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# Terrorism and Developing Countries

*Edited by Syed Abdul Rehman Khan and Zhang Yu*





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and Zhang Yu*

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Terrorism and Developing Countries

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Edited by Syed Abdul Rehman Khan and Zhang Yu

#### Contributors

Nanche Billa Robert, Cecilia Idika-Kalu, Simón Pedro Izcara Palacios, Wilson Muna, Syed Abdul Rehman Khan, Zhang Yu

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# Preface

Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentional violence for political purposes. It is primarily used to refer to violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants. The use of living organisms as a weapon has been seen throughout the history of humankind. But due to increasing trade wars between countries, the risk of biological terror attacks has become more real and more alarming. Bioterrorism is terrorism involving the intentional dissemination of biological agents. As in biological warfare, bioterrorism agents can be viruses, fungi, bacteria, toxins, insects or any other number of naturally occurring or synthetic agents.

Before the start of Chinese New Year, the first patient with COVID-19 was diagnosed in Wuhan, China. Within a couple of days, the virus had spread all over China and infected more than 90,000 people. In instances such as this, it can be challenging for clinicians to discriminate between an act of terrorism and a naturally occurring outbreak. Therefore, this book discusses the effects of bioterrorism and terrorism on the socioeconomic sustainability of different countries around the globe.

I would like to thank the contributors to this book for their hard work in crafting their valuable and innovative chapters. I would also like to thank IntechOpen and Author Service Manager Lada Bozic for their coordination and support in facilitating this project.

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Section 1

**Bioterrorism and  
Terrorism**

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# Introductory Chapter: The Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) - Death and Terror in 2020

*Syed Abdul Rehman Khan and Zhang Yu*

## 1. Death and terror

Until now, the world still has been experiencing challenges, such as weapon war, poverty, and bombing attacks for different reasons, which almost makes the people living in peace accustomed to the continuous bad news from other places. However, we cannot act as outsiders when trade war and bioterrorism become the new members of the world challenges, especially when they are combined.

In December 2019, the first patient of coronavirus diagnosed in Wuhan city of China's Hubei province [1]. According to the Centers for Disease Control, after we stepped into 2020, the coronavirus, causing never-before-seen respiratory illness, started spreading fast inside and outside the border of China. Further, the World Health Organization [2] declared the coronavirus a public health emergency of "international concern." So far, the virus has infected more than 90,000 people around the globe and entered in 50+ countries (see **Table 1**).

## 2. World factory shutdown

China is known as "The World Factory" for that China has been using mass manufacturing strategy, continuing to improve production technology, making other countries their stable clients (**Figure 1**). It has created a world dependency on China [3]. The virus that has hijacked China for months is severely affecting the logistics and supply chain operations. In fact, the worst is yet to come. As per our prediction, the real impact of coronavirus on global supply chains will occur during March [4]. Because, due to the Chinese New Year festival, multinational firms usually stored materials for a couple of weeks for their smooth manufacturing operations. Also, due to long lead-time between China and European markets, there were in-transit shipments, which will arrive late February/Beginning of March. But what next?—It is terrible.

In the upcoming days, the prices of products in international markets will hike due to the shortage of supply. The most vulnerable firms are those who depend solely on Chinese suppliers [5]. Since last months, Chinese manufacturers are hardly fulfilling the domestic demand. Besides, the equilibrium of supply and demand has already been started to unbalance.

S. no	Country	Cumulative diagnosis	Total cure	Total death
1	<i>China</i>	79,968	41,849	2873
2	Korea	3526	27	18
3	Italy	1128	50	29
4	Japan	947	41	11
5	Iran	593	123	43
6	Singapore	102	72	—
7	France	100	12	2
8	Germany	99	16	—
9	U.S.A	64	3	1
10	Spain	58	2	—
11	Kuwait	45	—	—
12	Thailand	42	28	1
13	Bahrain	41	—	—
14	Australia	26	15	1
15	Malaysia	25	20	—
16	Switzerland	24	—	—
17	England	23	8	—
18	United Arab Emirates	21	5	—
19	Canada	20	6	—
20	Vietnam	16	16	—
21	Norway	15	—	—
22	Sweden	13	—	—
23	Iraq	13	—	—
24	Austria	10	—	—
25	Israel	9	3	—
26	Netherlands	7	—	—
27	Greece	7	—	—
28	Oman	6	—	—
29	Croatia	6	—	—
30	Russia	5	2	—
31	Mexico	4	—	—
32	India	3	3	—


*Significance of italicized values 1. Virus started to spread from China; 2. The greater numbers of affected people in Chinese region.*

*Source: National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China (Last updated on February 29, 2020).*

**Table 1.**  
*List of top coronavirus infected countries.*

### **3. Coronavirus in emerging economies of Asian region**

China, Japan, and South Korea contribute to 25% of the world economy, but due to coronavirus, the production lines have stopped, which disrupted the global supply chain [6]. These countries' yearly trading volume is more than US720 billion, and have the most integrated international economic blocs.



**Figure 1.**  
*China export to the world.*

Due to the risk of decoupling from the United States, Chinese firms have been attempting to boost investment and trade with South Korea and Japan. Further, because of the “trade war” between China and the US, Chinese firms have started to import their supplies and material from Japan and South Korea. However, unfortunately, the epidemic already spreads in South Korea and Japan, which probably will bring the second shock to the downstream manufacturers in China and multiplier effects into the global supply chain.

According to the Chinese customs data, in 2019, Japan was fourth largest trade partner of the mainland China, behind the EU, the ASEAN economic block, and the US, with annual bilateral exports and imports valued at US\$315 billion approximately, with South Korea sixth at US\$285 billion. On the other hand, during 2019, they also both ranked in the top five for imports into mainland China. Both the countries (South Korea and Japan) export chemical and electrical components, which are essential for China’s massive manufacturing.

According to Chinese analysts, due to the faster spread of coronavirus in South Korea and Japan, more firms are reducing their manufacturing or even shut down. Chinese firms heavily import steel, shipbuilding, electronics, and automotive equipment from Japanese and South Korean suppliers [6]. There is no doubt that China is exporting and fulfilling the demand of global customers with its “mass customization” strategy. It is expected that in upcoming weeks, the consequences of coronavirus will spread from the Asian region toward American and European regions. Due to the shortage of supply from China, the world economy already started to shake.

Many analyses compare the current coronavirus with the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic 2002–2003, which created just a small breakdown in the global supply chain and financial markets [4]. This comparison is dangerous and misleads to the facts because the relative significance of mainland China in the global economic ecosystem has amplified massively in the past 18 years: China has more than doubled its share of trade with the rest of the world between the SARS epidemic and today, and many more industries are now heavily dependent on China.

In 2019, the GDP (gross domestic product) of China represented 16% of the global GDP. However, in 2003, the GDP of China represented only 4.31% of the global GDP, an almost four-fold increase. Due to the dependence on Chinese manufacturers, we cannot imagine the consequences and adverse effects on the global supply chain. The time will speak louder than words.

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# The Socioeconomic Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region

*Cecilia Idika-Kalu*

## Abstract

The Lake Chad Basin (LCB), in West Africa, is surrounded by three countries with shared borders. In the previous years, the Lake Chad Basin was a flourishing area, as a result of the opportunities presented by the lake for livelihood, agriculture, tourism, and access to markets and trade. Severe drought has since decimated the socioeconomic potential of the Lake Chad Basin, but more recently, it has worse impact with the Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgency that started in 2002 from Maiduguri town, Borno State in Nigeria, has spread to the Chad and Cameroon leaving destruction, displacement, and the demise of a once-virile economy in its wake. The insecurity that plagues the region has forced millions to flee their homes and abandon their livelihood and trade around the lake. Major trade routes and markets in the area now have greatly reduced activity, as poverty and deep deprivation hold sway and inhabitants who have migrated or live within internally displaced persons camps depend on aid.

**Keywords:** Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, economy, insurgency, poverty, displacement

## 1. Introduction

Conflict ravaging the Lake Chad Basin region (LCB), driven by the Boko Haram-led insurgency, has taken monstrous proportions. The direct impact of this reflects in the socioeconomic state of populations and countries in the environs. This chapter discusses the socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region. In analyzing the current situation, we will take into cognizance the historical antecedence of the region and the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as the group tactics and strategy in understanding the socioeconomic impact on the area. A microlevel analysis, studying violent extremism and the economic survival of people affected by the conflict, will be engaged. This is followed by the impact of this insurgency on the LCB and surrounding states at the macro-level.

Over time, the LCB has suffered various issues, from drought, severe effects of climate change, desertification, and poor governance that have contributed to deep poverty in the region. The LCB is encapsulating borders of Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad. About 30 million people derived their means of livelihood from the resource provided by the 2,500,000 km<sup>2</sup> lake in this semiarid area [1]. Precipitation in the lake annually reduces from the south (more than 1000 mm yr. – 1) to the north

of the basin (less than 100 mm yr. – 1) [2]. The Chari/Logone River system may account for 90% of water inflow to the LCB, which has shrunk from 22,000 km<sup>2</sup> to approximately 300 km<sup>2</sup> between the 1960s and the 1980s [3]. This loss has been attributed to climate change and drought among other factors and has created a significant socioeconomic impact on the area [4].

The violent extremist activities started in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, by Boko Haram which spread into adjacent Lake Chad and became a regional problem. In 2002, Boko Haram came to the limelight in Nigeria as an Islamist terrorist group of the Sunni strain for preaching Jihad. Its formal name in Arabic is Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād, which is translated from Arabic to mean, "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad" [6]. The phrase Boko Haram is, however, the widely accepted name of the group or more recently the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).

The group has unleashed violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, mostly in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It was founded by Muhammed Yusuf, but the mantle of leadership was taken by Abubakar Shekau, the current leader after Yusuf was killed [7]. Translated from Hausa, "Boko Haram" means "Western education is sinful," and this reflects the group's two main aims: the opposition of what it considers to be the secular westernization of Nigeria, especially coeducational learning and democratic elections, and the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria or at least in the country's majority-Muslim northern states [8].

The crises are now raging along the borders of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Between 2014 and 2015, the group held full control over large areas in northeast Nigeria. Later in 2015, however, Nigeria and the other countries affected in coalition succeeded in taking back many of those territories captured by Boko Haram. The insurgents have morphed their tactics to a guerrilla war-type, using suicide attacks, especially with women as lethal weapons. Their refuge being in areas around the Lake Chad hills around the Nigeria-Cameroon border and forests in Borno State [5].

## **2. History**

The founder of the movement which became Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was heavily influenced by the ideology and writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Salafi scholar [9] explained some of Yusuf's beliefs thus, "...quoting copiously from Ibn Taymiyyah, Mohammed Yusuf describes as taghut (idolatry) any form of executive, legislative or judicial function derived from a secular constitution rather than from Islamic Shariah Law." This is at the root of his opposition to secularism, democracy, and partisan politics as practiced in Nigeria [8].

After the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Army, Boko Haram became less visible in debate and discussion and greatly manifested in violence. The post-Mohammed Yusuf Boko Haram that evolved displayed a very violent agenda of political domination and establishment of a Sharia state. To attain this lofty goal, all elements of modern government reflective of western civilization had to be destroyed. All people unsympathetic to the sect's ideology must also be exterminated. The *modus operandi* of the group is to use brutal force, combat, and suicide terrorism to achieve its objectives. All these have manifested in the activities of the members and have also been communicated to the general public through the use of social media, precisely through consistent YouTube videos of their spokesman and current leader, Abubakar Shekau [8].



The group has modified its tactics through the years. Old methods like killing security officials, village heads, and security operatives changed to bombing infrastructure, market places, and kidnap [9]. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 and split into two factions. Abubakar Shekau continues to lead the Boko Haram faction and Umar Al barnawi, the IS-West Africa faction as they are known.

## **2.1 Boko Haram's structure and strategy**

Boko Haram, like many terrorist groups, are not static but can alter their mission and approaches, to take on different shapes as they move from one location to the next—much as a sand dune does. They should be described and understood according to how they evolve and what their internal and external organizational patterns are, rather than what they happen to be at a given moment [10]. Instead of seeing these organizations as networks or hierarchical structures, it is described as a dune-like organization which shifts with the wind and is continually reshaped [11]. These key characteristics are evident in Boko Haram as well as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas which include adherence to a grand vision like a global jihad, no institutional presence, giving a ghost-like organizational reality based on its disappearance when necessary, and dynamic activity that sticks to sequential reasoning, among others.

Using the association between networks' density, centrality, and their outputs to evaluate the operational success of terror networks, [12] came up with conclusions that apply to Boko Haram today. He says the group's success in operations and resilience in its ability to survive and to continue to generate a systematic campaign of violence or, more specifically, its durability and productivity describe its success [12]. The significant use of women from kidnapping to suicide bombing seems to show a pattern that reflects Faure and Zartman's [10] description of stages in terrorist activities. This phase is described as the commercialization phase, using strategic violence, follows the incubation stage in the organizational life cycle of the group. For Boko Haram, this strategy would supposedly help deliver on their mission and goals. It would hold the attention of their target audience (government, public as well as the rest of the world).

## **2.2 Boko haram and multiple tactics**

Boko Haram has deployed different tactics in driving terrorist activities in the LCB region. In analyzing factors using quantitative tools that lead terrorist organizations to attack undefended civilians, which they called "soft targets," Asal et al. examined two distinct processes in choosing to attack soft targets. The first one being the one-time decision to begin attacking soft targets and, second, being the continued use of violence against such targets. The analysis pointed to ideology—specifically religion—as the main factor in using civilians as targets, while organizational factors like group size and network centrality are related to the number of incidents perpetrated [13]. According to Bloom and Matfess [14], as Boko Haram shifted in its demography and prioritizing in terms of suicide operations, it adopted the "unexpected bomber" profile of women and children.

## **2.3 Female suicide bombers, kidnappings, and media in the evolution of strategy**

The year 2013 showed an evolution in Boko Haram's tactics. Boko Haram carried out kidnappings, in which one of the main characteristics was the instrumental use of women. From data and reports from Mendelboim and Schweitzer [15], in 2017,

a record of 126 women and girls accounting for 92% of the global figures of female suicide bombers were of the Boko Haram sect, carrying out attacks in Africa. It has been argued, and logically so, that Boko Haram's recognition by global media gained from the Chibok kidnappings in April 2014 helped establish this pattern [16, 17]. The #BringBackOurGirls campaigns, after the group abducted about 276 school-age girls from a school in Chibok, Northeastern Nigeria, caused an increase in the use of women in waging war. Understandably, Boko Haram realized the potency of gendered dimensions, especially in media for its campaign. This is evidenced in terms of its current strategy and notoriety and continued pattern. Looking at the trend of actions between 2002 when the group started in 2019, the use of women only picked up after the Chibok case. It is crucial to note the specific role the media played.

### **3. Boko haram, welfare, and development: What is the existing evidence?**

#### **3.1 Development and socioeconomic situation**

Generally, inhabitants of the LCB live with relatively high poverty rate and population pressure, with about 50 people per km<sup>2</sup> [19]. The human population in the area is expected to grow annually by an estimated 2.5–3.0% [18]. The area is also prone to intense water scarcity with access to less than 550 m<sup>3</sup> of water per year [20]. Their challenges include poor medical facilities, human literacy, and inadequate water supply [21]. The critical factor to the economy of this region is the level of displacement resulting from the conflict and the consequent unemployment and deprivation. As Boko Haram continues its attacks in the area, thousands are forced to flee across the borders between the countries around the LCB, and within the states [22], records of thousands of refugees fleeing Nigeria to Cameroon when insurgents sacked Rann, one of the border towns, recorded. The same was the case with over 5000 inhabitants of Baga, another city on the border of Chad, fleeing across the Lake into Ngouboua village in Chad. This new demographic is dependent on aid and accounts for a swelling vulnerable population and fragile economy in the LCB.

