Understanding Elections

Chapter 1

Abstract

1. Introduction

3

Elvis Bisong Tambe

Who Does Not Vote and Why?

Implication for New Democracies

With the attention of scholars already drawn to the decline in voter turnout in new democracies after the first wave of open/competitive elections, by relying on aggregate data studies have provided explanations for cross-national variations in turnout. Yet, the reliance on aggregate data makes it hard to establish what had lead individuals to abstain from the political process. Thus, in this chapter, by using individual-level analysis from the European Social Survey and the Afrobarometer we re-interrogate the determinants of non-voting in two new democracies of post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Having tested the various explanations for non-voting, first, our results show some consistency across the two regions, suggesting non-voters are those who lack any form of psychological engagement with politics, who are isolated from the recruitment networks and live in urban areas. Second, our result tends to be contradictory, in which while in post-Communist Europe non-voters are men and those with lower level of education in sub-Saharan Africa they are women and those with higher level of education. Third, pertaining to country level indicators, apart from the fact non-voters in both regions are those who have no trust in elections and who lived in countries with

disproportional electoral systems, the results tend to be varied.

Keywords: non-voting, political participation, new democracies, post-communist Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, European social survey, Afrobarometer survey data

Although the first wave of open and competitive elections in a number of new democracies, most especially those in post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, was marked by high rates of voter turnout, in recent decades, the attention of scholars has been drawn to the decline of voter turnout in both regions. Despite the difference between the two regions, which includes a history of communism, colonialism, and economic and social development, both regions are similar in that they experienced the transition to democracy almost at the same time (i.e. the early 1990s), but more importantly, they are comparable in terms of their current trajectory with respect to the decline in voter turnout. In fact, an observation of national elections in both regions (i.e. Central/Eastern European countries and sub-Saharan Africa) shows the percentage of people who abstain from voting has gradually risen. For example, in post-communist European countries, from initial rates of 80%, average turnout rates have reduced to 50–66% in some of these countries [1–3]. With regards to sub-Saharan Africa, data from the International Institute for

#### Chapter 1

### Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

Elvis Bisong Tambe

#### Abstract

With the attention of scholars already drawn to the decline in voter turnout in new democracies after the first wave of open/competitive elections, by relying on aggregate data studies have provided explanations for cross-national variations in turnout. Yet, the reliance on aggregate data makes it hard to establish what had lead individuals to abstain from the political process. Thus, in this chapter, by using individual-level analysis from the European Social Survey and the Afrobarometer we re-interrogate the determinants of non-voting in two new democracies of post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Having tested the various explanations for non-voting, first, our results show some consistency across the two regions, suggesting non-voters are those who lack any form of psychological engagement with politics, who are isolated from the recruitment networks and live in urban areas. Second, our result tends to be contradictory, in which while in post-Communist Europe non-voters are men and those with lower level of education in sub-Saharan Africa they are women and those with higher level of education. Third, pertaining to country level indicators, apart from the fact non-voters in both regions are those who have no trust in elections and who lived in countries with disproportional electoral systems, the results tend to be varied.

Keywords: non-voting, political participation, new democracies, post-communist Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, European social survey, Afrobarometer survey data

#### 1. Introduction

Although the first wave of open and competitive elections in a number of new democracies, most especially those in post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, was marked by high rates of voter turnout, in recent decades, the attention of scholars has been drawn to the decline of voter turnout in both regions. Despite the difference between the two regions, which includes a history of communism, colonialism, and economic and social development, both regions are similar in that they experienced the transition to democracy almost at the same time (i.e. the early 1990s), but more importantly, they are comparable in terms of their current trajectory with respect to the decline in voter turnout. In fact, an observation of national elections in both regions (i.e. Central/Eastern European countries and sub-Saharan Africa) shows the percentage of people who abstain from voting has gradually risen.

For example, in post-communist European countries, from initial rates of 80%, average turnout rates have reduced to 50–66% in some of these countries [1–3]. With regards to sub-Saharan Africa, data from the International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (i.e. International IDEA) suggest Africa's average turnout was the lowest, at 64% compared to the world average ([4], p. 77). Moreover, even more pronounced are the country variations in turnout, with countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia experiencing a significant downward trend of more than 32% ([5], p. 26). On the other hand, sub-Saharan African countries such as Cape Verde, Nigeria, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, and Senegal have an all-time downward trend in voter turnout ranging from 35.5 to 57%.

which goes a long way of decreasing the degree of acceptance of governmental decisions. With the newness of democracies across our regions of interest, this seem to be an important rationale for studying non-voting considering that in such societies it is imperative that people turnout in their numbers as this will directly give consent to the winning candidate and or parties to exercise governmental control without opposition from the losing candidate or parties as they have met the criteria of being a legitimate government chosen by the people. Third, and final reason for studying non-voting is based on the argument that voting is supposed to strengthen citizenship and the quality of democratic civic life [9]. Building on this, Kymlicka [10] cites this justification goes back to classical political thinkers such as Jean J. Rousseau and John S. Mill, who advance the view that political participation tends to enlarge the minds of individuals, thus encouraging them to see and acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention. Moreover, Putnam [11] suggest that voting is important seeing that it encourages social capital, volunteering and other forms of good citizenship. In summary, by building on the representative, legitimacy and citizenship and democratic civic life argument, it is reasonable to expect that the phenomenon of nonvoting would have serious implication for democracy and its expansion considering the newness or transition of democracy in post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore natural as earlier mention to ask who the non-voters are and what characterises them; while equally establishing if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique.

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

1.2 An empirical mapping of voter turnout trends in new democracies: evidence

Voter turnout has been declining in most societies, particularly those in postcommunist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. In this section, we rely on five typolo-

This is done in order to ascertain if both regions are experiencing a decline in voter turnout. Moreover, by relying on these five typologies, first we focus only on elections where the most important figure of the executive is being elected (i.e. national elections).<sup>2</sup> Second and most importantly we only considered countries across both regions, where multipartism is the norm and which have held at least four consecutive competitive elections. Tables 1 and 2 show the difference in turnout between the first elections (i.e. third wave of democratisation) and the

<sup>2</sup> In the case of post-communist Europe these are generally parliamentary elections, while for sub-

from central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa

• Countries that have high voter turnout and turnout remains high.

• Countries that have low voter turnout and turnout remains low.

• Countries that have high turnout and turnout later declines.

• Countries that have low voter turnout and turnout increases.

• Countries that have a stable level of turnout over time.

most recent elections held in each country across the two regions.

Saharan Africa it is a mixture of presidential and parliamentary elections.

gies, which center on:

5

Because of the presumed consequences of low turnout for democratic theory and practice<sup>1</sup> and by relying on aggregate data, scholars in established democracies and to some extent those in emerging democracies have done a great deal to provide explanations for cross-national decline as well as regional variations in turnout. However, as cited by Karp and Milazzo [1], the dependence on aggregate data makes it extremely challenging to establish what has led individuals to abstain from the political process, which therefore makes the question of who does not vote and why in new democracies of post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa an interesting and relevant puzzle which requires individual-level analysis. That said, at the core of this chapter is the need: (1) to establish who the non-voters are and what characterises them; (2) to see if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique. To do this, we rely on a dataset drawn from the European Social Survey (ESV) and the Afrobarometer (AB). In the section that follows, we begin by explaining why it is important to study non-voting in the context of new democracies, followed by establishing trends in voter turnout (i.e. by comparing the turnout data from the first elections and most recent elections across both regions), then a theoretical review of determinants of voting to deduce explanations for non-voting. Finally, we proceed with a discussion of the research design, present our results, while concluding remarks round off the empirical findings.

#### 1.1 Why studying non-voting matters

Although, we can argue that the issue of non-voting in new democracies does seem to have potentially important implication for democracy and its expansion, however, this does not seem to be clear at first sight. Thus, we find it important to begin by asking why studying the phenomenon of non-voting most especially in the context of emerging democracies in post-Communist Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa countries seem to matter. That said, a brief review of the literature reveals three crucial justification for studying non-voting:

First, as cited by Tambe [6] electoral politics or voting is generally considered or judged as an important corner-stone for representative democracy. Thus, the fact that certain groups or section of the population do not engage or participate poses a genuine problem to representative democracy as the fundamental principle of oneman-one-vote is being violated. To make matters worse, the implication of having a large group or section of people not voting is that they might be a risk of biased representation with groups that turnout having a greater influence on policy outcomes, government composition and issues that get to be debated at the national or political agenda ([7], p. 276). Second, Hadjar and Beck ([8], p. 522); argue non-voting does not only constitute a severe problem of lack of democratic representation but more notably it does reduce the legitimacy of an elected government

<sup>1</sup> In the subsequent section, we examine why studying the issue of non-voting in the context of new democracies seem to matter.

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (i.e. International IDEA) suggest Africa's average turnout was the lowest, at 64% compared to the world average ([4], p. 77). Moreover, even more pronounced are the country variations in turnout, with countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia experiencing a significant downward trend of more than 32% ([5], p. 26). On the other hand, sub-Saharan African countries such as Cape Verde, Nigeria, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, and Senegal have an all-time downward trend in voter turnout

Because of the presumed consequences of low turnout for democratic theory and practice<sup>1</sup> and by relying on aggregate data, scholars in established democracies and to some extent those in emerging democracies have done a great deal to provide explanations for cross-national decline as well as regional variations in turnout. However, as cited by Karp and Milazzo [1], the dependence on aggregate data makes it extremely challenging to establish what has led individuals to abstain from the political process, which therefore makes the question of who does not vote and why in new democracies of post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa an interesting and relevant puzzle which requires individual-level analysis. That said, at the core of this chapter is the need: (1) to establish who the non-voters are and what characterises them; (2) to see if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique. To do this, we rely on a dataset drawn from the European Social Survey (ESV) and the Afrobarometer (AB). In the section that follows, we begin by explaining why it is important to study non-voting in the context of new democracies, followed by establishing trends in voter turnout (i.e. by comparing the turnout data from the first elections and most recent elections across both regions), then a theoretical review of determinants of voting to deduce explanations for non-voting. Finally, we proceed with a discussion of the research design, present our results, while concluding remarks

Although, we can argue that the issue of non-voting in new democracies does seem to have potentially important implication for democracy and its expansion, however, this does not seem to be clear at first sight. Thus, we find it important to begin by asking why studying the phenomenon of non-voting most especially in the context of emerging democracies in post-Communist Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa countries seem to matter. That said, a brief review of the literature reveals

First, as cited by Tambe [6] electoral politics or voting is generally considered or judged as an important corner-stone for representative democracy. Thus, the fact that certain groups or section of the population do not engage or participate poses a genuine problem to representative democracy as the fundamental principle of oneman-one-vote is being violated. To make matters worse, the implication of having a large group or section of people not voting is that they might be a risk of biased representation with groups that turnout having a greater influence on policy outcomes, government composition and issues that get to be debated at the national or political agenda ([7], p. 276). Second, Hadjar and Beck ([8], p. 522); argue non-voting does not only constitute a severe problem of lack of democratic representation but more notably it does reduce the legitimacy of an elected government

<sup>1</sup> In the subsequent section, we examine why studying the issue of non-voting in the context of new

ranging from 35.5 to 57%.

Elections - A Global Perspective

round off the empirical findings.

democracies seem to matter.

4

1.1 Why studying non-voting matters

three crucial justification for studying non-voting:

which goes a long way of decreasing the degree of acceptance of governmental decisions. With the newness of democracies across our regions of interest, this seem to be an important rationale for studying non-voting considering that in such societies it is imperative that people turnout in their numbers as this will directly give consent to the winning candidate and or parties to exercise governmental control without opposition from the losing candidate or parties as they have met the criteria of being a legitimate government chosen by the people. Third, and final reason for studying non-voting is based on the argument that voting is supposed to strengthen citizenship and the quality of democratic civic life [9]. Building on this, Kymlicka [10] cites this justification goes back to classical political thinkers such as Jean J. Rousseau and John S. Mill, who advance the view that political participation tends to enlarge the minds of individuals, thus encouraging them to see and acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention. Moreover, Putnam [11] suggest that voting is important seeing that it encourages social capital, volunteering and other forms of good citizenship. In summary, by building on the representative, legitimacy and citizenship and democratic civic life argument, it is reasonable to expect that the phenomenon of nonvoting would have serious implication for democracy and its expansion considering the newness or transition of democracy in post-Communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore natural as earlier mention to ask who the non-voters are and what characterises them; while equally establishing if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique.

#### 1.2 An empirical mapping of voter turnout trends in new democracies: evidence from central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa

Voter turnout has been declining in most societies, particularly those in postcommunist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. In this section, we rely on five typologies, which center on:


This is done in order to ascertain if both regions are experiencing a decline in voter turnout. Moreover, by relying on these five typologies, first we focus only on elections where the most important figure of the executive is being elected (i.e. national elections).<sup>2</sup> Second and most importantly we only considered countries across both regions, where multipartism is the norm and which have held at least four consecutive competitive elections. Tables 1 and 2 show the difference in turnout between the first elections (i.e. third wave of democratisation) and the most recent elections held in each country across the two regions.

<sup>2</sup> In the case of post-communist Europe these are generally parliamentary elections, while for sub-Saharan Africa it is a mixture of presidential and parliamentary elections.

Looking at the data displayed in Tables 1 and 2 and drawing on our empirical mapping of voter turnout based on the five typologies permits us to make the following observations. First, beginning with countries that have high voter turnout after their founding elections and where turnout remains high, the following countries in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Burundi, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa) could be placed in this category. Surprisingly, no country in Central and Eastern Europe could be found in this category. Second, moving to countries that experience high turnout rates after the first competitive elections and later suffer a drop in turnout, most of the post-communist countries could be placed in this category. Third, looking at countries that experience a very low level of turnout rate and their turnout remains low, the result reveals very few countries across both regions could be placed in this category except for Poland, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. Fourth, turning to countries that experience a very low turnout in their first democratic elections and later experience an increase, like the third typology, very few countries across the two regions could be placed under this category except for Ghana. In summary, what is observed is that not only have new democracies in Central/ Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa experienced significant decline in voter turnout, but even more pronounced are the country variations across both regions, with some countries experiencing a significant downward trend in voter turnout, and more so than others.

#### 2. Theory: determinants of non-voting


There is a huge array of factors that have been postulated to explain what influences people's decision to participate in or refrain from politics (for an

Source: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout.

Notes: Data for Central/Eastern European countries based on parliamentary elections.

#### Table 1.

Difference in turnout between the first election and the most recent election: post-communist countries.

overview see: [6, 12, 13]; but see also [14–16]); to account for non-voting, the theoretical perspective that we adopt is derived from the classical work of Verba, Schlozman and Brady titled Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. To explain individual political participation, Verba et al. [17] began by posing the following question: Why do some people not take part in politics? To answer this

Difference in turnout between the first election and the most recent election: sub-Saharan African countries.

1991 60.0 2016 46.0 14 6

Senegal 1993 51.5 2012 57.1 5.6 5 South Africa 1994 86.8 2014 73.4 13.4 5 Togo 1993 n/a 2015 60.9 6 Tanzania 1995 76.6 2015 67.3 9.3 5 Uganda 1996 72.6 2016 67.6 5 5 Zambia 1991 44.4 2016 56.4 12 8 Zimbabwe 1990 53.9 2013 54.3 0.4 5 Source: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout and http://africanelections.tripod.com/. Note: Data for sub-Saharan African countries is based on countries' parliamentary/presidential elections.

Countries First election Most recent

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

Year Turnout (%)

São Tomé and Príncipe

Table 2.

7

election

Year Turnout (%) Benin 1991 64.1 2016 66.1 2 6 Botswana 1989 68.2 2014 84.7 16.5 6 Burkina Faso 1991 35.4 2015 60.0 24.6 5 Burundi 1993 91.4 2015 73.4 18 3 Cameroon 1992 78.2 2015 64.2 14 4 Cape Verde 1991 75.3 2016 65.9 10.1 6 Côte d'Ivoire 1990 70.0 2015 52.8 17.2 5 Gabon 1993 88.1 2016 59.5 28.6 5 Ghana 1992 50.2 2016 68.6 18.4 7 Guinea 1993 78.5 2015 68.3 10.2 5 Kenya 1992 66.8 2017 79.5 12.7 6 Lesotho 1993 72.8 2017 46.4 26.4 7 Malawi 1994 80.5 2014 70.7 9.8 4 Mauritius 1991 84.1 2014 74.1 10 6 Mozambique 1994 88.0 2014 48.6 39.4 5 Madagascar 1992 74.9 2013 50.7 24.2 6 Mali 1992 n/a 2013 45.7 5 Namibia 1994 74.2 2014 71.7 2.5 5 Niger 1993 35.2 2016 59.7 24.5 6 Nigeria 1993 n/a 2015 43.6 6

Difference in turnout (%)

Number of elections conducted


Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Source: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout and http://africanelections.tripod.com/. Note: Data for sub-Saharan African countries is based on countries' parliamentary/presidential elections.

#### Table 2.

Looking at the data displayed in Tables 1 and 2 and drawing on our empirical mapping of voter turnout based on the five typologies permits us to make the following observations. First, beginning with countries that have high voter turnout after their founding elections and where turnout remains high, the following countries in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Burundi, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa) could be placed in this category. Surprisingly, no country in Central and Eastern Europe could be found in this category. Second, moving to countries that experience high turnout rates after the first competitive elections and later suffer a drop in turnout, most of the post-communist countries could be placed in this category. Third, looking at countries that experience a very low level of turnout rate and their turnout remains low, the result reveals very few countries across both regions could be placed in this category except for Poland, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. Fourth, turning to countries that experience a very low turnout in their first democratic elections and later experience an increase, like the third typology, very few countries across the two regions could be placed under this category except for Ghana. In summary, what is observed is that not only have new democracies in Central/ Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa experienced significant decline in voter turnout, but even more pronounced are the country variations across both regions, with some countries experiencing a significant downward trend in voter turnout,

There is a huge array of factors that have been postulated to explain what influences people's decision to participate in or refrain from politics (for an

election

Albania 1991 98.9 2017 46.7 52.2 9 Bulgaria 1991 83.8 2017 53.8 30 9 Czech Republic 1990 96.3 2017 60.8 35.5 9 Croatia 1990 84.5 2016 52.6 31.9 9 Estonia 1990 78.2 2015 64.2 14 8 Poland 1989 62.1 2015 50.9 11.2 9 Slovenia 1992 85.9 2014 51.7 34.2 7 Slovakia 1990 96.3 2016 59.8 36.5 9 Hungary 1990 65.1 2018 69.7 4.6 8 Latvia 1990 81.2 2014 58.5 22.7 9 Lithuania 1990 71.7 2016 50.6 21.1 8 Romania 1990 79.7 2016 37.8 41.9 8 Ukraine 1994 75.8 2014 52.4 23.4 7

Year Turnout (%) Year Turnout (%)

Difference in turnout (%)

Number of elections conducted

and more so than others.

Elections - A Global Perspective

2. Theory: determinants of non-voting

Countries First election Most recent

Source: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout.

Table 1.

6

Notes: Data for Central/Eastern European countries based on parliamentary elections.

Difference in turnout between the first election and the most recent election: post-communist countries.

Difference in turnout between the first election and the most recent election: sub-Saharan African countries.

overview see: [6, 12, 13]; but see also [14–16]); to account for non-voting, the theoretical perspective that we adopt is derived from the classical work of Verba, Schlozman and Brady titled Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. To explain individual political participation, Verba et al. [17] began by posing the following question: Why do some people not take part in politics? To answer this

question, their framework consists of providing three answers to the above question: (1) They cannot; which suggests a paucity or lack of necessary resources needed for political participation. (2) They do not want to; this points to the absence of psychological engagement with politics such as a lack of interest in politics, minimal concern with public issues and or a sense that activity makes no difference. (3) Nobody asked; this implies isolation from the recruitment networks through which citizens are mobilised to engage in politics. By standing on the shoulders of these giants, our explanations for non-voting in post-communist countries and sub-Saharan Africa therefore consist of a theory triangulation that rest on three main factors and or models: individual resources (i.e. capacity), motivation (i.e. politicalpsychology) and network recruitment.

source of low voter turnout. Moreover, recent studies by Karp and Banducci [28] and Norris [29] reveal that individuals who are considered efficacious tend to be much more involved in politics. In our previous studies [13], although we have been able to confirm a positive significant relationship between political efficacy and electoral participation in post-communist Europe and Western democracies, however, with respect to tropical Africa this relationship was directly contrary to what we expected in that the relationship was non-significant. However, for the sake of comparability we would expect the probability of non-voting will tend to decrease with a higher level of political efficacy. Next, we include political interest, which is defined as the degree to which politics or political affairs arouse curiosity or attention among citizens. As expected, findings across established and emerging democracies do show that individuals who declared to be more politically interested are more likely to engage in politics, most especially in terms of voting [9], with lack of political interest being argued as a cause of lower voter turnout [30]. Thus, we expect the probability of non-voting to decrease with higher political interest. Third, we examine the relationship between political trust and non-voting. Political trust is broadly defined as voters' or citizens' evaluation of their political system. According to Putnam [11] trust is the basis of democratic society; this therefore means people will be more willingly to vote if they believe the political system is responding in some way to their voting behaviour. Relying on his work, we expect the probability of non-voting to decrease with increase in political trust. Fourth, we evaluate the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and non-voting, with Norris [29] suggesting that citizens who do not trust their political institutions are least likely to participate. However, in Central and Eastern European countries as in other regions, studies show the level of satisfaction with democracy is generally low [31]. Thus, we will expect the probability of non-voting to be higher among disenchanted

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Apart from individual resources and motivational factors that we have examined above, Verba et al. [17] argue the only way we could explain why people do not take part in politics is based on the idea that nobody asks, or simply because individuals are outside of network of recruitments. The implication of this is that for us to explain non-voting it is important to look above individuals and include social networks such as family, friends, co-workers, politicians, parties, church, voluntary associations and interest groups, as these social networks can be considered important channels for mobilising individuals because they help nurture political interest and awareness on politics and issues at stake in an election through political discussion. Also, La Due Lake and Huckfeldt [32] argue social networks help provide expertise and free political information (i.e. social capital) which therefore

increases the likelihood that citizens will participate in elections. Moreover, Kuenzi and Lambright [24] and Klesner [33], in the context of new democracies do suggest membership of voluntary organisations and or non-political organisations has a significant positive effect on voting. Based on these studies, we would expect the propensity of non-voting to be higher among those who are not members of social networks. Finally, we examine individuals' place of residence and this is justified from the fact that scholars are still undecided if social networks or parties tend to be more effective in mobilising voters in urban or rural areas. For example, while a study by Karp et al. [34] argues cities are more attractive locations for parties to canvass due to their higher population, Hoffmann-Martinot [35] argues that urbanisation on the other hand tends to reduce interpersonal bonds and social networks thus

voters.

9

2.3 Network of recruitments and non-voting

#### 2.1 Individual resources and non-voting

First, beginning with individual resources, we consider two salient resources that are said to be important for vote choice: socio-economic status (SES) and political experience (i.e. age). Socio-economic status consists of a voter's educational level and/or income, with studies suggesting those with a higher SES are by and large considered to have a higher propensity to participate [18]. Also, Verba et al. [17] suggest individuals who are more educated tend to participate at a higher rate because they can understand the issues at stake in an election, thus making them more politically interested. In the context of new democracies, studies by Orvista et al. [19] with regards to post-communist Europe do provide evidence supporting that those with higher education and income are most likely to participate. However, when the effect of SES on vote choice is tested in sub-Saharan Africa the results are contrary to the general theoretical expectation, in that findings show those with a lower material status and lower level of education tend to participate at a higher rate compared to those with a higher socio-economic status [20–22]. Notwithstanding these findings from sub-Saharan Africa, the theoretical assumption adopted here is that the higher an individual finds themselves in terms of SES the more likely they are to engage in electoral politics. Based on this, our theoretical proposition suggests that the probability of non-voting in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa will decrease with higher socio-economic status. Second, another valuable resource which we consider is political experience, which is better operationalised as age of voters. Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita [23] argue political experience is generally considered to be acquired over time, most especially as voters face concrete policy issues. Following this line of argument, in the context of new democracies, Bratton [20], Kuenzi and Lambright [24], Resnick and Casale [25], Isaksson [22], and Tambe [12, 13] provide empirical evidence confirming those with more political experience are much more likely to engage with or participate in politics. By building on these studies, we therefore expect the probability of nonvoting to be higher among those with lower political experience that is younger cohorts.

#### 2.2 Motivation or voter political psychology and non-voting

Another key variable of Verba et al.'s [17] model for explaining why people do not participate in politics centres on motivation or a voter's psychological disposition, which is measured by political efficacy, political interest, political trust and satisfaction with democracy. First, political efficacy refers to the degree in which voters believe they can understand national politics and the belief or perception that their actions generally have an influence on political institutions. Campbell et al. [26] and Abramson and Aldrich [27] show that lack of political efficacy is a major

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

question, their framework consists of providing three answers to the above question: (1) They cannot; which suggests a paucity or lack of necessary resources needed for political participation. (2) They do not want to; this points to the absence of psychological engagement with politics such as a lack of interest in politics, minimal

First, beginning with individual resources, we consider two salient resources that are said to be important for vote choice: socio-economic status (SES) and political experience (i.e. age). Socio-economic status consists of a voter's educational level and/or income, with studies suggesting those with a higher SES are by and large considered to have a higher propensity to participate [18]. Also, Verba et al. [17] suggest individuals who are more educated tend to participate at a higher rate because they can understand the issues at stake in an election, thus making them more politically interested. In the context of new democracies, studies by Orvista et al. [19] with regards to post-communist Europe do provide evidence supporting that those with higher education and income are most likely to participate. However, when the effect of SES on vote choice is tested in sub-Saharan Africa the results are contrary to the general theoretical expectation, in that findings show those with a lower material status and lower level of education tend to participate at a higher rate compared to those with a higher socio-economic status [20–22]. Notwithstanding these findings from sub-Saharan Africa, the theoretical assumption adopted here is that the higher an individual finds themselves in terms of SES the more likely they are to engage in electoral politics. Based on this, our theoretical proposition suggests that the probability of non-voting in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa will decrease with higher socio-economic status. Second, another valuable resource which we consider is political experience, which is better

operationalised as age of voters. Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita [23] argue political experience is generally considered to be acquired over time, most especially as voters face concrete policy issues. Following this line of argument, in the context of new democracies, Bratton [20], Kuenzi and Lambright [24], Resnick and Casale [25], Isaksson [22], and Tambe [12, 13] provide empirical evidence confirming those with more political experience are much more likely to engage with or participate in politics. By building on these studies, we therefore expect the probability of nonvoting to be higher among those with lower political experience that is younger cohorts.

Another key variable of Verba et al.'s [17] model for explaining why people do not participate in politics centres on motivation or a voter's psychological disposition, which is measured by political efficacy, political interest, political trust and satisfaction with democracy. First, political efficacy refers to the degree in which voters believe they can understand national politics and the belief or perception that their actions generally have an influence on political institutions. Campbell et al. [26] and Abramson and Aldrich [27] show that lack of political efficacy is a major

2.2 Motivation or voter political psychology and non-voting

8

concern with public issues and or a sense that activity makes no difference. (3) Nobody asked; this implies isolation from the recruitment networks through which citizens are mobilised to engage in politics. By standing on the shoulders of these giants, our explanations for non-voting in post-communist countries and sub-Saharan Africa therefore consist of a theory triangulation that rest on three main factors and or models: individual resources (i.e. capacity), motivation (i.e. political-

psychology) and network recruitment.

Elections - A Global Perspective

2.1 Individual resources and non-voting

source of low voter turnout. Moreover, recent studies by Karp and Banducci [28] and Norris [29] reveal that individuals who are considered efficacious tend to be much more involved in politics. In our previous studies [13], although we have been able to confirm a positive significant relationship between political efficacy and electoral participation in post-communist Europe and Western democracies, however, with respect to tropical Africa this relationship was directly contrary to what we expected in that the relationship was non-significant. However, for the sake of comparability we would expect the probability of non-voting will tend to decrease with a higher level of political efficacy. Next, we include political interest, which is defined as the degree to which politics or political affairs arouse curiosity or attention among citizens. As expected, findings across established and emerging democracies do show that individuals who declared to be more politically interested are more likely to engage in politics, most especially in terms of voting [9], with lack of political interest being argued as a cause of lower voter turnout [30]. Thus, we expect the probability of non-voting to decrease with higher political interest. Third, we examine the relationship between political trust and non-voting. Political trust is broadly defined as voters' or citizens' evaluation of their political system. According to Putnam [11] trust is the basis of democratic society; this therefore means people will be more willingly to vote if they believe the political system is responding in some way to their voting behaviour. Relying on his work, we expect the probability of non-voting to decrease with increase in political trust. Fourth, we evaluate the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and non-voting, with Norris [29] suggesting that citizens who do not trust their political institutions are least likely to participate. However, in Central and Eastern European countries as in other regions, studies show the level of satisfaction with democracy is generally low [31]. Thus, we will expect the probability of non-voting to be higher among disenchanted voters.

#### 2.3 Network of recruitments and non-voting

Apart from individual resources and motivational factors that we have examined above, Verba et al. [17] argue the only way we could explain why people do not take part in politics is based on the idea that nobody asks, or simply because individuals are outside of network of recruitments. The implication of this is that for us to explain non-voting it is important to look above individuals and include social networks such as family, friends, co-workers, politicians, parties, church, voluntary associations and interest groups, as these social networks can be considered important channels for mobilising individuals because they help nurture political interest and awareness on politics and issues at stake in an election through political discussion. Also, La Due Lake and Huckfeldt [32] argue social networks help provide expertise and free political information (i.e. social capital) which therefore increases the likelihood that citizens will participate in elections. Moreover, Kuenzi and Lambright [24] and Klesner [33], in the context of new democracies do suggest membership of voluntary organisations and or non-political organisations has a significant positive effect on voting. Based on these studies, we would expect the propensity of non-voting to be higher among those who are not members of social networks. Finally, we examine individuals' place of residence and this is justified from the fact that scholars are still undecided if social networks or parties tend to be more effective in mobilising voters in urban or rural areas. For example, while a study by Karp et al. [34] argues cities are more attractive locations for parties to canvass due to their higher population, Hoffmann-Martinot [35] argues that urbanisation on the other hand tends to reduce interpersonal bonds and social networks thus

making it less likely for people to participate. However, considering that scholars are still undecided, we shall only be able to decide on this once our empirical analysis is concluded.

4. Results

statistically significant in the two regions.

Significance: \*\*\* p<.001,\*\* p<.01,\* p<.05.

Table 3.

11

coefficient can be obtained be seen in the appendences.

To explain the probability of non-voting in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, we estimate a multivariate logistic regression which combines micro- and macro-level variables and build four models as guided by our theoretical strategy. Moreover, considering our main objective is to evaluate the genuine effects of the variables at different levels and using different models, we began by breaking down citizens' propensity for non-voting along the lines of each of our key theoretical perspectives (i.e. individual resources, motivation, networks, and contextual or country-level) by building very parsimonious models step-by-step, before rounding up by pulling all the variables from each of the four theoretical perspective into an expanded logit model that incorporates the effect of individual- and country-level variables. An overview of the results from the logistic modelling is summarised in Table 3, which shows which variables was

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

First, we began by modelling the effect of individual resource variables on the probability of non-voting in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan African countries, with the results revealing the following. Looking at education, in Central and Eastern Europe, people with higher education (i.e. secondary or higher education) turn out to have the lowest probability of being non-voters compared to those with low education, who have the highest rate of non-voting. However, this is

Direction: + = positive relationship, given the coding used. = negative relationship. 0 = no effect given coding used. Yellow highlighting: indicates a variable for which it has not been possible to use identical question wording across both regions (so there is a chance that any differences might simply be artefactual rather than substantive). Note: Analysis produced based on logit regression, with robust standard errors. Detailed tables showing actual

Sources: European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012) and Afrobarometer Survey (2011-2013).

Determinants of non-voting in new democracies: overview of two geo-political regions.

#### 3. Data, method and measurement

To examine comparatively the determinants of non-voting across countries in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, one of the initial challenges that we encountered was the lack of comprehensive survey data that included a multitude of countries across both regions. However, to overcome this hurdle, we rely on two separate datasets: European Social Survey<sup>3</sup> (ESS-2012; Round 6) and Afrobarometer<sup>4</sup> (AB-2011-2013; Round 5 [36]) for Central and Eastern European and sub-Saharan Africa countries, which allows us to embark on an international comparison, as the measures of both the dependent and independent variables do not vary very much across the two geo-political regions. Moreover, considering that our outcome variable (i.e. non-voting) is binary, we use multivariate or logistic regression modelling to estimate the probability of non-voting across the two regions. Also, we introduce robust standard errors in our model estimation so as to reduce the variance of fluctuation across our data or samples and proceeds by building a step-by-step model that takes into consideration three theoretical perspectives, while adding a final model that takes into consideration our individual indicators and a few of the country-specific variables that we have added to our data.

Our main dependent variable of interest is non-voting. We employ a dichotomous measure of the respondents who did not vote in the most recent elections. Turning to the independent variables, our key variables are organised into three groups: individual resources, motivation and networking factors. First, concerning individual resources, we include the following: educational level, income and two demographic factors (age and gender). Second, for the motivational variables, we include: political efficacy, interest, trust and satisfaction with democracy. Third, for the networking factors, we include: membership in associational or voluntary organisations, and place of residence (i.e. whether respondents live in an urban or rural area). But more importantly, considering that our two geo-political regions have differing institutional characteristics, but even more so based on current research by Franklin [37], Gallego [38] and Van Egmond et al. [39] which reveals that politics or political action is influenced by the context in which individuals find themselves, in this study we include a number of country-specific contextual variables (i.e. electoral system, concurrent elections, closeness of elections and trust in elections) in predicting non-voting. Appendices 1 and 2 show which countries are included in our study and how the different variables have been operationalised.

<sup>3</sup> The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every 2 years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than 30 nations: http://www.europeansocialsurvey. org/data/download.html?r=6 (Accessed: 20/06/2018).

<sup>4</sup> Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa: http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-5-data-34-countries-2011-2013-last-update-july-2015 (Accessed: 20/06/2018).

### 4. Results

making it less likely for people to participate. However, considering that scholars are still undecided, we shall only be able to decide on this once our empirical

To examine comparatively the determinants of non-voting across countries in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, one of the initial challenges that we encountered was the lack of comprehensive survey data that included a multitude of countries across both regions. However, to overcome this hurdle, we rely on

Afrobarometer<sup>4</sup> (AB-2011-2013; Round 5 [36]) for Central and Eastern European and sub-Saharan Africa countries, which allows us to embark on an international comparison, as the measures of both the dependent and independent variables do not vary very much across the two geo-political regions. Moreover, considering that our outcome variable (i.e. non-voting) is binary, we use multivariate or logistic regression modelling to estimate the probability of non-voting across the two regions. Also, we introduce robust standard errors in our model estimation so as to reduce the variance of fluctuation across our data or samples and proceeds by building a step-by-step model that takes into consideration three theoretical perspectives, while adding a final model that takes into consideration our individual indicators and a few of the country-specific variables that we have added to our

Our main dependent variable of interest is non-voting. We employ a dichotomous measure of the respondents who did not vote in the most recent elections. Turning to the independent variables, our key variables are organised into three groups: individual resources, motivation and networking factors. First, concerning individual resources, we include the following: educational level, income and two demographic factors (age and gender). Second, for the motivational variables, we include: political efficacy, interest, trust and satisfaction with democracy. Third, for the networking factors, we include: membership in associational or voluntary organisations, and place of residence (i.e. whether respondents live in an urban or rural area). But more importantly, considering that our two geo-political regions have differing institutional characteristics, but even more so based on current research by Franklin [37], Gallego [38] and Van Egmond et al. [39] which reveals that politics or political action is influenced by the context in which individuals find themselves, in this study we include a number of country-specific contextual variables (i.e. electoral system, concurrent elections, closeness of elections and trust in elections) in predicting non-voting. Appendices 1 and 2 show which countries are included in our study and how the different variables have been operationalised.

<sup>3</sup> The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every 2 years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than 30 nations: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.

<sup>4</sup> Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa: http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-5-data-34-countries-2011-2013-last-update-july-2015

org/data/download.html?r=6 (Accessed: 20/06/2018).

(Accessed: 20/06/2018).

10

two separate datasets: European Social Survey<sup>3</sup> (ESS-2012; Round 6) and

analysis is concluded.

Elections - A Global Perspective

data.

3. Data, method and measurement

To explain the probability of non-voting in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, we estimate a multivariate logistic regression which combines micro- and macro-level variables and build four models as guided by our theoretical strategy. Moreover, considering our main objective is to evaluate the genuine effects of the variables at different levels and using different models, we began by breaking down citizens' propensity for non-voting along the lines of each of our key theoretical perspectives (i.e. individual resources, motivation, networks, and contextual or country-level) by building very parsimonious models step-by-step, before rounding up by pulling all the variables from each of the four theoretical perspective into an expanded logit model that incorporates the effect of individual- and country-level variables. An overview of the results from the logistic modelling is summarised in Table 3, which shows which variables was statistically significant in the two regions.

First, we began by modelling the effect of individual resource variables on the probability of non-voting in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan African countries, with the results revealing the following. Looking at education, in Central and Eastern Europe, people with higher education (i.e. secondary or higher education) turn out to have the lowest probability of being non-voters compared to those with low education, who have the highest rate of non-voting. However, this is


Significance: \*\*\* p<.001,\*\* p<.01,\* p<.05.

Direction: + = positive relationship, given the coding used. = negative relationship. 0 = no effect given coding used. Yellow highlighting: indicates a variable for which it has not been possible to use identical question wording across both regions (so there is a chance that any differences might simply be artefactual rather than substantive). Note: Analysis produced based on logit regression, with robust standard errors. Detailed tables showing actual coefficient can be obtained be seen in the appendences.

Sources: European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012) and Afrobarometer Survey (2011-2013).

#### Table 3.

Determinants of non-voting in new democracies: overview of two geo-political regions.

directly contrary to our sub-Saharan Africa countries, where those with higher education rather turn to have a higher rate of non-voting compared to individuals with lower education. Next, regarding socio-economic status, across the two regions, we are able to confirm that those with a lower income or socio-economic status are more likely to have a higher rate of non-voting, which comes as a surprise with respect to the African countries. Additionally, looking at age of respondents, across both regions, our results indicate that younger cohorts have a higher rate of non-voting compared to their older citizens. Similarly, turning to the last individual resource variable, that is, gender, in post-communist countries gender points to a significant effect with non-voting, albeit men appearing to have a higher rate of non-voting compared to women. With regards to sub-Saharan Africa, we can confirm women have a higher rate of non-voting compared to men.

cross-sectional survey data that is derived from the European Social Survey and the Afrobarometer. By employing a theory triangulation that consist of individual-level variables, and by adding a few country-specific indicators, we have tested the distinct types of effect on the individual decision to abstain from electoral politics. All done, we are now left with two important question which constitute the core objective of this chapter: Who are the non-voters and How much consistency do we find

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Beginning with the first question, (i.e. who the non-voters are?), with respect to the individual resource variable, education and income tend to be a very important indicator in the post-communist countries that we analysed in this study, as those with a lower level of education and material status are more likely to be non-voters. With respect to sub-Saharan African countries this is quite the opposite, as those with a higher level of education are considered most likely to be non-voters. Another important characteristic of non-voters across both regions is age, with data suggesting young cohorts are more likely to be non-voters compared to older citizens. Additionally, moving to the motivational variables, our study reveals nonvoting is greatly influenced by political efficacy, political trust and political efficacy. To be precise, in Eastern Europe as in tropical Africa, non-voters tend to display lower interest, trust and efficacy, albeit political efficacy appears to have an indirect effect with respect to sub-Saharan African countries. Similarly, looking at networks of recruitment, across both regions, we can confirm non-voters appear to be citizens who are not members of voluntary or associational organisations and who tend to live in cities or urban areas. Finally, putting the macro-level indicators into perspective, country electoral integrity or trust in elections and electoral formula appears to be influential in our context analysis, with non-voters being those who perceive elections are not free and fair and who live in countries where is electoral system is disproportional. Apart from this, what we could add is that country-level variables tend to have a varied effect across both regions. So far, we have identified who the non-voters are, but even more important is for us to interrogate how much consistency we find across the two regions. This question is important because it will enable us to ascertain if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique. By relying on Table 3, we systematically cross-checked each of the four main models across the two geo-political regions, which informs us of the following: First, beginning with the individual resource variables, age proves to be consistent across post-communist European and sub-Saharan African countries, with younger cohorts far more likely to be nonvoters. Second, looking at motivational indicators, our data reveals non-voting is positively influenced by factors such as political interest and political trust. Across both regions what we observe is that non-voters have a lower trust in political

institutions and a lack of interest in politics or public affairs.

So far, our analysis of the determinants of non-voting across new democracies in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa carries a number of implications. First, we begin by exploring the implication of what the analysis reveals in light of the theory used (i.e. individual resource, mobilisation and networking) and in order to do this, we ask a very simply question: does our theoretical model works equally well across both regions? Answering this question prove challenging because some variables or theories seem to very important in predicting people's decision not to engage in electoral politics while other do not. That said, we can confirm individual resource, mobilisation and networking models seems to work well across both

5. Conclusion and implications

13

across the two regions?

Second, pertaining to the motivational or political psychology variables, we can make the following extrapolations. In post-communist European countries, what is observed is that political interest, political trust and political efficacy tend to reduce the probability of non-voting. With respect to sub-Saharan Africa, we can equally confirm that political trust and political interest do in fact reduce the probability of non-voting, but this is not true for political efficacy, which surprisingly shows that those who are declared to be politically efficacious are more likely to be non-voters. Finally, with respect to satisfaction with democracy, across the two regions, our results indicate no substantial effect between being satisfied with a country's democracy and the probability of non-voting.

Third, turning to the networks of recruitment, we modelled two types of variable (i.e. associational networks and place of residence). In Central and Eastern Europe as well as countries in tropical Africa, what we observe is that those who declared not to be members of associational or voluntary organisations have a higher rate of non-voting compared to those who are members of such organisations. Similarly, looking at one's place of residence (i.e. urban or rural) what we can deduce is that individuals living in urban areas across both regions are more likely to be non-voters.

Fourth, looking at contextual-level variables, we can make the following remarks. Beginning with electoral system, in both regions, what our data tells is that the rate of non-voting is supposedly higher in countries with a disproportional electoral system (i.e. majoritarian, mixed or plurality). Additionally, turning to closeness of elections, our results tell of a statistically significant relationship with non-voting in Central/Eastern European countries, indicating that the probability of non-voting tends to be higher in countries where voters perceive the elections are closed or competitive. This result is directly opposite to that of our sub-Saharan African countries, where the results points to a non-significant relationship although in the expected direction (i.e. citizens living in countries where the elections are less competitive tend to have a higher rate of non-voting). Moving to trust in elections or electoral integrity, our data reveals that across both regions, the rate of non-voting tends to be higher in countries where voters perceive the elections are not considered to be free and fair. Lastly, we equally evaluate the effect of concurrent elections on non-voting. Although we could test the effect of this variable only in tropical Africa, what can be said is that the probability of non-voting is said to be higher in countries that do not concurrently held elections.

#### 4.1 Who are the non-voters and how much consistency do we find across the two regions?

To explain the determinates of non-voting in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, we have relied heavily on

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

directly contrary to our sub-Saharan Africa countries, where those with higher education rather turn to have a higher rate of non-voting compared to individuals with lower education. Next, regarding socio-economic status, across the two regions, we are able to confirm that those with a lower income or socio-economic status are more likely to have a higher rate of non-voting, which comes as a surprise with respect to the African countries. Additionally, looking at age of respondents, across both regions, our results indicate that younger cohorts have a higher rate of non-voting compared to their older citizens. Similarly, turning to the last individual resource variable, that is, gender, in post-communist countries gender points to a significant effect with non-voting, albeit men appearing to have a higher rate of non-voting compared to women. With regards to sub-Saharan Africa, we can con-

Second, pertaining to the motivational or political psychology variables, we can make the following extrapolations. In post-communist European countries, what is observed is that political interest, political trust and political efficacy tend to reduce the probability of non-voting. With respect to sub-Saharan Africa, we can equally confirm that political trust and political interest do in fact reduce the probability of non-voting, but this is not true for political efficacy, which surprisingly shows that those who are declared to be politically efficacious are more likely to be non-voters. Finally, with respect to satisfaction with democracy, across the two regions, our results indicate no substantial effect between being satisfied with a country's

Third, turning to the networks of recruitment, we modelled two types of variable (i.e. associational networks and place of residence). In Central and Eastern Europe as well as countries in tropical Africa, what we observe is that those who declared not to be members of associational or voluntary organisations have a higher rate of non-voting compared to those who are members of such organisations. Similarly, looking at one's place of residence (i.e. urban or rural) what we can deduce is that individuals living in urban areas across both regions are more likely to

Fourth, looking at contextual-level variables, we can make the following remarks. Beginning with electoral system, in both regions, what our data tells is that the rate of non-voting is supposedly higher in countries with a disproportional electoral system (i.e. majoritarian, mixed or plurality). Additionally, turning to closeness of elections, our results tell of a statistically significant relationship with non-voting in Central/Eastern European countries, indicating that the probability of non-voting tends to be higher in countries where voters perceive the elections are closed or competitive. This result is directly opposite to that of our sub-Saharan African countries, where the results points to a non-significant relationship although in the expected direction (i.e. citizens living in countries where the elections are less competitive tend to have a higher rate of non-voting). Moving to trust in elections or electoral integrity, our data reveals that across both regions, the rate of non-voting tends to be higher in countries where voters perceive the elections are not considered to be free and fair. Lastly, we equally evaluate the effect of concurrent elections on non-voting. Although we could test the effect of this variable only in tropical Africa, what can be said is that the probability of non-voting is said to be

4.1 Who are the non-voters and how much consistency do we find across the

To explain the determinates of non-voting in the new democracies of Central

and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, we have relied heavily on

higher in countries that do not concurrently held elections.

firm women have a higher rate of non-voting compared to men.

democracy and the probability of non-voting.

