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Elections
A Global Perspective

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Preface

Among the most prized and revered democratic institutions are elections, and few other actions typify what it means to participate in the democratic process in the same way that turning up, casting a ballot, and then having that ballot be part of determining who will control power has. Elections are at the center of what we view as democracy and much ink has been spilled in attempting to explain just how essential the electoral action is to democracy.

In fact, scholarship about political regimes has long focused on their classification into simple categories: authoritarian, monarchical, democratic, etc. Designations that in large part rely directly on how, when, and if they hold meaningful electoral competitions for determining who will govern.

Among those who study democratic institutions that utilize a common definition, with near infinite variation of particulars, to simply classify a political system as being democratic or non-democratic. Their definitions are generally distillable too; does the nation hold regular elections? The very notion of regular elections provides common ground for discussing what is and what is not a democratic system.

Given the relative importance of elections to our wider understanding of democracy and its role in the world it is not surprising that explorations of elections particularly in the developed world abound and have explored both the impact of the electoral system and its institutions and the role of the individual voter in that system.

At the systemic level, the rules of the game matter greatly and the outcomes of elections are heavily influenced by how the rules are constructed, who is allowed to compete, what the field of competition looks like, and ultimately how who wins is decided.

My own background is heavily tilted toward US politics and public policy. The unique nature of the rules of the electoral game in the United States has greatly influenced its electoral outcomes, often to the chagrin of those who study elections and democracy. The US system with its levels of electoral control and competition creates a complicated landscape for those who wish to understand how elections are conducted and what influences them. The wide and deep literature on this subject illustrates that the differences between local, state, national, and ultimately presidential elections are substantial, driven by a variety of causes, and lead to unique outcomes.

In the United States, local elections are distinguished by low voter turnout, high voter information, and little partisan conflict. State and national elections have higher voter turnout and low voter information but also introduce the unique role of party into the electoral dynamic. The first-past-the-post system coupled with single-member districts both at the state and federal levels has led only two parties to emerge as substantial political forces that compete for legislative majorities in state legislatures and the US Congress.

The impacts of this reality alone shape who is likely to run for and have a serious chance at winning the election. This system, which rewards party loyalty over a lifetime, leads to only the most committed ideologues serving in elected office and that devotion to ideology has a substantial impact on the policy decisions that are implemented.

Even among what is one of the more advanced democratic systems, the electoral system itself plays a substantive and often determinant role in electoral outcomes. The importance of this impact of the electoral system is readily apparent as many of the chapters included in this edited volume indicate.

Like the influence of electoral systems, the role and impact of the individual voter and other players within the electoral system similarly have substantial and important impacts. Again, I draw from my own experience with the US system to provide an example of the potential that the participants in the electoral system are likely to have on the electoral outcomes.

Among the most studied aspects of the US electoral system is the role of low information voters on electoral outcomes. Low information voters typify many advanced democratic systems and are voters who, despite having little substantive knowledge about the candidates, issues, or policy positions advanced by those competing in the election, still vote. These voters have been shown to be influenced heavily by partisan affiliations, advertising by candidates, the physical appearance of candidates, and a variety of other considerations that have little to do with the qualifications of the individual candidate for elected office, or the policies would implement.

These low information voters often rely on a single piece of information, for example party identification or a particular advertisement, to make their electoral choice. For many low information voters their vote choice changes when additional information about the actual positions of the candidate are made clear. However, getting voters to engage with this information is difficult and borders on impossible in most US elections; voters simply don't know and generally don't care.

Together these two short examples provide a taste of what follows in this volume as authors from around the world attempt to explore both the impact of the electoral system of a variety of nations and the role of the individual voter in those systems.

It would be difficult to underestimate the impact that elections can have on the individuals who their decisions govern; indeed, to paraphrase what has become a recent truism in US politics, elections have consequences. Most often those consequences are felt not by the political class but by the governed.

Collectively, this and other work on elections serves an important purpose in better enlightening how elections work, don't work, and often are not what we expect at first glance. Our hope is that those who explore the chapters gain a better understanding of the elections, how they run, and their impact on the lives of those they impact.

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Section 1

Understanding Elections

Chapter 1

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

Elvis Bisong Tambe

Abstract

With the attention of scholars already drawn to the decline in voter turnout in new democracies after the first wave of open/competitive elections, by relying on aggregate data studies have provided explanations for cross-national variations in turnout. Yet, the reliance on aggregate data makes it hard to establish what had lead individuals to abstain from the political process. Thus, in this chapter, by using individual-level analysis from the European Social Survey and the Afrobarometer we re-interrogate the determinants of non-voting in two new democracies of post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Having tested the various explanations for non-voting, first, our results show some consistency across the two regions, suggesting non-voters are those who lack any form of psychological engagement with politics, who are isolated from the recruitment networks and live in urban areas. Second, our result tends to be contradictory, in which while in post-Communist Europe non-voters are men and those with lower level of education in sub-Saharan Africa they are women and those with higher level of education. Third, pertaining to country level indicators, apart from the fact non-voters in both regions are those who have no trust in elections and who lived in countries with disproportional electoral systems, the results tend to be varied.

Keywords: non-voting, political participation, new democracies, post-communist Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, European social survey, Afrobarometer survey data

1. Introduction

Although the first wave of open and competitive elections in a number of new democracies, most especially those in post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, was marked by high rates of voter turnout, in recent decades, the attention of scholars has been drawn to the decline of voter turnout in both regions. Despite the difference between the two regions, which includes a history of communism, colonialism, and economic and social development, both regions are similar in that they experienced the transition to democracy almost at the same time (i.e. the early 1990s), but more importantly, they are comparable in terms of their current trajectory with respect to the decline in voter turnout. In fact, an observation of national elections in both regions (i.e. Central/Eastern European countries and sub-Saharan Africa) shows the percentage of people who abstain from voting has gradually risen.

For example, in post-communist European countries, from initial rates of 80%, average turnout rates have reduced to 50–66% in some of these countries [1–3]. With regards to sub-Saharan Africa, data from the International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (i.e. International IDEA) suggest Africa's average turnout was the lowest, at 64% compared to the world average ([4], p. 77). Moreover, even more pronounced are the country variations in turnout, with countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia experiencing a significant downward trend of more than 32% ([5], p. 26). On the other hand, sub-Saharan African countries such as Cape Verde, Nigeria, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, and Senegal have an all-time downward trend in voter turnout ranging from 35.5 to 57%.

Because of the presumed consequences of low turnout for democratic theory and practice[1] and by relying on aggregate data, scholars in established democracies and to some extent those in emerging democracies have done a great deal to provide explanations for cross-national decline as well as regional variations in turnout. However, as cited by Karp and Milazzo [1], the dependence on aggregate data makes it extremely challenging to establish what has led individuals to abstain from the political process, which therefore makes the question of *who does not vote and why* in new democracies of post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa an interesting and relevant puzzle which requires individual-level analysis. That said, at the core of this chapter is the need: (1) to establish who the non-voters are and what characterises them; (2) to see if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique. To do this, we rely on a dataset drawn from the European Social Survey (ESV) and the Afrobarometer (AB). In the section that follows, we begin by explaining why it is important to study non-voting in the context of new democracies, followed by establishing trends in voter turnout (i.e. by comparing the turnout data from the first elections and most recent elections across both regions), then a theoretical review of determinants of voting to deduce explanations for non-voting. Finally, we proceed with a discussion of the research design, present our results, while concluding remarks round off the empirical findings.

1.1 Why studying non-voting matters

Although, we can argue that the issue of non-voting in new democracies does seem to have potentially important implication for democracy and its expansion, however, this does not seem to be clear at first sight. Thus, we find it important to begin by asking why studying the phenomenon of non-voting most especially in the context of emerging democracies in post-Communist Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa countries seem to matter. That said, a brief review of the literature reveals three crucial justification for studying non-voting:

First, as cited by Tambe [6] electoral politics or voting is generally considered or judged as an important corner-stone for representative democracy. Thus, the fact that certain groups or section of the population do not engage or participate poses a genuine problem to representative democracy as the fundamental principle of *one-man-one-vote* is being violated. To make matters worse, the implication of having a large group or section of people not voting is that they might be a risk of biased representation with groups that turnout having a greater influence on policy outcomes, government composition and issues that get to be debated at the national or political agenda ([7], p. 276). Second, Hadjar and Beck ([8], p. 522); argue non-voting does not only constitute a severe problem of lack of democratic representation but more notably it does reduce the legitimacy of an elected government

[1] In the subsequent section, we examine why studying the issue of non-voting in the context of new democracies seem to matter.

which goes a long way of decreasing the degree of acceptance of governmental decisions. With the newness of democracies across our regions of interest, this seem to be an important rationale for studying non-voting considering that in such societies it is imperative that people turnout in their numbers as this will directly give consent to the winning candidate and or parties to exercise governmental control without opposition from the losing candidate or parties as they have met the criteria of being a legitimate government chosen by the people. Third, and final reason for studying non-voting is based on the argument that voting is supposed to strengthen citizenship and the quality of democratic civic life [9]. Building on this, Kymlicka [10] cites this justification goes back to classical political thinkers such as Jean J. Rousseau and John S. Mill, who advance the view that political participation tends to enlarge the minds of individuals, thus encouraging them to see and acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention. Moreover, Putnam [11] suggest that voting is important seeing that it encourages social capital, volunteering and other forms of good citizenship. In summary, by building on the representative, legitimacy and citizenship and democratic civic life argument, it is reasonable to expect that the phenomenon of non-voting would have serious implication for democracy and its expansion considering the newness or transition of democracy in post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore natural as earlier mention to ask who the non-voters are and what characterises them; while equally establishing if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique.

1.2 An empirical mapping of voter turnout trends in new democracies: evidence from central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa

Voter turnout has been declining in most societies, particularly those in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. In this section, we rely on five typologies, which center on:

- Countries that have high voter turnout and turnout remains high.
- Countries that have high turnout and turnout later declines.
- Countries that have low voter turnout and turnout remains low.
- Countries that have low voter turnout and turnout increases.
- Countries that have a stable level of turnout over time.

This is done in order to ascertain if both regions are experiencing a decline in voter turnout. Moreover, by relying on these five typologies, first we focus only on elections where the most important figure of the executive is being elected (i.e. national elections).[2] Second and most importantly we only considered countries across both regions, where multipartism is the norm and which have held at least four consecutive competitive elections. **Tables 1** and **2** show the difference in turnout between the first elections (i.e. third wave of democratisation) and the most recent elections held in each country across the two regions.

[2] In the case of post-communist Europe these are generally parliamentary elections, while for sub-Saharan Africa it is a mixture of presidential and parliamentary elections.

Looking at the data displayed in **Tables 1** and **2** and drawing on our empirical mapping of voter turnout based on the five typologies permits us to make the following observations. First, beginning with countries that have high voter turnout after their founding elections and where turnout remains high, the following countries in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Burundi, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa) could be placed in this category. Surprisingly, no country in Central and Eastern Europe could be found in this category. Second, moving to countries that experience high turnout rates after the first competitive elections and later suffer a drop in turnout, most of the post-communist countries could be placed in this category. Third, looking at countries that experience a very low level of turnout rate and their turnout remains low, the result reveals very few countries across both regions could be placed in this category except for Poland, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. Fourth, turning to countries that experience a very low turnout in their first democratic elections and later experience an increase, like the third typology, very few countries across the two regions could be placed under this category except for Ghana. In summary, what is observed is that not only have new democracies in Central/ Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa experienced significant decline in voter turnout, but even more pronounced are the country variations across both regions, with some countries experiencing a significant downward trend in voter turnout, and more so than others.

2. Theory: determinants of non-voting

There is a huge array of factors that have been postulated to explain what influences people's decision to participate in or refrain from politics (for an

Countries	First election		Most recent election		Difference in turnout (%)	Number of elections conducted
	Year	Turnout (%)	Year	Turnout (%)		
Albania	1991	98.9	2017	46.7	−52.2	9
Bulgaria	1991	83.8	2017	53.8	−30	9
Czech Republic	1990	96.3	2017	60.8	−35.5	9
Croatia	1990	84.5	2016	52.6	−31.9	9
Estonia	1990	78.2	2015	64.2	−14	8
Poland	1989	62.1	2015	50.9	−11.2	9
Slovenia	1992	85.9	2014	51.7	−34.2	7
Slovakia	1990	96.3	2016	59.8	−36.5	9
Hungary	1990	65.1	2018	69.7	4.6	8
Latvia	1990	81.2	2014	58.5	−22.7	9
Lithuania	1990	71.7	2016	50.6	−21.1	8
Romania	1990	79.7	2016	37.8	−41.9	8
Ukraine	1994	75.8	2014	52.4	−23.4	7

Source: *https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout.*
Notes: *Data for Central/Eastern European countries based on parliamentary elections.*

Table 1.
Difference in turnout between the first election and the most recent election: post-communist countries.

Countries	First election		Most recent election		Difference in turnout (%)	Number of elections conducted
	Year	Turnout (%)	Year	Turnout (%)		
Benin	1991	64.1	2016	66.1	2	6
Botswana	1989	68.2	2014	84.7	16.5	6
Burkina Faso	1991	35.4	2015	60.0	24.6	5
Burundi	1993	91.4	2015	73.4	−18	3
Cameroon	1992	78.2	2015	64.2	−14	4
Cape Verde	1991	75.3	2016	65.9	−10.1	6
Côte d'Ivoire	1990	70.0	2015	52.8	−17.2	5
Gabon	1993	88.1	2016	59.5	−28.6	5
Ghana	1992	50.2	2016	68.6	18.4	7
Guinea	1993	78.5	2015	68.3	−10.2	5
Kenya	1992	66.8	2017	79.5	12.7	6
Lesotho	1993	72.8	2017	46.4	−26.4	7
Malawi	1994	80.5	2014	70.7	−9.8	4
Mauritius	1991	84.1	2014	74.1	−10	6
Mozambique	1994	88.0	2014	48.6	−39.4	5
Madagascar	1992	74.9	2013	50.7	−24.2	6
Mali	1992	n/a	2013	45.7		5
Namibia	1994	74.2	2014	71.7	−2.5	5
Niger	1993	35.2	2016	59.7	24.5	6
Nigeria	1993	n/a	2015	43.6		6
São Tomé and Príncipe	1991	60.0	2016	46.0	−14	6
Senegal	1993	51.5	2012	57.1	5.6	5
South Africa	1994	86.8	2014	73.4	−13.4	5
Togo	1993	n/a	2015	60.9		6
Tanzania	1995	76.6	2015	67.3	−9.3	5
Uganda	1996	72.6	2016	67.6	−5	5
Zambia	1991	44.4	2016	56.4	12	8
Zimbabwe	1990	53.9	2013	54.3	0.4	5

Source: *https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout and http://africanelections.tripod.com/.*

Note: *Data for sub-Saharan African countries is based on countries' parliamentary/presidential elections.*

Table 2.
Difference in turnout between the first election and the most recent election: sub-Saharan African countries.

overview see: [6, 12, 13]; but see also [14–16]); to account for non-voting, the theoretical perspective that we adopt is derived from the classical work of Verba, Schlozman and Brady titled *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics.* To explain individual political participation, Verba et al. [17] began by posing the following question: *Why do some people not take part in politics?* To answer this

question, their framework consists of providing three answers to the above question: (1) *They cannot*; which suggests a paucity or lack of necessary resources needed for political participation. (2) *They do not want to*; this points to the absence of psychological engagement with politics such as a lack of interest in politics, minimal concern with public issues and or a sense that activity makes no difference. (3) *Nobody asked*; this implies isolation from the recruitment networks through which citizens are mobilised to engage in politics. By standing on the shoulders of these giants, our explanations for non-voting in post-communist countries and sub-Saharan Africa therefore consist of a theory triangulation that rest on three main factors and or models: individual resources (i.e. capacity), motivation (i.e. political-psychology) and network recruitment.

2.1 Individual resources and non-voting

First, beginning with individual resources, we consider two salient resources that are said to be important for vote choice: *socio-economic status (SES) and political experience (i.e. age)*. Socio-economic status consists of a voter's educational level and/or income, with studies suggesting those with a higher SES are by and large considered to have a higher propensity to participate [18]. Also, Verba et al. [17] suggest individuals who are more educated tend to participate at a higher rate because they can understand the issues at stake in an election, thus making them more politically interested. In the context of new democracies, studies by Orvista et al. [19] with regards to post-communist Europe do provide evidence supporting that those with higher education and income are most likely to participate. However, when the effect of SES on vote choice is tested in sub-Saharan Africa the results are contrary to the general theoretical expectation, in that findings show those with a lower material status and lower level of education tend to participate at a higher rate compared to those with a higher socio-economic status [20–22]. Notwithstanding these findings from sub-Saharan Africa, the theoretical assumption adopted here is that the higher an individual finds themselves in terms of SES the more likely they are to engage in electoral politics. *Based on this, our theoretical proposition suggests that the probability of non-voting in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa will decrease with higher socio-economic status*. Second, another valuable resource which we consider is political experience, which is better operationalised as age of voters. Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita [23] argue political experience is generally considered to be acquired over time, most especially as voters face concrete policy issues. Following this line of argument, in the context of new democracies, Bratton [20], Kuenzi and Lambright [24], Resnick and Casale [25], Isaksson [22], and Tambe [12, 13] provide empirical evidence confirming those with more political experience are much more likely to engage with or participate in politics. *By building on these studies, we therefore expect the probability of non-voting to be higher among those with lower political experience that is younger cohorts.*

2.2 Motivation or voter political psychology and non-voting

Another key variable of Verba et al.'s [17] model for explaining why people do not participate in politics centres on motivation or a voter's psychological disposition, which is measured by political efficacy, political interest, political trust and satisfaction with democracy. First, political efficacy refers to the degree in which voters believe they can understand national politics and the belief or perception that their actions generally have an influence on political institutions. Campbell et al. [26] and Abramson and Aldrich [27] show that lack of political efficacy is a major

source of low voter turnout. Moreover, recent studies by Karp and Banducci [28] and Norris [29] reveal that individuals who are considered efficacious tend to be much more involved in politics. In our previous studies [13], although we have been able to confirm a positive significant relationship between political efficacy and electoral participation in post-communist Europe and Western democracies, however, with respect to tropical Africa this relationship was directly contrary to what we expected in that the relationship was non-significant. *However, for the sake of comparability we would expect the probability of non-voting will tend to decrease with a higher level of political efficacy*. Next, we include political interest, which is defined as the degree to which politics or political affairs arouse curiosity or attention among citizens. As expected, findings across established and emerging democracies do show that individuals who declared to be more politically interested are more likely to engage in politics, most especially in terms of voting [9], with lack of political interest being argued as a cause of lower voter turnout [30]. *Thus, we expect the probability of non-voting to decrease with higher political interest*. Third, we examine the relationship between political trust and non-voting. Political trust is broadly defined as voters' or citizens' evaluation of their political system. According to Putnam [11] trust is the basis of democratic society; this therefore means people will be more willingly to vote if they believe the political system is responding in some way to their voting behaviour. *Relying on his work, we expect the probability of non-voting to decrease with increase in political trust.* Fourth, we evaluate the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and non-voting, with Norris [29] suggesting that citizens who do not trust their political institutions are least likely to participate. However, in Central and Eastern European countries as in other regions, studies show the level of satisfaction with democracy is generally low [31]. *Thus, we will expect the probability of non-voting to be higher among disenchanted voters.*

2.3 Network of recruitments and non-voting

Apart from individual resources and motivational factors that we have examined above, Verba et al. [17] argue the only way we could explain why people do not take part in politics is based on the idea that *nobody asks*, or simply because individuals are outside of network of recruitments. The implication of this is that for us to explain non-voting it is important to look above individuals and include social networks such as family, friends, co-workers, politicians, parties, church, voluntary associations and interest groups, as these social networks can be considered important channels for mobilising individuals because they help nurture political interest and awareness on politics and issues at stake in an election through political discussion. Also, La Due Lake and Huckfeldt [32] argue social networks help provide expertise and free political information (i.e. social capital) which therefore increases the likelihood that citizens will participate in elections. Moreover, Kuenzi and Lambright [24] and Klesner [33], in the context of new democracies do suggest membership of voluntary organisations and or non-political organisations has a significant positive effect on voting. *Based on these studies, we would expect the propensity of non-voting to be higher among those who are not members of social networks*. Finally, we examine individuals' place of residence and this is justified from the fact that scholars are still undecided if social networks or parties tend to be more effective in mobilising voters in urban or rural areas. For example, while a study by Karp et al. [34] argues cities are more attractive locations for parties to canvass due to their higher population, Hoffmann-Martinot [35] argues that urbanisation on the other hand tends to reduce interpersonal bonds and social networks thus

making it less likely for people to participate. However, considering that scholars are still undecided, we shall only be able to decide on this once our empirical analysis is concluded.

3. Data, method and measurement

To examine comparatively the determinants of non-voting across countries in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, one of the initial challenges that we encountered was the lack of comprehensive survey data that included a multitude of countries across both regions. However, to overcome this hurdle, we rely on two separate datasets: European Social Survey[3] (ESS-2012; Round 6) and Afrobarometer[4] (AB-2011-2013; Round 5 [36]) for Central and Eastern European and sub-Saharan Africa countries, which allows us to embark on an international comparison, as the measures of both the dependent and independent variables do not vary very much across the two geo-political regions. Moreover, considering that our outcome variable (i.e. non-voting) is binary, we use multivariate or logistic regression modelling to estimate the probability of non-voting across the two regions. Also, we introduce robust standard errors in our model estimation so as to reduce the variance of fluctuation across our data or samples and proceeds by building a step-by-step model that takes into consideration three theoretical perspectives, while adding a final model that takes into consideration our individual indicators and a few of the country-specific variables that we have added to our data.

Our main dependent variable of interest is non-voting. We employ a dichotomous measure of the respondents who did not vote in the most recent elections. Turning to the independent variables, our key variables are organised into three groups: individual resources, motivation and networking factors. First, concerning individual resources, we include the following: educational level, income and two demographic factors (age and gender). Second, for the motivational variables, we include: political efficacy, interest, trust and satisfaction with democracy. Third, for the networking factors, we include: membership in associational or voluntary organisations, and place of residence (i.e. whether respondents live in an urban or rural area). But more importantly, considering that our two geo-political regions have differing institutional characteristics, but even more so based on current research by Franklin [37], Gallego [38] and Van Egmond et al. [39] which reveals that politics or political action is influenced by the context in which individuals find themselves, in this study we include a number of country-specific contextual variables (i.e. electoral system, concurrent elections, closeness of elections and trust in elections) in predicting non-voting. Appendices 1 and 2 show which countries are included in our study and how the different variables have been operationalised.

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[3] The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every 2 years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than 30 nations: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6 (Accessed: 20/06/2018).

[4] Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa: http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-5-data-34-countries-2011-2013-last-update-july-2015 (Accessed: 20/06/2018).

4. Results

To explain the probability of non-voting in the new democracies of post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, we estimate a multivariate logistic regression which combines micro- and macro-level variables and build four models as guided by our theoretical strategy. Moreover, considering our main objective is to evaluate the genuine effects of the variables at different levels and using different models, we began by breaking down citizens' propensity for non-voting along the lines of each of our key theoretical perspectives (i.e. individual resources, motivation, networks, and contextual or country-level) by building very parsimonious models step-by-step, before rounding up by pulling all the variables from each of the four theoretical perspective into an expanded logit model that incorporates the effect of individual- and country-level variables. An overview of the results from the logistic modelling is summarised in **Table 3**, which shows which variables was statistically significant in the two regions.

First, we began by modelling the effect of individual resource variables on the probability of non-voting in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan African countries, with the results revealing the following. Looking at education, in Central and Eastern Europe, people with higher education (i.e. secondary or higher education) turn out to have the lowest probability of being non-voters compared to those with low education, who have the highest rate of non-voting. However, this is

Models	*Variables*	*Central/East Europe*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*
Individual Resources	Educational level	-, Significant***	+, Significant*
	SES (household income)	-, Insignificant	-, Significant***
	Age	-, Significant***	-, Significant***
	Gender (women)	-, Significant**	+, Significant
Motivational	Political efficacy	-, Significant*	+, Significant**
	Political interest	-, Significant***	-, Significant***
	Political trust	-, Significant***	-, Significant***
	Satisfaction with democracy	0	0
Social Networks	Membership of voluntary organizations	-, Significant**	-, Significant***
	Place of residence (urban)	+, Significant***	+, Significant***
Country-Level Variables	Electoral system	+, Significant**	+, Significant***
	Closeness of election	+, Significant***	-, Insignificant
	Concurrent elections	N/a	-, Significant***
	Trust in elections	-, Significant***	-, Significant***

Significance: **** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.*
Direction: *+ = positive relationship, given the coding used. − = negative relationship. 0 = no effect given coding used.*
Yellow highlighting: *indicates a variable for which it has not been possible to use identical question wording across both regions (so there is a chance that any differences might simply be artefactual rather than substantive).*
Note: *Analysis produced based on logit regression, with robust standard errors. Detailed tables showing actual coefficient can be obtained be seen in the appendences.*
Sources: *European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012) and Afrobarometer Survey (2011-2013).*

Table 3.
Determinants of non-voting in new democracies: overview of two geo-political regions.

directly contrary to our sub-Saharan Africa countries, where those with higher education rather turn to have a higher rate of non-voting compared to individuals with lower education. Next, regarding socio-economic status, across the two regions, we are able to confirm that those with a lower income or socio-economic status are more likely to have a higher rate of non-voting, which comes as a surprise with respect to the African countries. Additionally, looking at age of respondents, across both regions, our results indicate that younger cohorts have a higher rate of non-voting compared to their older citizens. Similarly, turning to the last individual resource variable, that is, gender, in post-communist countries gender points to a significant effect with non-voting, albeit men appearing to have a higher rate of non-voting compared to women. With regards to sub-Saharan Africa, we can confirm women have a higher rate of non-voting compared to men.

Second, pertaining to the motivational or political psychology variables, we can make the following extrapolations. In post-communist European countries, what is observed is that political interest, political trust and political efficacy tend to reduce the probability of non-voting. With respect to sub-Saharan Africa, we can equally confirm that political trust and political interest do in fact reduce the probability of non-voting, but this is not true for political efficacy, which surprisingly shows that those who are declared to be politically efficacious are more likely to be non-voters. Finally, with respect to satisfaction with democracy, across the two regions, our results indicate no substantial effect between being satisfied with a country's democracy and the probability of non-voting.

Third, turning to the networks of recruitment, we modelled two types of variable (i.e. associational networks and place of residence). In Central and Eastern Europe as well as countries in tropical Africa, what we observe is that those who declared not to be members of associational or voluntary organisations have a higher rate of non-voting compared to those who are members of such organisations. Similarly, looking at one's place of residence (i.e. urban or rural) what we can deduce is that individuals living in urban areas across both regions are more likely to be non-voters.

Fourth, looking at contextual-level variables, we can make the following remarks. Beginning with electoral system, in both regions, what our data tells is that the rate of non-voting is supposedly higher in countries with a disproportional electoral system (i.e. majoritarian, mixed or plurality). Additionally, turning to closeness of elections, our results tell of a statistically significant relationship with non-voting in Central/Eastern European countries, indicating that the probability of non-voting tends to be higher in countries where voters perceive the elections are closed or competitive. This result is directly opposite to that of our sub-Saharan African countries, where the results points to a non-significant relationship although in the expected direction (i.e. citizens living in countries where the elections are less competitive tend to have a higher rate of non-voting). Moving to trust in elections or electoral integrity, our data reveals that across both regions, the rate of non-voting tends to be higher in countries where voters perceive the elections are not considered to be free and fair. Lastly, we equally evaluate the effect of concurrent elections on non-voting. Although we could test the effect of this variable only in tropical Africa, what can be said is that the probability of non-voting is said to be higher in countries that do not concurrently held elections.

4.1 Who are the non-voters and how much consistency do we find across the two regions?

To explain the determinates of non-voting in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, we have relied heavily on

cross-sectional survey data that is derived from the European Social Survey and the Afrobarometer. By employing a theory triangulation that consist of individual-level variables, and by adding a few country-specific indicators, we have tested the distinct types of effect on the individual decision to abstain from electoral politics. All done, we are now left with two important question which constitute the core objective of this chapter: *Who are the non-voters* and *How much consistency do we find across the two regions?*

Beginning with the first question, (i.e. *who the non-voters are?*), with respect to the individual resource variable, education and income tend to be a very important indicator in the post-communist countries that we analysed in this study, as those with a lower level of education and material status are more likely to be non-voters. With respect to sub-Saharan African countries this is quite the opposite, as those with a higher level of education are considered most likely to be non-voters. Another important characteristic of non-voters across both regions is age, with data suggesting young cohorts are more likely to be non-voters compared to older citizens. Additionally, moving to the motivational variables, our study reveals non-voting is greatly influenced by political efficacy, political trust and political efficacy. To be precise, in Eastern Europe as in tropical Africa, non-voters tend to display lower interest, trust and efficacy, albeit political efficacy appears to have an indirect effect with respect to sub-Saharan African countries. Similarly, looking at networks of recruitment, across both regions, we can confirm non-voters appear to be citizens who are not members of voluntary or associational organisations and who tend to live in cities or urban areas. Finally, putting the macro-level indicators into perspective, country electoral integrity or trust in elections and electoral formula appears to be influential in our context analysis, with non-voters being those who perceive elections are not free and fair and who live in countries where is electoral system is disproportional. Apart from this, what we could add is that country-level variables tend to have a varied effect across both regions. So far, we have identified who the non-voters are, but even more important is for us to interrogate how much consistency we find across the two regions. This question is important because it will enable us to ascertain if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique. By relying on **Table 3**, we systematically cross-checked each of the four main models across the two geo-political regions, which informs us of the following: First, beginning with the individual resource variables, age proves to be consistent across post-communist European and sub-Saharan African countries, with younger cohorts far more likely to be non-voters. Second, looking at motivational indicators, our data reveals non-voting is positively influenced by factors such as political interest and political trust. Across both regions what we observe is that non-voters have a lower trust in political institutions and a lack of interest in politics or public affairs.

5. Conclusion and implications

So far, our analysis of the determinants of non-voting across new democracies in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa carries a number of implications. First, we begin by exploring the implication of what the analysis reveals in light of the theory used (i.e. individual resource, mobilisation and networking) and in order to do this, we ask a very simply question: does our theoretical model works equally well across both regions? Answering this question prove challenging because some variables or theories seem to very important in predicting people's decision not to engage in electoral politics while other do not. That said, we can confirm individual resource, mobilisation and networking models seems to work well across both

regions (i.e. most especially in Central and Eastern European countries) with a few exceptions in sub-Saharan Africa countries (i.e. relating to education and political efficacy). Additionally, the country, contextual or institutional variables seem harder to evaluate in general terms because of the inconsistency of the findings. Overall, the full picture in relations to non-voting in new democracies suggest that political behaviour of voters in these regions is determine by many of the same factors that influence political participation in older democracies. Second, this paper also carries certain implications for both future research and democracy: (1) The first relates to how voters could be brought back to the polls or encouraged to participate in electoral politics. In fact, as we have observed in this study, this could be achieved by increasing by raising citizens' interest in politics and improving their trust in political institutions. For this to be attained, parties must be able to provide voters with clear alternatives, and invest in electoral campaigning, most especially in urban areas. (2) Next, one of the practical implication of this study relates to the conduct of future elections and democracy in these regions. In an era of declining turnout, this study points to the need for electoral integrity and transparency, that is, the need for countries to organise free and fair elections that will not only get voters back to the polls but will equally improve the overall quality of democracy in these regions.

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Conflict of interest

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. By relying on the representative, legitimacy and citizenship and quality of democracy, we provide a justification for why studying the phenomenon of non-voting within the context of new emerging democracies seem to matter.

2. In the case of post-communist Europe these are generally parliamentary elections, while for sub-Saharan Africa it is a mixture of presidential and parliamentary elections.

3. The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every 2 years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than 30 nations http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6 [Accessed: 18/06/2018].

4. Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa: http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-5-data-34-countries-2011-2013-last-update-july-2015 [Accessed: 18/06/2018].

Appendices

1 Sample of countries in the European Social Survey and Afrobarometer Data.

Regions	Number of countries	Countries covered
Sub-Saharan Africa	27	Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Post-communist countries	10	Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine
Total	**37**	

2 Operationalisation of the variables.

Variable	Operationalisation: central and Eastern Europe (European Social Survey)	Operationalisation: sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer)
Dependent variable		
Non-voting	Some people do not vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last national election? (1) for non-voting and 'voting' (0), thereby omitting all the people who had not been eligible to vote at the last election.	With regard to the most recent national election, which statement is true for you? Voting in the most recent national election? (1) for non-voting and (0) for voting.
Individual resource variables		
Age	Age is recoded into four-age categories: young adults (i.e. consisting of those aged 15–33), adults (i.e. those aged 34–49), middle-aged (i.e. those aged 50–59) and finally elderly people (i.e. those aged 66 and above).	Age is recoded into four-age categories: young adults (i.e. consisting of those aged 15–33), adults (i.e. those aged 34–49), middle-aged (i.e. those aged 50–59) and finally elderly people (i.e. those aged 66 and above).
Gender	Dummy: 1 for a woman, 0 for a man.	Dummy: 1 for a woman, 0 for a man.
Education	People were asked for the highest level of education they had achieved. The different educational systems & degree allows us to create three educational categories: Primary education, secondary education and higher education	People are asked for their highest educational level of education. Regarding education, respondent's educational levels are recoded into four categories (i.e. no formal education, primary education, secondary education and higher education).
Income	Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit: [10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country] (lowest income = 1…highest income = 10)	We use occupational status as a proxy to measure income. Occupational status is measure by a question which asks about the citizen's occupational status. A dummy variable is therefore created, with 1 assigned to individuals having jobs, while a coding of 0 is assigned to individuals who declared having no job.

Variable	Operationalisation: central and Eastern Europe (European Social Survey)	Operationalisation: sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer)
Motivation or political psychology variables		
Political interest	Political interest is capture by a question that asks how interested would you say you are in politics? We recode this into a four-point with not interested coded as 0, not very interested 1, somewhat interested assigned a value of 2 and very interested coded as 3.	Political interest is capture by a question that asks how interested would you say you are in public affairs? We recode this into a four-point with not interested coded as 0, not very interested 1, somewhat interested assigned a value of 2 and very interested coded as 3.
Political trust	Trust is measured by an evaluation regarding trust in the parliament, the legal system and politicians (i.e. please tell me on a scale of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the following institutions.	How much do you trust each of the following, or have not you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime Minister? Trust parliament/national assembly, Trust courts of law. Recoded into 0 = no trust, 1 = little, 3 = some, 4 = a lot)
Satisfaction with democracy	How satisfied with the way democracy works in country on a scale of 0–10 (i.e. 0 extremely dissatisfied, 10 extremely satisfied)	Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country? 0 Not satisfied, 1 not very satisfied, 2 fairly satisfied, 3 very satisfied.
Network of recruitments variables		
Associational/ informal networks	Membership in voluntary or informal networks is measure by evaluating membership in different social and political organisation such as religious, recreational, environment, labour, professional and humanitarian organisations.	Membership in voluntary or informal networks is measure by evaluating membership in different social and political organisation such as religious, recreational, environment, labour, professional and humanitarian organisations.
Residence	Recoded into 1 = urban area, 0 = rural area	Recoded into 1 = urban area, 0 = rural area
Country level indicators		
Electoral system	Dummy: 0 for Proportional system, 1 for plurality, mixed or majoritarian systems	Dummy: 0 for Proportional system, 1 for plurality, mixed or majoritarian systems
Concurrent elections	Dummy: 0 for elections not concurrent, 1 for concurrent elections	Dummy: 0 for elections not concurrent, 1 for concurrent elections
Closeness of elections	I measure closeness of election as the margin of victory for the winning candidate or over the runner-up in presidential elections. While for parliamentary democracies, we measure closeness of election as the difference in seat shares between the top two parties. That said, I coded the variable in such a way that a winning margin of less 5% = 1, and a margin greater than 5% = 0.	I measure closeness of election as the margin of victory for the winning candidate or over the runner-up in presidential elections. While for parliamentary democracies, we measure closeness of election as the difference in seat shares between the top two parties. That said, I coded the variable in such a way that a winning margin of less 5% = 1, and a margin greater than 5% = 0.