The main points for trade and access to local markets for inhabitants, which are the borders are mostly closed for security. Some livestock farmers move their herds through longer routes passing Niger, from Chad to sell at higher prices at the border markets. Commercial activities from fishing and agriculture have become restricted. Counter-terrorism endeavor by joint task force has been recorded to involve “clearing out” areas around the border, surrounding forests, and the lake shores. This military style operations targeted at flushing out insurgents have the side effect of destabilizing the lives of local fishermen and farmers [5]. Maiduguri, in Borno State, Nigeria, has an ancient history of serving not only as a cultural and religious hub but as the commercial heartbeat of the LCB region. Going back to thousands of years culturally, the Kanem-Bornu Empire and Kanembu of Chad are akin to the Kanuri in Nigeria in the way of life and language. The threat of constant Boko Haram activities over the last few years in the area has negatively affected business in the region and the rest of Northeastern Nigeria.

#### **3.2 Poverty and ripe recruits**

Following the high levels of displacement and refugee status, inhabitants of the LCB seeking a means of generating income and employment engage in hawking agric produce and menial tasks. Many send their children to Koranic schools,

entrusting their children whom they are unable to care for to religious teachers. In many cases, this leads to radicalization of the children and the perpetuation of extremism [23]. Scholarly work on reasons why insurgency and terrorism may thrive shows that the socioeconomic environment is a critical predictor. The response of people, especially women, to this is participation in these organizations [24, 25]. Governance failure, corruption, economic marginalization leading to poverty, unemployment, inequality, and hunger are challenges faced by people in Nigeria and the LCB in varying degrees. According to Matfess [26], and corroborated by Walker [27], some Boko Haram women exercised agency in joining the ranks to make their quality of life better. Contrary to the argument of some scholars like Zedalis [28], regarding this point poverty does breed terrorism.

Radicalization is associated with poverty in some cases [29], in the context of Northeastern Nigeria and the LCB, radical groups offer economic prospects. A *Time* magazine publication [30] giving an account of victims of Boko Haram tells of Fatima G. She narrates how 15 of her female friends accepted to be suicide bombers after being feted with treats and stories of martyrdom. Sen [31], in his seminal work on development as freedom, alludes to the fact that women's agency and well-being are critical to political and social action. The study showed women's agency and voice through independence and empowerment in literacy, education, earning power, and property rights as necessary. These same factors, or just put, the lack of their availability, cause the exercise of agency in mass violence by suicide bombing.

### **3.3 History, culture, and colonization**

The history and culture of an area influence the nature of insurgency in the area. The long history of drought, for example, had left the LCB and Northeast Nigeria in poverty, before the insurgency started. Colonization played a part in the history and origins of conflict in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the colonial masters—Britain—left a historical legacy of social fractures in the northeast, making it easier for Boko Haram to recruit followers in the 2000s. The colonialists handpicked the mountain people from Gwoza, made them the elite class and the larger group—the Dgwhede who felt marginalized and are currently some of the most militant Boko Haram fighters [27].

The Kanuri-speaking people, covering Gwoza, Dgwhede, Borno, and Northeast Nigeria, also had a culture of *pardah* (seclusion of women) and *mubaya* (oath of secrecy). The culture aligns with religion practiced in the area now, as well as commonly held beliefs around patriarchy, polygamy, divorce, and women's work in the farms [32, 26]. Meagher [24] argues that the specific interaction of culture, agency, and power in social contexts and how they relate to economic networks and political process affect outcomes in an area. History has evolved with a strong culture of structural violence against women in places like Northeastern Nigeria. This oppression manifests itself in limited opportunities and repressive norms for them. It informs their participation with radicalized groups in a way that mixes coercion, consent, and autonomy [26].

## **4. Where do we go from here?**

Consistent across findings from the previous study, development reports, and media analysis are the facts of a socioeconomic crisis in the LCB. Various policy recommendations have been made on improving the human and economic conditions of life in the LCB from academia to development experts. The World Bank, in building resilience for the area, initiated the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to engage with the challenges and developed a plan. The purpose of the LCBC is

to reduce poverty and address climate change and food security. Furthermore, the LCBC, in cooperation with the French Development Agency, affected countries, and the World Bank, plans on allocation of about \$1 billion to this cause. The priority themes for allocating the funds, however, show a paltry 8% for managing conflicts in the area [33].

The impact of Boko Haram activity in the area may require a direct or indirect significant allocation of resource in policy design, to defeat the insurgency, for meaningful progress to take place. Some have advocated for better cooperation between the countries in the LCB instead of closing borders, which increases poverty [5]. This approach may have a better potential for socioeconomic development in the region but has to take into account the large migrant flows between the countries as a result of the insurgency. The recommendation made by Okpara, Stringer, and Doughill [34] is vital to this end. They state that interventions should aid cohabitation as well as income opportunities for mixed migrants in the area.

Migrant populations displaced by the insurgency live as IDP's in camps within the northeast of Nigeria. These people, in their millions, have lost access to farmlands, tools, and markets to create a livelihood for themselves or contribute to the local economy. Many have fled across the national borders into Chad and Cameroon depending on aid for food and shelter and putting further stress on scarce natural and economic resources. The existing background of deep lack and deprivation in the LCB accelerated by Boko Haram attacks calls for solutions proffered with security implications well considered. While the shrinking lake and harsh climate have left a hitherto agrarian region severely affected by drought and lack of water, the impact of conflict concludes the disaster scenario. This triad of devastation can be engaged at different levels; however, for socioeconomic improvement to proceed, peace has to return as a precursor to investment, employment, and trade.

Proposed interventions with strategic components addressing security in the area directly as a step to socioeconomic change may be more impactful. In this regard, Angerbrandt [35] states the need for coordinating regional demobilization plans for vigilante members and stopping conflicts before they escalate. Enobi and Johnson-Rokosu [36] posit that eliminating terrorist finances or considerable reductions to their illicit financial flows by the government, and global effort is the direction to take. Providing water and food in critical parts of the LCB will remove an essential recruiting tool from Boko Haram. This is because 1.9 million displaced people and 2.7 million people with food insecurity live in the area according to the displacement tracking matrix of the IOM [37]. These people whose needs are as essential as food and water would succumb to offers that would offer these seeming benefits [38].

## **5. Conclusion**

Meaningful intervention in the socioeconomic development of the LCB should not exclude significant investments in security, counter-terrorism measures, and food programs. Shelter, infrastructure, access to markets, and gender-informed policies are necessary to guide aid as well as policy and infrastructure that are gender-informed. The possibility of reviving trade in spite of the damage already done to the economy will have to entail more than military effort [5].

A clear strategy that considers the multilevel intersectionality of factors that drive the Boko Haram strategy and informs the economic condition in the area should be the basis of interventions. These factors are the unique historical, socio-cultural, and development context of the Lake Chad Basin as well as the effect of climate change on the lake and livelihood. Policy implementation that will defeat

the insurgency and direct investment into the region and boost socioeconomic development in the short- and long-term may not be easy to enact. This is because of the governance problems, corruption, and structural patriarchy that are common to the countries in the LCB. The gains, however, are essential and worth the effort—the equivalent of saving human lives.

In making recommendations, an essential point to note is the question of responsibility. In whose hands does the buck of responsibility regarding socioeconomic development of the Lake Chad basin rest? The perspective of state sovereignty will suggest Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, maybe Mali, and other interested West African nations to bear the brunt alone—regardless of their capacity to do so. A world polity theory perspective however will suggest differently [39, 40]. This framework highlights the global system as one social system with a cultural framework referred to as “world polity.” This takes into account every actor in the world system and influences international organizations like the UN, states as well as individuals affected by both. This social system is governed by principles and models that shape the course and objectives of social actors and what they do [39, 40]. From this perspective, the security situation in the LCB, negatively impacting the economy and adversely affecting the lives of millions, does have grave global import.


Changing the socioeconomic situation in the region and turning the fortunes of its inhabitants should give attention to the global and local nature of the causes and proposed solutions. Independently, and in collaboration, the affected states and global actors, like development organizations, nonprofits and other states within the region, can gradually effect change. Insecurity from insurgency affecting the region is a global phenomenon so is climate change causing drought in the LCB. Interventions designed around intelligence, capacity building, foreign direct investment, and environmental protection driven locally and influenced globally will be key to restoration in the Lake Chad Basin.

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# Family-Based Networks: Soft Policy Tools in Countering Radicalisation to Violent Extremism

*Wilson Muna*

## Abstract

This chapter explores the vital role played by family-based networks, not only as a facilitative function in support of violent extremism (VE) activities but also more importantly as a preventative policy instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth into violent extremist groups. It draws from social facilitated theory that identifies family as key in dissuading young minds from violent radical behavior and proposes acceptable alternatives. Mothers have been identified to have significant moral authority that shapes behavior and influences decision among their children, while father figures are seen to be vital in building and strengthening the character, identity, and confidence. It is argued that families have the potential to build and strengthen attitudes toward non-violence, identify signs of possible radicalization to violence among their own, and prevent and intervene in the course of the radicalization process. It is concluded here that in a bid to design effective long-term counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies to VE, stakeholders must re-affirm the role of family-based community networks as crucial pillars in building resilient communities.

**Keywords:** family-based community networks, soft power, radicalization, violent extremism, resilience, Kenya

## 1. Introduction

It is not surprising to find that after analyzing the family history of an individual who is at risk, or susceptible to radicalization or radical extreme ideologies, that such persons would have suffered neglect from their families or absent parental figures, particularly in their early years of growth. Drawing from four, eight-member focus group discussions conducted among Muslim youth drawn from Kangemi slums in Nairobi, and from already published empirical evidence, this work aims to demonstrate how family and those within its close networks act not only as a facilitative function in support of VE activities but also more importantly as a preventative instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent extremist groups (VEOs).

It is argued that family is considered as the prime institution that transmits fundamental values and beliefs to their children in the following ways: it teaches

acceptable behavior, it provides an individual with a personal identity and a sense of national loyalty (belonging), and the child also becomes aware of ideologies associated with the authorities and learns obedience to the state or political authority. By forming basic loyalties and identifying with political systems, “the child also learns to sort people into social categories—linguistic, racial, class, tribal, occupational, or geographical. Children learn to classify people according to certain characteristics and to behave differently toward them depending on how they are classified, and the bond (or lack thereof) between the parent and the child plays an extremely important role in developing a person’s self-esteem, sense of identity, personality, and emotional health” [1]. Thus, individual radicalization is not sparked just by external factors but also internally through environments in which they develop. In this case, the family plays a fertile space in an individual’s growth, development, and eventual life choices [1].

## **2. Theoretical model**

This work goes beyond implicit linear, sequential models that explain the radicalization process in support of socially based design. Specifically, this work draws from social facilitated theory, which establishes that an individual’s introduction to radical ideologies and becoming extremists is often traced back to their social environment, particularly family and kinship networks. By and large, social institutions, particularly family, become instrumental in playing a facilitative function in pushing their own toward adopting violent extremist ideologies. Thus, it is determined that ideologies (and group support for them) breed around the social ecology of nested contexts and systems—including family networks [2]—and hence a relevant and most suitable point of intervention.

Bauman et al. [3] tried out different intervention measures (like the use of school curricula, vending machine control, cigarette tax increase, and age restriction enforcement on sales) as an attempt to prevent adolescent from tobacco and alcohol use and found them to have recorded dismal success away from the desired goal. Instead, they turned to families of these adolescents and evaluated their influence of their children’s choices. They were of the assumption that families do have a substantial impact on their children’s behavior, since characteristics of individual families were found to be correlated with the adolescent’s use of alcohol, tobacco, and other abusive substances. Drawing from their findings, the influence of families after implementing the Family Matters program showed significant success in involving families in the prevention program [3].

In their results, following the assessment of the impact of family systems intervention on recidivism and sibling delinquency, Klein et al. found that the family systems approach, when equated to other conditions, yielded substantial improvements in process measures and a significant reduction in recidivism [4]. According to Bailey et al. [5], effective adaptation of design and implementation of family-centered approaches is critical in bringing about change among children in the early stages of their development.

## **3. Discussion and analysis of findings**

The emerging question in the field of CVE is who is likely to be among the first to notice, and be willing to intercede, with individuals beginning to radicalize and having affinity with ideologies and activities associated with VE? This study argues that families and individuals close to such families are best position to detect such

signs and respond. On the contrary, other findings indicate that “the family is the last to know. They only know when the person is in trouble” [6], meaning that such individuals may want to really hide their engagements from their kin and families only get to know at an advanced stage.

However, I argue that it is unlikely that members of the family remain in the blind spot since they are the first to encounter the at-risk individual when they begin to change their behavior, unless the individual physically detaches and relocates from his/her familiar location. It is important to acknowledge that family members may want to remain in denial in an effort to save themselves from public embarrassment. Vidino and Hughes [7] have argued that before individuals made initial attempts toward radicalization, there must have a family member, or at least a friend close to the family, who witnessed the individual embarking on the journey toward VE. Williams et al. [6] are of the view that from the start, family members are the first to notice change of behavior in one of their own but often remain reluctant to dissuade them from the choice of violence due to fear that this might negatively affect their relationships.

Although volumes of literature and empirical evidence have been published about how individuals are recruited into terrorist networks and activities, little research has focused on the role of family-based community networks (FBCNs), not only as a facilitative function in support of VE activities but more importantly as a preventative instrument against radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent extremist groups (VEOs). In a case in point, a respondent in the focus group discussion (FGD) expressed that the major reason he had joined gangs, commonly hired by politicians to cause violence, was the inability of his family to provide for his needs (house rent, clothing, food, and other basic needs). Another respondent indicated that after he completed high school, he was forced to suspend his pursuit for higher education to allow younger siblings to complete school. This pressure from family increased his vulnerability and desperation. Respondents agreed that high demands for survival on jobless youth, created by family’s financial inability to support their children to acquire critical skills, remain a critical push factor toward violent extremism. However, the phenomenon of material lack is not to be generalized, since most of the militant individuals have in fact originated from middle-class families, with college-level education, and often had jobs in both formal and informal sector [2]. Other results [8] have shown that among young people with affinity to terrorism, students from middle-class families were particularly involved.

Families are argued to be the most defining element in character formation. In fact, as teenagers attempt to find their space and create their identity, away from family frames, they become vulnerable to being recruited into VEOs. The decisions they make eventually are shaped by their family background, whereby those who may have lived a neglected childhood, or lived in families or parents with unhealthy conflicts and tensions, may seek affirmations outside the family ties. In the end, any chance to engage in an extraordinary group or activity is attractive for this group of youth, particularly those that do not enjoy support from their kin [9]. The case of Kemunto, one of those believed to have been the instigators of the deadly attack that left 21 people dead at 14 Riverside Drive in Nairobi, is illustrative. She, a Muslim convert, came from a broken family and an absent father who was rarely home due to drinking problems [10].