Elections - A Global Perspective

be non-voters.

two regions?

12

cross-sectional survey data that is derived from the European Social Survey and the Afrobarometer. By employing a theory triangulation that consist of individual-level variables, and by adding a few country-specific indicators, we have tested the distinct types of effect on the individual decision to abstain from electoral politics. All done, we are now left with two important question which constitute the core objective of this chapter: Who are the non-voters and How much consistency do we find across the two regions?

Beginning with the first question, (i.e. who the non-voters are?), with respect to the individual resource variable, education and income tend to be a very important indicator in the post-communist countries that we analysed in this study, as those with a lower level of education and material status are more likely to be non-voters. With respect to sub-Saharan African countries this is quite the opposite, as those with a higher level of education are considered most likely to be non-voters. Another important characteristic of non-voters across both regions is age, with data suggesting young cohorts are more likely to be non-voters compared to older citizens. Additionally, moving to the motivational variables, our study reveals nonvoting is greatly influenced by political efficacy, political trust and political efficacy. To be precise, in Eastern Europe as in tropical Africa, non-voters tend to display lower interest, trust and efficacy, albeit political efficacy appears to have an indirect effect with respect to sub-Saharan African countries. Similarly, looking at networks of recruitment, across both regions, we can confirm non-voters appear to be citizens who are not members of voluntary or associational organisations and who tend to live in cities or urban areas. Finally, putting the macro-level indicators into perspective, country electoral integrity or trust in elections and electoral formula appears to be influential in our context analysis, with non-voters being those who perceive elections are not free and fair and who live in countries where is electoral system is disproportional. Apart from this, what we could add is that country-level variables tend to have a varied effect across both regions. So far, we have identified who the non-voters are, but even more important is for us to interrogate how much consistency we find across the two regions. This question is important because it will enable us to ascertain if the determinants of non-voting are generally similar across both regions or if each region is unique. By relying on Table 3, we systematically cross-checked each of the four main models across the two geo-political regions, which informs us of the following: First, beginning with the individual resource variables, age proves to be consistent across post-communist European and sub-Saharan African countries, with younger cohorts far more likely to be nonvoters. Second, looking at motivational indicators, our data reveals non-voting is positively influenced by factors such as political interest and political trust. Across both regions what we observe is that non-voters have a lower trust in political institutions and a lack of interest in politics or public affairs.

#### 5. Conclusion and implications

So far, our analysis of the determinants of non-voting across new democracies in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa carries a number of implications. First, we begin by exploring the implication of what the analysis reveals in light of the theory used (i.e. individual resource, mobilisation and networking) and in order to do this, we ask a very simply question: does our theoretical model works equally well across both regions? Answering this question prove challenging because some variables or theories seem to very important in predicting people's decision not to engage in electoral politics while other do not. That said, we can confirm individual resource, mobilisation and networking models seems to work well across both

regions (i.e. most especially in Central and Eastern European countries) with a few exceptions in sub-Saharan Africa countries (i.e. relating to education and political efficacy). Additionally, the country, contextual or institutional variables seem harder to evaluate in general terms because of the inconsistency of the findings. Overall, the full picture in relations to non-voting in new democracies suggest that political behaviour of voters in these regions is determine by many of the same factors that influence political participation in older democracies. Second, this paper also carries certain implications for both future research and democracy: (1) The first relates to how voters could be brought back to the polls or encouraged to participate in electoral politics. In fact, as we have observed in this study, this could be achieved by increasing by raising citizens' interest in politics and improving their trust in political institutions. For this to be attained, parties must be able to provide voters with clear alternatives, and invest in electoral campaigning, most especially in urban areas. (2) Next, one of the practical implication of this study relates to the conduct of future elections and democracy in these regions. In an era of declining turnout, this study points to the need for electoral integrity and transparency, that is, the need for countries to organise free and fair elections that will not only get voters back to the polls but will equally improve the overall quality of democracy in these regions.

Appendices

Data.

Post-communist countries

Total 37

Dependent variable

Individual resource variables

Regions Number of

countries

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

2 Operationalisation of the variables.

Survey)

Variable Operationalisation: central and

Non-voting Some people do not vote nowadays for

Age Age is recoded into four-age categories:

aged 66 and above).

Education People were asked for the highest level

education

15

Income Into which of the following income

of this household fit:

Eastern Europe (European Social

one reason or another. Did you vote in the last national election? (1) for nonvoting and 'voting' (0), thereby omitting all the people who had not been eligible to vote at the last election.

young adults (i.e. consisting of those aged 15–33), adults (i.e. those aged 34– 49), middle-aged (i.e. those aged 50–59) and finally elderly people (i.e. those

of education they had achieved. The different educational systems & degree allows us to create three educational categories: Primary education, secondary education and higher

ranges does the total monthly income

[10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country] (lowest income = 1…highest income = 10)

Gender Dummy: 1 for a woman, 0 for a man. Dummy: 1 for a woman, 0 for a man.

1 Sample of countries in the European Social Survey and Afrobarometer

Countries covered

Sub-Saharan Africa 27 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape

Tanzania, Uganda Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

10 Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,

voting.

aged 66 and above).

and higher education).

Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, South Africa, Togo,

> Operationalisation: sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer)

With regard to the most recent national election, which statement is true for you? Voting in the most recent national election? (1) for non-voting and (0) for

Age is recoded into four-age categories: young adults (i.e. consisting of those aged 15–33), adults (i.e. those aged 34– 49), middle-aged (i.e. those aged 50–59) and finally elderly people (i.e. those

People are asked for their highest educational level of education. Regarding education, respondent's educational levels are recoded into four categories (i.e. no formal education, primary education, secondary education

We use occupational status as a proxy to measure income. Occupational status is measure by a question which asks about the citizen's occupational status. A dummy variable is therefore created, with 1 assigned to individuals having jobs, while a coding of 0 is assigned to individuals who declared having no job.

#### Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editor for the valuable comments and suggestions to improve the quality of the paper.

### Conflict of interest

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

#### Notes


### Appendices

regions (i.e. most especially in Central and Eastern European countries) with a few exceptions in sub-Saharan Africa countries (i.e. relating to education and political efficacy). Additionally, the country, contextual or institutional variables seem harder to evaluate in general terms because of the inconsistency of the findings. Overall, the full picture in relations to non-voting in new democracies suggest that political behaviour of voters in these regions is determine by many of the same factors that influence political participation in older democracies. Second, this paper also carries certain implications for both future research and democracy: (1) The first relates to how voters could be brought back to the polls or encouraged to participate in electoral politics. In fact, as we have observed in this study, this could be achieved by increasing by raising citizens' interest in politics and improving their trust in political institutions. For this to be attained, parties must be able to provide voters with clear alternatives, and invest in electoral campaigning, most especially in urban areas. (2) Next, one of the practical implication of this study relates to the conduct of future elections and democracy in these regions. In an era of declining turnout, this study points to the need for electoral integrity and transparency, that is, the need for countries to organise free and fair elections that will not only get voters back to the polls but will equally improve the overall quality of democracy in these regions.

The author would like to thank the editor for the valuable comments and sug-

1. By relying on the representative, legitimacy and citizenship and quality of democracy, we provide a justification for why studying the phenomenon of non-voting within the context of new emerging democracies seem to matter.

2. In the case of post-communist Europe these are generally parliamentary elections, while for sub-Saharan Africa it is a mixture of presidential and

3. The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every 2 years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and

behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than 30 nations http://www. europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6 [Accessed: 18/06/2018].

4.Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa: http://afrobarometer.org/ data/merged-round-5-data-34-countries-2011-2013-last-update-july-2015

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgements

Elections - A Global Perspective

Conflict of interest

parliamentary elections.

[Accessed: 18/06/2018].

Notes

14

gestions to improve the quality of the paper.

1 Sample of countries in the European Social Survey and Afrobarometer Data.


### 2 Operationalisation of the variables.



3. Logistic

17

 analysis

Models/variables

Constant Individual

Gender (Male) Age (reference:

Adults (34–49)

Middle-aged

Elderly people (60+)

Educational

Secondary education

Higher education

Income

Motivational

Political interest

Political trust

Satisfaction

Political efficacy Network variables

Associational

Residence (Urban)

 network

 with democracy

 variables

 level (reference:

 primary education)

.358

.882

.013

 .008

 .09

 .987

.005

.710

.067

.002

.065

 .010

 .000

 .937

.064

.150

.230

 .047

 .000

 1.25

 239

 .047

 .000

 1.27

 .045

 .001

 .861

.110

 .046

 .02

 .895

 .010

 .000

 .938

.024

 .012

 .05

 .976

 .010

 .84

 1.02

 .003

 .122

 .85

 1.03

 .002

 .010

 .85

 1.002

 .010

 .000

 .936

.069

 .010

 .000

 .934

.072

 .010

 .000

 .930

 .028

 .000

 .492

.709

 .028

 .000

 .492

.680

 .028

 .000

 .506

 .009

 .59

 .995

.011

 .009

 .29

 .989

.011

 .009

 .27

 .989

 .070

 .000

 .414

.569

 .074

 .000

 .566

.639

 .075

 .000

 .528

.631

 .076

 .000

 .532

 .052

 .000

 .699

.247

 .054

 .000

 .781

.287

 .005

 .000

 .750

.294

 .055

 .000

 .745

 adults (50–59)

.55

.80

1.05

 .058

 .000

 .348

.754

 .061

 .000

 .470

.751

 .009

 .000

 .472

.770

 .062

 .000

 .989

 .064

 .000

 .449

.608

 .067

 .000

 .545

.594

 .067

 .000

 .552

.606

 .067

 .000

 .546

 .056

 .000

 .574

.478

 .058

 .000

 .620

.470

 .059

 .000

 .625

.470

 .059

 .000

 .625

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

 young people)

.024

 .041

 .56

 1.02

.138

 .043

 .001

 .871

.132

 .044

 .002

 .876

.141

 .044

 .001

 .869

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

 resource

Model I

B

.069

 .072

 .34

 1.07

 1.369

 .124

 .000

 3.932

 1.443

 .126

 .000

 4.232

 1.715

 .143

 .000

 5.557

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

Model II

Model III

Model IV

 of

non-voting:

 results

 for Central

 and Eastern

European

countries.


Logistic analysis of non-voting: results for Central and Eastern European countries.

Variable Operationalisation: central and

Political interest Political interest is capture by a question

interested coded as 3.

Political trust Trust is measured by an evaluation

institutions.

satisfied)

organisations.

area

systems

Country level indicators

Concurrent elections

Closeness of elections

16

Residence Recoded into 1 = urban area, 0 = rural

Electoral system Dummy: 0 for Proportional system, 1

1 for concurrent elections

Network of recruitments variables

Satisfaction with democracy

Associational/ informal networks

Survey)

Motivation or political psychology variables

Elections - A Global Perspective

Eastern Europe (European Social

that asks how interested would you say you are in politics? We recode this into a four-point with not interested coded as 0, not very interested 1, somewhat interested assigned a value of 2 and very

regarding trust in the parliament, the legal system and politicians (i.e. please tell me on a scale of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the following

How satisfied with the way democracy works in country on a scale of 0–10 (i.e. 0 extremely dissatisfied, 10 extremely

Membership in voluntary or informal networks is measure by evaluating membership in different social and political organisation such as religious, recreational, environment, labour, professional and humanitarian

for plurality, mixed or majoritarian

Dummy: 0 for elections not concurrent,

I measure closeness of election as the margin of victory for the winning candidate or over the runner-up in presidential elections. While for parliamentary democracies, we measure closeness of election as the difference in seat shares between the top two parties. That said, I coded the variable in such a way that a winning margin of less 5% = 1, and a margin greater than 5% = 0. Operationalisation: sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer)

Political interest is capture by a question that asks how interested would you say you are in public affairs? We recode this into a four-point with not interested coded as 0, not very interested 1, somewhat interested assigned a value of 2 and very interested coded as 3.

How much do you trust each of the following, or have not you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime Minister? Trust parliament/national assembly, Trust courts of law. Recoded into 0 = no trust, 1 = little, 3 = some, 4 =

Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country? 0 Not satisfied, 1 not very satisfied, 2 fairly satisfied, 3 very satisfied.

Membership in voluntary or informal networks is measure by evaluating membership in different social and political organisation such as religious, recreational, environment, labour, professional and humanitarian

Recoded into 1 = urban area, 0 = rural

Dummy: 0 for Proportional system, 1 for plurality, mixed or majoritarian systems

Dummy: 0 for elections not concurrent,

I measure closeness of election as the margin of victory for the winning candidate or over the runner-up in presidential elections. While for parliamentary democracies, we measure closeness of election as the difference in seat shares between the top two parties. That said, I coded the variable in such a way that a winning margin of less 5% = 1, and a margin greater than 5% = 0.

1 for concurrent elections

a lot)

organisations.

area

3.


### 4. Logistic analysis of non-voting: result for sub-Saharan African countries.


Models/variables

19

Educational

Primary education

Secondary education

Higher education

Income Motivational

Political interest

Political trust

Satisfaction

Political efficacy Network variables

Associational

Residence (Urban)

Country-level

Electoral system Closeness of elections

Trust in elections

Concurrent

Chi-square

improvement

 (df)

 1090.4 (8)

1391.0 (4)

1506.2 (4)

 elections

 variables

 network

 with democracy

 variables

 level (reference:

 no education)

.197

.326

.514

202

 .033

 .000

 .817

.188

.164

.127

.073

.042

 .012

 .000

 1.043

 .043 .159

.219

 .033

 .000

 1.245

 .236 .264

.013

.244

.337

1957.4 (6)

 .068

 .000

 .640

 .015

 .000

 .784

 .035

 .70

 .987

 .038

 .000

 1.302

 .033

 .000

 1.266

 .046

 .001

 .853

.192

 .047

 .000

 .825

 .012

 .000

 1.044

 .032

 .012

 .007

 1.032

 .017

 .000

 .930

.074

 .017

 .000

 .929

 .015

 .018

 .40

 1.015

 .015

 .000

 .881

.121

 .015

 .000

 .886

.057

 .015

 .000

 .917

 .014

 .000

 .828

.145

 .014

 .000

 .865

.135

 .015

 .000

 .873

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

 .033

 .000

 .828

.198

 .033

 .000

 .820

.205

 .034

 .000

 .815

 .080

 .000

 1.672

 .457

 .081

 .000

 1.579

 .351

 .083

 .000

 1.421

 .209

 .084

 .013

 1.233

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

 .041

 .000

 1.385

 .278

 .042

 .000

 1.321

 .196

 .044

 .000

 1.216

 .067

 .045

 .14

 1.069

 .037

 .000

 1.217

 .178

 .038

 .000

 1.195

 .137

 .038

 .000

 1.146

 .071

 .039

 .06

 1.073

Model I

B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

Model II

Model III

Model IV


#### Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Models/variables

18

Country-level

Electoral system Closeness of election

Trust in elections

Chi-Square

Significance

4. Logistic

 analysis

Models/variables

Constant

Individual

Gender (male) Age (reference:

Adults (34–49)

Middle-aged

Elderly people (60+)

 adults (50–59)

.811

.947

.961

 .062

 .000

 .383

.922

 .063

 .000

 .394

.924

 .063

 .000

 .397

.971

 .063

 .000

 .379

 .059

 .000

 .388

.920

 .059

 .000

 .398

.904

 .059

 .000

 .405

.944

 .060

 .000

 .389

 .036

 .000

 .445

.801

 .036

 .000

 .449

.780

 .037

 .000

 .458

.807

 .037

 .000

 .446

 young people)

.140

 .031

 .000

 1.150

 .098

 .031

 .002

 1.103

 .082

 .037

 .000

 1.086

 .085

 .031

 .007

 1.089

 resource

Model I

B

1.356

 .038

 .000

 .258

.761

 .054

 .000

 .467

.762

 .056

 .000

 .467

.447

 .068

 .000

 .647

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 SE

 Sig

 ExpB

Model II

Model III

Model IV

 of

non-voting:

 result for

sub-Saharan

 African

countries.

 levels: \*\*\*p < .001, \*\*p < .01, \*p < .05.

Improvement

 (df)

 467.9 (7)

1341.0 (11)

1376.5 (13)

 variables

Model I

B

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

 B

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

 B .125

.243

.091

1462.5 (16)

 .013

 000

 .913

 .044

 .007

 1.133

 .046

 .000

 1.133

Elections - A Global Perspective

 S.E

 Sig

 ExpB

Model II

Model III

Model IV Elections - A Global Perspective

#### Author details

Elvis Bisong Tambe Department of Economics and International Relations, Political Science Graduate Program, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

References

[1] Karp JA, Milazzo C. Democratic scepticism and political participation in Europe. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. 2015;25(1):97-110

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies

[11] Putnam RD. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and

[12] Tambe EB. Electoral participation in African democracies: The impact of individual and contextual factors. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. 2017;55(2):119-140

[13] Tambe EB. Electoral participation in new-democracies: applying existing models of turnout to new democracies in Africa, East Asia and post-communist

Europe [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Sussex; 2018

Parties. 2008;18(1):75-100

Studies. 2006;25:637-663

Press; 1980

[16] Smets K, Van Ham C. The embarrassment of riches? A metaanalysis of individual level research on voter turnout. Electoral Studies. 2013

[14] Diwakar R. Voter turnout in the India states: An empirical analysis. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and

[15] Geys B. Voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research. Electoral

[17] Verba S, Schlozman KL, Brady HE. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1995

[18] Wolfinger RE, Rosenstone SJ. Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University

[20] Bratton M. Political participation in

[19] Marta O, Anetta C, John H. Intended electoral participation in transitional countries. Economics of Governance. 2005;6(3):211-228

a new democracy: Institutional considerations from Zambia.

Schuster; 2000

[2] Kostadinova T. Voter turnout dynamics in post-communist Europe. European Journal of Political Research.

[4] International Institute for

Report. 2nd ed. Stockholm: International IDEA; 2002

International IDEA; 2016

[7] Rosenstone SJ, Hansen JM. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York:

2016;15(2):149-173

Macmillan; 1993

12(4):521-542

2002

21

Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global

[5] International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout Trends around the World. Stockholm:

[6] Tambe EB. Who votes in East Asia? European Journal of East Asian Studies.

[8] Hadjar A, Michael B. Who does not participate in elections in Europe and why is this? European Societies. 2010;

[9] Sheerin C. Political Efficacy and Youth Non-Voting. Saarbrücken: VDM

[10] Kymlicka W. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press;

Verlag Dr. Muller; 2008

[3] Pacek AC, Pop-Eleches G, Tucker JA. Disenchanted or discerning: Voter turnout in post-communist countries. The Journal of Politics. 2009;71(2):

2003;42(6):741-759

473-491

\*Address all correspondence to: elvisbisong@yahoo.coms

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Who Does Not Vote and Why? Implication for New Democracies DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80988

#### References

[1] Karp JA, Milazzo C. Democratic scepticism and political participation in Europe. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. 2015;25(1):97-110

[2] Kostadinova T. Voter turnout dynamics in post-communist Europe. European Journal of Political Research. 2003;42(6):741-759

[3] Pacek AC, Pop-Eleches G, Tucker JA. Disenchanted or discerning: Voter turnout in post-communist countries. The Journal of Politics. 2009;71(2): 473-491

[4] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report. 2nd ed. Stockholm: International IDEA; 2002

[5] International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout Trends around the World. Stockholm: International IDEA; 2016

[6] Tambe EB. Who votes in East Asia? European Journal of East Asian Studies. 2016;15(2):149-173

[7] Rosenstone SJ, Hansen JM. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan; 1993

[8] Hadjar A, Michael B. Who does not participate in elections in Europe and why is this? European Societies. 2010; 12(4):521-542

[9] Sheerin C. Political Efficacy and Youth Non-Voting. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller; 2008

[10] Kymlicka W. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press; 2002

[11] Putnam RD. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster; 2000

[12] Tambe EB. Electoral participation in African democracies: The impact of individual and contextual factors. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. 2017;55(2):119-140

[13] Tambe EB. Electoral participation in new-democracies: applying existing models of turnout to new democracies in Africa, East Asia and post-communist Europe [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Sussex; 2018

[14] Diwakar R. Voter turnout in the India states: An empirical analysis. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. 2008;18(1):75-100

[15] Geys B. Voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research. Electoral Studies. 2006;25:637-663

[16] Smets K, Van Ham C. The embarrassment of riches? A metaanalysis of individual level research on voter turnout. Electoral Studies. 2013

[17] Verba S, Schlozman KL, Brady HE. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1995

[18] Wolfinger RE, Rosenstone SJ. Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 1980

[19] Marta O, Anetta C, John H. Intended electoral participation in transitional countries. Economics of Governance. 2005;6(3):211-228

[20] Bratton M. Political participation in a new democracy: Institutional considerations from Zambia.

Author details

20

Elvis Bisong Tambe

Elections - A Global Perspective

Department of Economics and International Relations, Political Science Graduate

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

Program, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

\*Address all correspondence to: elvisbisong@yahoo.coms

provided the original work is properly cited.

Comparative Political Studies. 1999;32: 549-588

[21] Croke K, Grossman G, Larreguy HA, Marshall J. Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. American Political Science Review. 2016;110(3):579-600

[22] Isaksson A-S. Political participation in Africa: The role of individual resources. Electoral Studies. 2014;32: 244-260

[23] Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita. Who votes in Latin America? A test of three theoretical perspective. Comparative Political Studies. 2014; 47(8):1079-1104

[24] Kuenzi M, Lambright GMS. Who votes in Africa? An examination of electoral participation in 10 African countries. Party Politics. 2011;17:767-799

[25] Resnick D, Casale D. Young populations in young democracies: Generational voting behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa. Democratization. 2014; 21(6):1172-1194

[26] Campbell A, Gurin G, Miller WE, Stokes DE. The Voter Decides. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 1954

[27] Abramson PR, Aldrich JH. The decline of electoral participation in America. American Political Science Review. 1982;76:502-521

[28] Karp JA, Banducci SA. Political efficacy and participation in twentyseven democracies. British Journal of Political Science. 2008;38:311-334

[29] Norris P. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2002

[30] Lazarsfeld P, Berelson B, Gaudet H. The People's Choice. New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce; 1948

[31] Besir C. The perils of political competition: Explaining participation and trust in political parties in Eastern Europe. Comparative Political Studies. 2012;46(12):1610-1635

[32] La Due Lake R, Huckfeldt R. Social capital, social networks, and political participation. Political Psychology. 1998; 19:567-584

[33] Klesner JL. Social capital and political participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Latin American Research Review. 2007;42:1-32

[34] Karp JA, Banducci SA, Bowler S. Getting out the vote: Party mobilization in a comparative perspective. British Journal of Political Science. 2007;38: 91-112

[35] Hoffmann-Martinot V. Voter turnout in French municipal elections. In: Lopez-Nieto L, editor. Local Elections in Europe. Barcelona, Spain: Institut de ciènces politiques I socials; 1994. pp. 13-42

[36] Afrobarometer Round 5. Data codebook for the 34 country merged data set and corresponding survey data; 2013

[37] Franklin MN. Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of 1) Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press; 2004

[38] Gallego A. Unequal Political Participation Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015

[39] Van Egmond, De Graafi, Eijk VD. Electoral participation in the Netherlands: Individual and contextual influences. European Journal of Political Research. 1998;34:281-300

**23**

Section 2

Elections in Developing

Democracies

Section 2

## Elections in Developing Democracies

Comparative Political Studies. 1999;32:

[31] Besir C. The perils of political competition: Explaining participation and trust in political parties in Eastern Europe. Comparative Political Studies.

[32] La Due Lake R, Huckfeldt R. Social capital, social networks, and political participation. Political Psychology. 1998;

[33] Klesner JL. Social capital and political participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Latin American Research Review. 2007;42:1-32

[34] Karp JA, Banducci SA, Bowler S. Getting out the vote: Party mobilization in a comparative perspective. British Journal of Political Science. 2007;38:

[35] Hoffmann-Martinot V. Voter turnout in French municipal elections. In: Lopez-Nieto L, editor. Local Elections in Europe. Barcelona, Spain: Institut de ciènces politiques I socials;

[36] Afrobarometer Round 5. Data codebook for the 34 country merged data set and corresponding survey data;

[37] Franklin MN. Voter Turnout and

Competition in Established Democracies since 1945. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press; 2004

the Dynamics of 1) Electoral

[38] Gallego A. Unequal Political Participation Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015

Electoral participation in the

Research. 1998;34:281-300

[39] Van Egmond, De Graafi, Eijk VD.

Netherlands: Individual and contextual influences. European Journal of Political

2012;46(12):1610-1635

19:567-584

91-112

2013

1994. pp. 13-42

[21] Croke K, Grossman G, Larreguy

disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. American Political Science Review.

[22] Isaksson A-S. Political participation

[23] Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita. Who votes in Latin America? A test of

[24] Kuenzi M, Lambright GMS. Who votes in Africa? An examination of electoral participation in 10 African countries. Party Politics. 2011;17:767-799

[26] Campbell A, Gurin G, Miller WE, Stokes DE. The Voter Decides.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 1954

[27] Abramson PR, Aldrich JH. The decline of electoral participation in America. American Political Science

[28] Karp JA, Banducci SA. Political efficacy and participation in twentyseven democracies. British Journal of Political Science. 2008;38:311-334

[29] Norris P. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2002

[30] Lazarsfeld P, Berelson B, Gaudet H. The People's Choice. New York: Duell,

Review. 1982;76:502-521

Sloan, & Pearce; 1948

22

[25] Resnick D, Casale D. Young populations in young democracies: Generational voting behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa. Democratization. 2014;

in Africa: The role of individual resources. Electoral Studies. 2014;32:

three theoretical perspective. Comparative Political Studies. 2014;

47(8):1079-1104

21(6):1172-1194

HA, Marshall J. Deliberate

Elections - A Global Perspective

2016;110(3):579-600

549-588

244-260

**25**

**1. Introduction**

**Chapter 2**

*Numvi Gwaibi*

**Abstract**

The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots

Electoral periods in Cameroon involve an impressive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches, door-to-door solicitations, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing etc. Electoral manipulation involves selective voter registration, tampering with the electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally as the political elite. These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials etc. have been at the helm of the state since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. On occasion, the grassroots are able to see through the mirage, which often leaves some members of the political elite staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on events around the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I employed participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews among others to unearth and document the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and other high-ranking members of the governing

**Keywords:** elections, campaigns, manipulation, political elite, grassroots populations

*"[E]lections entail the largest mobilization of the national population in a short time span and require the coordination of millions of individuals engaged in* 

The history of Cameroon is quite colourful. 'Kamerun' was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1919, then a League of Nations Mandate following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, and later a United Nations Trust Territory administered by Britain and France respectively [2, 3]. In 1961, the British and French sections of Cameroon were united under a Federal structure [4, 5]. In 1972 the federation dissolved following a referendum and the country became known

Omnipresent, Overbearing and

Realities in Cameroon: The

Contested Political Elite

CPDM party during election periods in Cameroon.

*hundreds of different activities" ([1], p. 5).*

#### **Chapter 2**

## The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing and Contested Political Elite

*Numvi Gwaibi*

### **Abstract**

Electoral periods in Cameroon involve an impressive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches, door-to-door solicitations, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing etc. Electoral manipulation involves selective voter registration, tampering with the electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally as the political elite. These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials etc. have been at the helm of the state since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. On occasion, the grassroots are able to see through the mirage, which often leaves some members of the political elite staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on events around the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I employed participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews among others to unearth and document the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and other high-ranking members of the governing CPDM party during election periods in Cameroon.

**Keywords:** elections, campaigns, manipulation, political elite, grassroots populations

#### **1. Introduction**

*"[E]lections entail the largest mobilization of the national population in a short time span and require the coordination of millions of individuals engaged in hundreds of different activities" ([1], p. 5).*

The history of Cameroon is quite colourful. 'Kamerun' was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1919, then a League of Nations Mandate following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, and later a United Nations Trust Territory administered by Britain and France respectively [2, 3]. In 1961, the British and French sections of Cameroon were united under a Federal structure [4, 5]. In 1972 the federation dissolved following a referendum and the country became known

as the United Republic of Cameroon, and in 1984 the name was changed yet again to the Republic of Cameroon [6–9].

Unlike some neighbouring states in the Central African sub-Region, postindependence Cameroon enjoyed a relative measure of political stability [8]. Over the last decade however, a number of crises have shattered the myth often propagated by government officials and supporters of the ruling party about Cameroon being an 'island of peace in tumultuous central Africa.' Rising insecurity around the Lake Chad basin coupled with an upsurge in cross-border attacks in Northern Cameroon by the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, as well as deadly cross-border incursions by rebels from neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR) in the East Region of the country has greatly undermined peace and security. Meanwhile, the on-going crisis situation in the two English speaking Regions1 which according to the International Crisis Group2 is gradually degenerating into a civil war has further undermined the country's image as a safe and secure location. This crisis is a direct consequence of the country's historical trajectory and the form of state that was adopted following unification in 1961.

The unitary approach to the nation-state was the predominant choice of African leaders in the decades following independence. According to ([10], p. 175); "independent Africa chose simply to step into the shoes of departing European powers." The unitary state was therefore a continuation of the colonial state's nation-building agenda which was aimed at fusing disparate ethnic and regional groupings into a single entity. At the political level, there was a concerted drive towards one-party systems as the sole vehicle for expressing political diversity [11]. With hindsight, it is generally agreed that this approach to statehood "fostered authoritarianism at the expense of constitutionalism" ([12], p. 1). However, when single-party rule was no longer feasible, and in a bid to survive in office authoritarian rulers adopted multiparty arrangements.

According to ([13], p. 2), "the early 1990s were a time of democratic optimism". Like most sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon was greatly impacted by the 'democratic wind of change' that swept across the African continent in the 1990s [14]. Unlike the others, Cameroon did not descend into anarchy nor was the regime in place swept aside. Instead the regime headed by Cameroon's second head of state, Paul Biya who succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo following the latter's resignation in 1982 reluctantly conceded to the legalisation of political parties and the re-introduction of multiparty elections. 'Pluralism heightened the political stakes and reinvigorated electoral campaigns, in some cases transforming them into battlegrounds where a number of actors, including politicians, parties, traditional authorities, and ordinary citizens, fought it out, nonetheless, employing every available means including cash, cults and culinary items to gain votes" ([15], p. 2).

Electoral periods in Cameroon therefore involve an impressive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches and door-to-door solicitations. Other activities include, distribution of food items and party paraphernalia, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing etc. At another level, electoral manipulation involves 'gerrymandering,' selective voter registration, tempering with the electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally

**27**

machine [16].

party hierarchy.

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

as the political elite. The definition of political elite in the context of this chapter is limited to former and serving government officials (ministers, administrators etc.), national and local level politician's businessmen and other stakeholders who belong to or are affiliated with the governing Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement

These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials, and other politicians have been revolving around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. However, on occasion, the grassroots are able to see through the mirage which often leaves some members of the political elite licking their wounds and others staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on my experiences of events around the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo an administrative sub-division in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I employed a number of methods including participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews etc. to unearth and document the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and other high ranking members of the governing CPDM during election periods in

As noted in Section 1, this chapter is based on my experiences of the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. It all began in July 2013, when the president of Cameroon signed a decree convening the electoral corps. Article (I) stated that an election of Parliamentarians into the National Assembly and Councillors into Municipal Councils would take place on 30 September 2013. This announcement came at a time of renewed optimism in the electoral process following the introduction of biometric registration of voters on the electoral roll. On the one hand, it raised the hopes of many Cameroonians who were aspiring for meaningful political change via the ballot box. On the other hand, it set the ball rolling for a nationwide electoral

In the period leading up to the elections, I had exchanges with friends, conducted interviews and listened to media conversations and commentaries on the side-lines involving state officials, politicians and ordinary people. The general feeling was that with the advent of the biometric voting system, the electoral process in Cameroon might finally be credible. Many were hopeful that this system sounded the death knell for electoral fraud. People were very enthusiastic about the opportunity to effect real change, something that has eluded them for decades. Expectations of a free and fair election were espoused not only by members of the opposition, but also within the governing CPDM party. In fact some CPDM militants expressed optimism that the biometric voting system would definitively put an end to the negative image of the party as a vote rigging

In the run-up to the elections, the chairman of the CPDM prescribed consensus as the method for selecting candidates. As will be discussed later on in this chapter, reaching consensus in many parts of the country was a major challenge not least in Mbankomo where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork for my PhD. The main issue was that grassroots militants who expressed a wish to have certain candidates represent them in the municipality were brazenly thwarted by the

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

(CPDM) party.

Cameroon.

**2. Background**

contest that was full political machinations.

<sup>1</sup> The North-West and South West Regions of Cameroon erstwhile known as the British Southern Cameroons and today named Ambazonia by activists fighting for the restoration of its statehood.

<sup>2</sup> Source:https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroons-anglophone-crisisdialogue-remains-only-viable-solution

#### *The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

as the political elite. The definition of political elite in the context of this chapter is limited to former and serving government officials (ministers, administrators etc.), national and local level politician's businessmen and other stakeholders who belong to or are affiliated with the governing Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) party.

These elites notably the head of state Paul Biya, key cabinet members, government officials, and other politicians have been revolving around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s. At the receiving end are grassroots populations, who over the years witnessed the political elite appear on the eve of elections and disappear immediately thereafter. However, on occasion, the grassroots are able to see through the mirage which often leaves some members of the political elite licking their wounds and others staring into the abyss. This chapter is based on my experiences of events around the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo an administrative sub-division in the Centre Region of Cameroon. I employed a number of methods including participant observation, document and archival analysis, interviews etc. to unearth and document the complex relationship between grassroots populations, party officials and other high ranking members of the governing CPDM during election periods in Cameroon.

#### **2. Background**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

speaking Regions1

party arrangements.

([15], p. 2).

in 1961.

to the Republic of Cameroon [6–9].

as the United Republic of Cameroon, and in 1984 the name was changed yet again

Unlike some neighbouring states in the Central African sub-Region, postindependence Cameroon enjoyed a relative measure of political stability [8]. Over the last decade however, a number of crises have shattered the myth often propagated by government officials and supporters of the ruling party about Cameroon being an 'island of peace in tumultuous central Africa.' Rising insecurity around the Lake Chad basin coupled with an upsurge in cross-border attacks in Northern Cameroon by the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, as well as deadly cross-border incursions by rebels from neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR) in the East Region of the country has greatly undermined peace and security. Meanwhile, the on-going crisis situation in the two English

which according to the International Crisis Group2

The unitary approach to the nation-state was the predominant choice of African leaders in the decades following independence. According to ([10], p. 175); "independent Africa chose simply to step into the shoes of departing European powers." The unitary state was therefore a continuation of the colonial state's nation-building agenda which was aimed at fusing disparate ethnic and regional groupings into a single entity. At the political level, there was a concerted drive towards one-party systems as the sole vehicle for expressing political diversity [11]. With hindsight, it is generally agreed that this approach to statehood "fostered authoritarianism at the expense of constitutionalism" ([12], p. 1). However, when single-party rule was no longer feasible, and in a bid to survive in office authoritarian rulers adopted multi-

According to ([13], p. 2), "the early 1990s were a time of democratic optimism". Like most sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon was greatly impacted by the 'democratic wind of change' that swept across the African continent in the 1990s [14]. Unlike the others, Cameroon did not descend into anarchy nor was the regime in place swept aside. Instead the regime headed by Cameroon's second head of state, Paul Biya who succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo following the latter's resignation in 1982 reluctantly conceded to the legalisation of political parties and the re-introduction of multiparty elections. 'Pluralism heightened the political stakes and reinvigorated electoral campaigns, in some cases transforming them into battlegrounds where a number of actors, including politicians, parties, traditional authorities, and ordinary citizens, fought it out, nonetheless, employing every available means including cash, cults and culinary items to gain votes"

Electoral periods in Cameroon therefore involve an impressive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources. Campaigning is marked by rallies, speeches and door-to-door solicitations. Other activities include, distribution of food items and party paraphernalia, as well as vote buying, intimidation, ballot box stuffing etc. At another level, electoral manipulation involves 'gerrymandering,' selective voter registration, tempering with the electoral roll and other administrative manoeuvres. At the centre of these activities is a group of people known locally

 The North-West and South West Regions of Cameroon erstwhile known as the British Southern Cameroons and today named Ambazonia by activists fighting for the restoration of its statehood.

Source:https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-

ally degenerating into a civil war has further undermined the country's image as a safe and secure location. This crisis is a direct consequence of the country's historical trajectory and the form of state that was adopted following unification

is gradu-

**26**

dialogue-remains-only-viable-solution

1

2

As noted in Section 1, this chapter is based on my experiences of the 2013 municipal and legislative elections in Mbankomo in the Centre Region of Cameroon. It all began in July 2013, when the president of Cameroon signed a decree convening the electoral corps. Article (I) stated that an election of Parliamentarians into the National Assembly and Councillors into Municipal Councils would take place on 30 September 2013. This announcement came at a time of renewed optimism in the electoral process following the introduction of biometric registration of voters on the electoral roll. On the one hand, it raised the hopes of many Cameroonians who were aspiring for meaningful political change via the ballot box. On the other hand, it set the ball rolling for a nationwide electoral contest that was full political machinations.

In the period leading up to the elections, I had exchanges with friends, conducted interviews and listened to media conversations and commentaries on the side-lines involving state officials, politicians and ordinary people. The general feeling was that with the advent of the biometric voting system, the electoral process in Cameroon might finally be credible. Many were hopeful that this system sounded the death knell for electoral fraud. People were very enthusiastic about the opportunity to effect real change, something that has eluded them for decades. Expectations of a free and fair election were espoused not only by members of the opposition, but also within the governing CPDM party. In fact some CPDM militants expressed optimism that the biometric voting system would definitively put an end to the negative image of the party as a vote rigging machine [16].

In the run-up to the elections, the chairman of the CPDM prescribed consensus as the method for selecting candidates. As will be discussed later on in this chapter, reaching consensus in many parts of the country was a major challenge not least in Mbankomo where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork for my PhD. The main issue was that grassroots militants who expressed a wish to have certain candidates represent them in the municipality were brazenly thwarted by the party hierarchy.

#### **3. Conceptualising the electoral arena in Cameroon**

*"For all their structural reliance on ruling parties, electoral authoritarian regimes often show personalistic traits and become deeply identified with the person controlling the chief executive office" ([17], p. 246).*

In Cameroon, key members of the governing elite including the head of state have been shuttling around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s [18]. The longevity of the Biya regime in power cannot be attributed to democratic credentials; rather it is linked to the ability to effectively subvert electoral rules. In fact, the government of Cameroon is renowned for having developed what is termed a 'sophisticated rigging machinery' that has ensured continued electoral success for the governing CPDM party in national and local elections since the 1990s [9, 12, 18]. Other than the change of leadership in 1982, there has not been any fundamental alteration in the system of governance in place since independence and reunification in 1960 and 1961 respectively. Effectively, it is a one man show where everything boils down to the head of state. He is the president of the ruling party, the head of the executive, the judiciary, and legislative branches of government; he is also the head of the army, police and other security services. The system is structured such that every action from the highest to the lowest echelons of the state apparatus is carried out on 'the very high instructions of the head of state.' Paradoxically, when things go wrong, everyone else but the head of state is blamed.

Meanwhile, the year 2018 is very important in the electoral calendar of Cameroon. A total of 4 elections are scheduled to take place, these include Senatorial, Municipal, Legislative and Presidential elections. Senatorial elections were held in March, 2018 for 70 out of 100 senators, the remaining 30 were appointed by the head of state. The governing CPDM party won 63 seats while the main opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) party won 7 seats. Going by the results of the senatorial elections, and given that the CPDM party has won every election in the decades following the return to multiparty politics in Cameroon in the 1990s, there is every reason to believe that the party is bound to maintain its tight grip in power.

Having weathered the political liberalisation of the 1990s without a significant threat to its hegemony, the governing elite in Cameroon skilfully combined authoritarian methods and democratic practices to maintain political power. In fact, the present electoral system is skewed in favour of the governing CPDM party which very often enters the electoral arena as strong contenders with very high chances of emerging victorious. This is due largely to what many observers have described as 'electoral hold-up,' specifically because the electoral timetable in Cameroon is the sole prerogative of the President who is often referred to by state media as the 'sole master of the electoral calendar.'

The capacity of the electoral system to sustain the governing regime in Cameroon, and the quest by the government to maintain the status-quo makes it difficult to envisage any meaningful electoral reform that could lay the groundwork for free, fair, transparent and credible elections in the near future. Therefore, the electoral system in Cameroon could be described as a form of electoral authoritarianism whereby the 'regime fills executive and legislative offices by elections, but the ruling party never loses elections' ([13], p. 10). Electoral Authoritarianism in this context denotes a number of conditions, the first being that elections in Cameroon are broadly inclusive. In principle municipal, legislative and presidential elections are held regularly, under universal suffrage. The only exception being the Senatorial elections which as noted earlier is held under a two tier system i.e. indirect elections whereby 70% of senators are elected by municipal councillors and the remaining 30% are appointed by the head of state.

**29**

3

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

Secondly, elections in Cameroon are minimally pluralistic. Following the return to multipartism in the 1990s, opposition parties were allowed to openly compete for elective posts. However, in its design to fractionalise the opposition and weaken its strength, the government sponsored the formation of mushroom parties most of them allied to the governing CPDM. The result is the proliferation of opposition political

parties are made up of members of a nuclear family i.e. husband, wife and sometimes the children. The electoral system in Cameroon is therefore set-up such that the "hegemonic party permit other parties to exist but only as second class licensed parties thus foreclosing the possibility of an electoral loss by the hegemonic party" ([19], p. 34). Thirdly, the political landscape in Cameroon is minimally competitive, i.e. the horde of opposition parties, while denied victory, is allowed to win votes and seats. On the one hand, opposition parties have minuscule representation in the National Assembly, Senate and Municipal Councils; some councils are controlled by the opposition, some are shared with other political parties including the CPDM, but majority of the Municipal Councils are controlled by the CPDM party. On the other hand, "by establishing multiparty elections for the highest office, Electoral Authoritarian regimes institute the concept of popular consent, even as they subvert it in practice" ([13], p. 12). In 1992, the candidate of the main opposition SDF party John Fru Ndi is widely believed to have won the presidential elections, however, the results was declared in favour of the incumbent President Paul Biya by the Supreme Court.

Fourthly, the political system in Cameroon is minimally open i.e. the opposition is not subject to massive repression as was the case during autocratic rule. In fact citizens are actively courted by the governing and opposition parties for votes because they are viewed as the "arbiters of last instance in the electoral arena." However, when things turn sour particularly when election results are contested, opposition parties and civil society in general regularly experience repressive treatment by the police and military who are used in selective and intermittent ways by government officials as "the arbiters of the last instance

The notion of electoral authoritarianism as applied in the context of Cameroon therefore involves the claim that the regime of Paul Biya is 'neither democratic nor democratising but plainly authoritarian albeit in ways that depart from the forms of authoritarian rule' that obtained prior to the democratic wind of change in the 1990s [13, 20]. Unlike during authoritarianism where everything boiled down to one-man rule, power in the context of multipartism ideally involves redistribution among those with vested interests such as 'political parties and other interest groups. Multipartism also involves 'institutionalised uncertainty' and the presence of opposition parties that plays the role of 'the

However, the financial, logistical and organisational limitations of the opposition in Cameroon prevent it from effectively challenging and defeating the governing CPDM through the ballot box. These and other shortcoming also inhibits the opposition from playing the role of 'the conscience of the executive.' On its part the executive in seeking to stamp-out any prospects of 'institutional uncertainty' in Cameroon governs the country through controlled multiparty elections whereby the CPDM party mobilises voters, and the state apparatus controls the elections. This Janus-faced action is designed to establish a pluralistic system that appears democratic on the surface, but is in reality is falling back to the one man-rule typical

Source: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD). <http://minatd.cm/

index.php/en/en/annuaires/partis-politiques?view=partis> accessed July 2018.

at the last count. Curiously, some of the mushroom political

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

over the electoral arena" ([13], p. 19).

conscience of the executive' [21].

of authoritarian regimes.

parties numbering 3053

#### *The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

Secondly, elections in Cameroon are minimally pluralistic. Following the return to multipartism in the 1990s, opposition parties were allowed to openly compete for elective posts. However, in its design to fractionalise the opposition and weaken its strength, the government sponsored the formation of mushroom parties most of them allied to the governing CPDM. The result is the proliferation of opposition political parties numbering 3053 at the last count. Curiously, some of the mushroom political parties are made up of members of a nuclear family i.e. husband, wife and sometimes the children. The electoral system in Cameroon is therefore set-up such that the "hegemonic party permit other parties to exist but only as second class licensed parties thus foreclosing the possibility of an electoral loss by the hegemonic party" ([19], p. 34).

Thirdly, the political landscape in Cameroon is minimally competitive, i.e. the horde of opposition parties, while denied victory, is allowed to win votes and seats. On the one hand, opposition parties have minuscule representation in the National Assembly, Senate and Municipal Councils; some councils are controlled by the opposition, some are shared with other political parties including the CPDM, but majority of the Municipal Councils are controlled by the CPDM party. On the other hand, "by establishing multiparty elections for the highest office, Electoral Authoritarian regimes institute the concept of popular consent, even as they subvert it in practice" ([13], p. 12). In 1992, the candidate of the main opposition SDF party John Fru Ndi is widely believed to have won the presidential elections, however, the results was declared in favour of the incumbent President Paul Biya by the Supreme Court.