3. Logistic analysis of non-voting: results for Central and Eastern European countries.

Models/variables	Model I				Model II				Model III				Model IV			
	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB
Constant	**.069**	**.072**	**.34**	**1.07**	**1.369**	**.124**	**.000**	**3.932**	**1.443**	**.126**	**.000**	**4.232**	**1.715**	**.143**	**.000**	**5.557**
Individual resource																
Gender (Male)	.024	.041	.56	1.02	−.138	.043	.001	.871	−.132	.044	.002	.876	−.141	.044	.001	.869
Age (reference: young people)																
Adults (34–49)	−.55	.056	.000	.574	−.478	.058	.000	.620	−.470	.059	.000	.625	−.470	.059	.000	.625
Middle-aged adults (50–59)	−.80	.064	.000	.449	−.608	.067	.000	.545	−.594	.067	.000	.552	−.606	.067	.000	.546
Elderly people (60+)	−1.05	.058	.000	.348	−.754	.061	.000	.470	−.751	.009	.000	.472	−.770	.062	.000	.989
Educational level (reference: primary education)																
Secondary education	−.358	.052	.000	.699	−.247	.054	.000	.781	−.287	.005	.000	.750	−.294	.055	.000	.745
Higher education	−.882	.070	.000	.414	−.569	.074	.000	.566	−.639	.075	.000	.528	−.631	.076	.000	.532
Income	−.013	.008	.09	.987	−.005	.009	.59	.995	−.011	.009	.29	.989	−.011	.009	.27	.989
Motivational variables																
Political interest					−.710	.028	.000	.492	−.709	.028	.000	.492	−.680	.028	.000	.506
Political trust					−.067	.010	.000	.936	−.069	.010	.000	.934	−.072	.010	.000	.930
Satisfaction with democracy					.002	.010	.84	1.02	.003	.122	.85	1.03	.002	.010	.85	1.002
Political efficacy					−.065	.010	.000	.937	−.064	.010	.000	.938	−.024	.012	.05	.976
Network variables																
Associational network									−.150	.045	.001	.861	−.110	.046	.02	.895
Residence (Urban)									.230	.047	.000	1.25	239	.047	.000	1.27

Models/variables	Model I				Model II				Model III				Model IV			
	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB	B	S.E	Sig	ExpB
Country-level variables																
Electoral system													.125	.046	.000	1.133
Closeness of election													.243	.044	.007	1.133
Trust in elections													−.091	.013	000	.913
Chi-Square Improvement (df)	**467.9 (7)**				**1341.0 (11)**				**1376.5 (13)**				**1462.5 (16)**			

Significance levels: $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$.

4. Logistic analysis of non-voting: result for sub-Saharan African countries.

Models/variables	Model I				Model II				Model III				Model IV			
	B	SE	Sig	ExpB	B	SE	Sig	ExpB	B	SE	Sig	ExpB	B	SE	Sig	ExpB
Constant	**−1.356**	**.038**	**.000**	**.258**	**−.761**	**.054**	**.000**	**.467**	**−.762**	**.056**	**.000**	**.467**	**−.447**	**.068**	**.000**	**.647**
Individual resource																
Gender (male)	.140	.031	.000	1.150	.098	.031	.002	1.103	.082	.037	.000	1.086	.085	.031	.007	1.089
Age (reference: young people)																
Adults (34–49)	−.811	.036	.000	.445	−.801	.036	.000	.449	−.780	.037	.000	.458	−.807	.037	.000	.446
Middle-aged adults (50–59)	−.947	.059	.000	.388	−.920	.059	.000	.398	−.904	.059	.000	.405	−.944	.060	.000	.389
Elderly people (60+)	−.961	.062	.000	.383	−.922	.063	.000	.394	−.924	.063	.000	.397	−.971	.063	.000	.379

Models/variables	Model I				Model II				Model III				Model IV			
	B	SE	Sig	ExpB	B	SE	Sig	ExpB	B	SE	Sig	ExpB	B	SE	Sig	ExpB
Educational level (reference: no education)																
Primary education	.197	.037	.000	1.217	.178	.038	.000	1.195	.137	.038	.000	1.146	.071	.039	.06	1.073
Secondary education	.326	.041	.000	1.385	.278	.042	.000	1.321	.196	.044	.000	1.216	.067	.045	.14	1.069
Higher education	.514	.080	.000	1.672	.457	.081	.000	1.579	.351	.083	.000	1.421	.209	.084	.013	1.233
Income	−202	.033	.000	.817	−.188	.033	.000	.828	−.198	.033	.000	.820	−.205	.034	.000	.815
Motivational variables																
Political interest					−.164	.014	.000	.828	−.145	.014	.000	.865	−.135	.015	.000	.873
Political trust					−.127	.015	.000	.881	−.121	.015	.000	.886	−.057	.015	.000	.917
Satisfaction with democracy					−.073	.017	.000	.930	−.074	.017	.000	.929	.015	.018	.40	1.015
Political efficacy					.042	.012	.000	1.043	.043	.012	.000	1.044	.032	.012	.007	1.032
Network variables																
Associational network									−.159	.046	.001	.853	−.192	.047	.000	.825
Residence (Urban)									.219	.033	.000	1.245	.236	.033	.000	1.266
Country-level variables																
Electoral system													.264	.038	.000	1.302
Closeness of elections													−.013	.035	.70	.987
Trust in elections													−.244	.015	.000	.784
Concurrent elections													−.337	.068	.000	.640
Chi-square improvement (df)	**1090.4 (8)**				**1391.0 (4)**				**1506.2 (4)**				**1957.4 (6)**			

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Section 2

Elections in Developing Democracies

Chapter 2

The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing and Contested Political Elite

Numvi Gwaibi

Abstract

Electoral periods in Cameroon involve an impressive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches, door-to-door solicitations, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing etc. Electoral manipulation involves selective voter registration, tampering with the electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally as the political elite. These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials etc. have been at the helm of the state since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. On occasion, the grassroots are able to see through the mirage, which often leaves some members of the political elite staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on events around the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I employed participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews among others to unearth and document the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and other high-ranking members of the governing CPDM party during election periods in Cameroon.

Keywords: elections, campaigns, manipulation, political elite, grassroots populations

1. Introduction

> *"[E]lections entail the largest mobilization of the national population in a short time span and require the coordination of millions of individuals engaged in hundreds of different activities" ([1], p. 5).*

The history of Cameroon is quite colourful. 'Kamerun' was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1919, then a League of Nations Mandate following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, and later a United Nations Trust Territory administered by Britain and France respectively [2, 3]. In 1961, the British and French sections of Cameroon were united under a Federal structure [4, 5]. In 1972 the federation dissolved following a referendum and the country became known

as the United Republic of Cameroon, and in 1984 the name was changed yet again to the Republic of Cameroon [6–9].

Unlike some neighbouring states in the Central African sub-Region, post-independence Cameroon enjoyed a relative measure of political stability [8]. Over the last decade however, a number of crises have shattered the myth often propagated by government officials and supporters of the ruling party about Cameroon being an 'island of peace in tumultuous central Africa.' Rising insecurity around the Lake Chad basin coupled with an upsurge in cross-border attacks in Northern Cameroon by the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, as well as deadly cross-border incursions by rebels from neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR) in the East Region of the country has greatly undermined peace and security. Meanwhile, the on-going crisis situation in the two English speaking Regions[1] which according to the International Crisis Group[2] is gradually degenerating into a civil war has further undermined the country's image as a safe and secure location. This crisis is a direct consequence of the country's historical trajectory and the form of state that was adopted following unification in 1961.

The unitary approach to the nation-state was the predominant choice of African leaders in the decades following independence. According to ([10], p. 175); "independent Africa chose simply to step into the shoes of departing European powers." The unitary state was therefore a continuation of the colonial state's nation-building agenda which was aimed at fusing disparate ethnic and regional groupings into a single entity. At the political level, there was a concerted drive towards one-party systems as the sole vehicle for expressing political diversity [11]. With hindsight, it is generally agreed that this approach to statehood "fostered authoritarianism at the expense of constitutionalism" ([12], p. 1). However, when single-party rule was no longer feasible, and in a bid to survive in office authoritarian rulers adopted multi-party arrangements.

According to ([13], p. 2), "the early 1990s were a time of democratic optimism". Like most sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon was greatly impacted by the 'democratic wind of change' that swept across the African continent in the 1990s [14]. Unlike the others, Cameroon did not descend into anarchy nor was the regime in place swept aside. Instead the regime headed by Cameroon's second head of state, Paul Biya who succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo following the latter's resignation in 1982 reluctantly conceded to the legalisation of political parties and the re-introduction of multiparty elections. 'Pluralism heightened the political stakes and reinvigorated electoral campaigns, in some cases transforming them into battlegrounds where a number of actors, including politicians, parties, traditional authorities, and ordinary citizens, fought it out, nonetheless, employing every available means including cash, cults and culinary items to gain votes" ([15], p. 2).

Electoral periods in Cameroon therefore involve an impressive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches and door-to-door solicitations. Other activities include, distribution of food items and party paraphernalia, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing etc. At another level, electoral manipulation involves 'gerrymandering,' selective voter registration, tempering with the electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally

[1] The North-West and South West Regions of Cameroon erstwhile known as the British Southern Cameroons and today named Ambazonia by activists fighting for the restoration of its statehood.

[2] Source: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-dialogue-remains-only-viable-solution

as the political elite. The definition of political elite in the context of this chapter is limited to former and serving government officials (ministers, administrators etc.), national and local level politician's businessmen and other stakeholders who belong to or are affiliated with the governing Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) party.

These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials, and other politicians have been revolving around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. However, on occasion, the grassroots are able to see through the mirage which often leaves some members of the political elite licking their wounds and others staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on my experiences of events around the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo an administrative sub-division in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I employed a number of methods including participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews etc. to unearth and document the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and other high ranking members of the governing CPDM during election periods in Cameroon.

2. Background

As noted in Section 1, this chapter is based on my experiences of the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. It all began in July 2013, when the president of Cameroon signed a decree convening the electoral corps. Article (I) stated that an election of Parliamentarians into the National Assembly and Councillors into Municipal Councils would take place on 30 September 2013. This announcement came at a time of renewed optimism in the electoral process following the introduction of biometric registration of voters on the electoral roll. On the one hand, it raised the hopes of many Cameroonians who were aspiring for meaningful political change via the ballot box. On the other hand, it set the ball rolling for a nationwide electoral contest that was full political machinations.

In the period leading up to the elections, I had exchanges with friends, conducted interviews and listened to media conversations and commentaries on the side-lines involving state officials, politicians and ordinary people. The general feeling was that with the advent of the biometric voting system, the electoral process in Cameroon might finally be credible. Many were hopeful that this system sounded the death knell for electoral fraud. People were very enthusiastic about the opportunity to effect real change, something that has eluded them for decades. Expectations of a free and fair election were espoused not only by members of the opposition, but also within the governing CPDM party. In fact some CPDM militants expressed optimism that the biometric voting system would definitively put an end to the negative image of the party as a vote rigging machine [16].

In the run-up to the elections, the chairman of the CPDM prescribed consensus as the method for selecting candidates. As will be discussed later on in this chapter, reaching consensus in many parts of the country was a major challenge not least in Mbankomo where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork for my PhD. The main issue was that grassroots militants who expressed a wish to have certain candidates represent them in the municipality were brazenly thwarted by the party hierarchy.

3. Conceptualising the electoral arena in Cameroon

> *"For all their structural reliance on ruling parties, electoral authoritarian regimes often show personalistic traits and become deeply identified with the person controlling the chief executive office" ([17], p. 246).*

In Cameroon, key members of the governing elite including the head of state have been shuttling around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s [18]. The longevity of the Biya regime in power cannot be attributed to democratic credentials; rather it is linked to the ability to effectively subvert electoral rules. In fact, the government of Cameroon is renowned for having developed what is termed a 'sophisticated rigging machinery' that has ensured continued electoral success for the governing CPDM party in national and local elections since the 1990s [9, 12, 18]. Other than the change of leadership in 1982, there has not been any fundamental alteration in the system of governance in place since independence and reunification in 1960 and 1961 respectively. Effectively, it is a one man show where everything boils down to the head of state. He is the president of the ruling party, the head of the executive, the judiciary, and legislative branches of government; he is also the head of the army, police and other security services. The system is structured such that every action from the highest to the lowest echelons of the state apparatus is carried out on 'the very high instructions of the head of state.' Paradoxically, when things go wrong, everyone else but the head of state is blamed.

Meanwhile, the year 2018 is very important in the electoral calendar of Cameroon. A total of 4 elections are scheduled to take place, these include Senatorial, Municipal, Legislative and Presidential elections. Senatorial elections were held in March, 2018 for 70 out of 100 senators, the remaining 30 were appointed by the head of state. The governing CPDM party won 63 seats while the main opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) party won 7 seats. Going by the results of the senatorial elections, and given that the CPDM party has won every election in the decades following the return to multiparty politics in Cameroon in the 1990s, there is every reason to believe that the party is bound to maintain its tight grip in power.

Having weathered the political liberalisation of the 1990s without a significant threat to its hegemony, the governing elite in Cameroon skilfully combined authoritarian methods and democratic practices to maintain political power. In fact, the present electoral system is skewed in favour of the governing CPDM party which very often enters the electoral arena as strong contenders with very high chances of emerging victorious. This is due largely to what many observers have described as 'electoral hold-up,' specifically because the electoral timetable in Cameroon is the sole prerogative of the President who is often referred to by state media as the 'sole master of the electoral calendar.'

The capacity of the electoral system to sustain the governing regime in Cameroon, and the quest by the government to maintain the status-quo makes it difficult to envisage any meaningful electoral reform that could lay the groundwork for free, fair, transparent and credible elections in the near future. Therefore, the electoral system in Cameroon could be described as a form of electoral authoritarianism whereby the 'regime fills executive and legislative offices by elections, but the ruling party never loses elections' ([13], p. 10). Electoral Authoritarianism in this context denotes a number of conditions, the first being that elections in Cameroon are broadly inclusive. In principle municipal, legislative and presidential elections are held regularly, under universal suffrage. The only exception being the Senatorial elections which as noted earlier is held under a two tier system i.e. indirect elections whereby 70% of senators are elected by municipal councillors and the remaining 30% are appointed by the head of state.

Secondly, elections in Cameroon are minimally pluralistic. Following the return to multipartism in the 1990s, opposition parties were allowed to openly compete for elective posts. However, in its design to fractionalise the opposition and weaken its strength, the government sponsored the formation of mushroom parties most of them allied to the governing CPDM. The result is the proliferation of opposition political parties numbering 305[3] at the last count. Curiously, some of the mushroom political parties are made up of members of a nuclear family i.e. husband, wife and sometimes the children. The electoral system in Cameroon is therefore set-up such that the "hegemonic party permit other parties to exist but only as second class licensed parties thus foreclosing the possibility of an electoral loss by the hegemonic party" ([19], p. 34).

Thirdly, the political landscape in Cameroon is minimally competitive, i.e. the horde of opposition parties, while denied victory, is allowed to win votes and seats. On the one hand, opposition parties have minuscule representation in the National Assembly, Senate and Municipal Councils; some councils are controlled by the opposition, some are shared with other political parties including the CPDM, but majority of the Municipal Councils are controlled by the CPDM party. On the other hand, "by establishing multiparty elections for the highest office, Electoral Authoritarian regimes institute the concept of popular consent, even as they subvert it in practice" ([13], p. 12). In 1992, the candidate of the main opposition SDF party John Fru Ndi is widely believed to have won the presidential elections, however, the results was declared in favour of the incumbent President Paul Biya by the Supreme Court.

Fourthly, the political system in Cameroon is minimally open i.e. the opposition is not subject to massive repression as was the case during autocratic rule. In fact citizens are actively courted by the governing and opposition parties for votes because they are viewed as the "arbiters of last instance in the electoral arena." However, when things turn sour particularly when election results are contested, opposition parties and civil society in general regularly experience repressive treatment by the police and military who are used in selective and intermittent ways by government officials as "the arbiters of the last instance over the electoral arena" ([13], p. 19).

The notion of electoral authoritarianism as applied in the context of Cameroon therefore involves the claim that the regime of Paul Biya is 'neither democratic nor democratising but plainly authoritarian albeit in ways that depart from the forms of authoritarian rule' that obtained prior to the democratic wind of change in the 1990s [13, 20]. Unlike during authoritarianism where everything boiled down to one-man rule, power in the context of multipartism ideally involves redistribution among those with vested interests such as 'political parties and other interest groups. Multipartism also involves 'institutionalised uncertainty' and the presence of opposition parties that plays the role of 'the conscience of the executive' [21].

However, the financial, logistical and organisational limitations of the opposition in Cameroon prevent it from effectively challenging and defeating the governing CPDM through the ballot box. These and other shortcoming also inhibits the opposition from playing the role of 'the conscience of the executive.' On its part the executive in seeking to stamp-out any prospects of 'institutional uncertainty' in Cameroon governs the country through controlled multiparty elections whereby the CPDM party mobilises voters, and the state apparatus controls the elections. This Janus-faced action is designed to establish a pluralistic system that appears democratic on the surface, but is in reality is falling back to the one man-rule typical of authoritarian regimes.

[3] Source: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD). <http://minatd.cm/index.php/en/en/annuaires/partis-politiques?view=partis> accessed July 2018.

Despite its overwhelming dominance of the electoral arena in Cameroon, the governing CPDM party sometimes faces unprecedented internal challenges that threaten to tear it apart. The next section of this chapter will analyse a number of events that have occurred over the years between the political elite and grassroots militants. These events play out the vision of the chairman of the party and head of state to create a 'strong democracy whereby the elite lead the masses' [22]. Whereas actualising this 'vision' might have gone hitch-free during the monolithic era, it is proving to be much more challenging in the era of electoral authoritarianism.

4. Selection of candidates for the municipal and legislative elections

Following the official announcement of elections, the national president of the CPDM party issued a circular letter addressed to all militants in which he outlined the mode of selection of candidates to represent the party in the polls. The circular letter cited Article 23 of the constitution and basic texts of the party, which states that "the nomination of CPDM candidates for the parliamentary and municipal elections will revert to the Central Committee" [23].

The president's instructions to party militants were not very different from what obtained during authoritarian rule. Then, the political elite did not fail to remind militants seeking elective posts that their 'investiture' was thanks to the magnanimity of the party leadership and its illustrious leader, and not to their own efforts or the support of grassroots militants [18]. The circular goes on to state that selection by the central committee of the party will be done in conjunction with militants at the base, and will aim to encourage the emergence of honest and dynamic men, women and youths who can effectively convey to the grassroots the president's vision of transforming Cameroon into an emerging country by the year 2035. The circular ended with a call for the selection of candidates to be conducted in a spirit of openness, political maturity, objectivity and the quest for consensus [23].

Consensus was therefore a key element in the strategy of the CPDM party to mobilise grassroots militants for the 2013 municipal and legislative elections. As is the norm, the party hierarchy dispatched teams throughout the country to oversee the 'investiture' process. These teams were divided into two; one in charge of the municipal elections and another in charge of the legislative elections. Each team included; a president, a vice president, a coordinator, a chargés des missions and members [23]. In the run-up to the elections there was a beehive of activities throughout the country by party officials, administrative authorities and grassroots militants aimed at cementing the dominance of the CPDM party in the electoral arena in Cameroon.

4.1 Pre-electoral manoeuvrings

According to electoral regulations in Cameroon, the convening of the electoral corps effectively puts an end to registration of voters on the electoral list. This also marks the start of overt and covert manoeuvres by political parties to select or elect candidates to compete for various posts. Whereas campaigning officially kicks off 2 weeks before polling day, many observers felt the governing CPDM was already on the campaign trail as far back as 19th May 2011 [24].

In his traditional annual speech delivered on the eve of national day celebrated every 20th May, the head of state announced the issuing of national identity (ID) cards cost-free to all eligible Cameroonians. Similarly, he ordered the extension of the process a couple of months later in his usual end of year speech for 2012 [25]. The official reason advanced for this move was to accelerate the registration of

voters on the electoral lists, which was lagging ever since the process was announced in early 2011. In Cameroon, the ID card not only contains details (name, sex, date of birth, place of birth, etc.) of the bearer, but is essential for all official transactions. It is scrupulously controlled by security forces stationed along make-shift check-points on roads throughout the country.

The ID card is also an essential document for voter registration. However, inscription into the electoral register has been on a steady decline in the decades following the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s. Voter apathy is largely blamed on electoral fraud and a general feeling among many Cameroonians that the electoral process is fundamentally flawed to the point where change cannot be effected via the ballot box. As noted earlier, the current regime is a prolongation of the autocratic system created by Ahidjo which his successor Paul Biya has skilfully adapted into a 'democratic' environment [26].

Over the years, many citizens have lost faith in the electoral system because it is perceived to be incapable of effecting genuine political renewal in Cameroon. The 1992 presidential election was therefore seen as the turning point when Cameroonians, according to ([27], p. 114), "were made to understand that democracy is not necessarily having as president the person the majority wants." This assessment is based on the widely held view that that election was won by the opposition SDF leader, John Fru Ndi, but declared in favour of the CPDM by the Supreme Court [28].

The then president of the Supreme Court was infamously associated with the phrase my hands are tied by the law. The inability of the Supreme Court to declare what many believed was the 'right result' i.e. the defeat of the incumbent head of state generated public uproar which degenerated into civil disobedience and violence for several years. The action by the Supreme Court of Cameroon not only bounded the fate of millions of Cameroonians to a regime that many people genuinely wanted out of power, but also strengthened the argument by ([29], p. 12), that "in the face of the global resurgence of democracy, [authoritarian regimes] are bending democracy into a strategy of power, using elections to disempower the people. And they are succeeding."

On another note, the press widely reported how thousands of uncollected ID cards littered Police stations throughout the country. One newspaper reported how the Divisional Officer (DO) of Ebolowa II in the president's home Region took it upon himself to tour villages in his administrative unit, personally handing out ID cards that had been abandoned in the South Regional capital, Ebolowa [30]. As the elections approached, other Divisional Officer's shifted gear from distributing ID cards to distributing voter cards. In Mbankomo, barely weeks after his installation, I accompanied the Divisional Officer on the last leg of his tour of the subdivision. In his address to the population, the DO performed the role of civil administrator and party official. He called on CPDM militants to be united and vigilant, and to massively register and turn out in throve on polling day to vote for their party and President Paul Biya. His official delegation also included workers from the local branch of the election management body Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), and during each stopover their functions was to identify registered voters and hand out voter cards.

4.2 Meddling elite and discontented militants

State officials were not the only ones concerned about potential voter apathy. In a note addressed to party militants, the Secretary General of the CPDM appointed high-powered delegations of party bigwigs to the 10 regions of the country to sensitise and mobilise grassroots militants to collect voter cards [31]. This came

in the wake of a bruising investiture process in which many grassroots militants were enraged by the actions of some party bosses. The deployment of senior party officials to the field was not unusual. It is common practice during electoral periods in Cameroon for the public administration, i.e. ministerial departments and other public institutions to be emptied of high ranking bureaucrats. These public servants are deployed to their home regions and villages to campaign for the CPDM party. Dispatching such high level delegations on the eve of the 2013 municipal-legislative elections came amid generalised paranoia among party hierarchy over threats of widespread dissent and a possible party split. Despite official denials, it was hard to conceal the fact that these officials were sent out to persuade grassroots supporters enraged by what many perceived as treachery by elements of the political elite not to desert the party. Acrimony was so widespread that some loyal militants who lost out in the process not only pointed accusing fingers at party hierarchy but also expressed fears for the future of the party [16].

In Mbankomo, the outgoing Mayor sought the party endorsement to run for a second term, but his re-election bid was met with stiff opposition from another faction of the party that was favoured by the political elite. According to an informant and member of the outgoing Mayor's team the delegation sent-out by the CPDM party hierarchy to conduct the investiture process in Mbankomo was biased in favour of the Mayors opponents and connived with them to frustrate his re-election bid. As discussed below, the candidates list of the outgoing Mayor was thrown out in a rather ignominious manner. Despite this setback, my informant remained steadfast to the party and reaffirmed his undying loyalty to party president, Paul Biya. He however, expressed fears that enraged grassroots militants might transform anger into negative votes which might cause the party to lose the elections in Mbankomo and other places around the country where other militants were equally aggrieved.[4] These issues will be examined in greater details subsequently in the meantime I will examine how the investiture process played out in Mbankomo.

4.3 Contesting the party elite

On 11 July 2013, the CPDM central committee delegation responsible for the supervision of the investiture process in the Mefou and Akono Division descended on Mbankomo, where a meeting was scheduled in the municipal hall. This delegation was based at the divisional headquarters in Ngoumou, whence they visited other towns in the area for similar purposes. Initially slated for 13:00 the meeting finally started around 15:00. The meeting began with presentation of the rules for the investiture of candidates by the party chairman Paul Biya. The militants present were cautioned that aspirants whose documents did not conform to the electoral code would be disqualified by ELECAM. They were also reminded that candidates would be selected via consensus lists, and the list will be forwarded to the party headquarters for approval. The militants present in the hall were asked not to pay the requisite caution fee of CFA 50.000 FRS, but to have the cash handy and wait for the appropriate moment [16].

Following this brief presentation, the floor was opened for questions and comments. The first question from the audience sought clarification from the party delegates about who was authorised to sign the attestation of residence; this person was confused about the competent authority to legalise this document. One of the party delegates responded that under normal circumstances it was the responsibility of the legal department, but due to time constraints the signature of the Divisional Officer was sufficient. The next issue was the competent authority to legalise a

[4] Personal communication 07/12/2013.

birth certificate, the answer to that question was that it is the responsibility of the Mayor or civil status registrar of the person's place of birth. This was confirmed by the outgoing Mayor who expressed his availability to sign birth certificates without delay [16].

Following the outgoing Mayors clarification, the head of the central committee delegation stated that their job was to collect the list of ruling party candidates aspiring to contest the municipal elections for Mbankomo council. He added that the party chairman had recommended investiture of candidates via consensus lists. He also stated that the most important part of the meeting was to select the 25 members that will contest the municipal elections in Mbankomo on the CPDM party list. Another member of the central committee delegation stated that prior to their arrival in Mbankomo they were informed that preparatory meetings had taken place between different branches of the party (Youth, Women and Men) in Mbankomo [16]. These meetings were held in the presence of a party elite and former Minister, however, the stakeholders failed to come up with a consensus. As a result, three of the four list leaders agreed to fuse into one, but the outgoing Mayor declined to associate with them.

Following this remark, the chairman opened the floor for comments, questions and clarifications. The first hand that went up was that of the youth-wing or Y-CPDM president. He argued that not every local stakeholder was invited to the meetings at the former Minister's residence and as a result it was unfair to hold decisions taken at that meeting to be representative of everyone's opinions. He added that any consensus list should take into consideration the hard work of local CPDM youths who had made lots of sacrifices to represent the party at public events in Mbankomo, despite limited support from the political elite. The next person to take the floor was a man describing himself as a member of the local elite. He said the groundwork for the meeting was laid in the presence of everyone and that the statement by the Y-CPDM president was simply absurd. He added that everything had been sorted out and that the Y-CPDM president had to accept things the way they are. He then urged the Y-CPDM president to lay his political ambitions aside and join him to work for the unity of the party [16].

Responding to the controversy, the head of the central committee delegation stated that the party hierarchy sent them out to seek unity and solidarity among grassroots militants and to oversee the selection of 25 people who will continue the achievements of the outgoing team. He added that the central committee will have the final say about who is elected as councillor and will designate a Mayor among them, but for the moment the objective was to designate candidates that will form the consensus list. He also reminded the audience that Mbankomo Council requires 25 not 50 councillors and that the numbers cannot be multiplied to suit personal ambitions [16]. At that point, a suggestion was made that the contending list leaders select two people each to enter into a conclave and come up with a consensus list. Both sides accepted the suggestions and the meeting was suspended to reconvene at 18:00.

4.4 Intractable conclave: conversations on the sidelines

I returned to the venue at 18:00, but it seemed the 'white smoke' from the conclave that will signify 'consensus' between the factions vying for the CPDM candidates list for the municipal elections in Mbankomo was a long way off. While waiting for the contending parties to return, I struck-up conversations with some Y-CPDM militants who like me were watching the events unfold from the side-lines. The content of our conversations centred on the municipal and legislative elections in general and the reasons for the turmoil within the CPDM in Mbankomo and other places around the country.

One of my interlocutors, Onana (pseudonym), started off by listing the two main criteria for choosing candidates for the party, i.e. election via party primaries or selection most often by consensus. In 2007, the CPDM party designated its candidates via party primaries; however, in 2013, it was done by consensus. As discussed later, the choice of consensus was designed to avoid a repetition of events of 2007 where prominent members of the political elite were rejected by grassroots militants in several constituencies around the country.

According to this contact, selection of the 25 candidates for the 2007 municipal elections on the CPDM ticket began at the base, during which each tribal grouping comes up with its quota of candidates to make up the sociological components of the area. According to Section 151 (3) of the electoral code, "each list shall take into consideration the various sociological components of the constituency concerned..."[5] However, this law is quite vague about the meaning of the term 'sociological components,' leaving it to various interpretations. This hazy clause is often employed by electoral officials mainly as a justification for rejecting opposition party lists. Following the selection of candidates at the base, the list was forwarded to party headquarters, where it was discovered that names of many grassroots militants were removed, and replaced with the names of members of the political elite who mainly reside in the capital Yaoundé roughly 20 km away. This, according to Onana did not go down well with the grassroots militants and almost 'led to a revolution in Mbankomo.'[6]

Many people were angry at what they perceived as deliberate undermining of their choice of candidates by the party hierarchy in favour of those who are merely seeking their selfish political gains. Moreover, he went on, these outsiders only think of the grassroots during election periods and, after securing their mandates, quickly scarper off and no-one hears from them until elections are approaching again. Frustrated by such disingenuous practices, grassroots militants in 2007 decided to teach them a lesson during the party primaries.

Another interlocutor, Abogo (pseudonym), was frustrated that other councils in the area had already selected candidates, but Mbankomo always had problems because of meddling by the political elite. Pressed on the issue of meddling by the elites, he cited the furore that ensued following nationwide primaries held by the CPDM in the lead-up to the 2007 municipal elections. Back then, many prominent members of the CPDM party were humiliated and denied electoral franchise by grassroots militants. A notorious casualty of this revolt was the president of the National Assembly who in 2007 lost the party primaries in his local constituency in the Mayo Sava Division in the Extreme North of Cameroon, but was reinstated by the CPDM central committee. According to Abogo, the actions of the Central Committee greatly infuriated grassroots militants who viewed it as a blatant violation of their right to select credible people to represent them in key state and local institutions. He expressed fears that a similar action might be in the offing in Mbankomo.[7]

Unlike in 2007, Cameroon's political calendar in 2013 featured municipal, legislative and senatorial elections. The creation of the Senate in 2013 wrought fundamental changes in the hierarchical order at the helm of the state. According to Article 6(4) of the constitution, the President of the Senate is next in line to fill the post of head of state, albeit temporarily in case of a vacancy for reasons of illness, death or resignation. Prior to the creation of the Senate in 2013, the role of 'constitutional successor' was the preserve of the president of the National Assembly who in terms of state protocol was the second personality

[5] Law No. 2012/001 of 19 April 2012, on the Electoral Code of Cameroon.

[6] Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.

[7] Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.

of the state. This constitutional provision allows the individuals at the helm of the state during this delicate period to preside over the transition, but not put themselves up for election; however, they could prove to be a vital king-maker. With the advent of the Senate as the upper chamber of parliament, the role of temporary successor automatically shifted from the National Assembly to the Senate President [16].

Considering that he was rejected by grassroots militants in 2007 but forcefully reinstated by party hierarchy. The President of the National Assembly viewed the Senate as an opportunity to move away from direct dependence on grassroots militants and 'universal suffrage' for his political survival to an 'electoral college' made up of a selected number of municipal councillors. He also probably conjectured the opportunity of being appointed by the head of state into the Senate, because, as noted earlier, the latter has the constitutional prerogative to appoint 30 out of 100 senators that make up the upper chamber of the Cameroon legislature. In a desperate but ultimately futile attempt to maintain himself as the second personality of the State, 'the MP from the Mayo Sava constituency sought to be a candidate for the Upper House. Unfortunately, his application was rejected by the CPDM party's national nomination commission presided over by the party chairman President Paul Biya [32].'

It should be noted that in Cameroon, senators are voted by an electoral college that consists of Municipal Councillors. As a result, it is much easier for the political elite (as was observed during the 2013 and 2018 senatorial elections) to sway this select group of voters with financial and other material incentives to vote for them, than is the case with the mass of ordinary voters. In the months after the rejection of his senatorial bid, there was wild speculation that the president of the National Assembly whose mandate as parliamentarian was nearing its end was heading towards political oblivion. However, just like the mythical phoenix, his candidacy was endorsed by the party hierarchy, and he rose from the ashes to stage a remarkable comeback following the 2013 legislative elections, this time around in the position of the 3rd personality of the state and president of the National Assembly, a post he held since 1992. The next section of this chapter returns to the intractable conclave in Mbankomo to examine the outcome of the clash between the contending lists for the 2013 municipal elections.

4.5 Investiture without consensus

The conclave to select a consensus list to run for the CPDM party in Mbankomo ended late at night. The day after I met a key informant who took part in the meeting to find out whether the leaders of the conflicting factions finally agreed to form a consensus list. This informant had on previous occasions informed me that he was the chairman of the economic and social affairs committee of the outgoing council team and a close personal friend of the Mayor whose re-election bid was the subject of a robust challenge.

I was very keen to know what the shape of the consensus list looked like. He began by stating the obvious, that the meeting stretched beyond the time allotted and after intense negotiations both sides were still unable to reach a compromise. As a result the incumbent Mayor's list of which he was a member and that supported by the political elite was forwarded that same night to the departmental committee in Ngoumou. At Ngoumou, the incumbent Mayor's list was rejected for being incomplete.

> *"How is this possible…? He fumed, how can people collect a file containing documents that were complete and verified and by the time it gets to its destination it is*

> *found to be incomplete? How is this possible...? You see how these people (referring to the central committee delegation) are rubbing us of our rights as militants of the CPDM. I could tell that something was fishy in the hall when he (the head of the central committee delegation) publicly asked both sides not to pay the caution money of 50,000, despite being aware that the fees for the opposition list had been paid."*[8]

Asked how the plot unfolded, he said a lot of underhand tactics were employed by their adversaries in the dying minutes of the conclave. Thus, before it was decided that two lists be forwarded to the departmental committee, both sides almost reached consensus, but discussion broke down over who would head such a list. When it finally arrived in Ngoumou, on examining the Mayor's list, it turned out to be incomplete because some documents were missing, while those of his opponents were complete. Days after the deadline for submission of documents to ELECAM had passed, the missing documents were discovered on the grounds of a secondary school in Yaoundé several kilometres from where they were deposited [16].

Not everybody was aggrieved by the outcome of the investiture process in Mbankomo. Another informant and CPDM militant I regularly interacted with during my research and who described himself as a supporter of the political elite was not very surprised at the outcome of the conclave. He said everyone from the Divisional Officer, former and current Ministers and other personalities who hail from the area were not very fond of the outgoing Mayor and his team, but could not really do much to get rid of them until the appropriate moment. He described the Mayor as an 'absentee landlord' who only appears when important personalities are visiting town or during public events such as the installation of the DO. He equally accused the mayor of abandoning the day-to-day management of the council to some auxiliaries and other individuals who were in his private pay. For example, he had a personal assistant who was not a member of the council staff and this person was not accountable to anybody except the Mayor. According to my informant, the Mayor also failed to delegate responsibility to his two official deputies as required by law.[9]

5. Conclusion

It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that 2018 is an important electoral year in Cameroon. In line with the initial calendar, legislative, municipal, senatorial and presidential elections were scheduled to take place. Senatorial elections were held in March 2018, municipal and legislative elections were postponed for 1 year, and presidential elections are scheduled for October 2018. The official reasons for the postponement of the legislative and municipal elections was a 'congested electoral calendar' however, many observers believe that the worsening security situation in the English-speaking North-West and South-West Regions makes it almost impossible for the conduct of elections based on universal suffrage. The question that therefore arises is why organise presidential elections which like the legislative and municipal elections that was postponed, are based on universal suffrage, even though, chances are the elections will not be effective in the two English Speaking areas of the country that are seeking to breakaway?

[8] Personal communication 07/12/2013.

[9] Personal communication 07/13/2013.

