globe have increasingly shifted focus from broad-based CVE interventions and are introducing individual specific approaches [7]. In 2012, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate had made recommendations to the executive branch to establish a system to address the fate of radicalized individuals who were yet to be mobilized to violence. This was proposed as an alternative approach to security agencies besides arrest. In the proposed plan, they suggested to bring key actors, such as family, who would be co-opted to dissuade at-risk individuals and disengage them from being radicalized into VE.

The US government needs to develop options within constitutional and statutory constraints for situations in which federal law enforcement, such as the FBI, comes in contact with an individual who is radicalizing. It is not law enforcement's or the intelligence community's role to seek to change an individual's beliefs protected by the First Amendment, as opposed to focusing on criminal conduct. An individual's family, friends, and local community and religious leaders are best suited to dissuading the individual from criminal activity as well as rolling back the radicalization. The US government needs to resolve the extent to which federal law enforcement can share information concerning radicalized individuals with family, friends, and local community and religious leaders [21].

In the US government, more senior administrators seemed to have been convinced by this proposal. It is recorded that a year after the Boston Marathon bombing, Lisa Monaco, the deputy to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, addressed this topic on her public lecture at Harvard University:

Parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home becoming confrontational. Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences. Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas. Or friends might notice a new interest in watching or sharing violent material. The government is rarely in a position to observe these early signals, so we need to do more to help communities understand the warning signs, and then work together to intervene before an incident can occur [22].

To this end, Vidino and Hughes [7] argued for the establishment of a wellcrafted system of interventions that provide options for families, communities, and law enforcement agencies to develop workable alternatives to prosecution of at-risk individuals or in the path of radicalization to VE.

In tandem with the foregoing, Williams et al. [6] consider public institutional approach as one component of developing CVE design interventions, such as law enforcement agencies, school systems, faith-based organizations, social service agencies, psychological services, and more. They argue that the second component is comprised of individuals [also known as gatekeepers], such as family members, who are willing and able to connect potentially at-risk persons to relevant institutions for professional assistance. Family members and those within their close networks most likely detect signs among at-risk individuals as they embrace radical ideologies and refer them to institutions that dissuade them from pursuing the path toward violence.

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

hardly able to get a handle on the situation.

station in Mombasa were identified as biological sisters.

My mother has had psychological problems all her life, and my sister required a lot of attention and care. She had to run the household all by herself, and so she was

In line with the foregoing, Spalek [12] posits that families are viewed as surprisingly able to play two conflicting roles in the field of countering/violent extremism (C/VE), both "as potentially being risky, as well as potentially being a source of protection and rehabilitation." This is not to purport that the wider society, away from the family networks, have a little role to play in de-/radicalization. This study is designed to explore how FBCNs reorient and instill behavioral change among the youth as they chose to join or detach from radicalization to VE and terror-related activities. A growing body of research links parental influence to radicalization.

To this end, Hoeve et al. posit that "lack of support, supervision, harsh disciplining, inconsistent parenting, delinquent family members, and problems within the family would enhance the chances of young people developing deviant behavior" [13]. However, little is known of the extent to which the role played in bringing up a child may influence radicalization and de-radicalization to, or from, violent extremism [11]. On the other hand, it is believed that sound parental support for the child goes a long way toward the enhancement of their moral development. Proper parental guidance assists children to establish prosocial moral internalization [14]. Apart from parents, siblings, especially between male brothers, play an important role in the de-/radicalization process. Particularly in large families, younger siblings look up to their older siblings as role models. According to Kumar [15] the late terrorist attacker Amrozi Nurhasyim came from a very big family and was inspired by his elder brother Mukhlas, with who they conspired to commit the Bali attack in 2002. Other cases in point include the Paris attacks in 2005, the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013, and the 2014 Mpeketoni massacre, among others, which were planned and carried out by siblings. Sisters too have their own share of influence in radicalization to VE. For example, two of the three attackers at a police

In a bid to prevent Australian youth from joining VEOs or traveling to become foreign fighters in countries at the center of terror insurgency like Syria and Iraq, a program sponsored by the Norway Action Plan against violent extremism organized conversations between parents and young people who conducted themselves in a manner that demonstrated signs of radicalization [16]. In Berlin, a program that gained international reputation is "Hayat." This is a CVE initiative established in the last decade by the Center for Democratic Culture. The sole aim of this effort was to respond to the more contemporary threat of foreign youth fighters traveling to countries at the center of terrorism and VE. Over time, the program has brought together families and communities of youth who had become part of, or intended to join, VE groups in foreign countries. Families and communities are oriented to the process of identifying signs of radicalization among the youth and were facilitated to create an environment around individuals at risk and dissuade them from being further involved [17]. Above all, the initiative provided a 24-hour counseling hotline to members of families with such youth at risk of joining VEOs and sometimes brought small groups of families together to share experiences [18]. In 2015, the Extreme Dialog project (sponsored by the Kanishka Project under the management of the Institute of Strategic Dialog) was launched. They used family members of those involved in VE activities to deliver messages against VE and terrorism as their