Fourthly, the political system in Cameroon is minimally open i.e. the opposition is not subject to massive repression as was the case during autocratic rule. In fact citizens are actively courted by the governing and opposition parties for votes because they are viewed as the "arbiters of last instance in the electoral arena." However, when things turn sour particularly when election results are contested, opposition parties and civil society in general regularly experience repressive treatment by the police and military who are used in selective and intermittent ways by government officials as "the arbiters of the last instance over the electoral arena" ([13], p. 19).

The notion of electoral authoritarianism as applied in the context of Cameroon therefore involves the claim that the regime of Paul Biya is 'neither democratic nor democratising but plainly authoritarian albeit in ways that depart from the forms of authoritarian rule' that obtained prior to the democratic wind of change in the 1990s [13, 20]. Unlike during authoritarianism where everything boiled down to one-man rule, power in the context of multipartism ideally involves redistribution among those with vested interests such as 'political parties and other interest groups. Multipartism also involves 'institutionalised uncertainty' and the presence of opposition parties that plays the role of 'the conscience of the executive' [21].

However, the financial, logistical and organisational limitations of the opposition in Cameroon prevent it from effectively challenging and defeating the governing CPDM through the ballot box. These and other shortcoming also inhibits the opposition from playing the role of 'the conscience of the executive.' On its part the executive in seeking to stamp-out any prospects of 'institutional uncertainty' in Cameroon governs the country through controlled multiparty elections whereby the CPDM party mobilises voters, and the state apparatus controls the elections. This Janus-faced action is designed to establish a pluralistic system that appears democratic on the surface, but is in reality is falling back to the one man-rule typical of authoritarian regimes.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

**3. Conceptualising the electoral arena in Cameroon**

*controlling the chief executive office" ([17], p. 246).*

*"For all their structural reliance on ruling parties, electoral authoritarian regimes often show personalistic traits and become deeply identified with the person* 

In Cameroon, key members of the governing elite including the head of state have been shuttling around the state apparatus since independence in the 1960s [18]. The longevity of the Biya regime in power cannot be attributed to democratic credentials; rather it is linked to the ability to effectively subvert electoral rules. In fact, the government of Cameroon is renowned for having developed what is termed a 'sophisticated rigging machinery' that has ensured continued electoral success for the governing CPDM party in national and local elections since the 1990s [9, 12, 18]. Other than the change of leadership in 1982, there has not been any fundamental alteration in the system of governance in place since independence and reunification in 1960 and 1961 respectively. Effectively, it is a one man show where everything boils down to the head of state. He is the president of the ruling party, the head of the executive, the judiciary, and legislative branches of government; he is also the head of the army, police and other security services. The system is structured such that every action from the highest to the lowest echelons of the state apparatus is carried out on 'the very high instructions of the head of state.' Paradoxically, when things go wrong, everyone else but the head of state is blamed. Meanwhile, the year 2018 is very important in the electoral calendar of

Cameroon. A total of 4 elections are scheduled to take place, these include Senatorial, Municipal, Legislative and Presidential elections. Senatorial elections were held in March, 2018 for 70 out of 100 senators, the remaining 30 were appointed by the head of state. The governing CPDM party won 63 seats while the main opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) party won 7 seats. Going by the results of the senatorial elections, and given that the CPDM party has won every election in the decades following the return to multiparty politics in Cameroon in the 1990s, there is every

Having weathered the political liberalisation of the 1990s without a significant threat to its hegemony, the governing elite in Cameroon skilfully combined authoritarian methods and democratic practices to maintain political power. In fact, the present electoral system is skewed in favour of the governing CPDM party which very often enters the electoral arena as strong contenders with very high chances of emerging victorious. This is due largely to what many observers have described as 'electoral hold-up,' specifically because the electoral timetable in Cameroon is the sole prerogative of the President who is often referred to by state media as the 'sole

reason to believe that the party is bound to maintain its tight grip in power.

The capacity of the electoral system to sustain the governing regime in Cameroon, and the quest by the government to maintain the status-quo makes it difficult to envisage any meaningful electoral reform that could lay the groundwork for free, fair, transparent and credible elections in the near future. Therefore, the electoral system in Cameroon could be described as a form of electoral authoritarianism whereby the 'regime fills executive and legislative offices by elections, but the ruling party never loses elections' ([13], p. 10). Electoral Authoritarianism in this context denotes a number of conditions, the first being that elections in Cameroon are broadly inclusive. In principle municipal, legislative and presidential elections are held regularly, under universal suffrage. The only exception being the Senatorial elections which as noted earlier is held under a two tier system i.e. indirect elections whereby 70% of senators are elected by municipal councillors and the remaining

**28**

master of the electoral calendar.'

30% are appointed by the head of state.

<sup>3</sup> Source: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD). <http://minatd.cm/ index.php/en/en/annuaires/partis-politiques?view=partis> accessed July 2018.

Despite its overwhelming dominance of the electoral arena in Cameroon, the governing CPDM party sometimes faces unprecedented internal challenges that threaten to tear it apart. The next section of this chapter will analyse a number of events that have occurred over the years between the political elite and grassroots militants. These events play out the vision of the chairman of the party and head of state to create a 'strong democracy whereby the elite lead the masses' [22]. Whereas actualising this 'vision' might have gone hitch-free during the monolithic era, it is proving to be much more challenging in the era of electoral authoritarianism.

#### **4. Selection of candidates for the municipal and legislative elections**

Following the official announcement of elections, the national president of the CPDM party issued a circular letter addressed to all militants in which he outlined the mode of selection of candidates to represent the party in the polls. The circular letter cited Article 23 of the constitution and basic texts of the party, which states that "the nomination of CPDM candidates for the parliamentary and municipal elections will revert to the Central Committee" [23].

The president's instructions to party militants were not very different from what obtained during authoritarian rule. Then, the political elite did not fail to remind militants seeking elective posts that their 'investiture' was thanks to the magnanimity of the party leadership and its illustrious leader, and not to their own efforts or the support of grassroots militants [18]. The circular goes on to state that selection by the central committee of the party will be done in conjunction with militants at the base, and will aim to encourage the emergence of honest and dynamic men, women and youths who can effectively convey to the grassroots the president's vision of transforming Cameroon into an emerging country by the year 2035. The circular ended with a call for the selection of candidates to be conducted in a spirit of openness, political maturity, objectivity and the quest for consensus [23].

Consensus was therefore a key element in the strategy of the CPDM party to mobilise grassroots militants for the 2013 municipal and legislative elections. As is the norm, the party hierarchy dispatched teams throughout the country to oversee the 'investiture' process. These teams were divided into two; one in charge of the municipal elections and another in charge of the legislative elections. Each team included; a president, a vice president, a coordinator, a chargés des missions and members [23]. In the run-up to the elections there was a beehive of activities throughout the country by party officials, administrative authorities and grassroots militants aimed at cementing the dominance of the CPDM party in the electoral arena in Cameroon.

#### **4.1 Pre-electoral manoeuvrings**

According to electoral regulations in Cameroon, the convening of the electoral corps effectively puts an end to registration of voters on the electoral list. This also marks the start of overt and covert manoeuvres by political parties to select or elect candidates to compete for various posts. Whereas campaigning officially kicks off 2 weeks before polling day, many observers felt the governing CPDM was already on the campaign trail as far back as 19th May 2011 [24].

In his traditional annual speech delivered on the eve of national day celebrated every 20th May, the head of state announced the issuing of national identity (ID) cards cost-free to all eligible Cameroonians. Similarly, he ordered the extension of the process a couple of months later in his usual end of year speech for 2012 [25]. The official reason advanced for this move was to accelerate the registration of

**31**

voter cards.

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

voters on the electoral lists, which was lagging ever since the process was announced in early 2011. In Cameroon, the ID card not only contains details (name, sex, date of birth, place of birth, etc.) of the bearer, but is essential for all official transactions. It is scrupulously controlled by security forces stationed along make-shift check-

The ID card is also an essential document for voter registration. However, inscription into the electoral register has been on a steady decline in the decades following the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s. Voter apathy is largely blamed on electoral fraud and a general feeling among many Cameroonians that the electoral process is fundamentally flawed to the point where change cannot be effected via the ballot box. As noted earlier, the current regime is a prolongation of the autocratic system created by Ahidjo which his successor Paul Biya has skilfully

Over the years, many citizens have lost faith in the electoral system because it is perceived to be incapable of effecting genuine political renewal in Cameroon. The 1992 presidential election was therefore seen as the turning point when Cameroonians, according to ([27], p. 114), "were made to understand that democracy is not necessarily having as president the person the majority wants." This assessment is based on the widely held view that that election was won by the opposition SDF leader, John Fru Ndi, but declared in favour of the CPDM by the

The then president of the Supreme Court was infamously associated with the phrase my hands are tied by the law. The inability of the Supreme Court to declare what many believed was the 'right result' i.e. the defeat of the incumbent head of state generated public uproar which degenerated into civil disobedience and violence for several years. The action by the Supreme Court of Cameroon not only bounded the fate of millions of Cameroonians to a regime that many people genuinely wanted out of power, but also strengthened the argument by ([29], p. 12), that "in the face of the global resurgence of democracy, [authoritarian regimes] are bending democracy into a strategy of power, using elections to disempower the

On another note, the press widely reported how thousands of uncollected ID cards littered Police stations throughout the country. One newspaper reported how the Divisional Officer (DO) of Ebolowa II in the president's home Region took it upon himself to tour villages in his administrative unit, personally handing out ID cards that had been abandoned in the South Regional capital, Ebolowa [30]. As the elections approached, other Divisional Officer's shifted gear from distributing ID cards to distributing voter cards. In Mbankomo, barely weeks after his installation, I accompanied the Divisional Officer on the last leg of his tour of the subdivision. In his address to the population, the DO performed the role of civil administrator and party official. He called on CPDM militants to be united and vigilant, and to massively register and turn out in throve on polling day to vote for their party and President Paul Biya. His official delegation also included workers from the local branch of the election management body Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), and during each stopover their functions was to identify registered voters and hand out

State officials were not the only ones concerned about potential voter apathy. In a note addressed to party militants, the Secretary General of the CPDM appointed high-powered delegations of party bigwigs to the 10 regions of the country to sensitise and mobilise grassroots militants to collect voter cards [31]. This came

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

points on roads throughout the country.

adapted into a 'democratic' environment [26].

Supreme Court [28].

people. And they are succeeding."

**4.2 Meddling elite and discontented militants**

#### *The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

voters on the electoral lists, which was lagging ever since the process was announced in early 2011. In Cameroon, the ID card not only contains details (name, sex, date of birth, place of birth, etc.) of the bearer, but is essential for all official transactions. It is scrupulously controlled by security forces stationed along make-shift checkpoints on roads throughout the country.

The ID card is also an essential document for voter registration. However, inscription into the electoral register has been on a steady decline in the decades following the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s. Voter apathy is largely blamed on electoral fraud and a general feeling among many Cameroonians that the electoral process is fundamentally flawed to the point where change cannot be effected via the ballot box. As noted earlier, the current regime is a prolongation of the autocratic system created by Ahidjo which his successor Paul Biya has skilfully adapted into a 'democratic' environment [26].

Over the years, many citizens have lost faith in the electoral system because it is perceived to be incapable of effecting genuine political renewal in Cameroon. The 1992 presidential election was therefore seen as the turning point when Cameroonians, according to ([27], p. 114), "were made to understand that democracy is not necessarily having as president the person the majority wants." This assessment is based on the widely held view that that election was won by the opposition SDF leader, John Fru Ndi, but declared in favour of the CPDM by the Supreme Court [28].

The then president of the Supreme Court was infamously associated with the phrase my hands are tied by the law. The inability of the Supreme Court to declare what many believed was the 'right result' i.e. the defeat of the incumbent head of state generated public uproar which degenerated into civil disobedience and violence for several years. The action by the Supreme Court of Cameroon not only bounded the fate of millions of Cameroonians to a regime that many people genuinely wanted out of power, but also strengthened the argument by ([29], p. 12), that "in the face of the global resurgence of democracy, [authoritarian regimes] are bending democracy into a strategy of power, using elections to disempower the people. And they are succeeding."

On another note, the press widely reported how thousands of uncollected ID cards littered Police stations throughout the country. One newspaper reported how the Divisional Officer (DO) of Ebolowa II in the president's home Region took it upon himself to tour villages in his administrative unit, personally handing out ID cards that had been abandoned in the South Regional capital, Ebolowa [30]. As the elections approached, other Divisional Officer's shifted gear from distributing ID cards to distributing voter cards. In Mbankomo, barely weeks after his installation, I accompanied the Divisional Officer on the last leg of his tour of the subdivision. In his address to the population, the DO performed the role of civil administrator and party official. He called on CPDM militants to be united and vigilant, and to massively register and turn out in throve on polling day to vote for their party and President Paul Biya. His official delegation also included workers from the local branch of the election management body Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), and during each stopover their functions was to identify registered voters and hand out voter cards.

#### **4.2 Meddling elite and discontented militants**

State officials were not the only ones concerned about potential voter apathy. In a note addressed to party militants, the Secretary General of the CPDM appointed high-powered delegations of party bigwigs to the 10 regions of the country to sensitise and mobilise grassroots militants to collect voter cards [31]. This came

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

authoritarianism.

Despite its overwhelming dominance of the electoral arena in Cameroon, the governing CPDM party sometimes faces unprecedented internal challenges that threaten to tear it apart. The next section of this chapter will analyse a number of events that have occurred over the years between the political elite and grassroots militants. These events play out the vision of the chairman of the party and head of state to create a 'strong democracy whereby the elite lead the masses' [22]. Whereas actualising this 'vision' might have gone hitch-free during the monolithic era, it is proving to be much more challenging in the era of electoral

**4. Selection of candidates for the municipal and legislative elections**

elections will revert to the Central Committee" [23].

Following the official announcement of elections, the national president of the CPDM party issued a circular letter addressed to all militants in which he outlined the mode of selection of candidates to represent the party in the polls. The circular letter cited Article 23 of the constitution and basic texts of the party, which states that "the nomination of CPDM candidates for the parliamentary and municipal

The president's instructions to party militants were not very different from what obtained during authoritarian rule. Then, the political elite did not fail to remind militants seeking elective posts that their 'investiture' was thanks to the magnanimity of the party leadership and its illustrious leader, and not to their own efforts or the support of grassroots militants [18]. The circular goes on to state that selection by the central committee of the party will be done in conjunction with militants at the base, and will aim to encourage the emergence of honest and dynamic men, women and youths who can effectively convey to the grassroots the president's vision of transforming Cameroon into an emerging country by the year 2035. The circular ended with a call for the selection of candidates to be conducted in a spirit of openness, political maturity, objectivity and the quest for consensus [23]. Consensus was therefore a key element in the strategy of the CPDM party to mobilise grassroots militants for the 2013 municipal and legislative elections. As is the norm, the party hierarchy dispatched teams throughout the country to oversee the 'investiture' process. These teams were divided into two; one in charge of the municipal elections and another in charge of the legislative elections. Each team included; a president, a vice president, a coordinator, a chargés des missions and members [23]. In the run-up to the elections there was a beehive of activities throughout the country by party officials, administrative authorities and grassroots militants aimed at cementing the dominance of the CPDM party in the electoral

According to electoral regulations in Cameroon, the convening of the electoral corps effectively puts an end to registration of voters on the electoral list. This also marks the start of overt and covert manoeuvres by political parties to select or elect candidates to compete for various posts. Whereas campaigning officially kicks off 2 weeks before polling day, many observers felt the governing CPDM was already on

In his traditional annual speech delivered on the eve of national day celebrated every 20th May, the head of state announced the issuing of national identity (ID) cards cost-free to all eligible Cameroonians. Similarly, he ordered the extension of the process a couple of months later in his usual end of year speech for 2012 [25]. The official reason advanced for this move was to accelerate the registration of

**30**

arena in Cameroon.

**4.1 Pre-electoral manoeuvrings**

the campaign trail as far back as 19th May 2011 [24].

in the wake of a bruising investiture process in which many grassroots militants were enraged by the actions of some party bosses. The deployment of senior party officials to the field was not unusual. It is common practice during electoral periods in Cameroon for the public administration, i.e. ministerial departments and other public institutions to be emptied of high ranking bureaucrats. These public servants are deployed to their home regions and villages to campaign for the CPDM party. Dispatching such high level delegations on the eve of the 2013 municipal-legislative elections came amid generalised paranoia among party hierarchy over threats of widespread dissent and a possible party split. Despite official denials, it was hard to conceal the fact that these officials were sent out to persuade grassroots supporters enraged by what many perceived as treachery by elements of the political elite not to desert the party. Acrimony was so widespread that some loyal militants who lost out in the process not only pointed accusing fingers at party hierarchy but also expressed fears for the future of the party [16].

In Mbankomo, the outgoing Mayor sought the party endorsement to run for a second term, but his re-election bid was met with stiff opposition from another faction of the party that was favoured by the political elite. According to an informant and member of the outgoing Mayor's team the delegation sent-out by the CPDM party hierarchy to conduct the investiture process in Mbankomo was biased in favour of the Mayors opponents and connived with them to frustrate his re-election bid. As discussed below, the candidates list of the outgoing Mayor was thrown out in a rather ignominious manner. Despite this setback, my informant remained steadfast to the party and reaffirmed his undying loyalty to party president, Paul Biya. He however, expressed fears that enraged grassroots militants might transform anger into negative votes which might cause the party to lose the elections in Mbankomo and other places around the country where other militants were equally aggrieved.4 These issues will be examined in greater details subsequently in the meantime I will examine how the investiture process played out in Mbankomo.

#### **4.3 Contesting the party elite**

On 11 July 2013, the CPDM central committee delegation responsible for the supervision of the investiture process in the Mefou and Akono Division descended on Mbankomo, where a meeting was scheduled in the municipal hall. This delegation was based at the divisional headquarters in Ngoumou, whence they visited other towns in the area for similar purposes. Initially slated for 13:00 the meeting finally started around 15:00. The meeting began with presentation of the rules for the investiture of candidates by the party chairman Paul Biya. The militants present were cautioned that aspirants whose documents did not conform to the electoral code would be disqualified by ELECAM. They were also reminded that candidates would be selected via consensus lists, and the list will be forwarded to the party headquarters for approval. The militants present in the hall were asked not to pay the requisite caution fee of CFA 50.000 FRS, but to have the cash handy and wait for the appropriate moment [16].

Following this brief presentation, the floor was opened for questions and comments. The first question from the audience sought clarification from the party delegates about who was authorised to sign the attestation of residence; this person was confused about the competent authority to legalise this document. One of the party delegates responded that under normal circumstances it was the responsibility of the legal department, but due to time constraints the signature of the Divisional Officer was sufficient. The next issue was the competent authority to legalise a

**33**

other places around the country.

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

birth certificate, the answer to that question was that it is the responsibility of the Mayor or civil status registrar of the person's place of birth. This was confirmed by the outgoing Mayor who expressed his availability to sign birth certificates without

Following the outgoing Mayors clarification, the head of the central committee delegation stated that their job was to collect the list of ruling party candidates aspiring to contest the municipal elections for Mbankomo council. He added that the party chairman had recommended investiture of candidates via consensus lists. He also stated that the most important part of the meeting was to select the 25 members that will contest the municipal elections in Mbankomo on the CPDM party list. Another member of the central committee delegation stated that prior to their arrival in Mbankomo they were informed that preparatory meetings had taken place between different branches of the party (Youth, Women and Men) in Mbankomo [16]. These meetings were held in the presence of a party elite and former Minister, however, the stakeholders failed to come up with a consensus. As a result, three of the four list leaders agreed to fuse into one, but the outgoing Mayor

Following this remark, the chairman opened the floor for comments, questions and clarifications. The first hand that went up was that of the youth-wing or Y-CPDM president. He argued that not every local stakeholder was invited to the meetings at the former Minister's residence and as a result it was unfair to hold decisions taken at that meeting to be representative of everyone's opinions. He added that any consensus list should take into consideration the hard work of local CPDM youths who had made lots of sacrifices to represent the party at public events in Mbankomo, despite limited support from the political elite. The next person to take the floor was a man describing himself as a member of the local elite. He said the groundwork for the meeting was laid in the presence of everyone and that the statement by the Y-CPDM president was simply absurd. He added that everything had been sorted out and that the Y-CPDM president had to accept things the way they are. He then urged the Y-CPDM president to lay his political ambitions aside

Responding to the controversy, the head of the central committee delegation stated that the party hierarchy sent them out to seek unity and solidarity among grassroots militants and to oversee the selection of 25 people who will continue the achievements of the outgoing team. He added that the central committee will have the final say about who is elected as councillor and will designate a Mayor among them, but for the moment the objective was to designate candidates that will form the consensus list. He also reminded the audience that Mbankomo Council requires 25 not 50 councillors and that the numbers cannot be multiplied to suit personal ambitions [16]. At that point, a suggestion was made that the contending list leaders select two people each to enter into a conclave and come up with a consensus list. Both sides accepted the suggestions and the meeting was suspended to reconvene at 18:00.

I returned to the venue at 18:00, but it seemed the 'white smoke' from the conclave that will signify 'consensus' between the factions vying for the CPDM candidates list for the municipal elections in Mbankomo was a long way off. While waiting for the contending parties to return, I struck-up conversations with some Y-CPDM militants who like me were watching the events unfold from the side-lines. The content of our conversations centred on the municipal and legislative elections in general and the reasons for the turmoil within the CPDM in Mbankomo and

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

declined to associate with them.

and join him to work for the unity of the party [16].

**4.4 Intractable conclave: conversations on the sidelines**

delay [16].

<sup>4</sup> Personal communication 07/12/2013.

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

birth certificate, the answer to that question was that it is the responsibility of the Mayor or civil status registrar of the person's place of birth. This was confirmed by the outgoing Mayor who expressed his availability to sign birth certificates without delay [16].

Following the outgoing Mayors clarification, the head of the central committee delegation stated that their job was to collect the list of ruling party candidates aspiring to contest the municipal elections for Mbankomo council. He added that the party chairman had recommended investiture of candidates via consensus lists. He also stated that the most important part of the meeting was to select the 25 members that will contest the municipal elections in Mbankomo on the CPDM party list. Another member of the central committee delegation stated that prior to their arrival in Mbankomo they were informed that preparatory meetings had taken place between different branches of the party (Youth, Women and Men) in Mbankomo [16]. These meetings were held in the presence of a party elite and former Minister, however, the stakeholders failed to come up with a consensus. As a result, three of the four list leaders agreed to fuse into one, but the outgoing Mayor declined to associate with them.

Following this remark, the chairman opened the floor for comments, questions and clarifications. The first hand that went up was that of the youth-wing or Y-CPDM president. He argued that not every local stakeholder was invited to the meetings at the former Minister's residence and as a result it was unfair to hold decisions taken at that meeting to be representative of everyone's opinions. He added that any consensus list should take into consideration the hard work of local CPDM youths who had made lots of sacrifices to represent the party at public events in Mbankomo, despite limited support from the political elite. The next person to take the floor was a man describing himself as a member of the local elite. He said the groundwork for the meeting was laid in the presence of everyone and that the statement by the Y-CPDM president was simply absurd. He added that everything had been sorted out and that the Y-CPDM president had to accept things the way they are. He then urged the Y-CPDM president to lay his political ambitions aside and join him to work for the unity of the party [16].

Responding to the controversy, the head of the central committee delegation stated that the party hierarchy sent them out to seek unity and solidarity among grassroots militants and to oversee the selection of 25 people who will continue the achievements of the outgoing team. He added that the central committee will have the final say about who is elected as councillor and will designate a Mayor among them, but for the moment the objective was to designate candidates that will form the consensus list. He also reminded the audience that Mbankomo Council requires 25 not 50 councillors and that the numbers cannot be multiplied to suit personal ambitions [16]. At that point, a suggestion was made that the contending list leaders select two people each to enter into a conclave and come up with a consensus list. Both sides accepted the suggestions and the meeting was suspended to reconvene at 18:00.

#### **4.4 Intractable conclave: conversations on the sidelines**

I returned to the venue at 18:00, but it seemed the 'white smoke' from the conclave that will signify 'consensus' between the factions vying for the CPDM candidates list for the municipal elections in Mbankomo was a long way off. While waiting for the contending parties to return, I struck-up conversations with some Y-CPDM militants who like me were watching the events unfold from the side-lines. The content of our conversations centred on the municipal and legislative elections in general and the reasons for the turmoil within the CPDM in Mbankomo and other places around the country.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

in the wake of a bruising investiture process in which many grassroots militants were enraged by the actions of some party bosses. The deployment of senior party officials to the field was not unusual. It is common practice during electoral periods in Cameroon for the public administration, i.e. ministerial departments and other public institutions to be emptied of high ranking bureaucrats. These public servants are deployed to their home regions and villages to campaign for the CPDM party. Dispatching such high level delegations on the eve of the 2013 municipal-legislative elections came amid generalised paranoia among party hierarchy over threats of widespread dissent and a possible party split. Despite official denials, it was hard to conceal the fact that these officials were sent out to persuade grassroots supporters enraged by what many perceived as treachery by elements of the political elite not to desert the party. Acrimony was so widespread that some loyal militants who lost out in the process not only pointed accusing fingers at party hierarchy but also expressed fears for the future of the party [16].

In Mbankomo, the outgoing Mayor sought the party endorsement to run for a second term, but his re-election bid was met with stiff opposition from another faction of the party that was favoured by the political elite. According to an informant and member of the outgoing Mayor's team the delegation sent-out by the CPDM party hierarchy to conduct the investiture process in Mbankomo was biased in favour of the Mayors opponents and connived with them to frustrate his re-election bid. As discussed below, the candidates list of the outgoing Mayor was thrown out in a rather ignominious manner. Despite this setback, my informant remained steadfast to the party and reaffirmed his undying loyalty to party president, Paul Biya. He however, expressed fears that enraged grassroots militants might transform anger into negative votes which might cause the party to lose the elections in Mbankomo and other places around the country where other militants were equally

These issues will be examined in greater details subsequently in the

meantime I will examine how the investiture process played out in Mbankomo.

On 11 July 2013, the CPDM central committee delegation responsible for the supervision of the investiture process in the Mefou and Akono Division descended on Mbankomo, where a meeting was scheduled in the municipal hall. This delegation was based at the divisional headquarters in Ngoumou, whence they visited other towns in the area for similar purposes. Initially slated for 13:00 the meeting finally started around 15:00. The meeting began with presentation of the rules for the investiture of candidates by the party chairman Paul Biya. The militants present were cautioned that aspirants whose documents did not conform to the electoral code would be disqualified by ELECAM. They were also reminded that candidates would be selected via consensus lists, and the list will be forwarded to the party headquarters for approval. The militants present in the hall were asked not to pay the requisite caution fee of CFA 50.000 FRS, but to have the cash handy and wait

Following this brief presentation, the floor was opened for questions and comments. The first question from the audience sought clarification from the party delegates about who was authorised to sign the attestation of residence; this person was confused about the competent authority to legalise this document. One of the party delegates responded that under normal circumstances it was the responsibility of the legal department, but due to time constraints the signature of the Divisional Officer was sufficient. The next issue was the competent authority to legalise a

**32**

4

aggrieved.4

**4.3 Contesting the party elite**

for the appropriate moment [16].

Personal communication 07/12/2013.

One of my interlocutors, Onana (pseudonym), started off by listing the two main criteria for choosing candidates for the party, i.e. election via party primaries or selection most often by consensus. In 2007, the CPDM party designated its candidates via party primaries; however, in 2013, it was done by consensus. As discussed later, the choice of consensus was designed to avoid a repetition of events of 2007 where prominent members of the political elite were rejected by grassroots militants in several constituencies around the country.

According to this contact, selection of the 25 candidates for the 2007 municipal elections on the CPDM ticket began at the base, during which each tribal grouping comes up with its quota of candidates to make up the sociological components of the area. According to Section 151 (3) of the electoral code, "each list shall take into consideration the various sociological components of the constituency concerned…"5 However, this law is quite vague about the meaning of the term 'sociological components,' leaving it to various interpretations. This hazy clause is often employed by electoral officials mainly as a justification for rejecting opposition party lists. Following the selection of candidates at the base, the list was forwarded to party headquarters, where it was discovered that names of many grassroots militants were removed, and replaced with the names of members of the political elite who mainly reside in the capital Yaoundé roughly 20 km away. This, according to Onana did not go down well with the grassroots militants and almost 'led to a revolution in Mbankomo.'<sup>6</sup>

Many people were angry at what they perceived as deliberate undermining of their choice of candidates by the party hierarchy in favour of those who are merely seeking their selfish political gains. Moreover, he went on, these outsiders only think of the grassroots during election periods and, after securing their mandates, quickly scarper off and no-one hears from them until elections are approaching again. Frustrated by such disingenuous practices, grassroots militants in 2007 decided to teach them a lesson during the party primaries.

Another interlocutor, Abogo (pseudonym), was frustrated that other councils in the area had already selected candidates, but Mbankomo always had problems because of meddling by the political elite. Pressed on the issue of meddling by the elites, he cited the furore that ensued following nationwide primaries held by the CPDM in the lead-up to the 2007 municipal elections. Back then, many prominent members of the CPDM party were humiliated and denied electoral franchise by grassroots militants. A notorious casualty of this revolt was the president of the National Assembly who in 2007 lost the party primaries in his local constituency in the Mayo Sava Division in the Extreme North of Cameroon, but was reinstated by the CPDM central committee. According to Abogo, the actions of the Central Committee greatly infuriated grassroots militants who viewed it as a blatant violation of their right to select credible people to represent them in key state and local institutions. He expressed fears that a similar action might be in the offing in Mbankomo.7

Unlike in 2007, Cameroon's political calendar in 2013 featured municipal, legislative and senatorial elections. The creation of the Senate in 2013 wrought fundamental changes in the hierarchical order at the helm of the state. According to Article 6(4) of the constitution, the President of the Senate is next in line to fill the post of head of state, albeit temporarily in case of a vacancy for reasons of illness, death or resignation. Prior to the creation of the Senate in 2013, the role of 'constitutional successor' was the preserve of the president of the National Assembly who in terms of state protocol was the second personality

**35**

incomplete.

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

of the state. This constitutional provision allows the individuals at the helm of the state during this delicate period to preside over the transition, but not put themselves up for election; however, they could prove to be a vital king-maker. With the advent of the Senate as the upper chamber of parliament, the role of temporary successor automatically shifted from the National Assembly to the

Considering that he was rejected by grassroots militants in 2007 but forcefully reinstated by party hierarchy. The President of the National Assembly viewed the Senate as an opportunity to move away from direct dependence on grassroots militants and 'universal suffrage' for his political survival to an 'electoral college' made up of a selected number of municipal councillors. He also probably conjectured the opportunity of being appointed by the head of state into the Senate, because, as noted earlier, the latter has the constitutional prerogative to appoint 30 out of 100 senators that make up the upper chamber of the Cameroon legislature. In a desperate but ultimately futile attempt to maintain himself as the second personality of the State, 'the MP from the Mayo Sava constituency sought to be a candidate for the Upper House. Unfortunately, his application was rejected by the CPDM party's national nomination commission presided over by the party chairman President

It should be noted that in Cameroon, senators are voted by an electoral college that consists of Municipal Councillors. As a result, it is much easier for the political elite (as was observed during the 2013 and 2018 senatorial elections) to sway this select group of voters with financial and other material incentives to vote for them, than is the case with the mass of ordinary voters. In the months after the rejection of his senatorial bid, there was wild speculation that the president of the National Assembly whose mandate as parliamentarian was nearing its end was heading towards political oblivion. However, just like the mythical phoenix, his candidacy was endorsed by the party hierarchy, and he rose from the ashes to stage a remarkable comeback following the 2013 legislative elections, this time around in the position of the 3rd personality of the state and president of the National Assembly, a post he held since 1992. The next section of this chapter returns to the intractable conclave in Mbankomo to examine the outcome of the clash between the contend-

The conclave to select a consensus list to run for the CPDM party in Mbankomo ended late at night. The day after I met a key informant who took part in the meeting to find out whether the leaders of the conflicting factions finally agreed to form a consensus list. This informant had on previous occasions informed me that he was the chairman of the economic and social affairs committee of the outgoing council team and a close personal friend of the Mayor whose re-election bid was the subject

I was very keen to know what the shape of the consensus list looked like. He began by stating the obvious, that the meeting stretched beyond the time allotted and after intense negotiations both sides were still unable to reach a compromise. As a result the incumbent Mayor's list of which he was a member and that supported by the political elite was forwarded that same night to the departmental committee in Ngoumou. At Ngoumou, the incumbent Mayor's list was rejected for being

*"How is this possible…? He fumed, how can people collect a file containing documents that were complete and verified and by the time it gets to its destination it is* 

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

ing lists for the 2013 municipal elections.

**4.5 Investiture without consensus**

of a robust challenge.

Senate President [16].

Paul Biya [32].'

<sup>5</sup> Law No. 2012/001 of 19 April 2012, on the Electoral Code of Cameroon.

<sup>6</sup> Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.

<sup>7</sup> Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.

#### *The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

of the state. This constitutional provision allows the individuals at the helm of the state during this delicate period to preside over the transition, but not put themselves up for election; however, they could prove to be a vital king-maker. With the advent of the Senate as the upper chamber of parliament, the role of temporary successor automatically shifted from the National Assembly to the Senate President [16].

Considering that he was rejected by grassroots militants in 2007 but forcefully reinstated by party hierarchy. The President of the National Assembly viewed the Senate as an opportunity to move away from direct dependence on grassroots militants and 'universal suffrage' for his political survival to an 'electoral college' made up of a selected number of municipal councillors. He also probably conjectured the opportunity of being appointed by the head of state into the Senate, because, as noted earlier, the latter has the constitutional prerogative to appoint 30 out of 100 senators that make up the upper chamber of the Cameroon legislature. In a desperate but ultimately futile attempt to maintain himself as the second personality of the State, 'the MP from the Mayo Sava constituency sought to be a candidate for the Upper House. Unfortunately, his application was rejected by the CPDM party's national nomination commission presided over by the party chairman President Paul Biya [32].'

It should be noted that in Cameroon, senators are voted by an electoral college that consists of Municipal Councillors. As a result, it is much easier for the political elite (as was observed during the 2013 and 2018 senatorial elections) to sway this select group of voters with financial and other material incentives to vote for them, than is the case with the mass of ordinary voters. In the months after the rejection of his senatorial bid, there was wild speculation that the president of the National Assembly whose mandate as parliamentarian was nearing its end was heading towards political oblivion. However, just like the mythical phoenix, his candidacy was endorsed by the party hierarchy, and he rose from the ashes to stage a remarkable comeback following the 2013 legislative elections, this time around in the position of the 3rd personality of the state and president of the National Assembly, a post he held since 1992. The next section of this chapter returns to the intractable conclave in Mbankomo to examine the outcome of the clash between the contending lists for the 2013 municipal elections.

#### **4.5 Investiture without consensus**

The conclave to select a consensus list to run for the CPDM party in Mbankomo ended late at night. The day after I met a key informant who took part in the meeting to find out whether the leaders of the conflicting factions finally agreed to form a consensus list. This informant had on previous occasions informed me that he was the chairman of the economic and social affairs committee of the outgoing council team and a close personal friend of the Mayor whose re-election bid was the subject of a robust challenge.

I was very keen to know what the shape of the consensus list looked like. He began by stating the obvious, that the meeting stretched beyond the time allotted and after intense negotiations both sides were still unable to reach a compromise. As a result the incumbent Mayor's list of which he was a member and that supported by the political elite was forwarded that same night to the departmental committee in Ngoumou. At Ngoumou, the incumbent Mayor's list was rejected for being incomplete.

*"How is this possible…? He fumed, how can people collect a file containing documents that were complete and verified and by the time it gets to its destination it is* 

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

Mbankomo.'<sup>6</sup>

Mbankomo.7

One of my interlocutors, Onana (pseudonym), started off by listing the two main criteria for choosing candidates for the party, i.e. election via party primaries or selection most often by consensus. In 2007, the CPDM party designated its candidates via party primaries; however, in 2013, it was done by consensus. As discussed later, the choice of consensus was designed to avoid a repetition of events of 2007 where prominent members of the political elite were rejected by grassroots

According to this contact, selection of the 25 candidates for the 2007 municipal elections on the CPDM ticket began at the base, during which each tribal grouping comes up with its quota of candidates to make up the sociological components of the area. According to Section 151 (3) of the electoral code, "each list shall take into consideration the various sociological components of the constituency concerned…"5 However, this law is quite vague about the meaning of the term 'sociological components,' leaving it to various interpretations. This hazy clause is often employed by electoral officials mainly as a justification for rejecting opposition party lists. Following the selection of candidates at the base, the list was forwarded to party headquarters, where it was discovered that names of many grassroots militants were removed, and replaced with the names of members of the political elite who mainly reside in the capital Yaoundé roughly 20 km away. This, according to Onana did not go down well with the grassroots militants and almost 'led to a revolution in

Many people were angry at what they perceived as deliberate undermining of their choice of candidates by the party hierarchy in favour of those who are merely seeking their selfish political gains. Moreover, he went on, these outsiders only think of the grassroots during election periods and, after securing their mandates, quickly scarper off and no-one hears from them until elections are approaching again. Frustrated by such disingenuous practices, grassroots militants in 2007

Another interlocutor, Abogo (pseudonym), was frustrated that other councils in the area had already selected candidates, but Mbankomo always had problems because of meddling by the political elite. Pressed on the issue of meddling by the elites, he cited the furore that ensued following nationwide primaries held by the CPDM in the lead-up to the 2007 municipal elections. Back then, many prominent members of the CPDM party were humiliated and denied electoral franchise by grassroots militants. A notorious casualty of this revolt was the president of the National Assembly who in 2007 lost the party primaries in his local constituency in the Mayo Sava Division in the Extreme North of Cameroon, but was reinstated by the CPDM central committee. According to Abogo, the actions of the Central Committee greatly infuriated grassroots militants who viewed it as a blatant violation of their right to select credible people to represent them in key state and local institutions. He expressed fears that a similar action might be in the offing in

Unlike in 2007, Cameroon's political calendar in 2013 featured municipal, legislative and senatorial elections. The creation of the Senate in 2013 wrought fundamental changes in the hierarchical order at the helm of the state. According to Article 6(4) of the constitution, the President of the Senate is next in line to fill the post of head of state, albeit temporarily in case of a vacancy for reasons of illness, death or resignation. Prior to the creation of the Senate in 2013, the role of 'constitutional successor' was the preserve of the president of the National Assembly who in terms of state protocol was the second personality

militants in several constituencies around the country.

decided to teach them a lesson during the party primaries.

Law No. 2012/001 of 19 April 2012, on the Electoral Code of Cameroon.

Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.

Personal Communication, 11 July 2013.

**34**

5

6

7

*found to be incomplete? How is this possible…? You see how these people (referring to the central committee delegation) are rubbing us of our rights as militants of the CPDM. I could tell that something was fishy in the hall when he (the head of the central committee delegation) publicly asked both sides not to pay the caution money of 50,000, despite being aware that the fees for the opposition list had been paid."8*

Asked how the plot unfolded, he said a lot of underhand tactics were employed by their adversaries in the dying minutes of the conclave. Thus, before it was decided that two lists be forwarded to the departmental committee, both sides almost reached consensus, but discussion broke down over who would head such a list. When it finally arrived in Ngoumou, on examining the Mayor's list, it turned out to be incomplete because some documents were missing, while those of his opponents were complete. Days after the deadline for submission of documents to ELECAM had passed, the missing documents were discovered on the grounds of a secondary school in Yaoundé several kilometres from where they were deposited [16].

Not everybody was aggrieved by the outcome of the investiture process in Mbankomo. Another informant and CPDM militant I regularly interacted with during my research and who described himself as a supporter of the political elite was not very surprised at the outcome of the conclave. He said everyone from the Divisional Officer, former and current Ministers and other personalities who hail from the area were not very fond of the outgoing Mayor and his team, but could not really do much to get rid of them until the appropriate moment. He described the Mayor as an 'absentee landlord' who only appears when important personalities are visiting town or during public events such as the installation of the DO. He equally accused the mayor of abandoning the day-to-day management of the council to some auxiliaries and other individuals who were in his private pay. For example, he had a personal assistant who was not a member of the council staff and this person was not accountable to anybody except the Mayor. According to my informant, the Mayor also failed to delegate responsibility to his two official deputies as required by law.9

#### **5. Conclusion**

It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that 2018 is an important electoral year in Cameroon. In line with the initial calendar, legislative, municipal, senatorial and presidential elections were scheduled to take place. Senatorial elections were held in March 2018, municipal and legislative elections were postponed for 1 year, and presidential elections are scheduled for October 2018. The official reasons for the postponement of the legislative and municipal elections was a 'congested electoral calendar' however, many observers believe that the worsening security situation in the English-speaking North-West and South-West Regions makes it almost impossible for the conduct of elections based on universal suffrage. The question that therefore arises is why organise presidential elections which like the legislative and municipal elections that was postponed, are based on universal suffrage, even though, chances are the elections will not be effective in the two English Speaking areas of the country that are seeking to breakaway?

**37**

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

That question like the issue of organising elections at a period when the country is embroiled in a profound crisis that is fast degenerating into a civil war remains contentious. However, many supporters of the governing regime argue that there is no clause in the electoral code that stipulates that presidential elections or indeed any elections must be held throughout the national territory for the results to be deemed legitimate. This therefore brings up another question. Why postpone the legislative and municipal elections and proceed with presidential elections if the legitimacy of the process is not affected by the prospects of elections not being organised throughout the country? The answer to this question not only lies in the intricacies of the crisis situation in the North-West and South-West Regions of the country, but also in the believe by the electoral authoritarian regime in Cameroon that its legitimacy is not necessarily based on the results of elections but on its

The announcement of the presidential elections generated a lot of debate and also speculation about whether the 84 years old President who has been in power for 36 years will run again. On the one hand, some opposition figures and civil society expressed the wish that the incumbent Paul Biya should not seek another 7 years mandate, but should instead organise free, fair transparent elections that will lead to a smooth transition of power. On the other hand, militants of the CPDM boasted that Biya is their 'natural candidate' and were in no doubt about the eventuality of him declaring his candidature before the expiration of the deadline, something he

In October 2018 therefore, Cameroonians will be heading to the polls to elect a new president. This will be exactly 26 years from the highly acrimonious 1992 presidential elections. Just like on previous occasions, the opposition is heading in to the electoral arena in dispersed ranks which greatly reduces its chances of electoral success. Not wanting to leave anything to chance, the government on its part has

Following internecine squabbles within three opposition parties, the Interior Minister issued a communique which surreptitiously declared three individuals that were contesting the leadership of their respective parties as the only individuals officially authorised to represent the said parties. Few days after the minister's communique, the 'officially recognised' party leaders in collaboration with a horde of other politicians came out publicly to pledge their support for the candidacy of President Paul Biya. Curiously, one of the deposed party leaders who sought to counter the minister's declaration was denied the authorization to organise a public event, and on the day of the said event, the party headquarters was surrounded by heavily armed policemen and soldiers bent on ensuring the event did not happen.

Data collection for this chapter was conducted in Mbankomo in 2013 during fieldwork for my PhD. My doctoral studies were funded by the Human Economy Research Program at the University of Pretoria, with the financial support from the Andrew J. Mellon Foundation. I was also a recipient of the Next Generation Social

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

eventually did via twitter on Friday 13th July 2018.

Science in Africa Doctoral completion Fellowship.

embarked on the usual divide, weaken and conquer strategy.

manipulative skills.

**Acknowledgements**

**Conflict of interest**

There is no conflict of Interest.

<sup>8</sup> Personal communication 07/12/2013.

<sup>9</sup> Personal communication 07/13/2013.

#### *The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

That question like the issue of organising elections at a period when the country is embroiled in a profound crisis that is fast degenerating into a civil war remains contentious. However, many supporters of the governing regime argue that there is no clause in the electoral code that stipulates that presidential elections or indeed any elections must be held throughout the national territory for the results to be deemed legitimate. This therefore brings up another question. Why postpone the legislative and municipal elections and proceed with presidential elections if the legitimacy of the process is not affected by the prospects of elections not being organised throughout the country? The answer to this question not only lies in the intricacies of the crisis situation in the North-West and South-West Regions of the country, but also in the believe by the electoral authoritarian regime in Cameroon that its legitimacy is not necessarily based on the results of elections but on its manipulative skills.

The announcement of the presidential elections generated a lot of debate and also speculation about whether the 84 years old President who has been in power for 36 years will run again. On the one hand, some opposition figures and civil society expressed the wish that the incumbent Paul Biya should not seek another 7 years mandate, but should instead organise free, fair transparent elections that will lead to a smooth transition of power. On the other hand, militants of the CPDM boasted that Biya is their 'natural candidate' and were in no doubt about the eventuality of him declaring his candidature before the expiration of the deadline, something he eventually did via twitter on Friday 13th July 2018.

In October 2018 therefore, Cameroonians will be heading to the polls to elect a new president. This will be exactly 26 years from the highly acrimonious 1992 presidential elections. Just like on previous occasions, the opposition is heading in to the electoral arena in dispersed ranks which greatly reduces its chances of electoral success. Not wanting to leave anything to chance, the government on its part has embarked on the usual divide, weaken and conquer strategy.