That question like the issue of organising elections at a period when the country is embroiled in a profound crisis that is fast degenerating into a civil war remains contentious. However, many supporters of the governing regime argue that there is no clause in the electoral code that stipulates that presidential elections or indeed any elections must be held throughout the national territory for the results to be deemed legitimate. This therefore brings up another question. Why postpone the legislative and municipal elections and proceed with presidential elections if the legitimacy of the process is not affected by the prospects of elections not being organised throughout the country? The answer to this question not only lies in the intricacies of the crisis situation in the North-West and South-West Regions of the country, but also in the believe by the electoral authoritarian regime in Cameroon that its legitimacy is not necessarily based on the results of elections but on its manipulative skills.

The announcement of the presidential elections generated a lot of debate and also speculation about whether the 84 years old President who has been in power for 36 years will run again. On the one hand, some opposition figures and civil society expressed the wish that the incumbent Paul Biya should not seek another 7 years mandate, but should instead organise free, fair transparent elections that will lead to a smooth transition of power. On the other hand, militants of the CPDM boasted that Biya is their 'natural candidate' and were in no doubt about the eventuality of him declaring his candidature before the expiration of the deadline, something he eventually did via twitter on Friday 13th July 2018.

In October 2018 therefore, Cameroonians will be heading to the polls to elect a new president. This will be exactly 26 years from the highly acrimonious 1992 presidential elections. Just like on previous occasions, the opposition is heading in to the electoral arena in dispersed ranks which greatly reduces its chances of electoral success. Not wanting to leave anything to chance, the government on its part has embarked on the usual divide, weaken and conquer strategy.

Following internecine squabbles within three opposition parties, the Interior Minister issued a communique which surreptitiously declared three individuals that were contesting the leadership of their respective parties as the only individuals officially authorised to represent the said parties. Few days after the minister's communique, the 'officially recognised' party leaders in collaboration with a horde of other politicians came out publicly to pledge their support for the candidacy of President Paul Biya. Curiously, one of the deposed party leaders who sought to counter the minister's declaration was denied the authorization to organise a public event, and on the day of the said event, the party headquarters was surrounded by heavily armed policemen and soldiers bent on ensuring the event did not happen.

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Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of Interest.

Notes/thanks/other declarations

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Chapter 3

Electoral Behavior and Politics of *Stomach Infrastructure* in Ekiti State (Nigeria)

Mike Omilusi

Abstract

Ekiti State is one of the most literate communities in Nigeria and adjudged to be a politically sophisticated entity within the federation. Expectedly, its politics becomes a research interest for political observers, policymakers and scholars alike. However, the 2014 governorship poll and 2015 general elections in the state present some socio-political paradoxes, contradictions and nuances that need an analytical examination. What could have propelled a state rich in human capital to prefer the choice of "stomach infrastructure" over sustainable development? What could have precipitated the rejection of a manifesto-driven candidature in preference for "I will put smile on your faces" sloganeering? This study interrogates the philosophical and socio-political underpinnings that may have shaped the political behavior of Ekiti people within the context of its larger Yoruba nation in particular and Nigeria in general. It also examines the nexus between performance in government—as a political investment—and electoral rewards by the voters. It employs the concept of prebendalism to further examine the interplay between politics of the belly and voting behavior in an electoral contest.

Keywords: electoral behavior, stomach infrastructure, politics, election, democracy

1. Introduction

Whether held under authoritarian or democratic regimes, elections have a ritualistic aspect. Elections and the campaigns preceding them are dramatic events that are accompanied by rallies, banners, posters, headlines and television coverage, all of which call attention to the importance of participation in the event. Whatever the peculiar national, regional, or local variations, elections are events that, by arousing emotions and channeling them towards collective symbols, break the monotony of daily life and focus attention on the common fate [1]. Competitive, free and fair elections are the sine qua non of democracy. However, other institutional components of good governance are also much more likely to be vibrant and effective in a democracy than it would be in a non-democracy. These include an independent judiciary with a clear and predictable rule of law; an elected parliament that is autonomous and capable of checking and scrutinizing the executive branch of government; and a civil society with the freedom and resources to monitor, evaluate, question and participate in the making and implementation of policy [2].

In reality, Almami [3] submits that Africa's experience with electoral democracy has been mixed: progress has been made but challenges remain. The various

elections in the past several years—from Kenya and Zimbabwe to Ghana and Sierra Leone—have become historical landmarks for different reasons, varying drastically in their conduct and outcome. This mix of electoral experiences has generated considerable debate and passion on the subject of transparent, free and fair electoral processes among election stakeholders, especially as democratic progress itself can come with further challenges; as more elections are held, and as these elections become increasingly competitive, one-party and military regimes face potentially destabilizing challenges that could increase the risk of fraud and violence.

Electoral democracy is based on the principle of free and open competition among alternative political parties, representing divergent policy programs, groups of candidates and sectors of society, so that citizens have a range of genuine choices at the ballot box. If party organizations are unduly constrained, then this limits the ability of citizens to articulate their demands, express their preferences and hold rulers to account ([4]: 5). The electoral system of a country is the critical institution which shapes and influences the rules of political competition for state power because it determines what parties look like, who is represented in the legislature, how accountable these representatives are to the electorate and above all who governs. It is good to know that the way an electoral system operates determines the degree of public confidence and support for the democratic system itself. An electoral system regulates elections and other related activities ([5]: xviii).

In other words, the will of the people manifested in the election of their representatives elected in a free, fair, credible and transparent atmosphere constitutes the leitmotif of the democratic process. For democracy to thrive, therefore, there must be a level playing field for all contestants to public office. Furthermore, there must be fully operational variables such as a free press, independent judiciary and an informed and discerning electorate, capable of making rational choices among competing ideologies and candidates put before them by the various political parties [6].

For the 2014 governorship election in Ekiti State, a number of posers have been raised particularly in respect of the choice of the electorate among the major contestants: Does performance matter? If not, what matters? What does the Ekiti election tell us about the electorate? They voted their preference. Is their preference for Fayose or against Fayemi? Can preferences be wrong? Where preferences reflect interests, can interests be misinformed? Can we firmly declare that emotional appeal as against rational appeal took the better part of most voters in Ekiti or is it just a manifestation of politics of spite? Can this trend be a pointer that can reveal the specific type of appeal that can sway the mind and voting pattern of the average Nigerian voter? Can the voting pattern in the 2015 Ekiti elections be regarded as an affirmation of the 2014 governorship election?

2. Background to Yoruba socio-political ecology

The Yoruba of the South-West zone, according to Osuntokun [7], was the first to organize themselves against the British imperialism. In fact, as far back as the time of the governor-generalship of Sir Frederick Lugard, Lagosians under their leaders were involved in protesting against water rate imposed on them without consultation. In 1923 Dr. J.C. Vaughan and Ayo Williams with Ernest Ikoli organized the "Union of Young Nigerian" to demand a say in the affairs of the country. Later, J.C. Vaughan, H.O. Davies, Ernest Ikoli and Samuel Akinsanya formed the Lagos Youth Movement which metamorphosed into the Nigerian Youth Movement in the 1930s. Throughout the period of the dominance of the Nigerian Youth Movement and later the N.C.N.C., Yoruba people have always played politics of principle such as the abandonment of Samuel Akinsanya's candidacy of the legislative council

in preference for Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw which created a crisis when ironically the Yoruba was accused of tribalism for supporting an Ijaw man. When in 1951 Obafemi Awolowo formed the Action Group, Yoruba opinion continued to be divided, and the Yoruba did not see any reason for everyone to belong to the same party. Osuntokun submits, as a matter of fact that:

> *Politics of principle continued to dominate Yorubaland through the period of the hegemony of the Action Group to the extent that the Action Group, a sitting government party lost the federal elections of 1954 to the N.C.N.C in the West. In other words, a pattern of political division and different approach to politics was firmly established in Yorubaland. So nothing really is new in the apparent lack of political unity in Yorubaland today.*

The high level of civic consciousness in this zone translates into a community capacity to define the correct political line and to impose sanctions for political misbehavior. The zone is noted for imposing sanctions on politicians adjudged to have a broken rank with tradition or to have acted in a politically embarrassing manner in relation to what is perceived as the collective interest of the Yoruba.

While examining the fortunes of Nigeria and the destiny of Yoruba race with particular reference to leadership, Kolawole [8] submits that the liberal approach of the Yoruba to leadership should ordinarily be a commendable group attribute. But in a pluralist society like Nigeria where the principles of true federalism are in abeyance rather than observance, where ethnicism determines the color of relationship, it becomes a handicap. He notes further:

> *The Yoruba people do not suffer fools gladly. Ironically, they do not follow a genius blindly either. They seem programmed to ask questions. The Yoruba people are the greatest critics of their Yoruba colleagues in power. It does not matter whether he is a President, Governor, Minister or Local Government Chairman. The most vociferous opposition to Awo's quest for national leadership came from a united though a minority Yoruba group.*

As noted by Sekoni [9], the response of the average Yoruba voter to election is determined by his view about the credibility of the electoral process. Yoruba people react to the organization of elections in three basic ways: spontaneous celebration after the result of voting is seen to reflect the choice voters believe they have made, immediate contestation or protest against an election they presume to have been rigged and delayed reaction to an election they also perceive to have been rigged. All of these three patterns of response on the day after an election have been witnessed in the region since the emergence of voting for political parties in the country.

The Yoruba value of plurality of perspective allows the average voter in the region to respect the principle of multiparty democracy. This principle also allows individuals to choose which of the parties is closest to his/her expectations in and from life. This explains why there are Yoruba people in all political parties. In the Yoruba region, twins belong to different or opposing political parties, the same way they may choose to belong to different religions. Siblings are happy with each other regardless of the parties or religions they espouse. But when an election leads to transferring the victory of candidate A to candidate B, friendship ends and tension emerges even among family members. While emphasizing the importance of the region to national politics, Akinnaso [10] observes that from the early days of independence, the South-West has always been the battleground zone in presidential politics. Saved for the unusual presidential election of 1999, in which former

President Olusegun Obasanjo was the preferred candidate from the onset, no one has been elected prime minister or president without winning the South-West.

3. Ekiti state creation and electoral democracy

Ekiti State of Nigeria was created on October 1, 1996, along five other states by General Sani Abacha regime. The state which was carved out of the old Ondo State has its headquarters located in Ado Ekiti, and it covers 12 local government areas that made up the Ekiti Zone of the old Ondo State. However, Ekiti State on creation took off with 16 local government areas, having had additional 4 carved out of the old ones.

The creation of Ekiti State for the people of Ekiti in the realization of their self-determination aspiration was received with overwhelming joy, pomp and pageantry by indigenes at home and abroad. The initial impetus for the agitation of the creation of the state by Ekiti people was borne out of a feeling of neglect, marginalization, impoverishment and the desire and quest for self-assertion, autonomous development and meaningful participation in events and situations that directly impacted on their lives and destiny ([11]: xi).

They are culturally homogenous and they speak a dialect of Yoruba language known as Ekiti. The homogenous nature of Ekiti confers on the state some uniqueness among the states of the federation. Slight differences are noticeable in the Ekiti dialect of the Yoruba language spoken by the people. This is affected by their partial locations, especially the border communities to other states [12]. Some core values used to guide the conduct of the people before the horrendous nature of politics in this clime became a constant feature of their existence as once observed by Omilusi [13]:

> *The state is a conglomeration of compact rural communities of distinct history where communalism operates in its real form. The people there live for the benefit of their neighbours and common good is the core value. Honour and integrity also play essential roles in every action and speech of that growing up boy or girl in the neighbourhood. Quest for materialism does not receive public attention. Rather, education is seen as an indisputable path to greater things in life... Admitted that the hooliganism of ethnic militias and incessant religious crises that characterize other parts of the country are not yet here with us, but the face of politics has horrendously changed to accommodate insecurity of life and property.*

Based on the 1999 constitution, promulgated as Decree 24 of 1999, Ekiti State was recognized as one of the states in the country for the conduct of the local government, state and federal elections. As at 2006, Ekiti State's population was 2,398,957. It has a land area of 6353 km^2, bigger than only four states: Imo, Abia, Anambra and Lagos. It is divided into 16 local government areas, 177 electoral wards, 26 state constituencies, 6 federal constituencies and 3 senatorial constituencies. The state is homogenous, the people being all of Ekiti-speaking Yoruba stock. With the voter registration conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the state has a population of 733,766 registered voters.

The quest for the creation of Ekiti was a long-cherished ambition of the people of the state. The excision of Ondo State (of which Ekiti was a part) from the Western State in 1976 was a half-way station on the road to the fulfilment of this dream, which came to reality in 1996. Thus, when the people of Ekiti State elected their governor and members of the State House of Assembly in 1999, they were hopeful that self-determination would result in rapid socio-economic development. The Alliance for Democracy won

the election of 1999 but lost the 2003 governorship election which brought in the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to power ([14]: 8).

The outcome of the 2003 election, as well as the behavior of the people at the polls, can be attributed to a number of variables. One is the non-performance of the incumbent, which further impoverished the people. The peoples' disenchantment with the AD government was so much that not even the huge amount of money doled out days before the election could make them vote otherwise. Another variable is the desire of the people to align with the government at the federal level and the desire of President Obasanjo to "capture" his constituency (South-West zone). The people perceived the prolonged neglect of the state by successive administrations to be consequent upon their traditional and historic romance with the opposition party. As such, they believed that voting at the state level, a party that controls the center, would attract the much-needed "federal" presence ([15]: 134). However, the mainstream politics—aligning with the party at the center—introduced to the zone in the 2003 election (which actually led to five out of the six states in the zone being controlled by the People's Democratic Party) did not reflect any significant change in the living standard of the people ([16]: 231). It merely corroborates one empirical way of defining political parties in Nigeria *that they are vehicles for the expression and exercise of conflicts over the control of power*.

However, the PDP's hold on power was tenuous because of internal party crises, which paved the way for the simultaneous impeachment of the governor and deputy governor on October 16, 2006. The political intrigues that culminated in their impeachment also resulted in the removal of the State Chief Judge, who was sidelined by the State House of Assembly to pave the way for the impeachments. The impeachment imbroglio led to a situation in which the Speaker of the State House of Assembly, the deputy governor and the governor simultaneously claimed to be the state's chief executive for a few days. Ostensibly because of the flawed process followed by the State House of Assembly in removing the executive and the multiple claimants to the political leadership of the state, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Ekiti State on October 19, 2006 and appointed retired General Tunji Olurin as a Sole Administrator for 6 months, during which period he presided over the 2007 general elections in Ekiti State ([14]: 8).

INEC declared the PDP winner of the 2007 election in the state, but the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) went to the election tribunal to challenge the result. In August 2008, the election tribunal confirmed the PDP candidate, Eng. Segun Oni, as winner of the gubernatorial election. Dissatisfied, the ACN candidate, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, went to the appeal court which in February 2009, nullified Oni's election and ordered re-run elections within 90 days in 10 out of Ekiti's 16 local government areas (LGAs). Although INEC again declared that Oni had won the re-run elections conducted in April 2009, Fayemi disagreed and again went to the election tribunal. The tribunal dismissed his petition in May 2010, so he proceeded to the Court of Appeal, which declared him the winner of the election in October 2010. Dr. Fayemi thus assumed office as governor in October 2010 after a protracted judicial struggle.

Ekiti State apart from being poor is predominantly an educationist and public service state, with majority of its people being teachers and public servants, who are basically salary earners. And going by the significant relevance of money to politics in Nigeria, these people find it difficult to invest such earnings in a "risky" venture like politics. What then obtains is that people outside the state with more financial clout and most often backed by a godfather but with less education usually find it easy gaining access into the political space of the state. Also, because of the pervasive nature of poverty in the state, it is not difficult for people who have money to induce or persuade the masses to vote for them, even when these people have nothing to offer. For instance, the victory of Niyi Adebayo over the likes of

S.K. Babalola in the AD primaries was believed by many in the state to have been facilitated by financial inducement of the delegates. As was the case in 1999, the PDP gubernatorial standard bearer—Ayo Fayose—was the least educated of all the candidates fielded by the major parties that contested the election.

Akinnaso [17–19] observes that Ekiti State politics has been typified by four main features, namely, cut-throat intraparty intrigues and interparty competition among contestants, imposition of candidates by political godfathers, physical and verbal thuggery and electoral malpractices. To be sure, none of these features is unique to Ekiti politics nor do they carry equal weight during each election cycle, but what is unique about Ekiti, according to him, is the conjunctive interplay among the features and the intensity of their manifestations. This was evident in 2007 when the governorship election led to a prolonged legal tussle, a controversial election re-run and the eventual reversal of Segun Oni's victory by the appeal court, which declared Dr. Kayode Fayemi of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria as the winner on October 15, 2010.

4. The 2014 governorship election: Issues and perspectives

Evidently, the poll was an enlightenment lesson on the fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. An apparently puzzled Fayemi noted that his understanding of the people's expectations may have been flawed. He said in his broadcast: "Indeed, a new sociology of the Ekiti people may have evolved. However, the task of understanding how the outcome of this election has defined us as a people will be that of scholars" ([20]: 21). Before the electoral defeat, public perception of his administration, largely informed by media presentation, gave him good marks for good governance. Against the background of his unexpected loss, it is apt to wonder whether the media was faithful to its role in representing reality (ibid). The landslide victory recorded by the candidate of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), Mr. Ayo Fayose, in the election, adjudged by most observers as remarkably free and fair, seems to reveal that the undercurrents of voter's behavior and political choice in Nigeria might still be shrouded in mystery that will take a long time to be unraveled ([21]: 47).

However, there is little doubt that the underlay of Mr. Ayo Fayose's "grassroots politics" and its success in the Ekiti election were principally a class factor. Fayose had plebian appeal, and it was so effective he did not even need to articulate a manifesto to win the election ([22]: 64). The election did not witness the intellectual debates that could have also influenced, as is the practice in advanced democracies, the choice of the voters. And, perhaps, the pre-election opinion poll would have clearly indicated the likely voting pattern. Akinnaso [17–19] argues that it is equally premature to extrapolate from the Ekiti results to the party affiliation of the Ekiti people or their voting pattern in 2015. Fayose's victory did not suddenly turn Ekiti people to People's Democratic Party members. They voted specifically for or against particular candidates and not for or against their political parties. Fayose's victory came from either voters who set out to vote for him or those who set out to vote against Fayemi for various reasons.

As opined by Fagbenle [23], "Granted that Ayo Fayose had a peculiar appeal on his people, and granted that there were other factors that conspired against Dr. kayode Fayemi, if truly, contrary to long held values of the Ekiti and the Yoruba people, the Ekiti result is owed largely to people's preference for 'stomach infrastructure' to long-term overall development of the state, then there is danger in the land and all right thinking people must recognize this and get armed to confront the virus before it assumes epidemic proportion".

5. The 2015 general elections: A case of affirmation?

It is posited that the March 28 and April 11, 2015, presidential and parliamentary elections offered a unique opportunity for the leaders of the APC in Ekiti, particularly ex-Governor Fayemi, to prove that Fayose's victory in the June 21, 2014, governorship election was a fluke. They should have demonstrated the APC's electoral strength on the ground to lend credence to their allegation that Fayose's earlier electoral triumph was rigged [24]. However, the People's Democratic Party won the three senatorial and six House of Representatives seats in the March 28, 2015, elections, just as it won the presidential election with a total 176,466 votes, winning in all the 16 local governments. Also, the People's Democratic Party cleared all the 26 State Assembly seats as officially declared by the Independent National Electoral Commission being the results of the House of Assembly election conducted on April 11.

Those who share the view that winning an election does not automatically confer popularity on a particular politician hinge their argument on the fact that in Nigeria's political climate, factors determining the success or victory of politicians defer. For example, some analysts argue that instances abound where elections are manipulated in favor of the preferred candidates who are not necessarily popular but are in the good books of the "powers that be". The political process is usually skewed in favor of these elements, who ordinarily could not have won in a free and fair contest. This often generated a lot of dust within the party with attendant defections. It is believed that some politicians often ride on the crest of party's popularity as against theirs to win elections [25].

For Mr. Ayodele Fayose, the outcome of the Presidential and National Assembly elections in the state actually vindicated his stand that the outcome of the June 21, 2014, governorship election was not rigged as was being touted by the All Progressives Congress. The Special Assistant to the Governor on Information, Mr. Lanre Ogunsuyi, said the 2015 election results proved the sceptics wrong that it was skewed in favor of the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

> *It is now confirmed to whoever is still doubting that Fayose is indeed a super political champion that the man is more than that, he is also a rare breed. In the same token, the outcome of the National Assembly election which made the PDP candidates to defeat all the candidates of APC in both the Senate and House of Representatives, including all the incumbent ones, show that all negative claims about June 21, 2014 governorship poll, existed only in the imagination of those that faulted the outcomes (APC).*

It should be noted, however, that during the electioneering, one of the leading proponents of hate campaign in the country was Ayo Fayose. Fayose once bought the front pages of *The Punch* and *The Sun Newspapers* not only to pass a death sentence on Buhari because the man is 72; he used the same medium to mock dead leaders from a section of the country. His invective and acid sarcasms targeted at the presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) that General Muhammadu Buhari may have left some Nigerians in consternation nay and bewilderment, but to many others, the Ekiti State Governor, Ayodele Fayose, was merely treading his familiar terrain of controversy. Ordinarily, this should have aroused resentment among the Ekiti people who are known for decency and integrity. According to Ayobolu [24], "many analysts have, directly or indirectly, questioned the fidelity of the Ekiti people to those principles and values for which they were once so highly regarded. These include industry, discipline, an ascetic disposition, honor, dignity, courage and courteousness".

Three major factors could be adduced to the voting pattern of the electorate in the 2015 elections in Ekiti. One, the passion with which a majority of the electors voted against Dr. Kayode Fayemi 8 months earlier had not waned. In spite of the non-visible improvement in their living standard or any development agenda by the incumbent, they still wanted to affirm their support for a man they see as a "friend of the masses". Two, the idea of mainstream politics—to guarantee support from a PDP-led federal government—was relentlessly emphasized by Fayose with a view to fulfilling his "electioneering promises". It became the main issue in their house-to-house campaign. Three, many of the APC leaders could not be seen in the state during electioneering campaign but for the centrally organized presidential rally. This is in addition to their inability to make funds available to the party and its candidates for the national and state assembly elections. Hence, few candidates that came out were easily intimidated just as they had their political rallies regularly disrupted by political thugs believed to be state agents.

6. Irony of good performance and mandate rejection: The place of *stomach infrastructure*

Much has been made of Governor Fayemi having been either unable or unwilling to satisfy the masses of Ekiti State on the matter of "stomach infrastructure". By this phrase it meant that the people cared far less for spending the state's meagre handouts from Abuja on the development of physical and institutional infrastructures than giving out largesse to cronies and not keeping from workers, teachers and students what they can consume now in the name of sacrifices for the future ([26]: 17). It is contended that Nigerians will always make their choices, even if the choices seem to serve short-term purposes and that the Ekiti governorship election was won and lost on this aphorism. This politics of "stomach infrastructure" applies to the two major political parties in the election, that is, the All Progressives Congress and the People's Democratic Party, taking advantage of the impoverished masses. In fact, those who were arrested on election day were caught with huge sums of money meant to buy votes only that the arrest was restricted to a political party. In his view, Gbadegesin [27] avers that there must be something more than performance that is central to the voters' idea of good governance:

> *For them, it has to be "performance plus x", where various items are substituted for X, depending on the preferences of individuals and groups. For contractors, it is performance plus contract awards. For teachers, it is performance plus payment of not only salaries but also allowances for training, in addition to not being held accountable for students' performances through continuous certification tests. For students, it is performance plus free tuition at the Ekiti State University (EKSU). For the jobless, it is performance plus job opportunities. For the hungry, it is performance plus bags of rice and gallons of cooking oil. The list is inexhaustible because preferences are elastic.*

In its analysis on the Ekiti election with regard to government reforms and people's voting behavior, *The Economist* [28] posits that, in dismissing a forward-thinker, the voters sent out a loud message. After coming to power in 2010, Fayemi laid new roads, improved the university system, presented a plan to get more young people into jobs, created a social security scheme for the elderly and cut corrupt wage payments to government workers. But such reforms upset people with a vested interest in the old political system. Unqualified teachers who have been told to take

tests as part of Mr. Fayemi's education reforms probably voted against him. So did civil servants upset by his more meritocratic hiring practices. Such people plainly prefer the old "politics of the belly", which keeps them comfortably on the state payroll and hands out cash in return for their votes. In fact, to convince people that he knew what they wanted, Fayose during his acceptance speech declared that his priority was not to industrialize the state now, but to "take good care of the people by awarding contracts to them" [21].

It is instructive that this may not be a peculiar feature of Ekiti political behavior when viewed within the context of the Nigerian state and its people. Omatseye [29] submits that those who spun the story of a disconnected Fayemi worked on a number of factors: One, Fayemi's belief that when you do your work, you will get the praise. This did not work because they knew Nigeria has changed progressively over a generation of alienated leadership. Honor has been redefined in the culture of the people. Infrastructure is important in government to inspire dignity of labor. When government provides them, individuals work for their own profit and so earn their own pride. But before their eyes, lazy men become billionaires and smart men work for them. Success no longer depends on the assiduity or the acumen but on indolence. They see the political elite buy all the lands and hold parties in Dubai and New York, and their labors lead nowhere.

It is expected that the basis of government's or, preferably, a leader's "connectedness" with the people should be primarily evident in government policies and physical projects that could better the lots of the populace. However, personal social relations of the vote seeker have become a significant contributing factor to the voting pattern of Ekiti people—a trend that is also observable in other parts of the country. With regard to this, the two major contestants in the 2014 election were assessed thus:

> *The major contrast between Fayemi and Fayose that actually defined the voting pattern was the issue of relating personally with the common man. While Fayemi does not believe in tokenism, that is the strength of $Fayose. While Fayemi is not the social party type, Fayose loves owanbe and is ever ready to dance with the common man. While Fayemi will wake up by 4 am and read till 8 am, Fayose wakes up to start political meetings with his supporters ([21]: 50).*

Being "out of touch" in the Nigerian political lexicon, however, defines the politician who is not grounded in grassroots politicking characterized by dispensing government largesse in cash and kind directly to the people who, out of poverty, only understand the language of instant gratification. Rather than building enduring infrastructure, politicians of this school of thought believe their electability or popularity will be enhanced by the amount of patronage they can dispense. In doing this, they create a cultlike figure in the eyes of the critical mass of the working poor. In a country where poverty stalks the citizens like a shadow, this has proven very effective ([30]: 26).

This can be further explained with Richard Joseph's concept of prebendalism. Prebendalism is the disbursing of public offices and state rents to one's ethnic-based clients and is inherently rooted in state corruption. The concept was applied specifically to the context of Nigerian politics. It is an extreme form of clientelism where state resources are corruptly allocated in order to mobilize cultural and political identities. Clientelism is defined as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors are offered in return for political support at the polls. It is an established pattern of political behavior that justifies pursuit of and use of public office for personal benefit of the officeholder and his clients. Under prebendalism

the position in public office becomes secondary to personal pursuits. Forest [31] submits, therefore, that:

> *Because of this system of patronage and personal largesse, a political culture has developed in which the government is not seen as a means to serve the people and the state, but rather, the means to wealth. Any member of a family or clan who can get a government job becomes the centerpiece of an extended support system, a type of relational social security built exclusively on who you know or who knows you. It is a system in which anyone who holds a position within the government—even at the lowest levels of authority—is expected by their family and friends to supplement their meager income with alternative sources, stealing money, and sharing the wealth.*

As noted by Wantchekon [32], a large body of the comparative politics literature has investigated the nature of patron-client relationships, the inefficiency of various forms of clientelist redistribution and conditions for its decay. The common conclusion is that clientelist politics is most attractive in conditions of low productivity, high inequality and starkly hierarchical social relations. Others stress the importance of culture, historical factors, levels of economic development and the size of the public sector economy. In Africa, comparative politics scholars have long considered electoral politics to be systematically and inherently clientelist. African rulers, whether self-appointed or democratically elected, rely on the distribution of personal favors to selected members of the electorate in exchange for ongoing political support. This observation relies on the implicit assumption that African voters invariably have a much stronger preference for private transfers than for public goods or projects of national interest.

The politics of "stomach infrastructure" and its now feared consequences, that is, if not applied, began to have ripple effects on governance philosophy in the country, particularly in states being controlled by the then opposition party to avoid protest votes at the poll. For instance, over 900 teachers, suspended by the Edo State government on charges of certificate and age forgery, who ordinarily should be prosecuted by a competent court, were recalled, while their allowances/salary arrears are being agitated for. Such policy reversal took place in Lagos State in respect of tuition fee. Akinlotan [33] expresses concern that the South-West zone has "begun to roll back their principled and well-considered stand on education, infrastructure and other policies....enact mass surrender to the short-sighted and even whimsical needs of the electorate". This trend is surely a worrisome template for governance, not only in the region but in Nigeria.

The idea of a specified single-term tenure for elected governors and president would have been an applicable antidote to compromising lofty policies on the basis of *next election*, but the obvious fact is if the candidate is not seeking a second term in office, his/her party desires it, even more passionately as other party members are also waiting for their turn. In this situation, that is, if the office holder refuses to apply "stomach infrastructure" to appeal to the sometimes superficial demands of the voters, the pressure will come more from within than without. In a country where voters are often swayed by frivolities rather than substance, opposition parties easily catch in on this.

One observable phenomenon among the populace in Ekiti is that many people depend on the government and political appointees for daily survival. Politics, rather than the much-talked-about education, has now become the major industry in Ekiti State especially for the teeming youths—both the unemployed certificated ones and the unemployable ones. To many of them, it is more desirable to pursue a career in politics—which they pride as their chosen profession—so as to access free money in lieu of a career job or skill acquisition in entrepreneurship.

7. The Ekiti electorate and right of/reasons for choice

The decision of the people to vote out the incumbent governor has been partly attributed to politics of spite particularly in respect of the political appointees from different communities of the state, those who alienate themselves from their constituencies. For a party that controls all the 16 local government areas through appointed caretaker committees, 25 out of the 26 members of the State House of Assembly, 5 of the 6 House of Representative members and the 3 senatorial seats, in addition to numerous appointees, commissioners, special advisers and special assistants, losing the governorship election surely serves as an indictment on the political value or relevance of these appointees. Ado Ekiti (the state capital) alone has over 100 appointees, yet none of the wards was delivered for the ruling party.

The argument has been that these people, ordinarily, should be doing the grassroots interaction, socialization and intimacy on behalf of the governor. Suffice it to say, many of those holding sensitive positions among them do not reside in their communities and spend their weekends in other cosmopolitan states. This sentiment (of neglect) is also expressed by the local contractors who, in their private interactions, campaigned against the governor's re-election bid on the basis of non-patronage, which could have aided capital circulation within their various communities.

Another factor that explains the voting pattern of the Ekiti people is located in their sociological trait of impatience, such that they are always in a hurry with any government that fails to satisfy their immediate needs—usually regarded as an element of performance. This may have accounted for the rapid regime turnover in the 18-year-old state. For instance, between 1996 and 2014, Ekiti has produced 12 administrators, governors and acting governors. This factor also partly explains why the people, at every critical moment, move from certainty to uncertainty. Adetoye [34] cites an instance when Ekiti wanted to pull out of the oil-rich old Ondo State despite the benefits accruable from remaining in that union.

In his analysis, Akinnaso [17–19] submits that what most people thought was Fayemi's main voting bloc—Ekiti intellectuals, political appointees and the educated workforce (teachers and civil servants)—was really never completely with him. This situation was worsened by the decision by his friend, Opeyemi Bamidele, to leave the All Progressives Congress and contest the governorship as a Labour Party candidate, largely because he was prevented by the leadership of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria from contesting the primary election against Fayemi. By so doing, he drew some supporters from Fayemi.

A comparative analysis of the 2003 and 2014 governorship elections in the state contested by Mr. Ayo Fayose against the two incumbent governors may have reinforced the ruling party's allegation of scientific rigging—*the use of photochromic technology used in printing the ballot paper and the quality of the indelible ink during the latter election*. Surely, this variant of alleged rigging is alien to the country's electoral democracy, and its authenticity has been questioned by curious observers. However, all those factors that usually work in favor of politicians in Nigeria, that is, incumbency factor, performance, party's traditional stronghold, spread of political appointments, financial inducement and party big wigs' influence in their communities, among others, did not guarantee victory for the incumbent governor as he lost in all the 16 local government areas.

From the two elections, it is clear that in 2003, the incumbent governor Mr. Niyi Adebayo of Alliance of Democracy (AD)—a precursor to the present All Progressives Congress (APC)—won in more of the 16 local government areas in spite of his relatively lower performance than the People's Democratic Party (PDP) but for the higher number of votes garnered in Ado Ekiti and Ikere Ekiti local governments in favor of the PDP. The outcome of the 2003 election partly justified the above-stated factors that work for politicians in this clime.

8. Other observable issues: Security and stakeholders' conduct

The role of the security during the 2014 election has been subjected to public scrutiny. Compared to other state governorship elections, the one held in Ekiti State was different. The country's electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission, and security agencies deployed extra number of personnel and equipment. Security operatives were present in strategic locations across the state. There were roadblocks where security checks were conducted on motorists and pedestrians, especially at the entry points to the state ([35]: 11). But such massive deployment of security agencies has been variously described as militarization of the state by the federal government.

Falana [36] argues that "militarisation of Ekiti State, harassment by security forces, disenfranchisement of some people by the military forces, and the fact that the place was invaded with 30,790 policemen, soldiers and members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, you cannot say that was a free and fair election". The concern, however, remains that if this is the only workable antidote for a violence-free election in Nigeria, as applied in these staggered elections, how can the federal government afford such huge number of security agents in a general election that will involve 36 states.

The reason for this, as advanced by the federal government, was to prevent violence and rigging that used to characterize previous elections in the country. Indeed, the exercise was regarded peaceful essentially on the election day. In spite of the fear struck by the massive presence of security operatives, many young men and women, who normally are apathetic to voting, reported at the polling stations, some even before the scheduled accreditation time. They endured the scorching sun to check their names and numbers, queued for accreditation, waited to vote and witnessed the collation and counting of the results, which they counted along with the election officials.

The important issue about the election was that INEC's performance was very good. The logistics were well planned, and there was timely arrival of electoral materials in most of the polling units. The process of accreditation of voters started in most polling units between 08:00 and 08:30 am [37]. In almost all the 177 electoral wards in the state, materials were promptly deployed and voting commenced on schedule.

9. Conclusion

The Ekiti election shows that a cynical citizenry has been bred because there also exists a cynical political class. They want to be receptacles, and that is what infrastructure of the stomach means ([29]: 64). The thinking in some quarters, therefore, is that government's effort that addresses the immediate needs of the citizens seems to gain more popularity than one that is targeted at achieving clean environment, safety of lives and property as well as infrastructural development. But as rightly noted by Gbadegesin [27], elections are the only means of choosing leaders in a democracy, and elections are about people's preferences. Preferences, on their part, could be rational or irrational, self-regarding or other-regarding. It does not really matter because in democracy, the voters are the kingmakers.

The Economist [28] affirms that the election was a clash between appeals to good governance on the one hand and the lure of old-school clientelism and populism on the other. Despite Ekiti having a relatively well-educated electorate, the old ways prevailed. Usukuma [21], in his piece on political marketing in relation to the Ekiti election, further explains this phenomenon: Most Nigerian politicians need to

assimilate today's reality in Nigeria that politics is more about emotions than intellect. The savviest marketer on this turf must understand that if he wants his brand to succeed, it must appeal to the heart more than the mind. To win, he must go beyond the visible, must swim beyond assumption and must never underestimate his competitors. Yet, Thomas [38] argues that a voter's power should be exercised with some degree of sanity and logical discretion and should not, under any normal circumstances, be used to encourage the enthronement of tyranny and to celebrate mediocrity.

It is imperative that electoral administration should not be subject to direction or manipulation by the incumbent officials or ruling party. The electoral administration consists of a daunting range of tasks which include registering voters; publishing and distributing voter lists; registering and qualifying parties and candidates; establishing and enforcing rules on campaigning and campaign finance; ensuring the security of campaigners, voters and the polling stations; administering the polls during voting; counting the ballots; reporting, collating and "announcing the results; investigating and adjudicating complaints; and certifying the results" (Robert A. Pastor, cited in [39]: 15). The range of tasks, many of them ongoing, requires a significant, professional and permanent administration that is able to administer competently and regulate impartially all of these aspects of political competition and electoral participation.