Noting the influence that family-based community networks have on individual and social relationships, governments across the world are beginning to focus their attention on families as a critical point of intervention. Notably, research has shown that the overwhelming majority of individuals continue to radicalize through the

**22**

main strategic approach.

When family members learn that one of their own is being radicalized and moving toward VE, they do not always intervene, at least publicly, for fear of victimization by security agencies and ridicule from members of the community. According to the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act [23], immediate family members of suspects of terrorism were imposed with restrictions, to a great extent translating them to being "guilty by association" [23]. In such a hostile policy and legal environment, families with individuals engaged in VE live their lives under immense pressure and fear of being victimized.

Some researchers have made efforts to find out the major reasons that make individuals detach themselves from radical ideologies. One such initiative was the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), a forum where individuals were allowed to narrate their stories and provide meaning to their experiences. Many indicated that their decision to disengage from VE activities was pegged on the fact that family members and friends they had left behind were being traumatized by their absence [7].

#### **4. Role of mothers in (countering) violent extremism**

This study considers a gendered perspective in understanding the process of (countering) violent extremism. Sikkens et al. [24] advocate that mothers have significant moral authority that shapes behavior and influences decision in a young person. In their case study, they refer to Katie's—not her real name—mother who took her daughter with her in her involvement with animal activism, an attitude that her daughter gradually absorbed:

I can be short and clear about that: I got my ideals from my mother. It cannot be any other way, you learn your ideals from your parents. First you have them [ideals] as a child, but over the years I discovered that they are ideals that I 100% agree with. And I just got involved, especially when my mother joined a group of animal activists. In the beginning, I was too young and stayed at home, but I knew that my mum was carrying out actions, and later on I joined her.

Apart from the direct influence from parents as demonstrated above in the radicalization process, indirect influence also exists [24].

While advancing a gendered approach to CVE, Guru [23] contends that, of the family members, women are better positioned to help in de-radicalization of members of the family by dissuading them from engaging in violence and forge stronger ties and protect individuals from becoming victims of VE and terror agents. Drawing recommendations from PAIMAN, an initiative in Pakistan that brought both mothers and youth as an effort to moderate extremism there, Veenkamp and Zeiger posit that "mothers voices, particularly mothers of victims of terrorism and of perpetrators on violent extremism, were powerful narratives that could be harnessed for promoting peace and countering the narrative of violent extremism" [25].

Uddin, Guru [23], believes that women are a "source of moral authority ... key to unlocking ... disillusion." It is believed that the mother-child relationship in human development is highly defining, for an individual's panoramic view of their environment [9]. Similarly, as evidenced in the findings of an initiative managed by Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) dubbed "Mothers for Change," due to the strategic positioning of women within the family unit, they stand a better chance to respond to ideologies of violent extremism in their families and subsequent communities [26]. According to Hearne [27], such approaches have worked in Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In his study, Brown [28] purports that "mothers and grandmothers" of at-risk individuals in the UK have been used and have become critical actors toward the implementation of CVE policies.

**25**

*Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism*

Attendees in the conference labeled "Women Without Borders/Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)" in 2010 held in Yemen observed the point that the preparedness of women to identify and respond to signs of extremism among their family members varies significantly depending on their academic qualifications, local awareness, and geographic remoteness. It was reported that mothers, especially those with little or no formal education, find it difficult to pick up warning signs, as they may take it that their children are merely becoming more religious and often consider the change to be commendable [26]. This categorically limits the ability of parents to intervene before individuals escalate deep into VE activities.