Following internecine squabbles within three opposition parties, the Interior Minister issued a communique which surreptitiously declared three individuals that were contesting the leadership of their respective parties as the only individuals officially authorised to represent the said parties. Few days after the minister's communique, the 'officially recognised' party leaders in collaboration with a horde of other politicians came out publicly to pledge their support for the candidacy of President Paul Biya. Curiously, one of the deposed party leaders who sought to counter the minister's declaration was denied the authorization to organise a public event, and on the day of the said event, the party headquarters was surrounded by heavily armed policemen and soldiers bent on ensuring the event did not happen.

#### **Acknowledgements**

Data collection for this chapter was conducted in Mbankomo in 2013 during fieldwork for my PhD. My doctoral studies were funded by the Human Economy Research Program at the University of Pretoria, with the financial support from the Andrew J. Mellon Foundation. I was also a recipient of the Next Generation Social Science in Africa Doctoral completion Fellowship.

#### **Conflict of interest**

There is no conflict of Interest.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

were deposited [16].

by law.9

**5. Conclusion**

*found to be incomplete? How is this possible…? You see how these people (referring to the central committee delegation) are rubbing us of our rights as militants of the CPDM. I could tell that something was fishy in the hall when he (the head of the central committee delegation) publicly asked both sides not to pay the caution money of 50,000, despite being aware that the fees for the opposition list had been paid."8*

Asked how the plot unfolded, he said a lot of underhand tactics were employed

by their adversaries in the dying minutes of the conclave. Thus, before it was decided that two lists be forwarded to the departmental committee, both sides almost reached consensus, but discussion broke down over who would head such a list. When it finally arrived in Ngoumou, on examining the Mayor's list, it turned out to be incomplete because some documents were missing, while those of his opponents were complete. Days after the deadline for submission of documents to ELECAM had passed, the missing documents were discovered on the grounds of a secondary school in Yaoundé several kilometres from where they

Not everybody was aggrieved by the outcome of the investiture process in Mbankomo. Another informant and CPDM militant I regularly interacted with during my research and who described himself as a supporter of the political elite was not very surprised at the outcome of the conclave. He said everyone from the Divisional Officer, former and current Ministers and other personalities who hail from the area were not very fond of the outgoing Mayor and his team, but could not really do much to get rid of them until the appropriate moment. He described the Mayor as an 'absentee landlord' who only appears when important personalities are visiting town or during public events such as the installation of the DO. He equally accused the mayor of abandoning the day-to-day management of the council to some auxiliaries and other individuals who were in his private pay. For example, he had a personal assistant who was not a member of the council staff and this person was not accountable to anybody except the Mayor. According to my informant, the Mayor also failed to delegate responsibility to his two official deputies as required

It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that 2018 is an important electoral year in Cameroon. In line with the initial calendar, legislative, municipal, senatorial and presidential elections were scheduled to take place. Senatorial elections were held in March 2018, municipal and legislative elections were postponed for 1 year, and presidential elections are scheduled for October 2018. The official reasons for the postponement of the legislative and municipal elections was a 'congested electoral calendar' however, many observers believe that the worsening security situation in the English-speaking North-West and South-West Regions makes it almost impossible for the conduct of elections based on universal suffrage. The question that therefore arises is why organise presidential elections which like the legislative and municipal elections that was postponed, are based on universal suffrage, even though, chances are the elections will not be effective in the two English Speaking areas of the country that are seeking to

**36**

8

9

breakaway?

Personal communication 07/12/2013.

Personal communication 07/13/2013.

### **Notes/thanks/other declarations**

My PhD thesis was published in a book by Langaa RPCIG in 2016. Some elements of this chapter were extracted from the book, with the expressed approval of the publishers and presented here after major revision.

### **Author details**

Numvi Gwaibi Freelance Writer, Bamenda, North-West Region, Cameroon

\*Address all correspondence to: numviv@gmail.com

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

**39**

*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing…*

[9] Takougang J, Krieger M. African State and Society in the 1990s; Cameroon's Political Crossroads. Oxford: Westview Press; 1998

[10] Bayart J-F. The State in Africa; Politics of the Belley. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2009

[11] Anyang-Nyong'o P. Discourses on democracy in Africa. In: Chole E, Ibrahim J, editors. Democratisation in Africa; Problems and Prospects. Dakar:

CODESRIA; 1995. pp. 29-42

[12] Konings P, Nyamnjoh FB. Negotiating an Anglophone Identity; A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill

[13] Schedler A. The logic of electoral authoritarianism. In: Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

[14] van de Walle N. Economic reform and the consolidation of democracy in Africa. In: Ottaway M, editor. Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; 1997. pp. 14-37

[15] Gwaibi NW. 'Wrath from the gods': Traditional institutions and electoral politics in Bali. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 2015;**52**(3):324-345

[16] Gwaibi N. Decentralisation and Community Participation: Local Development and Municipal Politics in Cameroon. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG;

[17] Schedler A. The Politics of

Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013

Inc; 2006. pp. 1-23

NV; 2003

2016

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

[1] Mozaffar S, Schedler A. The comparative study of electoral governance. International Political Science Review. 2002;**23**:5-27

[2] Anyangwe C. Manumission from black-on-black colonialism; sovereign statehood for the British Southern Cameroons. In: Ndlovu-Gatsheni SJ, Mhlanga B, editors. Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa; The 'Northern Problem' and Ethno-Futures. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa; 2013.

[3] Chiabi EM. Redressing regional imbalance in Cameroon: The lessons from the past. In: Nkwi P, Nyamnjoh FB, editors. Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and Uncertain Future. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG; 2011. pp. 41-58

[4] Forje JW. Developing viable

[5] Jua N. The mortuary sphere, privilege and the politics of belonging in contemporary Cameroon. Africa.

[6] Konings P. Agro-industry and regionalism in the South West province of Cameroon during the national economic and political crisis. In: Nkwi PN, Nyamnjoh FB, editors. Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future. Bamenda: Langaa

RPCIG; 2011. pp. 505-533

[8] Delancy MW. Cameroon;

Westview Press Inc; 1989

[7] Eyongetah T, Brian R. A History of the Cameroon. London: Longman; 1974

Dependence & Independence. Colorado:

2005;**75**(3):325-355

independent institutions for political and economic development in Cameroon. Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights. 2008;**2**(2):31-43

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*The Electoral Cycle and Grassroots Realities in Cameroon: The Omnipresent, Overbearing… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80966*

#### **References**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

**Notes/thanks/other declarations**

the publishers and presented here after major revision.

My PhD thesis was published in a book by Langaa RPCIG in 2016. Some elements of this chapter were extracted from the book, with the expressed approval of

**38**

**Author details**

Numvi Gwaibi

provided the original work is properly cited.

Freelance Writer, Bamenda, North-West Region, Cameroon

\*Address all correspondence to: numviv@gmail.com

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

[1] Mozaffar S, Schedler A. The comparative study of electoral governance. International Political Science Review. 2002;**23**:5-27

[2] Anyangwe C. Manumission from black-on-black colonialism; sovereign statehood for the British Southern Cameroons. In: Ndlovu-Gatsheni SJ, Mhlanga B, editors. Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa; The 'Northern Problem' and Ethno-Futures. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa; 2013. pp. 163-184

[3] Chiabi EM. Redressing regional imbalance in Cameroon: The lessons from the past. In: Nkwi P, Nyamnjoh FB, editors. Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and Uncertain Future. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG; 2011. pp. 41-58

[4] Forje JW. Developing viable independent institutions for political and economic development in Cameroon. Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights. 2008;**2**(2):31-43

[5] Jua N. The mortuary sphere, privilege and the politics of belonging in contemporary Cameroon. Africa. 2005;**75**(3):325-355

[6] Konings P. Agro-industry and regionalism in the South West province of Cameroon during the national economic and political crisis. In: Nkwi PN, Nyamnjoh FB, editors. Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG; 2011. pp. 505-533

[7] Eyongetah T, Brian R. A History of the Cameroon. London: Longman; 1974

[8] Delancy MW. Cameroon; Dependence & Independence. Colorado: Westview Press Inc; 1989

[9] Takougang J, Krieger M. African State and Society in the 1990s; Cameroon's Political Crossroads. Oxford: Westview Press; 1998

[10] Bayart J-F. The State in Africa; Politics of the Belley. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2009

[11] Anyang-Nyong'o P. Discourses on democracy in Africa. In: Chole E, Ibrahim J, editors. Democratisation in Africa; Problems and Prospects. Dakar: CODESRIA; 1995. pp. 29-42

[12] Konings P, Nyamnjoh FB. Negotiating an Anglophone Identity; A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV; 2003

[13] Schedler A. The logic of electoral authoritarianism. In: Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Inc; 2006. pp. 1-23

[14] van de Walle N. Economic reform and the consolidation of democracy in Africa. In: Ottaway M, editor. Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; 1997. pp. 14-37

[15] Gwaibi NW. 'Wrath from the gods': Traditional institutions and electoral politics in Bali. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 2015;**52**(3):324-345

[16] Gwaibi N. Decentralisation and Community Participation: Local Development and Municipal Politics in Cameroon. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG; 2016

[17] Schedler A. The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013

[18] Geschiere P. The Perils of Belonging; Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press; 2009

[19] Munk GL. Drawing boundaries: How to craft intermediate regime categories. In: Schedler A, editor. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc; 2006. pp. 27-54

[20] Southall R. Democracy in Africa: Moving Beyond a Difficult Legacy. Cape Town: HSRC Publishers; 2003

[21] Ottaway M. From political opening to democratization. In: Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.; 1997. pp. 1-13

[22] Biya P. Communal Liberalism. London: Macmillan Publishers; 1987

[23] RDPC-CPDM. Circulaire N°03/ RDPC/PN DU 05 Juillet 2013. [Online] 07 05, 2013. [Cited: 11 11, 2014.] http://www.rdpcpdm.cm/en/content/ circulaire-n%C2%B003-rdpcpn-du05 juillet-2013-le-pr%C3%A9sidentnational

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[25] Le Messager. Gratuité des CNI…: La grande ruée dans les commissariats de Douala. [Online] 01 08, 2013. [Cited: 10 12, 2014.] http://cameroon-info.net/ stories/0,40139,@,gratuite-des-cni-lagrande-ruee-dans-les-commissariatsde-douala.html

[26] Mentan T. Cameroon: A flawed transition to democracy. In: Gros J-G, editor. Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa. Westport: Greenwood Press; 1998. pp. 41-58

[27] Nyamnjoh FB. Cameroon: A country united by ethnic ambition and difference. African Affairs. 1999;**98**(390):101-118

[28] Nkwi PN, Socpa A. Ethnicity and party politics in Cameroon: The politics of divide and rule. In: Nkwi PN, Nyamnjoh FB, editors. Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG; 2011. pp. 247-268

[29] Ake C. Is Africa Democratizing? CASS Monograph No. 5. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited; 1996

[30] L'Actu. Listes électorales: Le Sous-préfet d'EboIowa II opte pour des inscriptions forcées dans les villages. [Online] 01 09, 2013. http://www.cameroon-info.net/ stories/0,40206,@,listes-electorales-lesous-prefet-d-eboiowa-ii-opte-pourdes-inscriptions-forcee.html [Cited: May 19, 2014]

[31] RDPC-CPDM. Elections Législatives et Municipales du 30 Septembre 2013. Investiture des candidats du RDPC. Commissions Régionales de Supervision. Yaoundé, le 7 Juillet 2013. [Online] 07 7, 2013. http:// www.rdpcpdm.cm/content/electionsl%C3%A9gislatives-et-municipales-du-30-septembre-2013 [Cited: November 11, 2014]

[32] La Nouvelle. Septentrion: Cavaye perd définitivement le Nord. [Online] 03 25, 2013. http://www.cameroon-info. net/stories/0,43384,@,septentrioncavaye-perd-definitivement-le-nord. html [Cited: November 12, 2014]

**41**

**Chapter 3**

*Mike Omilusi*

**Abstract**

State (Nigeria)

voting behavior in an electoral contest.

**1. Introduction**

Electoral Behavior and Politics

of *Stomach Infrastructure* in Ekiti

Ekiti State is one of the most literate communities in Nigeria and adjudged to be a politically sophisticated entity within the federation. Expectedly, its politics becomes a research interest for political observers, policymakers and scholars alike. However, the 2014 governorship poll and 2015 general elections in the state present some socio-political paradoxes, contradictions and nuances that need an analytical examination. What could have propelled a state rich in human capital to prefer the choice of "stomach infrastructure" over sustainable development? What could have precipitated the rejection of a manifesto-driven candidature in preference for "I will put smile on your faces" sloganeering? This study interrogates the philosophical and socio-political underpinnings that may have shaped the political behavior of Ekiti people within the context of its larger Yoruba nation in particular and Nigeria in general. It also examines the nexus between performance in government—as a political investment—and electoral rewards by the voters. It employs the concept of prebendalism to further examine the interplay between politics of the belly and

**Keywords:** electoral behavior, stomach infrastructure, politics, election, democracy

Whether held under authoritarian or democratic regimes, elections have a ritualistic aspect. Elections and the campaigns preceding them are dramatic events that are accompanied by rallies, banners, posters, headlines and television coverage, all of which call attention to the importance of participation in the event. Whatever the peculiar national, regional, or local variations, elections are events that, by arousing emotions and channeling them towards collective symbols, break the monotony of daily life and focus attention on the common fate [1]. Competitive, free and fair elections are the sine qua non of democracy. However, other institutional components of good governance are also much more likely to be vibrant and effective in a democracy than it would be in a non-democracy. These include an independent judiciary with a clear and predictable rule of law; an elected parliament that is autonomous and capable of checking and scrutinizing the executive branch of government; and a civil society with the freedom and resources to monitor, evaluate, question and participate in the making and implementation of policy [2]. In reality, Almami [3] submits that Africa's experience with electoral democracy has been mixed: progress has been made but challenges remain. The various

#### **Chapter 3**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

Press; 2009

2006. pp. 27-54

national

Autochthony, Citizenship, and

[18] Geschiere P. The Perils of Belonging;

Twentieth-Century Africa. Westport: Greenwood Press; 1998. pp. 41-58

[27] Nyamnjoh FB. Cameroon: A country united by ethnic ambition and difference. African Affairs.

[28] Nkwi PN, Socpa A. Ethnicity and party politics in Cameroon: The politics of divide and rule. In: Nkwi PN, Nyamnjoh FB, editors. Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG; 2011.

[29] Ake C. Is Africa Democratizing? CASS Monograph No. 5. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited; 1996

[30] L'Actu. Listes électorales: Le Sous-préfet d'EboIowa II opte pour des inscriptions forcées dans les villages. [Online] 01 09, 2013. http://www.cameroon-info.net/ stories/0,40206,@,listes-electorales-lesous-prefet-d-eboiowa-ii-opte-pourdes-inscriptions-forcee.html [Cited:

[31] RDPC-CPDM. Elections Législatives

[32] La Nouvelle. Septentrion: Cavaye perd définitivement le Nord. [Online] 03 25, 2013. http://www.cameroon-info. net/stories/0,43384,@,septentrioncavaye-perd-definitivement-le-nord. html [Cited: November 12, 2014]

et Municipales du 30 Septembre 2013. Investiture des candidats du RDPC. Commissions Régionales de Supervision. Yaoundé, le 7 Juillet 2013. [Online] 07 7, 2013. http:// www.rdpcpdm.cm/content/electionsl%C3%A9gislatives-et-municipales-du-30-septembre-2013 [Cited: November

1999;**98**(390):101-118

pp. 247-268

May 19, 2014]

11, 2014]

Exclusion in Africa and Europe. Chicago and London: University of Chicago

[19] Munk GL. Drawing boundaries: How to craft intermediate regime categories. In: Schedler A, editor. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc;

[20] Southall R. Democracy in Africa: Moving Beyond a Difficult Legacy. Cape

[21] Ottaway M. From political opening to democratization. In: Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.; 1997. pp. 1-13

[22] Biya P. Communal Liberalism. London: Macmillan Publishers; 1987

[23] RDPC-CPDM. Circulaire N°03/ RDPC/PN DU 05 Juillet 2013. [Online] 07 05, 2013. [Cited: 11 11, 2014.] http://www.rdpcpdm.cm/en/content/ circulaire-n%C2%B003-rdpcpn-du05 juillet-2013-le-pr%C3%A9sident-

[24] Mutations. Présidentielle 2011: Paul Biya décrète la gratuité de la carte d'identité. [Online] 05 23, 2011. [Cited: 11 2, 2014.] http://www.cameroon-info. net/stories/0,28752,@,presidentielle-2011-paul-biya-decrete-la-gratuite-de-

[25] Le Messager. Gratuité des CNI…: La grande ruée dans les commissariats de Douala. [Online] 01 08, 2013. [Cited: 10 12, 2014.] http://cameroon-info.net/ stories/0,40139,@,gratuite-des-cni-lagrande-ruee-dans-les-commissariats-

[26] Mentan T. Cameroon: A flawed transition to democracy. In: Gros J-G, editor. Democratization in Late

la-carte-d-identite.html

de-douala.html

Town: HSRC Publishers; 2003

**40**

## Electoral Behavior and Politics of *Stomach Infrastructure* in Ekiti State (Nigeria)

*Mike Omilusi*

#### **Abstract**

Ekiti State is one of the most literate communities in Nigeria and adjudged to be a politically sophisticated entity within the federation. Expectedly, its politics becomes a research interest for political observers, policymakers and scholars alike. However, the 2014 governorship poll and 2015 general elections in the state present some socio-political paradoxes, contradictions and nuances that need an analytical examination. What could have propelled a state rich in human capital to prefer the choice of "stomach infrastructure" over sustainable development? What could have precipitated the rejection of a manifesto-driven candidature in preference for "I will put smile on your faces" sloganeering? This study interrogates the philosophical and socio-political underpinnings that may have shaped the political behavior of Ekiti people within the context of its larger Yoruba nation in particular and Nigeria in general. It also examines the nexus between performance in government—as a political investment—and electoral rewards by the voters. It employs the concept of prebendalism to further examine the interplay between politics of the belly and voting behavior in an electoral contest.

**Keywords:** electoral behavior, stomach infrastructure, politics, election, democracy

#### **1. Introduction**

Whether held under authoritarian or democratic regimes, elections have a ritualistic aspect. Elections and the campaigns preceding them are dramatic events that are accompanied by rallies, banners, posters, headlines and television coverage, all of which call attention to the importance of participation in the event. Whatever the peculiar national, regional, or local variations, elections are events that, by arousing emotions and channeling them towards collective symbols, break the monotony of daily life and focus attention on the common fate [1]. Competitive, free and fair elections are the sine qua non of democracy. However, other institutional components of good governance are also much more likely to be vibrant and effective in a democracy than it would be in a non-democracy. These include an independent judiciary with a clear and predictable rule of law; an elected parliament that is autonomous and capable of checking and scrutinizing the executive branch of government; and a civil society with the freedom and resources to monitor, evaluate, question and participate in the making and implementation of policy [2].

In reality, Almami [3] submits that Africa's experience with electoral democracy has been mixed: progress has been made but challenges remain. The various

#### *Elections - A Global Perspective*

elections in the past several years—from Kenya and Zimbabwe to Ghana and Sierra Leone—have become historical landmarks for different reasons, varying drastically in their conduct and outcome. This mix of electoral experiences has generated considerable debate and passion on the subject of transparent, free and fair electoral processes among election stakeholders, especially as democratic progress itself can come with further challenges; as more elections are held, and as these elections become increasingly competitive, one-party and military regimes face potentially destabilizing challenges that could increase the risk of fraud and violence.

Electoral democracy is based on the principle of free and open competition among alternative political parties, representing divergent policy programs, groups of candidates and sectors of society, so that citizens have a range of genuine choices at the ballot box. If party organizations are unduly constrained, then this limits the ability of citizens to articulate their demands, express their preferences and hold rulers to account ([4]: 5). The electoral system of a country is the critical institution which shapes and influences the rules of political competition for state power because it determines what parties look like, who is represented in the legislature, how accountable these representatives are to the electorate and above all who governs. It is good to know that the way an electoral system operates determines the degree of public confidence and support for the democratic system itself. An electoral system regulates elections and other related activities ([5]: xviii).

In other words, the will of the people manifested in the election of their representatives elected in a free, fair, credible and transparent atmosphere constitutes the leitmotif of the democratic process. For democracy to thrive, therefore, there must be a level playing field for all contestants to public office. Furthermore, there must be fully operational variables such as a free press, independent judiciary and an informed and discerning electorate, capable of making rational choices among competing ideologies and candidates put before them by the various political parties [6].

For the 2014 governorship election in Ekiti State, a number of posers have been raised particularly in respect of the choice of the electorate among the major contestants: Does performance matter? If not, what matters? What does the Ekiti election tell us about the electorate? They voted their preference. Is their preference for Fayose or against Fayemi? Can preferences be wrong? Where preferences reflect interests, can interests be misinformed? Can we firmly declare that emotional appeal as against rational appeal took the better part of most voters in Ekiti or is it just a manifestation of politics of spite? Can this trend be a pointer that can reveal the specific type of appeal that can sway the mind and voting pattern of the average Nigerian voter? Can the voting pattern in the 2015 Ekiti elections be regarded as an affirmation of the 2014 governorship election?

#### **2. Background to Yoruba socio-political ecology**

The Yoruba of the South-West zone, according to Osuntokun [7], was the first to organize themselves against the British imperialism. In fact, as far back as the time of the governor-generalship of Sir Frederick Lugard, Lagosians under their leaders were involved in protesting against water rate imposed on them without consultation. In 1923 Dr. J.C. Vaughan and Ayo Williams with Ernest Ikoli organized the "Union of Young Nigerian" to demand a say in the affairs of the country. Later, J.C. Vaughan, H.O. Davies, Ernest Ikoli and Samuel Akinsanya formed the Lagos Youth Movement which metamorphosed into the Nigerian Youth Movement in the 1930s. Throughout the period of the dominance of the Nigerian Youth Movement and later the N.C.N.C., Yoruba people have always played politics of principle such as the abandonment of Samuel Akinsanya's candidacy of the legislative council

**43**

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

in preference for Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw which created a crisis when ironically the Yoruba was accused of tribalism for supporting an Ijaw man. When in 1951 Obafemi Awolowo formed the Action Group, Yoruba opinion continued to be divided, and the Yoruba did not see any reason for everyone to belong to the same party.

*Politics of principle continued to dominate Yorubaland through the period of the hegemony of the Action Group to the extent that the Action Group, a sitting government party lost the federal elections of 1954 to the N.C.N.C in the West. In other words, a pattern of political division and different approach to politics was firmly established in Yorubaland. So nothing really is new in the apparent lack of* 

The high level of civic consciousness in this zone translates into a community capacity to define the correct political line and to impose sanctions for political misbehavior. The zone is noted for imposing sanctions on politicians adjudged to have a broken rank with tradition or to have acted in a politically embarrassing manner in

While examining the fortunes of Nigeria and the destiny of Yoruba race with particular reference to leadership, Kolawole [8] submits that the liberal approach of the Yoruba to leadership should ordinarily be a commendable group attribute. But in a pluralist society like Nigeria where the principles of true federalism are in abeyance rather than observance, where ethnicism determines the color of relationship,

*The Yoruba people do not suffer fools gladly. Ironically, they do not follow a genius blindly either. They seem programmed to ask questions. The Yoruba people are the greatest critics of their Yoruba colleagues in power. It does not matter whether he is a President, Governor, Minister or Local Government Chairman. The most vociferous opposition to Awo's quest for national leadership came from a united* 

As noted by Sekoni [9], the response of the average Yoruba voter to election is determined by his view about the credibility of the electoral process. Yoruba people react to the organization of elections in three basic ways: spontaneous celebration after the result of voting is seen to reflect the choice voters believe they have made, immediate contestation or protest against an election they presume to have been rigged and delayed reaction to an election they also perceive to have been rigged. All of these three patterns of response on the day after an election have been witnessed in the region since the emergence of voting for political

The Yoruba value of plurality of perspective allows the average voter in the region to respect the principle of multiparty democracy. This principle also allows individuals to choose which of the parties is closest to his/her expectations in and from life. This explains why there are Yoruba people in all political parties. In the Yoruba region, twins belong to different or opposing political parties, the same way they may choose to belong to different religions. Siblings are happy with each other regardless of the parties or religions they espouse. But when an election leads to transferring the victory of candidate A to candidate B, friendship ends and tension emerges even among family members. While emphasizing the importance of the region to national politics, Akinnaso [10] observes that from the early days of independence, the South-West has always been the battleground zone in presidential politics. Saved for the unusual presidential election of 1999, in which former

relation to what is perceived as the collective interest of the Yoruba.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

Osuntokun submits, as a matter of fact that:

*political unity in Yorubaland today.*

it becomes a handicap. He notes further:

*though a minority Yoruba group.*

parties in the country.

#### *Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

in preference for Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw which created a crisis when ironically the Yoruba was accused of tribalism for supporting an Ijaw man. When in 1951 Obafemi Awolowo formed the Action Group, Yoruba opinion continued to be divided, and the Yoruba did not see any reason for everyone to belong to the same party. Osuntokun submits, as a matter of fact that:

*Politics of principle continued to dominate Yorubaland through the period of the hegemony of the Action Group to the extent that the Action Group, a sitting government party lost the federal elections of 1954 to the N.C.N.C in the West. In other words, a pattern of political division and different approach to politics was firmly established in Yorubaland. So nothing really is new in the apparent lack of political unity in Yorubaland today.*

The high level of civic consciousness in this zone translates into a community capacity to define the correct political line and to impose sanctions for political misbehavior. The zone is noted for imposing sanctions on politicians adjudged to have a broken rank with tradition or to have acted in a politically embarrassing manner in relation to what is perceived as the collective interest of the Yoruba.

While examining the fortunes of Nigeria and the destiny of Yoruba race with particular reference to leadership, Kolawole [8] submits that the liberal approach of the Yoruba to leadership should ordinarily be a commendable group attribute. But in a pluralist society like Nigeria where the principles of true federalism are in abeyance rather than observance, where ethnicism determines the color of relationship, it becomes a handicap. He notes further:

*The Yoruba people do not suffer fools gladly. Ironically, they do not follow a genius blindly either. They seem programmed to ask questions. The Yoruba people are the greatest critics of their Yoruba colleagues in power. It does not matter whether he is a President, Governor, Minister or Local Government Chairman. The most vociferous opposition to Awo's quest for national leadership came from a united though a minority Yoruba group.*

As noted by Sekoni [9], the response of the average Yoruba voter to election is determined by his view about the credibility of the electoral process. Yoruba people react to the organization of elections in three basic ways: spontaneous celebration after the result of voting is seen to reflect the choice voters believe they have made, immediate contestation or protest against an election they presume to have been rigged and delayed reaction to an election they also perceive to have been rigged. All of these three patterns of response on the day after an election have been witnessed in the region since the emergence of voting for political parties in the country.

The Yoruba value of plurality of perspective allows the average voter in the region to respect the principle of multiparty democracy. This principle also allows individuals to choose which of the parties is closest to his/her expectations in and from life. This explains why there are Yoruba people in all political parties. In the Yoruba region, twins belong to different or opposing political parties, the same way they may choose to belong to different religions. Siblings are happy with each other regardless of the parties or religions they espouse. But when an election leads to transferring the victory of candidate A to candidate B, friendship ends and tension emerges even among family members. While emphasizing the importance of the region to national politics, Akinnaso [10] observes that from the early days of independence, the South-West has always been the battleground zone in presidential politics. Saved for the unusual presidential election of 1999, in which former

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

elections in the past several years—from Kenya and Zimbabwe to Ghana and Sierra Leone—have become historical landmarks for different reasons, varying drastically in their conduct and outcome. This mix of electoral experiences has generated considerable debate and passion on the subject of transparent, free and fair electoral processes among election stakeholders, especially as democratic progress itself can come with further challenges; as more elections are held, and as these elections become increasingly competitive, one-party and military regimes face potentially

destabilizing challenges that could increase the risk of fraud and violence.

Electoral democracy is based on the principle of free and open competition among alternative political parties, representing divergent policy programs, groups of candidates and sectors of society, so that citizens have a range of genuine choices at the ballot box. If party organizations are unduly constrained, then this limits the ability of citizens to articulate their demands, express their preferences and hold rulers to account ([4]: 5). The electoral system of a country is the critical institution which shapes and influences the rules of political competition for state power because it determines what parties look like, who is represented in the legislature, how accountable these representatives are to the electorate and above all who governs. It is good to know that the way an electoral system operates determines the degree of public confidence and support for the democratic system itself. An electoral system regulates elections and other related activities ([5]: xviii).

In other words, the will of the people manifested in the election of their representatives elected in a free, fair, credible and transparent atmosphere constitutes the leitmotif of the democratic process. For democracy to thrive, therefore, there must be a level playing field for all contestants to public office. Furthermore, there must be fully operational variables such as a free press, independent judiciary and an informed and discerning electorate, capable of making rational choices among competing ideologies

For the 2014 governorship election in Ekiti State, a number of posers have been raised particularly in respect of the choice of the electorate among the major contestants: Does performance matter? If not, what matters? What does the Ekiti election tell us about the electorate? They voted their preference. Is their preference for Fayose or against Fayemi? Can preferences be wrong? Where preferences reflect interests, can interests be misinformed? Can we firmly declare that emotional appeal as against rational appeal took the better part of most voters in Ekiti or is it just a manifestation of politics of spite? Can this trend be a pointer that can reveal the specific type of appeal that can sway the mind and voting pattern of the average Nigerian voter? Can the voting pattern in the 2015 Ekiti elections be regarded as an

The Yoruba of the South-West zone, according to Osuntokun [7], was the first to organize themselves against the British imperialism. In fact, as far back as the time of the governor-generalship of Sir Frederick Lugard, Lagosians under their leaders were involved in protesting against water rate imposed on them without consultation. In 1923 Dr. J.C. Vaughan and Ayo Williams with Ernest Ikoli organized the "Union of Young Nigerian" to demand a say in the affairs of the country. Later, J.C. Vaughan, H.O. Davies, Ernest Ikoli and Samuel Akinsanya formed the Lagos Youth Movement which metamorphosed into the Nigerian Youth Movement in the 1930s. Throughout the period of the dominance of the Nigerian Youth Movement and later the N.C.N.C., Yoruba people have always played politics of principle such as the abandonment of Samuel Akinsanya's candidacy of the legislative council

and candidates put before them by the various political parties [6].

affirmation of the 2014 governorship election?

**2. Background to Yoruba socio-political ecology**

**42**

President Olusegun Obasanjo was the preferred candidate from the onset, no one has been elected prime minister or president without winning the South-West.

#### **3. Ekiti state creation and electoral democracy**

Ekiti State of Nigeria was created on October 1, 1996, along five other states by General Sani Abacha regime. The state which was carved out of the old Ondo State has its headquarters located in Ado Ekiti, and it covers 12 local government areas that made up the Ekiti Zone of the old Ondo State. However, Ekiti State on creation took off with 16 local government areas, having had additional 4 carved out of the old ones.

The creation of Ekiti State for the people of Ekiti in the realization of their selfdetermination aspiration was received with overwhelming joy, pomp and pageantry by indigenes at home and abroad. The initial impetus for the agitation of the creation of the state by Ekiti people was borne out of a feeling of neglect, marginalization, impoverishment and the desire and quest for self-assertion, autonomous development and meaningful participation in events and situations that directly impacted on their lives and destiny ([11]: xi).

They are culturally homogenous and they speak a dialect of Yoruba language known as Ekiti. The homogenous nature of Ekiti confers on the state some uniqueness among the states of the federation. Slight differences are noticeable in the Ekiti dialect of the Yoruba language spoken by the people. This is affected by their partial locations, especially the border communities to other states [12]. Some core values used to guide the conduct of the people before the horrendous nature of politics in this clime became a constant feature of their existence as once observed by Omilusi [13]:

*The state is a conglomeration of compact rural communities of distinct history where communalism operates in its real form. The people there live for the benefit of their neighbours and common good is the core value. Honour and integrity also play essential roles in every action and speech of that growing up boy or girl in the neighbourhood. Quest for materialism does not receive public attention. Rather, education is seen as an indisputable path to greater things in life… Admitted that the hooliganism of ethnic militias and incessant religious crises that characterize other parts of the country are not yet here with us, but the face of politics has horrendously changed to accommodate insecurity of life and property.*

Based on the 1999 constitution, promulgated as Decree 24 of 1999, Ekiti State was recognized as one of the states in the country for the conduct of the local government, state and federal elections. As at 2006, Ekiti State's population was 2,398,957. It has a land area of 6353 km2 , bigger than only four states: Imo, Abia, Anambra and Lagos. It is divided into 16 local government areas, 177 electoral wards, 26 state constituencies, 6 federal constituencies and 3 senatorial constituencies. The state is homogenous, the people being all of Ekiti-speaking Yoruba stock. With the voter registration conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the state has a population of 733,766 registered voters.

The quest for the creation of Ekiti was a long-cherished ambition of the people of the state. The excision of Ondo State (of which Ekiti was a part) from the Western State in 1976 was a half-way station on the road to the fulfilment of this dream, which came to reality in 1996. Thus, when the people of Ekiti State elected their governor and members of the State House of Assembly in 1999, they were hopeful that self-determination would result in rapid socio-economic development. The Alliance for Democracy won

**45**

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

the election of 1999 but lost the 2003 governorship election which brought in the

The outcome of the 2003 election, as well as the behavior of the people at the polls, can be attributed to a number of variables. One is the non-performance of the incumbent, which further impoverished the people. The peoples' disenchantment with the AD government was so much that not even the huge amount of money doled out days before the election could make them vote otherwise. Another variable is the desire of the people to align with the government at the federal level and the desire of President Obasanjo to "capture" his constituency (South-West zone). The people perceived the prolonged neglect of the state by successive administrations to be consequent upon their traditional and historic romance with the opposition party. As such, they believed that voting at the state level, a party that controls the center, would attract the much-needed "federal" presence ([15]: 134). However, the mainstream politics—aligning with the party at the center—introduced to the zone in the 2003 election (which actually led to five out of the six states in the zone being controlled by the People's Democratic Party) did not reflect any significant change in the living standard of the people ([16]: 231). It merely corroborates one empirical way of defining political parties in Nigeria *that they are vehicles for the expression and* 

However, the PDP's hold on power was tenuous because of internal party crises, which paved the way for the simultaneous impeachment of the governor and deputy governor on October 16, 2006. The political intrigues that culminated in their impeachment also resulted in the removal of the State Chief Judge, who was sidelined by the State House of Assembly to pave the way for the impeachments. The impeachment imbroglio led to a situation in which the Speaker of the State House of Assembly, the deputy governor and the governor simultaneously claimed to be the state's chief executive for a few days. Ostensibly because of the flawed process followed by the State House of Assembly in removing the executive and the multiple claimants to the political leadership of the state, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Ekiti State on October 19, 2006 and appointed retired General Tunji Olurin as a Sole Administrator for 6 months, during which

period he presided over the 2007 general elections in Ekiti State ([14]: 8).

INEC declared the PDP winner of the 2007 election in the state, but the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) went to the election tribunal to challenge the result. In August 2008, the election tribunal confirmed the PDP candidate, Eng. Segun Oni, as winner of the gubernatorial election. Dissatisfied, the ACN candidate, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, went to the appeal court which in February 2009, nullified Oni's election and ordered re-run elections within 90 days in 10 out of Ekiti's 16 local government areas (LGAs). Although INEC again declared that Oni had won the re-run elections conducted in April 2009, Fayemi disagreed and again went to the election tribunal. The tribunal dismissed his petition in May 2010, so he proceeded to the Court of Appeal, which declared him the winner of the election in October 2010. Dr. Fayemi thus assumed office as governor in October 2010 after a protracted judicial struggle. Ekiti State apart from being poor is predominantly an educationist and public service state, with majority of its people being teachers and public servants, who are basically salary earners. And going by the significant relevance of money to politics in Nigeria, these people find it difficult to invest such earnings in a "risky" venture like politics. What then obtains is that people outside the state with more financial clout and most often backed by a godfather but with less education usually find it easy gaining access into the political space of the state. Also, because of the pervasive nature of poverty in the state, it is not difficult for people who have money to induce or persuade the masses to vote for them, even when these people have nothing to offer. For instance, the victory of Niyi Adebayo over the likes of

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

*exercise of conflicts over the control of power*.

People's Democratic Party (PDP) to power ([14]: 8).

#### *Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

the election of 1999 but lost the 2003 governorship election which brought in the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to power ([14]: 8).

The outcome of the 2003 election, as well as the behavior of the people at the polls, can be attributed to a number of variables. One is the non-performance of the incumbent, which further impoverished the people. The peoples' disenchantment with the AD government was so much that not even the huge amount of money doled out days before the election could make them vote otherwise. Another variable is the desire of the people to align with the government at the federal level and the desire of President Obasanjo to "capture" his constituency (South-West zone). The people perceived the prolonged neglect of the state by successive administrations to be consequent upon their traditional and historic romance with the opposition party. As such, they believed that voting at the state level, a party that controls the center, would attract the much-needed "federal" presence ([15]: 134). However, the mainstream politics—aligning with the party at the center—introduced to the zone in the 2003 election (which actually led to five out of the six states in the zone being controlled by the People's Democratic Party) did not reflect any significant change in the living standard of the people ([16]: 231). It merely corroborates one empirical way of defining political parties in Nigeria *that they are vehicles for the expression and exercise of conflicts over the control of power*.

However, the PDP's hold on power was tenuous because of internal party crises, which paved the way for the simultaneous impeachment of the governor and deputy governor on October 16, 2006. The political intrigues that culminated in their impeachment also resulted in the removal of the State Chief Judge, who was sidelined by the State House of Assembly to pave the way for the impeachments. The impeachment imbroglio led to a situation in which the Speaker of the State House of Assembly, the deputy governor and the governor simultaneously claimed to be the state's chief executive for a few days. Ostensibly because of the flawed process followed by the State House of Assembly in removing the executive and the multiple claimants to the political leadership of the state, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Ekiti State on October 19, 2006 and appointed retired General Tunji Olurin as a Sole Administrator for 6 months, during which period he presided over the 2007 general elections in Ekiti State ([14]: 8).

INEC declared the PDP winner of the 2007 election in the state, but the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) went to the election tribunal to challenge the result. In August 2008, the election tribunal confirmed the PDP candidate, Eng. Segun Oni, as winner of the gubernatorial election. Dissatisfied, the ACN candidate, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, went to the appeal court which in February 2009, nullified Oni's election and ordered re-run elections within 90 days in 10 out of Ekiti's 16 local government areas (LGAs). Although INEC again declared that Oni had won the re-run elections conducted in April 2009, Fayemi disagreed and again went to the election tribunal. The tribunal dismissed his petition in May 2010, so he proceeded to the Court of Appeal, which declared him the winner of the election in October 2010. Dr. Fayemi thus assumed office as governor in October 2010 after a protracted judicial struggle.

Ekiti State apart from being poor is predominantly an educationist and public service state, with majority of its people being teachers and public servants, who are basically salary earners. And going by the significant relevance of money to politics in Nigeria, these people find it difficult to invest such earnings in a "risky" venture like politics. What then obtains is that people outside the state with more financial clout and most often backed by a godfather but with less education usually find it easy gaining access into the political space of the state. Also, because of the pervasive nature of poverty in the state, it is not difficult for people who have money to induce or persuade the masses to vote for them, even when these people have nothing to offer. For instance, the victory of Niyi Adebayo over the likes of

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

old ones.

[13]:

President Olusegun Obasanjo was the preferred candidate from the onset, no one has been elected prime minister or president without winning the South-West.

Ekiti State of Nigeria was created on October 1, 1996, along five other states by General Sani Abacha regime. The state which was carved out of the old Ondo State has its headquarters located in Ado Ekiti, and it covers 12 local government areas that made up the Ekiti Zone of the old Ondo State. However, Ekiti State on creation took off with 16 local government areas, having had additional 4 carved out of the

The creation of Ekiti State for the people of Ekiti in the realization of their selfdetermination aspiration was received with overwhelming joy, pomp and pageantry

They are culturally homogenous and they speak a dialect of Yoruba language known as Ekiti. The homogenous nature of Ekiti confers on the state some uniqueness among the states of the federation. Slight differences are noticeable in the Ekiti dialect of the Yoruba language spoken by the people. This is affected by their partial locations, especially the border communities to other states [12]. Some core values used to guide the conduct of the people before the horrendous nature of politics in this clime became a constant feature of their existence as once observed by Omilusi

*The state is a conglomeration of compact rural communities of distinct history where communalism operates in its real form. The people there live for the benefit of their neighbours and common good is the core value. Honour and integrity also play essential roles in every action and speech of that growing up boy or girl in the neighbourhood. Quest for materialism does not receive public attention. Rather, education is seen as an indisputable path to greater things in life… Admitted that the hooliganism of ethnic militias and incessant religious crises that characterize other parts of the country are not yet here with us, but the face of politics has hor-*

Based on the 1999 constitution, promulgated as Decree 24 of 1999, Ekiti State was recognized as one of the states in the country for the conduct of the local government, state and federal elections. As at 2006, Ekiti State's population was

The quest for the creation of Ekiti was a long-cherished ambition of the people of the state. The excision of Ondo State (of which Ekiti was a part) from the Western State in 1976 was a half-way station on the road to the fulfilment of this dream, which came to reality in 1996. Thus, when the people of Ekiti State elected their governor and members of the State House of Assembly in 1999, they were hopeful that self-determination would result in rapid socio-economic development. The Alliance for Democracy won

Anambra and Lagos. It is divided into 16 local government areas, 177 electoral wards, 26 state constituencies, 6 federal constituencies and 3 senatorial constituencies. The state is homogenous, the people being all of Ekiti-speaking Yoruba stock. With the voter registration conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the state has a population of 733,766 registered voters.

, bigger than only four states: Imo, Abia,

*rendously changed to accommodate insecurity of life and property.*

by indigenes at home and abroad. The initial impetus for the agitation of the creation of the state by Ekiti people was borne out of a feeling of neglect, marginalization, impoverishment and the desire and quest for self-assertion, autonomous development and meaningful participation in events and situations that directly

**3. Ekiti state creation and electoral democracy**

impacted on their lives and destiny ([11]: xi).

2,398,957. It has a land area of 6353 km2

**44**

S.K. Babalola in the AD primaries was believed by many in the state to have been facilitated by financial inducement of the delegates. As was the case in 1999, the PDP gubernatorial standard bearer—Ayo Fayose—was the least educated of all the candidates fielded by the major parties that contested the election.

Akinnaso [17–19] observes that Ekiti State politics has been typified by four main features, namely, cut-throat intraparty intrigues and interparty competition among contestants, imposition of candidates by political godfathers, physical and verbal thuggery and electoral malpractices. To be sure, none of these features is unique to Ekiti politics nor do they carry equal weight during each election cycle, but what is unique about Ekiti, according to him, is the conjunctive interplay among the features and the intensity of their manifestations. This was evident in 2007 when the governorship election led to a prolonged legal tussle, a controversial election re-run and the eventual reversal of Segun Oni's victory by the appeal court, which declared Dr. Kayode Fayemi of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria as the winner on October 15, 2010.

#### **4. The 2014 governorship election: Issues and perspectives**

Evidently, the poll was an enlightenment lesson on the fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. An apparently puzzled Fayemi noted that his understanding of the people's expectations may have been flawed. He said in his broadcast: "Indeed, a new sociology of the Ekiti people may have evolved. However, the task of understanding how the outcome of this election has defined us as a people will be that of scholars" ([20]: 21). Before the electoral defeat, public perception of his administration, largely informed by media presentation, gave him good marks for good governance. Against the background of his unexpected loss, it is apt to wonder whether the media was faithful to its role in representing reality (ibid). The landslide victory recorded by the candidate of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), Mr. Ayo Fayose, in the election, adjudged by most observers as remarkably free and fair, seems to reveal that the undercurrents of voter's behavior and political choice in Nigeria might still be shrouded in mystery that will take a long time to be unraveled ([21]: 47).

However, there is little doubt that the underlay of Mr. Ayo Fayose's "grassroots politics" and its success in the Ekiti election were principally a class factor. Fayose had plebian appeal, and it was so effective he did not even need to articulate a manifesto to win the election ([22]: 64). The election did not witness the intellectual debates that could have also influenced, as is the practice in advanced democracies, the choice of the voters. And, perhaps, the pre-election opinion poll would have clearly indicated the likely voting pattern. Akinnaso [17–19] argues that it is equally premature to extrapolate from the Ekiti results to the party affiliation of the Ekiti people or their voting pattern in 2015. Fayose's victory did not suddenly turn Ekiti people to People's Democratic Party members. They voted specifically for or against particular candidates and not for or against their political parties. Fayose's victory came from either voters who set out to vote for him or those who set out to vote against Fayemi for various reasons.

As opined by Fagbenle [23], "Granted that Ayo Fayose had a peculiar appeal on his people, and granted that there were other factors that conspired against Dr. kayode Fayemi, if truly, contrary to long held values of the Ekiti and the Yoruba people, the Ekiti result is owed largely to people's preference for 'stomach infrastructure' to long-term overall development of the state, then there is danger in the land and all right thinking people must recognize this and get armed to confront the virus before it assumes epidemic proportion".