Empowerment of the people, who have over the years been disenchanted and disillusioned by government's obnoxious policies and insensitivity, is also very germane. Empowerment, as noted by the World Bank [40], involves the expansion of freedom of choice and action to shape one's life. Therefore, the state should not abdicate its responsibilities of providing basic services to the people, involving the citizenry in governance, creating pro-poor economic policies and increasing access to justice and legal aid. This becomes imperative because the continuing force of patron-client ties is often attributed to the persistence of insecurity and uncertainty in people's everyday lives (Gellner and Waterbury 1977 cited in [41]). When people become more affluent and their opportunities increase, their need for patronage decreases. Patronage politics thus offer an apt illustration of Samuel Hays' statement that "politics is necessary for those below the poverty line and an item of luxury consumption for those above it" (quoted by [42]: 169).

In the final analysis, the *developmental state* approach can be adopted in addressing Ekiti State's development challenges by focusing on rebuilding and strengthening state capacity, with a view to raising its ability to expand human capabilities and promote an equitable and efficient allocation of resources. This, in turn, should generate appropriate incentives for economic diversification and transformation. The approach should also prioritize the building and strengthening of economic and socio-political institutions and their effective coordination to produce the desired socio-economic development outcomes. The outcomes, therefore, are human capacity building and strong economic base with job opportunities for the teeming youths such that "stomach infrastructure" will no longer be a determining factor for the electorate in voting for a candidate of their choice in an election.

Note

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Chapter 4

Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian Democracy in Bangladesh

Moniruzzaman M.

Abstract

Despite variations in its forms, contents, and qualities, arguably regular election is the only tool that upholds the "democratic" label of a government. Election works as the only legitimizing factor and, over the past several decades, it has become a popular means for authoritarian political leaders or dominant political parties in young or transitional democracies to consolidate their powerbase. Hence, elections have apparently lost their representative value and have, increasingly, been turned into a democratic means to legitimize and institutionalize undemocratic regimes. This has been the most obvious trend in Bangladesh electoral politics over the past decade. Both national and local level elections are engineered in such ways through manipulating electoral laws, the election commission, and the legal system that effectively developed an intended mechanism of preventive representation. A field of electoral competition emerged from such a mechanism where the opposition parties are formally and informally prevented from entering competition in the first place. Technically, this is shown as deliberate nonparticipation by the opposition parties but, in effect, nonparticipation is deliberately orchestrated by the ruling party. An eventual outcome is a government that is free from the parliamentary or legislative opposition, which helps to regularize an authoritarian democracy in the country.

Keywords: election, preventive representation, authoritarian democracy, Bangladesh

1. Introduction

Democracy is the most desired and legitimate political system in the modern world. Samuel P. Huntington's influential research has shown that over the past 200 years, countries around the world have generally displayed a political tendency to move toward democratic forms of government [1]. Even though there have been substantial reversals in some instances, generally, the trend, has gained momentum following the end of colonialism and, later, the end of the Cold War. This is substantiated by the fact that the number of countries with a democratic form of government today is much higher than at any other time in the past. Huntington argued that the process of democratization occurred in a number of waves; according to his analysis, the third and last wave created the biggest impact. Arguably, the trend

toward democracy after 1990, following the end of the Soviet Socialist system, the Gulf war in 1991, and the "Arab Spring" in 2010, set the biggest wave, which some experts have termed the fourth wave [2–5].

As the cornerstone of democracy is the peoples' representation and rule, democratization obviously involves elections. Thus, elections have been the only means to connect between peoples' representation and democracy. However, elections as a system and mechanism are not a monolith; rather, it has taken on a variety of forms to ensure proper representation [6]; the two most popular forms being first-past-the post, and proportional representation (and its varieties). Over time, as the democratization trend continuously gained momentum, the election mechanism has developed with further complexities. Notwithstanding multiple variations and complexities, it appears that countries' transition toward—and continue in its maintenance of—democracy, invariably has led to elections being implemented as a means of legitimacy.

In mature and consolidated democracies, especially in highly industrialist countries, elections serve twin functions: representation of the people and continuity of democracy. But that, apparently, is not the case with new or young democracies in nonindustrialist or underdeveloped countries, where elections are used merely as legitimizing tools for the ruling regime to preserve and continue its power. Therefore, the true meaning of "representation" often remains suppressed. An analysis of the relationship between elections and democracy in Asian, African, and Latin American countries reveal that the ruling regimes tend to hold periodic elections to maintain a "legitimacy cloak" of democracy. Hence, the meaning of and relationship between elections and democracy in "western" and nonwestern countries are not the same.

This chapter takes a detailed look at elections in Bangladesh, and their true function, not as a means of representation and democracy, but as a means of *preventive* representation, and a legitimizing label for the ruling regimes. In other words, elections are manipulated to prevent the opposition parties from representing the people, to provide legitimacy to the ruling parties, and to maintain the democratic label of governance. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the general electoral and democratic trends in western and nonwestern countries; and the second section offers a detailed analysis of elections and democracy in Bangladesh.

2. Election, representation, and democracy

There is an inseparable relationship among election, political representation, and democracy. One without the others is inconceivable. It is the idea of democracy as a political system that essentially necessitates the other two. The idea of democracy is not new; it is as old as the ancient Greek political thought. The Greek philosophers of the time, notably Plato and Aristotle, discussed and analyzed democracy as a system of government in comparison with other systems such as monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. Even though it was well conceived, the philosophers did not prescribe the system as necessarily good for its society. These philosophers maintained a lofty vision of an ideal society, which was based on a different set of moral good and virtue from that of the common man. They perceived that the common citizen possessed neither the level of knowledge nor the balanced moral standard required to rule that ideal society. Hence, the concept of democracy as common peoples' rule was ranked at the lowest level of gradation. In any case, subsequently, the Greek political thought was overtaken by the prevalence

of imperial and monarchic system. Interestingly, even that idea of democracy was not prevalent anywhere in the ancient world.

However, over the next two millennia, the gradual decline of the imperial and monarchial system gave rise to democratic thought and system [7, 8]. The European renaissance, reformation, and rationalism redefined the role and place of human beings in society. These movements placed humans at the center of everything as the author and maker of society, its rules and regulations replacing the role of divinity. The preeminence of humans took the center stage [9]. Eventually, rationality-based "legal-formal" political authority replaced "traditional." This legal-formal political authority was the direct or indirect representation of the people and was termed democratic. The process of representation eventually came to be known as elections. The mechanism of elections developed into the modern form of direct and indirect or first-past-the-post or proportional representation with different varieties. All over the world today, democracy is considered the most desired and legitimate form of political system, and the "democratic" regimes with all of their varieties are legitimized with one form of election or other.

3. Electoral practices in western and nonwestern countries

The western industrial countries experienced the emergence of democracy first, starting more than 200 years ago, which gave those democracies plenty of time to develop, mature, and consolidate by the time the nonwestern countries were introduced to the system following the end of colonialism. Over the course of two centuries, the mature western democracies of today have been able to institutionalize the electoral politics that ensure fair representation of the people in the government. With the exception of certain time periods when some of those democracies slipped into military authoritarianisms, generally, those democracies have maintained the tradition of party politics, electoral competition, and elected governments. Free and fair elections have been the defining characteristics of those democracies. Therefore, the western European, North American, Australia, New Zealand, and Japanese democracies are referred to as models of ideal electoral democracies [10].

Following the continental European or American models of representative and electoral democracies, the nonwestern countries have adopted either the American presidential or British parliamentarian system. However, these nonwestern countries have adapted the models to their local conditions, instead of adopting them in entirety. Because of many local political, economic, cultural, and other social reasons, electoral politics in nonwestern countries have not been institutionalized; rather in the name of democracy, party politics and election, a culture of electoral corruption and denial of competitive and fair representation have persisted. The South Asian (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan), African (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, South Africa, Sierra Leon), and Latin American (Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Chile, Peru) democracies and electoral practices are heavily marred by violence, manipulation, malpractices, and subjected to government control [11–13]. Many authoritarian democracies and electoral politics in Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia), Africa (Algeria, Egypt), Arab (Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria), and Latin America (Venezuela) are heavily controlled by their sitting governments [14–16]. There, the oppositions are systematically denied the opportunity or offered a little space to contest in elections, and the controlled elections are meant just to legitimize the "democratic" label of the governments. Those democracies with defective and manipulative electoral politics are sometimes grouped together as "illiberal democracies," indicating that those "democracies" have serious shortcomings in terms of free and fair electoral politics [17].

4. Electoral trend and history in Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a tiny but populous South Asian country. Then called East Pakistan, its independence from West Pakistan in 1971 came as a result of West Pakistani's denial of a transfer of political power to the victorious East Pakistani political party. The entire Pakistan was to transit from military to democratic rule through national legislative elections held in December 1970. Historically, this occurred toward the end of what Huntington termed the Second Wave of democracy. Even though its citizens gave a resounding electoral mandate to the east Pakistani political party named Awami League, the west Pakistani popular leader and the west-Pakistan dominated military regimes were reluctant to uphold the representation choice of the people, and instead were inclined to a military authoritarian regime. Eventually, a 9-month long civil war broke out, essentially on the issue of representation; East Pakistan achieved independence with a new name: Bangladesh [18].

Since 1971, independent Bangladesh has conducted 10 national elections, the first in 1973, and the most recent in 2014. However, the electoral and government systems kept oscillating between parliamentary and presidential, until it finally settled in favor of a parliamentary system, which effected through a constitutional amendment in 1991. Its legislature, known as *Jatiyo Sangsad* (national assembly), is comprised of 350 directly elected members for a 5-year term. Of these, 300 are elected based on first-past-the-post system, representing single-member electoral districts. The elected members then fill the remaining 50 seats, reserved for women, based on proportional representation of the elected parties.

Even though there are at least four dozen political parties in Bangladesh, only two parties stand tall: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Since the mid-1980s, the two parties have maintained coalition alliances separately with other minor parties. AL has a coalition of 14 parties, and BNP has a coalition of 18 parties. In the early 1970s, AL enjoyed almost absolute popularity as a freedom-winning party for the country; in 1973, it achieved landslide victory in 1973 elections. However, by the late 1970s, BNP was established and wrested AL's popularity in the 1979 election. The tide turned in the 1986 elections when a new party, Jatiya Party (JP), which was formed in 1984, contested the election. From 1991 onward, electoral contestation has remained basically in the hands of AL and BNP [19].

In Bangladesh, elections are conducted at seven layers of administration at both national and local levels. From top to bottom, these are the presidential election, national assembly election, city corporation election, district council election, subdistrict council election, municipal election, and union council election. At all levels, the elections are conducted along party lines.

During the first decade of independence, elections were largely a fairly competitive game for representative politics. Either because the people were not highly politically socialized, or the scope of political participation was limited to city dwellers, the elections were systematic, competitions were among professional politicians, and representations were by qualified politicians. However, over time, the representational politics became tainted with money, muscle, violence, manipulation, and became largely commercial in nature. The goals for such tainted representational politics were twofold: continuation of the ruling party in power by any means possible and prevention of the opposition from getting into power by any means possible. Between these two goals, the real objective of political representation through elections had disappeared. This remains the trend of politics of preventive representation and regularization of authoritarian democracy in Bangladesh.

5. Election engineering and preventive representation

Until 1970, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) elections were contestations between east and west Pakistan, which probably bound the Bengalis more tightly, allowing them to overlook their differences. However, in independent Bangladesh, the scope, objectives and process of electoral competition have changed such that the stakes have become very high, due to increasing population and limited resources. This was further aggravated by the nature and intensity of traditional and modern forms of economic and political clientelism that decisively control resource allocation and distribution in Bangladesh. Therefore, as a global wave, Bangladesh has had to lean toward maintaining a democratic form of government, and to do that, it had to allow for periodic elections. But since competition for political and economic resources are very high, elections did not remain immune from deliberate distortion. A culture of massive election engineering has developed since the mid-1980s, and has become a political endemic in the country, ridiculing representation and democracy [20].

There are many forms of election engineering that various political parties have practiced during the past three decades. These various forms include intentional timing, gerrymandering, changing of electoral rules, and the voting system. Due to the spike in population and sociopolitical development over time, such changes are sometimes warranted. Therefore, with the ever-changing contexts and demographics, even consolidated democracies sometimes adjust aspects of their electoral mechanisms and processes, though mostly for the purpose of ensuring fair representation. However, in young and new democracies, especially in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, election engineering includes deliberate means to control the entire election and representative process. Often, elections are offered periodically to renew the legitimacy—and ascertain the longevity—of the ruling parties or regimes, and not necessarily to mean that those in power are the true representatives of the people. Simultaneously, the entire election mechanism is controlled in such a way that it prevents the representatives desired by the people from rising to power. During the past decade, the electoral practices in Bangladesh have displayed a strong tendency toward preventive representation.

5.1 Mechanism of preventive representation in Bangladesh

As described earlier, elections in nonwestern countries are heavily marred by defective practices, and Bangladesh is not an exception. In this section, specific forms of electoral malpractices and corruptions are discussed [21–27].

5.1.1 Controlling of the election commission

Elections in Bangladesh are managed and conducted by an autonomous body known as Bangladesh Election Commission (EC), which is constitutionally sanctioned and empowered. Constitutionally, the EC is to discharge the duties relating to election, maintaining absolute neutrality without favoring or disfavoring the ruling or the opposition parties. However, in Bangladesh, the EC has become a highly politicized and controversial institution since 1991. Since it has the absolute power in determining district boundaries, nomination and selection, ballot-box distribution and vote counting, the ruling parties have been heavily inclined to use the institutions in their favor by appointing like-minded or partisan Commissioners. The opposition parties, being aware of such facts, take it gravely, to the point of sparking serious antigovernment movements and national political crises, as occurred in the mid- and late-1990s. So the appointment of an election commissioner is an important consideration of a sitting government.

An election commissioner should, ideally, be a politically neutral person commanding respect and acceptance by all. The most desired candidate for the post would, for instance, be a recently retired chief justice. A sitting government pays particular attention to this factor and awaits a suitable time when the retirement of a chief justice and appointment of an election commissioner coincides. For that matter, the government may intentionally appoint a chief justice knowing that his retirement could coincide with the timing for appointing a new election commissioner, so that he can then be chosen for the EC position. This was a common strategy during much of the 1990s, when major political parties could still force each other to change the course of action. However, over the recent decade, the issue has become normalized in favor of government choice, as the voice and influence of the opposition parties have been completely decimated through an authoritarian type of elected government. Since 1995, all seven chief election commissioners have been seriously controversial and considered to be highly partisan, as their decisions and behaviors clearly supported the government's preferences. The most notorious chief EC was the 11th commissioner (2012–2017), when the 2014 national and 2016 Union Council elections were the most controversial and defiantly in favor of the ruling party.

5.1.2 Imprisonment

Preventive representation is often associated with predatory legal means to disqualify prospective opposition candidates from contesting elections. In Bangladesh, arbitrary and false cases against social and political opponents are commonplace, and are effective tools to score political gains. The culture of filing cases against anonymous suspects is very strong, and primarily used against political opponents. The recently adopted antiterrorism and cybercrime laws have added a new dimension to the existing culture of false cases and arbitrary arrests. Usually, for any political violence, the ruling party activists file police cases *en masse* and anonymously against the opposition activists. During the election period, the police, then, in collaboration with the ruling party, arrested the key opposition figures, ostensibly for some wrong that had been filed earlier by an anonymous individual. This is then used, with reference to electoral rules, to disqualify key opposition candidates from contesting in elections. In addition, many are denied bail by the courts, which are also controlled by the partisan judges. As such, a carefully coordinated legal, administrative and political nexus is used to frame political opponents within the legal grid to systematically prevent them from contesting. The implication is that such practice denies people the opportunity to choose from a wide range of candidates. In other words, it often offers the voters no alternative choice, which results in many voters abstaining from voting; this ensures that the ruling party's fielded candidates will win the elections.

5.1.3 Preventing nomination

Elections offer open and equal opportunity for every eligible citizen to contest to represent the people and their interests in politics and government. For that, every citizen has equal right to file a nomination for election, either independently, or on behalf of a party. However, in Bangladesh, such a level playing field is increasingly disappearing with the rise of new and innovative techniques to prevent the nomination of opposition candidates in the first place. This was very systematically played for the first time in massive form in 2014 national parliamentary elections.

In that instance, AL, which was (and still is) the sitting government, was bent to get re-elected with even a stronger majority, for which it adopted a policy of

preventing nominations on a massive scale. The AL wanted to ensure its simple majority in that year's parliamentary elections amidst an empty field, i.e., no opposition candidates. To ensure this, AL's armed thugs and activists intimidated willing opposition candidates at their homes with threats, and warned them against filing a nomination; the opposition candidates who showed up on Nomination Day were prevented from approaching the election commission offices to file for nominations; and those who were able to file their nomination were forced under severe threats to withdraw. This was systematically done to ensure that at least 154 seats would not be contested, a figure sufficient to ascertain a simple majority. In total, 154 seats were uncontested. Of the remaining seats, the ruling party ensured that most of the seats were won by their candidates. Such massive manipulation of the election mechanism resulted in all of the opposition parties boycotting the election, thus preventing a fair representation.

5.1.4 Preventing political campaign

For elections, campaigning is a must. However, in Bangladesh, political campaigning is now mostly one sided, as the opposition parties enjoy no—or relatively little—opportunity to campaign: the nature of political campaigning is violence-prone, and its forms include large-scale, open-air political gatherings, mammoth street processions, competitive showdowns, and physical violence. Naturally, the ruling party always enjoys the support of the law-enforcement authorities in such competitive election campaigns, while the opposition parties are disfavored by those authorities. The police often approve the ruling party's use of a suitable public space, including major roads for campaign gathering, at the same time denying the opposition parties the same. Often, if a public venue is approved for an opposition party for a specific day and time, the ruling party will then organize a similar event at the same place and time; this then becomes an excuse for the police to cancel both events. In the face of such predatory government and police behaviors, the opposition is always disadvantaged. Obviously, such political and administrative obstructions prevent the opposition and the people from reaching out to the other during the campaign period.

5.1.5 Arresting polling agents

In elections, ballot casting venues are represented by polling agents of political parties. In their presence, manipulation of ballot papers or the vote casting process is prevented. This ensures free and fair elections. However, for preventive representation, this is an obstacle.

Malpractice in elections is very common in Bangladesh, and it has become highly institutionalized since the 1986 parliamentary elections under the military regime. Among other malpractices, expelling the polling agents of opposition parties from the polling booths was a common complaint that the EC would receive in large numbers. However, recently under the AL government, the practice has spiked to a disproportionate level. This was particularly noticed in the 2018 Gazipur City Corporation election, where about 50 polling agents from opposition BNP were arrested by plainclothes secret police, even though there were no criminal bases against them. Reportedly, they were simply approached by a number of unknown individuals to step out of the polling booths for a chat; once out, the polling agents were asked to remain silent and were escorted out of the polling station and taken far away for the rest of the day. They were released 60–100 km away at the end of the day. By then, the voting was conveniently over, and the AL candidate had won with a huge margin.

5.1.6 Preventing polling agents

Expelling the polling agents or arresting them from the polling booths is an onsite example of electoral malpractices intended to prevent opposition candidates from winning. However, there are frequent offsite practices of the same when the polling agents are not even allowed to approach the polling stations in the first place. The armed supporters of the ruling party take position in groups en route to the polling stations, but not within the vicinity, to block the polling agents from reaching the polling stations. Often at gun point, they are forced to turn back, and are asked to stay away for the entire day. This is a common practice in any type of election at any level. Absence of polling agents from the polling booths creates an unsafe atmosphere for the party supporters, which eventually keeps them away from voting.

5.1.7 Arresting supporters

Another recent trend has been the arrest of opposition party supporters by the police immediately before the election day. The police might initiate an anticrime drive a few days before the election and indiscriminately arrest supporters of opposition parties based on information given by the ruling party channels. The supporters may be forcibly taken from a political rally or campaign meeting in the name of public safety; once arrested, there may be arbitrary accusations filed against them even if they are innocent. This policy was extensively used in the Khulna City Corporation elections in 2018. In this way, a large number of supporters and voters are prevented from voting, which leads to unfair representation.

5.1.8 Casting of bogus votes

A very widespread electoral corruption in Bangladesh is bogus and phantom votes. The obsession to win and to deny the opposition a vote is a political attitude that makes no compromise. The major parties and their activists never consider elections as a win or lose game; rather, they are obsessed with the attitude that elections are to win, and not to lose. As such, elections are for absolute gain. To secure that, the parties and their activists always want to make sure that they get more and, if possible, all the votes. An easy way to ensure winning is to stuff the ballot box with false votes.

False votes are casted in two major ways. Firstly, by voting on another's behalf: those who control the polling booths complete the vote casting on behalf of the voters according to the list of voter names in their possession. In this case, the party supporters are also allowed to enter the polling booths multiple times to caste on behalf of other voters. Individual voters who go to the polling stations may find that their votes have already been casted. In this case, the casted votes are always in support of the candidates whose supporters control the polling booths. Secondly, stuffing the ballot boxes with false votes: in this case, either the polling agents who control the polling booths stuff the boxes with ballot papers in favor of their party, or they allow party activists to enter the polling booths as a group and do the same. The obvious results of such electoral corruption are two; one, the ruling party candidates win, with a large margin of vote difference; and two, the total vote cast sometimes ends up with a bigger number than the total number of voters in the constituency or at a particular polling station.

5.1.9 Hijacking ballot boxes

The ultimate electoral corruption in Bangladesh takes place through hijacking the ballot boxes when it becomes clear that the ruling party candidates are likely to

lose. Hijacking of ballot boxes involves armed violence and often, the law enforcing authorities are found to be inactive in preventing the crime. The purpose of hijacking is to destroy the casted ballot papers so that in vote counting, the opposition does not win, or the voting process is canceled. Often, the EC and the police do not recognize such irregularities, and no legal challenge is entertained. Sometimes, the EC takes into consideration certain complaints but, in its investigation, the accusations are conveniently found to be baseless.

6. An analysis of the mechanism of preventive representation

The foregoing section demonstrates the various types of means and ways of electoral malpractices and corruptions. It is clear from the discussion that elections are recognized as a means of political legitimacy; however, elections are highly manipulated in favor of the ruling regimes, and against opposition parties. An intimidating electoral atmosphere is deliberately created for the opposition parties so that they cannot take part in elections in the first place. Hence, only one political party represents the people in government, albeit through elections. So elections serve dual purposes—to ensure that the ruling party continues in power, and that the opposition is systematically prevented from representing the people. Theoretically, elections perform the job of selection and de-selection, and no ruling party wants to be removed from power through elections. However, these normal functions of elections are only partially applied in Bangladesh. Why is it so, and what are its implications?

Perhaps the answers to these questions are to be found in the peculiar nature of its political history, party politics, and political culture. Here, we attempt to offer some interpretation of these factors.

The political history, party politics, and political culture are highly interrelated in Bangladesh. The most important of the three is its political history, which officially starts with its independence—a highly charged political issue, which was both highly uniting and dividing at the same time. Independence was achieved after a long civil war in which the AL party led the independence movement and pro-independence civil war in association with some other left-oriented minor parties. However, a group of other political parties who were Islamic-oriented and local born, set out to establish a legacy of Pakistan movement prior to the 1947 partition of India, supported the united Pakistan and fought against the independence movement. This pro- and anti-independence divide later became permanently entrenched in Bangladesh politics postindependence. The divide is now so huge, sharp and politically lethal that it divides the entire nation into two camps. The AL, as the leading independence party, capitalized on the entire credit of independence and considers itself the only agent, proprietor, and protector. The party believes only in its own narratives of independence politics, which it then imposes on others. Those who disagree are regarded as anti-independence and, thus, deserve no role and share in politics.

This political history reflects on party politics of the country. Through a multiparty system, the parties are ideologically aligned with secular, religious, and socialist ideologies who maintain a peculiar love-hate relationship. Other than AL and BNP, the remaining political parties command a tiny support base among the people. However, neither of the two parties commands enough support and popularity to win majority seats in the parliament; hence, they form alliances with like-minded parties. This led to the emergence of alliance-based party politics from around the mid-1980s. Since then, the AL commands a 14-party alliance, while BNP commands an 18-party alliance. The AL is leftist-oriented in that it is composed of

secular and socialist-communist parties; while BNP is considered rightist, with its alliance members mostly concerned with religious national identity at the core of their political beliefs.

Despite maintaining an alliance structure, most of the parties, with the exception of a tiny few, have internal factionalism and splinter groups. Some of the parties maintain the same name, but with different leadership. Individually, most of these parties are simply paper based, have no support-base among the people, and are never get elected. Nevertheless, many of them are significant in alliance politics. Their political relevance depends on their close relationship with the mother party, whether AL or BNP. Since 1991, the ruling governments have all been coalition-based. But, since AL and BNP are the only two major parties, each with an almost equal support base. The system can largely be called a two-party or two-plus party system. Again, the two parties are largely seen as pro-independence versus anti-independence. Ideological differences remain, alongside some of their roles during the 1971 independence conflict, compelling the various political parties to side with a particular alliance against another.

The last factor is political culture, which is also highly subjective to the first factor: political history. In effect, Bangladesh shares a common political history with India and Pakistan prior to independence. From 1757 to 1947, it shares a common political history with the British-united India, and from 1947 to 1971, it shares common political history with a united Pakistan. During these two periods, the popular politics in Bangladesh was essentially the anti-government movement, because politics and government were neither represented nor controlled by the Bangladeshi people. From 1905 to 1971, the anti-government movement was led by one major party though known by three different names—the Muslim League (which fought for Pakistan's independence) which, during independent united Pakistan, splintered to form a new party called Awami Muslim League, and later renamed Awami League (during united Pakistan), and Bangladesh Awami League (in independent Bangladesh). Since 1905, these political parties were primarily anti-government movements. The essential elements of such movements were characterized by sheer distrust, political violence, non-cooperation, disobedience to laws and orders, and public agitation. These became the fundamental characteristics of political and party political culture in Bangladesh [28].

The significance of preventive representation politics in Bangladesh can be found in these three major factors. Since the AL has always persistently and consistently claimed that it is the sole agent, proprietor and defender of independence, it strongly believes that only it has the legitimate claim and right to be in political power. By definition, this implies that other parties have no legitimate right, not only to political power, but also the right to be involved in politics in the first place. These attitudes are clearly reflected in its political behavior when it is in power, as well as when it is outside of that power.

The AL took power during the first 5 years of independence, during when it banned many Islamic and rightist political parties, and toward the end of its regime, it introduced a one-party system in the country. This was one way of claiming ownership of the country along party lines. Between 1996 and 2000, the party returned to power, but before it could consolidate its power base, it was ousted. It returned to power in 2009, and has been in power ever since. Since then, it has successfully institutionalized its political claims with legal backup. For instance: AL's narratives on the day independence was declared, the constitutional status of its founding leader Sheikh Mujib, the history of the independence movement and war, are now constitutionally safeguarded to the point that the official narratives cannot be disagreed on or challenged. Any violation is subject to criminal prosecution.

Additionally, the current AL government is bent on decimating two political parties—namely, BNP and BJI—either by banning them altogether or by attempts to introduce a formal one-party system like it did in 1974. AL believes that these two parties have no legitimate rights to be involved in politics. Their rationale: BNP is a party established by an army General who is thought be part of a conspiracy that killed Sheikh Mujib and his entire family, save for two daughters, in 1975. Furthermore, BNP maintains a close relationship with Pakistan, the perpetrator of genocide of Bangladeshis in 1971. As for BJI, it directly opposed the independence movement and war, and collaborated with the military regime of Pakistan in 1971. So for, family and political reasons, these two parties have become arch enemies of AL. Hence, since 2010, the AL government has taken a number of initiatives to corner the two parties [29].

Firstly, AL put on trial the three individuals accused of killing Sheikh Mujib and his family; the three were hanged in 2010. They had been arrested and tried earlier during AL's regime in 1996–2000, but were exonerated by BNP's founding leader, then by a Marshall Law Administrator, through the Indemnity Ordinance 1975.

Secondly, in 2013, under the AL government, it reopened and re-tried an infamous murder of an army Colonel named Abu Taher in 1976. The court concluded that it was a cold-blooded murder orchestrated by the BNP leader General Ziaur Rahman, implicating him as a criminal.

Thirdly, the current BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of BNP founder Ziaur Rahman, was evicted from her residence, which is within the cantonment area in Dhaka, by a court order subsequently in 2013. The military had sold the residence to her for a token sum after her husband Ziaur Rahman, then President, was killed in 1981. The AL government, during its earlier 1996–2000 term, had made an abortive attempt to evict her. The eviction clearly involves both personal vengeance and political reason. Personally, Sheikh Hasina, as prime minister, AL leader and one of two surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujib, could never accept that her nemesis, Khaleda Zia, was allowed to enjoy owning a property within the cantonment vicinity. And, politically, in a coup-prone country [30], Hasina could not compromise political security by letting her political opponent and opposition party leader continue to live within the cantonment area.

Fourthly, the AL government revived and proceeded to prosecute all cases that were filed against Khaleda Zia by the army-backed Caretaker Government in 2008. During that time, both Hasina and Khaleda had been arrested and scores of corruption cases were filed against each of them. When Hasina assumed premiership following the 2009 elections, her government withdrew all cases against her, but not those against her opponent. Ever since, Khaleda Zia has been fighting court battles over those and other cases filed against her following her anti-government movement during the 2014 general elections. After a prolonged court battle, Khaleda lost and was imprisoned in February 2018. Her attempts to obtain bail were delayed through official manipulation of time and hearing sessions; at other times, bail applications were blocked by arrest orders in other pending cases. As dozens of politically motivated cases are filed against Khaleda Zia, and their prosecutions are in order with various terms of jail sentence it is likely that her chances that her chances of being released from jail is slim.

Fifthly, the ruling party's strategy is to decimate BNP by targeting its leaders, in the belief that a political party without its leaders will eventually become politically irrelevant. To date, all of BNP's top leaders, but for an insignificant few, are either in jail, have been forced to leave the country, or made to disappear by AL's plainclothes security forces. Others have been so severely tortured, they have become mentally disabled. Those fortunate enough to still be free face regular court battles to settle numerous cases filed against them in various courts throughout the country. In any event, they find themselves constantly in and out of jail.

Sixthly, the AL government has been even more ruthless against Jamaat-e-Islami, the party believed to be the symbol for anti-independence. Under the guise of trying for the war crimes in 1971, the AL government arrested all the top leaders of Jamaat and hanged four of the most prominent. One leader died in prison during trial, and another leader was handed a life imprisonment sentence "until death." There are serious concerns and doubts that the so-called International War Crime tribunal is impartial or remotely international at all, as none of the international legal agencies have been included, nor are international legal experts and representatives allowed to attend the hearings. In one case, it inadvertently leaked out that the court decision was written by someone living in a European country, and that all of the evidence and witnesses presented by the government prosecutor were fabricated. In some cases, witnesses willing to testify against the prosecutor were made to disappear by plainclothes police [31]. Alongside these "judicial killings," the government has killed several hundreds of Jamaat leaders, arrested thousands of them, and made them systematically disappear or compelled them to leave the country. Those who choose to remain in Bangladesh risk the same fate; and remain in hiding [32]. Their private properties, businesses, and financial and educational institutions are forcefully taken over either by AL's local party leaders or by corporate syndicates. The case of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) is a prime example; the party was forced to change its objectives and operating framework, and is facing the prospect of an outright ban.

Seventhly, the AL government has adopted policies to keep public—and sometimes private—administrations and offices away from BNP and Jamaat supporters. This they have done by adopting a three-pronged approach: by sacking opposition supporters from key positions; preventing them from occupying new positions; and, if they somehow are elected, they are either sacked by executive order or arrested on false charges leading to their disqualification. Interestingly, AL's inimical and violent behaviors are not necessarily occasioned or emboldened by its current legal and political authority; in any event, it maintains and displays these same bullying attitudes and behaviors even when it is in opposition. Many instances of AL's violent behaviors during its antigovernment times in 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s have been well documented [33].

The AL government's ultra-legal behaviors toward these two political parties—and others that are similarly defiant—attest to the AL government's staunch "winner takes all" policy. Most importantly, it fosters the culture of political intolerance, vengeance, noncompromise, police brutality, judicial killings, legal predatory arrest and torment, and denial of rights, including right to life. In such an authoritarian context, what purposes do elections signify?

If elections are taken as indicators, then the AL government would be regarded as highly democratic, since numerous elections were held between 2010 and 2018: 492 Upazila (sub-district) elections, 64 district level elections, and numerous other municipal and city corporations' elections to date (mid-2018). The national parliamentary elections are due in early 2019.

These regularly held elections would be sufficient to certify the government's avowed democratic label. However, if one delves deeper into the internal characteristics of those elections, one would find that the reality is more like the picture presented in the earlier section of this chapter. The opposition electoral contestation and representation is systematically prevented, with the ruling party, election commission, the police, and government, collectively ensuring that only the ruling party candidates win. The EC is no longer a neutral national agency, and the police is no longer a neutral law enforcement agency. And, above all, the government does not represent the interest of its citizens; rather, to rephrase Abraham Lincoln, it is a government of the party, by the party, and for the party. Therefore, it is clear that

elections in Bangladesh are not used as a means for fair representation of the people in the government; rather, elections are used as legitimizing labels for the authoritarian democracy and its regularization.

7. Conclusion

Democratization has been a popular political trend over the past several decades. As democracy denotes peoples' participation in politics and peoples' rule, democratization entails elections. Indeed, elections are considered to be the most visible criterion for democracy, as various "illiberal," semi-, or nondemocracies also hold regular elections so as to claim or enjoy democratic legitimacy. However, it is this apparent legitimizing function of elections that has suppressed its true meaning and significance: as equal political opportunities for all and fair representation of the people in the government.

This chapter argues that the electoral practices and politics in Bangladesh substantiate the above-mentioned claim. Due to certain peculiarities of the local politics in Bangladesh, political parties in power generally tend to claim an absolute control in political and other resources for which the people have equal rights to claim. Of the parties in Bangladesh, Awami League and its current ruling government are the most predatory, authoritarian, intolerant, and repressive. Since its current regime began in 2009, the AL-led government has conducted many elections at national, regional, and local levels. However, those elections are marred with various electoral malpractices and corruptions such as the arrest, imprisonment and murder of opposition party candidates and their supporters; preventing the opposition from filing their nominations, holding meetings and conducting election campaigns; controlling and obstructing polling stations on election day; stuffing ballot boxes with false votes; hijacking the ballot boxes; and much, much more. The objectives of these malpractices are to prevent the opponents from contesting, and to ensure that AL's candidates win. Literally, the election festivity goes on almost year-round. Even though these are apparently elections, the preventive and threatening mechanisms that the AL government applies make the elections useless as a means of representation. While the elections serve to certify the democratic nature of the government, in essence, they regularize and preserve the authoritarian regime's continuity in power.

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Section 3

Elections in Developed Democracies

Chapter 5

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

Lauren Dique and Maria Gallego

Abstract

We examine whether voter media awareness of the 2016 US Presidential election campaign influenced the election using a logit model to estimate the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for one of the two candidates. Our results indicate that the more active voters were on social media, the more likely they were to vote for Trump, and the more aware they were of the electoral campaign (watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers, etc.) and the more interested they were in the news/politics, the less likely they were to vote for Trump. The impact of these variables was not as important as their sociodemographic characteristics.

Keywords: 2016 US Presidential election, candidates' and voters' policy positions, voters' awareness of the election, probability of voting, voters' activity on social media, voters' media interests on the campaign

1. Introduction

The 2016 US Presidential election stands out as an anomaly in election history. A candidate with no prior political experience used his advantage on social media and, in particular, on Twitter to reach the oval office. The election took over the media in extensive news coverage, TV ads, and social media trending. The awareness this election generated due to explicit and implicit advertising may have had a large impact on the outcome. Obama was the first candidate to utilize Twitter and other social media platforms in order to communicate directly with voters during the 2012 election (see Ref. [1]). Trump stormed the media and constantly trended on Facebook and Twitter throughout the campaign and used Twitter to speak freely about his platform (see Ref. [2]).