According to the observation made by Sikkens et al. [11] in their case study research, more than 70% of youth that had joined radical violent groups came from families that had been afflicted with divorce, health and mental health problems, and extreme financial constraints. In this case, this undesirable condition may have played a role in the radicalization process. In their case study, they cite expression from Daniel—not real name—a Muslim who had disengaged from an extremist group, saying:

My mother has had psychological problems all her life, and my sister required a lot of attention and care. She had to run the household all by herself, and so she was hardly able to get a handle on the situation.

In line with the foregoing, Spalek [12] posits that families are viewed as surprisingly able to play two conflicting roles in the field of countering/violent extremism (C/VE), both “as potentially being risky, as well as potentially being a source of protection and rehabilitation.” This is not to purport that the wider society, away from the family networks, have a little role to play in de-/radicalization. This study is designed to explore how FBCNs reorient and instill behavioral change among the youth as they chose to join or detach from radicalization to VE and terror-related activities. A growing body of research links parental influence to radicalization.

To this end, Hoeve et al. posit that “lack of support, supervision, harsh disciplining, inconsistent parenting, delinquent family members, and problems within the family would enhance the chances of young people developing deviant behavior” [13]. However, little is known of the extent to which the role played in bringing up a child may influence radicalization and de-radicalization to, or from, violent extremism [11]. On the other hand, it is believed that sound parental support for the child goes a long way toward the enhancement of their moral development. Proper parental guidance assists children to establish prosocial moral internalization [14].

Apart from parents, siblings, especially between male brothers, play an important role in the de-/radicalization process. Particularly in large families, younger siblings look up to their older siblings as role models. According to Kumar [15] the late terrorist attacker Amrozi Nurhasyim came from a very big family and was inspired by his elder brother Mukhlas, with who they conspired to commit the Bali attack in 2002. Other cases in point include the Paris attacks in 2005, the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013, and the 2014 Mpeketoni massacre, among others, which were planned and carried out by siblings. Sisters too have their own share of influence in radicalization to VE. For example, two of the three attackers at a police station in Mombasa were identified as biological sisters.

In a bid to prevent Australian youth from joining VEOs or traveling to become foreign fighters in countries at the center of terror insurgency like Syria and Iraq, a program sponsored by the Norway Action Plan against violent extremism organized conversations between parents and young people who conducted themselves in a manner that demonstrated signs of radicalization [16]. In Berlin, a program that gained international reputation is “Hayat.” This is a CVE initiative established in the last decade by the Center for Democratic Culture. The sole aim of this effort was to respond to the more contemporary threat of foreign youth fighters traveling to countries at the center of terrorism and VE. Over time, the program has brought together families and communities of youth who had become part of, or intended to join, VE groups in foreign countries. Families and communities are oriented to the process of identifying signs of radicalization among the youth and were facilitated to create an environment around individuals at risk and dissuade them from being further involved [17]. Above all, the initiative provided a 24-hour counseling hotline to members of families with such youth at risk of joining VEOs and sometimes brought small groups of families together to share experiences [18]. In 2015, the Extreme Dialog project (sponsored by the Kanishka Project under the management of the Institute of Strategic Dialog) was launched. They used family members of those involved in VE activities to deliver messages against VE and terrorism as their main strategic approach.

Noting the influence that family-based community networks have on individual and social relationships, governments across the world are beginning to focus their attention on families as a critical point of intervention. Notably, research has shown that the overwhelming majority of individuals continue to radicalize through the

influence of close social or family relationships [19] and just as importantly, that personal relationships provide the primary vehicle for disengagement [20]. At the backdrop of the foregoing, part of the \$13.4 million dollars allocated by the Australian government for CVE intervention was designed to enhance support for families by strengthening their capacity to perform the intervention work. According to Haris-Hogan et al. [16], this was a move away from generic community interventions to a more individually focused and purposeful response strategy to the problem of radicalization to VE.

In the last decade, governments across the globe have increasingly shifted focus from broad-based CVE interventions and are introducing individual specific approaches [7]. In 2012, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate had made recommendations to the executive branch to establish a system to address the fate of radicalized individuals who were yet to be mobilized to violence. This was proposed as an alternative approach to security agencies besides arrest. In the proposed plan, they suggested to bring key actors, such as family, who would be co-opted to dissuade at-risk individuals and disengage them from being radicalized into VE.

The US government needs to develop options within constitutional and statutory constraints for situations in which federal law enforcement, such as the FBI, comes in contact with an individual who is radicalizing. It is not law enforcement's or the intelligence community's role to seek to change an individual's beliefs protected by the First Amendment, as opposed to focusing on criminal conduct. An individual's family, friends, and local community and religious leaders are best suited to dissuading the individual from criminal activity as well as rolling back the radicalization. The US government needs to resolve the extent to which federal law enforcement can share information concerning radicalized individuals with family, friends, and local community and religious leaders [21].

In the US government, more senior administrators seemed to have been convinced by this proposal. It is recorded that a year after the Boston Marathon bombing, Lisa Monaco, the deputy to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, addressed this topic on her public lecture at Harvard University:

Parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home—becoming confrontational. Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences. Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas. Or friends might notice a new interest in watching or sharing violent material. The government is rarely in a position to observe these early signals, so we need to do more to help communities understand the warning signs, and then work together to intervene before an incident can occur [22].

To this end, Vidino and Hughes [7] argued for the establishment of a well-crafted system of interventions that provide options for families, communities, and law enforcement agencies to develop workable alternatives to prosecution of at-risk individuals or in the path of radicalization to VE.

In tandem with the foregoing, Williams et al. [6] consider public institutional approach as one component of developing CVE design interventions, such as law enforcement agencies, school systems, faith-based organizations, social service agencies, psychological services, and more. They argue that the second component is comprised of individuals [also known as gatekeepers], such as family members, who are willing and able to connect potentially at-risk persons to relevant institutions for professional assistance. Family members and those within their close networks most likely detect signs among at-risk individuals as they embrace radical ideologies and refer them to institutions that dissuade them from pursuing the path toward violence.

When family members learn that one of their own is being radicalized and moving toward VE, they do not always intervene, at least publicly, for fear of victimization by security agencies and ridicule from members of the community. According to the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act [23], immediate family members of suspects of terrorism were imposed with restrictions, to a great extent translating them to being “guilty by association” [23]. In such a hostile policy and legal environment, families with individuals engaged in VE live their lives under immense pressure and fear of being victimized.

Some researchers have made efforts to find out the major reasons that make individuals detach themselves from radical ideologies. One such initiative was the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), a forum where individuals were allowed to narrate their stories and provide meaning to their experiences. Many indicated that their decision to disengage from VE activities was pegged on the fact that family members and friends they had left behind were being traumatized by their absence [7].

#### **4. Role of mothers in (countering) violent extremism**

This study considers a gendered perspective in understanding the process of (countering) violent extremism. Sikkens et al. [24] advocate that mothers have significant moral authority that shapes behavior and influences decision in a young person. In their case study, they refer to Katie’s—not her real name—mother who took her daughter with her in her involvement with animal activism, an attitude that her daughter gradually absorbed:

I can be short and clear about that: I got my ideals from my mother. It cannot be any other way, you learn your ideals from your parents. First you have them [ideals] as a child, but over the years I discovered that they are ideals that I 100% agree with. And I just got involved, especially when my mother joined a group of animal activists. In the beginning, I was too young and stayed at home, but I knew that my mum was carrying out actions, and later on I joined her.

Apart from the direct influence from parents as demonstrated above in the radicalization process, indirect influence also exists [24].

While advancing a gendered approach to CVE, Guru [23] contends that, of the family members, women are better positioned to help in de-radicalization of members of the family by dissuading them from engaging in violence and forge stronger ties and protect individuals from becoming victims of VE and terror agents. Drawing recommendations from PAIMAN, an initiative in Pakistan that brought both mothers and youth as an effort to moderate extremism there, Veenkamp and Zeiger posit that “mothers voices, particularly mothers of victims of terrorism and of perpetrators on violent extremism, were powerful narratives that could be harnessed for promoting peace and countering the narrative of violent extremism” [25].

Uddin, Guru [23], believes that women are a “source of moral authority ... key to unlocking ... disillusion.” It is believed that the mother-child relationship in human development is highly defining, for an individual’s panoramic view of their environment [9]. Similarly, as evidenced in the findings of an initiative managed by Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) dubbed “Mothers for Change,” due to the strategic positioning of women within the family unit, they stand a better chance to respond to ideologies of violent extremism in their families and subsequent communities [26]. According to Hearne [27], such approaches have worked in Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In his study, Brown [28] purports that “mothers and grandmothers” of at-risk individuals in the UK have been used and have become critical actors toward the implementation of CVE policies.

Attendees in the conference labeled “Women Without Borders/Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)” in 2010 held in Yemen observed the point that the preparedness of women to identify and respond to signs of extremism among their family members varies significantly depending on their academic qualifications, local awareness, and geographic remoteness. It was reported that mothers, especially those with little or no formal education, find it difficult to pick up warning signs, as they may take it that their children are merely becoming more religious and often consider the change to be commendable [26]. This categorically limits the ability of parents to intervene before individuals escalate deep into VE activities.

While citing agency among women in conflict resolution, Sebugwaawo [29] posits that mothers, due to their effective art in convincing and soft power approach, stand a good chance to act as agents of change in their kin, dissuading them from radicalization and any form of violent extremism. Women understand too well the effects of conflicts and have immediate sense of what to be done to families of the victims. In fact, women are more integrated in their communities than men, and therefore they have stronger perception of problems experienced by their children [29].

## **5. Role of father figures in (countering) violent extremism**

Veenkamp and Zeiger argued that the role played by fathers in both recruitment and prevention of VE cannot be ignored or dismissed. They posited that, in many cultures, the father-son relationship is defining particularly when sons become of age. Empirical literature has shown that in the cases where the father figure is absent, feelings of resentment and isolation become evident. These may at times “contribute to a young person’s vulnerability to recruitment into violent extremism” [25]. In South Asia, research has been published to support this claim. In the province of Swat, Pakistan, for example, about 65% of militant boys identified between the age of 12 and 18 had absent father figures [25].

Following the foregoing, Bjørgo and Carlsson [30] have argued that many young people are lured into violent radical groups in their search for substitute families and father figures: in most times, many individual youths who opt to join extremist groups have wanting relationships with their families and with their father figures in particular. In this case, extremist groups paint a lucrative environment where young people could satisfy their urge for mentorship.

Findings from a research undertaken by Botha [1] in Kenya on assessing youth vulnerability to radicalization and extremism indicate that when young people experience a sense of abandonment, or lack of identity, this phenomenon does contribute significantly to making them susceptible to a father figure or urge to fit in a group that assures them protection and sense of being wanted. Further, they found that many young people that were susceptible to the Al-Shabaab network in Kenya did not have a father figure while growing up. In his study, Botha concluded that lack of a father figure is by no means a precursor for radicalization, but the gap created by such an absence of a father figure is telling [1].

It is worth noting that as compared to mothers, the role of father figures in CVE has not been significantly explored. Many scholars agree that there exist many programs that empower women as agents of de-radicalization, but little attention is paid to the critical role played by father figures, or absent father figures in the radicalization process. Botha points to the fact that in the profiles of those implicated with acts of terrorism in Kenya, an absent father figure was a recurring phenomenon [1]. Results from the FGD showed that more often than not, children heads of families usually feel the pressure to engage in criminal activities or accept offers of economic favors from extremists.

The theme on absent parents in VE literature is evidently a recurring phenomenon. While assessing the relationship between an absent parent and joining a violent extremist group, Botha [31] found that the phenomenon about an absent father figure resembled those of J. Post in his study of 250 West German terrorists (from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement). Results of that study indicated that 25% had lost one or both parents by age 14, whereas 79% had strained family relationships—and more intriguing was the fact that 33% had a particularly negative relationship with their fathers. She [31] further posits that many respondents among the Allied Democratic Forces (44%), Lord's Resistance Army (38%), al-Shabaab (18%), and Mombasa Republican Council (31%) had been raised without a father figure. Rashid Mberesero, a Tanzanian national and a terror convict, who was sentenced to a life imprisonment by a Kenyan court in July 2019, grew without a father for 20 years, after his parents separated following persistent marital misunderstandings. Even after the two, father and son, reunited, they quickly fell out after the father made attempts to force him to convert from Islam to Christianity [32].

However, this phenomenon may not be generalized since majority of the respondents who joined these organizations had father figures present growing up. She [31] concludes that this is not to insinuate that experiencing rejection or a lack of belonging will not contribute to make a young person susceptible to seek other father figures or enhance the need to belong to a group to experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. It is critical to note that these feelings can be experienced even in situations where both parents are present. In tandem with the foregoing, participants in the FGD observed that young people, particularly those who converted to Islam after the age of 18, were rejected by their families and in most instances preferred to join other [predatory] groups in which they were received and accepted. Results of findings by Ndung'u et al. [33] indicate that children of absent fathers who had left to fight for Al-Shabaab, or had been killed while fighting for the cause of the extremist group, were vulnerable to extremist preachers. The study indicated that clerics would pay school fees for these children in support of the mothers, who, together with their children, in turn become vulnerable to their teaching.

## **6. Conclusion**

The strongest thread in this work indicates that family plays a crucial role (whether positive or negative) throughout any individual's life, particularly in the early years of their growth and development. Results from this study indicate that individuals at risk of radicalization to VE emerge from families that are too large, or broken, separated, in which father figures are missing, or, if there, emotionally strained. Family-based community networks have a role to play in teaching children acceptance, tolerance, and respect for members of the society. Thus, creating opportunities for strong economically stable families, with emotionally present parent/father figures, is not only critical pillars for building an equitable social policy but also arguably a sound national security policy too. It is important that policymakers design policies with relevant strategies and tools toward addressing radicalized individuals within their family and community settings. Law enforcement agencies shall need to adopt a paradigm shift in their approach and embrace soft power approaches, apart from punitive measures through law enforcement agencies, to countering individuals in the process of radicalization in a bid to create self-sustaining communities.



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Section 2

Terrorism and Economic  
Losses

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# Terrorism in Emerging Economies: A Double-Edged Sword

*Syed Abdul Rehman Khan and Zhang Yu*

## Abstract

Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence against civilians to intimidate a government or its citizens to further certain social and political objectives. Usually terrorist attacks on government officials and property to create panic and dictate or enforce their illegal terms and conditions on sitting government. The chapter discussed the definitions of terrorism, types of definitions and consequences on terrorism in developing countries. Finally, the chapter draws a picture of terrorism and economic growth with the support of literature reviews.

**Keywords:** terrorism, developing countries, civil disorder, political terrorism, quasi terrorism

## 1. Introduction

Terrorism is the use of internationally indiscriminate ferocity as a means to create panic in public; or fear to gain some political, financial, or religious objective. During the French Revolution, the terrorism and terrorist invented but increased popularity in the 1970s in news reports, research papers, and magazines covering the dispute and/or conflicts in the Basque, Palestine, and North Ireland.

There is no doubt that there are many definitions of terrorism. Terrorism is a charged term. It is usually used with the connotation of something that is “ethically and morally wrong”. According to the Global Terrorism Database [1], from 2000 to 2014, almost 61,000 incidents of non-state terrorism, resulting in at least 140,000 deaths.