While citing agency among women in conflict resolution, Sebugwaawo [29] posits that mothers, due to their effective art in convincing and soft power approach, stand a good chance to act as agents of change in their kin, dissuading them from radicalization and any form of violent extremism. Women understand too well the effects of conflicts and have immediate sense of what to be done to families of the victims. In fact, women are more integrated in their communities than men, and therefore they

Veenkamp and Zeiger argued that the role played by fathers in both recruitment and prevention of VE cannot be ignored or dismissed. They posited that, in many cultures, the father-son relationship is defining particularly when sons become of age. Empirical literature has shown that in the cases where the father figure is absent, feelings of resentment and isolation become evident. These may at times "contribute to a young person's vulnerability to recruitment into violent extremism" [25]. In South Asia, research has been published to support this claim. In the province of Swat, Pakistan, for example, about 65% of militant boys identified between

Following the foregoing, Bjørgo and Carlsson [30] have argued that many young people are lured into violent radical groups in their search for substitute families and father figures: in most times, many individual youths who opt to join extremist groups have wanting relationships with their families and with their father figures in particular. In this case, extremist groups paint a lucrative environment where

Findings from a research undertaken by Botha [1] in Kenya on assessing youth vulnerability to radicalization and extremism indicate that when young people experience a sense of abandonment, or lack of identity, this phenomenon does contribute significantly to making them susceptible to a father figure or urge to fit in a group that assures them protection and sense of being wanted. Further, they found that many young people that were susceptible to the Al-Shabaab network in Kenya did not have a father figure while growing up. In his study, Botha concluded that lack of a father figure is by no means a precursor for radicalization, but the gap

It is worth noting that as compared to mothers, the role of father figures in CVE

has not been significantly explored. Many scholars agree that there exist many programs that empower women as agents of de-radicalization, but little attention is paid to the critical role played by father figures, or absent father figures in the radicalization process. Botha points to the fact that in the profiles of those implicated with acts of terrorism in Kenya, an absent father figure was a recurring phenomenon [1]. Results from the FGD showed that more often than not, children heads of families usually feel the pressure to engage in criminal activities or accept

have stronger perception of problems experienced by their children [29].

**5. Role of father figures in (countering) violent extremism**

the age of 12 and 18 had absent father figures [25].

young people could satisfy their urge for mentorship.

created by such an absence of a father figure is telling [1].

offers of economic favors from extremists.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

#### *Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

Attendees in the conference labeled "Women Without Borders/Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)" in 2010 held in Yemen observed the point that the preparedness of women to identify and respond to signs of extremism among their family members varies significantly depending on their academic qualifications, local awareness, and geographic remoteness. It was reported that mothers, especially those with little or no formal education, find it difficult to pick up warning signs, as they may take it that their children are merely becoming more religious and often consider the change to be commendable [26]. This categorically limits the ability of parents to intervene before individuals escalate deep into VE activities.

While citing agency among women in conflict resolution, Sebugwaawo [29] posits that mothers, due to their effective art in convincing and soft power approach, stand a good chance to act as agents of change in their kin, dissuading them from radicalization and any form of violent extremism. Women understand too well the effects of conflicts and have immediate sense of what to be done to families of the victims. In fact, women are more integrated in their communities than men, and therefore they have stronger perception of problems experienced by their children [29].

#### **5. Role of father figures in (countering) violent extremism**

Veenkamp and Zeiger argued that the role played by fathers in both recruitment and prevention of VE cannot be ignored or dismissed. They posited that, in many cultures, the father-son relationship is defining particularly when sons become of age. Empirical literature has shown that in the cases where the father figure is absent, feelings of resentment and isolation become evident. These may at times "contribute to a young person's vulnerability to recruitment into violent extremism" [25]. In South Asia, research has been published to support this claim. In the province of Swat, Pakistan, for example, about 65% of militant boys identified between the age of 12 and 18 had absent father figures [25].

Following the foregoing, Bjørgo and Carlsson [30] have argued that many young people are lured into violent radical groups in their search for substitute families and father figures: in most times, many individual youths who opt to join extremist groups have wanting relationships with their families and with their father figures in particular. In this case, extremist groups paint a lucrative environment where young people could satisfy their urge for mentorship.

Findings from a research undertaken by Botha [1] in Kenya on assessing youth vulnerability to radicalization and extremism indicate that when young people experience a sense of abandonment, or lack of identity, this phenomenon does contribute significantly to making them susceptible to a father figure or urge to fit in a group that assures them protection and sense of being wanted. Further, they found that many young people that were susceptible to the Al-Shabaab network in Kenya did not have a father figure while growing up. In his study, Botha concluded that lack of a father figure is by no means a precursor for radicalization, but the gap created by such an absence of a father figure is telling [1].

It is worth noting that as compared to mothers, the role of father figures in CVE has not been significantly explored. Many scholars agree that there exist many programs that empower women as agents of de-radicalization, but little attention is paid to the critical role played by father figures, or absent father figures in the radicalization process. Botha points to the fact that in the profiles of those implicated with acts of terrorism in Kenya, an absent father figure was a recurring phenomenon [1]. Results from the FGD showed that more often than not, children heads of families usually feel the pressure to engage in criminal activities or accept offers of economic favors from extremists.