We examine whether voter awareness of the electoral campaign affects voting decisions. Following Schofield et al [3], we model voters' utility functions as depending on their preferences on an economic and a social policy dimension and sociodemographic characteristics (age, race, gender, education, income, and home state). Voters' utility is also influenced by their awareness of the campaign through TV news, radio, social media trending, their social media activity, the reported ideologies of themselves, and perception of candidates' ideology. We also include in voters' utilities other policy dimensions (stance on state spending on law enforcement, approval of the military, increasing the number of police officers, harsher

punishments for previous offenders, and environmental policies) and a random shock. We derive the probability of voting for the candidates using voters' utilities assuming voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their utility.

Using responses to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey and voters' utility functions, we estimate the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our findings indicate that a voter who is more aware of media outlets (TV and radio) and that has a higher level of social media activity is, respectively, less and more likely to vote for Trump (relative to Clinton). We also find that voters' awareness of the campaign affected their voting decisions, though this impact is less strong than the effect of voters' sociodemographic characteristics. Advertising and awareness, in the form of active use of social media, influenced the election. Trump raised and spent significantly less than Clinton did an indication that campaign advertising is not just a matter of dollars but that voters' awareness of the campaign also affects their voting decisions (see Ref. [4]).

Section 2 summarizes the findings in the literature on the effect that media has on US elections. Section 3 models the utility voters derived from each candidate, then using this utility we derive the probability that a voter votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Section 4 gives the descriptive statistics of our data with results presented in Section 5. Final comments are given in Section 6 with the Appendix containing tables that support the analysis carried out in Section 5.

2. Literature review

We first review the literature on the effects of campaign advertising, the impact of Twitter on elections, and on modeling voters' choices using their preferences.

Huber and Arceneaux [5] study whether advertising mobilizes, informs, or persuades citizens in non-battleground states in the 2000 Presidential election, as candidates' advertising campaigns did not target these voters. Using the overlapping nature of media markets (TV) across states, they examine if campaign advertising aimed at swing states, also airing in non-battleground states, affects voting in non-battleground states. They argue that the volume and partisan balance of advertising in swing states is uncorrelated with voter behavior in non-battleground states. They find advertising campaigns did not mobilize or inform citizens but had a strong persuasive effect with moderately aware individuals being the most susceptible to advertising-induced changes in opinion.

Gordon and Hartmann [6] use the 2000 and 2004 US elections to analyze the effect of market-level advertising on county-level vote shares. They use *gross ratings point*s (GRP) from the Campaign Media Analysis Group as their advertising variable measuring the number of exposures to ads per capita. After controlling for other factors, they find that an increase of 1000 GRPs increases the probability of voting for the Republican and Democratic candidates by 1.5 and 1.7%.

Hong [7] uses a sample of the 112th US House of Representatives' activity on social media to study the impact of Twitter on the politicians' campaign finances from June 8 to 22, 2011. He finds that politicians' adoption of social media increases donations from outside their constituencies, that politicians with extreme ideologies benefit more from social media, and that social media tends to react to salient ideas more easily and is thus more likely to benefit political extremists. He finds that an increase in out-of-state donations allows candidates to become more ideologically extreme concluding that social media bridges the gap between politicians and citizens, which may lead to increased inequality and polarization of candidate platforms.

Schofield et al [3] builds stochastic models of the 2000 and 2004 US Presidential elections with valences[1] that affect voter's decisions. After placing voters in an economic and social policy space using factor analysis, they estimate a cleavage line, from a binomial logit model, dividing likely Democratic and Republican voters, and find voters' valence judgments and policy preferences significantly influence candidates' policy choices.

For the 2008 Presidential election, Clarke et al [8] models voters' choices using a valence model (including stance on social, economic, and education issues), partisanship, and party leader images. They find that McCain had a positive image as voters viewed him as more experienced, patriotic, and trustworthy than Obama but that voters' believed Obama would improve America's standing. Despite the presence of racial resentment, meaning that those with it had a negative view of Obama and a positive view of McCain, they find that Obama inspired hope with a "yes we can" attitude, typical in valence politics, and attributed Obama's higher valence to the belief that he could tackle the nation's issues and get the job done.

The literature finds that campaign advertising has an impact and a persuasive effect on voter's decisions. The large discrepancy between Clinton's and Trump's Twitter followers and number of tweets indicates that Trump had an advantage on social media as Trump more effectively used social media to connect directly with voters (see Ref. [9]). We study the effect that voters' awareness of the campaign had on their choice of candidate after taking into account the effect of differences between voters' and candidates' economic and social policy preferences, voters' sociodemographic characteristics, and their stance on other policy dimensions.

3. Modeling voters' electoral choices

In this section, we first model voters' electoral choices using the utility they derive from each candidate, then using the assumptions made on the shock affecting their utility derive the probability that the voter votes for Trump relative to Clinton.

We model the utility voter i derives from candidate j for $j = Clinton, Trump$ as a function of i's preferences, characteristics, and a random shock observed only by i and assume i votes for the candidate that maximizes i's utility. The utility voter i derives from candidate j is given by

$$\begin{aligned} U_{ij} = &- \alpha_e \left(e_i - E_j\right)^2 - \alpha_s \left(s_i - S_j\right)^2 + \left(\beta_j \cdot sociodemo_i\right) + \left(\gamma_j \cdot awareness_i\right) \\ &+ \left(\delta_j \cdot participation_i\right) + \left(\rho_j \cdot ideology_i\right) + \left(\theta_j \cdot other_i\right) + \lambda_j + u_{ij}. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

We assume voters have preferences over the economic and social policies they would like candidates to implement if elected. Voter i's ideal, or most preferred, economic and social policies are given by e_i and s_i in Eq. (1). Prior to the election, candidates announce their economic and social policy platforms. Candidate j's economic and social policy platforms are given by E_j and S_j in Eq. (1). The positive coefficients α_e and α_s in Eq. (1) measure the importance voters give to the economic and social policy dimensions. The terms $-\alpha_e \left(s_i - S_j\right)^2$ and $-\alpha_s \left(e_i - E_j\right)^2$ capture the disutility i experiences when j's economic and social policy platforms differ from i's

[1] Valence is voters' non-policy evaluations of candidates and in particular in [3] measures voters' beliefs on the ability of a candidate to govern effectively.

ideal policies, so that the farther j's policies, E_j and S_j, are from i's ideal policies, e_i and s_i, the lower is i's utility from candidate j.

Voters' individual sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, gender, income, and race) affect their voting behavior independent of their policy positions, through i's *sociodemographic valence* for j, $(\beta_j \cdot sociodemo_i)$ in Eq. (1), given by

$$\beta_j \cdot sociodemo_i \equiv \beta_{j1} age_i + \beta_{j2} educ_i + \beta_{j3} gender_i + \beta_{j4} income_i + \beta_{j5} race_i.$$

We allow voters' awareness of the electoral campaign to affect their utility function to examine if their awareness of the campaign influences their choice of candidate. *Aware* measures the number of media-related things the voter did in *the past 24 hours* (watch TV news, listen to the radio, read the newspaper, read a blog) with higher values measuring higher engagement by the voter in these events. A higher *socialmedia* value indicates i's greater participation in social media activities. Voter i's political activities include i's political meeting *attendance* and postings of political *signs*. The *newsint* variable indicates the *self-reported* level of interest the voter had in the news. These variables affect voters' choices through voters' *awareness valence*, $\left(\gamma_j \cdot awareness_i\right)$ in Eq. (1), given by

$$\gamma_j \cdot awareness_i \equiv \gamma_{j1} aware_i + \gamma_{j2} socialmedia_i + \gamma_{j3} attend_i + \gamma_{j4} signs_i + \gamma_{j5} newsint_i.$$

Voter i's *political participation valence*, $\left(\delta_j \cdot participation_i\right)$ in Eq. (1), measures whether the voter worked on a political campaign or donated money to candidate j, i.e.,

$$\delta_j \cdot participation_i \equiv \delta_{j1} worked_i + \delta_{j2} donated_i.$$

Voters' ideology and their perception of candidates' ideology may affect their voting decisions. The *self-reported ideology* is rated on a scale of very conservative (7) to very liberal (1), whereas voters' perception of *candidate's ideology* is rated from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). These variables capture voters' beliefs of where they stand relative to their perception of candidates' ideology. The *ideology valence* $\left(\rho_j \cdot ideology_i\right)$ in Eq. (1), is given by

$$\rho_j \cdot ideology_i \equiv \rho_{j1} selfideology_i + \rho_{j2} idelogyClinton_i + \rho_{j3} idelogyTrump_i.$$

We also added other policy variables that may affect the utility voters derive from candidates. We included voter's opinions on increasing state spending on *law enforcement* and their approval of the *military* ensuring the supply of oil. We also incorporated voters' opinions on increasing the number of *police officers* (*crime a*), their support for *harsher prison sentences* for individuals with prior offenses (*crime b*), and their stance on *environmental policies*. We grouped these variables in what we call the *other policy valence*, $\left(\theta_j \cdot other_i\right)$ in Eq. (1), given by

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_j \cdot other_i \equiv\ & \theta_{j1} lawenforcement_i + \theta_{j2} military_i + \theta_{j3} crimea_i \\ & + \theta_{j4} crimeb_i + \theta_{j5} environmental_i.\end{aligned}$$

As in Schofeld et al [3], we model i's belief of j's competence, or ability to govern, through the competence valence, $\left(\lambda_j + u_{ij}\right)$ in Eq. (1) where λ_j denotes mean of voters' belief of j's competence or ability to govern[2] and u_{ij} is the idiosyncratic

[2] In the empirical work below, λ_j is the constant in the regression.

component of i's belief of j's competence that is only observed by i and that varies around λ_j according to a type I extreme value distribution.

Voter i's utility from j has an observable (O) component, U_{ij}^{O}, that depends on voters' disutility from candidates' platforms differing from their ideals, the valences (sociodemographic, media, political participation, ideology, other, and competence), and on a random component, u_{ij}. So that U_{ij} in Eq. (1) is given by

$$U_{ij} = U_{ij}^{O} + u_{ij} \tag{2}$$

$$\text{where} \quad U_{ij}^{O} = -\alpha_e(e_i - E_j)^2 - \alpha_s(s_i - S_j)^2 + \left(\beta_j \cdot sociodemo_i\right) + \left(\gamma_j \cdot media_i\right) + \left(\delta_j \cdot participation_i\right) + \left(\rho_j \cdot ideology_i\right) + \left(\theta_j \cdot other_i\right) + \lambda_j.$$

We assume that only Clinton and Trump run in the election and code the vote of i for Trump as 1 ($Y_i = 1$) and make Clinton the base candidate ($Y_i = 0$), so that the dependent variable Y_i is coded as

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \textit{if voted for Trump} \\ 0 & \textit{if voted for Clinton} \end{cases}$$

Voter i votes for Trump when the utility i derives from Trump is greater than that of voting for Clinton, i.e., when $U_{i\ Trump} > U_{i\ Clinton}$ and votes for Clinton otherwise. Since i's utility from j is affected by a random component, u_{ij}, the probability that i votes for Trump is given by $Prob_{i\ Trump}\left(U_{i\ Trump} > U_{i\ Clinton}\right)$, and since u_{ij} is drawn from a type I extreme value distribution, the probability that i votes for Trump has a logit specification, i.e.,

$$Prob_{i\ Trump}[Y_i = 1|\ \boldsymbol{x}] = \frac{\exp\left\{U_{i\ Trump}^{O}\right\}}{1 + \exp\left\{U_{i\ Trump}^{O}\right\}} \tag{3}$$

where exp is the exponential function and $\boldsymbol{x}$ is the vector of factors included in the observable component of i's utility function, $U_{i\ Trump}^{O}$ given in Eq. (2).[3,4]

The marginal impact of an explanatory variable on the probability that i votes for Trump is obtained by finding the marginal effect that say variable x_k has on Eq. (3), holding all other factors in i's utility function in Eq. (1) constant at some specified value, usually their means. The marginal effect of x_k on $Prob_{i\ Trump}$ in Eq. (3), obtained by taking the partial derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to x_k, is given by

$$\frac{\partial P_{i\ Trump}}{\partial x_k} = \Pr[Y_i = 1|\ \mathbf{x}] \times \Pr[Y_i = 0|\ \mathbf{x}] \times \beta_k \tag{4}$$

$$\frac{\partial P_{i\ Trump}}{\partial x_k} = \frac{\exp\left\{U_{i\ Trump}\right\}}{1 + \exp\left\{U_{i\ Trump}\right\}} \times \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left\{U_{i\ Trump}\right\}} \times \beta_k \tag{5}$$

[3] The coefficients in Clinton's utility function (the base candidate) are standardized to zero, so that the "1" in the denominator of Eq. (3) stands for $\exp\{U_{i\ Clinton}\} = e^0 = 1$.

[4] If instead we assume that all valences have an observable mean component affected by random shocks observable only by the voter that vary around the mean valences according to type I extreme value distributions, the probability that i votes for j still has a logit specification as shown in Eq. (3).

where $\Pr[Y_i = 1|\ \mathbf{x}]$ is the probability that i votes for Trump and $\Pr[Y_i = 0|\ \mathbf{x}] = 1 - \Pr[Y_i = 1|\ \mathbf{x}]$ is that of voting for Clinton. These probabilities change in a *nonlinear* manner as x_k changes. As shown in Eqs. (4) and (5), the marginal effect of x_k on $P_{i\ Trump}$ is the product of the logit coefficient, β_k, and the probabilities of voting for the two candidates. The marginal effect measures the impact of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that an individual votes for Trump relative to Clinton, the base candidate, holding all other variables at the mean, so that $\Pr[Y_i = 1|\ \mathbf{x}]$ and $\Pr[Y_i = 0|\ \mathbf{x}]$ can be estimated.

4. Descriptive statistics

We now provide the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Our data comes from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a nationally representative sample of the voting age population, interviewing 64,600 *pre-* and *post*-election respondents. We exclude those not voting for Clinton or Trump from our sample. Since the post-election *follow-up* survey asked the *same* individuals "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?," we know whom each individual voted for assuming truthful revelation.

The 2016 CCES survey includes a wide range of responses to related questions essentially conveying similar though different information on voters' preferences. Given the high correlation among these questions, these variables should not be simultaneously included in the regressions to avoid multicollinearity effects that may render the regression coefficient estimates unstable and that lead to the interpretation of the effect of these variables on the probability of voting for Trump, relative to Clinton, difficult. Rather than including a large number of highly correlated variables, we use the *principal component analysis* (PCA) to reduce the number of correlated variables included in the regression. The PCA performs *orthogonal* transformations to convert correlated variables into a *smaller* set of linearly *uncorrelated* variables called *principal components*.[5] The PCA gives the factor loading[6] of each principal component variable and identifies a smaller set of latent dimensions along which voters make their decisions.

Schofield et al [3],[7] we perform a PCA on 12 survey questions relating to voters' stances on the military, welfare spending, condition of the economy, approval of Obama, gun control, immigration, abortion, gay marriage, budget cuts, personal ideology, tax increases, and racism. **Table A.1** in the *Appendix* contains the questions used in the analysis and the coding of possible responses. We use the PCA factor loadings for each question and each voter's response to each question to derive each voter's preferences along the dimensions identified in the PCA.

The PCA revealed two latent dimensions, labeled as the social and economic dimensions. **Table 1** shows the PCA factor loadings for each survey question. The first component has two heavy loadings, racism (consistent with Schofield et al [3])

[5] For example, if supporting gay marriage and abortion have a high correlation, the PCA analysis would group these two variables into a single component.

[6] Factor loadings represent how much a component explains the latent variable in the factor analysis. Their values range between −1 and 1 with values close in absolute value to 1 (0) indicating that the component has a strong (weak) effect on the latent variable.

[7] In their study of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential election, [3] finds that voters tend to make voting decisions along two economic and social latent dimensions. After locating voters along these two dimensions, they find that to maximize vote share candidates locate close to electoral mean, the average of voters' location along these two dimensions.

Question	Economic policy	Social policy
1. Military approval	**−0.4058**	−0.1564
2. Tax increases	0.0934	**−0.3249**
3. Racism	**0.8535**	−0.0633
4. State welfare spending	0.1545	**0.3255**
5. Economic problems	−0.0671	**−0.3456**
6. Approve of Obama	0.0635	**0.4131**
7. Gun control	−0.1236	**0.2907**
8. Immigration	−0.1593	**0.2906**
9. Abortion	0.1295	**0.3091**
10. Gays	−0.0855	**0.3027**
11. Federal spending	−0.0317	**0.3373**

[a]*Bolded factor loadings are statistically significantly different from zero.*

Table 1.
PCA factor loadings from the CCES 2016 survey.[a]

and military, on the economic dimension. We anticipated that voters' opinion on economic problems and spending would load strongly in the economic dimension, as found in the literature; however this was not the case in our sample. Perhaps the 2016 election was too different from previous elections. The loadings indicate which component is associated with our social dimension and are consistent with previous literature (such as abortion and gay marriage).

We multiplied the significantly different from zero factor loading of each variable, given in **Table 1**, with the corresponding response of the voter to that question, and then aggregated these products according to their identification in the economic or social dimensions to find voters' locations along these two latent dimensions and assume these locations represent their preferences in these dimensions. Using the factor loadings in **Table 1**, voter i's location along these two dimensions, e_i and s_i in Eq. (1), are estimated as follows:

$$e_i = -0.4058 \times \text{Military Approval}_i + 0.8535 \times \text{Racism}_i$$

$$\begin{aligned} s_i = &-0.3249 \times \text{Tax Increases}_i + 0.3255 \times \text{State Welfare Spending}_i \\ &-0.3456 \times \text{Economic problems}_i + 0.4131 \times \text{Approve of Obama}_i \\ &+0.2907 \times \text{Gun control}_i + 0.2906 \times \text{Immigration}_i \\ &+0.3091 \times \text{Abortion}_i + 0.3027 \times \text{Gays}_i + 0.3373 \times \text{Federal spending}_i \end{aligned}$$

Right on the economic axis (*horizontal*) in **Figure 1** represents an individual that approves of the military and is fearful of people of other races. We interpret north on the social axis (*vertical*) as liberal concerning, for example, civil rights issues. **Figure 1** shows that, while the Clinton and Trump voters are clearly divided along the social dimension, there is no strong divide among them in the economic axis. **Table 2** echoes **Figure 1** indicating that, on average, Trump voters are more conservative (−1.757) in their social values and Clinton's more liberal (1.753). The statistics of the two candidates along the economic dimension are relatively similar in mean, median, and standard deviations.



Figure 1.
Voter policy positions in 2016 US Presidential election.

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. dev.	Min	Max
			Clinton voters (15,264)		
Social	1.753	1.925	1.148	−3.994	4.194
Economic	−0.024	−0.218	0.986	−1.972	3.909
			Trump voters (12,314)		
Social	−1.757	−1.934	1.299	−4.103	3.478
Economic	−0.032	−0.150	0.991	−2.039	3.806

Table 2.
Descriptive statistics: economic and social policy dimensions.

Schofield et al [3], candidates' platforms, S_j and E_j, are at the mean of voters' ideal policies so that we can estimate voters' disutility when candidates adopt policies that differ from their ideals, $-(s_i - S_j)^2$ and $-(e_i - E_j)^2$ in Eq. (3).

Since voter's decisions depend on more than their economic and social stances, we control for voters' sociodemographic characteristics, reported ideologies, "other" policy variables, and our awareness valence. **Table 3** shows that, while a larger proportion of women voted for Clinton, a larger proportion of men voted for Trump (see **Figure 2a** where 0 = male and 1 = female). Clinton had a higher proportion of nonwhite voters as 70% of her voters were white than Trump's 88% (see **Figure 2b** where 0 = nonwhite and 1 = white) with a higher proportion of educated and young individuals voting for Clinton (**Figures 2c** and **d**).

In **Table 4**, the self-reported ideologies and voters' perceived ideologies of each candidate show that Trump voters, on average, identify themselves as "conservative" and perceive Clinton as "very liberal" and Trump as "somewhat conservative." Clinton voters, on average, identify themselves as "somewhat liberal" and perceive Clinton as "somewhat liberal" and Trump as "very conservative." Clinton voters are more pro-environmental than Trump's, and Trump (Clinton) voters prefer to increase (maintain) state spending on law enforcement and support (oppose) increasing the number of police officers.

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. dev.	Min	Max
			Clinton voters (15,264 voters)		
Birth year	1965.9	1964	16.008	1923	1998
Female	0.554	1	0.497	0	1
Education	4.176	5	1.426	1	6
White	0.699	1	0.459	0	1
Family income	7.124	7	3.575	1	31
			Trump voters (12,314 voters)		
Birth year	1960.7	1959	14.69	1923	1998
Female	0.451	0	0.498	0	1
Education	3.647	3	1.414	1	6
White	0.880	1	0.325	0	1
Family income	7.026	7	3.390	1	31

Table 3.
Descriptive statistics: sociodemographic characteristics.



Figure 2.
(a) Female and male voters by candidate. (b) White and nonwhite voters by candidate. (c) Voter education by candidate. (d) Voter birth year by candidate.

It is well known that voters' choice of candidate may depend on their state of residence (see also Refs. [10, 11]) and that candidates carry out their campaign mostly in swing states. To control for differences across states, we create *Democratic*, *Republican*, *and Swing dummy* variables for voters living in Democratic, Republican, and swing states, coded using Politico's *June 2016* list of swing states (see **Table A.2** in the Appendix and [12]) called the state *swingness* variable.

Variables	Mean	Median	Std. dev.	Min	Max
			Clinton voters (15,264 voters)		
Aware	2.126	2	0.932	1	4
Social media	0.163	0	0.370	0	1
Attend	1.654	1	1.674	0	5
Sign	0.204	0	0.403	0	1
Work	0.099	0	0.298	0	1
Donate	0.346	0	0.476	0	1
News interest	1.513	1	0.806	1	7
Ideology (self)	5.141	5	1.425	1	7
Ideology (Clinton)	3.210	3	1.443	1	8
Ideology (Trump)	6.156	7	1.876	1	8
Military	1.114	1	0.318	1	2
Environment	1.984	2	0.124	1	2
Law enforcement	2.559	3	0.944	1	5
Crime policy a	1.564	2	0.496	1	2
Crime policy b	1.249	1	0.432	1	2
			Trump voters (12,314 voters)		
Aware	2.020	2	0.902	1	4
Social media	0.132	0	0.338	0	1
Attend	1.379	1	1.637	0	5
Sign	0.209	0	0.407	0	1
Work	0.051	0	0.220	0	1
Donate	0.251	0	0.434	0	1
News interest	1.460	1	0.762	1	7
Ideology (self)	2.567	2	1.251	1	7
Ideology (Clinton)	1.767	1	1.721	1	8
Ideology (Trump)	4.947	5	1.434	1	8
Military	1.295	1	0.456	1	2
Environment	1.596	2	0.491	1	2
Law enforcement	2.042	2	0.886	1	5
Crime policy a	1.278	1	0.448	1	2
Crime policy b	1.051	1	0.221	1	2

Table 4.
Descriptive statistics: all other variables.

5. Estimating the probability of voting for Trump

We examine the effect that the various components in voters' utility function in Eq. (1) have on the probability that voters choose a particular candidate in Eq. (3). We estimate a set of logit models sequentially adding groups of variables to show the effect these variables, *as a group*, have on the models' decision criteria and later discuss their marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump.

Table 5 shows the results for the basic policy model (column 1), then we add voters' sociodemographic characteristics (column 2). The decision criteria (highest

Variables	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6) Full**
Social2	0.110***	0.100***	0.131***	0.086***	0.098***	0.075***
	(34.300)	(28.730)	(34.160)	(16.850)	(15.160)	(10.350)
Economic2	0.043***	0.080***	0.089***	0.049***	0.037***	0.021
	(4.920)	(8.470)	(9.130)	(4.490)	(2.790)	(1.620)
Military				0.878***		0.577***
				(21.0)		(11.000)
Environment				−3.599***		−2.196***
				(47.910)		(25.400)
Law enforcement				−0.375***		−0.243***
				(19.330)		(9.880)
Crime policy a				−0.753***		−0.412***
				(20.690)		(8.930)
Crime policy b				−1.204***		−0.649***
				(20.770)		(9.030)
Birth year		−0.012***	−0.015***	−0.001	0.000	0.006***
		(13.560)	(16.140)	(0.780)	(0.040)	(3.770)
Female		−0.332***	−0.366***	−0.322***	−0.222***	−0.235***
		(12.290)	(13.110)	(9.570)	(5.480)	(5.500)
Education		−0.284***	−0.239***	−0.164***	−0.191***	−0.160***
		(28.290)	(23.040)	(13.060)	(12.590)	(9.940)
White		0.927***	0.971***	1.143***	1.248***	1.282***
		(26.340)	(27.020)	(26.540)	(24.670)	(24.300)
State "swingness"		0.485***	0.485***	0.377***	0.122***	0.121**
		(14.460)	(14.190)	(9.180)	(2.420)	(2.290)
Family income		0.022***	0.034***	0.020***	0.012*	0.009
		(5.400)	(8.050	(3.960)	(1.900)	(1.320)
Social2	0.110***	0.100***	0.131***	0.086***	0.098***	0.075***
	(34.300)	(28.730)	(34.160)	(16.850)	(15.160)	(10.350)
Aware			−0.046***	−0.075***	−0.068***	−0.086***
			(2.840)	(3.840)	(2.870)	(3.460)
Attend			0.083**	0.014	0.058	0.004
			(1.970)	(0.270)	(0.930)	(0.050)
Social media			−0.057***	−0.037***	−0.002	0.004
			(6.340)	(3.270)	(0.180)	(0.260)
Signs			0.251***	0.255***	0.294***	0.279***
			(6.680)	(5.510)	(5.100)	(4.560)
Work			−0.582***	−0.392***	−0.256***	−0.175*
			(9.850)	(5.260)	(2.850)	(1.800)
Donate			−0.756***	−0.648***	−0.471***	−0.460***
			(21.810)	(14.960)	(8.920)	(8.030)
News interest			0.109***	0.128***	0.113***	0.118***
			(5.680)	(5.960)	(4.240)	(4.440)
Ideology (self)					−1.083***	−0.930***
					(70.830)	(59.000)
Ideology (Clinton)					−0.413***	−0.340***
					(34.900)	(28.910)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Full
Ideology (Trump)					−0.253*** (24.410)	−0.209*** (19.760)
λ	−0.759*** (34.960)	22.805*** (13.240)	29.578*** (15.840)	9.879*** (4.340)	5.697** (2.060)	−1.120 (0.380)
Log likelihood	−18333.82	−16487.57	−16012.94	−11753.72	−8529.503	−7795.902
AIC	36673.64	32993.14	32057.88	23549.43	17097.01	15639.8
BIC	36698.32	33066.89	32188.99	23721.42	17252.58	15836.21
Obs = N	27,578	26,767	26,758	26,639	26,580	26,462

*|z-score| in parentheses.***prob <0.001, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.1.*

Table 5.
Logit model specifications (base = Clinton).

	Model 1		Model 2	
Variables	**Coefficient**	**Z-score**	**Coefficient**	**Z-score**
Social2	0.076***	10.580	0.075***	10.350
Economic2	0.022	1.650	0.021	1.620
Military b	0.581***	11.210	0.577***	11.000
Environment	−2.219***	25.820	−2.196***	25.400
Law enforcement	−0.243***	10.000	−0.243***	9.880
Crime policy a	−0.419***	9.200	−0.412***	8.930
Crime policy b	−0.651***	9.150	−0.649***	9.030
Birth year	0.006***	3.860	0.006***	3.770
Female	−0.238***	5.630	−0.235***	5.500
Education	−0.159***	10.020	−0.160***	9.940
White	1.317***	25.280	1.282***	24.300
State	−0.001	0.640	0.121**	2.290
Family income	0.005	0.850	0.009	1.320
Aware	−0.087***	3.570	−0.086***	3.460
Attend	−0.007	0.110	0.004	0.050
Social media	0.004	0.290	0.004	0.260
Signs	0.264***	4.370	0.279***	4.560
Work	−0.201**	2.090	−0.175*	1.800
Donate	−0.456***	8.080	−0.460***	8.030
News interest	0.127***	4.880	0.118***	4.440
Ideology (self)	−0.933***	60.040	−0.930***	59.000
Ideology (Clinton)	−0.343***	29.600	−0.340***	28.910
Ideology (Trump)	−0.212***	20.360	−0.209***	19.760
λ	−1.113	0.380	−1.120	0.380
State "swingness"			0.121**	2.290

	Model 1		Model 2	
Variables	**Coefficient**	**Z-score**	**Coefficient**	**Z-score**
Log likelihood	−7990.705		−7795.902	
AIC	16029.41		15639.8	
BIC	16226.53		15836.21	
Obs = N	27,264		26,462	

****prob. <0.001, **prob. <0.05, *prob. <0.1.*

Table 6.
State "swingness" models (base = Clinton).

Variable	Mean[a]	Marginal effect	Z-scores[b]
Social2	4.532	0.019***	10.240
Economic2	0.974	0.005	1.620
Military[a]	1.193	0.142***	10.980
Environment	1.811	−0.541***	24.620
Law enforcement	2.331	−0.060***	9.880
Crime policy a	1.437	−0.101***	8.930
Crime policy b	1.162	−0.160***	9.060
Birth year	1963.6	0.001***	3.760
Female	0.508	−0.058***	5.500
Education	3.940	−0.039***	9.930
White	0.782	0.316***	24.310
State "swingness"	0.447	0.030**	2.290
Family income	7.080	0.002	1.320
Aware	2.078	−0.021***	3.460
Attend	0.149	0.001	0.050
Social media	1.531	0.001	0.260
Signs	0.207	0.069***	4.560
Work	0.077	−0.043*	1.800
Donate	0.304	−0.113***	8.040
News interest	1.489	0.029***	4.440
Ideology (self)	3.998	−0.229***	58.870
Ideology (Clinton)	2.567	−0.084***	28.780
Ideology (Trump)	5.619	−0.051***	19.810

[a]Marginal effects are calculated holding all other variables at the mean of all voters given in this column.
*[b]***prob. <0.001, **prob. <0.05, *prob. <0.1.*

Table 7.
Marginal effects (base = Clinton).

log likelihood ratio and the lowest AIC and BIC statistics) show that voters' sociodemographic characteristics are an important determinant of their voting decisions. Adding the awareness variables (column 3) and the ideology variables (column 4) also improves the model's specification. The full model (column 6), our

preferred model specification, includes all of the previous variables plus the "other" policy variables and gives the best fit according to the decision criteria statistics. The sign and significance of the coefficients of all variables except the economic dimension, attend, and social media are significant and stable across model specifications. The economic dimension becomes insignificant in column (6) after introducing other policy variables, which improves the model fit as seen in the decision criteria statistics.

We take an alternative approach to the fixed effects used in the literature by incorporating the *real swingness* of each state as reported by Politico in June 2016 *prior* to the election. **Tables 5** and **6** show that the full model with the state swingness variable gives a better fit to the data.

The logit coefficients given in **Tables 5** and **6** do *not* measure the marginal effect that a variable has on the probability of voting for Trump. As shown in Eqs. (3)–(5), this probability varies in a nonlinear manner with changes in variable x_k while holding all other variables at their mean. A positive marginal effect indicates that an increase in the variable results in an increased probability that an individual with mean characteristics votes for Trump (relative to Clinton), whereas a negative marginal effect decreases this probability.

Table 7 shows the marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump of each variable and their significant levels holding all other variables at their mean (given in column 2). A white voter that has the mean characteristics in all the other variables is 31.6% (which is significantly different from zero) more likely to vote for Trump relative to Clinton. A mean voter who approves of using the military for securing the oil supply is 14.2% more likely to vote for Trump, who cares about the environment is 54.1% less likely to vote for Trump, and who views themselves as very liberal on the ideology scale is 22.9% less likely to vote for Trump. An increase in the level of education, from say high school to some college, decreases the probability of voting for Trump by almost 4%.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we examine which factors influence the probability that an individual votes for Trump relative to Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential election. Our major contribution is the addition of variables that measure voters' awareness of the electoral campaign after controlling for other factors that the literature finds significantly affect voters' choice of US Presidential candidate. Others in the literature include the number of advertising per capita or the amounts spent on advertising. We opt for a different approach by looking at the effect of the media on voters' choices by using data at the *voter level*. That is, our awareness variables measure voters' direct interest in the news, their use of social media, and their interest in the electoral campaign. By measuring variables at the voter level, we capture the impact that voters' media awareness had on their voting decisions. We also estimate voters' position along the economic and social dimensions to study the influence the disutility voters derive from candidates adopting positions that differ from their ideal policies had on their voting decisions.

We estimate a set of binomial logit regressions to examine the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our results indicate that the more active a voter with mean characteristics is on social media, the more likely she/he was to vote for Trump. We also find that the more aware the mean voter was of the media (TV, radio, reading newspaper) and the more interested she/he was in the news, the less likely she/he was to vote for Trump. Even

though the mean voter's awareness of the campaign impacted the mean voter's decision, the stances on social and economic issues, perceived ideologies, and voter sociodemographic had a greater impact on her/his voting decision.

The 2016 US election was the first election in which a candidate adopted a Twitter platform to communicate directly with voters. Our results indicate that future candidates should capitalize on this low-cost approach to bridging the gap between themselves and voters. Hong [7] argues that social media allows the voter to self-select in the form of a "follow" or "friend" to reinforce their ideological positions. Trump sent almost four times more tweets than Clinton did, finding many supporters along the way (see Ref. [9]). Furthermore, social media tends to react to salient ideas more easily and faster and therefore is more likely to benefit political extremists (see Ref. [7]). Although voter awareness has a lower impact than say, race, in the 2016 election, it still influenced the mean voter's choice of candidate. Future candidates can learn from the 2016 election as it may have changed the political campaign battleground forever.

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A. Appendix

Variable	Question	Coding
Economic problems	Over the past year the nation's economy has…?	1. Gotten much better 2. Gotten better 3. Stayed the same 4. Gotten worse 5. Gotten much worse
Approve of Obama	Do you approve of the way each is doing their job?	1. Strongly disapprove 2. Somewhat disapprove 3. Somewhat approve 4. Strongly approve
Gun control	On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit	1. Support 2. Oppose
Immigration	What do you think the US government should do about immigration? Select all that apply. Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years and not been convicted of any felony crimes	1. No 2. Yes

Variable	Question	Coding
Abortion	Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice	1. Oppose 2. Support
Economic problems	Over the past year the nation's economy has...?	1. Gotten much better 2. Gotten better 3. Stayed the same 4. Gotten worse 5. Gotten much worse
Gun control	On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit	1. Support 2. Oppose
Gay marriage	Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?	1. Oppose 2. Favor
Federal spending	The federal budget deficit is approximately 1 trillion dollar this year. If the Congress were to balance the budget, it would have to consider cutting defense spending, cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social Security), or raising taxes to cover the deficit. Please rank the options below from what would you most prefer that the Congress do to what you would least prefer they do: (1) cut defense spending, (2) cut domestic spending, and (3) raise taxes	1. Cut domestic first 2. Cut domestic second 3. Cut domestic last
Ideology (self)	How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups? Yourself	1. Very conservative 2. Conservative 3. Somewhat conservative 4. Middle of the road 5. Somewhat liberal 6. Liberal 7. Very liberal
Military a	Would you approve of the use of US military troops in ensuring the supply of oil?	1. No 2. Yes
Military b	Would you approve of the use of US military troops in order to destroy a terrorist camp?	1. No 2. Yes
State spending on welfare	State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Welfare	1. Greatly decrease 2. Slightly decrease 3. Maintain 4. Slightly increase 5. Greatly increase
Tax increases	If your state were to have a budget deficit this year, it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 100% tax increases (and no spending cuts) to 100% spending cuts	The values range between 0 and 100. The closer to 0 the more they prefer increases in taxes The closer to 100 the more they prefer spending cuts

Variable	Question	Coding
	(and no tax increases). The point in the middle means that the budget should be balanced with equal amounts of spending cuts and tax increases	
Racism	Question: I often find myself fearful of people of other races	1. Strongly disagree 2. Somewhat disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Somewhat agree 5. Strongly agree
Aware	In the past 24 hours have you (check all that apply) (1) read a blog, (2) watched TV news, (3) read a newspaper in print or online, (4) listened to a radio news program or talk radio, or (5) used social media (such as Facebook or YouTube)?	This variable is taken as an aggregate. The higher the coded number the greater their awareness
Social media	Did you do any of the following on social media (such as Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter)? Posted a story, photo, video, or link about politics; Posted a comment about politics; Read a story or watched a video about politics; Followed a political event; Forwarded a story, photo, video, or link about politics to friends	This variable is taken as an aggregate. The higher the social media variable the more active the voter was on social media
Attend	During the past year, did you attend local political meetings (such as school board or city council)?	1. Yes 2. No
Signs	During the past year, did you put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or bumper sticker)?	1. Yes 2. No
Work	During the past year, did you work for a candidate or campaign?	1. Yes 2. No
Donate	During the past year, did you donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization?	1. Yes 2. No
Ideology (Clinton)	Question: How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups? Hillary Clinton	1. Very liberal 2. Liberal 3. Somewhat liberal 4. Middle of the road 5. Somewhat conservative 6. Conservative 7. Very conservative
Ideology (Trump)	Question: How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups? Donald Trump	1. Very liberal 2. Liberal 3. Somewhat liberal 4. Middle of the road 5. Somewhat conservative 6. Conservative 7. Very conservative
State spending on law enforcement	State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Law enforcement	1. Greatly increase 2. Slightly increase 3. Maintain 4. Slightly decrease 5. Greatly decrease

Variable	Question	Coding
Crime policy a	Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services	1. Support 2. Oppose
Crime policy b	Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Increase prison sentences for felons who have already committed two or more serious or violent crimes	1. Support 2. Oppose
Interest in the news	Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others are not that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs?	1. Most of the time 2. Some of the time 3. Only now and then 4. Hardly at all
Environmental policy	Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Give Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions; Raise required fuel efficiency for the average automobile from 25 mpg to 35 mpg; Require a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase somewhat CC16_333d; Strengthen enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs US jobs	This variable is taken as an aggregate, if individual said support to one or more of the environmental policies they are coded as a higher value (2)

Table A.1.
Variable description and coding.