**Figure 1.**  
*The Mumbai attack in 2008.*

Terrorism can occur in different places to create fear in the public and build pressure on governmental bodies for the aim of financial, religious, or any other benefits (**Figure 1**). The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standard and Goals highlighted six fundamental types of terrorism:

### **1.1 Civil disorder**

This is a violent form of protest, which usually held against the sitting government and mostly time supported by opposition parties. The objective is to show the unhappiness of people, but they sometimes result in large riots in which public and private property is burned/broken and civilians are injured.

### **1.2 Political terrorism**

This type of terrorism is used by one political group to threaten another political group. In fact, government leaders are the ones who are intended to receive the ultimate message and citizens are the ones who are targeted with violent attacks.

### **1.3 Quasi terrorism**

This is a violent act that utilizes the same methods, which employed by terrorists, but does not have the same factors of motivating. Usually, these cases involve an armed criminal who is trying to escape from law enforcement utilizing civilians as a hostage to help them escape. The lawbreaker is acting in a similar manner to a terrorist, but terrorism is not the goal.

### **1.4 Nonpolitical terrorism**

This type of terrorism is not for gaining any political purpose, but most times is connected with religious nature.

### **1.5 State terrorism**

This type of terrorism is totally supported by the government. In state terrorism, the government uses its military forces for their illegal objectives. The state terrorism is well-known for Indian governmental activities in Kashmir, which is also the violation of human rights. In addition, one more example of state terrorism can be noticed in Palestine.

### **1.6 Limited political terrorism**

These acts are usually one time only plots to make an ideological statement. In this type of terrorism, the key objective is not to change the government, but to show the unhappiness against the governmental policy.

## **2. Cases of terrorism in developing countries**

During 2014, a terrorist group attack on the APS (Army Public School), which is located in the Peshawar capital city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan. All militants were foreigner including Chechen, Afghanis, and Arabs. They entered the school and killed 132 school children and 17 school teacher and staff. During the incidents, a rescue operation was launched by the great Pak Army, who killed all the terrorists and rescued more than 950 people (**Figure 2**).





**Figure 2.**  
*The Army Public School attack in 2014.*

In 2019, during the celebration of Easter festival in Sri Lanka, three churches and three hotels were targeted by the terrorist. In the suicide bombings, approximately 258 people were died including 45 foreigners, while the number of injured people was around 500. As per the official agencies, the terrorist was Sri Lankan national and was associated with a local militant group (**Figures 3 and 4**).

During May 2019, Afghan Taliban attack in Kabul and killed five people and 24 people were injured. According to the Afghan government, four terrorists were also killed by the security forces and more than 200 people were rescued (**Figure 5**).

In April 2019, two suicide bomb attack in the northeastern Nigerian city of Maiduguri. The national news confirmed the death of 3 people and 30 were hospitalized. According to the governmental reports, two female bombers detonated their explosives among a crowd in Muna Dalti on the outskirts of Borno state capital Maiduguri, the birthplace of the Boko Haram jihadist group (**Figure 6**).

In February 2019, around 42 Indian soldiers have been killed in a suicide attack in the disputed area of Kashmir. After the suicide attack, the Indian government put



**Figure 3.**  
*Attack on churches in Sri Lanka.*




**Figure 4.**  
*Suicide bombing on Easter day in Sri Lanka.*



**Figure 5.**  
*Smokes rises after a terrorist attack in Kabul.*



**Figure 6.**  
*Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria.*



**Figure 7.**  
*Disputed area of Kashmir between Pakistan-Indian.*



**Figure 8.**  
*A suicide bombing last week in southern Kashmir killed at least 40 Indian soldiers.*

their failure on Pakistani forces and blamed that the attackers were sent from Pakistan (**Figures 7 and 8**). On the other hand, Pakistani officials clearly denied the Indian officials statement. In addition, the Pakistani government spokesman said: “It is Indian habit to blame Pakistan.” Further, the spokesman offers that we are willing to investigate the case with the Indian government for better regional peace and prosperity.

### **3. Terrorism in developing countries and economic growth**

Since the last couple of decades, the developing world is significantly facing the problem of terrorism, which slowdown to the economic growth of those countries. The table displays the list of seven developing countries that experienced terrorism incidents and lost their economic growth (**Table 1**).

In 2004, Blomberg et al. [2] conducted a study to examine the effect of terrorism on economic viability in the sample of time series data during the period of 1968 to 2000. Their findings show that terrorism has a significant and negative effect on economic growth. In addition, greater terrorist activities lose the interest of investors and mostly time’s countries face some international sanctions. In a similar way, Gaibulloev and Sandler [3] formulated a comparative analysis between developed and developing countries; they collected the data from 52 and 7 developing and

S. no.	Country	Domestic	International	Total incidents
1	India	2229	78	2438
2	Thailand	985	21	1027
3	Philippines	621	51	702
4	Israel	482	42	546
5	Colombia	540	37	620
6	Nigeria	712	92	842
7	Nepal	282	27	323

**Table 1.**

*The developing countries with greater terrorism activities.*

developed countries, respectively. The findings were little surprising, as terrorism has no adverse effect on economic growth in developed countries, while the emerging countries economy are badly affected and destroyed by terrorism. There are myriads of other costs like brain drain, destruction of transportation and trade-related infrastructure, and diversion of funds to counterterrorism (compared to funding on social welfare including subsidies on medicines and free education).

Unquestionably, foreign direct investment is fuel for economic growth, but without political stability and terror-free country, it is almost impossible. In developing countries, raising terrorism is creating an alarming situation for their economic viability [4]. A study published by Bandyopadhyay et al. [5] emphasized on a sample of 78 developing nations and they found that 1% increase in terrorism will reduce the foreign direct investment inflows by \$323.6 million approximately.

On the other hand, terrorism also raises the cost of doing business such as shipping cost will rise if shippers have to buy insurance to mitigate their risk of possible damages in the ports of terrorism-prone nations. In the results, the costs transferred to the consumers in terms of expensive products, which will not only reduce both imports and exports of terror-affected countries. Nitsch and Schumacher [6] claimed that during the period of 1960 to 1993, an increasing number of terrorist incidents reduced the bilateral trade among 200 countries. The multiplier effect of terrorism is not only dragged economic activities but sometimes pull countries into circular debt problems.

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter mainly discussed the types of terrorism and their impact on the economic growth of the countries. In addition, authors also provided cases of different terrorist attack in developing countries, particularly in Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria. Authors discussed and explored with the support of previously published articles that terrorism is strongly and negatively associated with economic growth in developing countries, while in some developed countries there is no relationship between terrorism and economic growth. As developing countries economy is not well sustained as compare to developed countries and due to a single attack can leak and shake to the economic and trade activities.

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## **Conflict of interest**

There is no conflict of interest.

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# The Survival Strategies of Poor Youth in the Metropolitan City of Douala, Cameroon

*Nanche Billa Robert*

## Abstract

The question we asked in this work was how young people who are predominantly poor survive in the metropolitan city of Douala, considering their reduced purchasing power. Our main objective was to identify the various coping mechanisms that the poor in the metropolitan city of Douala use to survive. We use the explanatory sequential mixed method to carry out this research: in the first phase, we randomly administered 610 questionnaires constructed using the desired values for living a comfortable life in Douala, and in the second phase, we purposefully selected and interviewed 50 poor youth to understand their survival strategies. We discovered that about 91% of youths are poor and 68.7% of them are the working poor. We discovered that they succeed by being calculative, flexible, and creative, accepting precarious jobs, practicing “long-linked borrowing” and modelling. In the course of struggling for survival, they form various identities of themselves: those of strugglers, helplessness, uncertainty, underachievers, alienated people, etc. We noticed that poverty is situational and not cultural, because they also wish to integrate the main stream values of their society but they are constrained.

**Keywords:** poverty, poor youths, Douala, flexibility, creativity

## 1. Introduction

Youth unemployment rates are much higher than adult rates in all regions, Isabel et al. [1]. According to the National Institute of Statistics, in Cameroon, youth unemployment is higher (6%) than that of the whole population (3.8%). The unemployment rate of youth has proven to be more sensitive to that of adults, supporting the “first-out, last-in” hypothesis. Youth face a longer recovery than adults, mainly because of surplus labour competing for a limited number of jobs, youth, with their shorter work histories, will also be the “last in”.

Many youth are stuck in work that does not match their skills level or desired career path, [2]. The high employment-to-population ratios of youth in the poorest regions reflect the fact that the poor must work more vulnerable to poverty and less vulnerable to unemployment. There is a correlation between lower unemployment rates and higher vulnerable employment rates. The lack of social safety nets such as unemployment benefits means the poor cannot afford to be unemployed. Instead, they struggle to earn an income through own-account work or sporadic casual wage employment. Most persons in developing economies do not have access to wage and

salaried employment, where job losses occur, but rather make their living in self-employment (own-account work) or in contributing to family work.

About one third of economically active youth are unemployed. It affects a broad spectrum of socio-economic groups including the less and well-educated youth and especially youth from low-income background and those with limited education. According to the World Bank [3], in 2010 about 92% of young people employed were in the informal sector in Cameroon. Unemployment rate is not the best indicator for measuring crisis impact on young people. Majority of youth in Africa are engaged in informal sector activities. Only a small proportion is engaged in the formal sector. A large proportion of youth are thus under-employed, working long hours under poor working conditions for little remuneration mainly in the informal sector.

Global labour markets have also been increasingly characterized by vulnerable employment, which is strongly related to low-paying jobs and difficult working conditions where wage inequality is high and fundamental worker's rights are likely to be in jeopardy. Vulnerable jobs and informal work can be expected to be widespread. According to the National Institute of Statistics [4, 5], in Cameroon, underemployment was about 12.3% in 2010, it was 12.1% in 2005.

Increasing "labour precarization" is fast becoming a concern. The "precariat" is a class in the making, a growing number of people across the world live and work precariously, usually in a series of short-term jobs, without recourse to stable occupational identities, social protection or protective regulations relevant to them. They are increasingly frustrated and dangerous because they have no voice, and, hence, they are vulnerable to the calls of extreme political parties [1].

Working poverty affects workers of all ages, vulnerability increases at different stages of the life cycle. Youth, in particular, have a higher likelihood of being among the working poor than adults [6]. Large cohorts of poor youth remain trapped in low-productivity jobs, principally in subsistence agriculture. Out of economic necessity, their offspring are, in turn, likely to enter the labour force at an early age, perpetuating the vicious circle of poverty from one generation to the next [3, 6].

Workers who experience unemployment, especially of long duration, have an increased likelihood of being jobless in later years and earning lower wages. These effects, which are known as "wage scars," are observed in both young and adult populations, but the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the impacts are much more acute on young workers [7].

A widespread coping strategy linked to the jobs crisis has been selling household assets and borrowing money. In order to maintain consumption needs during periods of unemployment or reduced or erratic wages, many households have drawn down savings and sold possessions, as well as turned to friends, relatives, membership-based clubs, community groups and banks, where possible, for financial help. While selling assets and borrowing are, indeed, important safety nets for the poor, they are also easily exhaustible [1].

What strategies do the poor youth of Douala adopt to survive in an urban area like Douala where the rate of unemployment, underemployment and own-account workers is very high and especially where everything is monetized?

The main objective of this work is to elicit all the coping mechanisms that the poor youth use to continue living with inadequate income in Douala.

## **2. Methodology**

The questionnaire construction was based on the notion that poverty is relative to a society and epoch. Sociologically speaking, one is poor when one cannot



attain the values of one's society. That is, a sociological description of poverty must take into consideration the values of the society in question. These values are not to be prescribed by the researcher in order to avoid subjectivity. The value must be a general consensus of those living in the society in question at the time of the research, [8].

We carried a pilot studies which is a small scale preliminary study conducted before the main research to find out the psychological and social essentials for ordinary living patterns in Douala in order to improve the design of the research. We asked respondents what they considered to be normal social activities; that is, the psychological and social essentials for ordinary living patterns in Douala. It was administered on 30 respondents having varied social status and then the responses constituted the foundation of our questionnaire.

We used the mixed methods research because the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of a research problem than either approach alone [9, 10]. The quantitative methods helped us to establish the poverty-line and the qualitative method helped us to understand the daily struggles for survival of the poor youth of Douala. A blend of both the quantitative and qualitative methods provided a profound picture of what youth poverty is in the city of Douala. The overall intent of this design is to have the qualitative data explain in more details the initial quantitative results.

We used the random sampling method wherein we selected every fifth of the youths in Douala ensuring that everyone had an equal chance in the selection. It is worth-noting that we had a full grasp of the sampling frame. We went to all the sub-divisions and all the neighbourhoods in each division.

The number of questionnaires administered in each of the five sub-divisions was determined by its population. We put the population of each sub-division over the total population of the five sub-divisions and then we multiplied by our sample size 610. We ensured that the number of females or males in the study was equivalent to their percentage in the general population by using the same above mathematical application.

We tried as much as possible too to ensure that the percentage of each sex selected was almost same as its percentage in the general population. In Douala, there are 956,883(49.67%) females and 969,630(50.33) males out of the total population of 1,926,513. Equally, we selected 300(49.18%) females and 310 (50.82%) males out of the total sample size of 610.


### 3. Results

#### 3.1 Description of youth poverty in Douala

**Youth age difference and poverty-line in Douala.**


Age range	% Below poverty-line	% Above poverty-line
<21	95	5
21–25	95.3	4.7
26–30	90.2	9.8
31–35	84.5	14.5

The above table shows that as age increases, the number of persons below the poverty-line decreases and vice versa. The graph below shows the distribution of income among the youth in the city of Douala.



From the above it is glaring that that a bulk of the youth in the city of Douala earn between 24,000 and 74,000 frs CFA (41%), 4.8% earn below 24, 000 frs and 19% earn nothing. Only 9% of the youths in Douala earn about 177,000 frs and above which is the amount required for participating in the predominant values in Douala [11–13]. It is quite difficult to cope in the city of Douala using such low salaries. Therefore the youths in Douala are what ILO [2] describes as the working poor who live below the poverty line and are working out of economic necessity. According to it, youth, in particular, have a higher likelihood of being among the working poor than adults. The question that preoccupies us in this work is the coping mechanisms these working poor youth in the city of Douala use to survive. In other words, what strategies do they use to have a good feeding habit, domestic comfort, health seeking behaviour among others?

### 3.2 Different survival strategies in Douala



The above histogram indicates that 26.6%, 44.7%, 17.4%, 1.3%, 1.5%, 4.3%, 4.2% of the youth in the city of Douala diversify their activities, work for long hours, are dependent, are prostitute, thieves, gamble and do others things respectively to survive. Therefore to survive in the city of Douala, the poor residents work for very long hours because they do a diversity of activities to survive.

### *3.2.1 Diversification of activities*

The poor youth of Douala do many precarious economic activities. When in financial difficulties, they walked out of their zone of expertise and do many other activities whether related to their field of specialization or not. So for the poor youth in Douala to survive, they must be very smart and tactful. They must learn to do several jobs simultaneously and must be willing to sacrifice their resting time to check their private work because it is what relieves them when their masters fail to pay their salaries for months and equally helps them to solve their other problems. As such, they overwork themselves just to survive since they do not have any support network either from their government nor parents because they are either predominantly from a polygamous family, or have lost a parent, or their parents are simply irresponsible or too old or too poor to take care of them. They have to fight on their own while hoping that their future will be better.

Serge who is mechanic lived alone and was independent because his former master had sent him away. Therefore he had to struggle as much as possible to survive in life. He had worked 2000 frs CFA the day we met him which was enough only for saving in the meeting he attended. So he had to do something different as he said “I will struggle elsewhere to live” meaning he was going to do other things to survive which was to change the tyres of vehicles which was not initially his profession.