**47**

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

It is posited that the March 28 and April 11, 2015, presidential and parliamentary elections offered a unique opportunity for the leaders of the APC in Ekiti, particularly ex-Governor Fayemi, to prove that Fayose's victory in the June 21, 2014, governorship election was a fluke. They should have demonstrated the APC's electoral strength on the ground to lend credence to their allegation that Fayose's earlier electoral triumph was rigged [24]. However, the People's Democratic Party won the three senatorial and six House of Representatives seats in the March 28, 2015, elections, just as it won the presidential election with a total 176,466 votes, winning in all the 16 local governments. Also, the People's Democratic Party cleared all the 26 State Assembly seats as officially declared by the Independent National Electoral Commission being the

Those who share the view that winning an election does not automatically confer popularity on a particular politician hinge their argument on the fact that in Nigeria's political climate, factors determining the success or victory of politicians defer. For example, some analysts argue that instances abound where elections are manipulated in favor of the preferred candidates who are not necessarily popular but are in the good books of the "powers that be". The political process is usually skewed in favor of these elements, who ordinarily could not have won in a free and fair contest. This often generated a lot of dust within the party with attendant defections. It is believed that some politicians often ride on the crest of party's

For Mr. Ayodele Fayose, the outcome of the Presidential and National Assembly

elections in the state actually vindicated his stand that the outcome of the June 21, 2014, governorship election was not rigged as was being touted by the All Progressives Congress. The Special Assistant to the Governor on Information, Mr. Lanre Ogunsuyi, said the 2015 election results proved the sceptics wrong that it was

*It is now confirmed to whoever is still doubting that Fayose is indeed a super political champion that the man is more than that, he is also a rare breed. In the same token, the outcome of the National Assembly election which made the PDP candidates to defeat all the candidates of APC in both the Senate and House of Representatives, including all the incumbent ones, show that all negative claims about June 21, 2014 governorship poll, existed only in the imagination of those that* 

It should be noted, however, that during the electioneering, one of the leading proponents of hate campaign in the country was Ayo Fayose. Fayose once bought the front pages of *The Punch* and *The Sun Newspapers* not only to pass a death sentence on Buhari because the man is 72; he used the same medium to mock dead leaders from a section of the country. His invective and acid sarcasms targeted at the presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) that General Muhammadu Buhari may have left some Nigerians in consternation nay and bewilderment, but to many others, the Ekiti State Governor, Ayodele Fayose, was merely treading his familiar terrain of controversy. Ordinarily, this should have aroused resentment among the Ekiti people who are known for decency and integrity. According to Ayobolu [24], "many analysts have, directly or indirectly, questioned the fidelity of the Ekiti people to those principles and values for which they were once so highly regarded. These include industry, discipline, an ascetic disposition,

**5. The 2015 general elections: A case of affirmation?**

results of the House of Assembly election conducted on April 11.

popularity as against theirs to win elections [25].

*faulted the outcomes (APC).*

honor, dignity, courage and courteousness".

skewed in favor of the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

#### **5. The 2015 general elections: A case of affirmation?**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

winner on October 15, 2010.

against Fayemi for various reasons.

virus before it assumes epidemic proportion".

S.K. Babalola in the AD primaries was believed by many in the state to have been facilitated by financial inducement of the delegates. As was the case in 1999, the PDP gubernatorial standard bearer—Ayo Fayose—was the least educated of all the

Akinnaso [17–19] observes that Ekiti State politics has been typified by four main features, namely, cut-throat intraparty intrigues and interparty competition among contestants, imposition of candidates by political godfathers, physical and verbal thuggery and electoral malpractices. To be sure, none of these features is unique to Ekiti politics nor do they carry equal weight during each election cycle, but what is unique about Ekiti, according to him, is the conjunctive interplay among the features and the intensity of their manifestations. This was evident in 2007 when the governorship election led to a prolonged legal tussle, a controversial election re-run and the eventual reversal of Segun Oni's victory by the appeal court, which declared Dr. Kayode Fayemi of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria as the

candidates fielded by the major parties that contested the election.

**4. The 2014 governorship election: Issues and perspectives**

Evidently, the poll was an enlightenment lesson on the fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. An apparently puzzled Fayemi noted that his understanding of the people's expectations may have been flawed. He said in his broadcast: "Indeed, a new sociology of the Ekiti people may have evolved. However, the task of understanding how the outcome of this election has defined us as a people will be that of scholars" ([20]: 21). Before the electoral defeat, public perception of his administration, largely informed by media presentation, gave him good marks for good governance. Against the background of his unexpected loss, it is apt to wonder whether the media was faithful to its role in representing reality (ibid). The landslide victory recorded by the candidate of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), Mr. Ayo Fayose, in the election, adjudged by most observers as remarkably free and fair, seems to reveal that the undercurrents of voter's behavior and political choice in Nigeria might still be shrouded in mystery that will take a long time to be unraveled ([21]: 47). However, there is little doubt that the underlay of Mr. Ayo Fayose's "grassroots politics" and its success in the Ekiti election were principally a class factor. Fayose had plebian appeal, and it was so effective he did not even need to articulate a manifesto to win the election ([22]: 64). The election did not witness the intellectual debates that could have also influenced, as is the practice in advanced democracies, the choice of the voters. And, perhaps, the pre-election opinion poll would have clearly indicated the likely voting pattern. Akinnaso [17–19] argues that it is equally premature to extrapolate from the Ekiti results to the party affiliation of the Ekiti people or their voting pattern in 2015. Fayose's victory did not suddenly turn Ekiti people to People's Democratic Party members. They voted specifically for or against particular candidates and not for or against their political parties. Fayose's victory came from either voters who set out to vote for him or those who set out to vote

As opined by Fagbenle [23], "Granted that Ayo Fayose had a peculiar appeal on his people, and granted that there were other factors that conspired against Dr. kayode Fayemi, if truly, contrary to long held values of the Ekiti and the Yoruba people, the Ekiti result is owed largely to people's preference for 'stomach infrastructure' to long-term overall development of the state, then there is danger in the land and all right thinking people must recognize this and get armed to confront the

**46**

It is posited that the March 28 and April 11, 2015, presidential and parliamentary elections offered a unique opportunity for the leaders of the APC in Ekiti, particularly ex-Governor Fayemi, to prove that Fayose's victory in the June 21, 2014, governorship election was a fluke. They should have demonstrated the APC's electoral strength on the ground to lend credence to their allegation that Fayose's earlier electoral triumph was rigged [24]. However, the People's Democratic Party won the three senatorial and six House of Representatives seats in the March 28, 2015, elections, just as it won the presidential election with a total 176,466 votes, winning in all the 16 local governments. Also, the People's Democratic Party cleared all the 26 State Assembly seats as officially declared by the Independent National Electoral Commission being the results of the House of Assembly election conducted on April 11.

Those who share the view that winning an election does not automatically confer popularity on a particular politician hinge their argument on the fact that in Nigeria's political climate, factors determining the success or victory of politicians defer. For example, some analysts argue that instances abound where elections are manipulated in favor of the preferred candidates who are not necessarily popular but are in the good books of the "powers that be". The political process is usually skewed in favor of these elements, who ordinarily could not have won in a free and fair contest. This often generated a lot of dust within the party with attendant defections. It is believed that some politicians often ride on the crest of party's popularity as against theirs to win elections [25].

For Mr. Ayodele Fayose, the outcome of the Presidential and National Assembly elections in the state actually vindicated his stand that the outcome of the June 21, 2014, governorship election was not rigged as was being touted by the All Progressives Congress. The Special Assistant to the Governor on Information, Mr. Lanre Ogunsuyi, said the 2015 election results proved the sceptics wrong that it was skewed in favor of the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

*It is now confirmed to whoever is still doubting that Fayose is indeed a super political champion that the man is more than that, he is also a rare breed. In the same token, the outcome of the National Assembly election which made the PDP candidates to defeat all the candidates of APC in both the Senate and House of Representatives, including all the incumbent ones, show that all negative claims about June 21, 2014 governorship poll, existed only in the imagination of those that faulted the outcomes (APC).*

It should be noted, however, that during the electioneering, one of the leading proponents of hate campaign in the country was Ayo Fayose. Fayose once bought the front pages of *The Punch* and *The Sun Newspapers* not only to pass a death sentence on Buhari because the man is 72; he used the same medium to mock dead leaders from a section of the country. His invective and acid sarcasms targeted at the presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) that General Muhammadu Buhari may have left some Nigerians in consternation nay and bewilderment, but to many others, the Ekiti State Governor, Ayodele Fayose, was merely treading his familiar terrain of controversy. Ordinarily, this should have aroused resentment among the Ekiti people who are known for decency and integrity. According to Ayobolu [24], "many analysts have, directly or indirectly, questioned the fidelity of the Ekiti people to those principles and values for which they were once so highly regarded. These include industry, discipline, an ascetic disposition, honor, dignity, courage and courteousness".

Three major factors could be adduced to the voting pattern of the electorate in the 2015 elections in Ekiti. One, the passion with which a majority of the electors voted against Dr. Kayode Fayemi 8 months earlier had not waned. In spite of the non-visible improvement in their living standard or any development agenda by the incumbent, they still wanted to affirm their support for a man they see as a "friend of the masses". Two, the idea of mainstream politics—to guarantee support from a PDP-led federal government—was relentlessly emphasized by Fayose with a view to fulfilling his "electioneering promises". It became the main issue in their house-to-house campaign. Three, many of the APC leaders could not be seen in the state during electioneering campaign but for the centrally organized presidential rally. This is in addition to their inability to make funds available to the party and its candidates for the national and state assembly elections. Hence, few candidates that came out were easily intimidated just as they had their political rallies regularly disrupted by political thugs believed to be state agents.

#### **6. Irony of good performance and mandate rejection: The place of**  *stomach infrastructure*

Much has been made of Governor Fayemi having been either unable or unwilling to satisfy the masses of Ekiti State on the matter of "stomach infrastructure". By this phrase it meant that the people cared far less for spending the state's meagre handouts from Abuja on the development of physical and institutional infrastructures than giving out largesse to cronies and not keeping from workers, teachers and students what they can consume now in the name of sacrifices for the future ([26]: 17). It is contended that Nigerians will always make their choices, even if the choices seem to serve short-term purposes and that the Ekiti governorship election was won and lost on this aphorism. This politics of "stomach infrastructure" applies to the two major political parties in the election, that is, the All Progressives Congress and the People's Democratic Party, taking advantage of the impoverished masses. In fact, those who were arrested on election day were caught with huge sums of money meant to buy votes only that the arrest was restricted to a political party. In his view, Gbadegesin [27] avers that there must be something more than performance that is central to the voters' idea of good governance:

*For them, it has to be "performance plus x", where various items are substituted for X, depending on the preferences of individuals and groups. For contractors, it is performance plus contract awards. For teachers, it is performance plus payment of not only salaries but also allowances for training, in addition to not being held accountable for students' performances through continuous certification tests. For students, it is performance plus free tuition at the Ekiti State University (EKSU). For the jobless, it is performance plus job opportunities. For the hungry, it is performance plus bags of rice and gallons of cooking oil. The list is inexhaustible because preferences are elastic.*

In its analysis on the Ekiti election with regard to government reforms and people's voting behavior, *The Economist* [28] posits that, in dismissing a forwardthinker, the voters sent out a loud message. After coming to power in 2010, Fayemi laid new roads, improved the university system, presented a plan to get more young people into jobs, created a social security scheme for the elderly and cut corrupt wage payments to government workers. But such reforms upset people with a vested interest in the old political system. Unqualified teachers who have been told to take

**49**

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

tests as part of Mr. Fayemi's education reforms probably voted against him. So did civil servants upset by his more meritocratic hiring practices. Such people plainly prefer the old "politics of the belly", which keeps them comfortably on the state payroll and hands out cash in return for their votes. In fact, to convince people that he knew what they wanted, Fayose during his acceptance speech declared that his priority was not to industrialize the state now, but to "take good care of the people

It is instructive that this may not be a peculiar feature of Ekiti political behavior when viewed within the context of the Nigerian state and its people. Omatseye [29] submits that those who spun the story of a disconnected Fayemi worked on a number of factors: One, Fayemi's belief that when you do your work, you will get the praise. This did not work because they knew Nigeria has changed progressively over a generation of alienated leadership. Honor has been redefined in the culture of the people. Infrastructure is important in government to inspire dignity of labor. When government provides them, individuals work for their own profit and so earn their own pride. But before their eyes, lazy men become billionaires and smart men work for them. Success no longer depends on the assiduity or the acumen but on indolence. They see the political elite buy all the lands and hold parties in Dubai and

It is expected that the basis of government's or, preferably, a leader's "connectedness" with the people should be primarily evident in government policies and physical projects that could better the lots of the populace. However, personal social relations of the vote seeker have become a significant contributing factor to the voting pattern of Ekiti people—a trend that is also observable in other parts of the country. With regard to this, the two major contestants in the 2014 election were

*The major contrast between Fayemi and Fayose that actually defined the voting pattern was the issue of relating personally with the common man. While Fayemi does not believe in tokenism, that is the strength of \$Fayose. While Fayemi is not the social party type, Fayose loves owanbe and is ever ready to dance with the common man. While Fayemi will wake up by 4 am and read till 8 am, Fayose wakes up to* 

Being "out of touch" in the Nigerian political lexicon, however, defines the politician who is not grounded in grassroots politicking characterized by dispensing government largesse in cash and kind directly to the people who, out of poverty, only understand the language of instant gratification. Rather than building enduring infrastructure, politicians of this school of thought believe their electability or popularity will be enhanced by the amount of patronage they can dispense. In doing this, they create a cultlike figure in the eyes of the critical mass of the working poor. In a country where poverty stalks the citizens like a shadow, this has proven very

This can be further explained with Richard Joseph's concept of prebendalism. Prebendalism is the disbursing of public offices and state rents to one's ethnic-based clients and is inherently rooted in state corruption. The concept was applied specifically to the context of Nigerian politics. It is an extreme form of clientelism where state resources are corruptly allocated in order to mobilize cultural and political identities. Clientelism is defined as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors are offered in return for political support at the polls. It is an established pattern of political behavior that justifies pursuit of and use of public office for personal benefit of the officeholder and his clients. Under prebendalism

*start political meetings with his supporters ([21]: 50).*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

by awarding contracts to them" [21].

New York, and their labors lead nowhere.

assessed thus:

effective ([30]: 26).

#### *Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

tests as part of Mr. Fayemi's education reforms probably voted against him. So did civil servants upset by his more meritocratic hiring practices. Such people plainly prefer the old "politics of the belly", which keeps them comfortably on the state payroll and hands out cash in return for their votes. In fact, to convince people that he knew what they wanted, Fayose during his acceptance speech declared that his priority was not to industrialize the state now, but to "take good care of the people by awarding contracts to them" [21].

It is instructive that this may not be a peculiar feature of Ekiti political behavior when viewed within the context of the Nigerian state and its people. Omatseye [29] submits that those who spun the story of a disconnected Fayemi worked on a number of factors: One, Fayemi's belief that when you do your work, you will get the praise. This did not work because they knew Nigeria has changed progressively over a generation of alienated leadership. Honor has been redefined in the culture of the people. Infrastructure is important in government to inspire dignity of labor. When government provides them, individuals work for their own profit and so earn their own pride. But before their eyes, lazy men become billionaires and smart men work for them. Success no longer depends on the assiduity or the acumen but on indolence. They see the political elite buy all the lands and hold parties in Dubai and New York, and their labors lead nowhere.

It is expected that the basis of government's or, preferably, a leader's "connectedness" with the people should be primarily evident in government policies and physical projects that could better the lots of the populace. However, personal social relations of the vote seeker have become a significant contributing factor to the voting pattern of Ekiti people—a trend that is also observable in other parts of the country. With regard to this, the two major contestants in the 2014 election were assessed thus:

*The major contrast between Fayemi and Fayose that actually defined the voting pattern was the issue of relating personally with the common man. While Fayemi does not believe in tokenism, that is the strength of \$Fayose. While Fayemi is not the social party type, Fayose loves owanbe and is ever ready to dance with the common man. While Fayemi will wake up by 4 am and read till 8 am, Fayose wakes up to start political meetings with his supporters ([21]: 50).*

Being "out of touch" in the Nigerian political lexicon, however, defines the politician who is not grounded in grassroots politicking characterized by dispensing government largesse in cash and kind directly to the people who, out of poverty, only understand the language of instant gratification. Rather than building enduring infrastructure, politicians of this school of thought believe their electability or popularity will be enhanced by the amount of patronage they can dispense. In doing this, they create a cultlike figure in the eyes of the critical mass of the working poor. In a country where poverty stalks the citizens like a shadow, this has proven very effective ([30]: 26).

This can be further explained with Richard Joseph's concept of prebendalism. Prebendalism is the disbursing of public offices and state rents to one's ethnic-based clients and is inherently rooted in state corruption. The concept was applied specifically to the context of Nigerian politics. It is an extreme form of clientelism where state resources are corruptly allocated in order to mobilize cultural and political identities. Clientelism is defined as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors are offered in return for political support at the polls. It is an established pattern of political behavior that justifies pursuit of and use of public office for personal benefit of the officeholder and his clients. Under prebendalism

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

*stomach infrastructure*

Three major factors could be adduced to the voting pattern of the electorate in the 2015 elections in Ekiti. One, the passion with which a majority of the electors voted against Dr. Kayode Fayemi 8 months earlier had not waned. In spite of the non-visible improvement in their living standard or any development agenda by the incumbent, they still wanted to affirm their support for a man they see as a "friend of the masses". Two, the idea of mainstream politics—to guarantee support from a PDP-led federal government—was relentlessly emphasized by Fayose with a view to fulfilling his "electioneering promises". It became the main issue in their house-to-house campaign. Three, many of the APC leaders could not be seen in the state during electioneering campaign but for the centrally organized presidential rally. This is in addition to their inability to make funds available to the party and its candidates for the national and state assembly elections. Hence, few candidates that came out were easily intimidated just as they had their political rallies regularly

disrupted by political thugs believed to be state agents.

central to the voters' idea of good governance:

*because preferences are elastic.*

**6. Irony of good performance and mandate rejection: The place of** 

Much has been made of Governor Fayemi having been either unable or unwilling to satisfy the masses of Ekiti State on the matter of "stomach infrastructure". By this phrase it meant that the people cared far less for spending the state's meagre handouts from Abuja on the development of physical and institutional infrastructures than giving out largesse to cronies and not keeping from workers, teachers and students what they can consume now in the name of sacrifices for the future ([26]: 17). It is contended that Nigerians will always make their choices, even if the choices seem to serve short-term purposes and that the Ekiti governorship election was won and lost on this aphorism. This politics of "stomach infrastructure" applies to the two major political parties in the election, that is, the All Progressives Congress and the People's Democratic Party, taking advantage of the impoverished masses. In fact, those who were arrested on election day were caught with huge sums of money meant to buy votes only that the arrest was restricted to a political party. In his view, Gbadegesin [27] avers that there must be something more than performance that is

*For them, it has to be "performance plus x", where various items are substituted for X, depending on the preferences of individuals and groups. For contractors, it is performance plus contract awards. For teachers, it is performance plus payment of not only salaries but also allowances for training, in addition to not being held accountable for students' performances through continuous certification tests. For students, it is performance plus free tuition at the Ekiti State University (EKSU). For the jobless, it is performance plus job opportunities. For the hungry, it is performance plus bags of rice and gallons of cooking oil. The list is inexhaustible* 

In its analysis on the Ekiti election with regard to government reforms and people's voting behavior, *The Economist* [28] posits that, in dismissing a forwardthinker, the voters sent out a loud message. After coming to power in 2010, Fayemi laid new roads, improved the university system, presented a plan to get more young people into jobs, created a social security scheme for the elderly and cut corrupt wage payments to government workers. But such reforms upset people with a vested interest in the old political system. Unqualified teachers who have been told to take

**48**

the position in public office becomes secondary to personal pursuits. Forest [31] submits, therefore, that:

*Because of this system of patronage and personal largesse, a political culture has developed in which the government is not seen as a means to serve the people and the state, but rather, the means to wealth. Any member of a family or clan who can get a government job becomes the centerpiece of an extended support system, a type of relational social security built exclusively on who you know or who knows you. It is a system in which anyone who holds a position within the government—even at the lowest levels of authority—is expected by their family and friends to supplement their meager income with alternative sources, stealing money, and sharing the wealth.*

As noted by Wantchekon [32], a large body of the comparative politics literature has investigated the nature of patron-client relationships, the inefficiency of various forms of clientelist redistribution and conditions for its decay. The common conclusion is that clientelist politics is most attractive in conditions of low productivity, high inequality and starkly hierarchical social relations. Others stress the importance of culture, historical factors, levels of economic development and the size of the public sector economy. In Africa, comparative politics scholars have long considered electoral politics to be systematically and inherently clientelist. African rulers, whether self-appointed or democratically elected, rely on the distribution of personal favors to selected members of the electorate in exchange for ongoing political support. This observation relies on the implicit assumption that African voters invariably have a much stronger preference for private transfers than for public goods or projects of national interest.

The politics of "stomach infrastructure" and its now feared consequences, that is, if not applied, began to have ripple effects on governance philosophy in the country, particularly in states being controlled by the then opposition party to avoid protest votes at the poll. For instance, over 900 teachers, suspended by the Edo State government on charges of certificate and age forgery, who ordinarily should be prosecuted by a competent court, were recalled, while their allowances/ salary arrears are being agitated for. Such policy reversal took place in Lagos State in respect of tuition fee. Akinlotan [33] expresses concern that the South-West zone has "begun to roll back their principled and well-considered stand on education, infrastructure and other policies….enact mass surrender to the short-sighted and even whimsical needs of the electorate". This trend is surely a worrisome template for governance, not only in the region but in Nigeria.

The idea of a specified single-term tenure for elected governors and president would have been an applicable antidote to compromising lofty policies on the basis of *next election*, but the obvious fact is if the candidate is not seeking a second term in office, his/her party desires it, even more passionately as other party members are also waiting for their turn. In this situation, that is, if the office holder refuses to apply "stomach infrastructure" to appeal to the sometimes superficial demands of the voters, the pressure will come more from within than without. In a country where voters are often swayed by frivolities rather than substance, opposition parties easily catch in on this.

One observable phenomenon among the populace in Ekiti is that many people depend on the government and political appointees for daily survival. Politics, rather than the much-talked-about education, has now become the major industry in Ekiti State especially for the teeming youths—both the unemployed certificated ones and the unemployable ones. To many of them, it is more desirable to pursue a career in politics—which they pride as their chosen profession—so as to access free money in lieu of a career job or skill acquisition in entrepreneurship.

**51**

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

The decision of the people to vote out the incumbent governor has been partly attributed to politics of spite particularly in respect of the political appointees from different communities of the state, those who alienate themselves from their constituencies. For a party that controls all the 16 local government areas through appointed caretaker committees, 25 out of the 26 members of the State House of Assembly, 5 of the 6 House of Representative members and the 3 senatorial seats, in addition to numerous appointees, commissioners, special advisers and special assistants, losing the governorship election surely serves as an indictment on the political value or relevance of these appointees. Ado Ekiti (the state capital) alone has over 100 appointees, yet none of the wards was delivered for the ruling party. The argument has been that these people, ordinarily, should be doing the grassroots interaction, socialization and intimacy on behalf of the governor. Suffice it to say, many of those holding sensitive positions among them do not reside in their communities and spend their weekends in other cosmopolitan states. This sentiment (of neglect) is also expressed by the local contractors who, in their private interactions, campaigned against the governor's re-election bid on the basis of non-patronage, which could have aided capital circulation within their various communities.

Another factor that explains the voting pattern of the Ekiti people is located in their sociological trait of impatience, such that they are always in a hurry with any government that fails to satisfy their immediate needs—usually regarded as an element of performance. This may have accounted for the rapid regime turnover in the 18-year-old state. For instance, between 1996 and 2014, Ekiti has produced 12 administrators, governors and acting governors. This factor also partly explains why the people, at every critical moment, move from certainty to uncertainty. Adetoye [34] cites an instance when Ekiti wanted to pull out of the oil-rich old Ondo State

In his analysis, Akinnaso [17–19] submits that what most people thought was Fayemi's main voting bloc—Ekiti intellectuals, political appointees and the educated workforce (teachers and civil servants)—was really never completely with him. This situation was worsened by the decision by his friend, Opeyemi Bamidele, to leave the All Progressives Congress and contest the governorship as a Labour Party candidate, largely because he was prevented by the leadership of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria from contesting the primary election against Fayemi. By

A comparative analysis of the 2003 and 2014 governorship elections in the state contested by Mr. Ayo Fayose against the two incumbent governors may have reinforced the ruling party's allegation of scientific rigging—*the use of photochromic technology used in printing the ballot paper and the quality of the indelible ink during the latter election.* Surely, this variant of alleged rigging is alien to the country's electoral democracy, and its authenticity has been questioned by curious observers. However, all those factors that usually work in favor of politicians in Nigeria, that is, incumbency factor, performance, party's traditional stronghold, spread of political appointments, financial inducement and party big wigs' influence in their communities, among others, did not guarantee victory for the incumbent governor as he lost in all the 16 local government areas. From the two elections, it is clear that in 2003, the incumbent governor Mr. Niyi Adebayo of Alliance of Democracy (AD)—a precursor to the present All Progressives Congress (APC)—won in more of the 16 local government areas in spite of his relatively lower performance than the People's Democratic Party (PDP) but for the higher number of votes garnered in Ado Ekiti and Ikere Ekiti local governments in favor of the PDP. The outcome of the 2003 election partly justified

**7. The Ekiti electorate and right of/reasons for choice**

despite the benefits accruable from remaining in that union.

the above-stated factors that work for politicians in this clime.

so doing, he drew some supporters from Fayemi.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

#### **7. The Ekiti electorate and right of/reasons for choice**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

submits, therefore, that:

public goods or projects of national interest.

for governance, not only in the region but in Nigeria.

the position in public office becomes secondary to personal pursuits. Forest [31]

*Because of this system of patronage and personal largesse, a political culture has developed in which the government is not seen as a means to serve the people and the state, but rather, the means to wealth. Any member of a family or clan who can get a government job becomes the centerpiece of an extended support system, a type of relational social security built exclusively on who you know or who knows you. It is a system in which anyone who holds a position within the government—even at the lowest levels of authority—is expected by their family and friends to supplement their meager income with alternative sources, stealing money, and sharing the wealth.*

As noted by Wantchekon [32], a large body of the comparative politics literature has investigated the nature of patron-client relationships, the inefficiency of various forms of clientelist redistribution and conditions for its decay. The common conclusion is that clientelist politics is most attractive in conditions of low productivity, high inequality and starkly hierarchical social relations. Others stress the importance of culture, historical factors, levels of economic development and the size of the public sector economy. In Africa, comparative politics scholars have long considered electoral politics to be systematically and inherently clientelist. African rulers, whether self-appointed or democratically elected, rely on the distribution of personal favors to selected members of the electorate in exchange for ongoing political support. This observation relies on the implicit assumption that African voters invariably have a much stronger preference for private transfers than for

The politics of "stomach infrastructure" and its now feared consequences, that is, if not applied, began to have ripple effects on governance philosophy in the country, particularly in states being controlled by the then opposition party to avoid protest votes at the poll. For instance, over 900 teachers, suspended by the Edo State government on charges of certificate and age forgery, who ordinarily should be prosecuted by a competent court, were recalled, while their allowances/ salary arrears are being agitated for. Such policy reversal took place in Lagos State in respect of tuition fee. Akinlotan [33] expresses concern that the South-West zone has "begun to roll back their principled and well-considered stand on education, infrastructure and other policies….enact mass surrender to the short-sighted and even whimsical needs of the electorate". This trend is surely a worrisome template

The idea of a specified single-term tenure for elected governors and president would have been an applicable antidote to compromising lofty policies on the basis of *next election*, but the obvious fact is if the candidate is not seeking a second term in office, his/her party desires it, even more passionately as other party members are also waiting for their turn. In this situation, that is, if the office holder refuses to apply "stomach infrastructure" to appeal to the sometimes superficial demands of the voters, the pressure will come more from within than without. In a country where voters are often swayed by frivolities rather than substance, opposition par-

One observable phenomenon among the populace in Ekiti is that many people depend on the government and political appointees for daily survival. Politics, rather than the much-talked-about education, has now become the major industry in Ekiti State especially for the teeming youths—both the unemployed certificated ones and the unemployable ones. To many of them, it is more desirable to pursue a career in politics—which they pride as their chosen profession—so as to access free

money in lieu of a career job or skill acquisition in entrepreneurship.

**50**

ties easily catch in on this.

The decision of the people to vote out the incumbent governor has been partly attributed to politics of spite particularly in respect of the political appointees from different communities of the state, those who alienate themselves from their constituencies. For a party that controls all the 16 local government areas through appointed caretaker committees, 25 out of the 26 members of the State House of Assembly, 5 of the 6 House of Representative members and the 3 senatorial seats, in addition to numerous appointees, commissioners, special advisers and special assistants, losing the governorship election surely serves as an indictment on the political value or relevance of these appointees. Ado Ekiti (the state capital) alone has over 100 appointees, yet none of the wards was delivered for the ruling party.

The argument has been that these people, ordinarily, should be doing the grassroots interaction, socialization and intimacy on behalf of the governor. Suffice it to say, many of those holding sensitive positions among them do not reside in their communities and spend their weekends in other cosmopolitan states. This sentiment (of neglect) is also expressed by the local contractors who, in their private interactions, campaigned against the governor's re-election bid on the basis of non-patronage, which could have aided capital circulation within their various communities.

Another factor that explains the voting pattern of the Ekiti people is located in their sociological trait of impatience, such that they are always in a hurry with any government that fails to satisfy their immediate needs—usually regarded as an element of performance. This may have accounted for the rapid regime turnover in the 18-year-old state. For instance, between 1996 and 2014, Ekiti has produced 12 administrators, governors and acting governors. This factor also partly explains why the people, at every critical moment, move from certainty to uncertainty. Adetoye [34] cites an instance when Ekiti wanted to pull out of the oil-rich old Ondo State despite the benefits accruable from remaining in that union.

In his analysis, Akinnaso [17–19] submits that what most people thought was Fayemi's main voting bloc—Ekiti intellectuals, political appointees and the educated workforce (teachers and civil servants)—was really never completely with him. This situation was worsened by the decision by his friend, Opeyemi Bamidele, to leave the All Progressives Congress and contest the governorship as a Labour Party candidate, largely because he was prevented by the leadership of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria from contesting the primary election against Fayemi. By so doing, he drew some supporters from Fayemi.

A comparative analysis of the 2003 and 2014 governorship elections in the state contested by Mr. Ayo Fayose against the two incumbent governors may have reinforced the ruling party's allegation of scientific rigging—*the use of photochromic technology used in printing the ballot paper and the quality of the indelible ink during the latter election.* Surely, this variant of alleged rigging is alien to the country's electoral democracy, and its authenticity has been questioned by curious observers. However, all those factors that usually work in favor of politicians in Nigeria, that is, incumbency factor, performance, party's traditional stronghold, spread of political appointments, financial inducement and party big wigs' influence in their communities, among others, did not guarantee victory for the incumbent governor as he lost in all the 16 local government areas.

From the two elections, it is clear that in 2003, the incumbent governor Mr. Niyi Adebayo of Alliance of Democracy (AD)—a precursor to the present All Progressives Congress (APC)—won in more of the 16 local government areas in spite of his relatively lower performance than the People's Democratic Party (PDP) but for the higher number of votes garnered in Ado Ekiti and Ikere Ekiti local governments in favor of the PDP. The outcome of the 2003 election partly justified the above-stated factors that work for politicians in this clime.

#### **8. Other observable issues: Security and stakeholders' conduct**

The role of the security during the 2014 election has been subjected to public scrutiny. Compared to other state governorship elections, the one held in Ekiti State was different. The country's electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission, and security agencies deployed extra number of personnel and equipment. Security operatives were present in strategic locations across the state. There were roadblocks where security checks were conducted on motorists and pedestrians, especially at the entry points to the state ([35]: 11). But such massive deployment of security agencies has been variously described as militarization of the state by the federal government.

Falana [36] argues that "militarisation of Ekiti State, harassment by security forces, disenfranchisement of some people by the military forces, and the fact that the place was invaded with 30,790 policemen, soldiers and members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, you cannot say that was a free and fair election". The concern, however, remains that if this is the only workable antidote for a violence-free election in Nigeria, as applied in these staggered elections, how can the federal government afford such huge number of security agents in a general election that will involve 36 states.

The reason for this, as advanced by the federal government, was to prevent violence and rigging that used to characterize previous elections in the country. Indeed, the exercise was regarded peaceful essentially on the election day. In spite of the fear struck by the massive presence of security operatives, many young men and women, who normally are apathetic to voting, reported at the polling stations, some even before the scheduled accreditation time. They endured the scorching sun to check their names and numbers, queued for accreditation, waited to vote and witnessed the collation and counting of the results, which they counted along with the election officials.

The important issue about the election was that INEC's performance was very good. The logistics were well planned, and there was timely arrival of electoral materials in most of the polling units. The process of accreditation of voters started in most polling units between 08:00 and 08:30 am [37]. In almost all the 177 electoral wards in the state, materials were promptly deployed and voting commenced on schedule.

#### **9. Conclusion**

The Ekiti election shows that a cynical citizenry has been bred because there also exists a cynical political class. They want to be receptacles, and that is what infrastructure of the stomach means ([29]: 64). The thinking in some quarters, therefore, is that government's effort that addresses the immediate needs of the citizens seems to gain more popularity than one that is targeted at achieving clean environment, safety of lives and property as well as infrastructural development. But as rightly noted by Gbadegesin [27], elections are the only means of choosing leaders in a democracy, and elections are about people's preferences. Preferences, on their part, could be rational or irrational, self-regarding or other-regarding. It does not really matter because in democracy, the voters are the kingmakers.

*The Economist* [28] affirms that the election was a clash between appeals to good governance on the one hand and the lure of old-school clientelism and populism on the other. Despite Ekiti having a relatively well-educated electorate, the old ways prevailed. Usukuma [21], in his piece on political marketing in relation to the Ekiti election, further explains this phenomenon: Most Nigerian politicians need to

**53**

**Note**

Abuja, Nigeria, July 27–28, 2015.

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

assimilate today's reality in Nigeria that politics is more about emotions than intellect. The savviest marketer on this turf must understand that if he wants his brand to succeed, it must appeal to the heart more than the mind. To win, he must go beyond the visible, must swim beyond assumption and must never underestimate his competitors. Yet, Thomas [38] argues that a voter's power should be exercised with some degree of sanity and logical discretion and should not, under any normal circumstances, be used to encourage the enthronement of tyranny and to celebrate

It is imperative that electoral administration should not be subject to direction or manipulation by the incumbent officials or ruling party. The electoral administration consists of a daunting range of tasks which include registering voters; publishing and distributing voter lists; registering and qualifying parties and candidates; establishing and enforcing rules on campaigning and campaign finance; ensuring the security of campaigners, voters and the polling stations; administering the polls during voting; counting the ballots; reporting, collating and "announcing the results; investigating and adjudicating complaints; and certifying the results" (Robert A. Pastor, cited in [39]: 15). The range of tasks, many of them ongoing, requires a significant, professional and permanent administration that is able to administer competently and regulate impartially all of these aspects of political

Empowerment of the people, who have over the years been disenchanted and disillusioned by government's obnoxious policies and insensitivity, is also very germane. Empowerment, as noted by the World Bank [40], involves the expansion of freedom of choice and action to shape one's life. Therefore, the state should not abdicate its responsibilities of providing basic services to the people, involving the citizenry in governance, creating pro-poor economic policies and increasing access to justice and legal aid. This becomes imperative because the continuing force of patron-client ties is often attributed to the persistence of insecurity and uncertainty in people's everyday lives (Gellner and Waterbury 1977 cited in [41]). When people become more affluent and their opportunities increase, their need for patronage decreases. Patronage politics thus offer an apt illustration of Samuel Hays' statement that "politics is necessary for those below the poverty line and an item of luxury consumption for those above it" (quoted

In the final analysis, the *developmental state* approach can be adopted in addressing

Ekiti State's development challenges by focusing on rebuilding and strengthening state capacity, with a view to raising its ability to expand human capabilities and promote an equitable and efficient allocation of resources. This, in turn, should generate appropriate incentives for economic diversification and transformation. The approach should also prioritize the building and strengthening of economic and socio-political institutions and their effective coordination to produce the desired socio-economic development outcomes. The outcomes, therefore, are human capacity building and strong economic base with job opportunities for the teeming youths such that "stomach infrastructure" will no longer be a determining factor for the

This paper was first presented at a 2-day national conference on "The 2015 General Elections in Nigeria: The Real Issues", organized by The Electoral Institute,

electorate in voting for a candidate of their choice in an election.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

competition and electoral participation.

mediocrity.

by [42]: 169).

#### *Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

assimilate today's reality in Nigeria that politics is more about emotions than intellect. The savviest marketer on this turf must understand that if he wants his brand to succeed, it must appeal to the heart more than the mind. To win, he must go beyond the visible, must swim beyond assumption and must never underestimate his competitors. Yet, Thomas [38] argues that a voter's power should be exercised with some degree of sanity and logical discretion and should not, under any normal circumstances, be used to encourage the enthronement of tyranny and to celebrate mediocrity.

It is imperative that electoral administration should not be subject to direction or manipulation by the incumbent officials or ruling party. The electoral administration consists of a daunting range of tasks which include registering voters; publishing and distributing voter lists; registering and qualifying parties and candidates; establishing and enforcing rules on campaigning and campaign finance; ensuring the security of campaigners, voters and the polling stations; administering the polls during voting; counting the ballots; reporting, collating and "announcing the results; investigating and adjudicating complaints; and certifying the results" (Robert A. Pastor, cited in [39]: 15). The range of tasks, many of them ongoing, requires a significant, professional and permanent administration that is able to administer competently and regulate impartially all of these aspects of political competition and electoral participation.

Empowerment of the people, who have over the years been disenchanted and disillusioned by government's obnoxious policies and insensitivity, is also very germane. Empowerment, as noted by the World Bank [40], involves the expansion of freedom of choice and action to shape one's life. Therefore, the state should not abdicate its responsibilities of providing basic services to the people, involving the citizenry in governance, creating pro-poor economic policies and increasing access to justice and legal aid. This becomes imperative because the continuing force of patron-client ties is often attributed to the persistence of insecurity and uncertainty in people's everyday lives (Gellner and Waterbury 1977 cited in [41]). When people become more affluent and their opportunities increase, their need for patronage decreases. Patronage politics thus offer an apt illustration of Samuel Hays' statement that "politics is necessary for those below the poverty line and an item of luxury consumption for those above it" (quoted by [42]: 169).

In the final analysis, the *developmental state* approach can be adopted in addressing Ekiti State's development challenges by focusing on rebuilding and strengthening state capacity, with a view to raising its ability to expand human capabilities and promote an equitable and efficient allocation of resources. This, in turn, should generate appropriate incentives for economic diversification and transformation. The approach should also prioritize the building and strengthening of economic and socio-political institutions and their effective coordination to produce the desired socio-economic development outcomes. The outcomes, therefore, are human capacity building and strong economic base with job opportunities for the teeming youths such that "stomach infrastructure" will no longer be a determining factor for the electorate in voting for a candidate of their choice in an election.

#### **Note**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

the state by the federal government.

election that will involve 36 states.

the election officials.

**9. Conclusion**

**8. Other observable issues: Security and stakeholders' conduct**

The role of the security during the 2014 election has been subjected to public scrutiny. Compared to other state governorship elections, the one held in Ekiti State was different. The country's electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission, and security agencies deployed extra number of personnel and equipment. Security operatives were present in strategic locations across the state. There were roadblocks where security checks were conducted on motorists and pedestrians, especially at the entry points to the state ([35]: 11). But such massive deployment of security agencies has been variously described as militarization of

Falana [36] argues that "militarisation of Ekiti State, harassment by security forces, disenfranchisement of some people by the military forces, and the fact that the place was invaded with 30,790 policemen, soldiers and members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, you cannot say that was a free and fair election". The concern, however, remains that if this is the only workable antidote for a violence-free election in Nigeria, as applied in these staggered elections, how can the federal government afford such huge number of security agents in a general

The reason for this, as advanced by the federal government, was to prevent violence and rigging that used to characterize previous elections in the country. Indeed, the exercise was regarded peaceful essentially on the election day. In spite of the fear struck by the massive presence of security operatives, many young men and women, who normally are apathetic to voting, reported at the polling stations, some even before the scheduled accreditation time. They endured the scorching sun to check their names and numbers, queued for accreditation, waited to vote and witnessed the collation and counting of the results, which they counted along with

The important issue about the election was that INEC's performance was very good. The logistics were well planned, and there was timely arrival of electoral materials in most of the polling units. The process of accreditation of voters started in most polling units between 08:00 and 08:30 am [37]. In almost all the 177 electoral wards in the state, materials were promptly deployed and voting commenced on schedule.

The Ekiti election shows that a cynical citizenry has been bred because there also exists a cynical political class. They want to be receptacles, and that is what infrastructure of the stomach means ([29]: 64). The thinking in some quarters, therefore, is that government's effort that addresses the immediate needs of the citizens seems to gain more popularity than one that is targeted at achieving clean environment, safety of lives and property as well as infrastructural development. But as rightly noted by Gbadegesin [27], elections are the only means of choosing leaders in a democracy, and elections are about people's preferences. Preferences, on their part, could be rational or irrational, self-regarding or other-regarding. It does

*The Economist* [28] affirms that the election was a clash between appeals to good governance on the one hand and the lure of old-school clientelism and populism on the other. Despite Ekiti having a relatively well-educated electorate, the old ways prevailed. Usukuma [21], in his piece on political marketing in relation to the Ekiti election, further explains this phenomenon: Most Nigerian politicians need to

not really matter because in democracy, the voters are the kingmakers.

**52**

This paper was first presented at a 2-day national conference on "The 2015 General Elections in Nigeria: The Real Issues", organized by The Electoral Institute, Abuja, Nigeria, July 27–28, 2015.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

#### **Author details**

Mike Omilusi Department of Political Science, Ekiti State University, Nigeria

\*Address all correspondence to: watermike2003@yahoo.co.uk

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

**55**

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria)*

[13] Omilusi M. Ekiti: Once a Peaceful

[14] NGF. State Peer Review Report No. 2, Abridged Version, Ekiti State. 2013. Available at: http://nggovernorsforum. com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ Ekiti-State\_SPRR-Abridged-Version.

[15] Abe Toyin. Governance Reforms in Ekiti State, Nigeria, 2001-2006 [PhD Thesis]. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan; 2010

[16] Omilusi Mike. Electoral Democracy and Governance in South-Western Nigeria, 1999-2009 [Doctoral Thesis]. Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, Ekiti State

[17] Akinnaso N. A Meta-Commentary on the Ekiti Election. The Punch; 2014

[18] Akinnaso N. Ekiti 2014 Electoral

[19] Akinnaso N. Why and how Fayose Won the Ekiti Election. The Punch; 2014

[20] Macaulay F. Fantabulous Fayose.

[21] Usukuma N. Political Marketing: Are Nigerian Voters Swayed by Emotion or Rationality? The Guardian; 2014

[22] Adelakun Abimbola. Fayose's Politics of 'Grassroots Politics'. The

Aberration? The Punch; 2014

Blame? The Nation; 2015

[23] Fagbenle T. Ekiti Voter-Values: An

[24] Ayobolu S. Ekiti Fiasco: Who Is to

[25] Popoola Y. Fayose, Oni's Popularity Contest In Ekiti. Daily Independent;

Politics. The Punch; 2014

State. The Nation; 2006

pdf

University; 2014

The Nation; 2014

Punch; 2014

2015

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

[1] Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009

[2] Diamond L. Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy.

[3] Almami C. Democracy and Elections in Africa: Recent Trends and the Role of the International Community. International Foundation for Electoral

[4] Norris P. Building Political Parties: Reforming Legal Regulations and Internal Rules. Stockholm; 2004. p.