Republican		Democratic		Swing
Alabama	Nebraska	California	New York	Colorado
Alaska	North Dakota	Connecticut	Oregon	Florida
Arizona	Oklahoma	Delaware	Rhode Island	Michigan
Arkansas	South Carolina	District	Vermont	Iowa
Indiana	South Dakota	Hawaii	Washington	Nevada
Idaho	Tennessee	Illinois		New Hampshire
Kansas	Texas	Maine		Pennsylvania
Kentucky	Utah	Maryland		North Carolina
Louisiana	West Virginia	Massachusetts		Ohio
Missouri	Wyoming	Minnesota		Virginia
Montana		New Jersey		Wisconsin

[a]*See Ref. [12].*

Table A.2.
Politico's classification of states (June 2016).[a]

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Chapter 6

How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles in a Gatekeeping Political Culture

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Abstract

In spite of decades of women's political battles, there is a persistent underrepresentation of women in legislative bodies, with only 23.8% in 2018. In this chapter, we discuss theories and empirical studies that have explored what kind of obstacles female politicians are more likely to meet and how they cope with them, when they face more hurdles, and why we need more women elected to political office. Furthermore, we report the results of several studies, which have involved 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Results of these studies show that female politicians face mainly external obstacles as the gatekeeping theory maintains. Women find obstacles all along their political career supporting labyrinth hypotheses. Females at all levels of political involvement scored higher in self-transcendence values that emphasize concern for the welfare of others, partially confirming the politics of presence theory. Female politicians were also more open to change and less conservation oriented than their male colleagues. Our findings in general support ethical struggles for a more balanced gender representation.

Keywords: female politicians, gatekeeping, gender differences, personal values, obstacles facing women in politics

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is primarily twofold. First, we seek to identify which obstacles among those postulated by different theories are hardest to cope with for female local and national politicians, and when in their career paths they face most difficulties. Elected women tend in fact to leave politics more often than men (revolving door syndrome); thus, knowing which obstacles they face more frequently will permit us to focus on political battles more precisely. The second aim of this chapter is to document why in this individualistic world, burdened with huge economic inequalities and environmental problems, we need to have more women in local and national political positions. We present empirical data that show that female and male voters differ in core political values and in their basic values, women score higher in self-transcendence values which emphasize concern for the welfare of others, and for the environment, while men have higher

self-enhancement (power and achievement) values. Then, we present scientific evidence in favor of theorists of the politics of presence hypothesis that these gender differences among voters persist even when women are elected to political positions and have to operate in male-dominated contexts. Finally, we argue that it is crucial to have a large number of women in powerful political positions since they may support different policy priorities that will allow us to better handle the main social and political challenges we face today.

Women are underrepresented in politics in most countries (on average in the world, 23.8% of women are in national parliaments) [1]. Different theories try to explain this persistent political gender gap in legislative bodies. Some theories have explored what kind of obstacles female politicians are more likely to encounter and how they cope with them. Researchers in this area have varied academic backgrounds, ranging from sociology, political science, and political psychology to gender studies. They have thus emphasized obstacles hypothesized by one or two specific theories focusing either on societal structure, institutional aspects which hindered women's access to political career, or explored the theories which examined hurdles women encounter after being elected (e.g., gatekeeping, gender stereotypes, work-family balance, and attitudes of mass media) [2]. Other theories have focused on when women encounter most obstacles. The "glass ceiling" theoretical approach maintains that women find more obstacles primarily on approaching high leadership roles. "Labyrinth" theory supporters instead argue that women encounter more obstacles than men all along their careers paths [2, 3]. Theorists of the politics of presence [4] have focused on why we need more women elected to political office hypothesizing that they have personality traits and hold values different from their male colleagues.

In this chapter, we discuss these theoretical approaches and the results of several studies, which have involved 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females).

The first part of our research with female politicians aimed to build two reliable instruments: (WO) Women's Perceived Obstacles and (WOC) Women's Coping Efficacy in Politics, to explore which kind of hurdles postulated by different theories such as gatekeeping, gender role, mass media, and work and family balance were more present for women elected to local and national offices and how women coped with different kinds of obstacles they encountered. We also tried to ascertain whether women find hurdles all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling supporters maintain. Furthermore, we examined how personality traits and personal values account for political career self-efficacy beliefs and career progression, among women legislators, since no published studies have tried to examine how dispositional variables and self-efficacy beliefs operate in concert to account for women's political career progression, in samples of women elected to top positions such as members of parliament.

The objective of our last study, that involved both men and women elected to political office, was to test the theory of presence that hypothesizes that women and men hold diverse interests and values and that women elected would still have similar values to women and therefore represent them more adequately than their male colleagues.

2. What kind of obstacles are women more likely to encounter in their political career and how they cope with them

Several studies from various theoretical viewpoints have tried to understand which factors promote or undermine women's political career [2, 5]. Structural

approach supporters maintain that women's underrepresentation in politics might be related to their past lower social status, lower levels of education, lower control of financial capitals, and fewer work occasions [5]. The institutional approach focuses on the role of: party rules and electoral laws, and access to funds for campaigning, in hindering or favoring women's political participation [2, 5].[1] The gatekeeping approach suggests that men systematically control all the most relevant political positions and literally keep the gates shut to women, by excluding them on purpose at the entry level and opposing their career progress [4, 6]. Alternatively, family and work balancing theories [7] claim that it is harder for women to be elected and remain in high political offices since their family responsibilities limit their career opportunities [3, 5].

Gender differences theories maintain that many cultural and personal factors, such as political empowerment, influence women's political experiences [5, 8]. Theorists who employ the term gender differences emphasize that these differences develop from acquired social expectations of what masculine and feminine means and that political underrepresentation of women is related to the characteristics conventionally associated to men and women [2, 9]. Theorists of mass media and political personalization highlight the importance of successfully campaigning to be elected in politic office. As politics has become more personalized, individual characteristics of politicians (e.g., their values, their personality traits, and their appearance) have a greater impact than in the past and the role of mass media has become more fundamental in drawing attention to the personal characteristics of politicians [10]. According to the *mass-media* hypothesis, women in politics have more difficulties to access media than men and are represented differently [11].

A close review of the literature reveals that few studies have involved top and middle level women politicians to investigate if they perceive the obstacles they encounter in their political career as deriving from situational, gatekeeping, gender differences, or mass media variables, and most of all, how they cope with them. Empirical studies in this field, involving women politicians, are scarce and reveal contrasting findings.

For instance, some studies indicated that women politicians have problems remaining in politics because of family issues [12]. Others [13], instead, have shown that most female members of parliament were aided by partners, children, and parents.

[1] The last Italian Electoral law (2017), has a mixed voting system: 37% of seats are gained using a first past the post electoral system and 61% using a proportional system (one round of voting). Also this new electoral law (also known also as Rosato) enables the same candidate to run for more offices simultaneously. In the past the multiple candidacy has allowed, party leaders to control the rank-and-file by promoting the election of those candidates who were most loyal to the leader. With the Rosato election law, however, this is no longer possible since when the candidate is elected in more than one multi-member constituency, they are given the seat in the constituency where their party has the lowest percentage of votes. Moreover, a candidate elected both in a single-member district and in one or more multi-member districts wins the seat of single-member district. Concerning gender equality the Rosato law requires that party lists must be filled using the 'zipper' system. Furthermore, none of the candidates from the same party can be present in single-member districts or at the top of the list more than 60% of the time. Although the Rosato law tried to promote the equal representation of women, in the last election (2018) in Italy, though women comprised 44% of the total population of candidates for the Chamber, the percentage of women among elected deputies was just 36%. The multiple candidacy system was partially responsible for this result, since, according to the zipper system the seats left vacant by elected women were assigned to male candidates from the same party. In our interviews many women c complained that the committees who decided placement on electoral lists had primarily male components and put women in locations were the party had fewer chances to fare well. (Data available at: https://constitution-unit.com/2018/05/08/how-italy-experienced-yet-another-electoral-system-and-why-it-may-soon-change-it-again/).

Contradictory results emerge also with respect to gatekeeping. Most studies show ample evidence of discriminatory behaviors. Powerful men do not place female colleagues in strategic political positions [12], do not put many women on electoral lists [14], or insert them in the most unelectable places [15]. Male politicians marginalize women colleagues by not communicating vital information [13] or verbally assaulting them and interrupting them even when they are head of a meeting [16]. Moreover, male politicians tend to make negative remarks on the femininity of assertive female colleagues [17] and to assign women politicians mostly to health, education, equal opportunities, and welfare committees [18]. Furthermore, they devalue the success of women politicians by giving to "luck" the credit for their achievements [18]. These negative behaviors by colleagues have been found to push women to leave the offices more often than their male colleagues (the "revolving door syndrome") [13]. Other studies reveal that men also tend to resent successful women in politics, especially if they are married and have children [19]. Some research studies, however, found that powerful women also act as gatekeepers toward their younger female colleagues and do not team up to support their colleagues [13]. A few studies show also that women candidates receive as much support as their male colleagues [20].

With respect to individual characteristics of politicians, contrasting results emerge regarding political ambition [21]. Moreover, women politicians face today a cultural double bind since typical male behaviors are considered inappropriate for a woman and typical female behaviors are inappropriate for a politician [22]. Various authors [23] argue that a "feminized" conception of politics has emerged, in which the concept of leadership is related to the ability to help groups to work together to solve problems. This contrasts with the traditional view of politics as a fight to obtain power for one's party and defeat the others [23]. Other researches confirm this trend [24] revealing that leadership styles of politicians show significant gender differences: female politicians tend to use a leadership style that pursues consensus, while male politicians, a style that pursues personal power and control.

Moreover, as Stevens points out we still do not know which personal qualities women politicians need to persist in their political career and to gain leading political positions, maintaining their believes and values [2]. She hypothesizes that for women politicians to achieve these goals, personal empowerment and a blend of feminine and masculine characteristics might be very important [2].

Research on media and politics indicates that there is often a misrepresentation of women (e.g., more comments on their appearance and family, and less on their policies) and that women politicians appear less frequently in the media (e.g., they are less present in talk shows) [11].

A review of most empirical studies and theoretical approaches highlights that the obstacles encountered by women politicians can be divided into two broad categories: (a) the first "inner obstacles" are supported mostly by the gender and difference theory and work and family balance theory (e.g., such ambivalence toward total commitment to politics (long hours, high stress levels, highly competitive environment, etc.)) and (b) "external obstacles" are supported mostly by mass media and gatekeeping theories (e.g., masculine cultures; restricting entry into politics or to higher political positions or institutional party practices that hinder women; difficulties to gain access to media) [25].

Which of these challenges are more difficult to overcome by women politicians, and with which types of obstacles they cope better? Reviewing the existing literature, we had difficulties answering these questions, since to our knowledge there is lack of studies that included specific instruments measuring internal and external obstacles that women politicians encounter and how they cope with them.

Our initial research [25] aimed therefore to build and validate specific instruments. We developed a Women Obstacles scale (WO), which included perceived obstacles derived from the four main theories. Furthermore, we built a scale called Women Coping Efficacy in Politics (WOC), which explored how well women politicians can cope with these obstacles.

A sample of 349 Italian women politicians either elected to the national parliament (N = 109, 68.8%) or to local councils (N = 240, 10%) participated in this study. Participants' age varied from 18 to 78 years (mean age = 47.18; *SD* = 10.6), and they were all administered the WO, WOC scales, the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ), and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ). About 70 women were also interviewed in depth, and all could answer open-ended questions in a section of the survey. Our findings with respect to the WO scale show a two-dimensional scale: women in politics perceived both external and internal obstacles. Male gatekeeping behaviors and also lack of women mentors and discriminatory acts put in practice by other powerful political women were external hurdles most often perceived by female politicians. Also, difficulties with media were often mentioned. Internal obstacles included primarily feeling ambivalent to compete for positions of high power in politics because women disliked the highly competitive and conflictual work environment and feeling unable to balance family and work [25].

The WOC scale resulted in a clear-cut four-factor structure of personal capabilities resembling the above-mentioned theoretical approaches: efficacy (1) in gaining access to mass media (e.g., "I can always gain visibility through television"), (2) in balancing work and family burden (e.g., "I can always manage my political task without sacrificing my private life"), (3) in self-empowering (e.g., "I can always pursue ambitious goals more effectively than my male colleagues"), and (4) in contrasting male gatekeeping (e.g., "I can always hold my own view when dealing with very powerful men") [25].

Having validated the WO and WOC scales we then began to explore the rather controversial question of when female politicians encounter most hurdles.

3. When do female politicians encounter most obstacles?

In this research, we used the WO and WOC scales to ascertain if women find hurdles all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling theorists maintain. The second aim was to explore which kind of hurdles among those postulated by gatekeeping, gender role, mass media, and work and family balance theorists were more present for women elected to local and national office and how well they coped with these obstacles.

Supporters of "glass ceiling" theory think that women encounter obstacles primarily when they approach high leadership roles [26]. Eagly and Carli [3] have argued that the glass ceiling interpretation is misleading because it erroneously implies that women have equal access to entry or middle level positions, facing obstacles only at the top. They underline that, compared to men, female politicians have to go through a "labyrinth" beset with obstacles all along their career paths. Given the widespread underrepresentation of women in elected political positions in most countries, it would be crucial to ascertain which theory best explains the difficulties women encounter in a traditionally male field such as politics. Yet, the available empirical studies of female politicians do not permit us to favor either the glass ceiling or the labyrinth hypothesis. Reviewing the literature, we found that most studies had involved only women elected to local office, and few have

involved national and local politicians at the same time; so we do not know which obstacles are perceived by women politicians at any level, as labyrinth theory would predict, and which prevail primarily at higher levels of political achievement, as glass ceiling theory would predict. Even less was known about how elected women politicians cope with and overcome the obstacles they were likely to find, and which they found more difficult to cope with. So we did a pilot study [13], based primarily on interviews with male and female local politicians but with a small sample of national male and female representatives. We found that the national congresswomen, being on average over 55, were less likely than local representatives to report problems balancing family-work obligations. Half of the national congresswomen had no children, while the other half had grown children. Compared to women of the political left, women of the right felt better able to balance work-family requirements, reporting receiving much support from husbands, children, and their own parents or relatives. They also felt more ready to occupy high positions in spite of their male colleagues' opposition. They could envision themselves as party leaders in the future more often than women of the left. The women of the left were more likely to state that they had problems showing their ambition too openly, did not feel qualified enough for top positions, and did not want to face the extreme competition and conflict that reaching a top position usually entails. Right-wing local and national politicians also had significantly higher scores on an empowerment scale than their left-wing peers, especially in the subscale measuring leadership propensity and capacity to reach goals.

Then, we did another study [27] in which we confronted two competing theories (glass ceiling or labyrinth) on why women still represent a small minority of elected politicians. We hypothesized that the labyrinth hypothesis would be sustained, and both local (lower level) and national (higher level) women politicians would report similar obstacles in pursuing their political careers. We also wanted to investigate how women elected coped with these obstacles, taking into account our previous study [13], we hypothesized that right-wing politicians would have greater self-reported ability to cope with the obstacles presented by mass media, work-family balance, and gatekeeping. We used the same sample of 349 local and national politicians involved in the study on perceived obstacles, analyzing in more depth the differences in answers to both WO and WOC between local and national politicians.

Our results on the WO overall seem to give more support to the labyrinth theory: both local and national politicians perceived more external obstacles, deriving primarily from hostile attitudes of their male colleagues, as gatekeeping theory (e.g., see [4, 6]) would predict. Internal obstacles included having trouble conciliating political engagements and family commitments, as other studies have shown [12], and also feeling ill at ease with some aspect of political life. For instance, top political positions were perceived as too stressful and demanding, so some women chose not to compete for them because they did not want to live "mutilated" lives, a choice that supports gender stereotype theories [23].

In general, results on the WOC showed a similar pattern for both local and national politicians, giving further indirect support to the labyrinth hypothesis. Both groups found it hardest to cope with the difficulties of accessing media, particularly national television, and easiest to confront male colleagues who exhibited gatekeeping attitudes and behaviors. Both groups had an intermediate level of difficulty in keeping their sense of empowerment high.

Local women were more able than national women to remain empowered and maintain high self-esteem even in the face of difficulties. This might depend on their younger age. However, further analysis showed that age affected only the perceived ability to conciliate public and private life. More specifically, women over 50 reported more perceived efficacy in coping with conciliation.

3.1 Interaction effects between political orientation and level of political engagement

We had hypothesized, on the basis of the earlier pilot study [13], that right-wing women politicians would portray themselves as better able to cope with obstacles. Our hypothesis has been confirmed in all four typologies of problems: balance issues, access to media, maintaining high levels of empowerment, and gatekeeping. National women politicians of the left also perceived more internal and external obstacles (WO) than the other groups, confirming the trend found in the pilot study [13]. The national women of the left also described themselves as less able to cope than the other groups in accessing the media, in feeling empowered, and in confronting gatekeeping behaviors. The glass ceiling theory thus derives some support from this particular group of politicians. What might explain this peculiarity?

We can hypothesize that women of the left have been in parliament for a longer time in Italy (while most women politicians of the right have increased their presence only in the last two decades). They thus may be more aware both from historical and personal experiences of the difficulties women politicians still face in a highly masculine culture. It is also conceivable that right-wing ideologies favor some forms of personal empowerment: right-wing ideals have always emphasized the rightfulness of hierarchies, perhaps making it easier for a national woman politician on the right to feel ambitious and empowered, while leftist ideologies have tended to promote egalitarianism, making it perhaps harder to legitimize aspiring to top positions. Right-wing women politicians may also be drawn from a pool of well-born local notables, who feel empowered from their family background. They may have personality traits, which propel them to more optimistic views and greater self-confidence in their ability to overcome obstacles.

4. Exploring traits and values as determinant of political orientation and perceived career efficacy

Personality has a critical role in political orientation [10]; however, while most studies have relied on direct methods when assessing personality of voters, most of the research on personality of politicians relied on indirect measures [28]. In this study [29], we compared 106 women members of parliament and 864 voters using the Big Five questionnaire and Schwartz's basic values questionnaire. Schwartz focuses on 10 motivationally distinct basic values: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. These can be grouped into four broader dimensions: self-enhancement (power and achievement), which includes pursuit of self-interest; self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence), which underlines concern for the welfare of others; openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), which emphasizes independence of thought and action and readiness for new experience; and conservation (security, conformity and tradition), which includes self-restriction, order, and resistance to change. Hedonism is not clearly located in one of the four dimensions, as it shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement. All of these values are measured through a Portrait Values Questionnaire, which has been tested and evaluated in more than 50 countries [30]. In this research [29], with female members of the parliament we examined the extent to which differences in traits and values contribute to ideological orientation of politicians and voters of rival coalitions. We found that traits and values contributed more to partisanship of politicians than of voters, and that there were higher significant differences in traits and values of left-wing and right-wing female politicians than of right-wing and left-wing voters. Since no males were included in this study, we could not examine gender differences.

In another research [31], we examined the potential explanatory role of personality traits and values as determinants of perceived political career efficacy and career progression in women elected to the national parliaments.

Our findings show that political women with higher levels of extraversion are more likely to attain higher scores in perceived self-efficacy in contrasting male gatekeeping, in balancing work and family duties, in gaining access to mass media, as well as in being able to set and pursue ambitious political goals. Our results are consistent with similar studies in organizational psychology, which maintain that extraversion is advantageous in job settings due to its positive relation to career decidedness, goal stability, and cognitive clarity [32]. Among personal values, self-transcendence had a greater impact since it was positively associated with two forms of efficacy: in dealing with gatekeeping and empowerment obstacles. These results confirm in part previous studies that have shown the importance of holding universalistic values for political efficacy and participation [33]. Moreover, a tied comparison of traits and values revealed that personality traits "trumped" personal values in the prediction of career efficacy beliefs.

With respect to prediction of career progression—operatively defined as the difference between the age at which each participant started her political activity and the age at which she was elected for the first time (the smaller the difference is, the quicker the career)—we were able to show not only that both traits (particularly extraversion) and values were correlated with this objective career outcome but also that personality is likely to have a distal effect on career outcomes that is mediated by career efficacy beliefs (particularly empowerment).

5. Why is it important to have more female politicians elected: gender differences in personal values of national and local Italian politicians, activists, and voters

The last decades have witnessed a strong debate over women's underrepresentation in politics. Politics of presence supporters [4] maintain that it does matter who is a representative, and that is very important for women to be involved in setting the agenda, since women and men hold different interests and values. According to this theoretical approach, female politicians' behaviors, attitudes, and values should mirror those of women voters [34]. Politics of presence can be studied analyzing political choices and activities of female politicians, but Lovenduski and Norris [35] maintain that behavioral measures (e.g., legislative voting) are influenced by backbench activities and offer therefore a limited view of the impact of women in politics and that an alternative systematic and reliable method to attest the hypotheses of the politics of presence theory is analyzing attitudes and values of females and male representatives. Indeed, if women and male politicians do hold similar values, then it will be rather questionable that women in public office can really make a difference (e.g., supporting "women's issues"). Values are envisioned and assessed in different ways by political scientists and by social and personality psychologists. The former include mostly in their research "core political values" such as social equality, civil right, liberty of expression, etc. (e.g., see [36]), while personality psychologists focus in their studies on "basic personal values." Basic personal values theory [30] defines values as desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. Different studies [37] maintain that focusing on personal values is relevant since it allows us to predict how people elected in public office might conduct themselves in unpredicted circumstances. In addition, basic value priorities tend to be more permanent and less affected by recent events than political attitudes.

5.1 Empirical evidence of gender differences in politics and basic personal values among voters and politicians

An analysis [36] of the political science literature on gender differences on political issues of the last three decades shows that there is a broad political gender gap in attitudes and behaviors, (e.g., women tend to favor more programs on health care, education, promoting employment and stricter gun control; they are less likely than men to support death penalty and the use of military force to resolve international conflicts). This difference is due principally to the different socialization experiences of men and women, who end up supporting distinctive values. Feminine values are: collaboration, empathy, equality, a belief we are all entitled to human rights, a preference for pacific solutions to fights, and a sense of community and the feeling of being part of something bigger than our selves. Men are socialized to endorse masculine values such as antagonism, hostility, and individualism. Therefore, they tend to make decisions mostly based on what suits them better and is best for them and they tend to favor more the use of force when necessary to manage foreign conflicts. Research on voters has shown a strong association between political behaviors and values [38]. Empirical studies on political values give support to the politics of presence theory.

Instead, contradictory results characterize the studies on gender gap values among politicians. Some research studies provide evidence that women elected in public office hold feminine values. Norris and Lovenduski's research [39] showed that women of British Parliament had more feminist and leftist radical values than their male colleagues; however, political orientation had a stronger impact on values and policies. In line with these findings, other studies [12] based in the United States, which included male and female politicians at the state levels, also highlighted different priorities. Among the priorities of women politicians were issues of women, children, and families. Other research, instead, showed that male and female politicians were more alike, holding similar values. A Swedish research that involved members of the parliament [40] showed only a small difference between men and women's attitudes on most of the issues investigated, since they both valued social goals. Also, another qualitative research on British politics (based on interviews) highlighted more similarities between female and male politicians [41]. Instead, in a qualitative study [11], the Italian female representatives interviewed perceived their male colleagues as more power oriented. Moreover, these female politicians noted that their personal values of caring for the commonwealth and for women's issues helped them face hurdles [11].

Political values have received more attention on the debate on representation with respect to personal values; however, in order to address politics of presence, we need additional studies to focus on personal values. Recent evidence [37], in fact, found that basic personal values underlie political ideologies and attitudes, and core political values (e.g., people who give greatest importance to security and power will tend to support policies that favor patriotism). The authors [37] highlight that the pattern of correlations between basic values and core political values reveal their shared motivational structure. They claim that the coherent structure of motivations that organizes basic values also structures core political values. For instance, the political values of equality, civil liberties, and—on the other side—free enterprise reveal the motivational opposition of universalism and benevolence versus power and achievement values. Therefore, the primary motivational conflict concerning these political values is self-interest versus interest for others.

In order to study the theory of presence, personal values seem particularly suited to explore whether women politicians, of different levels, have values similar to most female voters. The few systematic studies on gender differences in personal

values among voters found small but significant differences. Males scored higher on self-enhancement values (power and achievement) and females higher on self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence) [42, 43]. Furthermore, previous studies have revealed that basic personal values predicted political orientation, across cultural contexts and political systems (e.g., see [10]) and our recent study involving women politicians confirmed this trend [29].

An analysis of the literature, taking into consideration different approaches, revealed that in order to legitimize the claims of politics of presence, investigating if women politicians have personal values more similar to female voters and different from male politicians, we needed to control also for political orientation and different levels of political experience. Some authors, in fact, have maintained that becoming involved in politics may modify values, so that simply being a female politician does not ensure that they will hold feminine values. To fill the literature gap we investigated if women, at all levels of political engagement, still held values of transcendence that correspond to those of female voters, as theory of presence maintains or personal values would vary at different levels of political involvement (e.g., activists, politicians elected to local and national political office).

To our knowledge, no previous studies have examined these issues involving male and female voters, activists, and politicians. Moreover, Wängnerud [44] in her research pointed out that there was a need for empirical studies of the politics of presence theory, particularly in countries where the political gender gap is higher than in Northern European ones. Italy ranks low in the Global Gender Gap Index, 50th among 144 countries [45]. Furthermore, Italy has a strongly masculine culture [9, 46].

Our most recent research [47] therefore aimed to investigate if gender differences in personal values were still present among activists, and local and national politicians. We also tried to determine if, in line with previous studies on voters, self-transcendence values were more strongly held by women and self-enhancement by men at all levels of political activities even after controlling for political orientation. Furthermore, since we are not aware of previous research that has examined gender differences in conservation and openness to change in people actively involved in politics, we explored whether gender-specific values for conservation and openness to change are similar at all levels of political participation.

A total 4533 participants were recruited for the study: 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Participants were given a shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 2003).

Our findings give additional support for the politics of presence theory since females, at all levels of political involvement, showed higher levels of self-transcendence values (that express concern for the welfare of others).

Our results lend support to previous studies [42, 43], self-transcendence values were more important for women; moreover, this specific gender difference was present at all levels of political activities, among activists, and local and national politicians, even after controlling for political orientation. However, our results did not show significant gender differences in self-enhancement values, in contrast to earlier studies [42, 43]. Self-enhancement values were somewhat higher for male voters, activists, and local politicians; however, unlike previous results reported in literature, female national politicians had slightly higher scores than their male colleagues. Furthermore, our findings show that female politicians were also more open to change and less conservation oriented than their male colleagues. These results significantly differ from previous research among voters, where females were less open to change and more conservation oriented than males [42, 43].

6. Conclusions

Women are underrepresented in in politics in most countries (on average in the world, 23.8% of women are in the parliament [1]. This gender gap has stimulated theoretical and empirical studies to discover which obstacles most hinder female politicians, when these hurdles are more present, and why we need more women in our legislative bodies.

To answer some of these questions, we constructed and validated two scales (WO women obstacles, and WOC Women coping efficacy in politics) that included items derived from each of four main theories (gatekeeping, mass media, life balance, and gender role). Results showed that female politicians faced primarily external obstacles (gatekeeping behaviors by male colleagues and difficult access to main stream media). Internal obstacles were cited less frequently and provided some support for work-life balance and gender role theories.

No general coping efficacy helped politicians face all these different hurdles. Each type of hurdle required a set of different personal capabilities, developed through experience with hostile, powerful men (for gatekeeping problems), or obtaining help and support from family members (for life-balance hurdles). Local politicians developed strategies to gain access to local media while national politicians had more problems accessing big national networks and used social media (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, etc.). Finally, those who felt empowered were better able to pursue ambitious goals related to the values that brought them to political activism in the first place. In some interviews, women stated clearly how important it was for them to uphold their feminine values and their femininity to contrast the prevalent warrior, masculine culture.

We also investigated the role of personality traits in coping with obstacles. Our findings indicated that being talkative, assertive, energetic, and dominant helps women overcome many different obstacles. Our results therefore supported authors who maintain that dispositional variables of politicians are important in the attainment of political success [10, 48], and that personality traits should be considered when selecting candidates. Moreover, to try to diminish women's underrepresentation in parliaments, we should also promote empowerment-training programs that increase female politicians' capacity to have high aspirations, to preserve their self-confidence in achieving ambitious goals even in hostile settings, and to strengthen extrovert attitudes and behavior.

We then tried to ascertain when women find hurdles, if all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling supporters maintain. We hypothesized that the labyrinth hypothesis would be sustained, and both local (lower level) and national (higher level) women politicians would report similar obstacles in pursuing their political careers. We also hypothesized that right-wing politicians would have greater self-reported ability to cope with the obstacles presented by mass media, work-family balance, and gatekeeping. Results supported both of our hypotheses. Further studies should explore if differences between right-wing and left-wing female politicians found in Italy are also present in other countries.

Our last research is the first study that we are aware, to directly measure personal values of female and male members of the parliament, local politicians, and activists through the PVQ [30] and to test the theory of politics of presence's hypothesis that women elected to political office would represent women better than male politicians, because they would still hold values similar to those of female voters.

Our results confirmed that the self-transcendence gender differences in voters can be found among politicians. This supports politics of presence claims that it could matter whether there are men or women in elected political positions. Female

politicians higher in transcendence values (benevolence and universalism) may favor policies that promote equality, civil liberties, and social welfare; they may be more willing to increase funds for medical care, education, and fighting violence against women. They will support more laws for gun control and against capital punishment and the use of force to resolve conflicts [36, 37]. To have documented significant self-transcendence gender differences among women and men at all levels for political involvement in a country with low level of gender equality such as Italy is an important finding, given that many countries present low levels of gender equality worldwide.

We also want to underline another interesting finding, local and national female politicians were more open to change and less conservative than their male colleagues, while among voters, normally, men were more open to change and less conservative. This finding does not support the politics of presence' theory, since women politicians differ in those two values from women voters. However, these results would please those activists who claim that a higher number of women may revitalize politics which is now held in low opinions by many voters [49]. Our results also may give some support to activists in women's movements who argue that female representatives are more likely than men to challenge the status quo [50]. Women who become politicians, thus accessing a career in a prevalently male field, are probably women who are willing to break the traditional gender schemata, and therefore more open to change in other domains also. Our female politicians moreover scored lower in conservation values than both their male colleagues and women voters. They therefore would be more likely to oppose policies related to traditional moralism, law and order, and blind patriotism, which are the core political values that are held [37] by people with conservative personal values. Further studies should examine if our results related to conservation and openness to change are confirmed in other countries with different indexes of gender equality.

We also found that women politicians who survive and thrive in hostile male-dominated political institutions have high level of personal empowerment and a blend of feminine and masculine characteristics as some feminist authors have hypothesized [2]. Taken together, then, the results of our different studies bring more scientific evidence in support for more gender balance in political representation. We are aware that our research has several limits. While we have a broadly representative sample of female members of parliament (70%), we have less representative samples of males in parliament, and of local politicians and activists. Moreover, future research should measure personal values, political decisions, and other behaviors of male and female politicians.

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Section 4

Elections in Historical Context

Chapter 7

Presidential Elections of 1934 in Colombia and Mexico

Olga Yanet Acuña Rodriguez

Abstract

This chapter reflects upon the 1934 electoral processes of Colombia and Mexico, after which presidents Alfonso López Pumarejo and Lázaro Cárdenas, respectively, were elected. They both designed social government programs, with the aim of improving the living conditions of the population. From the electoral history, a historiographical and documental review was carried out, which allowed for a better understanding of the political dynamics of the two candidates in distinct settings, but both with political projects oriented toward aiding the most vulnerable. This allowed a view of how their government programs were perceived during the electoral campaigns and what brought about the favorable results which made Alfonso López the president of Colombia and Lázaro Cárdenas the president of Mexico.

Keywords: presidential elections, party, social reforms, popular sectors

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to compare the political and the electoral processes of 1934 which took place in Colombia and México, when Alfonso López Pumarejo was elected president of Colombia and Lázaro Cárdenas president of México. In Colombia, in 1934, the Liberal Party had managed to consolidate majorities in the electoral results after the national and local governmental elections conducted in 1933. Simultaneously, the Conservative Party had weakened and, given the public order situation, in which they condemned the fraud and lack of guarantees, they decided to abstain from participating in the presidential election. As a result, the only candidate was Alfonso López Pumarejo, who presented a proposal for reform focused on the popular sectors, which he called La *Revolución en Marcha* (Revolution in Progress). In the case of Mexico, the political leader Lázaro Cárdenas, the candidate for the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Party), the official party, had at his command state resources and a vast organizational infrastructure for his campaign, which allowed him to defeat the other three candidates. Cárdenas' project had an underlying social tone and was denominated the "Six-Year Plan"; for many, this was the materialization of the revolution. Thus, both candidates had every chance of winning the election, either because there were no other contenders or because their rivals did not have enough electoral strength to compete. On the other hand, both presented social reforms which captivated the voters. The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the support for, as well as the opposition to, these candidates, the nature and the scope of their political projects, in addition to the electoral process they followed in order to gain power.

The topic of the elections has been approached from different perspectives; however, attention has been focused more on electoral legislation [1–6], electoral practices [7–14], the elections per se, and the construction of citizenship [15–18], although the works dedicated to the presidential elections have been few [19], while a considerable number have focused on the regional elections [20]. Thus, the topic of the elections has gradually drawn the attention of historians, although there have not been any comparative studies that portray the different connections and works of the presidential candidates, their parties, and the electoral bases, as is the intention of this study.

Initially, a historiographical review on the topic was carried out, which allowed for the identification of their approaches, methodological processes regarding elections, and the construction of citizenship, in Colombia as well as in Mexico. Afterward, a review of the newspapers and documents of the time was conducted, which led to the characterization of the political and electoral processes in both countries. An analysis and interpretation of these, in addition to the events that were the presidential campaigns in Colombia and Mexico, were implemented under the parameters of the comparative method, for which spaces and temporalities with similar dimensions were designated. In that same vein, the following aspects were defined: the situation of the political parties in both countries; the campaign rituals with regard to electoral tours and government plans, which showed a rapprochement of the candidates and the electors; the use of the media during the campaign; and the expectation created by the proposal of a government with a social orientation among the popular sectors.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first is related to the 1934 electoral campaign in Colombia and the Revolution in Progress. The second refers to the 1934 election in Mexico, the Six-Year Plan promoted by the presidential candidate Lázaro Cárdenas, and how support was obtained in the political and popular spheres. The third presents a reflection upon the scope and limitations of both campaigns and the government plans from a comparative perspective.