Mathias a mechanic who did not have enough money to pay his rent, buy dresses, food for himself and take care of his younger ones, had to do other jobs related to his profession such as repairing motorcycle, light panel beating just to survive and help family members.

For a poor youth to survive in Douala, he/she must be very calculative—that is, must try as much as possible to make good use of the little resources that he/she earns as well as do many other things to complement his or her salary. This is the case of Nora who operated a call-box business in Bonanjo—she ensured to save 7000 francs weekly every week-end for her “Pépé-soup business” from which she gained 2000 francs per day which she would use to feed her two children and her unemployed husband. She would give 1000 francs to her husband to prepare food in the house and would add the remaining 3000 to the 7000 francs to buy air-time credit for her call box business.

Alain who earned about 100,000 frs CFA thinks it was insufficient to carter for all his needs and those of his relations. Apart from being employed as a commercial agent he also worked in the informal sector: he had an unlegalised printing press. He was afraid his master would dismiss him if he legalized it in his name. He was doing everything possible to use the names of one of his cousins in order to maintain his job. Whenever he presented the goods of his company, he would tell his customers about his printing press and the services they offer. They would call him whenever they needed his services which he would give to workers he had employed to work in the printing press. He would check it in the evening or during break-time or after returning from his work or over the weekend. He was also a go-between: he was a commercial agent, his customers would call for him to advertise their products which he would sell at an elevated price in order to make some gains for himself. He looked for them too even during working hours.

Romeo who wanted to go back to the university, sold umbrella, schoolbags and others goods over the week-end and even on Sunday in Bonanjo which is normally a resting day in order to make more money for himself. "I am a fighter because I can do all to survive" he had difficult moments but he tried to overcome them in one way or the other.

Poor youth who are teachers did what Bissai, a secondary school teacher symbolically termed to be "prostitution by giving home tuition to rich people's children," for payment. At times their masters would stay for months without paying them but they had no choice but to keep on teaching their children. Bissai equally had a plantation in his village although he did not have enough money to invest in it.

### *3.2.2 Flexibility and creativity*

Most poor youths are very flexible and creative in doing businesses and other activities. When one business is not doing well, they can easily switch to another or do another activity. They equally serve as some sort of reserve labourers for building site; whenever someone has a contract to build a house for example they would employ them and pay them per task or at the end of the day. From the beginning they would give building materials to the builders, later they mix the mould and then learn how to build and even lay the bricks. After having mastered the work, contractors take building contracts and hand them over to them and pay them very low-salary since they do not know the value of work not being professionals themselves.

An interesting example is Djeufack who dropped out of school from lower sixth. He is a builder, a painter, a welder and an electrician, etc. He learned all that except electricity "on the spot" he said, that is in the course of doing them without any formal training. If a contractor goes to the quarter looking for a painter for example, they pretend to be painters just because they are idle and poor. The contractor takes them to the construction site. "We pretend to give him the different types of paints and materials that we need and will go and ask the price from a quincaillerie." This is just for them to get better information from a professional painter whom they will take to the site. After having all the required information, they then return and bargain with the contractor before starting the work. If from the onset the work is not going on smoothly, they will call an expert who will show them how to do it. The expert comes and verifies the work at the end to ensure that they have done it very well.

Sometimes they recruit them and they learn from those who know how to do it already although they all earn the same salary. It is difficult for the contractor to distinguish experts from charlatans. At times those who master the work report them to the contractor and if he notices that the work has been well done, he does not care to punish them. They understand very fast when those who have a mastery of the work teach them on the spot. Although he said such works "suffocate a lot and is dirty" and it is not motivating but "we have no choice because we need it," said Djeufack.

Djeufack who learned electricity at school, would take those idling in the quarter to help him whenever he had a lot of work to do. When he was employed as storekeeper in COMENTAL, he learned welding too on the spot during his free time because they were welders around him. Some of his friends who had welding jobs out of the company gave them to him and he did the works during his free time.

They also do farm work not because they have done it before but because hardship forces them to accept it. They ask farm proprietors who have farms to hire their service. They dump them there just to come back in a week to pick them up. They cut grass and harvest crops. There is no sense of direction when they are working because they have not done it before.

Djeufack also did small business that is, all what he could find: he sold apparatus, motorcycles, etc. He was a go-between if someone wanted to buy or sell something; he communicated it to those who are in need. If he sold it above the cost price, the extra sum will be his gain. He also did the business his dead father left because he did not have any other thing to do at the moment we met him—meaning that at the time we met him if he had had something more fruitful to do, he would have left for it. He was also a caterer because his brother was involved in it and constantly would call for him.

However, Djeufack has got no precise job, just like many other poor youths in the city Douala he does whatever he sees—he is an electrician, a welder, a go between, a painter, and does tapestry when there is an opportunity for him to do caterer, business, clearing people's farm he would not hesitate accepting them.

“Why all this?”, we asked him.

“Because it is not working,” he replied.

“Why?” We asked again.

“The country is not well, we are obliged to juggle like this to survive—because all is expensive and work is rare and it is by knowing someone. It is necessary to fight to have something,” he replied.

The salary is not good all the times but they are obliged to do it because they have got nothing else to do. However it is very competitive because there are many other poor youths in need of them. One could arrive when they had called for other persons.

### *3.2.3 Modelling*

Modelling is learning by imitating others. When we learn how to behave in a new situation by watching how other behave in other words called observational learning. An example is watching someone use unfamiliar tool either live or on film and afterward being able to handle the tool oneself [14].

This is the method that many youths in Douala use to survive. They do not wait to have a proper training in something before doing it. They are daring and very adaptive and some learn very fast on the spot. After all they have no choice, imagine you have stayed for days without eating what will you do when an opportunity comes your way for you to earn some money? Will you refuse it because you have not got the appropriate training? So they have to “juggle to survive.” It gives us a sense of disorder but which saves its purpose.

There is no verification of expertise in such work—painting, welding, clearing a farm repairing a benskin, etc. We see the poor youths of Douala as being creative, someone trying to make maximum use of his environment and not just someone who just sit and hope that things may change on its own. He works while hoping. By so doing they later become professionals in many other fields that they have received no formal education or training. Tchuigoua summarized as follows: “All what I see that I can do, I do it.” They are not out to select jobs after all the jobs are very rare and highly solicited—that is, the poor youths scramble for them. If you are selective you will stay for weeks and even months without doing anything. In short, you will starve to dead. How then will you manage your bills, feeding, dressing, and other things?

### *3.2.4 Accepting of odd jobs*

Whenever the youth are pushed against the wall, they often forget their identity: their level of education in order to satisfy their basic needs. They cannot brandish their certificates because it cannot put food on their plates. Although it is often

frustrating but they have got no choice—they have to accept it or suffer the worst pains of poverty.

Anne is a 30 year old unemployed single lady who has a professional degree in touristic industries management and whose parents have been helping her for long. She said “my parents are very tired financially.” Having changed her jobs four times because of too much work and little salary which could not help her to save, she decided to do what she called “small work” such as placing “grafts,” plaiting women’s hair at their homes. She earned about 74000 frs CFA which was not enough to satisfy her basic needs and her objectives in life of returning to school.

Bernard was a BTS holder from the Institute Universitaire de Technologie of Douala who worked as an electrician in a construction site in Makepe. Although he earned about 4000 frs CFA per day, he considered his salary “disappointing, derisory. It cannot even be enough considering the size of the company.” According to him, it did not permit him to express his intrinsic values—that is, it is lower than his qualification. According to him, he ought to study the system, control and conserve it but as he put it “I only execute.” It disturbs him because he cannot express what he wanted to do by anticipating but only have to follow “the dictatorship of the enterprise.” He did not have any job satisfaction and was looking for a job that suited his level.

### *3.2.5 Second pay check and sacrifice*

This means empowering ones wife by enabling her to operate a small business which can increase the household income rather than depending only on the man. According to Aert et al. [15], the inactivity of women is only possible when the other members of the household bring enough resources for the up-keep of the family. In a situation of insufficient resources, women contribute to the house comfort by working in the informal sector: doing petty business or operating a call box business.

Romeo who earned about 90000 frs CFA per month considered it insufficient to pay rent, bills and feed his family. To ameliorate his household comfort, he opened a shop for his wife where she sold Chinese sandals. He would invest about 7000 frs CFA every week in her business which help her to buy more food for the household. She saved 5000 frs CFA every week in a meeting in order to increase the size of her shop. Romeo had four trucks on rent managed by his wife which yielded her 1200 frs CFA per day which she would use to buy her personal and household needs such as detergents and their child’s needs, etc. They made a lot of sacrifices by eating twice rather than thrice in order to invest more money in their business.

Equally at times too Romeo like many other petit traders would sell their goods at a loss in order not to fail their contribution or to give food money at home. They are bound to do this because such gatherings do not have pity on the poor. Failure to contribute is often sanctioned by a fine. That is the little the poor has is further extorted by the association which will be later shared as accrued interest at the end of the year or session. Therefore the poor who join such associations do everything even to their own detriment to have their *Njangi* money.

They are also conscious of the fact that they equally have to feed their family and will do everything possible to have money for food. “What will you tell a child when he is hungry; it means you have failed as a father,” said Romeo—so they are conscious of their parental role. This is an indication that the poor youths have not develop the culture of poverty because they are conscious of the mainstream value of handwork which they think could bring them success. They are very hard working because they believe or are convince that they will make it 1 day in life. The question is whether they can develop the culture of poverty if failure comes after continuous struggles to survive—the sign of learned helplessness.

Some despite their slow-paced business do not have any other activity that they could do to earn extra money because they have just started. Some said if their business declined, they would be obliged to be motor-taxi drivers in the evening—they would rent it because they did not have enough money to buy one. Similarly Ayissi was raising money for her husband to start an ambulant second-hand shoes business. It was quite a reversal of role for the woman to be the one fighting for the man and not the reversal.

### *3.2.6 Long linked borrowing*

Since the amount the poor make from their business is so insufficient, they borrow from friends to buy their goods such as cigarettes, biscuit, air-time credits, chips, bonbons, cool water, etc. to retail them. If it happens that they have not got the money yet and their creditors want the money, they will borrow from another friend to pay the creditor and the chain continues until they have made some profits from their business to pay back. Survival for the poor is really an uphill task and a lot of risk-taking. They keep on juggling while hoping that 1 day they will make enough money in order not to take credit but it is often difficult because the amount they gain from their business is often very little as compared to the problems they have to solve: paying children's school fees, feeding them and even taking care of them. At times some of the women even use their business capital to feed the family because their husbands are not working. What a reversal of role!

### **3.3 Sharing the same room**

About 10% of friends live together in order to save money by jointly paying their rents. They share the bills together and help each other whenever one of them is hard-up. When one is agonized, the other put a smile on his face by telling him stories—he helps to communicate with him thereby breaking the silence. He shares his problems with him and gets his advice. However, others consider living with an unemployed friend a disadvantage because they pay the bills alone. Their friends may lack the means although he may work as a petit trader in the market or do other petit jobs. Most often they do not have any choice because they have taken the decision to live with them. Mathias did not initially want to live with his friend because he wanted a quiet life to read the Bible and understand it due to his low education. His friend distracted him but he could not send him away. He prayed that God should provide his friend the means to rent his own room. He said things were always in disorder—he did not care about the house. Mathias did everything alone. His friend did not do the washing up. Living with him was not helpful to him—it instead brought him down. He hardly would switch off the television and hardly closed the door allowing rats to enter the house. Whenever he told him he thought he hated him. His friend did not care because he did not pay the bills.

### **3.4 The management of psychological problems**

Many things disturb the youths of Douala because they have limited resources to satisfy their needs. We asked them what they have done or were doing to solve them and their answers vary from total resignation to their fate to some actions taken to ameliorate their situation. The fact is that if they were more prosperous, they would solve their problems and as a consequence liberate themselves from psychological tortures.

Seigni was doing nothing to solve his psychological problems except his mechanic work where he was making maximum effort to succeed. He concluded by saying “what will I do?” Tchuigoua did not allow himself to be disturbed psychologically

because of lack of means. “I am happy with my situation and I live with it. What ought I have done? Go and steal? I don’t have any choice ---I am obliged to accept. After the death of my father, I have understood that life is not easy ... I am happy with my situation. I cannot go and break a bank because I need money.” Djonfack added that he was disturbed because his activity was stagnant and he needed to survive. He said “What will I do? I have not yet undertaken a solution.” Nineteen years old Kamdem did not diversify his activity to make money and did not often have enough money to live on, he said “Whether money suffices or not I am already used to it, if I have my two hundred francs, it is enough for me.”

Mbengate on his part said “in my life when some problems confront me—I have the means to solve. I will solve and if I do not have the means I will stay because I am tired of begging.” Michou added that “I struggle with what I have” which still means he does not have any option and cannot expect more than he can afford. Therefore he put the little he had in maximum use. Without any other option, the 27 years old Northerner said “At certain month, I don’t have money. I just have to work. I can’t go and borrow money from people. At a given time I took 10 000 frs CFA and pay back 16 000 frs CFA from a brother.” However, Mokoro said “it just worries me and I have to borrow money from friends to meet-up.” Twenty-eight years old Romeo put it as such “What does not kill us make us stronger.” He is in a way valorizing poverty—since poverty cannot kill them it instead empowers them. He concluded by saying “I am mentally very strong—if I had not been psychologically strong, I would have fallen in the River Wouri.” He accepted his situation which was full of battles since his childhood and acknowledged that he was already used to it—some sort of overcoming it and is no longer afraid of it although his daily battle for survival was still a very tough one.

Another category of youths are very combative. They do not want to accept their situation. “I say to myself, I must do all to change my situation,” Herman added by saying “ I am a struggler—I can do all to survive.” He always had difficult periods in his life and had always tried to overcome them in one way or the other.” “I must work,” Doumbé confirmed “I have struggled as I could.” This means he did not give in to psychological torment; he went out there and worked as much as he could. He acknowledged that “When I am in need, I put all in the hands of God.” Mathew too confirmed that work alone was insufficient “I always struggle to resolve my problems. I always ask God and He always answers my prayers.” Ngantchieu too said “I try to multiply the sources of revenue to pray to God that He gives me His grace and that find a good job.”

Alain solved his psychological problems by trying to have more money and to have jobs elsewhere. They even revolted at their place of work to force their master pay their 4 months arrears. According to Bissai the 31 years Old Catholic secondary school teacher, he permanently made sacrifices; revisited his management skills by economizing in order to manage spontaneous problems. “I am farsighted,” he concluded in the same light. Nora ensured to pay her rent and on time. She informed her debtors before time that she may not pay them on time in order to avoid problem with them.

Equally 26 years old Thierry who was a teacher said that students disrespected him and he would feel useless in front of them and as a result decided to be very hard on them and not to smile with them. One of our respondents decided to ameliorate his social relation by often visiting his friends and relations in order to communicate with them. Others are struggling not to miss death celebration which they do not often attend because of lack of means.

Others manage their psychological problems by being violent Mathias put it as follows: “I do that because I think if I don’t react they may walk over me because



they always want me to fulfil their plan first and not mine. I will become angry and will speak rudely and maybe someone will come out from them and say that I should stop. Whenever I speak they will hah only at that moment and stop, realizing that I also have right somewhere. I have tried many ways not to be hard but they always try to provoke me. I have prayed God not to speak to them hardly but I have noticed that when I speak to them hard they cool down their temper.” How frustrating it is for these poor youths with limited resources, who are unable to take care of themselves and whose family members are also pressuring them for help. In order to make them understand their hardship, they tend to be hard on them.