[5] Adetula AO. Money and Politics in Nigeria. Abuja: IFES-Nigeria; 2008

[7] Osuntokun J. Politics in Post 2011 Nigeria: Is Yorubaland Endangered? The

[8] Kolawole D. Awoism: Rekindling the Fortunes of Nigeria and the Destiny of Yoruba Race, Being a Lecture Delivered in Honour of High Chief J.E Babatola to Mark his 90th Birthday Anniversary, Nigerian Tribune, February 11, 2009

[9] Sekoni R. *Leyin Ibo*: The Day after Election in Yorubaland. The Nation; 2014

[10] Akinnaso N. Jonathan, Buhari, and the South-West. The Punch; 2015

[11] Oyebode A. Introduction. In: Oyebode A et al., editors. Ekiti State: The Story of a Determined People. Ado Ekiti: Fountain Newspaper and

[12] Ekiti State Government Bulletin. 2011. Available at: https://ekitistate.gov.

ng/tag/ekiti-state-government/

Publishing Company; 2001

[6] Oyebode A. The Future of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Nigeria, Lecture Delivered at Ikoyi Club, Lagos on May 28, 2012

**References**

2002;**13**(2):7

IDEA

Nation; 2011

Systems, IFES; 2010

*Electoral Behavior and Politics of Stomach Infrastructure in Ekiti State (Nigeria) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81387*

#### **References**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

**54**

**Author details**

Mike Omilusi

provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

Department of Political Science, Ekiti State University, Nigeria

\*Address all correspondence to: watermike2003@yahoo.co.uk

[1] Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009

[2] Diamond L. Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy. 2002;**13**(2):7

[3] Almami C. Democracy and Elections in Africa: Recent Trends and the Role of the International Community. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES; 2010

[4] Norris P. Building Political Parties: Reforming Legal Regulations and Internal Rules. Stockholm; 2004. p. IDEA

[5] Adetula AO. Money and Politics in Nigeria. Abuja: IFES-Nigeria; 2008

[6] Oyebode A. The Future of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Nigeria, Lecture Delivered at Ikoyi Club, Lagos on May 28, 2012

[7] Osuntokun J. Politics in Post 2011 Nigeria: Is Yorubaland Endangered? The Nation; 2011

[8] Kolawole D. Awoism: Rekindling the Fortunes of Nigeria and the Destiny of Yoruba Race, Being a Lecture Delivered in Honour of High Chief J.E Babatola to Mark his 90th Birthday Anniversary, Nigerian Tribune, February 11, 2009

[9] Sekoni R. *Leyin Ibo*: The Day after Election in Yorubaland. The Nation; 2014

[10] Akinnaso N. Jonathan, Buhari, and the South-West. The Punch; 2015

[11] Oyebode A. Introduction. In: Oyebode A et al., editors. Ekiti State: The Story of a Determined People. Ado Ekiti: Fountain Newspaper and Publishing Company; 2001

[12] Ekiti State Government Bulletin. 2011. Available at: https://ekitistate.gov. ng/tag/ekiti-state-government/

[13] Omilusi M. Ekiti: Once a Peaceful State. The Nation; 2006

[14] NGF. State Peer Review Report No. 2, Abridged Version, Ekiti State. 2013. Available at: http://nggovernorsforum. com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ Ekiti-State\_SPRR-Abridged-Version. pdf

[15] Abe Toyin. Governance Reforms in Ekiti State, Nigeria, 2001-2006 [PhD Thesis]. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan; 2010

[16] Omilusi Mike. Electoral Democracy and Governance in South-Western Nigeria, 1999-2009 [Doctoral Thesis]. Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, Ekiti State University; 2014

[17] Akinnaso N. A Meta-Commentary on the Ekiti Election. The Punch; 2014

[18] Akinnaso N. Ekiti 2014 Electoral Politics. The Punch; 2014

[19] Akinnaso N. Why and how Fayose Won the Ekiti Election. The Punch; 2014

[20] Macaulay F. Fantabulous Fayose. The Nation; 2014

[21] Usukuma N. Political Marketing: Are Nigerian Voters Swayed by Emotion or Rationality? The Guardian; 2014

[22] Adelakun Abimbola. Fayose's Politics of 'Grassroots Politics'. The Punch; 2014

[23] Fagbenle T. Ekiti Voter-Values: An Aberration? The Punch; 2014

[24] Ayobolu S. Ekiti Fiasco: Who Is to Blame? The Nation; 2015

[25] Popoola Y. Fayose, Oni's Popularity Contest In Ekiti. Daily Independent; 2015

[26] Jeyifo B. Kayode Fayemi: Not What Went Wrong but What Went Right. The Nation; 2014

[27] Gbadegesin S. Posers from Ekiti 2014. The Nation; 2014

[28] The Economist. Why Reform Is So Hard in Nigeria; 2014

[29] Omatseye S. The Nanny State. The Nation; 2014

[30] Olupohunda B. Ekiti Triumph of *Amala* Politics. The Punch; 2014

[31] Forest JF. Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, JSOU Report 12-5. Florida: The JSOU Press MacDill Air Force Base; 2012

[32] Wantchekon L. Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. World Politics. 2003;**55**(April 2003):399-422

[33] Akinlotan I. Osun Poll: What Next for APC? The Nation; 2014

[34] Adetoye MA. The Politics and Contradictions of Ekiti State Creation [Doctoral Thesis]. Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan; 2010

[35] Baiyewu L. The Cost of Ekiti Governorship Election. The Punch; 2014

[36] Falana F. Ekiti: Fayose Can't Change. The Punch; 2014

[37] Ibrahim J. Ekiti's Lessons for Democracy. Daily Trust; 2014

[38] Thomas D. Fayemi: The Fall and Rise of an Idealist. The Nation; 2014

[39] Diamond L. Building Trust in Government by improving governance. In: 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: "Building Trust in Government" Sponsored by the United Nations Session V: Elections,

Parliament, and Citizen Trust Vienna, June 27, 2007. 2007

[40] World Bank. Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Source Book. Washington D.C: The World Bank; 2002

[41] Beekers Daan, van Gool Bas. From Patronage to Neo-Patrimonialism: Postcolonial Governance in Sub-Sahara Africa and Beyond, African Studies Centre, ASC Working Paper 101/2012; 2012

[42] Lemarchand R, Legg K. Political Clientelism and development: A preliminary analysis. Comparative Politics. 1972;**4**(2):149-178

**57**

**Chapter 4**

**Abstract**

Bangladesh

**1. Introduction**

*Moniruzzaman M.*

Electoral Legitimacy,

Democracy in Bangladesh

Preventive Representation, and

Regularization of Authoritarian

Despite variations in its forms, contents, and qualities, arguably regular election is the only tool that upholds the "democratic" label of a government. Election works as the only legitimizing factor and, over the past several decades, it has become a popular means for authoritarian political leaders or dominant political parties in young or transitional democracies to consolidate their powerbase. Hence, elections have apparently lost their representative value and have, increasingly, been turned into a democratic means to legitimize and institutionalize undemocratic regimes. This has been the most obvious trend in Bangladesh electoral politics over the past decade. Both national and local level elections are engineered in such ways through manipulating electoral laws, the election commission, and the legal system that effectively developed an intended mechanism of preventive representation. A field of electoral competition emerged from such a mechanism where the opposition parties are formally and informally prevented from entering competition in the first place. Technically, this is shown as deliberate nonparticipation by the opposition parties but, in effect, nonparticipation is deliberately orchestrated by the ruling party. An eventual outcome is a government that is free from the parliamentary or legislative opposition, which helps to regularize an authoritarian democracy in the country.

**Keywords:** election, preventive representation, authoritarian democracy,

Democracy is the most desired and legitimate political system in the modern world. Samuel P. Huntington's influential research has shown that over the past 200 years, countries around the world have generally displayed a political tendency to move toward democratic forms of government [1]. Even though there have been substantial reversals in some instances, generally, the trend, has gained momentum following the end of colonialism and, later, the end of the Cold War. This is substantiated by the fact that the number of countries with a democratic form of government today is much higher than at any other time in the past. Huntington argued that the process of democratization occurred in a number of waves; according to his analysis, the third and last wave created the biggest impact. Arguably, the trend

#### **Chapter 4**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

2014. The Nation; 2014

Hard in Nigeria; 2014

Air Force Base; 2012

Nation; 2014

Nation; 2014

[26] Jeyifo B. Kayode Fayemi: Not What Went Wrong but What Went Right. The Parliament, and Citizen Trust Vienna,

[40] World Bank. Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Source Book. Washington D.C: The World Bank; 2002

[41] Beekers Daan, van Gool Bas. From Patronage to Neo-Patrimonialism: Postcolonial Governance in Sub-Sahara Africa and Beyond, African Studies Centre, ASC Working Paper 101/2012;

[42] Lemarchand R, Legg K. Political Clientelism and development: A preliminary analysis. Comparative

Politics. 1972;**4**(2):149-178

June 27, 2007. 2007

2012

[27] Gbadegesin S. Posers from Ekiti

[28] The Economist. Why Reform Is So

[29] Omatseye S. The Nanny State. The

[30] Olupohunda B. Ekiti Triumph of *Amala* Politics. The Punch; 2014

[32] Wantchekon L. Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. World Politics.

[33] Akinlotan I. Osun Poll: What Next

[34] Adetoye MA. The Politics and Contradictions of Ekiti State Creation [Doctoral Thesis]. Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan; 2010

[35] Baiyewu L. The Cost of Ekiti Governorship Election. The Punch; 2014

[37] Ibrahim J. Ekiti's Lessons for Democracy. Daily Trust; 2014

[38] Thomas D. Fayemi: The Fall and Rise of an Idealist. The Nation; 2014

[39] Diamond L. Building Trust in Government by improving governance. In: 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: "Building Trust in Government" Sponsored by the United Nations Session V: Elections,

The Punch; 2014

[36] Falana F. Ekiti: Fayose Can't Change.

2003;**55**(April 2003):399-422

for APC? The Nation; 2014

[31] Forest JF. Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, JSOU Report 12-5. Florida: The JSOU Press MacDill

**56**

## Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian Democracy in Bangladesh

*Moniruzzaman M.*

#### **Abstract**

Despite variations in its forms, contents, and qualities, arguably regular election is the only tool that upholds the "democratic" label of a government. Election works as the only legitimizing factor and, over the past several decades, it has become a popular means for authoritarian political leaders or dominant political parties in young or transitional democracies to consolidate their powerbase. Hence, elections have apparently lost their representative value and have, increasingly, been turned into a democratic means to legitimize and institutionalize undemocratic regimes. This has been the most obvious trend in Bangladesh electoral politics over the past decade. Both national and local level elections are engineered in such ways through manipulating electoral laws, the election commission, and the legal system that effectively developed an intended mechanism of preventive representation. A field of electoral competition emerged from such a mechanism where the opposition parties are formally and informally prevented from entering competition in the first place. Technically, this is shown as deliberate nonparticipation by the opposition parties but, in effect, nonparticipation is deliberately orchestrated by the ruling party. An eventual outcome is a government that is free from the parliamentary or legislative opposition, which helps to regularize an authoritarian democracy in the country.

**Keywords:** election, preventive representation, authoritarian democracy, Bangladesh

#### **1. Introduction**

Democracy is the most desired and legitimate political system in the modern world. Samuel P. Huntington's influential research has shown that over the past 200 years, countries around the world have generally displayed a political tendency to move toward democratic forms of government [1]. Even though there have been substantial reversals in some instances, generally, the trend, has gained momentum following the end of colonialism and, later, the end of the Cold War. This is substantiated by the fact that the number of countries with a democratic form of government today is much higher than at any other time in the past. Huntington argued that the process of democratization occurred in a number of waves; according to his analysis, the third and last wave created the biggest impact. Arguably, the trend

toward democracy after 1990, following the end of the Soviet Socialist system, the Gulf war in 1991, and the "Arab Spring" in 2010, set the biggest wave, which some experts have termed the fourth wave [2–5].

As the cornerstone of democracy is the peoples' representation and rule, democratization obviously involves elections. Thus, elections have been the only means to connect between peoples' representation and democracy. However, elections as a system and mechanism are not a monolith; rather, it has taken on a variety of forms to ensure proper representation [6]; the two most popular forms being first-pastthe post, and proportional representation (and its varieties). Over time, as the democratization trend continuously gained momentum, the election mechanism has developed with further complexities. Notwithstanding multiple variations and complexities, it appears that countries' transition toward—and continue in its maintenance of—democracy, invariably has led to elections being implemented as a means of legitimacy.

In mature and consolidated democracies, especially in highly industrialist countries, elections serve twin functions: representation of the people and continuity of democracy. But that, apparently, is not the case with new or young democracies in nonindustrialist or underdeveloped countries, where elections are used merely as legitimizing tools for the ruling regime to preserve and continue its power. Therefore, the true meaning of "representation" often remains suppressed. An analysis of the relationship between elections and democracy in Asian, African, and Latin American countries reveal that the ruling regimes tend to hold periodic elections to maintain a "legitimacy cloak" of democracy. Hence, the meaning of and relationship between elections and democracy in "western" and nonwestern countries are not the same.

This chapter takes a detailed look at elections in Bangladesh, and their true function, not as a means of representation and democracy, but as a means of *preventive* representation, and a legitimizing label for the ruling regimes. In other words, elections are manipulated to prevent the opposition parties from representing the people, to provide legitimacy to the ruling parties, and to maintain the democratic label of governance. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the general electoral and democratic trends in western and nonwestern countries; and the second section offers a detailed analysis of elections and democracy in Bangladesh.

#### **2. Election, representation, and democracy**

There is an inseparable relationship among election, political representation, and democracy. One without the others is inconceivable. It is the idea of democracy as a political system that essentially necessitates the other two. The idea of democracy is not new; it is as old as the ancient Greek political thought. The Greek philosophers of the time, notably Plato and Aristotle, discussed and analyzed democracy as a system of government in comparison with other systems such as monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. Even though it was well conceived, the philosophers did not prescribe the system as necessarily good for its society. These philosophers maintained a lofty vision of an ideal society, which was based on a different set of moral good and virtue from that of the common man. They perceived that the common citizen possessed neither the level of knowledge nor the balanced moral standard required to rule that ideal society. Hence, the concept of democracy as common peoples' rule was ranked at the lowest level of gradation. In any case, subsequently, the Greek political thought was overtaken by the prevalence

**59**

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian…*

of imperial and monarchic system. Interestingly, even that idea of democracy was

However, over the next two millennia, the gradual decline of the imperial and monarchial system gave rise to democratic thought and system [7, 8]. The European renaissance, reformation, and rationalism redefined the role and place of human beings in society. These movements placed humans at the center of everything as the author and maker of society, its rules and regulations replacing the role of divinity. The preeminence of humans took the center stage [9]. Eventually, rationality-based "legal-formal" political authority replaced "traditional." This legal-formal political authority was the direct or indirect representation of the people and was termed democratic. The process of representation eventually came to be known as elections. The mechanism of elections developed into the modern form of direct and indirect or first-past-the-post or proportional representation with different varieties. All over the world today, democracy is considered the most desired and legitimate form of political system, and the "democratic" regimes with all of their

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

not prevalent anywhere in the ancient world.

varieties are legitimized with one form of election or other.

**3. Electoral practices in western and nonwestern countries**

serious shortcomings in terms of free and fair electoral politics [17].

The western industrial countries experienced the emergence of democracy first, starting more than 200 years ago, which gave those democracies plenty of time to develop, mature, and consolidate by the time the nonwestern countries were introduced to the system following the end of colonialism. Over the course of two centuries, the mature western democracies of today have been able to institutionalize the electoral politics that ensure fair representation of the people in the government. With the exception of certain time periods when some of those democracies slipped into military authoritarianisms, generally, those democracies have maintained the tradition of party politics, electoral competition, and elected governments. Free and fair elections have been the defining characteristics of those democracies. Therefore, the western European, North American, Australia, New Zealand, and Japanese democracies are referred to as models of ideal electoral democracies [10]. Following the continental European or American models of representative and electoral democracies, the nonwestern countries have adopted either the American presidential or British parliamentarian system. However, these nonwestern countries have adapted the models to their local conditions, instead of adopting them in entirety. Because of many local political, economic, cultural, and other social reasons, electoral politics in nonwestern countries have not been institutionalized; rather in the name of democracy, party politics and election, a culture of electoral corruption and denial of competitive and fair representation have persisted. The South Asian (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan), African (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, South Africa, Sierra Leon), and Latin American (Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Chile, Peru) democracies and electoral practices are heavily marred by violence, manipulation, malpractices, and subjected to government control [11–13]. Many authoritarian democracies and electoral politics in Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia), Africa (Algeria, Egypt), Arab (Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria), and Latin America (Venezuela) are heavily controlled by their sitting governments [14–16]. There, the oppositions are systematically denied the opportunity or offered a little space to contest in elections, and the controlled elections are meant just to legitimize the "democratic" label of the governments. Those democracies with defective and manipulative electoral politics are sometimes grouped together as "illiberal democracies," indicating that those "democracies" have

#### *Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

of imperial and monarchic system. Interestingly, even that idea of democracy was not prevalent anywhere in the ancient world.

However, over the next two millennia, the gradual decline of the imperial and monarchial system gave rise to democratic thought and system [7, 8]. The European renaissance, reformation, and rationalism redefined the role and place of human beings in society. These movements placed humans at the center of everything as the author and maker of society, its rules and regulations replacing the role of divinity. The preeminence of humans took the center stage [9]. Eventually, rationality-based "legal-formal" political authority replaced "traditional." This legal-formal political authority was the direct or indirect representation of the people and was termed democratic. The process of representation eventually came to be known as elections. The mechanism of elections developed into the modern form of direct and indirect or first-past-the-post or proportional representation with different varieties. All over the world today, democracy is considered the most desired and legitimate form of political system, and the "democratic" regimes with all of their varieties are legitimized with one form of election or other.

#### **3. Electoral practices in western and nonwestern countries**

The western industrial countries experienced the emergence of democracy first, starting more than 200 years ago, which gave those democracies plenty of time to develop, mature, and consolidate by the time the nonwestern countries were introduced to the system following the end of colonialism. Over the course of two centuries, the mature western democracies of today have been able to institutionalize the electoral politics that ensure fair representation of the people in the government. With the exception of certain time periods when some of those democracies slipped into military authoritarianisms, generally, those democracies have maintained the tradition of party politics, electoral competition, and elected governments. Free and fair elections have been the defining characteristics of those democracies. Therefore, the western European, North American, Australia, New Zealand, and Japanese democracies are referred to as models of ideal electoral democracies [10].

Following the continental European or American models of representative and electoral democracies, the nonwestern countries have adopted either the American presidential or British parliamentarian system. However, these nonwestern countries have adapted the models to their local conditions, instead of adopting them in entirety. Because of many local political, economic, cultural, and other social reasons, electoral politics in nonwestern countries have not been institutionalized; rather in the name of democracy, party politics and election, a culture of electoral corruption and denial of competitive and fair representation have persisted. The South Asian (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan), African (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, South Africa, Sierra Leon), and Latin American (Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Chile, Peru) democracies and electoral practices are heavily marred by violence, manipulation, malpractices, and subjected to government control [11–13]. Many authoritarian democracies and electoral politics in Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia), Africa (Algeria, Egypt), Arab (Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria), and Latin America (Venezuela) are heavily controlled by their sitting governments [14–16]. There, the oppositions are systematically denied the opportunity or offered a little space to contest in elections, and the controlled elections are meant just to legitimize the "democratic" label of the governments. Those democracies with defective and manipulative electoral politics are sometimes grouped together as "illiberal democracies," indicating that those "democracies" have serious shortcomings in terms of free and fair electoral politics [17].

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

means of legitimacy.

countries are not the same.

**2. Election, representation, and democracy**

Bangladesh.

experts have termed the fourth wave [2–5].

toward democracy after 1990, following the end of the Soviet Socialist system, the Gulf war in 1991, and the "Arab Spring" in 2010, set the biggest wave, which some

In mature and consolidated democracies, especially in highly industrialist countries, elections serve twin functions: representation of the people and continuity of democracy. But that, apparently, is not the case with new or young democracies in nonindustrialist or underdeveloped countries, where elections are used merely as legitimizing tools for the ruling regime to preserve and continue its power. Therefore, the true meaning of "representation" often remains suppressed. An analysis of the relationship between elections and democracy in Asian, African, and Latin American countries reveal that the ruling regimes tend to hold periodic elections to maintain a "legitimacy cloak" of democracy. Hence, the meaning of and relationship between elections and democracy in "western" and nonwestern

This chapter takes a detailed look at elections in Bangladesh, and their true function, not as a means of representation and democracy, but as a means of *preventive* representation, and a legitimizing label for the ruling regimes. In other words, elections are manipulated to prevent the opposition parties from representing the people, to provide legitimacy to the ruling parties, and to maintain the democratic label of governance. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the general electoral and democratic trends in western and nonwestern countries; and the second section offers a detailed analysis of elections and democracy in

There is an inseparable relationship among election, political representation, and democracy. One without the others is inconceivable. It is the idea of democracy as a political system that essentially necessitates the other two. The idea of democracy is not new; it is as old as the ancient Greek political thought. The Greek philosophers of the time, notably Plato and Aristotle, discussed and analyzed democracy as a system of government in comparison with other systems such as monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. Even though it was well conceived, the philosophers did not prescribe the system as necessarily good for its society. These philosophers maintained a lofty vision of an ideal society, which was based on a different set of moral good and virtue from that of the common man. They perceived that the common citizen possessed neither the level of knowledge nor the balanced moral standard required to rule that ideal society. Hence, the concept of democracy as common peoples' rule was ranked at the lowest level of gradation. In any case, subsequently, the Greek political thought was overtaken by the prevalence

As the cornerstone of democracy is the peoples' representation and rule, democratization obviously involves elections. Thus, elections have been the only means to connect between peoples' representation and democracy. However, elections as a system and mechanism are not a monolith; rather, it has taken on a variety of forms to ensure proper representation [6]; the two most popular forms being first-pastthe post, and proportional representation (and its varieties). Over time, as the democratization trend continuously gained momentum, the election mechanism has developed with further complexities. Notwithstanding multiple variations and complexities, it appears that countries' transition toward—and continue in its maintenance of—democracy, invariably has led to elections being implemented as a

**58**

#### **4. Electoral trend and history in Bangladesh**

Bangladesh is a tiny but populous South Asian country. Then called East Pakistan, its independence from West Pakistan in 1971 came as a result of West Pakistani's denial of a transfer of political power to the victorious East Pakistani political party. The entire Pakistan was to transit from military to democratic rule through national legislative elections held in December 1970. Historically, this occurred toward the end of what Huntington termed the Second Wave of democracy. Even though its citizens gave a resounding electoral mandate to the east Pakistani political party named Awami League, the west Pakistani popular leader and the west-Pakistan dominated military regimes were reluctant to uphold the representation choice of the people, and instead were inclined to a military authoritarian regime. Eventually, a 9-month long civil war broke out, essentially on the issue of representation; East Pakistan achieved independence with a new name: Bangladesh [18].

Since 1971, independent Bangladesh has conducted 10 national elections, the first in 1973, and the most recent in 2014. However, the electoral and government systems kept oscillating between parliamentary and presidential, until it finally settled in favor of a parliamentary system, which effected through a constitutional amendment in 1991. Its legislature, known as *Jatiyo Sangsad* (national assembly), is comprised of 350 directly elected members for a 5-year term. Of these, 300 are elected based on first-past-the-post system, representing single-member electoral districts. The elected members then fill the remaining 50 seats, reserved for women, based on proportional representation of the elected parties.

Even though there are at least four dozen political parties in Bangladesh, only two parties stand tall: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Since the mid-1980s, the two parties have maintained coalition alliances separately with other minor parties. AL has a coalition of 14 parties, and BNP has a coalition of 18 parties. In the early 1970s, AL enjoyed almost absolute popularity as a freedom-winning party for the country; in 1973, it achieved landslide victory in 1973 elections. However, by the late 1970s, BNP was established and wrested AL's popularity in the 1979 election. The tide turned in the 1986 elections when a new party, Jatiya Party (JP), which was formed in 1984, contested the election. From 1991 onward, electoral contestation has remained basically in the hands of AL and BNP [19].

In Bangladesh, elections are conducted at seven layers of administration at both national and local levels. From top to bottom, these are the presidential election, national assembly election, city corporation election, district council election, subdistrict council election, municipal election, and union council election. At all levels, the elections are conducted along party lines.

During the first decade of independence, elections were largely a fairly competitive game for representative politics. Either because the people were not highly politically socialized, or the scope of political participation was limited to city dwellers, the elections were systematic, competitions were among professional politicians, and representations were by qualified politicians. However, over time, the representational politics became tainted with money, muscle, violence, manipulation, and became largely commercial in nature. The goals for such tainted representational politics were twofold: continuation of the ruling party in power by any means possible and prevention of the opposition from getting into power by any means possible. Between these two goals, the real objective of political representation through elections had disappeared. This remains the trend of politics of preventive representation and regularization of authoritarian democracy in Bangladesh.

**61**

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian…*

Until 1970, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) elections were contestations between east and west Pakistan, which probably bound the Bengalis more tightly, allowing them to overlook their differences. However, in independent Bangladesh, the scope, objectives and process of electoral competition have changed such that the stakes have become very high, due to increasing population and limited resources. This was further aggravated by the nature and intensity of traditional and modern forms of economic and political clientelism that decisively control resource allocation and distribution in Bangladesh. Therefore, as a global wave, Bangladesh has had to lean toward maintaining a democratic form of government, and to do that, it had to allow for periodic elections. But since competition for political and economic resources are very high, elections did not remain immune from deliberate distortion. A culture of massive election engineering has developed since the mid-1980s, and has become a political endemic in the country, ridiculing representation and democracy [20].

There are many forms of election engineering that various political parties have practiced during the past three decades. These various forms include intentional timing, gerrymandering, changing of electoral rules, and the voting system. Due to the spike in population and sociopolitical development over time, such changes are sometimes warranted. Therefore, with the ever-changing contexts and demographics, even consolidated democracies sometimes adjust aspects of their electoral mechanisms and processes, though mostly for the purpose of ensuring fair representation. However, in young and new democracies, especially in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, election engineering includes deliberate means to control the entire election and representative process. Often, elections are offered periodically to renew the legitimacy—and ascertain the longevity—of the ruling parties or regimes, and not necessarily to mean that those in power are the true representatives of the people. Simultaneously, the entire election mechanism is controlled in such a way that it prevents the representatives desired by the people from rising to power. During the past decade, the electoral practices in Bangladesh

have displayed a strong tendency toward preventive representation.

forms of electoral malpractices and corruptions are discussed [21–27].

As described earlier, elections in nonwestern countries are heavily marred by defective practices, and Bangladesh is not an exception. In this section, specific

Elections in Bangladesh are managed and conducted by an autonomous body known as Bangladesh Election Commission (EC), which is constitutionally sanctioned and empowered. Constitutionally, the EC is to discharge the duties relating to election, maintaining absolute neutrality without favoring or disfavoring the ruling or the opposition parties. However, in Bangladesh, the EC has become a highly politicized and controversial institution since 1991. Since it has the absolute power in determining district boundaries, nomination and selection, ballot-box distribution and vote counting, the ruling parties have been heavily inclined to use the institutions in their favor by appointing like-minded or partisan Commissioners. The opposition parties, being aware of such facts, take it gravely, to the point of sparking serious antigovernment movements and national political crises, as occurred in the mid- and late-1990s. So the appointment of an election commis-

**5.1 Mechanism of preventive representation in Bangladesh**

sioner is an important consideration of a sitting government.

*5.1.1 Controlling of the election commission*

**5. Election engineering and preventive representation**

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

#### **5. Election engineering and preventive representation**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

Bangladesh [18].

of AL and BNP [19].

**4. Electoral trend and history in Bangladesh**

Bangladesh is a tiny but populous South Asian country. Then called East Pakistan, its independence from West Pakistan in 1971 came as a result of West Pakistani's denial of a transfer of political power to the victorious East Pakistani political party. The entire Pakistan was to transit from military to democratic rule through national legislative elections held in December 1970. Historically, this occurred toward the end of what Huntington termed the Second Wave of democracy. Even though its citizens gave a resounding electoral mandate to the east Pakistani political party named Awami League, the west Pakistani popular leader and the west-Pakistan dominated military regimes were reluctant to uphold the representation choice of the people, and instead were inclined to a military authoritarian regime. Eventually, a 9-month long civil war broke out, essentially on the issue of representation; East Pakistan achieved independence with a new name:

Since 1971, independent Bangladesh has conducted 10 national elections, the first in 1973, and the most recent in 2014. However, the electoral and government systems kept oscillating between parliamentary and presidential, until it finally settled in favor of a parliamentary system, which effected through a constitutional amendment in 1991. Its legislature, known as *Jatiyo Sangsad* (national assembly), is comprised of 350 directly elected members for a 5-year term. Of these, 300 are elected based on first-past-the-post system, representing single-member electoral districts. The elected members then fill the remaining 50 seats, reserved for women,

Even though there are at least four dozen political parties in Bangladesh, only two parties stand tall: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Since the mid-1980s, the two parties have maintained coalition alliances separately with other minor parties. AL has a coalition of 14 parties, and BNP has a coalition of 18 parties. In the early 1970s, AL enjoyed almost absolute popularity as a freedom-winning party for the country; in 1973, it achieved landslide victory in 1973 elections. However, by the late 1970s, BNP was established and wrested AL's popularity in the 1979 election. The tide turned in the 1986 elections when a new party, Jatiya Party (JP), which was formed in 1984, contested the election. From 1991 onward, electoral contestation has remained basically in the hands

In Bangladesh, elections are conducted at seven layers of administration at both national and local levels. From top to bottom, these are the presidential election, national assembly election, city corporation election, district council election, subdistrict council election, municipal election, and union council election. At all

During the first decade of independence, elections were largely a fairly competi-

tive game for representative politics. Either because the people were not highly politically socialized, or the scope of political participation was limited to city dwellers, the elections were systematic, competitions were among professional politicians, and representations were by qualified politicians. However, over time, the representational politics became tainted with money, muscle, violence, manipulation, and became largely commercial in nature. The goals for such tainted representational politics were twofold: continuation of the ruling party in power by any means possible and prevention of the opposition from getting into power by any means possible. Between these two goals, the real objective of political representation through elections had disappeared. This remains the trend of politics of preventive representation and regularization of authoritarian democracy in

based on proportional representation of the elected parties.

levels, the elections are conducted along party lines.

**60**

Bangladesh.

Until 1970, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) elections were contestations between east and west Pakistan, which probably bound the Bengalis more tightly, allowing them to overlook their differences. However, in independent Bangladesh, the scope, objectives and process of electoral competition have changed such that the stakes have become very high, due to increasing population and limited resources. This was further aggravated by the nature and intensity of traditional and modern forms of economic and political clientelism that decisively control resource allocation and distribution in Bangladesh. Therefore, as a global wave, Bangladesh has had to lean toward maintaining a democratic form of government, and to do that, it had to allow for periodic elections. But since competition for political and economic resources are very high, elections did not remain immune from deliberate distortion. A culture of massive election engineering has developed since the mid-1980s, and has become a political endemic in the country, ridiculing representation and democracy [20].

There are many forms of election engineering that various political parties have practiced during the past three decades. These various forms include intentional timing, gerrymandering, changing of electoral rules, and the voting system. Due to the spike in population and sociopolitical development over time, such changes are sometimes warranted. Therefore, with the ever-changing contexts and demographics, even consolidated democracies sometimes adjust aspects of their electoral mechanisms and processes, though mostly for the purpose of ensuring fair representation. However, in young and new democracies, especially in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, election engineering includes deliberate means to control the entire election and representative process. Often, elections are offered periodically to renew the legitimacy—and ascertain the longevity—of the ruling parties or regimes, and not necessarily to mean that those in power are the true representatives of the people. Simultaneously, the entire election mechanism is controlled in such a way that it prevents the representatives desired by the people from rising to power. During the past decade, the electoral practices in Bangladesh have displayed a strong tendency toward preventive representation.

#### **5.1 Mechanism of preventive representation in Bangladesh**

As described earlier, elections in nonwestern countries are heavily marred by defective practices, and Bangladesh is not an exception. In this section, specific forms of electoral malpractices and corruptions are discussed [21–27].

#### *5.1.1 Controlling of the election commission*

Elections in Bangladesh are managed and conducted by an autonomous body known as Bangladesh Election Commission (EC), which is constitutionally sanctioned and empowered. Constitutionally, the EC is to discharge the duties relating to election, maintaining absolute neutrality without favoring or disfavoring the ruling or the opposition parties. However, in Bangladesh, the EC has become a highly politicized and controversial institution since 1991. Since it has the absolute power in determining district boundaries, nomination and selection, ballot-box distribution and vote counting, the ruling parties have been heavily inclined to use the institutions in their favor by appointing like-minded or partisan Commissioners. The opposition parties, being aware of such facts, take it gravely, to the point of sparking serious antigovernment movements and national political crises, as occurred in the mid- and late-1990s. So the appointment of an election commissioner is an important consideration of a sitting government.

An election commissioner should, ideally, be a politically neutral person commanding respect and acceptance by all. The most desired candidate for the post would, for instance, be a recently retired chief justice. A sitting government pays particular attention to this factor and awaits a suitable time when the retirement of a chief justice and appointment of an election commissioner coincides. For that matter, the government may intentionally appoint a chief justice knowing that his retirement could coincide with the timing for appointing a new election commissioner, so that he can then be chosen for the EC position. This was a common strategy during much of the 1990s, when major political parties could still force each other to change the course of action. However, over the recent decade, the issue has become normalized in favor of government choice, as the voice and influence of the opposition parties have been completely decimated through an authoritarian type of elected government. Since 1995, all seven chief election commissioners have been seriously controversial and considered to be highly partisan, as their decisions and behaviors clearly supported the government's preferences. The most notorious chief EC was the 11th commissioner (2012–2017), when the 2014 national and 2016 Union Council elections were the most controversial and defiantly in favor of the ruling party.

#### *5.1.2 Imprisonment*

Preventive representation is often associated with predatory legal means to disqualify prospective opposition candidates from contesting elections. In Bangladesh, arbitrary and false cases against social and political opponents are commonplace, and are effective tools to score political gains. The culture of filing cases against anonymous suspects is very strong, and primarily used against political opponents. The recently adopted antiterrorism and cybercrime laws have added a new dimension to the existing culture of false cases and arbitrary arrests. Usually, for any political violence, the ruling party activists file police cases *en masse* and anonymously against the opposition activists. During the election period, the police, then, in collaboration with the ruling party, arrested the key opposition figures, ostensibly for some wrong that had been filed earlier by an anonymous individual. This is then used, with reference to electoral rules, to disqualify key opposition candidates from contesting in elections. In addition, many are denied bail by the courts, which are also controlled by the partisan judges. As such, a carefully coordinated legal, administrative and political nexus is used to frame political opponents within the legal grid to systematically prevent them from contesting. The implication is that such practice denies people the opportunity to choose from a wide range of candidates. In other words, it often offers the voters no alternative choice, which results in many voters abstaining from voting; this ensures that the ruling party's fielded candidates will win the elections.

#### *5.1.3 Preventing nomination*

Elections offer open and equal opportunity for every eligible citizen to contest to represent the people and their interests in politics and government. For that, every citizen has equal right to file a nomination for election, either independently, or on behalf of a party. However, in Bangladesh, such a level playing field is increasingly disappearing with the rise of new and innovative techniques to prevent the nomination of opposition candidates in the first place. This was very systematically played for the first time in massive form in 2014 national parliamentary elections.

In that instance, AL, which was (and still is) the sitting government, was bent to get re-elected with even a stronger majority, for which it adopted a policy of

**63**

with a huge margin.

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian…*

preventing nominations on a massive scale. The AL wanted to ensure its simple majority in that year's parliamentary elections amidst an empty field, i.e., no opposition candidates. To ensure this, AL's armed thugs and activists intimidated willing opposition candidates at their homes with threats, and warned them against filing a nomination; the opposition candidates who showed up on Nomination Day were prevented from approaching the election commission offices to file for nominations; and those who were able to file their nomination were forced under severe threats to withdraw. This was systematically done to ensure that at least 154 seats would not be contested, a figure sufficient to ascertain a simple majority. In total, 154 seats were uncontested. Of the remaining seats, the ruling party ensured that most of the seats were won by their candidates. Such massive manipulation of the election mechanism resulted in all of the opposition parties boycotting the election,

For elections, campaigning is a must. However, in Bangladesh, political campaigning is now mostly one sided, as the opposition parties enjoy no—or relatively little—opportunity to campaign: the nature of political campaigning is violenceprone, and its forms include large-scale, open-air political gatherings, mammoth street processions, competitive showdowns, and physical violence. Naturally, the ruling party always enjoys the support of the law-enforcement authorities in such competitive election campaigns, while the opposition parties are disfavored by those authorities. The police often approve the ruling party's use of a suitable public space, including major roads for campaign gathering, at the same time denying the opposition parties the same. Often, if a public venue is approved for an opposition party for a specific day and time, the ruling party will then organize a similar event at the same place and time; this then becomes an excuse for the police to cancel both events. In the face of such predatory government and police behaviors, the opposition is always disadvantaged. Obviously, such political and administrative obstructions prevent the opposition and the people from reaching out to the other during

In elections, ballot casting venues are represented by polling agents of political parties. In their presence, manipulation of ballot papers or the vote casting process is prevented. This ensures free and fair elections. However, for preventive represen-

Malpractice in elections is very common in Bangladesh, and it has become highly institutionalized since the 1986 parliamentary elections under the military regime. Among other malpractices, expelling the polling agents of opposition parties from the polling booths was a common complaint that the EC would receive in large numbers. However, recently under the AL government, the practice has spiked to a disproportionate level. This was particularly noticed in the 2018 Gazipur City Corporation election, where about 50 polling agents from opposition BNP were arrested by plainclothes secret police, even though there were no criminal bases against them. Reportedly, they were simply approached by a number of unknown individuals to step out of the polling booths for a chat; once out, the polling agents were asked to remain silent and were escorted out of the polling station and taken far away for the rest of the day. They were released 60–100 km away at the end of the day. By then, the voting was conveniently over, and the AL candidate had won

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

thus preventing a fair representation.

*5.1.4 Preventing political campaign*

the campaign period.

*5.1.5 Arresting polling agents*

tation, this is an obstacle.

#### *Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

preventing nominations on a massive scale. The AL wanted to ensure its simple majority in that year's parliamentary elections amidst an empty field, i.e., no opposition candidates. To ensure this, AL's armed thugs and activists intimidated willing opposition candidates at their homes with threats, and warned them against filing a nomination; the opposition candidates who showed up on Nomination Day were prevented from approaching the election commission offices to file for nominations; and those who were able to file their nomination were forced under severe threats to withdraw. This was systematically done to ensure that at least 154 seats would not be contested, a figure sufficient to ascertain a simple majority. In total, 154 seats were uncontested. Of the remaining seats, the ruling party ensured that most of the seats were won by their candidates. Such massive manipulation of the election mechanism resulted in all of the opposition parties boycotting the election, thus preventing a fair representation.

#### *5.1.4 Preventing political campaign*

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

ruling party.

*5.1.2 Imprisonment*

will win the elections.

*5.1.3 Preventing nomination*

An election commissioner should, ideally, be a politically neutral person commanding respect and acceptance by all. The most desired candidate for the post would, for instance, be a recently retired chief justice. A sitting government pays particular attention to this factor and awaits a suitable time when the retirement of a chief justice and appointment of an election commissioner coincides. For that matter, the government may intentionally appoint a chief justice knowing that his retirement could coincide with the timing for appointing a new election commissioner, so that he can then be chosen for the EC position. This was a common strategy during much of the 1990s, when major political parties could still force each other to change the course of action. However, over the recent decade, the issue has become normalized in favor of government choice, as the voice and influence of the opposition parties have been completely decimated through an authoritarian type of elected government. Since 1995, all seven chief election commissioners have been seriously controversial and considered to be highly partisan, as their decisions and behaviors clearly supported the government's preferences. The most notorious chief EC was the 11th commissioner (2012–2017), when the 2014 national and 2016 Union Council elections were the most controversial and defiantly in favor of the

Preventive representation is often associated with predatory legal means to disqualify prospective opposition candidates from contesting elections. In Bangladesh, arbitrary and false cases against social and political opponents are commonplace, and are effective tools to score political gains. The culture of filing cases against anonymous suspects is very strong, and primarily used against political opponents. The recently adopted antiterrorism and cybercrime laws have added a new dimension to the existing culture of false cases and arbitrary arrests. Usually, for any political violence, the ruling party activists file police cases *en masse* and anonymously against the opposition activists. During the election period, the police, then, in collaboration with the ruling party, arrested the key opposition figures, ostensibly for some wrong that had been filed earlier by an anonymous individual. This is then used, with reference to electoral rules, to disqualify key opposition candidates from contesting in elections. In addition, many are denied bail by the courts, which are also controlled by the partisan judges. As such, a carefully coordinated legal, administrative and political nexus is used to frame political opponents within the legal grid to systematically prevent them from contesting. The implication is that such practice denies people the opportunity to choose from a wide range of candidates. In other words, it often offers the voters no alternative choice, which results in many voters abstaining from voting; this ensures that the ruling party's fielded candidates

Elections offer open and equal opportunity for every eligible citizen to contest to represent the people and their interests in politics and government. For that, every citizen has equal right to file a nomination for election, either independently, or on behalf of a party. However, in Bangladesh, such a level playing field is increasingly disappearing with the rise of new and innovative techniques to prevent the nomination of opposition candidates in the first place. This was very systematically played

In that instance, AL, which was (and still is) the sitting government, was bent to get re-elected with even a stronger majority, for which it adopted a policy of

for the first time in massive form in 2014 national parliamentary elections.

**62**

For elections, campaigning is a must. However, in Bangladesh, political campaigning is now mostly one sided, as the opposition parties enjoy no—or relatively little—opportunity to campaign: the nature of political campaigning is violenceprone, and its forms include large-scale, open-air political gatherings, mammoth street processions, competitive showdowns, and physical violence. Naturally, the ruling party always enjoys the support of the law-enforcement authorities in such competitive election campaigns, while the opposition parties are disfavored by those authorities. The police often approve the ruling party's use of a suitable public space, including major roads for campaign gathering, at the same time denying the opposition parties the same. Often, if a public venue is approved for an opposition party for a specific day and time, the ruling party will then organize a similar event at the same place and time; this then becomes an excuse for the police to cancel both events. In the face of such predatory government and police behaviors, the opposition is always disadvantaged. Obviously, such political and administrative obstructions prevent the opposition and the people from reaching out to the other during the campaign period.

#### *5.1.5 Arresting polling agents*

In elections, ballot casting venues are represented by polling agents of political parties. In their presence, manipulation of ballot papers or the vote casting process is prevented. This ensures free and fair elections. However, for preventive representation, this is an obstacle.

Malpractice in elections is very common in Bangladesh, and it has become highly institutionalized since the 1986 parliamentary elections under the military regime. Among other malpractices, expelling the polling agents of opposition parties from the polling booths was a common complaint that the EC would receive in large numbers. However, recently under the AL government, the practice has spiked to a disproportionate level. This was particularly noticed in the 2018 Gazipur City Corporation election, where about 50 polling agents from opposition BNP were arrested by plainclothes secret police, even though there were no criminal bases against them. Reportedly, they were simply approached by a number of unknown individuals to step out of the polling booths for a chat; once out, the polling agents were asked to remain silent and were escorted out of the polling station and taken far away for the rest of the day. They were released 60–100 km away at the end of the day. By then, the voting was conveniently over, and the AL candidate had won with a huge margin.

#### *5.1.6 Preventing polling agents*

Expelling the polling agents or arresting them from the polling booths is an onsite example of electoral malpractices intended to prevent opposition candidates from winning. However, there are frequent offsite practices of the same when the polling agents are not even allowed to approach the polling stations in the first place. The armed supporters of the ruling party take position in groups en route to the polling stations, but not within the vicinity, to block the polling agents from reaching the polling stations. Often at gun point, they are forced to turn back, and are asked to stay away for the entire day. This is a common practice in any type of election at any level. Absence of polling agents from the polling booths creates an unsafe atmosphere for the party supporters, which eventually keeps them away from voting.

#### *5.1.7 Arresting supporters*

Another recent trend has been the arrest of opposition party supporters by the police immediately before the election day. The police might initiate an anticrime drive a few days before the election and indiscriminately arrest supporters of opposition parties based on information given by the ruling party channels. The supporters may be forcibly taken from a political rally or campaign meeting in the name of public safety; once arrested, there may be arbitrary accusations filed against them even if they are innocent. This policy was extensively used in the Khulna City Corporation elections in 2018. In this way, a large number of supporters and voters are prevented from voting, which leads to unfair representation.

#### *5.1.8 Casting of bogus votes*

A very widespread electoral corruption in Bangladesh is bogus and phantom votes. The obsession to win and to deny the opposition a vote is a political attitude that makes no compromise. The major parties and their activists never consider elections as a win or lose game; rather, they are obsessed with the attitude that elections are to win, and not to lose. As such, elections are for absolute gain. To secure that, the parties and their activists always want to make sure that they get more and, if possible, all the votes. An easy way to ensure winning is to stuff the ballot box with false votes.

False votes are casted in two major ways. Firstly, by voting on another's behalf: those who control the polling booths complete the vote casting on behalf of the voters according to the list of voter names in their possession. In this case, the party supporters are also allowed to enter the polling booths multiple times to caste on behalf of other voters. Individual voters who go to the polling stations may find that their votes have already been casted. In this case, the casted votes are always in support of the candidates whose supporters control the polling booths. Secondly, stuffing the ballot boxes with false votes: in this case, either the polling agents who control the polling booths stuff the boxes with ballot papers in favor of their party, or they allow party activists to enter the polling booths as a group and do the same. The obvious results of such electoral corruption are two; one, the ruling party candidates win, with a large margin of vote difference; and two, the total vote cast sometimes ends up with a bigger number than the total number of voters in the constituency or at a particular polling station.

#### *5.1.9 Hijacking ballot boxes*

The ultimate electoral corruption in Bangladesh takes place through hijacking the ballot boxes when it becomes clear that the ruling party candidates are likely to

**65**

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian…*

**6. An analysis of the mechanism of preventive representation**

lose. Hijacking of ballot boxes involves armed violence and often, the law enforcing authorities are found to be inactive in preventing the crime. The purpose of hijacking is to destroy the casted ballot papers so that in vote counting, the opposition does not win, or the voting process is canceled. Often, the EC and the police do not recognize such irregularities, and no legal challenge is entertained. Sometimes, the EC takes into consideration certain complaints but, in its investigation, the accusa-

The foregoing section demonstrates the various types of means and ways of electoral malpractices and corruptions. It is clear from the discussion that elections are recognized as a means of political legitimacy; however, elections are highly manipulated in favor of the ruling regimes, and against opposition parties. An intimidating electoral atmosphere is deliberately created for the opposition parties so that they cannot take part in elections in the first place. Hence, only one political party represents the people in government, albeit through elections. So elections serve dual purposes—to ensure that the ruling party continues in power, and that the opposition is systematically prevented from representing the people. Theoretically, elections perform the job of selection and de-selection, and no ruling party wants to be removed from power through elections. However, these normal functions of elections are only partially applied in Bangladesh. Why is it so, and

Perhaps the answers to these questions are to be found in the peculiar nature of its political history, party politics, and political culture. Here, we attempt to offer

The political history, party politics, and political culture are highly interrelated

This political history reflects on party politics of the country. Through a multiparty system, the parties are ideologically aligned with secular, religious, and socialist ideologies who maintain a peculiar love-hate relationship. Other than AL and BNP, the remaining political parties command a tiny support base among the people. However, neither of the two parties commands enough support and popularity to win majority seats in the parliament; hence, they form alliances with like-minded parties. This led to the emergence of alliance-based party politics from around the mid-1980s. Since then, the AL commands a 14-party alliance, while BNP commands an 18-party alliance. The AL is leftist-oriented in that it is composed of

in Bangladesh. The most important of the three is its political history, which officially starts with its independence—a highly charged political issue, which was both highly uniting and dividing at the same time. Independence was achieved after a long civil war in which the AL party led the independence movement and proindependence civil war in association with some other left-oriented minor parties. However, a group of other political parties who were Islamic-oriented and local born, set out to establish a legacy of Pakistan movement prior to the 1947 partition of India, supported the united Pakistan and fought against the independence movement. This pro- and anti-independence divide later became permanently entrenched in Bangladesh politics postindependence. The divide is now so huge, sharp and politically lethal that it divides the entire nation into two camps. The AL, as the leading independence party, capitalized on the entire credit of independence and considers itself the only agent, proprietor, and protector. The party believes only in its own narratives of independence politics, which it then imposes on others. Those who disagree are regarded as anti-independence and, thus, deserve no role

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

tions are conveniently found to be baseless.

what are its implications?

and share in politics.

some interpretation of these factors.