2. Alfonso López Pumarejo and the Revolution in Progress

The topic of the elections is still of great relevance as regards understanding the political dynamic, taking into account the recent elections in Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico. This is because elections define a state's political orientation, social policies, and its general form of governance. In the case of Colombia, in the political scene that we have just experienced, there was a return to the tensions between friends and foes, among the followers of the right and the left, in order to find alliances, trends, and dynamics that, at times, are far removed from the needs and interests of the population. The 1930s in Colombia were not exempt from the debates, partisan polarization, projects of social reform, and the defense of traditionalism; rather they were part of the public scene and stimulated the ballots.

In Colombia, the presidential candidacy of Alfonso López Pumarejo was considered to be the continuation of the liberal regime which began in 1930, with the election of President Enrique Olaya Herrera. From the taking of office of the new president in August of that year, the political panorama started to change: firstly, because the population of Colombia at the time wanted social changes in government policies; secondly, because the Conservative Party that had been in power for more than 45 years had been weakened; and thirdly, because liberalism started to consolidate its own political machinery, with the changing of public officials in institutions, which was eventually reflected in the electoral results of the different public corporations, where conservatism started to lose its political strength

as regards the number of votes received, whereas liberalism gained more voters. Furthermore, the intention of the liberal government to propose social reforms as a means to mitigate the impact of the international economic crisis of 1929, which revitalized Colombian politics, attracted the attention of voters. In their 3 years in office (1930–1933), the Liberal Party had managed to transform the political map in their favor, as can be seen in **Table 1**.

Alfonso López Pumarejo was born on January 31, 1886 in Honda, Tolima, and died in London on November 20, 1959. He was a liberal politician and statesman, who served as president of the Republic of Colombia during the periods 1934–1938 and 1942–1945 [21, 22]. He studied finance in Brighton College and then continued his studies in economics in Packard School (New York). He worked, together with his father, in Casa López, where he developed his skills as a statesman and in the management of economic policy. Tirado Mejía considered him to be the most important statesman of the twentieth century and a pioneer of social reform. Nonetheless, Tirado Mejía's reflections could have an emotional charge when exalting the magnitude of the politician, given that he does not make a balance of the scope and the dimension of his reforms.

During the government of Olaya Herrera (1930–1934), some fundamental changes were fostered in relation to social policies, although many of them could not be applied. This situation allowed Alfonso López Pumarejo to revisit those proposals and to launch a social reform program that would be managed by the state. He proposed a governmental project called the Revolution in Progress, which included a series of social reforms focused on solving some of the problems of the popular sectors, among them the settlers, and the main focus was on agrarian reform, education, labor reforms, and tax reform.

When the liberal hegemony started in Colombia (1930), the Conservative Party seemed to be weakened and with few reformist perspectives. It limited itself to conserving things the way they were, to repeating the political principles of the government, and to strengthening the relationship between the Church and the state. One of the main controversies was the posture to be taken regarding the liberal government, as there was doubt as to whether to take peaceful action or to totally reject the work of the government. This led to the creation of diverse groups with different principles. For example, the civil movement did not have a clear position with regard to the government; another faction retook the course of *caciquismo* (also called bossism), turning the electoral activity into an individualistic bastion, while the conservative youth remained relegated from the decisions of the veterans, due to their pacifistic viewpoint as well as a lack of innovation. The youth were influenced by Italian Fascism and Spanish Falangism, and proposed a nationalist political project to reestablish social order and, as a tactic, it proposed the use of force or offensive and counter-revolutionary violence [23]. One of the movements among the youth was constituted by the Leopards, who had an anti-communist, anti-revolutionary approach which defended order, authority, and Catholicism. These ideas brought them closer to right-wing political tendencies, turning them into the first opposition to the liberal governments of Olaya Herrera and López

Congressmen February 1, 1931				**Congressmen February 5, 1933**			
Liberal	**Conservative**	**Others**	**Total**	**Liberal**	**Conservative**	**Others**	**Total**
458,702	406,441	363	735,312	551,029	333,892	4829	896,532

Source: Anuario General de Estadística 1937, No. 3183 (statistical yearbook).

Table 1.
Election of deputies in 1931 and 1933.

Pumarejo, which can be summarized in the words of Silvio Villegas: "the Marxist heresy could only be opposed by a bronze doctrine; the violence of the left could only be opposed by the counter-revolution of order. Hybrid species are called to disappear... [24]."

This movement proposed a political project focused on order, nationalism, tradition, and the relationship between the Church and state. In addition, it put forward a policy of excluding adversaries from the governmental scene, which made violence a component of politics. Likewise, it declared itself an enemy of democracy, of communism, and of republican ideas, while its proponents assumed a stance of deep appreciation for the classical, especially for monarchist ideas. It broke away from Caesarist ideology and considered establishing a new order emphasizing Bolivarian patriotism and expansionism. As a state project, it was considered fundamental to promote an authoritarian government, with corporate forms of representation, and with a nationalist project which highlighted the motherland as the basis of the struggle. In addition, it was thought that violence was the principal mechanism through which to consolidate authority.

In the context of the political dispute for power between liberalism and conservatism, a war broke out against Peru (1932–1933), a conflict characterized, as it is referred to by Álvaro Acevedo and John Jaime Correa, more by rhetoric than by military combat [25]. The development of the war had several purposes, among them the articulation of the population around a common objective: fostering nationalism, omitting the triumph and the strengthening of liberalism, and discrediting the government of Olaya Herrera due to the diplomatic management of border relations. Olaya, for his part, insisted that this was a problem of a diplomatic nature, unrelated to the phenomena of local and targeted violence. Notwithstanding, the diplomatic management of the situation as well as the campaign in defense of the national territory, on a national and international level, favored the image of Olaya Herrera and Lopez Pumarejo which, in turn, projected the latter as a political leader, negotiator, and possible presidential candidate. More than an international conflict, this war represented a strategy used by both parties. In the case of the conservatives, they intended to promote the image of war in the nationalist perception with which it tried to unify and strengthen the party. The liberals tried to foster the idea of conciliation and integration with the neighboring countries, which set the scene for promoting the presidential candidacy of Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo.

With relation to the electoral campaign for president, liberalism resorted to the political machinery and the networks of local and regional power that had been consolidated as from 1930. The elections for public corporations that took place in 1933 reconfigured the political map and made liberalism stronger. Those elections helped to prepare for the electoral campaign that would lead Alfonso López to the presidency of the Republic. In general, López Pumarejo led the committees that visited the capitals, cities, and some towns. The press wrote about the activities of his campaign and simultaneously published photographs of López even when he was not an official candidate. This was intended to build his public image. Conversely, with the elections for congressmen in February [26] 1933, for representatives in May [27] of that year, and for councilors in October [28–31], the political structure and machinery were conserved. This favored the number of votes for the liberals, while the Conservative Party lost the regional power it had had for over 50 years, as can be seen in the number of votes and the comments of the liberal press (El Tiempo, El Espectador, Revista Cromos).

Alfonso López Pumarejo had accompanied Olaya Herrera's administration from different positions and this support made him one of the most important liberal figures, because of his public recognition and his projection as a reformist leader. López's presidential campaign proceeded naturally and without many demands.

Although he was out of the country during some key moments, such as the peace negotiations with the Peruvian government in 1933, he led the delegations to the Economic Conference of London in 1932 and the Pan American Conference in Montevideo in 1933 [32]. Those visits earned him international recognition and projected him as a diplomat and a Colombian public figure, knowledgeable in international politics.

The political campaigns officially started with the national convention of the party formed by delegations from all the departments, where candidates were put forward and the general outlines related to the organization of the campaign were defined. Said outlines were to be put into practice in the towns and regions. Those activities were coordinated by the political directorates of each party, which operated in the capitals of the department and municipal seats. In the case of liberalism, the convention took place on November 6, 1933. In this gathering, Alfonso López Pumarejo was officially proclaimed as the candidate for the presidency of the elections of February 1934 [33].

Political parties in Colombia, in pre-election periods, were organized through directorates with a vertical structure, with the aim of articulating the electors and dynamizing the electoral activities. The base was formed by the masses, the popular sectors: farmers, craftsmen, workers, day laborers, tenants, and small traders. The medium sector was formed by public officials, who directly assumed a partisan, rather than a state role, as their duties were focused on supporting the actions of the candidate of their party, whereas the state institutions were malleable to the interests of the party [34, 35]. Then, there were the political officials who had managerial positions and who could later become advisers, regional directors, or leaders. At the top were the political leaders, regional as well as national, who gave orders, had the function of appointing candidates, along with supporting and approving government programs that catered to the nature of the party.

The organization of political directorates also had a vertical structure, with which it was intended to gain power in the territory. Directorates established an institutional link and consolidated a hierarchical order, from which decisions that involved the population and favored the interests of the party [36] were made and executed. In this way, the national directorate operated in the capital, Bogotá; the departmental directorate operated in the departmental capitals; the municipal directorate operated in the municipal seat, and their function was to appoint leaders or agents in the *veredas* [37] (territorial division in rural areas). This system can be related to the hierarchized conception of power presented by Norberto Bobbio, when referring to the consolidation of a particular type of representative democracy [38]. The organization of the directorates constituted the first phase of the electoral process, which guaranteed the presence and activity of the party in the area.

In his election campaign, López Pumarejo introduced an innovative model for the time, with a view to visiting the regions and having a broad view of the situation of the population. This intention motivated him to travel the country widely by plane, including in his electoral tours, to peripheral areas with a considerable number of inhabitants, such as the coast, which until the 1920s had been ignored due to its distance [39]. Despite his government program and his intention to get closer to the vulnerable sectors, the most relevant meetings were carried out in clubs, restaurants, and prestigious venues, as the image he wanted to portray was that of an English gentleman.

Another phase was carried out by the media with the dissemination of the programs of visits, endorsements, and controversies in which the protagonist, victim, and winner was always the candidate that the newspaper or journal supported. With respect to this, Álvaro Acevedo and John Jaime Correa [40] present an important balance of the meaning, sense, and scope of the press during the Liberal

Republic (1930–1946) in the construction and promotion of political representations. They also center their attention on the endorsement of sectors, such as the unions, farmers, committees, and other forms of political groups, given that for López Pumarejo it was very important that the farmers, artisans, and workers organized in order to reclaim and defend their rights.

The press and the radio contributed to promoting the activities of the candidates, reporting on political events, and publicizing political and propagandistic activities. They published the itinerary of the candidates' visits to different towns, reported on the visits and, along with the interviews; they included pictures of the candidate and his entourage in places where they wanted to empower the masses. In addition, the importance of the sector leader, the liberal leader, and the priest was taken into consideration, given that they had an impact on the decisions of the voters. Meanwhile, the shops and canteens became places to socialize, where the people could learn about politics and the actions of the party.

In the presidential elections of 1934, Alfonso López Pumarejo, as the only candidate, had a great majority of votes, as he did not have a strong opponent, given that the Conservative Party had declared its abstention from the election [41] due to the lack of guarantees; it was still weak and constantly denounced irregularities and their persecution by the liberal government. For his part, the communist candidate, Eutiquio Timoté, did not have enough electoral strength. Therefore, Pumarejo was certainly going to win. Firstly, he had no opposition, and secondly, the political machinery was ready to inflate the results, as it appears happened in several localities. In **Table 2**, we can see a comparison of the votes obtained in 1934, which show an increase in some departments, as can be seen below.

According to the results obtained on February 11, 1934, López obtained 938,608 votes against the scarce 1974 votes of the communist Eutiquio Timoté, with total conservative abstention. So, López Pumarejo won with 99.8%, against Timoté, who obtained 0.002%. On the other hand, said electoral results gave an account of a process of political homogenization, as the Liberal Party obtained the votes of both, liberals and conservatives. As shown in **Table 2**, in the 1933 elections for the Chamber, the liberals obtained 604,372 votes and there was an increase of 300,000 votes in only 9 months, whereas the number of votes for the conservatives fell enormously.

The number of votes obtained in 1934 was high in relation to the 1930 election, considering that there had not been any reforms either in the political or in the electoral systems; nor had there been a census carried out in which an increase in the population was shown. For this reason, the results were questioned although no detailed explanation was given.

	Congressmen 5 February, 1933				Chamber 14 May, 1933				Presidency 1934			
Departamento	Liberal	Conservative	Others	Total	Liberal	Conservative	Others	Total	López Pumar	Dr. E. Timoté	Other parties	Total
Antioquia	41150	67790	318	112253	55339	64582	132	120053	44022	212	480	44714
Atlántico	11442	5759	1011	18212	15827	2642	0	18469	26697	12	7	26416
Bolívar	29381	12523	0	41901	29153	5492		34645	91234	64	4	91302
Boyacá	69304	45459	0	114763	88345	67636		155981	121614	92	47	121753
Caldas	48811	47126	160	95097	42817	44387	51	87258	62136	173	4	62313
Cauca	30724	17397	37	48158	28205	17450		45655	42958	55	3	43016
Cundinaman	83717	56705	2854	143276	82088	61230	1633	144951	131067	859	802	132728
Huila	4560	9038	34	13632	10019	7446	34	17499	10424	49		10473
Magdalena	20704	16827	0	37531	24303	12076	2	36381	45348	9	4	45361
Nariño	0	0	0	0	13067	23499		36566	26791		16	26807
Norte de San	47873	22787	8	70663	56718	15403		72121	69117			69117
Santander	86687	621	60	92368	88356	2504		90860	122209	60		122269
Tolima	34858	10768	347	45773	33796	16234	68	50098	58301	211	26	58538
Valle del Ca	41818	21092	0	62905	36339	20990		57329	67750	171	27	67948
total	553.824	338892	4819	897535	604372	361571	1923	967329	919668	1967	1420	922755

Table 2.
Elections carried out in 1933–1934/by department.

In the elections of 1933 and 1934, the liberal machinery installed by public officials played a fundamental role in the definition of the number of votes. For many people, these results were a threat to democracy and the legality of the political system. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that both liberals and conservatives resorted to fraudulent practices in an attempt to augment the number of votes in their favor and, frequently, each accused their adversary of being corrupt, violent, and immoral. Finally, liberalism achieved the majority of the votes because it had better political machinery, which allowed it to legitimize the results obtained, given that it had control over the whole system: from the elaboration of the census to the consolidation of the final results. In addition, having the security forces on their side guaranteed them a structure with which to legally coerce and persecute their adversary.

2.1 The Revolution in Progress

The political program presented by Alfonso López Pumarejo, known as the Revolution in Progress, was focused on consolidating a reformist government in accordance with other political projects of the time, as was the case of Mexico and Spain. However, his proposals were questioned by the liberal and conservative elites. His main objective was to make a reform of the constitution as he considered it to be a conservative and traditional framework. Among his ideas were the reviewing of the agreement concerning the relations between the Church and the state, launching agrarian reform in order to improve the situation of the farmers, fostering public education, and the organization of the working class. These proposals were condensed into the program that was called "The Revolution in Progress" which, in political terms, was the strengthening of the Liberal Republic. The concept of *revolution* was controversial for the time, because it called political and religious traditionalism into question as well as proposing a project of institutional and social modernization. This was questioned by the clergy and the traditional political elites because they linked it with the arrival of communism and the empowerment of the popular sectors. Thus, they considered it a threat to the political stability of the regime.

Miguel Ángel Urrego reviews the different processes of Colombian political history, highlighting the legislation regarding land, wasteland, and land ownership, which preceded the so-called "Revolution in Progress." Mainly focusing on this reform, the author points out that López Pumarejo proposed a project of intervention in the economy in which he stated: "[…] the state will be able to intervene through laws for the exploitation of industries or public and private companies, with the aim of rationalizing the production, distribution and consumption of the wealth, or of protecting work [42]." According to Urrego, the intervention proposal was not new, it had been proposed by Rafael Uribe Uribe at the beginning of the 1910s and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in the early 1930s. These two political leaders considered that the state should intervene to correct the huge social inequality and guide the productive sector. On the other hand, interventionism was adopted as a policy to lessen the impact of the economic crisis of 1929 and, in some states, to reactivate the economy.

The first proposal for agrarian reform was presented to the Congress in 1933, but it was rejected, which strengthened the position of the landowners. Lopez's government had the objective of implementing a reform project which intended to stop the growing conflict in rural areas. The proposal came to a halt in Congress, given that landowners were already organized in a union of landowners and agricultural businessmen, and they opposed any attempt to reform the property regime.

The main axis of the Revolution in Progress was the constitutional reform of 1936. However, it is important to consider other measures such as the trade agreement with the United States, the tax reform, and the land law. For the popular sectors, the Revolution in Progress brought great expectations, because it became

their hope as regards obtaining a piece of land, improving their living conditions, and bolstering their freedoms. From the point of view of the opposition, it caused the radicalization of the liberal and conservative elites, as well as the clergy. With regard to this, the controversies eventually intensified in Congress, the press, and in the public sphere. At the same time, the image of López Pumarejo was associated with communism, which along with Pumarejo, had to be fought on all fronts, even if it required violence.

3. Lázaro Cárdenas and the Six-Year Plan

Lázaro Cárdenas was born in 1895 in the state of Michoacán. He was raised in the bosom of a humble family. He was forced to work from an early age and, given their limited social conditions, he only managed to finish primary school. He took part in the revolution and quickly ascended in rank. At the age of 32, he was major general. At 33, he was appointed governor of Michoacán. In 1931, Cárdenas was the head of the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Party, PNR by its acronym in Spanish). Afterward, he was government secretary during the mandate of Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930–1932) and, finally, Secretary of War during the term of Abelardo Rodríguez (1932–1934). He had gained the trust of Plutarco Elías Calles—a political leader who controlled power within the PNR. Thus, he remained close to power, given that the PNR was the only means of reaching the presidency of the Republic [43]. Through his military and political ascent, he gained valuable governmental experience, which projected him as a political leader capable of guiding the Mexican nation in a difficult period when conflict and social crises had to be overcome.

In September 1928, he took office as the governor of Michoacán, while he continued to develop various activities in accordance with the principles of the revolution, mainly focused on mass politics [44]. In 1929, General Lázaro Cárdenas was one of the most relevant figures in Mexican politics. He seemed to be one of the three leaders of the revolution, together with General Calles and General Joaquín Amaro. Cárdenas was a revolutionary leader who was determined to recover and make triumphant the ideological and political heritage of the revolution; that was his goal as a presidential pre-candidate.

While he was governor of the state of Michoacán, he had to face the *Cristera* war (1926–1928), political polarization, and an economic crisis. He had a conciliatory attitude, so he took on direct negotiations with his countrymen in arms and achieved an agreement that put an end to the war. He was committed to guaranteeing the Catholic Church and its followers the respect of the state for their beliefs and to collaborating with some material improvements for some goods and buildings that had been affected by the war [45].

In Mexico, the Program of the Revolution was based around four pillars, the agrarian and educational reforms, the organization of the working and popular sectors, and the regulation of fiscal policy; the first two being given more emphasis, they became even stronger with the boost given to them by Lázaro Cárdenas.

Cárdenas' period in power was preceded by the government and the influence of Plutarco Elías Calles, who was president between 1924 and 1928, with a favorable fiscal and economic situation which gave the Mexican financial elite a certain confidence (1924–1926). Meanwhile, economic growth was reflected in the banking industry and public works. However, a key point was that presented in the constitutional reform (1917) which was the application of constitutional controls imposed on the Church and the oil industry. This was a clear sign that Calles was defying the Catholics and the Americans. The *Cristeros* War (1926–1929), the conflict with the United States, and the deterioration of the economic situation were consequences

of this. Against this background, Calles' project started to weaken due to internal confrontations. At the same time, he started to identify with the ideology of the European right, particularly with Hitler's policies, which distanced him from the ideals of the revolution. Another turning point was the assassination of Álvaro Obregón (17 July 1928), who had been president between 1920 and 1924, and president elect at the moment of his death. This caused an acute economic crisis in Mexico, before the world economic crisis of 1929. The criticism and confrontation led Calles to retire from power and name as his successors figures such as Emilio Portes Gil (1928–1930), Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930–1932), and Abelardo Rodríguez (1932–1934), who governed for the following 6 years, that is to say from 1928 to 1934 when Lázaro Cárdenas took office. Those 6 years of government were called the *maximato*, because they were governed by the *Jefe Máximo* (Supreme Leader), who was behind the political proposals and the governments of those three presidents, that is to say that he exerted power from behind the throne [46]. Alan Knight considered that the previously named period, the *maximato*, was a transition, from then on there was a shift from a personalistic to an institutional government. During the *maximato,* Calles called for an assembly of the new *Partido Revolucionario Oficial* (Official Revolutionary Party, PNR), with the aim of opposing the liberal and anti-reelection governmental aspirations of José Vasconcelos in the presidential election of 1934 [47]. During that period, apart from the political institutionalization of the *maximato*, there was escalating social conflict and growing ideological polarization. For this reason, Cárdenas' rise as a national political leader made him the hope for the negotiation of the conflict and the materialization of the revolution.

Lázaro Cárdenas became a presidential pre-candidate in June 1933 [48] and started an intense campaign of visits to the most remote areas with the aim of learning about the real problems of the population. For that, he resigned from his position as Secretary of War (May 15, 1933). He announced that on June 5, he would make a statement related to the acceptance of his candidacy and, at the same time, he would launch a manifesto with the content of the preliminary design of his governmental program. By that time, Cárdenas had received the support of farmers, workers, and indigenous people. The other pre-candidate was General Pérez Treviño, who had developed political activities in Coahuila and had received the support of the majority groups of the Socialist Party from the southwest of the state of Yucatán, and some from Guanajuato. After realizing that most of the revolutionary people and the organizations of the PNR supported Cárdenas, General Pérez Treviño declined his postulation [49].

During his electoral campaign, Lázaro Cárdenas proposed to the masses that they get organized in order to defend their rights. On many occasions, he reminded them of the importance of organization as the one and only basis upon which their cultural and material situation would improve. He often intervened directly in conflicts among workers, with the aim of advancing peace, which led him to identifying the needs of the people. He reiterated that unity was the best weapon the workers had and that it was more important than laws and the authorities, because no official was to be found where the deeds were done, whereas the workers were ready to continue fighting. With the organization of workers, a substantial change could be achieved with regard to economic relations, with the aim that the workers would no longer be dependent on others. To that end, unification and cooperativism were urged. Cárdenas considered that this was a fundamental means of gaining the adhesion of the proletariat, paving the way for the integral control of the instruments of production. Thus, it could be seen as a mobilization process of the workers [50].

On several occasions, Cárdenas expressed his wish to see the working and the subsistence farmer class together as a common front, which would fight actively to fulfill their social aspirations and specific interests. During his electoral campaign,

Cárdenas also dealt with other important topics, among which was the indigenous issue which was a visible stigma of national misery and disintegration. He considered that it was important to integrate this ethnic group into the nation [51].

In his many rallies and tours, such as in Veracruz, again and again he promoted the union of the workers. In many towns, he called for the formation of a united front, not to destroy the organizations, but rather to strengthen the demand and to make it evident that the needs of the workers were the same. This unification would allow them to consolidate a general program in which the fair demands of all workers were included.

In his visits to diverse regions, Cárdenas learned firsthand, the situation of farmers and their needs. In Puebla, he declared that he would dedicate himself fully and radically to the cause of the farmers and the laborers, for which he obtained their full support [52]. Cardenas' electoral tour contributed to the formation of a public figure sustained not only by representative organizations, but also by deep popular roots.

At the beginning of the campaign, there were persecutions against the followers of Lázaro Cárdenas, as had occurred in Tulancigo, where the local authorities denied permission to carry out a pro-Cárdenas demonstration, which was organized by worker and farmer unions. Likewise, there was another complaint regarding persecution on the June 20, 1933, when six Cárdenas supporters who were handing out leaflets with propaganda of the pre-candidate in the village of San Pedro Nextlalpan were killed. A group that formed part of the social defenses, led by Cristiano Cruz [53], was held accountable for the crime.

The Mexican reformist movements eventually won prestige within the PNR, and its members were convinced of the need to generate substantial changes in accordance with the constitution and social needs. However, the reforming forces made their political victory public with the approval of the Six-Year Plan and the election of General Cárdenas as their candidate for the presidency of the republic in the framework of the second ordinary national convention of the National Revolutionary Party, which was celebrated in Querétaro on December 6, 1933.

By choosing Lázaro Cárdenas as its official candidate for the 1934 elections, the PNR was inclining toward the left. In addition, it trusted that Cárdenas could follow the government of Calles with loyalty because he had proven to be radical, without being orthodox, during his time as governor of Michoacán (1928–1932), but he was still a prominent politician who had been trained in the ranks of the revolutionary army, where he had been a loyal subordinate of Calles. At the same time, Cárdenas' bureaucratic experience was taken into consideration, given that he had held important political positions as president of the party and Secretary of War, and so he was considered a key player in the political-military hierarchy of the PNR [54].

From his appointment as candidate for the presidency of the republic, Lázaro Cárdenas undertook the initiative of politically mobilizing the masses around the country, in order to strengthen revolutionary activity. In opposition to other leaders of the revolution, he considered that the revolution had not ended and that the old regime had to be completely eradicated [55].

After his selection as presidential candidate, Cárdenas started his campaign by visiting faraway places, traveling some 300 km, visiting cities, factories, and villages. Thus, he created a particular style as a candidate. He went to the provinces on several occasions, visited remote communities and places that were very difficult to access, sometimes on horseback, on foot, or in the presidential boat. The electoral campaign and the tours he embarked on afterward gave the president direct knowledge of the conditions existing in the country and they seem to have contributed to creating an identity. Also, with his reformist rhetoric, especially regarding the agrarian issue, he managed to captivate the popular sectors [56], which became a powerful electoral bastion.

Cardenas' political program in the federal district was developed on the basis of the following three fundamental points: the strengthening of the economy, the design of mechanisms for its effective application, and the unity of the action of workers, farmers, and indigenous people. As part of the activities of his campaign, he proposed the creation of "pro Cárdenas" committees in each state [57]. These committees were supposed to be in charge of managing the propaganda and of harmonizing electoral projects in the numerous branches. In political and parliamentary circles, those who followed Cárdenas were classified under three groups: first, states without opposition which unanimously declared themselves to be supporters of Cárdenas from the very beginning, such as Sonora, Nuevo León, and San Luis de Potosí; second, states with groups that opposed the local governments, in which both opposition and government declared their support for Cárdenas, such as Tamaulipas, Jalisco, and Guerrero; and third, states in which the government officials had been followers of Pérez Treviño and opposed Cárdenas, but now they all supported Cárdenas, as was the case of Hidalgo, Guanajuato, and Coahuila.

Close to the end of the electoral campaign, Lázaro Cárdenas toured the region of San Luis de Potosí (June 8, 1934) and he encouraged different people to travel to the area to meet with and interview him. General Zedillo accompanied him during his tour. They both addressed the crowds which were comprised of groups of workers from different local factories and close to 5000 countrymen, communal land representatives, school children, etc. In these types of visits, the influence of the candidate could be seen, as well as the participation of some of the most outstanding leaders, regional leaders, countrymen, students, children, and young people. There were also congressmen who generally spoke on behalf of the rights of women, farmers, indigenous people, and their sense of participation and access to civil and political rights. Those speeches were broadcast by the radio station of the *Partido Nacional* [58] (National Party), in order to gain a broader audience and follow the activities of the candidate.

With relation to those who opposed the election of General Cárdenas from the *Partido Nacional Antirreeleccionista* (National Anti-Reelection Party, PNA by its acronym in Spanish), they stated their dissatisfaction with the upcoming elections in a manifesto. They told their members that they could vote freely for any candidate, while highlighting that their social work and activities would continue until they obtained the postulates in their program of principles of the revolution [59].

The presidential elections of July 1, 1934, were won by Cárdenas on behalf of the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* with a total of 2,225,000 votes against his opponents Antonio Villarreal, the representative of the *Confederación Revolucionaria de Partidos Independientes* (Revolutionary Confederation of Political Parties), who obtained 24,395 votes; Adalberto Tejada Olivares from the *Partidos Socialistas de Izquierda* (Left Wing Socialist Parties), with 16,037 votes; and Hernán Laborde from the *Partido Comunista Mexicano* (Mexican Communist Party), who won 539 votes. Thus, Lázaro Cárdenas obtained 98.2%; Antonio Villarreal 0.11%; Adalberto Tejada 0.077%; and Hernán Laborde 0.0023% of the votes.

The new president won an overwhelming victory and took office in December 1934 without significant controversies. In terms of the distribution of power, the *carlistas* kept their key positions, which had more weight than those of Cárdenas' followers. In this way, Calles had hopes of controlling power while the media also considered that Cárdenas would be just another of Calles' pawns. But the dynamic was different: Cárdenas became familiar with power while some key leaders within his government still tried to generate a crisis with the Church and to destabilize the new government. However, Cardenas soon discovered Calles duplicity, which caused a crisis that resulted in Calles' exile.

3.1 The Six-Year Plan

The emergence of the Mexican Six-Year Plan had its origins in the projects derived from the Mexican Revolution. However, the impact of the 1929 economic crisis and the high poverty rate in some Mexican rural areas brought about great controversy within the emerging National Revolutionary Party. For his part, in 1930, Calles referred to the crisis of the Mexican Revolution and declared that the agrarian reform had been a failure because, according to him, communal property led to laziness. As a consequence, it was necessary to foster the capitalist agriculture of private property. Another main point Calles mentioned was laborer unrest, highlighting that it was necessary to take severe measures to limit strikes. On the other hand, he reiterated the decisive topic of the anti-clerical element, which had brought about the *cristero* conflict and the controversies in the 1920s. Regarding this, he reaffirmed that it was the anti-clerical policy that had caused the political turmoil. In addition, he emphasized the role of teaching as a means for revolutionary transformation. He pointed out that the objectives of change for social impact in Sonora (the political model established in the state of Sonora) were not the means of production, but rather minds [60].

According to Alan Knight, the main factors of the Mexican economic crisis were the drop in the prices of exports, deflation, and the contraction of the economy as from 1926. Between 1929 and 1932, foreign trade decreased by two-thirds while the capacity to import was reduced by a half and at the same time unemployment rose. To a large extent, the cause was the repatriation of 300,000 Mexicans who had migrated to the United States. Likewise, there was a drop in the exports of gold, silver, crude oil, raw materials, and other products [61], which contributed to the worsening of the economic crisis.

From the congress held on December 6, 1933, emerged the Six-Year Plan, which became the government program that the president elect should follow, according to the election of 1934. This plan implicitly criticized the *sonerense* model (developed by Plutarco Elías Calles), asserted the role of the interventionist state and the need for Mexicans to exploit the national resources of the country. It promised minimum wages to the workers and the right to present collective agreements. It also restated the importance of the agrarian question, which required radical solutions, including the division of very large properties.

The Six-Year Plan was the result of a commission formed of 25 members and with a representative from each delegation, formed on December 3, 1933 [62]. This commission, of which pre-candidate General Pérez Treviño was a member, had the following objectives: the discussion of the Six-Year Plan; the study of the reforms to the statutes of the National Revolutionary Party; and the designation of a presidential candidate [63]. This commission requested information from the Secretary of State, autonomous departments, and other governmental branches, as well as reports on the modifications and orientations that the administrative function of the government required, so as to make them more expeditious and adjust them in accordance with the postulates of the revolution. Starting from there, the commission elaborated the Six-Year Plan, which contemplated a set of actions in fields such as communications, public works, labor, agriculture, and promotion. Some aspects related to the labor sector were taken into consideration: the implementation of compulsory social insurance applicable to all workers was thought to be necessary; the promotion of accessible and hygienic rooms for the workers; the regulation of the legal framework of family patrimony; the establishment of recruitment agencies and an employment exchange; the construction of statistical bases regarding employment; the creation, in the supreme court, of a special chamber for labor [64]. With regard to the agrarian situation: a review of the agrarian legislation; the

endowment of land in compliance with article 27 of the constitution; an increase in economic resources for the solution of the problems of the countryside; a commitment of the United States in the endowment of land according to the fractioning of the sites that belong to the nation were included [65]. However, one of the key points was perhaps the importance of reviewing land ownership, mainly related to profiteers, for the commission suggested that lands had to be subject to the provision of communal land, different from that of private property.

In the report of the advisory commission regarding said plan, it was expressed that the Mexican state had to take and maintain a policy of intervention that would regulate the economic activities of national life. It also said that the state was an effective agent for the management and order of the vital activities of the country. This became one of the principles of the 1917 constitution, which allowed the nation to begin an agrarian reform and reclaim its natural resources [66]. The intervention of the state referred to in the Six-Year Plan was supposed to be carried out in four fundamental fields: the agrarian, industrial, union, and educational.

The central question is: "why so much insistence on focusing the Six-Year Plan on the distribution of land and the working sector?" With relation to the agricultural sector, Tzvi Medin highlights that toward 1930, in Mexico, there were more than 16 and a half million inhabitants. The economically active population was about 5 million people, and 70% of that, 3 and a half million people, worked in agriculture. According to that same census, of a total surface of about 130 and a half million hectares, 110 belonged to 15,488 properties larger than 1000 hectares, while 796,600 pieces of land only reached almost 5 and a half million hectares. The situation becomes clearer after verifying that 70 billion hectares were divided into less than 2000 larger pieces of land of 10,000 hectares each [67]. If we analyze this information, we can conclude that there was a high level of property concentration and that this did not favor economic production, which was a concern for the reformist governments of the time.

Calles' statements were taken differently, given that many people rejected the anti-clerical policy, while they considered that some reforms were necessary in order to improve the social and economic conditions of the Mexican population. Simultaneously, like in Colombia, the adoption of state interventionism was proposed, as in the federal labor law of 1931, which offered concessions regarding timetables, vacations, and collective agreements, in exchange for which the state would regulate industrial relations more rigorously. As an economic policy, it was considered that salaries could reinforce internal demand and benefit industry. However, this project failed to bring about the postulates of the revolution, and from different points of view the revolution itself had failed. For this reason, the Six-Year Plan became the hope for the popular sectors, while the elites maintained the desire to control power through Cardenas' government.

In 1934, an autonomous agrarian department and a new agrarian code were created, through which it was allowed, for the first time, that the laborers of the large farms could ask for land concessions. At the same time, this code offered guarantees to the landowners, which caused ambivalences and divisions within the PNR.

4. Campaigns and government programs in Colombia and Mexico in 1934: a comparative perspective

Although the world economic crisis had different levels of intensity in both countries, this event, along with the economic situation of each state, provoked broad reflections in the political scene. In both states, López Pumarejo as well as Lázaro Cárdenas took the foreground because they proposed social programs and

projects, in order to improve the quality of life of the most vulnerable sectors. In both cases, they focused on agrarian reform, educational reform, improving the relationship between the Church and the state, as well as the conditions of workers, indigenous people, and farmers. All this was linked to a fiscal policy which was intended to guarantee the application of the social policy.

The candidates developed their campaigns by visiting remote areas in order to learn firsthand the reality of the farmers, workers, women, children, indigenous people, and industrial workers (this can be applied more extensively to the Mexican case). In Colombia, although the candidate visited some towns, he gained his perception of people's needs through the visits and demonstrations he carried out mainly in urban centers. Unlike Lázaro Cárdenas, López Pumarejo did not go directly to the villages, nor did he get close to the daily realities of the people. Thus, the social perception of the candidates was different. The two candidates did coincide in the nature of their visits and in proclaiming the social purpose that their government programs should have, but nevertheless, Cárdenas was able to get closer to the people and was more sensitive to their situation, perhaps as a result of his origins and his perception of their needs.

While in Mexico the political and the popular sectors had expectations and hopes for the Six-Year Plan to be the materialization of the Mexican revolution, in Colombia the concept imprinted by López Pumarejo with the Revolution in Progress was controversial and was particularly questioned by the liberal, conservative political elites, as well as the Church. For the popular sectors, it became the hope for obtaining recognition from the state. In this sense, in Colombia the plan was associated with communism and socialism, a circumstance which was not so different in Mexico.

In their campaigns, both Lázaro Cárdenas and López Pumarejo had the entire infrastructure and the machinery of the state institutions at their disposal. In that way, they had the necessary resources and projects that were granted to them by the majorities. In both cases, in Mexico and in Colombia, the elections for public corporations, which preceded the presidential elections, contributed to promoting and strengthening the activities of the parties, their political and electoral bases, as well as to organizing the committees in charge of the election activities, which secured them an important electoral structure.

According to the electoral results obtained in both countries, it is observed that the representation of the Communist Party in both countries was 0.002%, which meant that in political terms it did not represent a "threat." However, an idea of the revolution was constructed as an expression of communism as well as generating a fear of the revolution, the masses, and social policies. In that way, the political elites managed to avoid any type of social reform because it was contrary to their interests, particularly in the case of Colombia.