Bernard is also trying to “reactivate” himself, hoping and searching because he believes in the adage which states that, “if you search without finding, you will find without searching.” He said he is not lazy and he has hope. In a way, one should keep on working hard for one will not go empty handed, one will end up finding something. What optimism!

Most of the female folks receive help from friends and family members. This indicates women’s dependence on others unlike their male counterparts who resign to their fate although they do not give up working.

### **3.5 Strategies to improve feeding habit**

One of the questions we asked our respondents is what they were doing to better feed themselves considering that they were poor and could not feed themselves appropriately. We still repeat some of them for clarity sake and to better perceive and analyse it. There are four categories of poor youths: those who try to vary their meals, those who make an effort to consume fruits, those who cannot determine their feeding habits because of lack of means and those who think they feed themselves very well.

Ngantchieu said “I try to vary meals—to consume fruits.” “I vary meals” Ngo Hiol confirmed “I balance my meals,” Pierre added. Romeo explained this further by saying “I try to vary my nutrition but it is not of the best quality since it is cheap in the market—it is the second class and not the first quality. For example good tomatoes cost more than cheap tomatoes but because of lack of means one is contented with the rotten ones.”

However, taking a variety of meals does not necessarily mean that one feeds very well because they may be of very bad quality as Romeo put it or the same class of food. Since the poor eat to fill their stomach, they mostly eat carbohydrates and hardly will they take protein and vitamin because they are expensive. Only 15% of the respondents said they vary their meals.

About 19% will take the substitute of meat and fish which are the source of protein. Nasser said “I buy cheap food like beans which replaces meat” A good number will take soya beans. Ouembe said he tried to ameliorate his feeding by consuming fruits. Alain confirmed this by saying “from time to time one buys fruits.” The 8% of respondents who take fruits buy them from the roadside for about 100 francs or so and as Alain put it, it was not consistent and heavy.

About 15% are very calculative in the number of meals they eat considering that they do not have enough resources and the next day meal is a mystery. As a result they have to make sacrifices in order not to stay hungry. This is neatly put by Calem by saying “I cannot go out of the house knowing that I am going to work, one juggles. If I eat a lot tomorrow what will I do. I eat on calculation much reflection before eating.” Their eating habit is determined by the amount of money they have worked that day. If it is good they eat vegetables too if it is not they go without and even spent days without eating. They do not have a fix eating calendar.

Nora said she eats one type of food for about two to 3 days. “I can’t use food for three days in one day. How can I buy pufpuf for 300 frs CFA whereas I can use the three hundred francs to buy three cups of rice to feed the whole family for the whole day?” The problem here is not trying to ameliorate one’s feeding habit but trying to avoid hunger. This category of respondents do not have enough to feed themselves with, even their daily meals are uncertain so they ensure that the little resources that they have are well-used in order to avoid hunger the next day.

Although Mathias is planning to better feed himself he considers other things more important, he said he can sacrifice feeding in order to buy a phone. Bissai said he sacrifices money or send money to the village so that they can buy him food there because they are natural and cheaper. Some make an effort to eat a good meal “I am happy with a good meal once a week.” Others care less of whatever thing they eat Mathew put it thus: “It is necessary to have money. If I eat banana nobody will disturb at the end of the month.” Those who are living in a family house do not know whether they feed themselves very well or not because they eat only what is eaten—what is available.

Mbengate said he did not feed himself very well because he did not eat what he liked. He ate what he saw or what he could afford with the little money he had. He was not making any plan to better feed himself because his system was already adapted to his type of food so it did not disturb him. Kamdem said he ate whatever pleased himself according to the amount of money he had. Therefore he was contented with his feeding habit. Those who said they fed very well said so according to their standard meaning that there is another standard which they cannot attain. Some sort of resignation to their situation. Serge thought he worked very hard to feed himself and Tcheugoua ate a heavy breakfast everyday at home and tried elsewhere during the day.

### **3.6 Strategies to possess durable goods**

Youth poverty is situational and not cultural because they also wish to integrate the main stream values of their society but they are constrained—They equally wish to live like others and are making efforts either by economizing money or are saving in the course of their daily struggles. We can put them in two categories those who are already making an effort and those who are dreaming about it.

As concerning owning a home about 34% are thinking of making an enormous sacrifice in the future to own a home that was why Oumbe called it a long term project because they did not have enough money to become a homeowner. They could not have them then because the little money they had was for their daily needs even if they bought them, they would have problems paying the bills. Nora further added that what was necessary at the moment was to feed herself, educate her children and she would only own a home if her life changed. She considered it a far-fetched project because she was making no effort.

So, those who are not working do not dream of owning neither a home nor any durable goods. Those who are living with their parents especially female youth do not have the project of renting but to either buy or build a house because they are at ease at their family house and nothing is pushing them to leave. After all they do not have enough resources to rent. Although they do not have any short term project to own a home, they neither do not have projects to buy some durable goods because their houses are small and they lack the resources. That is why Mathew said “It is enough for me on rentage like this.” He meant that the things that he had were sufficient for him so far as he continued renting. So what he had was sufficient for him not because he did not want to have more but because they cannot do otherwise.

The others are making desperate efforts to be homeowners and it is common to hear them say: “I am struggling as I can,” “I try to keep some money aside or to economize,” “I economize but it is not easy for I often lack to keep aside,” “I work in

order to economize,” “I work a lot and I try to save,” “I put them in future projects,” I am saving now to be a home owner. It needs a lot of money so I will take more time to have. I will have to; it is not always good to copy from others.” “Saving from time to time even when problems come and ravage all.” “What disturbs me the more is to have my own house. It is a real problem more than having other goods,” “we struggle to economize.”

The above are good testimonies of desperate youths who are making effort to be like others they see in the city of Douala—homeowners with homes full of durable goods. They also dream and as a result are working very hard to change their fate. Serge says “I am thinking of buying a land. I know that one day God will give me.” What a sign of hope. It is such a hope that forces them to work harder especially the Bamileke youths. Some are just let by the wind without any sense of direction. Some are saving money quite alright but building a house is a difficult task, that is, they do not have any precise idea of building a house. Tchuigoue said “I live with it like that.” The *like that* means a lack of precision although he is saving money. Only 3% of them have bought a house in a swampy area and certainly most of them also will end up buying houses in such areas because of lack of means to buy land in good areas. They have not constructed yet, however, they are saving money to do so.

## **4. Theoretical implication**

### **4.1 The individualistic approach**

It is true that the poor suffer from low-income because they are unable to provide for their needs but they are not unwilling to provide adequately for their own well-being as the individualist theory states. If the youth of Douala were lazy, they would not be working so hard to change their fate. This theory erroneously states that neither the society nor the social groups to which individuals belong are accountable, and therefore should not help the poor. This is wrong because the poor youths in the city of Douala are victims of circumstances. They did not choose to be born in the third generation of a polygamous family, nor poor monogamous families which failed to empower them socially and economically, nor in the region or harsh area where they were born.

They are not lazy as such: a good number of them are quite hard working to change their lot. They are very hard working and creative; that is the reason why they diversify their activities in the informal sector and take advantage of every least opportunity that comes their way to make some money for themselves. This theory also states that, by increasing public expenditures they take money away from investment in industry and thus hinder the production of wealth. This is not the case with Douala where public investment and job creation is very low. Most of this youth would not have suffered from chronic poverty if the government had invested in the productive sector that could help employ them. Therefore the individualistic theory is not an appropriate theory that can be used to explain youth poverty in the city of Douala. Youth poverty is more a characteristic of a social group: a family or a community and not a characteristic of individuals.

### **4.2 Symbolic interactionism**

The youth in the city of Douala go about their everyday activities interpreting the harsh world in which they live. Their symbolic environment mediates the physical environment so that they do not only experience a stimulus, but rather a definition of the situation. A definition of the situation is the interpretation or meaning

we give to our immediate circumstances. Berger states that a person finds out who he is as he learns what society is ([16], p. 78). According to Zenden facts do not have an inherent or uniform existence apart from the person who observes and assigns meanings to them. Real fact is the ways people define various situations. The youths of Douala form various identities in the course of struggling to survive.

First of all they acknowledge the fact that they live in a very difficult environment where the prizes of basic goods are very high and at the same time most of them are low-salary earners. More so, they are school drop outs, or have just halted their education in order to save some money that they are even unable to raise because their salary and the little profit they make from their petit businesses is used to satisfy their immediate needs. Their families have abandoned them to their fate because they are not the only children or because they are too poor to take care of their children. They therefore have formed various concepts about who they are, what sociologists call the self which emerges in the course of interacting with other people.

The concept they have of themselves is one of the strugglers who is fighting to break the iron bars of poverty which is independent of their will, because they did not choose their family nor the order of their birth, they are just victims. There is nobody neither from their family nor the society in which they live ready to reinforce their capital building. Instead they are being exploited by those who have the least opportunity to do so. Therefore they must have the stamina to look for a way to survive. They often say: "I am a struggler because I can do all to survive." They have difficulties in getting the required satisfaction however, they must live by creating other means the society may consider illegal. They deceive the vigilance of the gatekeepers those who restrict them from getting certain favours, in entering in certain neighbourhoods, etc.

The concept they have of themselves is that of helplessness in getting the mainstream values of their society. Just like any other person in their society they will also like to be homeowners and own durable goods but they do not have the means. They seem resigned to their fate as they see their fellow friends and countrymen of their generation possessing what to them is far-fetched "It is difficult, one juggles only to live. What will I do?" "I am happy with my situation and I live with it, what ought I have done, go and steal? I do not have choice. One cannot do things that other people do, one is obliged to accept." "What will I do, we know already that there is nothing," etc.

The third is that of uncertainty. Their future is very blur; there is no clarity of what will happen the next day. As a result they have to be cautious because if the worst comes to the worst, their poor parents nor the government will not be able to help them neither will they go to the tontines which exploit them by giving them loan on interest basis. "I cannot go out of the house knowing that I will work—one juggles. If I eat a lot tomorrow what will I do?"

Thus with low educational level they define themselves as underachievers because they think they do not have the necessary academic backing them to pursue higher studies. Ayissi said "For my level what type of job can I have where I no get book. My job is equivalent to my level, I don't expect more." Alain meets people who can help him have a better employment but he has is not even a *Probatoire* holder.

After struggling to live by managing the little resources that they have, they may alienate themselves from what obtains in the outer world. They are always spontaneously awkward when they come in contact with it. Some confuse breakfast and lunch because they are not used to it not because they do not want it but because they do not have the means to have one. They are so used to not taking breakfast so much so that it has lost its importance. To them the perception of a meal is different from that of the rich. All what they care for is to fill their stomach and not to take light meal for taking sake.

## 5. Conclusion

The poor youth of Douala do many precarious economic activities. When in financial difficulties, they walked out of their zone of expertise and do many other activities whether related to their field of specialization or not. So for them to survive, they must be very smart and tactful, flexible and creative in diversifying their businesses and other activities. When one business is not doing well, they can easily switch to another or do another activity. They do not wait to have a proper training in something before doing it. They are daring and very adaptive and some learn very fast on the spot because they have no choice. It is some sort of disorder but it saves its purpose. Men also diversify by empowering their wives to operate small businesses which increase the household income.

Survival for the poor is really an uphill task and a lot of risk-taking. They keep on juggling while hoping that 1 day they will make enough money in order not to take credit but it is often difficult because the amount they gain from their business is often very little as compared to the problems they have to solve: therefore they engage in long-linked borrowing.

Many things disturb them because they have limited resources to satisfy their needs. Their solution is that of total resignation to their fate although they take some actions to ameliorate their situations. The fact is that if they were more prosperous, they would solve their problems and as a consequence liberate themselves from psychological tortures.

Poor youth try to vary their meals, some make an effort to consume fruits while others cannot determine their feeding habits because of lack of means. Their eating habit is influenced by the amount of money they earn daily. If it is good they eat vegetables too if it is not they go without and even spent days without eating. They do not have a fix eating calendar. Those who said they feed very well said so according to their standard meaning that there is another standard which they cannot attain. Some sort of resignation to their situation.

In the course of struggling for survival, they form various identities of themselves: those of strugglers, helplessness, uncertainty, underachievers, alienated people, etc. Youth poverty is situational and not cultural because they also wish to integrate the main stream values of their society but they are constrained—they equally wish to live like others and are making efforts to save in the course of their daily struggles.

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# Mexican Migrant Smugglers and Foreign Terrorists

*Simón Pedro Izcara Palacios*

## Abstract

Human smuggling and terrorism are seen as two related activities because the first is a potential source of funding for the last and it could facilitate the clandestine transportation of terrorists. Accordingly, the White House has stated that terrorists are among those who illegally enter from the Mexican border. Engaging a qualitative methodology that included in-depth interviews conducted between 2011 and 2018 with 144 Mexican migrant smugglers, this chapter proceeds from the following research question: Have Mexican migrant smugglers and foreign terrorists built alliances in order for the latter to enter into the United States? This chapter concludes that Mexican migrant smugglers have not built alliances with foreign terrorists. However, while migrant smugglers involved in simple networks were more inclined to think that foreign terrorists could not be smuggled into the United States, migrant smugglers involved in complex networks were more inclined to think the opposite.

**Keywords:** terrorism, migrant smugglers, foreign terrorists, Mexico, US Southwestern border

## 1. Introduction

Migrant smuggling has increasingly been framed as associated with transnational terrorism [1, 2]. However, migrant smugglers and terrorists have opposite motivations and goals, and migrant smuggling and terrorism are different phenomena [2, 3]. Migrant smugglers are driven mainly by selfish motivations as they are seeking for a material gain. On the contrary, terrorists are ideologically driven. The latter aim to overhaul existing governance structures or influence public opinion through criminal acts [2, 4]. The involvement of violent non-state actors, including insurgent and terrorist groups, in drugs smuggling has been known for some time. Many scholars have pointed out that the narcotic trade facilitates terrorism [5–10]. On the contrary, there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the involvement of migrant smugglers in terrorist activities. In places where human smuggling represents a significant portion of organized criminal activity, a link with terrorism is suspected [11], but not proved. In some cases insurgent and terrorist groups have driven drug cartels out of the market to supplant them themselves [12]. However, nothing indicates that migrant smugglers have been supplanted neither by drug traffickers [13–16] nor terrorist groups [3].

US authorities have been concerned about a possible collusion between Mexican migrant smugglers and foreign terrorists from the mid-1950s [17]. The global threat

of terrorism was acknowledged in the 1981 Executive Order 12333 [18], and in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, these concerns were further accentuated [18, 19]. The thinking was that foreign terrorists seeking US entry through the Southwestern border would require the highly specialized Mexican smugglers who uniquely understood how to navigate the complexities of clandestine travel. In an effort to reduce the threat of terrorist infiltration at the US Southwest border, the US Government has focused its attention on international smuggling networks transporting special interest or other than Mexican aliens [7]. On December 16, 2002, President Bush signed the National Security Directive 22, the connection between migrant smuggling and terrorism being made explicit. Two years later, the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center was established in order to facilitate the exchange of information to support the investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers, and in 2005, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act developed an interagency task force to study the interrelationship between human trafficking and terrorism, including the use of profits from the former to finance the latter [3, 12, 20].