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

lose. Hijacking of ballot boxes involves armed violence and often, the law enforcing authorities are found to be inactive in preventing the crime. The purpose of hijacking is to destroy the casted ballot papers so that in vote counting, the opposition does not win, or the voting process is canceled. Often, the EC and the police do not recognize such irregularities, and no legal challenge is entertained. Sometimes, the EC takes into consideration certain complaints but, in its investigation, the accusations are conveniently found to be baseless.

#### **6. An analysis of the mechanism of preventive representation**

The foregoing section demonstrates the various types of means and ways of electoral malpractices and corruptions. It is clear from the discussion that elections are recognized as a means of political legitimacy; however, elections are highly manipulated in favor of the ruling regimes, and against opposition parties. An intimidating electoral atmosphere is deliberately created for the opposition parties so that they cannot take part in elections in the first place. Hence, only one political party represents the people in government, albeit through elections. So elections serve dual purposes—to ensure that the ruling party continues in power, and that the opposition is systematically prevented from representing the people. Theoretically, elections perform the job of selection and de-selection, and no ruling party wants to be removed from power through elections. However, these normal functions of elections are only partially applied in Bangladesh. Why is it so, and what are its implications?

Perhaps the answers to these questions are to be found in the peculiar nature of its political history, party politics, and political culture. Here, we attempt to offer some interpretation of these factors.

The political history, party politics, and political culture are highly interrelated in Bangladesh. The most important of the three is its political history, which officially starts with its independence—a highly charged political issue, which was both highly uniting and dividing at the same time. Independence was achieved after a long civil war in which the AL party led the independence movement and proindependence civil war in association with some other left-oriented minor parties. However, a group of other political parties who were Islamic-oriented and local born, set out to establish a legacy of Pakistan movement prior to the 1947 partition of India, supported the united Pakistan and fought against the independence movement. This pro- and anti-independence divide later became permanently entrenched in Bangladesh politics postindependence. The divide is now so huge, sharp and politically lethal that it divides the entire nation into two camps. The AL, as the leading independence party, capitalized on the entire credit of independence and considers itself the only agent, proprietor, and protector. The party believes only in its own narratives of independence politics, which it then imposes on others. Those who disagree are regarded as anti-independence and, thus, deserve no role and share in politics.

This political history reflects on party politics of the country. Through a multiparty system, the parties are ideologically aligned with secular, religious, and socialist ideologies who maintain a peculiar love-hate relationship. Other than AL and BNP, the remaining political parties command a tiny support base among the people. However, neither of the two parties commands enough support and popularity to win majority seats in the parliament; hence, they form alliances with like-minded parties. This led to the emergence of alliance-based party politics from around the mid-1980s. Since then, the AL commands a 14-party alliance, while BNP commands an 18-party alliance. The AL is leftist-oriented in that it is composed of

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

*5.1.6 Preventing polling agents*

*5.1.7 Arresting supporters*

*5.1.8 Casting of bogus votes*

constituency or at a particular polling station.

*5.1.9 Hijacking ballot boxes*

Expelling the polling agents or arresting them from the polling booths is an onsite example of electoral malpractices intended to prevent opposition candidates from winning. However, there are frequent offsite practices of the same when the polling agents are not even allowed to approach the polling stations in the first place. The armed supporters of the ruling party take position in groups en route to the polling stations, but not within the vicinity, to block the polling agents from reaching the polling stations. Often at gun point, they are forced to turn back, and are asked to stay away for the entire day. This is a common practice in any type of election at any level. Absence of polling agents from the polling booths creates an unsafe atmosphere for the party supporters, which eventually keeps them away from voting.

Another recent trend has been the arrest of opposition party supporters by the police immediately before the election day. The police might initiate an anticrime drive a few days before the election and indiscriminately arrest supporters of opposition parties based on information given by the ruling party channels. The supporters may be forcibly taken from a political rally or campaign meeting in the name of public safety; once arrested, there may be arbitrary accusations filed against them even if they are innocent. This policy was extensively used in the Khulna City Corporation elections in 2018. In this way, a large number of supporters and voters

A very widespread electoral corruption in Bangladesh is bogus and phantom votes.

The ultimate electoral corruption in Bangladesh takes place through hijacking the ballot boxes when it becomes clear that the ruling party candidates are likely to

The obsession to win and to deny the opposition a vote is a political attitude that makes no compromise. The major parties and their activists never consider elections as a win or lose game; rather, they are obsessed with the attitude that elections are to win, and not to lose. As such, elections are for absolute gain. To secure that, the parties and their activists always want to make sure that they get more and, if possible, all the votes. An easy way to ensure winning is to stuff the ballot box with false votes. False votes are casted in two major ways. Firstly, by voting on another's behalf: those who control the polling booths complete the vote casting on behalf of the voters according to the list of voter names in their possession. In this case, the party supporters are also allowed to enter the polling booths multiple times to caste on behalf of other voters. Individual voters who go to the polling stations may find that their votes have already been casted. In this case, the casted votes are always in support of the candidates whose supporters control the polling booths. Secondly, stuffing the ballot boxes with false votes: in this case, either the polling agents who control the polling booths stuff the boxes with ballot papers in favor of their party, or they allow party activists to enter the polling booths as a group and do the same. The obvious results of such electoral corruption are two; one, the ruling party candidates win, with a large margin of vote difference; and two, the total vote cast sometimes ends up with a bigger number than the total number of voters in the

are prevented from voting, which leads to unfair representation.

**64**

secular and socialist-communist parties; while BNP is considered rightist, with its alliance members mostly concerned with religious national identity at the core of their political beliefs.

Despite maintaining an alliance structure, most of the parties, with the exception of a tiny few, have internal factionalism and splinter groups. Some of the parties maintain the same name, but with different leadership. Individually, most of these parties are simply paper based, have no support-base among the people, and are never get elected. Nevertheless, many of them are significant in alliance politics. Their political relevance depends on their close relationship with the mother party, whether AL or BNP. Since 1991, the ruling governments have all been coalitionbased. But, since AL and BNP are the only two major parties, each with an almost equal support base. The system can largely be called a two-party or two-plus party system. Again, the two parties are largely seen as pro-independence versus antiindependence. Ideological differences remain, alongside some of their roles during the 1971 independence conflict, compelling the various political parties to side with a particular alliance against another.

The last factor is political culture, which is also highly subjective to the first factor: political history. In effect, Bangladesh shares a common political history with India and Pakistan prior to independence. From 1757 to 1947, it shares a common political history with the British-united India, and from 1947 to 1971, it shares common political history with a united Pakistan. During these two periods, the popular politics in Bangladesh was essentially the anti-government movement, because politics and government were neither represented nor controlled by the Bangladeshi people. From 1905 to 1971, the anti-government movement was led by one major party though known by three different names—the Muslim League (which fought for Pakistan's independence) which, during independent united Pakistan, splintered to form a new party called Awami Muslim League, and later renamed Awami League (during united Pakistan), and Bangladesh Awami League (in independent Bangladesh). Since 1905, these political parties were primarily anti-government movements. The essential elements of such movements were characterized by sheer distrust, political violence, non-cooperation, disobedience to laws and orders, and public agitation. These became the fundamental characteristics of political and party political culture in Bangladesh [28].

The significance of preventive representation politics in Bangladesh can be found in these three major factors. Since the AL has always persistently and consistently claimed that it is the sole agent, proprietor and defender of independence, it strongly believes that only it has the legitimate claim and right to be in political power. By definition, this implies that other parties have no legitimate right, not only to political power, but also the right to be involved in politics in the first place. These attitudes are clearly reflected in its political behavior when it is in power, as well as when it is outside of that power.

The AL took power during the first 5 years of independence, during when it banned many Islamic and rightist political parties, and toward the end of its regime, it introduced a one-party system in the country. This was one way of claiming ownership of the country along party lines. Between 1996 and 2000, the party returned to power, but before it could consolidate its power base, it was ousted. It returned to power in 2009, and has been in power ever since. Since then, it has successfully institutionalized its political claims with legal backup. For instance: AL's narratives on the day independence was declared, the constitutional status of its founding leader Sheikh Mujib, the history of the independence movement and war, are now constitutionally safeguarded to the point that the official narratives cannot be disagreed on or challenged. Any violation is subject to criminal prosecution.

**67**

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian…*

ment has taken a number of initiatives to corner the two parties [29].

Additionally, the current AL government is bent on decimating two political parties—namely, BNP and BJI—either by banning them altogether or by attempts to introduce a formal one-party system like it did in 1974. AL believes that these two parties have no legitimate rights to be involved in politics. Their rationale: BNP is a party established by an army General who is thought be part of a conspiracy that killed Sheikh Mujib and his entire family, save for two daughters, in 1975. Furthermore, BNP maintains a close relationship with Pakistan, the perpetrator of genocide of Bangladeshis in 1971. As for BJI, it directly opposed the independence movement and war, and collaborated with the military regime of Pakistan in 1971. So for, family and political reasons, these two parties have become arch enemies of AL. Hence, since 2010, the AL govern-

Firstly, AL put on trial the three individuals accused of killing Sheikh Mujib and his family; the three were hanged in 2010. They had been arrested and tried earlier during AL's regime in 1996–2000, but were exonerated by BNP's founding leader, then by a Marshall Law Administrator, through the Indemnity Ordinance 1975. Secondly, in 2013, under the AL government, it reopened and re-tried an infamous murder of an army Colonel named Abu Taher in 1976. The court concluded that it was a cold-blooded murder orchestrated by the BNP leader General Ziaur

Thirdly, the current BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of BNP founder Ziaur Rahman, was evicted from her residence, which is within the cantonment area in Dhaka, by a court order subsequently in 2013. The military had sold the residence to her for a token sum after her husband Ziaur Rahman, then President, was killed in 1981. The AL government, during its earlier 1996–2000 term, had made an abortive attempt to evict her. The eviction clearly involves both personal vengeance and political reason. Personally, Sheikh Hasina, as prime minister, AL leader and one of two surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujib, could never accept that her nemesis, Khaleda Zia, was allowed to enjoy owning a property within the cantonment vicinity. And, politically, in a coup-prone country [30], Hasina could not compromise political security by letting her political opponent and opposition

Fourthly, the AL government revived and proceeded to prosecute all cases that were filed against Khaleda Zia by the army-backed Caretaker Government in 2008. During that time, both Hasina and Khaleda had been arrested and scores of corruption cases were filed against each of them. When Hasina assumed premiership following the 2009 elections, her government withdrew all cases against her, but not those against her opponent. Ever since, Khaleda Zia has been fighting court battles over those and other cases filed against her following her anti-government movement during the 2014 general elections. After a prolonged court battle, Khaleda lost and was imprisoned in February 2018. Her attempts to obtain bail were delayed through official manipulation of time and hearing sessions; at other times, bail applications were blocked by arrest orders in other pending cases. As dozens of politically motivated cases are filed against Khaleda Zia, and their prosecutions are in order with various terms of jail sentence it is

Fifthly, the ruling party's strategy is to decimate BNP by targeting its leaders, in the belief that a political party without its leaders will eventually become politically irrelevant. To date, all of BNP's top leaders, but for an insignificant few, are either in jail, have been forced to leave the country, or made to disappear by AL's plainclothes security forces. Others have been so severely tortured, they have become mentally disabled. Those fortunate enough to still be free face regular court battles to settle numerous cases filed against them in various courts throughout the country. In any

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

Rahman, implicating him as a criminal.

party leader continue to live within the cantonment area.

likely that her chances that her chances of being released from jail is slim.

event, they find themselves constantly in and out of jail.

#### *Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

Additionally, the current AL government is bent on decimating two political parties—namely, BNP and BJI—either by banning them altogether or by attempts to introduce a formal one-party system like it did in 1974. AL believes that these two parties have no legitimate rights to be involved in politics. Their rationale: BNP is a party established by an army General who is thought be part of a conspiracy that killed Sheikh Mujib and his entire family, save for two daughters, in 1975. Furthermore, BNP maintains a close relationship with Pakistan, the perpetrator of genocide of Bangladeshis in 1971. As for BJI, it directly opposed the independence movement and war, and collaborated with the military regime of Pakistan in 1971. So for, family and political reasons, these two parties have become arch enemies of AL. Hence, since 2010, the AL government has taken a number of initiatives to corner the two parties [29].

Firstly, AL put on trial the three individuals accused of killing Sheikh Mujib and his family; the three were hanged in 2010. They had been arrested and tried earlier during AL's regime in 1996–2000, but were exonerated by BNP's founding leader, then by a Marshall Law Administrator, through the Indemnity Ordinance 1975.

Secondly, in 2013, under the AL government, it reopened and re-tried an infamous murder of an army Colonel named Abu Taher in 1976. The court concluded that it was a cold-blooded murder orchestrated by the BNP leader General Ziaur Rahman, implicating him as a criminal.

Thirdly, the current BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of BNP founder Ziaur Rahman, was evicted from her residence, which is within the cantonment area in Dhaka, by a court order subsequently in 2013. The military had sold the residence to her for a token sum after her husband Ziaur Rahman, then President, was killed in 1981. The AL government, during its earlier 1996–2000 term, had made an abortive attempt to evict her. The eviction clearly involves both personal vengeance and political reason. Personally, Sheikh Hasina, as prime minister, AL leader and one of two surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujib, could never accept that her nemesis, Khaleda Zia, was allowed to enjoy owning a property within the cantonment vicinity. And, politically, in a coup-prone country [30], Hasina could not compromise political security by letting her political opponent and opposition party leader continue to live within the cantonment area.

Fourthly, the AL government revived and proceeded to prosecute all cases that were filed against Khaleda Zia by the army-backed Caretaker Government in 2008. During that time, both Hasina and Khaleda had been arrested and scores of corruption cases were filed against each of them. When Hasina assumed premiership following the 2009 elections, her government withdrew all cases against her, but not those against her opponent. Ever since, Khaleda Zia has been fighting court battles over those and other cases filed against her following her anti-government movement during the 2014 general elections. After a prolonged court battle, Khaleda lost and was imprisoned in February 2018. Her attempts to obtain bail were delayed through official manipulation of time and hearing sessions; at other times, bail applications were blocked by arrest orders in other pending cases. As dozens of politically motivated cases are filed against Khaleda Zia, and their prosecutions are in order with various terms of jail sentence it is likely that her chances that her chances of being released from jail is slim.

Fifthly, the ruling party's strategy is to decimate BNP by targeting its leaders, in the belief that a political party without its leaders will eventually become politically irrelevant. To date, all of BNP's top leaders, but for an insignificant few, are either in jail, have been forced to leave the country, or made to disappear by AL's plainclothes security forces. Others have been so severely tortured, they have become mentally disabled. Those fortunate enough to still be free face regular court battles to settle numerous cases filed against them in various courts throughout the country. In any event, they find themselves constantly in and out of jail.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

their political beliefs.

a particular alliance against another.

party political culture in Bangladesh [28].

well as when it is outside of that power.

secular and socialist-communist parties; while BNP is considered rightist, with its alliance members mostly concerned with religious national identity at the core of

Despite maintaining an alliance structure, most of the parties, with the exception of a tiny few, have internal factionalism and splinter groups. Some of the parties maintain the same name, but with different leadership. Individually, most of these parties are simply paper based, have no support-base among the people, and are never get elected. Nevertheless, many of them are significant in alliance politics. Their political relevance depends on their close relationship with the mother party, whether AL or BNP. Since 1991, the ruling governments have all been coalitionbased. But, since AL and BNP are the only two major parties, each with an almost equal support base. The system can largely be called a two-party or two-plus party system. Again, the two parties are largely seen as pro-independence versus antiindependence. Ideological differences remain, alongside some of their roles during the 1971 independence conflict, compelling the various political parties to side with

The last factor is political culture, which is also highly subjective to the first factor: political history. In effect, Bangladesh shares a common political history with India and Pakistan prior to independence. From 1757 to 1947, it shares a common political history with the British-united India, and from 1947 to 1971, it shares common political history with a united Pakistan. During these two periods, the popular politics in Bangladesh was essentially the anti-government movement, because politics and government were neither represented nor controlled by the Bangladeshi people. From 1905 to 1971, the anti-government movement was led by one major party though known by three different names—the Muslim League (which fought for Pakistan's independence) which, during independent united Pakistan, splintered to form a new party called Awami Muslim League, and later renamed Awami League (during united Pakistan), and Bangladesh Awami League (in independent Bangladesh). Since 1905, these political parties were primarily anti-government movements. The essential elements of such movements were characterized by sheer distrust, political violence, non-cooperation, disobedience to laws and orders, and public agitation. These became the fundamental characteristics of political and

The significance of preventive representation politics in Bangladesh can be found in these three major factors. Since the AL has always persistently and consistently claimed that it is the sole agent, proprietor and defender of independence, it strongly believes that only it has the legitimate claim and right to be in political power. By definition, this implies that other parties have no legitimate right, not only to political power, but also the right to be involved in politics in the first place. These attitudes are clearly reflected in its political behavior when it is in power, as

The AL took power during the first 5 years of independence, during when it banned many Islamic and rightist political parties, and toward the end of its regime, it introduced a one-party system in the country. This was one way of claiming ownership of the country along party lines. Between 1996 and 2000, the party returned to power, but before it could consolidate its power base, it was ousted. It returned to power in 2009, and has been in power ever since. Since then, it has successfully institutionalized its political claims with legal backup. For instance: AL's narratives on the day independence was declared, the constitutional status of its founding leader Sheikh Mujib, the history of the independence movement and war, are now constitutionally safeguarded to the point that the official narratives cannot be disagreed on or challenged. Any violation is subject to criminal prosecution.

**66**

Sixthly, the AL government has been even more ruthless against Jamaat-e-Islami, the party believed to be the symbol for anti-independence. Under the guise of trying for the war crimes in 1971, the AL government arrested all the top leaders of Jamaat and hanged four of the most prominent. One leader died in prison during trial, and another leader was handed a life imprisonment sentence "until death." There are serious concerns and doubts that the so-called International War Crime tribunal is impartial or remotely international at all, as none of the international legal agencies have been included, nor are international legal experts and representatives allowed to attend the hearings. In one case, it inadvertently leaked out that the court decision was written by someone living in a European country, and that all of the evidence and witnesses presented by the government prosecutor were fabricated. In some cases, witnesses willing to testify against the prosecutor were made to disappear by plainclothes police [31]. Alongside these "judicial killings," the government has killed several hundreds of Jamaat leaders, arrested thousands of them, and made them systematically disappear or compelled them to leave the country. Those who choose to remain in Bangladesh risk the same fate; and remain in hiding [32]. Their private properties, businesses, and financial and educational institutions are forcefully taken over either by AL's local party leaders or by corporate syndicates. The case of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) is a prime example; the party was forced to change its objectives and operating framework, and is facing the prospect of an outright ban.

Seventhly, the AL government has adopted policies to keep public—and sometimes private—administrations and offices away from BNP and Jamaat supporters. This they have done by adopting a three-pronged approach: by sacking opposition supporters from key positions; preventing them from occupying new positions; and, if they somehow are elected, they are either sacked by executive order or arrested on false charges leading to their disqualification. Interestingly, AL's inimical and violent behaviors are not necessarily occasioned or emboldened by its current legal and political authority; in any event, it maintains and displays these same bullying attitudes and behaviors even when it is in opposition. Many instances of AL's violent behaviors during its antigovernment times in 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s have been well documented [33].

The AL government's ultra-legal behaviors toward these two political parties and others that are similarly defiant—attest to the AL government's staunch "winner takes all" policy. Most importantly, it fosters the culture of political intolerance, vengeance, noncompromise, police brutality, judicial killings, legal predatory arrest and torment, and denial of rights, including right to life. In such an authoritarian context, what purposes do elections signify?

If elections are taken as indicators, then the AL government would be regarded as highly democratic, since numerous elections were held between 2010 and 2018: 492 Upazila (sub-district) elections, 64 district level elections, and numerous other municipal and city corporations' elections to date (mid-2018). The national parliamentary elections are due in early 2019.

These regularly held elections would be sufficient to certify the government's avowed democratic label. However, if one delves deeper into the internal characteristics of those elections, one would find that the reality is more like the picture presented in the earlier section of this chapter. The opposition electoral contestation and representation is systematically prevented, with the ruling party, election commission, the police, and government, collectively ensuring that only the ruling party candidates win. The EC is no longer a neutral national agency, and the police is no longer a neutral law enforcement agency. And, above all, the government does not represent the interest of its citizens; rather, to rephrase Abraham Lincoln, it is a government of the party, by the party, and for the party. Therefore, it is clear that

**69**

**Author details**

Moniruzzaman M.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia,

\*Address all correspondence to: mmzaman@iium.edu.my

*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian…*

elections in Bangladesh are not used as a means for fair representation of the people in the government; rather, elections are used as legitimizing labels for the authori-

Democratization has been a popular political trend over the past several decades. As democracy denotes peoples' participation in politics and peoples' rule, democratization entails elections. Indeed, elections are considered to be the most visible criterion for democracy, as various "illiberal," semi-, or nondemocracies also hold regular elections so as to claim or enjoy democratic legitimacy. However, it is this apparent legitimizing function of elections that has suppressed its true meaning and significance: as equal political opportunities for all and fair representation of

This chapter argues that the electoral practices and politics in Bangladesh substantiate the above-mentioned claim. Due to certain peculiarities of the local politics in Bangladesh, political parties in power generally tend to claim an absolute control in political and other resources for which the people have equal rights to claim. Of the parties in Bangladesh, Awami League and its current ruling government are the most predatory, authoritarian, intolerant, and repressive. Since its current regime began in 2009, the AL-led government has conducted many elections at national, regional, and local levels. However, those elections are marred with various electoral malpractices and corruptions such as the arrest, imprisonment and murder of opposition party candidates and their supporters; preventing the opposition from filing their nominations, holding meetings and conducting election campaigns; controlling and obstructing polling stations on election day; stuffing ballot boxes with false votes; hijacking the ballot boxes; and much, much more. The objectives of these malpractices are to prevent the opponents from contesting, and to ensure that AL's candidates win. Literally, the election festivity goes on almost year-round. Even though these are apparently elections, the preventive and threatening mechanisms that the AL government applies make the elections useless as a means of representation. While the elections serve to certify the democratic nature of the government, in essence, they regularize and preserve the authoritarian regime's continuity in power.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

tarian democracy and its regularization.

the people in the government.

**7. Conclusion**

elections in Bangladesh are not used as a means for fair representation of the people in the government; rather, elections are used as legitimizing labels for the authoritarian democracy and its regularization.

#### **7. Conclusion**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

and is facing the prospect of an outright ban.

2000s have been well documented [33].

context, what purposes do elections signify?

mentary elections are due in early 2019.

Sixthly, the AL government has been even more ruthless against Jamaat-e-Islami, the party believed to be the symbol for anti-independence. Under the guise of trying for the war crimes in 1971, the AL government arrested all the top leaders of Jamaat and hanged four of the most prominent. One leader died in prison during trial, and another leader was handed a life imprisonment sentence "until death." There are serious concerns and doubts that the so-called International War Crime tribunal is impartial or remotely international at all, as none of the international legal agencies have been included, nor are international legal experts and representatives allowed to attend the hearings. In one case, it inadvertently leaked out that the court decision was written by someone living in a European country, and that all of the evidence and witnesses presented by the government prosecutor were fabricated. In some cases, witnesses willing to testify against the prosecutor were made to disappear by plainclothes police [31]. Alongside these "judicial killings," the government has killed several hundreds of Jamaat leaders, arrested thousands of them, and made them systematically disappear or compelled them to leave the country. Those who choose to remain in Bangladesh risk the same fate; and remain in hiding [32]. Their private properties, businesses, and financial and educational institutions are forcefully taken over either by AL's local party leaders or by corporate syndicates. The case of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) is a prime example; the party was forced to change its objectives and operating framework,

Seventhly, the AL government has adopted policies to keep public—and sometimes private—administrations and offices away from BNP and Jamaat supporters. This they have done by adopting a three-pronged approach: by sacking opposition supporters from key positions; preventing them from occupying new positions; and, if they somehow are elected, they are either sacked by executive order or arrested on false charges leading to their disqualification. Interestingly, AL's inimical and violent behaviors are not necessarily occasioned or emboldened by its current legal and political authority; in any event, it maintains and displays these same bullying attitudes and behaviors even when it is in opposition. Many instances of AL's violent behaviors during its antigovernment times in 1980s, 1990s, and early

The AL government's ultra-legal behaviors toward these two political parties and others that are similarly defiant—attest to the AL government's staunch "winner takes all" policy. Most importantly, it fosters the culture of political intolerance, vengeance, noncompromise, police brutality, judicial killings, legal predatory arrest and torment, and denial of rights, including right to life. In such an authoritarian

If elections are taken as indicators, then the AL government would be regarded as highly democratic, since numerous elections were held between 2010 and 2018: 492 Upazila (sub-district) elections, 64 district level elections, and numerous other municipal and city corporations' elections to date (mid-2018). The national parlia-

These regularly held elections would be sufficient to certify the government's avowed democratic label. However, if one delves deeper into the internal characteristics of those elections, one would find that the reality is more like the picture presented in the earlier section of this chapter. The opposition electoral contestation and representation is systematically prevented, with the ruling party, election commission, the police, and government, collectively ensuring that only the ruling party candidates win. The EC is no longer a neutral national agency, and the police is no longer a neutral law enforcement agency. And, above all, the government does not represent the interest of its citizens; rather, to rephrase Abraham Lincoln, it is a government of the party, by the party, and for the party. Therefore, it is clear that

**68**

Democratization has been a popular political trend over the past several decades. As democracy denotes peoples' participation in politics and peoples' rule, democratization entails elections. Indeed, elections are considered to be the most visible criterion for democracy, as various "illiberal," semi-, or nondemocracies also hold regular elections so as to claim or enjoy democratic legitimacy. However, it is this apparent legitimizing function of elections that has suppressed its true meaning and significance: as equal political opportunities for all and fair representation of the people in the government.

This chapter argues that the electoral practices and politics in Bangladesh substantiate the above-mentioned claim. Due to certain peculiarities of the local politics in Bangladesh, political parties in power generally tend to claim an absolute control in political and other resources for which the people have equal rights to claim. Of the parties in Bangladesh, Awami League and its current ruling government are the most predatory, authoritarian, intolerant, and repressive. Since its current regime began in 2009, the AL-led government has conducted many elections at national, regional, and local levels. However, those elections are marred with various electoral malpractices and corruptions such as the arrest, imprisonment and murder of opposition party candidates and their supporters; preventing the opposition from filing their nominations, holding meetings and conducting election campaigns; controlling and obstructing polling stations on election day; stuffing ballot boxes with false votes; hijacking the ballot boxes; and much, much more. The objectives of these malpractices are to prevent the opponents from contesting, and to ensure that AL's candidates win. Literally, the election festivity goes on almost year-round. Even though these are apparently elections, the preventive and threatening mechanisms that the AL government applies make the elections useless as a means of representation. While the elections serve to certify the democratic nature of the government, in essence, they regularize and preserve the authoritarian regime's continuity in power.

#### **Author details**

Moniruzzaman M. Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

\*Address all correspondence to: mmzaman@iium.edu.my

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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*Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80929*

[21] Rahman MM, Nasrin S. Maiden Partisan rural local government elections: Bangladesh experience. Journal of Public Administration and Governance. 2017;**7**(1):48-70. DOI: 10.5296/jpag.v7i1.10636

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[23] Ahmed N. Critical elections and democratic consolidation: The 2008 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. Contemporary South Asia. 2011;**19**(2):137-152. DOI: 10.1080/09584935.2011.563282

[24] Riaz A. Bangladesh's failed election. Journal of Democracy. 2014;**25**(2):119- 130. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2014.0034

[25] Ahsan A. City corporation election on party lines in Bangladesh: A review of Narayanganj city corporation (NCC) election 2016. Public Affairs and Governance. 2017;**5**(1):73-82. DOI: 10.5958/2321-2136.2017.00005.4

[26] Akhter MY. Electoral Corruption in Bangladesh. New York: Routeledge; 2018. 252 p

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[32] Jalil MA. Arrest and police remand issue of top jamaat leaders in Bangladesh: Under the guise of hurting the religious sentiments of muslims. Asian Social Science. 2010;**7**(1):75-87. DOI: 10.5539/ass.v7n1p75

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*Elections - A Global Perspective*

Oklahoma Press; 2011

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232 p

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[2] Abushouk AI. The arab spring: A fourth wave of democratization? Digest of Middle East Studies. 2016;**25**(1):52-

[3] Diamond L. A fourth wave or false start? Democracy after the arab spring.

69. DOI: 10.1111/dome.12080

[4] McFaul M. The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: Noncooperation transition in the postcommunist world. World Politics. 2002;**54**:212-244. DOI: 10.1353/

[5] Drezner DW. The fourth wave of democratization? Foreign Policy. 2005. Available from: https://foreignpolicy. com/2005/03/24/the-fourth-wave-ofdemocratization [Accessed: 09-07-2018]

[6] Elisabeth C, Farrell DM. Electoral systems and election management. In: Lawrence LD, Neimi RG, Norris P, editors. Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in the 21st Century. London: Sage; 2010. pp. 25-44. DOI:

10.4135/9781446288740.n3

2006. 248 p

Press; 2014. 176 p

[7] Dunn J. Democracy: A History. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press;

[8] Kaplan T. Democracy: A World History. Oxford: Oxford University

[9] Pirenne H. Early Democracies in the Low Countries: Urban Society and Political Conflict in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; 1971. 288 p

[10] Lijphard A. Democracies: Patterns

Government in Twenty-One Countries.

of Majoritarian and Consensus

Foreign Affairs. **2011**:5-9

wp.2002.0004

Section 3

Elections in Developed

Democracies

73

Section 3

## Elections in Developed Democracies

Chapter 5

Abstract

Estimating the Effect of Voters'

Presidential Election

Lauren Dique and Maria Gallego

sociodemographic characteristics.

about his platform (see Ref. [2]).

1. Introduction

75

media, voters' media interests on the campaign

Media Awareness on the 2016 US

We examine whether voter media awareness of the 2016 US Presidential election campaign influenced the election using a logit model to estimate the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for one of the two candidates. Our results indicate that the more active voters were on social media, the more likely they were to vote for Trump, and the more aware they were of the electoral campaign (watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers, etc.) and the more interested they were in the news/politics, the less likely they were to vote for

Keywords: 2016 US Presidential election, candidates' and voters' policy positions, voters' awareness of the election, probability of voting, voters' activity on social

The 2016 US Presidential election stands out as an anomaly in election history. A candidate with no prior political experience used his advantage on social media and, in particular, on Twitter to reach the oval office. The election took over the media in extensive news coverage, TV ads, and social media trending. The awareness this election generated due to explicit and implicit advertising may have had a large impact on the outcome. Obama was the first candidate to utilize Twitter and other social media platforms in order to communicate directly with voters during the 2012 election (see Ref. [1]). Trump stormed the media and constantly trended on Facebook and Twitter throughout the campaign and used Twitter to speak freely

We examine whether voter awareness of the electoral campaign affects voting

decisions. Following Schofield et al [3], we model voters' utility functions as depending on their preferences on an economic and a social policy dimension and sociodemographic characteristics (age, race, gender, education, income, and home state). Voters' utility is also influenced by their awareness of the campaign through TV news, radio, social media trending, their social media activity, the reported ideologies of themselves, and perception of candidates' ideology. We also include in voters' utilities other policy dimensions (stance on state spending on law enforcement, approval of the military, increasing the number of police officers, harsher

Trump. The impact of these variables was not as important as their

#### Chapter 5

## Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

Lauren Dique and Maria Gallego

#### Abstract

We examine whether voter media awareness of the 2016 US Presidential election campaign influenced the election using a logit model to estimate the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for one of the two candidates. Our results indicate that the more active voters were on social media, the more likely they were to vote for Trump, and the more aware they were of the electoral campaign (watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers, etc.) and the more interested they were in the news/politics, the less likely they were to vote for Trump. The impact of these variables was not as important as their sociodemographic characteristics.

Keywords: 2016 US Presidential election, candidates' and voters' policy positions, voters' awareness of the election, probability of voting, voters' activity on social media, voters' media interests on the campaign

#### 1. Introduction

The 2016 US Presidential election stands out as an anomaly in election history. A candidate with no prior political experience used his advantage on social media and, in particular, on Twitter to reach the oval office. The election took over the media in extensive news coverage, TV ads, and social media trending. The awareness this election generated due to explicit and implicit advertising may have had a large impact on the outcome. Obama was the first candidate to utilize Twitter and other social media platforms in order to communicate directly with voters during the 2012 election (see Ref. [1]). Trump stormed the media and constantly trended on Facebook and Twitter throughout the campaign and used Twitter to speak freely about his platform (see Ref. [2]).

We examine whether voter awareness of the electoral campaign affects voting decisions. Following Schofield et al [3], we model voters' utility functions as depending on their preferences on an economic and a social policy dimension and sociodemographic characteristics (age, race, gender, education, income, and home state). Voters' utility is also influenced by their awareness of the campaign through TV news, radio, social media trending, their social media activity, the reported ideologies of themselves, and perception of candidates' ideology. We also include in voters' utilities other policy dimensions (stance on state spending on law enforcement, approval of the military, increasing the number of police officers, harsher

punishments for previous offenders, and environmental policies) and a random shock. We derive the probability of voting for the candidates using voters' utilities assuming voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their utility.

Schofield et al [3] builds stochastic models of the 2000 and 2004 US Presidential

For the 2008 Presidential election, Clarke et al [8] models voters' choices using a valence model (including stance on social, economic, and education issues), partisanship, and party leader images. They find that McCain had a positive image as voters viewed him as more experienced, patriotic, and trustworthy than Obama but that voters' believed Obama would improve America's standing. Despite the presence of racial resentment, meaning that those with it had a negative view of Obama and a positive view of McCain, they find that Obama inspired hope with a "yes we can" attitude, typical in valence politics, and attributed Obama's higher valence to

The literature finds that campaign advertising has an impact and a persuasive effect on voter's decisions. The large discrepancy between Clinton's and Trump's Twitter followers and number of tweets indicates that Trump had an advantage on social media as Trump more effectively used social media to connect directly with voters (see Ref. [9]). We study the effect that voters' awareness of the campaign had on their choice of candidate after taking into account the effect of differences between voters' and candidates' economic and social policy preferences, voters' sociodemographic characteristics, and their stance on other policy dimensions.

In this section, we first model voters' electoral choices using the utility they derive from each candidate, then using the assumptions made on the shock affecting their utility derive the probability that the voter votes for Trump relative to

We model the utility voter i derives from candidate j for j ¼ Clinton, Trump as a function of i's preferences, characteristics, and a random shock observed only by i and assume i votes for the candidate that maximizes i's utility. The utility voter i

<sup>2</sup> <sup>þ</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>j</sup> � sociodemoi

We assume voters have preferences over the economic and social policies they would like candidates to implement if elected. Voter i's ideal, or most preferred, economic and social policies are given by ei and si in Eq. (1). Prior to the election, candidates announce their economic and social policy platforms. Candidate j's economic and social policy platforms are given by Ej and Sj in Eq. (1). The positive coefficients α<sup>e</sup> and α<sup>s</sup> in Eq. (1) measure the importance voters give to the economic

disutility i experiences when j's economic and social policy platforms differ from i's

<sup>1</sup> Valence is voters' non-policy evaluations of candidates and in particular in [3] measures voters' beliefs

<sup>þ</sup> <sup>θ</sup><sup>j</sup> � otheri

<sup>þ</sup> <sup>γ</sup><sup>j</sup> � awarenessi

<sup>2</sup> and �α<sup>s</sup> ei � Ej

<sup>þ</sup> <sup>λ</sup><sup>j</sup> <sup>þ</sup> uij:

<sup>2</sup> capture the

(1)

elections with valences<sup>1</sup> that affect voter's decisions. After placing voters in an economic and social policy space using factor analysis, they estimate a cleavage line, from a binomial logit model, dividing likely Democratic and Republican voters, and find voters' valence judgments and policy preferences significantly influence can-

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

the belief that he could tackle the nation's issues and get the job done.

3. Modeling voters' electoral choices

derives from candidate j is given by

þ δ<sup>j</sup> � participationi

on the ability of a candidate to govern effectively.

<sup>2</sup> � <sup>α</sup><sup>s</sup> si � Sj

and social policy dimensions. The terms �α<sup>e</sup> si � Sj

<sup>þ</sup> <sup>ρ</sup><sup>j</sup> � ideologyi

Uij ¼ � α<sup>e</sup> ei � Ej

Clinton.

77

didates' policy choices.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Using responses to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey and voters' utility functions, we estimate the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our findings indicate that a voter who is more aware of media outlets (TV and radio) and that has a higher level of social media activity is, respectively, less and more likely to vote for Trump (relative to Clinton). We also find that voters' awareness of the campaign affected their voting decisions, though this impact is less strong than the effect of voters' sociodemographic characteristics. Advertising and awareness, in the form of active use of social media, influenced the election. Trump raised and spent significantly less than Clinton did an indication that campaign advertising is not just a matter of dollars but that voters' awareness of the campaign also affects their voting decisions (see Ref. [4]).

Section 2 summarizes the findings in the literature on the effect that media has on US elections. Section 3 models the utility voters derived from each candidate, then using this utility we derive the probability that a voter votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Section 4 gives the descriptive statistics of our data with results presented in Section 5. Final comments are given in Section 6 with the Appendix containing tables that support the analysis carried out in Section 5.

#### 2. Literature review

We first review the literature on the effects of campaign advertising, the impact of Twitter on elections, and on modeling voters' choices using their preferences.

Huber and Arceneaux [5] study whether advertising mobilizes, informs, or persuades citizens in non-battleground states in the 2000 Presidential election, as candidates' advertising campaigns did not target these voters. Using the overlapping nature of media markets (TV) across states, they examine if campaign advertising aimed at swing states, also airing in non-battleground states, affects voting in non-battleground states. They argue that the volume and partisan balance of advertising in swing states is uncorrelated with voter behavior in nonbattleground states. They find advertising campaigns did not mobilize or inform citizens but had a strong persuasive effect with moderately aware individuals being the most susceptible to advertising-induced changes in opinion.

Gordon and Hartmann [6] use the 2000 and 2004 US elections to analyze the effect of market-level advertising on county-level vote shares. They use gross ratings points (GRP) from the Campaign Media Analysis Group as their advertising variable measuring the number of exposures to ads per capita. After controlling for other factors, they find that an increase of 1000 GRPs increases the probability of voting for the Republican and Democratic candidates by 1.5 and 1.7%.

Hong [7] uses a sample of the 112th US House of Representatives' activity on social media to study the impact of Twitter on the politicians' campaign finances from June 8 to 22, 2011. He finds that politicians' adoption of social media increases donations from outside their constituencies, that politicians with extreme ideologies benefit more from social media, and that social media tends to react to salient ideas more easily and is thus more likely to benefit political extremists. He finds that an increase in out-of-state donations allows candidates to become more ideologically extreme concluding that social media bridges the gap between politicians and citizens, which may lead to increased inequality and polarization of candidate platforms.

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Schofield et al [3] builds stochastic models of the 2000 and 2004 US Presidential elections with valences<sup>1</sup> that affect voter's decisions. After placing voters in an economic and social policy space using factor analysis, they estimate a cleavage line, from a binomial logit model, dividing likely Democratic and Republican voters, and find voters' valence judgments and policy preferences significantly influence candidates' policy choices.

For the 2008 Presidential election, Clarke et al [8] models voters' choices using a valence model (including stance on social, economic, and education issues), partisanship, and party leader images. They find that McCain had a positive image as voters viewed him as more experienced, patriotic, and trustworthy than Obama but that voters' believed Obama would improve America's standing. Despite the presence of racial resentment, meaning that those with it had a negative view of Obama and a positive view of McCain, they find that Obama inspired hope with a "yes we can" attitude, typical in valence politics, and attributed Obama's higher valence to the belief that he could tackle the nation's issues and get the job done.

The literature finds that campaign advertising has an impact and a persuasive effect on voter's decisions. The large discrepancy between Clinton's and Trump's Twitter followers and number of tweets indicates that Trump had an advantage on social media as Trump more effectively used social media to connect directly with voters (see Ref. [9]). We study the effect that voters' awareness of the campaign had on their choice of candidate after taking into account the effect of differences between voters' and candidates' economic and social policy preferences, voters' sociodemographic characteristics, and their stance on other policy dimensions.

#### 3. Modeling voters' electoral choices

In this section, we first model voters' electoral choices using the utility they derive from each candidate, then using the assumptions made on the shock affecting their utility derive the probability that the voter votes for Trump relative to Clinton.

We model the utility voter i derives from candidate j for j ¼ Clinton, Trump as a function of i's preferences, characteristics, and a random shock observed only by i and assume i votes for the candidate that maximizes i's utility. The utility voter i derives from candidate j is given by

$$\begin{split} U\_{\vec{\eta}} &= -a\_{\epsilon} \left( e\_{i} - E\_{\vec{\jmath}} \right)^{2} - a\_{\epsilon} \left( \varsigma\_{i} - \mathbb{S}\_{\vec{\jmath}} \right)^{2} + \left( \boldsymbol{\beta}\_{\vec{\jmath}} \cdot \textit{sociodemo}\_{i} \right) + \left( \boldsymbol{\gamma}\_{\vec{\jmath}} \cdot \textit{awareness}\_{i} \right) \\ &+ \left( \boldsymbol{\delta}\_{\vec{\jmath}} \cdot \textit{participation}\_{i} \right) + \left( \boldsymbol{\rho}\_{\vec{\jmath}} \cdot \textit{ideology}\_{i} \right) + \left( \boldsymbol{\theta}\_{\vec{\jmath}} \cdot \textit{other}\_{i} \right) + \boldsymbol{\lambda}\_{\vec{\jmath}} + u\_{\vec{\eta}}. \end{split} \tag{1}$$

We assume voters have preferences over the economic and social policies they would like candidates to implement if elected. Voter i's ideal, or most preferred, economic and social policies are given by ei and si in Eq. (1). Prior to the election, candidates announce their economic and social policy platforms. Candidate j's economic and social policy platforms are given by Ej and Sj in Eq. (1). The positive coefficients α<sup>e</sup> and α<sup>s</sup> in Eq. (1) measure the importance voters give to the economic and social policy dimensions. The terms �α<sup>e</sup> si � Sj <sup>2</sup> and �α<sup>s</sup> ei � Ej <sup>2</sup> capture the disutility i experiences when j's economic and social policy platforms differ from i's

punishments for previous offenders, and environmental policies) and a random shock. We derive the probability of voting for the candidates using voters' utilities

Using responses to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey and voters' utility functions, we estimate the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our findings indicate that a voter who is more aware of media outlets (TV and radio) and that has a higher level of social media activity is, respectively, less and more likely to vote for Trump (relative to Clinton). We also find that voters' awareness of the campaign affected their

sociodemographic characteristics. Advertising and awareness, in the form of active use of social media, influenced the election. Trump raised and spent significantly less than Clinton did an indication that campaign advertising is not just a matter of dollars but that voters' awareness of the campaign also affects their voting decisions

Section 2 summarizes the findings in the literature on the effect that media has on US elections. Section 3 models the utility voters derived from each candidate, then using this utility we derive the probability that a voter votes for Trump relative

We first review the literature on the effects of campaign advertising, the impact of Twitter on elections, and on modeling voters' choices using their preferences. Huber and Arceneaux [5] study whether advertising mobilizes, informs, or persuades citizens in non-battleground states in the 2000 Presidential election, as

overlapping nature of media markets (TV) across states, they examine if campaign advertising aimed at swing states, also airing in non-battleground states, affects voting in non-battleground states. They argue that the volume and partisan balance

battleground states. They find advertising campaigns did not mobilize or inform citizens but had a strong persuasive effect with moderately aware individuals being

Gordon and Hartmann [6] use the 2000 and 2004 US elections to analyze the effect of market-level advertising on county-level vote shares. They use gross ratings points (GRP) from the Campaign Media Analysis Group as their advertising variable measuring the number of exposures to ads per capita. After controlling for other factors, they find that an increase of 1000 GRPs increases the probability of

Hong [7] uses a sample of the 112th US House of Representatives' activity on social media to study the impact of Twitter on the politicians' campaign finances from June 8 to 22, 2011. He finds that politicians' adoption of social media increases donations from outside their constituencies, that politicians with extreme ideologies benefit more from social media, and that social media tends to react to salient ideas more easily and is thus more likely to benefit political extremists. He finds that an increase in out-of-state donations allows candidates to become more ideologically extreme concluding that social media bridges the gap between politicians and citizens, which may lead to increased inequality and polarization of candidate plat-

voting decisions, though this impact is less strong than the effect of voters'

to Clinton. Section 4 gives the descriptive statistics of our data with results presented in Section 5. Final comments are given in Section 6 with the Appendix

candidates' advertising campaigns did not target these voters. Using the

of advertising in swing states is uncorrelated with voter behavior in non-

voting for the Republican and Democratic candidates by 1.5 and 1.7%.

the most susceptible to advertising-induced changes in opinion.

containing tables that support the analysis carried out in Section 5.