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

fear of being victimized.

that her daughter gradually absorbed:

violent extremism" [25].

toward the implementation of CVE policies.

was carrying out actions, and later on I joined her.

radicalization process, indirect influence also exists [24].

When family members learn that one of their own is being radicalized and moving toward VE, they do not always intervene, at least publicly, for fear of victimization by security agencies and ridicule from members of the community. According to the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act [23], immediate family members of suspects of terrorism were imposed with restrictions, to a great extent translating them to being "guilty by association" [23]. In such a hostile policy and legal environment, families with individuals engaged in VE live their lives under immense pressure and

Some researchers have made efforts to find out the major reasons that make individuals detach themselves from radical ideologies. One such initiative was the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), a forum where individuals were allowed to narrate their stories and provide meaning to their experiences. Many indicated that their decision to disengage from VE activities was pegged on the fact that family members and friends they had left behind were being traumatized by their absence [7].

This study considers a gendered perspective in understanding the process of (countering) violent extremism. Sikkens et al. [24] advocate that mothers have significant moral authority that shapes behavior and influences decision in a young person. In their case study, they refer to Katie's—not her real name—mother who took her daughter with her in her involvement with animal activism, an attitude

I can be short and clear about that: I got my ideals from my mother. It cannot be any other way, you learn your ideals from your parents. First you have them [ideals] as a child, but over the years I discovered that they are ideals that I 100% agree with. And I just got involved, especially when my mother joined a group of animal activists. In the beginning, I was too young and stayed at home, but I knew that my mum

Apart from the direct influence from parents as demonstrated above in the

While advancing a gendered approach to CVE, Guru [23] contends that, of the family members, women are better positioned to help in de-radicalization of members of the family by dissuading them from engaging in violence and forge stronger ties and protect individuals from becoming victims of VE and terror agents. Drawing recommendations from PAIMAN, an initiative in Pakistan that brought both mothers and youth as an effort to moderate extremism there, Veenkamp and Zeiger posit that "mothers voices, particularly mothers of victims of terrorism and of perpetrators on violent extremism, were powerful narratives that could be harnessed for promoting peace and countering the narrative of

Uddin, Guru [23], believes that women are a "source of moral authority ... key to unlocking ... disillusion." It is believed that the mother-child relationship in human development is highly defining, for an individual's panoramic view of their environment [9]. Similarly, as evidenced in the findings of an initiative managed by Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) dubbed "Mothers for Change," due to the strategic positioning of women within the family unit, they stand a better chance to respond to ideologies of violent extremism in their families and subsequent communities [26]. According to Hearne [27], such approaches have worked in Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In his study, Brown [28] purports that "mothers and grandmothers" of at-risk individuals in the UK have been used and have become critical actors

**4. Role of mothers in (countering) violent extremism**

**24**

The theme on absent parents in VE literature is evidently a recurring phenomenon. While assessing the relationship between an absent parent and joining a violent extremist group, Botha [31] found that the phenomenon about an absent father figure resembled those of J. Post in his study of 250 West German terrorists (from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement). Results of that study indicated that 25% had lost one or both parents by age 14, whereas 79% had strained family relationships—and more intriguing was the fact that 33% had a particularly negative relationship with their fathers. She [31] further posits that many respondents among the Allied Democratic Forces (44%), Lord's Resistance Army (38%), al-Shabaab (18%), and Mombasa Republican Council (31%) had been raised without a father figure. Rashid Mberesero, a Tanzanian national and a terror convict, who was sentenced to a life imprisonment by a Kenyan court in July 2019, grew without a father for 20 years, after his parents separated following persistent marital misunderstandings. Even after the two, father and son, reunited, they quickly fell out after the father made attempts to force him to convert from Islam to Christianity [32].

However, this phenomenon may not be generalized since majority of the respondents who joined these organizations had father figures present growing up. She [31] concludes that this is not to insinuate that experiencing rejection or a lack of belonging will not contribute to make a young person susceptible to seek other father figures or enhance the need to belong to a group to experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. It is critical to note that these feelings can be experienced even in situations where both parents are present. In tandem with the foregoing, participants in the FGD observed that young people, particularly those who converted to Islam after the age of 18, were rejected by their families and in most instances preferred to join other [predatory] groups in which they were received and accepted. Results of findings by Ndung'u et al. [33] indicate that children of absent fathers who had left to fight for Al-Shabaab, or had been killed while fighting for the cause of the extremist group, were vulnerable to extremist preachers. The study indicated that clerics would pay school fees for these children in support of the mothers, who, together with their children, in turn become vulnerable to their teaching.