The United States has been insulated from international terrorism since 9/11, and no migrant has committed an attack on US soil, to date [21]. Accordingly, some studies suggest that more migration into a country is associated with a lower level of terrorist attacks [22]. However, migration control for the control of terrorism is a widely used instrument in the United States. The threat of terrorism provided a pretext for a rigorous application of entry restrictions and deportations, the enforcement of stricter migration controls being legitimized [23]. As Slack et al. have pointed out: “the mission statement for CBP does not mention immigration at all, but rather focuses explicitly on terrorism” [24]. Departing from the argument that several terrorist attacks in the western part of continental Europe were perpetrated by immigrants who were smuggled and camouflaged among millions of asylum seekers, every migrant or refugee has become a potential terrorist [4, 25]. If foreign-based terrorists were successful in using migrant smuggling networks to reach European targets, which also could reach the US Southwestern border in the same manner. On the other hand, the migrant smuggling industry is seen as a potential source of income for terrorist groups [1]. Consequently, building a wall along the southern border in order to keep the country safe from terrorists and illegal immigrants was a key promise of Trump’s presidential campaign. This promise has been repeated with conviction and consistency. On January 25, 2017, just 8 days since taking office, President Trump signed an executive order defining illegal immigration as a “clear and present danger to the interests of the United States.” Two days later, on January 27, a new executive order “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals” was issued, the entry of nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen being suspended [25]. Accordingly, in order to prevent human smuggling and acts of terrorism, the construction of a contiguous physical wall between Mexico and the United States was ordered.

This chapter is underpinned in the following research question: Have Mexican migrant smugglers and foreign terrorists built alliances in order for the latter to enter into the United States? On the other hand, this research centers on the hypothesis that Mexican migrant smugglers involved in simple networks do not help foreign terrorists to enter the US soil as they carry only labor migrants from their hometown or region; on the contrary, those smugglers involved in complex networks could inadvertently help terrorists to cross the border as they do not know their clientele.

This chapter, based on interviews with 144 Mexican migrant smugglers, examines if Mexican migrant smugglers have built alliances with foreign terrorists. The paper proceeds as follows: I first provide a description of the methodology. Next,



the characteristics of simple networks and complex networks are analyzed. Finally, I go on to examine the opinions of migrant smugglers involved in simple and complex networks about the possibility of foreign terrorists being crossed through the US Southwestern border with the help of Mexican migrant smugglers.

## 2. Methodology

This research is based on a qualitative methodology. Qualitative interviews were conducted with a guide, all interviews being recorded and transcribed literally. On the other hand, contact with interviewees was made via social networks and snowballing in different Mexican states.

Fieldwork was conducted between 2011 and 2018, and 144 migrant smugglers ranging from 21 to 48 years were interviewed. All had considerable experience in the business of human smuggling. They started working as migrant smugglers between the ages of 16 and 45 years and are dedicated to this activity for 9.5 years on average. Respondents had 0–17 years of schooling, and the age at which they started working ranges from 5 to 23 years (see **Table 1**).

More than two-thirds of the interviewees were born in Tamaulipas, a Mexican state located in the northeast of the country. However, interviewees originated from almost half of Mexico's states. Only one of the interviewees was not born in Mexico (see **Table 2**).

	Average	Mode	Median	Min	Max	Standard deviation
Age	36.8	35	37	21	48	5.2
Years of schooling	5.7	6	6	0	17	3.5
Age when started working	10.1	10	10	5	23	3.33
Age when started working as migrant smugglers	27.2	29	28	16	45	5.1
Number of years involved in human smuggling	9.5	7	9	3	21	4.0

Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews. *n* = 144.

**Table 1.**  
 Characteristics of the interviewees.

	n	%		n	%
Tamaulipas	60	41.7	Tabasco	3	2.1
Veracruz	15	10.4	State of Mexico	2	1.4
Mexico City	13	9.0	Guanajuato	2	1.4
Nuevo León	13	9.0	Oaxaca	2	1.4
San Luis Potosí	12	8.3	Sonora	2	1.4
Chiapas	10	6.9	Chihuahua	1	0.7
Puebla	4	2.8	Guerrero	1	0.7
Coahuila	3	2.1	California (United States)	1	0.7

Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews. *n* = 144.

**Table 2.**  
 Place of origin of migrant smugglers interviewed.

Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Tamaulipas University research group on “Migration, development and human rights” [26]. Informed oral consent was obtained from the respondents, and participants were provided with verbal information about the study purpose in simple language. Interviewees were informed about the voluntary nature of their participation in the study and were told that the information they shared was confidential. Participants were assured that individual names would not be collected or used in any study findings.

### **3. Simple networks and complex networks**

Mexican migrant smuggling networks can be divided by their degree of complexity. Those networks composed of one cell led by a migrant smuggler can be defined as simple, while those consisting of one or more lines, with two or more cells per line, can be defined as complex [27–29]. A cell is a structure led by a migrant smuggler supported by a small number of assistants, who transport migrants from the point A to the point B. A line is the group of actors involved in the transportation of a group of migrants from the point A in the country of origin to the point B in the country of destination. In simple networks a unique cell transports migrants from the point of origin to the point of destination. In complex networks usually a line is composed of several cells. Simple networks are composed only of a line, while complex networks usually involve several lines.

Simple networks are composed of one cell led by a migrant smuggler, with the support of a small number of assistants. Migrant smugglers involved in simple networks are autonomous entrepreneurs who lead the network. Some of them satisfy the labor demand of US employers and receive an economic compensation from them; others tend to work primarily for migrant social networks.

Complex networks are composed of one or more lines; each line has several cells, and each cell appears to be led by a migrant smuggler who has the support of several assistants. Migrant smugglers involved in complex networks are salaried workers. They lead the cell but not the network they are involved in. The one who leads the network is a person that the smugglers call “patron.” Smugglers receive orders from the “patron” who manages the network and receive a salary that is paid by their patron [30].

### **4. Migrant smugglers in simple networks**

Migrant smugglers involved in simple networks answered to the question if foreign terrorists could be smuggled into the United States by using the services provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks, by using two lines of argumentation to describe the possible links between smugglers and foreign terrorists:

- Less than half (46.2%) of the respondents thought that terrorists could enter the United States by using established human smuggling networks.
- More than half (53.8%) of the respondents did not believe that terrorists could be smuggled into the United States by using Mexican migrant smuggling networks (see **Table 3**).

Migrant smugglers involved in simple networks tend to believe that foreign terrorists cannot be smuggled into the United States by using the services provided

Argument		n	%
Terrorists could enter the United States by using established migrant smuggling networks	If illegal immigrants can cross the border also can terrorists.	28	35
	If weapons and drugs are smuggled into the United States, also terrorists can be smuggled.	2	2.5
	Migrant smugglers are unaware of the intentions of their clients.	5	6.2
	Terrorists can enter the United States because of corruption.	2	2.5
	Total	37	46.2
Terrorists could not be smuggled into the United States by using Mexican migrant smuggling networks	They had never witnessed the crossing of terrorists.	24	30
	They did not have an extensive knowledge of the border.	12	15
	The US Government blames Mexico for all of their problems.	2	2.5
	Terrorists cannot cross through territories controlled by the drug cartels.	1	1.3
	Terrorists can enter the United States through its airports.	3	3.7
	Terrorists can cross through the customs situated at the southwestern border.	1	1.3
	Total	43	53.8
Total		80	100

Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interviews.

**Table 3.**  
*Arguments expressed by migrant smugglers involved in simple networks.*

by Mexican migrant smuggling networks. Almost one-third (30%) answered that they never witnessed the crossing of terrorist. Interviewees pointed out that they had witnessed how labor migrants from many different countries had crossed the US Southwestern border. Some of them also pointed out that drugs were being smuggled through the border day in and day out, during day and night times. However, during the many years they had been working as migrant smugglers, they never witnessed Arab terrorists being smuggled to the United States. This was reflected in expressions such as: “I haven’t seen Arabs; I have only seen Mexicans and Central Americans” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2011); “I haven’t seen any Arabs; I’ve seen Cubans, Central Americans, people from Brazil or Belize; but I haven’t seen any Arabs” (migrant smuggler from Puebla interviewed in 2012); “Here I didn’t see that. I’ve seen many immigrants crossing the border; but they are Mexicans or they come from Central America” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2014); or “Terrorists don’t cross, the only thing crossing are drugs, always, every day, and at every hour of the day” (migrant smuggler from Coahuila interviewed in 2015). On the other hand, less than one-sixth (15%) indicated that they thought terrorist were not crossing through the Mexico-US border; but, they pointed out that they did not have an extensive knowledge of the border. Therefore, they indicated that their opinion was not very relevant.

## 5. Migrant smugglers in complex networks

Migrant smugglers involved in complex networks answered to the question if foreign terrorists could be smuggled into the United States by using the services provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks, by using two lines of argumentation to describe the possible links between smugglers and foreign terrorists:

- More than half (56.3%) of the respondents thought that terrorists could enter the United States by using established human smuggling networks.
- Less than half (43.7%) of the respondents did not believe that terrorists could be smuggled into the United States by using Mexican migrant smuggling networks (**Table 4**).

Migrant smugglers involved in complex networks tend to believe that foreign terrorists can be smuggled into the United States by using the services provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks. More than one-third (37.5%) thought that if illegal immigrants could cross the border also could terrorists. Interviewees pointed out that they were helping anybody to cross the US Southwestern border who paid a fee. Respondents had helped people from many different countries to cross the border. Therefore, they could not know if some of these people were terrorists or not. Respondents had the impression that the US Southwestern border was not an orderly inspected place; on the contrary, they used to think that the border was a place poorly protected where migrants, drugs, and so on were crossing over at every moment [30]. The expression “so many things happen at the border” were repeated

Argument		n	%
Terrorists could enter the United States by using established migrant smuggling networks	If illegal immigrants can cross the border also can terrorists.	24	37.5
	If weapons and drugs are smuggled into the United States, also terrorists can be smuggled.	5	7.8
	Migrant smugglers are unaware of the intentions of their clients.	6	9.4
	Terrorists can enter the United States because of corruption.	1	1.6
	Total	36	56.3
Terrorists could not be smuggled into the United States by using Mexican migrant smuggling networks	They had never witnessed the crossing of terrorists.	8	12.5
	They did not have an extensive knowledge of the border.	4	6.2
	The US Government blames Mexico for all of their problems.	1	1.6
	Terrorists can't cross through territories controlled by the drug cartels.	4	6.2
	Terrorists can enter the United States through its airports.	9	14.1
	Terrorists can cross through the customs situated at the southwestern border.	2	3.1
	Total	28	43.7
Total		64	100

Source: Compiled by the authors from data recorded in the interviews.

**Table 4.**  
*Arguments expressed by migrant smugglers involved in complex networks.*

by many interviewees indicating that anything could occur at the border. This was reflected in expressions such as: “It could be possible, because many things happen from here to there, from there to here also happen” (migrant smuggler from Mexico City interviewed in 2012); “Probably they could cross; many people are going to the north, people that we don’t know, they are not from here, they are not Central Americans” (migrant smuggler from Veracruz interviewed in 2013); “It could happen; so many illegals cross through Mexico that sometimes you don’t know where they are coming from” (migrant smuggler from Sonora interviewed in 2014); “So many things happen at the border, that terrorist could cross the frontier and nobody would notice” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2014); “There is so much smuggling that everything can be true. It could be possible that Mexico is used by terrorists to cross to the United States” (migrant smuggler from Coahuila interviewed in 2015); “I think that it is possible because Mexico is the US entrance; from Mexico many things cross: drugs, illegals and more” (migrant smuggler from Mexico City interviewed in 2018); or “It is possible that they could cross; it is said that there is so much vigilance, it is not true. I didn’t see them, but there is so much free passage to the US” (migrant smuggler from Tamaulipas interviewed in 2018). Moreover, almost 1 in 10 (7.8%) thought that if weapons and drugs were smuggled into the United States, also terrorists could be smuggled (**Table 4**).

## **6. Conclusion**

Migrant smugglers interviewed had never witnessed terrorists to cross the border by using the services provided by Mexican migrant smuggling networks. However, there was a difference between the answers responded by migrant smugglers involved in simple networks and those involved in complex networks. The former were more inclined to express arguments denying the existence of connections between foreign terrorists and Mexican migrant smugglers, while the latter were more predisposed to think that foreign terrorist could enter the United States by using the same channels employed by migrant smugglers to smuggle labor migrants or by drug traffickers to smuggle weapons or drugs. We conclude that migrant smugglers involved in simple networks are more inclined to think that foreign terrorist cannot be smuggled to the United States because they come from the same hometown or region of their clientele and gained their knowledge of entering the United States illegally from their own experiences as migrants. Therefore, they personally know that their customers are not terrorists. On the contrary, migrant smugglers involved in complex networks do not come from the same hometown or region of their clientele. Their customers come from different countries; and they do not know personally any of them. Therefore, they could not be completely sure if any of them was a terrorist.

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## **Conflict of interest**

The author declares no conflict of interest.

## Appendices

## Appendix 1: Information about the interviewees

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument		
					Years	Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ year crossing	Age	Women			>50	<12
1	39	7	Tamaulipas	Virginia	4	2007	2	13/18	25-45	No	No	No	Simple	1.3
2	38	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	11	2000	1	10/15	20-50	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	1.3
3	45	5	Tamaulipas	Idaho	21	1990	0/1	8/10	16-40	No	No	No	Simple	1.1
4	35	1	Tamaulipas	Texas	6	2005	2/3	6/12	20-35	No	No	No	Simple	1.2
5	39	6	Veracruz	Florida	10	2001	2	20/25	20-40	No	No	No	Simple	2.4
6	40	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	11	2000	6	13	16-30	Yes	No	No	Complex	3.1
7	44	9	Chiapas	Virginia	4	2007	6	8/12	10-45	Yes	No	Yes	Complex	2.2
8	33	6	Tamaulipas	North Carolina	7	2004	2/3	12/18	20-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.1
9	46	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	5	2006	4/6	10/20	16-40	No	No	No	Simple	2.2
10	39	4	Tamaulipas	North Carolina	8	2003	2	10/15		Yes	No	No	Simple	1.1
11	45	6	Mexico City	Oregon	5	2006	2	15/20	15-35	No	No	No	Simple	1.1
12	43	9	Tamaulipas	Texas, Canada	14	1997	1	9/20	12-55	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simple	2.1
13	40	6	Nuevo León	Texas, California	5	2006	2	10/20		Yes	Yes	Yes	Simple	3.1
14	28	12	Nuevo León	Arizona	4	2007	12	6/10	16-35	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.2
15	21	9	Tamaulipas	South Carolina	4	2007	1	8/10	15-40	No	No	No	Simple	2.2
16	37	6	San Luis Potosí	California	16	1995	1	5/15	20-50	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
17	39	6	San Luis Potosí	Colorado	5	2006	1	10/15	18-50	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
18	37	6	San Luis Potosí	Texas	7	2004	2	17/20	15-55	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	2.1