Among the basic aspects of Cárdenas' campaign, what stands out is his contact with the masses and his desire to improve the quality of life of the popular sectors through national policies, which were derived from the project of the Mexican Revolution. Despite the fact that his ideological approach used the postulates of the Six-Year Plan, Cárdenas gave them a particular spin that led them to having a direct impact and ultimately to the materialization of the projects. Also, in his electoral tour, Cárdenas was in close contact with workers, farmers, women, indigenous people, and business people. As a future president, Cárdenas gained the recognition and acceptance of these sectors, which, as president, allowed him to build a political space of his own, with a different posture from the *callista* tutelage.

In the case of Colombia, López Pumarejo also imprinted a social purpose on his government plan but with the view of a statesman, as although he tried to come closer to the masses and their needs, he did not manage to gain a real sensitivity to

the actual necessities of the population. Moreover, while he distanced himself from some party leaders, such as Olaya Herrera and Eduardo Santos, who belonged to the conservative wing of liberalism, he kept an undefined position with which he intended to carry out a new revolution from the state apparatus.

5. Conclusions

The topic of the elections is vital to understanding the intentions, reformist projects, and political dynamics of the two states. For the year 1934, it is an opportunity to study the coalitions; the controversies among parties; and how the economic and political crises, at a national and international level, were channeled with projects of social reform, which transformed the political scene in Colombia and in Mexico.

The late 1930s saw social and political changes which made farmers, workers, women, and indigenous people the protagonists, who in the text have been referred to as the popular sectors. They were at the same time potential voters and also susceptible to socialist and communist ideas. In this sense, the presidential candidates of Colombia and Mexico sensed this dynamic and the vulnerability of these social actors and for that reason they focused their government programs on improving their living conditions. They carried out tours to learn about these peoples' needs, particularly Lázaro Cárdenas. These tours motivated the Six-Year Plan and the Revolution in Progress. Perhaps, the candidates intended to carry out a revolution from within the state, as Alfonso López suggested, in order to prevent the possible organization of these social actors outside the state or that they were captivated by socialist and communist ideas.

These government plans, the Revolution in Progress, and the Six-Year Plan, in addition to their social purpose, are policies that coincided in many aspects, including: agrarian reform; fiscal policy; educational reform; the separation of the Church and state; labor reforms; and the promotion of the organization of workers, farmers, and indigenous people. As can be appreciated, they were not transcendental changes, but strategies to govern which implied the promotion of other forms of social organization, a dynamic different from that of subjects and, instead, one of citizens, and the establishment of a different political relationship between the state and society.

The electoral campaign was the means chosen by Lázaro Cárdenas, as well as Alfonso López Pumarejo, to get close to the electoral bases. In both cases, there was a concept of intensifying the democratic spirit and participation, the vote being a fundamental act to establish that negotiation process; that is to say, to place one's trust in a candidate, to later receive the benefits with the materialization of their government programs. The two candidates had administrative and economic capital derived from the institutions of the state, which granted them supremacy in the control of political and electoral power. It is true that neither of them had a strong opponent; they would achieve a victory even with very few votes. Nevertheless, what is striking is the particular way of doing politics by visiting remote areas and having a social orientation in their programs, while they conserved the traditional organizational structure of political campaigns when it came to the structure of the parties, the directorates and the networks, which allowed them to secure their power.

The dynamics that have been the focus of this text show how, in these two states, Colombia and Mexico, the elections were a pretext to revitalize politics, mitigate crises, and reduce the polarization between the political elites, as well as to negotiate with the popular sectors, a situation that continues even today.

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Chapter 8

Judicialization and Citizens: Elites and Election Practices—Chile, 1860–1920

Juan Cáceres Muñoz

Abstract

This paper examines the judicialization and election practices and their impact on Chilean citizens in the nineteenth century. It is established that the formation and maintenance of an archaic political-electoral system served for many decades the interests of an elite that kept the middle and lower classes excluded from political participation. The political culture of the elite, which was tied to fraud, corruption, bribery, and intimidation against the voters, was not transformed by the decorative political and electoral reforms. In that context, these forms of behavior were supported by the existence of a pseudo-democratic government that ruled with a complete indifference of the legal and constitutional standards and whose main victims were poor people and farmers frequently treated despotically. The lack of a "human rights culture," meaning, the idea that all individuals have rights, as well as the absence of a genuine competition between parties to regulate the political power through equal and effective vote, showed, until around 1920, the fragile state of a political-electoral system controlled by the infights between important families that alternated their position in ruling.

Keywords: elite, citizens, judicialization, electoral practices, electoral fraud, Chile, 1860–1920

1. Introduction

In the last decades, Latin America has been affected by continuous allegations of corruption. Comparing the present to the predominance of the Republican spirit and practices in the past has quickly emerged in the everyday talk among citizens in every country. This preoccupation about the danger and the significance of the corruption has also become a relevant topic in Chile, a country that since the nineteenth century has been regarded by the international community thanks to its institutional seriousness and devotion to the Republican righteousness.

In the Chilean notion, there still exists a kind of acceptance that Chile was, for a long time, exceptional within the Latin-American context. The official historiography transmitted the idea that the political life elapsed peacefully and along their respective institutional lines [1]. Likewise, the belief in the victory of liberal ideas in the construction of a solid national state is emphasized[1]. The most complicated thing

[1] The myth of an exceptional Chile is an image born in the second half of the nineteenth century with liberal historiographers and reinforced in the twentieth century with the assumption that this long and stable institutional liberal structure was only disturbed by the coup d'état that overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973.

about these analyses, however, hinged upon the omission of the civil society's reactions and the political actors in respect to their nature and citizenship ([2], p. 16).

However, for some time now, mainly because of the renewal of political historiography, historiographers are doubting the truthfulness and interpretation that those images present ([3], pp. 404–405). A set of violent events (uprisings, riots, revolutions, strikes, slaughters), as well as a scarcely democratic character of the political life that excluded most of the voter communities, has caused the appearance of articles and books that analyze topics regarding the elite's power, the private violence, and the civic life, among others [4].

To this historiographical preoccupation, in the present time, the citizenry concerns are added. After Pinochet's dictatorship, citizens have anxiously watched how the neoliberal transformations that have made the country grow and progress have negatively impacted the political life and its relations. Beyond the democratic electoral competition and the alternation of the power between right-wing and center-left-wing parties, the return to democracy has been difficult because of the repeated cases of corruption among politicians that have appeared before the Courts of Justice. The theme of political corruption and bribery and, of course, the relationship between economy and politics have rocked the public opinion that sees how the democracy is being chipped away because of limitless ambition and the need to win an election at all costs.

In this context, studying the judicialization of politics from a historical perspective proves to be relevant in understanding how the Democratic and Republican lives that the country built in the past are now in danger if they continue through the same route. The recurrent cases of judicialization that occurred since the return to democracy in the 1990s have tended to show attitudes that quarrel with ethics, as well as to expose the scarce respect for the electoral regulations. To this, the lack of efficient controls for its compliance is added.

This was not always the reality. While there were cases of corruption, in the nineteenth and the majority of the twentieth centuries, institutions such as the Council of State and the election court played a key role in controlling and solving those behaviors that called into question the validity of a developing democracy. The article centers its attention precisely in the past and analyzes the endeavor of those judicial institutions in the elections.

A way to delve into these topics is to analyze the political practices and, specially, the electoral fraud as a problem that directly affects the civic political life ([5], pp. 234–235). By means of what is called the judicialization of politics that has been a field of study mainly for political scientists, sociologists, and jurists, we can approach the political culture and see the real nature of the governments of this period, the political behavior of the powerful elite, and the reactions of an emergent citizenry ([6], pp. 14–15).

The period between 1850 and 1930 was chosen for this analysis because, in that time, Chile started a modernization process driven by the liberal government that, aside from prompting urbanization politics and the moralization of the population, incentivized the transformation of the political system by, for example, expanding the suffrage and stimulating the financial and economical free trade. It is also a time in which an elite that refuses to die still maintained its privileges, as well as corresponding to a strong period of struggle by other social classes (middle and lower) that burst forth asking for participation in the public life, something they would achieve in the second decade of the twentieth century ([7], p. 126). Ultimately, a synchronous analysis allows us to step closer to history and backward from myths, as well as the study of the Chilean liberal institutionalism and, hence, to how the political culture of the Chilean people was in the past.

Delving deeper in the topic of judicialization of the politics, certainly in the conceptions of the liberal theory and especially in what was pointed out by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century, justice should be a third power to help avoid tyranny and the despotism of the powerful [8]. Establishing a judicial power independent from the other two, executive and legislative, would contribute to the liberal and Republican formation. Each power would understand what their areas of would be and, in the case of the judicial power, would come into being specifically to not be involved in the dilemmas and the subjects within the political world ([6], p. 21).

Going to the Courts of Law to solve problems derived from the political activity has been a recurrent reality in the history of western democracies, especially in the present day ([9], p. 30). The mistrust in the system and the criticism leveled to practices in opposition to the rules and ethics have been reported by both the political actors involved and an organized civil society. Government authorities, members of political parties, political leaders, warlords, and chieftains, inter alia, have been under the spotlight of a vigilant citizenry that questions the ways and practices of their actions in the political life. This mistrust has been the main motive that has encouraged the people to seek refuge and protection in the Court of Law ([6], p. 23).

In the case of Latin-American countries, all of them stablished in their first constitutions such ideas: the ideal Republican blindly trusted in virtue and honesty. Nevertheless, the fraud and corruption practices within the system led this third power to participate in political dilemmas. Thus, and paraphrasing Nosetto, the term judicialization refers to the general phenomenon by virtue of which the social and political practices of various natures take the tribunal form. This means that the conflicts that normally were resolved "by custom, trust or deference are progressively led to judicial instances for their resolution." The same happened with "the activities belonging to the political sphere or system, such as party life, electoral competition, public debate, legislation and government." However,

> *the judicialization consist in the passage from the normal to the norm, this is, from the customary rules of resolution of social conflicts to normative and judiciable guidelines* ([10], p. 96)

2. The contexts of the political judicialization

The Chilean political history of the nineteenth century (and the twentieth century) was marked by the obsession of the political elite by means of fear and order. These not only constitute the cultural matrix of the Chilean elite's political actions, but it also contributed to limiting the development and consolidation of a full democracy. Although the fear and the order were habitual practices in the wide spectrum of the rural world at the time of the Spanish colony, it was with the foundation of the national state in the nineteenth century that this matrix reached its maximum refinement. Laws and discipline strategies for the population were promoted in order to consolidate the development of the new state, which quickly aligned in economic matters with the worldwide free trade in vogue at that moment and with the doctrinaire ideas of liberalism [11].

In macro terms, the life of the Chilean elite in the nineteenth century—with a common social culture and many of its members related through family ties—resulted in the constant struggle between liberals and conservatives: the first, supporters of the principles of the liberalism spread by the French Revolution, freedom, equality, and fraternity and, the latter, believers of "God, the fatherland, and the nation." In other words, there are two ways of seeing the world that

prompted tensions and conflicts in the society of the time, tensions that, according to Sabato, put into discussion the "liberties of the moderns," meaning the idea of a republic without restriction and, on the other hand, the "liberties of the ancients," which was related to the maintenance of the old corporatist structures of the colonial times and the conceptions of a society of notables that firmly believed in the "honor, wealth, and prestige" as foundation of the political life [12]. However, this tension was nothing more than an inter-elite conflict.

The ideas of this inter-elite (conservatism or liberalism) that suffered were first put into doubt with the irruption of radicalized political parties that demanded their incorporation into the system. For them, it wasn't fear or order, but their inclusion in politics. One of the groups that set a precedent in the 1840s was led by Francisco Bilbao and was called the Society of Equality, a group of utopic socialists that was composed mainly of artisans and liberal elite youth: Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, José Antonio Alemparte Vial, Federico Errazuriz Zañartu, and Santiago Arcos. The objective of the group was to end the old conservative regime and guarantee civic liberties. By replicating the revolutionary barricades of Paris in Santiago, Bilbao kept the Chilean elite in check, which came together (liberal and conservatives) to fight against the Society of Equality and, in the end, imprison and banish its leaders ([13], pp. 14–15).

The political impact of the advent of the Society of Equality, especially the fear that the barricades in the streets of the capital brought, changed the liberal discourse: from the second half of the nineteenth century, the idea of liberty was still present but restricted and controlled, just like what happened with the enactment of the print law that ordered a censor to monitor all writings and articles to prevent any threats against the established order. Meanwhile, the idea of equality was definitely eradicated. From then on, the elite's political discourse was nourished by two concepts: order (that came from the conservative world) and progress, this second one being in alignment with the image of the European development that the elites wanted to replicate in the country, discarding with this the originality of the culture and its local identity. Thus, along the country, in every province or commune, the so-called Progress Clubs multiplied, consolidating an order that was still far away from democracy.

On the other hand, the political life of the liberals showed contradictions (and tensions) between the discourse and political practices. Thus, the liberty, equality, and fraternity discourse, as the fathers of the liberalism conceived it, encountered a reality that consisted of cities full of the poor and scarcely paid illiterates, while in the countryside, a countryman population was kept captive and submissive by the landowners. In this situation, democracy was impossible: civil rights existed, yes, but constrained, political rights too, but only a few could hold the political positions of popular representation, and in the case of equality, it was just an incredibly remote idea. With this political logic, the idea of order (that came from the conservative world) and progress (that the liberals advocated for) joined with the psychological factor of fear, leading them to join (the so-called liberal-conservative fusion) to defend again, and as a consolidated group, the privileges and political power.

Fear certainly was a psychological and maybe an unfounded phenomenon, but in politics it sometimes can become so real that it ends up translating into threats to the group's survival and hegemony. That was what the elite saw in the nineteenth century. As Correa Sutil points out:

> *the Chilean elite from the 19th century, forced by the historical circumstances, transforms in the second half of the 20th century into the right wing, since it's the first time they have to compete in the political life against social antagonistic forces, which had become the left wing, that challenged its control of wealth, power and social consideration, until then undisputed* ([14], p. 9).

The first threat appeared from the emergence of the Radical Party in the second half of the nineteenth century, a conglomerate consisting of liberals disappointed of the union with the conservatives and mainly of individuals that came from an incipient middle class—mostly professionals and bureaucrats—taught in the Universidad de Chile [15]. From then on, the radical marked the way to the political fight against the liberal conservatism that refused, on one hand, to grant the citizenship to the middle and poor classes and, on the other hand, attacked the continuation of stately behaviors inherited from the colonial era that, according to them, prevented the genuine social, economic, and political progress of a citizenry integrated mainly of countryman and illiterates. The Radical Party, conformed by a central committee that operated in the capital, Santiago, and along the country, with provincial and district committees, shook the archaic structures of the Chilean political life that was dominated by the conflicts of the elitist families and the power of the landowners in the rural zones that removed or designated local authorities at their whim.

The political changes and specifically the emergence of the radicals can be explained by the changes happening in Chile and the world. Surrounded by a growing modernization process, Chile started a scarce industrial development with a group of factories. It certainly wasn't an industrial revolution like the European or North American, but the few factories established in the important cities like Santiago and Concepción by Chilean and foreign businessmen represented a growth in the urban population, as well as a slow development that translated into stonework and street lighting, transforming their rural look, although without entirely changing their customs and social habits that were still bounded to the countryside. In fact, the 1930 census, for example, kept showing that more than the 50.6% of Chile was still rural [16].

This scarce modernization managed to significantly change the colonial physiognomy of those cities, but it couldn't radically transform the archaic structures and ways of the political life. These old ways of the Chilean politics were related to the existence of a society of notables that, since the colonial era, maintained the political order [17]. After the establishment of electoral systems and the pursuit of the suffrage in the nineteenth century, the old elite families fortified the old practices that were prone to the reproduction of the social power, using strategies and mechanisms such as marriages of convenience and promoting political nepotism, cronyism, and patronage. Municipalities, base of the local power, and the congress witnessed the actions of the group that not only hoarded the political power but also used its influence and wealth to increase its lands and to take ownership of mining sites and forests, among other things. Until the first decades of the twentieth century, at which point the predominance of the notables end, the Congress presented a face that showed, euphemistically speaking, a big family where parents, uncles, brothers, and cousins discussed the future of the country. In this reality, the democratic ideal in Chile still remained far-off ([18], p. 157).

A second threat to the liberal-conservative elite came from the lower classes that were historically excluded from the political life, and their culture was rejected for an elite that saw them as a class composed of ignorant, idle, lazy, and drunk people [19]. Living in the outskirts of the estate and "eradicated" in the cities, these classes were marginalized because of their ethnic background and poverty [20]. According to this, stately elite, natives, half-breed, and poor white people did not deserve to be treated as "decent and good," qualities that were up to them to designate, since they were honorable, honest, and reasonable. Even though those ideas were fought by radicals and progressive liberals, the prejudice and the stereotype prevailed. The color of their skin was reason enough to be discriminated [21].

The official historiography keeps denying the possibility that the people had political ambitions, seeing them as subjects "carried" in those important historical milestones such as the Independency in 1810, the inter-elite civil wars during the

nineteenth century (1829, 1851, 1859, and 1891), and the military conflicts with Peru and Bolivia in 1836 and 1879. These days, the new political history has demonstrated that the lower classes—aside from the artisans that voted as free people with self-supporting activities—were the architects of the political acts, knowledge, and maturation. In the current political historiography, the idea of rational inability, incomprehension, and political ignorance of these people in the nineteenth century proves to be unsustainable. Demystifying helps to better understand the idea of the rational participation of the lower classes in the events of the past; admittedly, in Chile there were no popular heroes, nor presidents like the Mexican Benito Juárez, but that does not mean that the people were absent in intellectual and political terms [22].

With the economic transformation of the second half of the eighteenth century, where the industrial capitalism and the Pacific War provided the country with vast resources, the lower classes put pressure to be included in the political life [23]. A way to do so was the social mobilization in the big cities and in the mining communities where, by means of marches, walks, and strikes, the workers complained about their economical and life conditions, holding the governments of those times in check. In the mining north, the work days were frequently interrupted by the ideologization of the conflict that, in this way, started to tear down the conformity of a mutualism that was still based on the idea of supportive and Christian aid. From then on, the *mancomunalismo*, a new form of workers' organization, strongly influenced by the socialist and anarchist ideas coming from Europe, was what elevated the workers' fight to a political organization level and convinced that the social changes could only be achieved by changing and participating in politics [4].

While this was happening in the cities and mining communities, in the rural zones, the countrymen and their families were still under the landowners' control, which combined traditional submission practices, such as paternalism and authoritarianism, that tended to neutralize any possible interest in politics ([24], pp. 107–108). This explains why the old tenancy system, born in the Colonial era, namely, a modern form of slavery of countrymen in the central zone of Chile, remained untouched until the agrarian reform promoted by Salvador Allende in 1970.

In 1924, workers obtained social and labor rights, like the establishment of employment contracts, Sundays as day off, child labor regulations, and health, disabilities, and occupational accident insurances that warranted a pension, among others. This effectively represented the social rights' acknowledgment. However, the fight for political rights was still pending. In 1874, with the electoral reform that expanded the number of votes, the elite benefited the most, because they were part of the so-called Major Taxpayers Board, groups formed by landowners and big merchants that chose the voters in each parish church. Thus, they obtained social and civil rights, but politicians were still far away.

3. Judicialization and citizenship

The judicialization of politics was related to the fragility and the deficiencies of an archaic political system, scarcely democratic and still dominated and controlled by notables. In this context, it is obvious that, from the second half of the nineteenth century, two different viewpoints about political practices amalgamated, especially those referring to elections. Fraud, corruption, and the use of politics as an instrument of electoral intervention was seen, among many other practices, as something natural and normal by the elites and the traditional political parties. From the implementation of the liberal election system at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which forced elite families to pursue the votes they needed to win and maintain their dominance, corruption and bribery were recurrent in the

Chilean society [25]. However, from the second half of the nineteenth century, a new way of conceiving the political activity started to emerge: from then on, fraud was seen not only as a crime but also as an anomaly of a system tailored for the elites; with this and the persistent radicals and lower classes opposition, citizens' reports in the press and the Courts of Law appeared after every suffrage. Essentially, the practice of complaining and reporting to the Courts of Law focused on the request of annulment of the elections that were considered questionable in ways and ends. Thus, the electors of the control, stolen ballot boxes, the appearance of votes that did not match with the total amount of voters, the handing over of votes already marked to "slave" voters, and the direct involvement of local authorities at the service of the big landowners' families during the electoral events were part of the plethora of citizens' complaints before the legal institutions [26].

The protest before the law about political matters was not a practice founded in the nineteenth century with the establishment of the liberal elections. In the colonial era, the possibility to complain at the first instance before the colonial councils for the electoral transparency was already established. Certainly, those elections only concerned the elite, but they were as close as those of the liberal era: achieving a position in the old colonial councils granted prestige and honor to the families, as well as serving to economic purposes, since they were the ones who finally decided on issues related to local prices, rates, and taxes ([27], pp. 105–107).

Another colonial institution that revised the electoral conflicts was the Real Audiencia (Royal Audience). This was the main colonial judicial institution that attended the claims of the wealthy neighbors ([28], pp. 60–70). According to Muñoz, since it was far from the Metropolis, Spain, the Real Audiencia not only fulfilled its usual responsibilities to achieving justice, but the judges also acted as counselors for the governor-general. With this and with an extralegal "golden aura" of prestige and influence, "the hearers were almost always the closest natural counselors of the governor, in such way that it can also be said that there was no matter of any importance that had not been known or 'talked' with the Audiencia … or with the hearers in particular" ([29]: p. 217).

In the era of the liberal state, the practice of complaints remained. Theoretically speaking, liberalism established the separation of power, and in the case of the judicial power, it was supposed to be independent from the executive and legislative powers, as well as grant justice for the citizens. In reality, however, this did not happen as it was conceived by the enlightened philosophers because, in the case of Chile, the local courts kept receiving complaints from the neighbors for fraud and patronage practices at the services of family factions. In 1824, for example, citizen Manuel Araos filed a political persecution complaint in the Court of Santiago against the judges Juan Vial and Gabriel José de Tocornal. In the opinion of Araos, his life would be in danger if he fell into the hands of these judges, devoid of neutrality, equanimity, and honor, because they were tied to the conservative party and declared publicly that the causes of any liberal will end if they fell into their hands. He concluded by saying:

> *Here is the most proper portrait of the evil magistrate! Here it is illustrated the vilest corruption of the justice administration in Chile! […] He ended up asking to find out the "terrible odiousness and if it was true that said odiousness is kept for all men who claim to be from the liberal party, that it is said are hungry dogs, hawks and other degrading epithets, and if I belong to the liberal party.*[2]

The bias and venality of judges, as well as the pressure experimented by the political system at the hands of the middle and lower classes demanding inclusion and to

[2] Acts that Mr. Manuel Araus continues against Juan Vial and other for political enmity. 1824, Archivo Nacional, Fondo Judicial de Santiago. Civic. Leg. 63, piece 5, lbs. 1–3

be recognized as citizens, explain the growing political importance that from 1860 on, the State Council starts to have for the resolution of electoral conflicts an institution that accomplished the "advisory, governmental, and judicial" labors ([30]: p. 17). Fundamentally, until well into the nineteenth century, the institution was responsible for political issues related to electoral conflicts and the cases that demanded the impeachment of the authorities to be civilly tried. Other responsibilities of the council were to decide the granting of pardons, to approve the municipal ordinances, and to authorize the bills that were sent to the National Congress for discussion.

The council was a state body that served the interests of the Chilean elite. Its development as an electoral institution proves to be paradoxical and counterproductive in the history of civic struggle to democratize the country. Conformed by members of the elite with different occupations—judges, soldiers, ministers, pastors, intendants, and municipal mayors ([31]: p. 188)—it was supposed to look out for the transparency in the political-electoral acts, working as an Electoral Court that resolved the conflicts of the different factions of the families.[3] Thus, in fact, its existence was conceived to ensure the continuation of a political system bias toward the notables. Just in 1925, during the first middle class government of the president Arturo Alessandri Palma, a real Election Control Board was formed to serve all Chilean people. Until then, the requirements to be considered a citizen-elector remained excluding for many Chilean locals.

In fact, according to the 1833 Constitution (that lasted until 1925 and that established the restricted and based on a census suffrage), those married men over 21 and single men over 25, that knew how to read and write, and that had the pecuniary requirements of a "real state" property, assets, an industry or a job that were proportional to the honor of being a citizen-elector were considered "active" citizen with the right to vote. Because of this, those who had some "physical or moral deficiency, domestic servants, tax debtors and prisoners" were left out ([31]: p. 174). Also, a transitory article clarified that the requirement of reading and writing would only come into force in 1840, a situation that allowed the elite to expand the electoral register with illiterate people who, with the vote already marked with the name of the candidate, were taken to the voting sites. With the electoral transformation of the 1970s that gave control and organization to the so-called Major Taxpayers Board, that is to say, to the landowners and urban notables, corruption and citizen distrust increased. In fact, when the pecuniary requirements were lowered, the process of electoral registration was easier for a greater number of voters, thereby expanding the electoral body; but this did not necessarily meant a turn or a step toward the democratization of the country, as Valenzuela argues ([32], pp. 101–102). The fact that there was electoral competition toward the end of the nineteenth century was an important aspect in the political evolution of Chile, but this did not necessarily mean paving a path toward democracy since a great number of citizens remained excluded from being able to vote, due to the continuation of practices that were at odds with democracy and, above all, because the elections were still in the elite's hands ([33], pp. 72–74).

It is clear, then, that the State Council served indistinctly to the dominant political class, whether they were liberals or conservatives, and, although it received criticism for its actions, they were rather decorative without actually trying to change or transform the institution. The truth is that, toward the ends of the nineteenth century, the council emerged as a kind of fourth power that, in electoral matter, threatened the freedom to choose. For example, Abdón Cifuentes, conservative senator, referred to it as:

[3] The Election Control Board was a late creation in Chile. Arturo Alessandri Palma's government created the Election Control Board under the Law Decree number 542, on September 23, 1925.

> *a hybrid body that lives off the attributions that it steals and of the blood that sucks from the other powers, which it crushes, when they do not serve as a screen or a shackle. Like those monstrous deities of fable, that had the head of a man, the wings of a bird, the hooves of a beast; the State Council has been among us a hermaphrodite body, which participates of the nature and of the attributions of all public powers ([34], pp. 480–481)* (**Table 1**).

In the period between 1860 and 1910, the State Council received 33 claims that requested the nullity of the elections. The motives were varied: fraudulent preparation of the lists of voters, corruption, bribery, threats and intimidations, use of force, and marked votes, among others. Most of the requests were concentrated in the central-northern area of the country (8 in the north and 20 in the center). It corresponded to the fight of radicals and progressive liberal individuals who fought against the electoral management of the great rural chiefs in places like Lontué, Chillán, San Fernando, Cauquenes, and Linares, denouncing the countryman submission and the intimidation of the voters through the police and civic guard. In the case of the north, the petitions particularly referred to mining sites that traditionally complicated the ruling elite of Santiago since the beginning of the republic. The criticism to the centralism imposed from Santiago was directed toward the abandonment of the regions, an aspect that originated two civil wars, one in 1851 and the other in 1859. Regarding the requests of the southern towns of Puerto Montt and Ancud, they specifically referred to the electoral intervention of the executive power. The south, unlike the other two areas, was still not fully incorporated in the national electoral reality, since it was still seen as a peripheral area, isolated and scarcely populated.

Some cases serve to exemplify the judicialization of politics in the hands of the State Council. The first deals with fraud by forgery of the list of the major taxpayers for the legislative elections in the mining town of Petorca. In practice, the people who organized and decided the conformation of the electoral roll won the elections. From then, therefore, it was strategic to negotiate the names of those who would form part of the Major Taxpayers Board. In this context, the anger of the citizen Pedro Montt (who, years later, would be president of the Republic) is explained. He asked the State Council to, "in the exercise of the popular action," impeach the titular and alternate governor (Alberto Luco Lynch and Pascual Torres, respectively) to submit them to the civil courts and explain how and why they favored the conservative side with a greater number of people qualified to vote, going above the regulation and the practice of conversing and negotiating the number of voters. This conflict also unveiled the clientelist practices of the conservatives that, in the eagerness to win elections no matter what, had dismissed the legitimate mayor and put a fellow member in order to conform the list of taxpayers; with this, it is denounced that "the first mayor had erased most of the liberal taxpayers."[4]

	North	Center	South
1860–1869	1	9	2
1870–1879	1	9	
1880–1889	6	1	3
1890–1899			
1900–1909		1	

Source: Cases of Election Nullity of the National Archive, Council of State Fund. 1860–1909.

Table 1.
Claims for nullity of elections before the Council of State, 1860–1899.

[4] Fraud for falsification of list of major contributors. Petorca, March 24, 1885, Archivo Nacional, Fondo Consejo de Estado, Vol. 56, lbs., 172–177

A second example that allows us to see the actions of the State Council as a political court is related to the nullity of elections in the agricultural town of Lontué. The fraud referred, again, to the procedures used by the municipality in the appointment of the election qualifying boards. Within said practices, it was an accepted behavior to add to the lists individuals that did not meet the requirements established by law in that voters were those citizens that paid taxes, were of legal age, and had never been in jail. However, in spite of this, the opposite happened in Lontué because "there were many poor people, condemned to forced labor in the urban prison, and minors." Along with this, corruption, bribery, and threats were common themes practiced by the political parties. Thus, it was common practice to visit the voters to secure the votes the days prior to the elections, and:

> *to those that they could not seduce with flattery and authority services, they intimidated them assuring that they will be persistently and grimly persecuted, keeping them away from their homes and imprison them in the public jail if they did not vote for the government or, at least, abstained from voting in favor of the opposition.*[5]

Another case that shows the electoral culture is related to the political machine and the voters' intimidation. Using the public force, nepotism, and clientelism was part of the electoral mechanism of the elites. Thus, to conquer, the members of the candidate's family, friends, and paid thugs traveled to every city and countryside to pressure the voters. On the election day, those "oppressed" voters went out of their houses escorted by "the mayor, the civic battalion's mayor sergeant, and local subdelegates" until they reached the voting sites, where "an infantry picket circulated the table and another from the cavalry placed on the right flank, both, as in war, perfectly armed with enough ammunition. All the civil and military servants were there and with their attitude and discourse inspired terror in the voters." This scene tended to repeat itself in every town:

> *A wall of soldiers divided the town from the voting site and, through this mechanism, some non-registered citizens voted following the official lists, using external qualifications, and also voted some people excluded from doing so, in spite of the claims of the opposition's representatives"*[6].

4. To conclude: an interpretation of the judicialization

In theoretical terms of what the meaning of liberalism is, taking politics to the Courts of Justice may be considered an inadequate way to resolve the conflict. There is no doubt that it should be observed as abnormal if we stick to the liberal principals of the no intervention of courts in political issues. The electoral problems and conflicts are supposed to be resolved by their own institutions. In the past, in the absence of the electoral courts or an electoral commission, the State Council helped resolve and stop the possible cases of corruption. Imbued in the Republican spirit and practices, citizens blindly believed in the virtue of those who should resolve the conflicts arising from the electoral disputes. The cases studied here show the citizens' preoccupation to prevent fraud. This was a permanent concern resulting from a way of feeling and practicing the political life on the basis of fulfilling the Republican principles of virtue and probity.

[5] Appeal for annulment filed by Mr. Pascual Meneses against Nacagua's subdelegate. June 22, 1875, in the Archivo Nacional, Fondo Consejo de Estado, Vol. 41, lb. 20–25

[6] Mr. Luis Urzúa's record about the nullity of the Lontué's municipal election. Talca. Archivo Nacional, Fondo Consejo de Estado, Vol. 110, lbs. 297–322

The judicialization of politics in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century responds to the changing contexts of a peripheral country. Far away, in the end of the world, the ideas of liberalism were strongly introduced, adapting to the surrounding historical reality, which means the presence of an elite of landowners that made the country a place dominated by the conservatism. The electoral judicialization happened mainly in the areas they believed were possible to lose in the hands of the new social and political forces that emerged during those years. The cases of judicialization were won by this conservative elite, keeping the local citizens waiting for an opportunity.

The political judicialization in Chile is also explained by the fragility of a political system that is scarcely democratic and where, moreover, the presence of a system of separation of powers and a culture of rights still did not exist in the era studied. This way, what can be observed—beyond the liberal signs—are authoritarian and archaic governments in disguise that clung to not disappear, in spite of the changing historical contexts that were transitioning to the so-called liberal modernity that has as basic principle to establish the granting of rights and the citizens' participation. It is clear that, even though the country was moving forward on the economic front, as a result of the revenue from the Pacific War, the social and political aspects at the end of the nineteenth century were still far away from being truly democratic.

The system's fragility was shown in the tensions arising from the ideology of an elite that monopolized the political activity and whose members, simultaneously, considered themselves as natural guardians of that order. This world and political view also explain why the lower classes were excluded from the formal political life for so long, as well as the persecution of the ideas that diverged from the liberal elite's propaganda. Riots, mutinies, and strikes marked the historicity of the struggles of those classes before the stereotyped rejection and depreciation from the elite that considered itself morally and intellectually superior. Repression, protected by the use of law, characterized the authoritarian and semi-democratic governments of the era, which mostly cared for the order and the establishment of a social and population control system.

The judicialization is also explained by the elitist nature of the elections. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the writings of the Democratic Party Leader, Luis Emilio Recabarren, and those from workers' press reported a great dissatisfaction with the authoritarian character of these governments, once elected. Following what was stated by Prezworski, once the elites gained power through pseudo-democratic electoral mechanisms, the authorities tended to completely forget the legal and constitutional standards that were supposed to regulate the exercise of political power. Thus, in the Chilean case, the main victims of such system were the population integrated of, mostly, poor people and countrymen that were treated despotically, especially in the rural areas ([35], pp. 61–89).

It is also added to that time, particularly from the cultural point of view, that it was difficult to find the presence of a "culture of rights," that is to say, an existing social acceptance of the principle that individuals have rights, as studied by Tate ([36], pp. 20–30). Certainly, laws and formal declarations of rights existed, such as the individual guarantees, but this did not prevent despotism from the chieftains' and elite's governments to happen. Just in the middle of the twentieth century, thanks to the pressure exerted by the lower classes, organized by the left-wing parties (communist and socialist), "support structures" for the legal and social mobilization rise, which demanded the legislation of public policies.

In Chile that time, the idea of party competition and regular assignment of the political power through equal and effective votes from all the adult population could not have existed. In fact, Karen Remmer showed in her study that, approximately until 1920, a competition system between political parties for the power did not exist and what rather prevailed was a fight between families' sides

that alternated the power. Independently from the rise of the Radical Party and its modern structure formed by committees, the governments—meaning, the power itself—continued to have the same owner: a notables' elite that, because of their family's fortune, participated in the political life with a traditional viewpoint [37].

Conversely, the judicialization of politics was the denial of the possibility to have a democracy. Samuel Valenzuela's thesis about the impact of the suffrage expansion in 1874 and the participation of the lower classes in the elections as precedent and as a step forward toward the future democracy is questionable in the current historiography. This is because, while it is true that it was an opening measure, it was ultimately a clever maneuver that prevented working-class riots and disorder. However, toward 1920, these groups' wish was unstoppable [38]. To this we should add that the victory of the conservatives in the State Council was the victory of a patronage political machine. Judges related to the landowner families, the nepotism and the patronage were fundamental in maintaining their localities controlled. There is no doubt that a major study, maybe prosopographical of the State Council and the junction of the information with the patronage, could show us the interweave between justice and politics.

One last thought about the electoral corruption in the past is concerning the preoccupation of the Chilean political historiographers for these issues. This responds to the concerns about the current meaning of citizenship. So, it is about looking for explanations and clues about the past to understand the present of a citizenry still limited by the social inequality and harassment on the part of the elites in power. A study based on the collection of empirical data would mostly help to those ends, especially to demystify the ideas that have been left "marked by fire" in Chilean historiography.

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Among the most prized and revered democratic institutions are elections. Few other actions typify what it means to participate in the democratic process in the same way that turning up, casting a ballot, and then having that ballot be part of determining who will control power has. Indeed, elections are at the center of what we view as democracy and much ink has been spilled in attempting to explain just how essential the electoral action is to democracy.

In this volume our authors explore elections both from an understanding of the systems that govern elections across both the developed and developing world, and from the perspective of the individual voter who participates in that system.

Taken together these analyses provide an intriguing look into this core aspect of democracy.

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