#### **6. Conclusion**

The strongest thread in this work indicates that family plays a crucial role (whether positive or negative) throughout any individual's life, particularly in the early years of their growth and development. Results from this study indicate that individuals at risk of radicalization to VE emerge from families that are too large, or broken, separated, in which father figures are missing, or, if there, emotionally strained. Family-based community networks have a role to play in teaching children acceptance, tolerance, and respect for members of the society. Thus, creating opportunities for strong economically stable families, with emotionally present parent/father figures, is not only critical pillars for building an equitable social policy but also arguably a sound national security policy too. It is important that policymakers design policies with relevant strategies and tools toward addressing radicalized individuals within their family and community settings. Law enforcement agencies shall need to adopt a paradigm shift in their approach and embrace soft power approaches, apart from punitive measures through law enforcement agencies, to countering individuals in the process of radicalization in a bid to create self-sustaining communities.

**27**

**Author details**

provided the original work is properly cited.

Wilson Muna

Kenya

*Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism*

Kenyatta University, Department of Public Policy and Administration, Nairobi,

\*Address all correspondence to: wmunah2007@gmail.com; muna.wilson@ku.ac.ke

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

*Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89122*

### **Author details**

*Terrorism and Developing Countries*

Christianity [32].

their teaching.

**6. Conclusion**

The theme on absent parents in VE literature is evidently a recurring phenomenon. While assessing the relationship between an absent parent and joining a violent extremist group, Botha [31] found that the phenomenon about an absent father figure resembled those of J. Post in his study of 250 West German terrorists (from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement). Results of that study indicated that 25% had lost one or both parents by age 14, whereas 79% had strained family relationships—and more intriguing was the fact that 33% had a particularly negative relationship with their fathers. She [31] further posits that many respondents among the Allied Democratic Forces (44%), Lord's Resistance Army (38%), al-Shabaab (18%), and Mombasa Republican Council (31%) had been raised without a father figure. Rashid Mberesero, a Tanzanian national and a terror convict, who was sentenced to a life imprisonment by a Kenyan court in July 2019, grew without a father for 20 years, after his parents separated following persistent marital misunderstandings. Even after the two, father and son, reunited, they quickly fell out after the father made attempts to force him to convert from Islam to

However, this phenomenon may not be generalized since majority of the respondents who joined these organizations had father figures present growing up. She [31] concludes that this is not to insinuate that experiencing rejection or a lack of belonging will not contribute to make a young person susceptible to seek other father figures or enhance the need to belong to a group to experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. It is critical to note that these feelings can be experienced even in situations where both parents are present. In tandem with the foregoing, participants in the FGD observed that young people, particularly those who converted to Islam after the age of 18, were rejected by their families and in most instances preferred to join other [predatory] groups in which they were received and accepted. Results of findings by Ndung'u et al. [33] indicate that children of absent fathers who had left to fight for Al-Shabaab, or had been killed while fighting for the cause of the extremist group, were vulnerable to extremist preachers. The study indicated that clerics would pay school fees for these children in support of the mothers, who, together with their children, in turn become vulnerable to

The strongest thread in this work indicates that family plays a crucial role (whether positive or negative) throughout any individual's life, particularly in the early years of their growth and development. Results from this study indicate that individuals at risk of radicalization to VE emerge from families that are too large, or broken, separated, in which father figures are missing, or, if there, emotionally strained. Family-based community networks have a role to play in teaching children acceptance, tolerance, and respect for members of the society. Thus, creating opportunities for strong economically stable families, with emotionally present parent/father figures, is not only critical pillars for building an equitable social policy but also arguably a sound national security policy too. It is important that policymakers design policies with relevant strategies and tools toward addressing radicalized individuals within their family and community settings. Law enforcement agencies shall need to adopt a paradigm shift in their approach and embrace soft power approaches, apart from punitive measures through law enforcement agencies, to countering individuals in the process of radicalization in a bid to create

**26**

self-sustaining communities.

Wilson Muna Kenyatta University, Department of Public Policy and Administration, Nairobi, Kenya

\*Address all correspondence to: wmunah2007@gmail.com; muna.wilson@ku.ac.ke

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **References**

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**31**

Section 2

Terrorism and Economic

Losses

### Section 2