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument		
					Years Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ crossing	Age	Women	>50			<12	
19	30	6	San Luis Potosí	Arizona	6	2005	1	15/25	18-30	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.1
20	25	9	Nuevo León	Texas	5	2006	12	7/12	1-60	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simple	2.1
21	39	0	Chiapas	Alabama	10	2001	2	8/15	12-60	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simple	2.1
22	30	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	4	2007	1	10/15	15-40	No	No	No	Simple	1.1
23	29	6	Tamaulipas	South Carolina	6	2005	1	10/20	16-50	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
24	45	9	San Luis Potosí	Florida	11	2000	1	7/15	13-50	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
25	32	6	Tamaulipas	North Carolina	8	2003	1	10/20	20-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.1
26	40	4	Tamaulipas	Texas	16	1995	1	7/9	14-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	3.2
27	36	9	Chiapas	Texas	5	2006	3/5	3/20	> 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Complex	3.2
28	38	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	7	2004	12	10/40		Yes	Yes	Yes	Complex	2.3
29	35	6	Nuevo León	Texas	6	2006	8/10	6	20-40	No	No	No	Complex	2.3
30	41	6	Coahuila	Texas	7	2005	1	10/15	10-40	Yes	No	Yes	Simple	1.1
31	25	9	Nuevo León	Texas	6	2006	4	7/9	20-40	No	No	No	Simple	2.3
32	45	4	Tamaulipas	Texas	17	1995	2	10	20-50	No	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
33	41	8	Tamaulipas	Texas	11	2001	1	20/25	15-40	No	No	No	Simple	2.1
34	33	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	10	2002	2	7/15	20-35	No	No	No	Simple	1.1
35	39	6	Nuevo León	Texas	12	2000	1	8/15	20-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.3
36	45	4	San Luis Potosí	Oklahoma	20	1992	1	7/15	15-35	No	No	No	Simple	2.3
37	37	6	Nuevo León	Texas	11	2001	2	4/8	18-50	No	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
38	35	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	15	1997	1/2	5/10	20-40	No	No	No	Simple	2.1
39	41	9	Tamaulipas	Louisiana	11	2001	1	4/12	18-35	No	No	No	Simple	2.1

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument	
					Years Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ crossing	Age	Women	>50			<12
40	48	9	Tamaulipas	Florida	14	1998	1	7/10	15-50	Yes	No	Simple	1.1
41	35	6	Tamaulipas	Louisiana	11	2001	1/2	4/10	20-40	No	No	Simple	2.1
42	30	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	4	2008	1	4/9	20-35	No	No	Simple	2.1
43	32	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	12	2000	1/2	5/9	35-40	No	No	Simple	1.1
44	35	9	Nuevo León	Texas	7	2005	6/12	5/15	18-40	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
45	40	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	12	2000	7/11	5/15	20-30	Yes	No	Simple	1.1
46	40	9	Tamaulipas	Virginia	17	1995	2	8/15	15-50	Yes	No	Simple	1.2
47	37	5	Tamaulipas	Florida	10	2002	2	6/10	15-40	Yes	No	Simple	1.2
48	45	9	Tamaulipas	Louisiana	12	2000	3	10/20	15-35	Yes	No	Simple	1.1
49	39	2	Tamaulipas	Louisiana	10	2002		10/20	18-40	Yes	Yes	Simple	2.1
50	28	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	8	2004	12/15	10/15	15-35	Yes	No	Complex	1.1
51	41	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	10	2002	2	7/10	15-45	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
52	38	9	Tamaulipas	Florida	8	2004	3	10	13-35	Yes	No	Simple	1.2
53	36	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	6	2006	6		16-40	No	No	Simple	2.1
54	30	12	Tamaulipas	Illinois	5	2007	6	7/10	20-35	Yes	Yes	Simple	2.1
55	40	4	Tamaulipas	Virginia	10	2002	2	7/10	18-40	Yes	No	Simple	1.1
56	43	8	Tamaulipas	Texas	15	1997	2	10/20		Yes	Yes	Simple	1.1
57	39	6	Mexico City	Florida	10	2002		25	20-40	No	No	Simple	2.1
58	35	3	Tamaulipas	Arizona	10	2002	3	7/15	20-40	No	No	Simple	2.3
59	45	6	Tamaulipas	North Carolina	9	2003	3/4	12/30	20-50	No	Yes	Simple	1.1
60	40	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	8	2004	2	7/10	15-35	No	No	Simple	2.1



Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument		
					Years	Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ crossing	Age	Women			>50	<12
61	34	6	Guanajuato	Texas, North Carolina, Virginia	8	2004	9/15	15/20	15-60	Yes	Yes	No	Complex	1.4
62	45	6	Tamaulipas	Texas	10	2002	1/2	8/30	13-50	Yes	Yes	No	Simple	1.1
63	36	9	Mexico City	Texas, New Mexico, New Orleans, Florida, Virginia, California	4	2008	12/15	15/20		Yes	Yes	Yes	Complex	2.1
64	37	6	Mexico City	Texas	5	2007	24	20/25	16-40	Yes	No	Yes	Complex	2.1
65	35	5	Mexico City	Texas	15	1997	12/24	5/10	5-40	Yes	No	Yes	Complex	3.1
66	32	0	Puebla	California	7	2005	12	8	13-45	Yes	No	No	Complex	1.1
67	40	9	Mexico city	Texas	12	2000	9/12	7/20	15-40	Yes	Yes	No	Complex	1.1
68	38	6	San Luis Potosí	Texas	9	2003	3	7/15	15-30	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.1
69	36	6	San Luis Potosí	Illinois	11	2001	4	7/20	15-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.2
70	42	9	Tamaulipas	Texas	9	2003	2	7	18-25	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.2
71	32	9	Veracruz	Texas	6	2002	12/24	15/20	14-40	Yes	No	No	Complex	1.2
72	35	3	Puebla	Texas	7	2005	4	10	15-30	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.1
73	41	12	San Luis Potosí	Texas	6	2006	12	11	3-40	Yes	Yes	Yes	Complex	2.1
74	37	3	Tamaulipas	Texas	8	2004	2	7	17-30	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.2
75	36	3	San Luis Potosí	Texas	9	2004	4	7/10	15-30	only	No	No	Complex	2.1
76	40	3	Coatzacoalcos Veracruz	Texas, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina	16	1997	6	10/12	13-50	Yes	Yes	No	Complex	3.1
77	35	4	Mexico City	Texas	16	1997	24/36	5/8	13-35	Yes	No	No	Complex	1.1
78	37	6	Mexico City	Florida	8	2005	6/24	6/10	15-30	Yes	No	No	Complex	3.1
79	32	0	Mexico City	Texas	9	2004	3/4	6/8	17-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	3.1

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument		
					Years Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ crossing	Age	Women	>50			<12	
80	28	6	State of Mexico	California	10	2003	3/4	10	20-27	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
81	23	6	Mexico City	Texas	7	2006	6	9/15	18-30	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
82	35	0	Mexico City	Texas	8	2005	6/12	8/10	20-40	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
83	40	9	Mexico City	Texas	16	1997	3/4	15/20	15-40	No	No	No	Complex	1.2
84	36	0	Tamaulipas	Oklahoma	9	2004	4	10	18-35	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.2
85	38	0	Chiapas	Texas	8	2005	3/4	10	15-30	No	No	No	Simple	3.1
86	27	6	Veracruz	Texas	7	2006	3/6	10	18-40	No	No	No	Complex	2.1
87	42	6	Chiapas	Oregon	20	1993	6	8/12	21-35	No	No	No	Complex	2.1
88	37	6	Chiapas	Texas, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Florida	15	1998	4/6	12	20-40	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.3
89	30	0	Chiapas	California	7	2006	4	12/15	20-25	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
90	32	9	Chihuahua	Texas, New Mexico, California	10	1997	4/12	12	18-25	Yes	No	No	Complex	3.1
91	35	0	Chiapas	Virginia	7	2006	6/12	15	20-40	No	No	No	Complex	1.2
92	31	0	Veracruz	Texas	11	2002	4/6	15/20	15-35	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.1
93	37	4	Veracruz	Texas	7	2006	4/12	10	20-40	Yes	Yes	No	Complex	2.1
94	40	0	Tamaulipas	Texas	12	2001	4	13/15	16-30	Yes	Yes	No	Complex	2.1
95	25	0	Veracruz	Texas, Florida	6	2007	6	8/10	< 40	No	No	No	Complex	2.2
96	38	0	Guerrero	Texas	9	2004	12	8/10	14-35	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
97	36	6	Veracruz	Texas	13	2000	5	10/12	20-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.1
98	41	4	Veracruz	California	8	2005	6	10	18-35	Yes	No	No	Complex	3.1
99	33	0	Veracruz	Arizona	12	2001	9/12	20/25		Yes	No	Yes	Complex	3.2

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument	
					Years	Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ crossing	Age	Women			>50
100	25	0	Puebla	Texas	7	2006	4	10/11	10-40	Yes	Yes	Complex	2.1
101	35	9	Veracruz	Texas	15	1998	4/6	15	16-25	Yes	No	Complex	2.2
102	42	6	Veracruz	Texas, California, Louisiana	9	2004	6	15	18-32	Yes	No	Complex	1.2
103	42	6	San Luis Potosí	Louisiana	9	2004	6/12	10	16-40	Yes	No	Simple	2.1
104	28	8	Tamaulipas	Texas	5	2008	8/10	7/8	16-25	Yes	No	Complex	2.1
105	35	0	Puebla	Texas	13	2000	8/10	8/10		Yes	Yes	Simple	1.1
106	29	6	Nuevo León	Florida	4	2009	12	8/12		Yes	No	Complex	3.1
107	36	5	Tamaulipas	Missouri	7	2006	6/7	15	16-35	Yes	No	Complex	1.1
108	39	0	Tamaulipas	Texas	11	2002	8/12	10/15	20-40	Yes	No	Simple	1.2
109	37	0	Tamaulipas	Texas	6	2007	12	10/15	16-35	Yes	No	Complex	1.3
110	37	17	Tamaulipas	Oklahoma	7	2006	4	13	20-40	No	No	Simple	1.2
111	40	9	Tamaulipas	Iowa	5	2009	3	12	17-35	No	No	Simple	1.1
112	34	2	Tamaulipas	Texas	4	2010	2	72	20-35	No	No	Simple	1.1
113	39	5	Tamaulipas	Texas	10	2004	2	9/10		No	No	Simple	1.4
114	45	5	Tabasco	Texas	17	1987	4	10	16-25	Yes	No	Complex	2.1
115	39	9	State of Mexico	California	8	2006	2	8/10	15-27	Yes	No	Simple	2.4
116	32	6	Sonora	Texas, Florida, California, New York, Louisiana, Colorado	12	1995	6/12	7	14-20	Yes	No	Complex	2.1
117	45	0	Veracruz	Texas	15	1999	4/5	10/12	15-25	Yes	No	Complex	2.4
118	38	6	Chiapas	California	17	1997	4/5	5/7	16-23	Yes	No	Complex	2.1
119	35	0	Veracruz	Texas	6	2008	4/6	10/12	14-20	Yes	No	Complex	2.1

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler			Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument		
					Years Initiation	Crossings/ year	People/ crossing	Age	Women	>50			<12	
120	39	5	Tamaulipas	South Carolina	6	2008	1	8/10	13-20	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.2
121	30	12	Tamaulipas	Texas	5	2009	1	10	14-22	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
122	35	0	Tamaulipas	Texas	10	2004	2	8/12	16-20	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.1
123	41	3	San Luis Potosí	Missouri	9	2005	2	12	16-22	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.1
124	36	0	Tamaulipas	Texas	12	1991	2/3	8/10	15-20	Yes	No	No	Complex	1.4
125	40	9	Coahuila	Texas	20	1995	3	12/15		Yes	No	Yes	Simple	1.1
126	42	6	Sonora	Arizona, Canada	18	1997	2	10	17-35	No	No	No	Complex	1.1
127	33	4	Nuevo León	Texas, Canada	8	2007	3	10	16-24	Yes	No	No	Complex	1.4
128	42	0	Chiapas	Texas	15	2000	2	10	16-30	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.2
129	39	8	Tabasco	California	16	1999	3/5	8/12	15-45	Yes	No	No	Complex	3.1
130	35	6	Tamaulipas	South Carolina	8	2007	2/3	14/20	16-30	No	No	No	Complex	1.1
131	36	8	Coahuila	Texas	5	2010	3	15/20	15-22	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.1
132	41	0	Oaxaca	Florida	15	2000	4	12/15	15-20	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.1
133	38	9	Nuevo León	Texas	5	2010	3	10	< 20	Yes	No	Yes	Complex	2.1
134	35	9	Guanajuato	Texas	8	2008	2/3	12/15	14-35	Yes	No	Yes	Complex	1.4
135	43	4	Tamaulipas	Texas	9	2007	2	15	17-30	Yes	No	No	Simple	2.3
136	42	6	Veracruz	Texas	10	2006	3/4	8/10	14-40	Yes	No	No	Simple	1.2
137	38	9	Tabasco	Texas	6	2010	3	10	16-24	No	No	No	Simple	1.1
138	39	0	Tamaulipas	Texas	12	2005	2	8	17-25	No	No	No	Complex	2.3
139	36	6	Oaxaca	Texas, Georgia	7	2010	2/3	10/11	16-40	Yes	No	No	Complex	1.1
140	40	12	Nuevo León	Texas	12	2005	2/3	10/13	16-30	Yes	No	No	Complex	2.3

Case	Age	Education	Origin	Destination	Experience as human smuggler		Profile of migrants			Type of network	Argument		
					Years Initiation	Crossings/year	People/crossing	Age	Women			>50	<12
141	39	6	California	California	9	2008	3/4	10/13	14-30	Yes	No	Complex	2.3
142	24	9	Nuevo Leon	Texas	3	2015	2	10	< 20	Yes	No	Complex	3.1
143	40	6	Mexico City	Texas	11	2007	¾	8/10	16-25	No	No	Complex	2.1
144	32	16	Tamaulipas	Texas	8	2010	3	8/10	16-25	No	No	Complex	2.1

Source: Compiled by the author from data recorded in the interview.  
 Education: Years of education of the interviewee.  
 Origin: Place where the interviewee originates from.  
 Destination: Place in the United States where the migrants are transported by human smuggling networks.  
 Experience as a migrant smuggler: Years: years of experience as a human smuggler.  
 Initiation: Year when interviewees began to work as human smugglers; Crossings/year: Number of times that the interviewee crosses the border each year; People/crossing: Number of migrants transported at every crossing.  
 Profile of migrants: Age: age of the migrants transported by the interviewee; Women: Transport women; > 50: Transport people 50 years old and older; < 12: Transport children of less than 12 years old.  
 Argument:

- 1.1. They had never witnessed the crossing of terrorists.
- 1.2. They didn't have an extensive knowledge of the border.
- 1.3. The US Government blames Mexico for all of their problems.
- 1.4. Terrorists can't cross through territories controlled by the drug cartels.
- 2.1. If illegal immigrants can pass also can terrorists.
- 2.2. If weapons and drugs are smuggled also terrorists can be smuggled.
- 2.3. Human smugglers are unaware of the intentions of their clients.
- 2.4. Terrorists can enter the United States because of corruption.
- 3.1. Terrorists cross by airports.
- 3.2. Terrorists pass through the border customs.


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Bioterrorism is terrorism involving the intentional dissemination of biological agents. As in biological warfare, bioterrorism agents can be viruses, fungi, bacteria, toxins, insects or any other number of naturally occurring or synthetic agents. Therefore, it can be difficult for clinicians to discriminate between an act of terrorism and a naturally occurring outbreak. Written by distinguished researchers in the field, this book examines the effects of bioterrorism and terrorism on the socioeconomic sustainability of different countries around the globe.

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