(see Ref. [4]).

Elections - A Global Perspective

2. Literature review

forms.

76

assuming voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their utility.

<sup>1</sup> Valence is voters' non-policy evaluations of candidates and in particular in [3] measures voters' beliefs on the ability of a candidate to govern effectively.

#### Elections - A Global Perspective

ideal policies, so that the farther j's policies, Ej and Sj, are from i's ideal policies, ei and si, the lower is i's utility from candidate j.

component of i's belief of j's competence that is only observed by i and that varies

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

voters' disutility from candidates' platforms differing from their ideals, the valences (sociodemographic, media, political participation, ideology, other, and competence), and on a random component, uij. So that Uij in Eq. (1) is given by

� �<sup>2</sup> <sup>þ</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>j</sup> � sociodemoi

exp U<sup>O</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <sup>þ</sup> exp <sup>U</sup><sup>O</sup>

i Trump n o

¼ Pr½ �� Yi ¼ 1j x Pr½ �� Yi ¼ 0j x β<sup>k</sup> (4)

1

<sup>1</sup> <sup>þ</sup> exp Ui Trump � � � <sup>β</sup><sup>k</sup> (5)

i Trump given in Eq. (2).3,4

� � <sup>þ</sup> <sup>θ</sup><sup>j</sup> � otheri

Uij <sup>¼</sup> <sup>U</sup><sup>O</sup>

� � <sup>þ</sup> <sup>ρ</sup><sup>j</sup> � ideologyi

We assume that only Clinton and Trump run in the election and code the vote of i for Trump as 1 (Yi ¼ 1) and make Clinton the base candidate (Yi ¼ 0), so that the

> Yi <sup>¼</sup> <sup>1</sup> if voted for Trump <sup>0</sup> if voted for Clinton (

Voter i votes for Trump when the utility i derives from Trump is greater than that of voting for Clinton, i.e., when Ui Trump>Ui Clinton and votes for Clinton otherwise. Since i's utility from j is affected by a random component, uij, the probability that i votes for Trump is given by Probi Trump Ui Trump>Ui Clinton � �, and since uij is drawn from a type I extreme value distribution, the probability that i votes for

where exp is the exponential function and x is the vector of factors included in the

The marginal impact of an explanatory variable on the probability that i votes for Trump is obtained by finding the marginal effect that say variable xk has on Eq. (3), holding all other factors in i's utility function in Eq. (1) constant at some specified value, usually their means. The marginal effect of xk on Probi Trump in Eq. (3), obtained by taking the partial derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to xk, is

<sup>3</sup> The coefficients in Clinton's utility function (the base candidate) are standardized to zero, so that the

<sup>4</sup> If instead we assume that all valences have an observable mean component affected by random shocks observable only by the voter that vary around the mean valences according to type I extreme value distributions, the probability that i votes for j still has a logit specification as shown in Eq. (3).

ij , that depends on

� �

ij þ uij (2)

� � <sup>þ</sup> <sup>γ</sup><sup>j</sup> � mediai

� � <sup>þ</sup> <sup>λ</sup>j:

i Trump n o (3)

around λ<sup>j</sup> according to a type I extreme value distribution.

ij ¼ � α<sup>e</sup> ei � Ej

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

dependent variable Yi is coded as

Trump has a logit specification, i.e.,

given by

79

observable component of i's utility function, U<sup>O</sup>

∂Pi Trump ∂xk

∂Pi Trump ∂xk

where U<sup>O</sup>

Voter i's utility from j has an observable (O) component, U<sup>O</sup>

� �<sup>2</sup> � <sup>α</sup><sup>s</sup> si � Sj

Probi Trump½ �¼ Yi ¼ 1j x

<sup>¼</sup> exp Ui Trump � � <sup>1</sup> <sup>þ</sup> exp Ui Trump � � �

"1" in the denominator of Eq. (3) stands for exp f g Ui Clinton <sup>¼</sup> <sup>e</sup><sup>0</sup> <sup>¼</sup> 1.

þ δ<sup>j</sup> � participationi

Voters' individual sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, gender, income, and race) affect their voting behavior independent of their policy positions, through i's sociodemographic valence for j, ðβ<sup>j</sup> � sociodemoiÞ in Eq. (1), given by

$$
\beta\_{\hat{\jmath}} \cdot \text{sociedemo}\_{i} \equiv \beta\_{\hat{\jmath}1} \text{age}\_{i} + \beta\_{\hat{\jmath}2} \text{educ}\_{i} + \beta\_{\hat{\jmath}3} \text{gender}\_{i} + \beta\_{\hat{\jmath}4} \text{income}\_{i} + \beta\_{\hat{\jmath}5} \text{race}\_{i}.
$$

We allow voters' awareness of the electoral campaign to affect their utility function to examine if their awareness of the campaign influences their choice of candidate. Aware measures the number of media-related things the voter did in the past 24 hours (watch TV news, listen to the radio, read the newspaper, read a blog) with higher values measuring higher engagement by the voter in these events. A higher socialmedia value indicates i's greater participation in social media activities. Voter i's political activities include i's political meeting attendance and postings of political signs. The newsint variable indicates the self-reported level of interest the voter had in the news. These variables affect voters' choices through voters' awareness valence, γ<sup>j</sup> � awarenessi in Eq. (1), given by

γ<sup>j</sup> � awarenessi � γ<sup>j</sup>1awarei þ γ<sup>j</sup>2socialmediai þ γ<sup>j</sup>3attendi þ γ<sup>j</sup>4signsi þ γ<sup>j</sup>5newsinti:

Voter i's political participation valence, δ<sup>j</sup> � participationi in Eq. (1), measures whether the voter worked on a political campaign or donated money to candidate j, i.e.,

δ<sup>j</sup> � participationi � δ<sup>j</sup>1workedi þ δ<sup>j</sup>2donatedi:

Voters' ideology and their perception of candidates' ideology may affect their voting decisions. The self-reported ideology is rated on a scale of very conservative (7) to very liberal (1), whereas voters' perception of candidate's ideology is rated from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). These variables capture voters' beliefs of where they stand relative to their perception of candidates' ideology. The ideology valence ρ<sup>j</sup> � ideologyi in Eq. (1), is given by

$$
\rho\_{\rangle} \cdot \text{ideology}\_{i} \equiv \rho\_{\rangle} \text{selfideology}\_{i} + \rho\_{\rangle} \text{idelology} \text{Clinton}\_{i} + \rho\_{\rangle} \text{idelology} \text{Turmp}\_{i}.
$$

We also added other policy variables that may affect the utility voters derive from candidates. We included voter's opinions on increasing state spending on law enforcement and their approval of the military ensuring the supply of oil. We also incorporated voters' opinions on increasing the number of police officers (crime a), their support for harsher prison sentences for individuals with prior offenses (crime b), and their stance on environmental policies. We grouped these variables in what we call the other policy valence, θ<sup>j</sup> � otheri in Eq. (1), given by

$$\begin{aligned} \theta\_j \cdot \text{other}\_i &\equiv \theta\_{j1} \text{layer} \text{for cement}\_i + \theta\_{j2} \text{military}\_i + \theta\_{j3} \text{circ}\_i \\ &+ \theta\_{j4} \text{circ}\_i + \theta\_{j5} \text{environment}\_i. \end{aligned}$$

As in Schofeld et al [3], we model i's belief of j's competence, or ability to govern, through the competence valence, <sup>λ</sup><sup>j</sup> <sup>þ</sup> uij in Eq. (1) where <sup>λ</sup><sup>j</sup> denotes mean of voters' belief of j's competence or ability to govern<sup>2</sup> and uij is the idiosyncratic

<sup>2</sup> In the empirical work below, λ<sup>j</sup> is the constant in the regression.

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

component of i's belief of j's competence that is only observed by i and that varies around λ<sup>j</sup> according to a type I extreme value distribution.

Voter i's utility from j has an observable (O) component, U<sup>O</sup> ij , that depends on voters' disutility from candidates' platforms differing from their ideals, the valences (sociodemographic, media, political participation, ideology, other, and competence), and on a random component, uij. So that Uij in Eq. (1) is given by

$$U\_{\vec{\eta}} = U\_{\vec{\eta}}^{\bullet} + \mathfrak{u}\_{\vec{\eta}} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{split} \text{where} \quad U\_{\vec{\eta}}^{\bullet} &= -\left(\mathfrak{a}\_{\epsilon}(\mathfrak{e}\_{i} - \mathbf{E}\_{j})^{2} - \mathfrak{a}\_{\epsilon}(\mathfrak{s}\_{i} - \mathbf{S}\_{j})\right)^{2} + \left(\boldsymbol{\beta}\_{j} \cdot \textit{sociodemo}\_{i}\right) + \left(\boldsymbol{\chi}\_{j} \cdot \textit{media}\_{i}\right) \\ &+ \left(\boldsymbol{\delta}\_{\vec{\eta}} \cdot \textit{participation}\_{i}\right) + \left(\boldsymbol{\rho}\_{j} \cdot \textit{ideology}\_{i}\right) + \left(\boldsymbol{\theta}\_{j} \cdot \textit{other}\_{i}\right) + \boldsymbol{\lambda}\_{j}. \end{split}$$

We assume that only Clinton and Trump run in the election and code the vote of i for Trump as 1 (Yi ¼ 1) and make Clinton the base candidate (Yi ¼ 0), so that the dependent variable Yi is coded as

$$Y\_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } vted for \, Trump \\ 0 & \text{if } vted for \, Clinton \end{cases}$$

Voter i votes for Trump when the utility i derives from Trump is greater than that of voting for Clinton, i.e., when Ui Trump>Ui Clinton and votes for Clinton otherwise. Since i's utility from j is affected by a random component, uij, the probability that i votes for Trump is given by Probi Trump Ui Trump>Ui Clinton � �, and since uij is drawn from a type I extreme value distribution, the probability that i votes for Trump has a logit specification, i.e.,

$$Prob\_{i \cdot Tump} \left[ Y\_i = \mathbf{1} \mid \mathfrak{x} \right] = \frac{\exp \left\{ U\_i^O\_{i \cdot Tump} \right\}}{\mathbf{1} + \exp \left\{ U\_i^O\_{i \cdot Tump} \right\}} \tag{3}$$

where exp is the exponential function and x is the vector of factors included in the observable component of i's utility function, U<sup>O</sup> i Trump given in Eq. (2).3,4

The marginal impact of an explanatory variable on the probability that i votes for Trump is obtained by finding the marginal effect that say variable xk has on Eq. (3), holding all other factors in i's utility function in Eq. (1) constant at some specified value, usually their means. The marginal effect of xk on Probi Trump in Eq. (3), obtained by taking the partial derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to xk, is given by

$$\frac{\partial P\_i \, \prescript{T}{}{Tump}}{\partial \mathbf{x}\_k} = \Pr[Y\_i = \mathbf{1} \mid \mathbf{x}] \times \Pr[Y\_i = \mathbf{0} \mid \mathbf{x}] \times \beta\_k \tag{4}$$

$$\frac{\partial P\_{i\ Tump}}{\partial \mathbf{x}\_k} = \frac{\exp\left\{U\_i \ Tump\right\}}{\mathbf{1} + \exp\left\{U\_i \ Tump\right\}} \times \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{1} + \exp\left\{U\_i \ Tump\right\}} \times \beta\_k \tag{5}$$

ideal policies, so that the farther j's policies, Ej and Sj, are from i's ideal policies, ei

Voters' individual sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, gender, income, and race) affect their voting behavior independent of their policy positions,

β<sup>j</sup> � sociodemoi � βj1agei þ βj2educi þ βj3genderi þ βj4incomei þ βj5racei:

We allow voters' awareness of the electoral campaign to affect their utility function to examine if their awareness of the campaign influences their choice of candidate. Aware measures the number of media-related things the voter did in the past 24 hours (watch TV news, listen to the radio, read the newspaper, read a blog) with higher values measuring higher engagement by the voter in these events. A higher socialmedia value indicates i's greater participation in social media activities. Voter i's political activities include i's political meeting attendance and postings of political signs. The newsint variable indicates the self-reported level of interest the voter had in the news. These variables affect voters' choices through voters' aware-

in Eq. (1), given by

Voter i's political participation valence, δ<sup>j</sup> � participationi

in Eq. (1), is given by

γ<sup>j</sup> � awarenessi � γ<sup>j</sup>1awarei þ γ<sup>j</sup>2socialmediai þ γ<sup>j</sup>3attendi þ γ<sup>j</sup>4signsi þ γ<sup>j</sup>5newsinti:

whether the voter worked on a political campaign or donated money to candidate j, i.e.,

δ<sup>j</sup> � participationi � δ<sup>j</sup>1workedi þ δ<sup>j</sup>2donatedi: Voters' ideology and their perception of candidates' ideology may affect their voting decisions. The self-reported ideology is rated on a scale of very conservative (7) to very liberal (1), whereas voters' perception of candidate's ideology is rated from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). These variables capture voters' beliefs of where they stand relative to their perception of candidates' ideology. The ideology

ρ<sup>j</sup> � ideologyi � ρ<sup>j</sup>1selfideologyi þ ρ<sup>j</sup>2idelogyClintoni þ ρ<sup>j</sup>3idelogyTrumpi

We also added other policy variables that may affect the utility voters derive from candidates. We included voter's opinions on increasing state spending on law enforcement and their approval of the military ensuring the supply of oil. We also incorporated voters' opinions on increasing the number of police officers (crime a), their support for harsher prison sentences for individuals with prior offenses (crime b), and their stance on environmental policies. We grouped these variables in what

> θ<sup>j</sup> � otheri � θ<sup>j</sup>1lawenforcementi þ θ<sup>j</sup>2militaryi þ θ<sup>j</sup>3crimeai þ θ<sup>j</sup>4crimebi þ θ<sup>j</sup>5environmentali:

voters' belief of j's competence or ability to govern<sup>2</sup> and uij is the idiosyncratic

As in Schofeld et al [3], we model i's belief of j's competence, or ability to govern,

in Eq. (1), given by

in Eq. (1) where λ<sup>j</sup> denotes mean of

in Eq. (1), measures

:

through i's sociodemographic valence for j, ðβ<sup>j</sup> � sociodemoiÞ in Eq. (1), given by

and si, the lower is i's utility from candidate j.

ness valence, γ<sup>j</sup> � awarenessi

Elections - A Global Perspective

valence ρ<sup>j</sup> � ideologyi

78

we call the other policy valence, θ<sup>j</sup> � otheri

through the competence valence, λ<sup>j</sup> þ uij

<sup>2</sup> In the empirical work below, λ<sup>j</sup> is the constant in the regression.

<sup>3</sup> The coefficients in Clinton's utility function (the base candidate) are standardized to zero, so that the "1" in the denominator of Eq. (3) stands for exp f g Ui Clinton <sup>¼</sup> <sup>e</sup><sup>0</sup> <sup>¼</sup> 1.

<sup>4</sup> If instead we assume that all valences have an observable mean component affected by random shocks observable only by the voter that vary around the mean valences according to type I extreme value distributions, the probability that i votes for j still has a logit specification as shown in Eq. (3).

where Pr½ � Yi ¼ 1j x is the probability that i votes for Trump and Pr½ �¼ Yi ¼ 0j x 1 � Pr½ � Yi ¼ 1j x is that of voting for Clinton. These probabilities change in a nonlinear manner as xk changes. As shown in Eqs. (4) and (5), the marginal effect of xk on Pi Trump is the product of the logit coefficient, βk, and the probabilities of voting for the two candidates. The marginal effect measures the impact of a oneunit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that an individual votes for Trump relative to Clinton, the base candidate, holding all other variables at the mean, so that Pr½ � Yi ¼ 1j x and Pr½ � Yi ¼ 0j x can be estimated.

#### 4. Descriptive statistics

We now provide the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Our data comes from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a nationally representative sample of the voting age population, interviewing 64,600 pre- and post-election respondents. We exclude those not voting for Clinton or Trump from our sample. Since the post-election follow-up survey asked the same individuals "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?," we know whom each individual voted for assuming truthful revelation.

The 2016 CCES survey includes a wide range of responses to related questions essentially conveying similar though different information on voters' preferences. Given the high correlation among these questions, these variables should not be simultaneously included in the regressions to avoid multicollinearity effects that may render the regression coefficient estimates unstable and that lead to the interpretation of the effect of these variables on the probability of voting for Trump, relative to Clinton, difficult. Rather than including a large number of highly correlated variables, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the number of correlated variables included in the regression. The PCA performs orthogonal transformations to convert correlated variables into a smaller set of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. <sup>5</sup> The PCA gives the factor loading<sup>6</sup> of each principal component variable and identifies a smaller set of latent dimensions along which voters make their decisions.

and military, on the economic dimension. We anticipated that voters' opinion on economic problems and spending would load strongly in the economic dimension, as found in the literature; however this was not the case in our sample. Perhaps the 2016 election was too different from previous elections. The loadings indicate which component is associated with our social dimension and are consistent with previous

Question Economic policy Social policy 1. Military approval �0.4058 �0.1564 2. Tax increases 0.0934 �0.3249 3. Racism 0.8535 �0.0633 4. State welfare spending 0.1545 0.3255 5. Economic problems �0.0671 �0.3456 6. Approve of Obama 0.0635 0.4131 7. Gun control �0.1236 0.2907 8. Immigration �0.1593 0.2906 9. Abortion 0.1295 0.3091 10. Gays �0.0855 0.3027 11. Federal spending �0.0317 0.3373

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

We multiplied the significantly different from zero factor loading of each variable, given in Table 1, with the corresponding response of the voter to that question, and then aggregated these products according to their identification in the economic or social dimensions to find voters' locations along these two latent dimensions and assume these locations represent their preferences in these dimensions. Using the factor loadings in Table 1, voter i's location along these two

ei ¼ �0:4058 � Military Approval<sup>i</sup> þ 0:8535 � Racism<sup>i</sup>

þ0:3091 � Abortion<sup>i</sup> þ 0:3027 � Gays<sup>i</sup> þ 0:3373 � Federal spending<sup>i</sup>

Right on the economic axis (horizontal) in Figure 1 represents an individual that approves of the military and is fearful of people of other races. We interpret north on the social axis (vertical) as liberal concerning, for example, civil rights issues. Figure 1 shows that, while the Clinton and Trump voters are clearly divided along the social dimension, there is no strong divide among them in the economic axis. Table 2 echoes Figure 1 indicating that, on average, Trump voters are more conservative (�1.757) in their social values and Clinton's more liberal (1.753). The statistics of the two candidates along the economic dimension are relatively similar

�0:3456 � Economic problems<sup>i</sup> þ 0:4131 � Approve of Obama<sup>i</sup>

si ¼ �0:3249 � Tax Increases<sup>i</sup> þ 0:3255 � State Welfare Spending<sup>i</sup>

þ0:2907 � Gun control<sup>i</sup> þ 0:2906 � Immigration<sup>i</sup>

literature (such as abortion and gay marriage).

PCA factor loadings from the CCES 2016 survey.<sup>a</sup>

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Bolded factor loadings are statistically significantly different from zero.

a

Table 1.

in mean, median, and standard deviations.

81

dimensions, ei and si in Eq. (1), are estimated as follows:

Schofield et al [3],<sup>7</sup> we perform a PCA on 12 survey questions relating to voters' stances on the military, welfare spending, condition of the economy, approval of Obama, gun control, immigration, abortion, gay marriage, budget cuts, personal ideology, tax increases, and racism. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains the questions used in the analysis and the coding of possible responses. We use the PCA factor loadings for each question and each voter's response to each question to derive each voter's preferences along the dimensions identified in the PCA.

The PCA revealed two latent dimensions, labeled as the social and economic dimensions. Table 1 shows the PCA factor loadings for each survey question. The first component has two heavy loadings, racism (consistent with Schofield et al [3])

<sup>5</sup> For example, if supporting gay marriage and abortion have a high correlation, the PCA analysis would group these two variables into a single component.

<sup>6</sup> Factor loadings represent how much a component explains the latent variable in the factor analysis. Their values range between �1 and 1 with values close in absolute value to 1 (0) indicating that the component has a strong (weak) effect on the latent variable.

<sup>7</sup> In their study of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential election, [3] finds that voters tend to make voting decisions along two economic and social latent dimensions. After locating voters along these two dimensions, they find that to maximize vote share candidates locate close to electoral mean, the average of voters' location along these two dimensions.

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964


#### Table 1.

where Pr½ � Yi ¼ 1j x is the probability that i votes for Trump and Pr½ �¼ Yi ¼ 0j x 1 � Pr½ � Yi ¼ 1j x is that of voting for Clinton. These probabilities change in a nonlinear manner as xk changes. As shown in Eqs. (4) and (5), the marginal effect of xk on Pi Trump is the product of the logit coefficient, βk, and the probabilities of voting for the two candidates. The marginal effect measures the impact of a oneunit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that an individual votes for Trump relative to Clinton, the base candidate, holding all other variables at the

We now provide the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Our data comes from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a nationally representative sample of the voting age population, interviewing 64,600 pre- and post-election respondents. We exclude those not voting for Clinton or Trump from our sample. Since the post-election follow-up survey asked the same individuals "For whom did you vote for President of the United States?," we know

The 2016 CCES survey includes a wide range of responses to related questions essentially conveying similar though different information on voters' preferences. Given the high correlation among these questions, these variables should not be simultaneously included in the regressions to avoid multicollinearity effects that may render the regression coefficient estimates unstable and that lead to the interpretation of the effect of these variables on the probability of voting for Trump, relative to Clinton, difficult. Rather than including a large number of highly correlated variables, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the number of correlated variables included in the regression. The PCA performs orthogonal transformations to convert correlated variables into a smaller set of linearly

ing<sup>6</sup> of each principal component variable and identifies a smaller set of latent

Schofield et al [3],<sup>7</sup> we perform a PCA on 12 survey questions relating to voters' stances on the military, welfare spending, condition of the economy, approval of Obama, gun control, immigration, abortion, gay marriage, budget cuts, personal ideology, tax increases, and racism. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains the questions used in the analysis and the coding of possible responses. We use the PCA factor loadings for each question and each voter's response to each question to derive each voter's preferences along the dimensions identified in the PCA.

The PCA revealed two latent dimensions, labeled as the social and economic dimensions. Table 1 shows the PCA factor loadings for each survey question. The first component has two heavy loadings, racism (consistent with Schofield et al [3])

<sup>5</sup> For example, if supporting gay marriage and abortion have a high correlation, the PCA analysis would

<sup>6</sup> Factor loadings represent how much a component explains the latent variable in the factor analysis. Their values range between �1 and 1 with values close in absolute value to 1 (0) indicating that the

<sup>7</sup> In their study of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential election, [3] finds that voters tend to make voting decisions along two economic and social latent dimensions. After locating voters along these two dimensions, they find that to maximize vote share candidates locate close to electoral mean, the average

<sup>5</sup> The PCA gives the factor load-

mean, so that Pr½ � Yi ¼ 1j x and Pr½ � Yi ¼ 0j x can be estimated.

whom each individual voted for assuming truthful revelation.

uncorrelated variables called principal components.

group these two variables into a single component.

of voters' location along these two dimensions.

80

component has a strong (weak) effect on the latent variable.

dimensions along which voters make their decisions.

4. Descriptive statistics

Elections - A Global Perspective

PCA factor loadings from the CCES 2016 survey.<sup>a</sup>

and military, on the economic dimension. We anticipated that voters' opinion on economic problems and spending would load strongly in the economic dimension, as found in the literature; however this was not the case in our sample. Perhaps the 2016 election was too different from previous elections. The loadings indicate which component is associated with our social dimension and are consistent with previous literature (such as abortion and gay marriage).

We multiplied the significantly different from zero factor loading of each variable, given in Table 1, with the corresponding response of the voter to that question, and then aggregated these products according to their identification in the economic or social dimensions to find voters' locations along these two latent dimensions and assume these locations represent their preferences in these dimensions. Using the factor loadings in Table 1, voter i's location along these two dimensions, ei and si in Eq. (1), are estimated as follows:

ei ¼ �0:4058 � Military Approval<sup>i</sup> þ 0:8535 � Racism<sup>i</sup>

si ¼ �0:3249 � Tax Increases<sup>i</sup> þ 0:3255 � State Welfare Spending<sup>i</sup>

�0:3456 � Economic problems<sup>i</sup> þ 0:4131 � Approve of Obama<sup>i</sup>

þ0:2907 � Gun control<sup>i</sup> þ 0:2906 � Immigration<sup>i</sup>

þ0:3091 � Abortion<sup>i</sup> þ 0:3027 � Gays<sup>i</sup> þ 0:3373 � Federal spending<sup>i</sup>

Right on the economic axis (horizontal) in Figure 1 represents an individual that approves of the military and is fearful of people of other races. We interpret north on the social axis (vertical) as liberal concerning, for example, civil rights issues. Figure 1 shows that, while the Clinton and Trump voters are clearly divided along the social dimension, there is no strong divide among them in the economic axis. Table 2 echoes Figure 1 indicating that, on average, Trump voters are more conservative (�1.757) in their social values and Clinton's more liberal (1.753). The statistics of the two candidates along the economic dimension are relatively similar in mean, median, and standard deviations.

#### Figure 1.

Voter policy positions in 2016 US Presidential election.


#### Table 2.

Descriptive statistics: economic and social policy dimensions.

Schofield et al [3], candidates' platforms, Sj and Ej, are at the mean of voters' ideal policies so that we can estimate voters' disutility when candidates adopt policies that differ from their ideals, si Sj <sup>2</sup> and ei Ej <sup>2</sup> in Eq. (3).

Since voter's decisions depend on more than their economic and social stances, we control for voters'sociodemographic characteristics, reported ideologies, "other" policy variables, and our awareness valence. Table 3 shows that, while a larger proportion of women voted for Clinton, a larger proportion of men voted for Trump (see Figure 2a where 0 = male and 1 = female). Clinton had a higher proportion of nonwhite voters as 70% of her voters were white than Trump's 88% (see Figure 2b where 0 = nonwhite and 1 = white) with a higher proportion of educated and young individuals voting for Clinton (Figures 2c and d).

In Table 4, the self-reported ideologies and voters' perceived ideologies of each candidate show that Trump voters, on average, identify themselves as "conservative" and perceive Clinton as "very liberal" and Trump as "somewhat conservative." Clinton voters, on average, identify themselves as "somewhat liberal" and perceive Clinton as "somewhat liberal" and Trump as "very conservative." Clinton voters are more pro-environmental than Trump's, and Trump (Clinton) voters prefer to increase (maintain) state spending on law enforcement and support (oppose) increasing the number of police officers.

It is well known that voters' choice of candidate may depend on their state of residence (see also Refs. [10, 11]) and that candidates carry out their campaign mostly in swing states. To control for differences across states, we create Democratic, Republican, and Swing dummy variables for voters living in Democratic, Republican, and swing states, coded using Politico's June 2016 list of swing states (see Table A.2 in the Appendix and [12]) called the state swingness variable.

(a) Female and male voters by candidate. (b) White and nonwhite voters by candidate. (c) Voter education by

Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

Birth year 1965.9 1964 16.008 1923 1998 Female 0.554 1 0.497 0 1 Education 4.176 5 1.426 1 6 White 0.699 1 0.459 0 1 Family income 7.124 7 3.575 1 31

Birth year 1960.7 1959 14.69 1923 1998 Female 0.451 0 0.498 0 1 Education 3.647 3 1.414 1 6 White 0.880 1 0.325 0 1 Family income 7.026 7 3.390 1 31

Table 3.

Figure 2.

83

candidate. (d) Voter birth year by candidate.

Descriptive statistics: sociodemographic characteristics.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Clinton voters (15,264 voters)

Trump voters (12,314 voters)


#### Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Table 3.

Descriptive statistics: sociodemographic characteristics.

#### Figure 2.

Schofield et al [3], candidates' platforms, Sj and Ej, are at the mean of voters' ideal policies so that we can estimate voters' disutility when candidates adopt

Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max

Social 1.753 1.925 1.148 3.994 4.194 Economic 0.024 0.218 0.986 1.972 3.909

Social 1.757 1.934 1.299 4.103 3.478 Economic 0.032 0.150 0.991 2.039 3.806

Since voter's decisions depend on more than their economic and social stances,

In Table 4, the self-reported ideologies and voters' perceived ideologies of each candidate show that Trump voters, on average, identify themselves as "conservative" and perceive Clinton as "very liberal" and Trump as "somewhat conservative." Clinton voters, on average, identify themselves as "somewhat liberal" and perceive Clinton as "somewhat liberal" and Trump as "very conservative." Clinton voters are more pro-environmental than Trump's, and Trump (Clinton) voters prefer to increase (maintain) state spending on law enforcement and support

we control for voters'sociodemographic characteristics, reported ideologies, "other" policy variables, and our awareness valence. Table 3 shows that, while a larger proportion of women voted for Clinton, a larger proportion of men voted for Trump (see Figure 2a where 0 = male and 1 = female). Clinton had a higher proportion of nonwhite voters as 70% of her voters were white than Trump's 88% (see Figure 2b where 0 = nonwhite and 1 = white) with a higher proportion of

educated and young individuals voting for Clinton (Figures 2c and d).

<sup>2</sup> and ei Ej

Clinton voters (15,264)

Trump voters (12,314)

<sup>2</sup> in Eq. (3).

policies that differ from their ideals, si Sj

Descriptive statistics: economic and social policy dimensions.

Voter policy positions in 2016 US Presidential election.

Elections - A Global Perspective

Figure 1.

Table 2.

82

(oppose) increasing the number of police officers.

(a) Female and male voters by candidate. (b) White and nonwhite voters by candidate. (c) Voter education by candidate. (d) Voter birth year by candidate.

It is well known that voters' choice of candidate may depend on their state of residence (see also Refs. [10, 11]) and that candidates carry out their campaign mostly in swing states. To control for differences across states, we create Democratic, Republican, and Swing dummy variables for voters living in Democratic, Republican, and swing states, coded using Politico's June 2016 list of swing states (see Table A.2 in the Appendix and [12]) called the state swingness variable.

#### Elections - A Global Perspective


Table 5 shows the results for the basic policy model (column 1), then we add voters'sociodemographic characteristics (column 2). The decision criteria (highest

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Full

0.131\*\*\* (34.160)

0.089\*\*\* (9.130)

0.015\*\*\* (16.140)

0.366\*\*\* (13.110)

0.239\*\*\* (23.040)

0.971\*\*\* (27.020)

0.485\*\*\* (14.190)

0.034\*\*\* (8.050

0.131\*\*\* (34.160)

(2.840)

(1.970)

(6.340)

(6.680)

(9.850)

(21.810)

(5.680)

Ideology (self) 1.083\*\*\*

0.086\*\*\* (16.850)

0.049\*\*\* (4.490)

(21.0)

(47.910)

0.375\*\*\* (19.330)

(20.690)

(20.770)

0.001 (0.780)

0.322\*\*\* (9.570)

0.164\*\*\* (13.060)

1.143\*\*\* (26.540)

0.377\*\*\* (9.180)

0.020\*\*\* (3.960)

0.086\*\*\* (16.850)

0.075\*\*\* (3.840)

> 0.014 (0.270)

0.037\*\*\* (3.270)

> 0.255\*\*\* (5.510)

0.392\*\*\* (5.260)

0.648\*\*\* (14.960)

> 0.128\*\*\* (5.960)

0.098\*\*\* (15.160)

0.037\*\*\* (2.790)

0.000 (0.040)

0.222\*\*\* (5.480)

0.191\*\*\* (12.590)

1.248\*\*\* (24.670)

0.122\*\*\* (2.420)

0.012\* (1.900)

0.098\*\*\* (15.160)

0.068\*\*\* (2.870)

> 0.058 (0.930)

> 0.002 (0.180)

0.294\*\*\* (5.100)

0.256\*\*\* (2.850)

0.471\*\*\* (8.920)

> 0.113\*\*\* (4.240)

(70.830)

0.413\*\*\* (34.900)

0.075\*\*\* (10.350)

0.021 (1.620)

0.577\*\*\* (11.000)

2.196\*\*\* (25.400)

0.243\*\*\* (9.880)

0.412\*\*\* (8.930)

0.649\*\*\* (9.030)

0.006\*\*\* (3.770)

0.235\*\*\* (5.500)

0.160\*\*\* (9.940)

1.282\*\*\* (24.300)

0.121\*\* (2.290)

0.009 (1.320)

0.075\*\*\* (10.350)

0.086\*\*\* (3.460)

> 0.004 (0.050)

> 0.004 (0.260)

0.279\*\*\* (4.560)

0.175\* (1.800)

0.460\*\*\* (8.030)

> 0.118\*\*\* (4.440)

0.930\*\*\* (59.000)

0.340\*\*\* (28.910)

0.100\*\*\* (28.730)

0.080\*\*\* (8.470)

Military 0.878\*\*\*

Environment 3.599\*\*\*

Crime policy a 0.753\*\*\*

Crime policy b 1.204\*\*\*

(13.560)

(12.290)

(28.290)

(26.340)

0.485\*\*\* (14.460)

(5.400)

0.100\*\*\* (28.730)

Social2 0.110\*\*\*

Economic2 0.043\*\*\*

Law enforcement

State "swingness"

Ideology (Clinton)

85

(34.300)

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

(4.920)

Birth year 0.012\*\*\*

Female 0.332\*\*\*

Education 0.284\*\*\*

White 0.927\*\*\*

Family income 0.022\*\*\*

(34.300)

Aware 0.046\*\*\*

Attend 0.083\*\*

Social media 0.057\*\*\*

Signs 0.251\*\*\*

Work 0.582\*\*\*

Donate 0.756\*\*\*

News interest 0.109\*\*\*

Social2 0.110\*\*\*

Table 4. Descriptive statistics: all other variables.

#### 5. Estimating the probability of voting for Trump

We examine the effect that the various components in voters' utility function in Eq. (1) have on the probability that voters choose a particular candidate in Eq. (3). We estimate a set of logit models sequentially adding groups of variables to show the effect these variables, as a group, have on the models' decision criteria and later discuss their marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump.

Table 5 shows the results for the basic policy model (column 1), then we add voters'sociodemographic characteristics (column 2). The decision criteria (highest


5. Estimating the probability of voting for Trump

Table 4.

84

Descriptive statistics: all other variables.

Elections - A Global Perspective

discuss their marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump.

We examine the effect that the various components in voters' utility function in Eq. (1) have on the probability that voters choose a particular candidate in Eq. (3). We estimate a set of logit models sequentially adding groups of variables to show the effect these variables, as a group, have on the models' decision criteria and later

Variables Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max

Aware 2.126 2 0.932 1 4 Social media 0.163 0 0.370 0 1 Attend 1.654 1 1.674 0 5 Sign 0.204 0 0.403 0 1 Work 0.099 0 0.298 0 1 Donate 0.346 0 0.476 0 1 News interest 1.513 1 0.806 1 7 Ideology (self) 5.141 5 1.425 1 7 Ideology (Clinton) 3.210 3 1.443 1 8 Ideology (Trump) 6.156 7 1.876 1 8 Military 1.114 1 0.318 1 2 Environment 1.984 2 0.124 1 2 Law enforcement 2.559 3 0.944 1 5 Crime policy a 1.564 2 0.496 1 2 Crime policy b 1.249 1 0.432 1 2

Aware 2.020 2 0.902 1 4 Social media 0.132 0 0.338 0 1 Attend 1.379 1 1.637 0 5 Sign 0.209 0 0.407 0 1 Work 0.051 0 0.220 0 1 Donate 0.251 0 0.434 0 1 News interest 1.460 1 0.762 1 7 Ideology (self) 2.567 2 1.251 1 7 Ideology (Clinton) 1.767 1 1.721 1 8 Ideology (Trump) 4.947 5 1.434 1 8 Military 1.295 1 0.456 1 2 Environment 1.596 2 0.491 1 2 Law enforcement 2.042 2 0.886 1 5 Crime policy a 1.278 1 0.448 1 2 Crime policy b 1.051 1 0.221 1 2

Clinton voters (15,264 voters)

Trump voters (12,314 voters)

#### Elections - A Global Perspective


#### Table 5.

Logit model specifications (base = Clinton).


log likelihood ratio and the lowest AIC and BIC statistics) show that voters' sociodemographic characteristics are an important determinant of their voting decisions. Adding the awareness variables (column 3) and the ideology variables (column 4) also improves the model's specification. The full model (column 6), our

Marginal effects are calculated holding all other variables at the mean of all voters given in this column.

Model 1 Model 2

Variables Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score

Log likelihood 7990.705 7795.902 AIC 16029.41 15639.8 BIC 16226.53 15836.21 Obs = N 27,264 26,462

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

Variable Mean<sup>a</sup> Marginal effect Z-scores<sup>b</sup> Social2 4.532 0.019\*\*\* 10.240 Economic2 0.974 0.005 1.620 Military<sup>a</sup> 1.193 0.142\*\*\* 10.980 Environment 1.811 0.541\*\*\* 24.620 Law enforcement 2.331 0.060\*\*\* 9.880 Crime policy a 1.437 0.101\*\*\* 8.930 Crime policy b 1.162 0.160\*\*\* 9.060 Birth year 1963.6 0.001\*\*\* 3.760 Female 0.508 0.058\*\*\* 5.500 Education 3.940 0.039\*\*\* 9.930 White 0.782 0.316\*\*\* 24.310 State "swingness" 0.447 0.030\*\* 2.290 Family income 7.080 0.002 1.320 Aware 2.078 0.021\*\*\* 3.460 Attend 0.149 0.001 0.050 Social media 1.531 0.001 0.260 Signs 0.207 0.069\*\*\* 4.560 Work 0.077 0.043\* 1.800 Donate 0.304 0.113\*\*\* 8.040 News interest 1.489 0.029\*\*\* 4.440 Ideology (self) 3.998 0.229\*\*\* 58.870 Ideology (Clinton) 2.567 0.084\*\*\* 28.780 Ideology (Trump) 5.619 0.051\*\*\* 19.810

\*\*\*prob. <0.001, \*\*prob. <0.05, \*prob. <0.1.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

State "swingness" models (base = Clinton).

Table 6.

a

b

87

Table 7.

\*\*\*prob. <0.001, \*\*prob. <0.05, \*prob. <0.1.

Marginal effects (base = Clinton).

#### Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964


#### Table 6.

Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Full

29.578\*\*\* (15.840)

AIC 36673.64 32993.14 32057.88 23549.43 17097.01 15639.8 BIC 36698.32 33066.89 32188.99 23721.42 17252.58 15836.21 Obs = N 27,578 26,767 26,758 26,639 26,580 26,462

Variables Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score Social2 0.076\*\*\* 10.580 0.075\*\*\* 10.350 Economic2 0.022 1.650 0.021 1.620 Military b 0.581\*\*\* 11.210 0.577\*\*\* 11.000 Environment 2.219\*\*\* 25.820 2.196\*\*\* 25.400 Law enforcement 0.243\*\*\* 10.000 0.243\*\*\* 9.880 Crime policy a 0.419\*\*\* 9.200 0.412\*\*\* 8.930 Crime policy b 0.651\*\*\* 9.150 0.649\*\*\* 9.030 Birth year 0.006\*\*\* 3.860 0.006\*\*\* 3.770 Female 0.238\*\*\* 5.630 0.235\*\*\* 5.500 Education 0.159\*\*\* 10.020 0.160\*\*\* 9.940 White 1.317\*\*\* 25.280 1.282\*\*\* 24.300 State 0.001 0.640 0.121\*\* 2.290 Family income 0.005 0.850 0.009 1.320 Aware 0.087\*\*\* 3.570 0.086\*\*\* 3.460 Attend 0.007 0.110 0.004 0.050 Social media 0.004 0.290 0.004 0.260 Signs 0.264\*\*\* 4.370 0.279\*\*\* 4.560 Work 0.201\*\* 2.090 0.175\* 1.800 Donate 0.456\*\*\* 8.080 0.460\*\*\* 8.030 News interest 0.127\*\*\* 4.880 0.118\*\*\* 4.440 Ideology (self) 0.933\*\*\* 60.040 0.930\*\*\* 59.000 Ideology (Clinton) 0.343\*\*\* 29.600 0.340\*\*\* 28.910 Ideology (Trump) 0.212\*\*\* 20.360 0.209\*\*\* 19.760 λ 1.113 0.380 1.120 0.380 State "swingness" 0.121\*\* 2.290

9.879\*\*\* (4.340)

Model 1 Model 2

18333.82 16487.57 16012.94 11753.72 8529.503 7795.902

0.253\*\*\* (24.410)

> 5.697\*\* (2.060)

0.209\*\*\* (19.760)

> 1.120 (0.380)

Ideology (Trump)

Log likelihood

Table 5.

86

λ 0.759\*\*\*

Elections - A Global Perspective

Logit model specifications (base = Clinton).

(34.960)


22.805\*\*\* (13.240)

State "swingness" models (base = Clinton).


a Marginal effects are calculated holding all other variables at the mean of all voters given in this column. b \*\*\*prob. <0.001, \*\*prob. <0.05, \*prob. <0.1.

#### Table 7.

Marginal effects (base = Clinton).

log likelihood ratio and the lowest AIC and BIC statistics) show that voters' sociodemographic characteristics are an important determinant of their voting decisions. Adding the awareness variables (column 3) and the ideology variables (column 4) also improves the model's specification. The full model (column 6), our preferred model specification, includes all of the previous variables plus the "other" policy variables and gives the best fit according to the decision criteria statistics. The sign and significance of the coefficients of all variables except the economic dimension, attend, and social media are significant and stable across model specifications. The economic dimension becomes insignificant in column (6) after introducing other policy variables, which improves the model fit as seen in the decision criteria statistics.

though the mean voter's awareness of the campaign impacted the mean voter's decision, the stances on social and economic issues, perceived ideologies, and voter

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

The 2016 US election was the first election in which a candidate adopted a Twitter platform to communicate directly with voters. Our results indicate that future candidates should capitalize on this low-cost approach to bridging the gap between themselves and voters. Hong [7] argues that social media allows the voter to self-select in the form of a "follow" or "friend" to reinforce their ideological positions. Trump sent almost four times more tweets than Clinton did, finding many supporters along the way (see Ref. [9]). Furthermore, social media tends to react to salient ideas more easily and faster and therefore is more likely to benefit political extremists (see Ref. [7]). Although voter awareness has a lower impact than say, race, in the 2016 election, it still influenced the mean voter's choice of candidate. Future candidates can learn from the 2016 election as it may have

We wish to acknowledge the Department of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier Uni-

We wish to thank Prof. Ryan Merlin Yonk and members of the Department of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier University for their useful comments on how to

> 1. Gotten much better 2. Gotten better 3. Stayed the same 4. Gotten worse 5. Gotten much worse

1. Strongly disapprove 2. Somewhat disapprove 3. Somewhat approve 4. Strongly approve

1. Support 2. Oppose

1. No 2. Yes

sociodemographic had a greater impact on her/his voting decision.

changed the political campaign battleground forever.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

versity who provided funding to Lauren Dique for this project.

Variable Question Coding

Over the past year the nation's economy

Do you approve of the way each is doing

support or oppose each of the following proposals? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit

should do about immigration? Select all that apply. Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years and not been convicted of any felony crimes

Acknowledgements

improve this paper.

A. Appendix

Economic problems

Approve of Obama

89

has…?

their job?

Gun control On the issue of gun regulation, do you

Immigration What do you think the US government

Thanks

We take an alternative approach to the fixed effects used in the literature by incorporating the real swingness of each state as reported by Politico in June 2016 prior to the election. Tables 5 and 6 show that the full model with the state swingness variable gives a better fit to the data.

The logit coefficients given in Tables 5 and 6 do not measure the marginal effect that a variable has on the probability of voting for Trump. As shown in Eqs. (3)–(5), this probability varies in a nonlinear manner with changes in variable xk while holding all other variables at their mean. A positive marginal effect indicates that an increase in the variable results in an increased probability that an individual with mean characteristics votes for Trump (relative to Clinton), whereas a negative marginal effect decreases this probability.

Table 7 shows the marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump of each variable and their significant levels holding all other variables at their mean (given in column 2). A white voter that has the mean characteristics in all the other variables is 31.6% (which is significantly different from zero) more likely to vote for Trump relative to Clinton. A mean voter who approves of using the military for securing the oil supply is 14.2% more likely to vote for Trump, who cares about the environment is 54.1% less likely to vote for Trump, and who views themselves as very liberal on the ideology scale is 22.9% less likely to vote for Trump. An increase in the level of education, from say high school to some college, decreases the probability of voting for Trump by almost 4%.

#### 6. Conclusion

In this paper, we examine which factors influence the probability that an individual votes for Trump relative to Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential election. Our major contribution is the addition of variables that measure voters' awareness of the electoral campaign after controlling for other factors that the literature finds significantly affect voters' choice of US Presidential candidate. Others in the literature include the number of advertising per capita or the amounts spent on advertising. We opt for a different approach by looking at the effect of the media on voters' choices by using data at the voter level. That is, our awareness variables measure voters' direct interest in the news, their use of social media, and their interest in the electoral campaign. By measuring variables at the voter level, we capture the impact that voters' media awareness had on their voting decisions. We also estimate voters' position along the economic and social dimensions to study the influence the disutility voters derive from candidates adopting positions that differ from their ideal policies had on their voting decisions.

We estimate a set of binomial logit regressions to examine the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our results indicate that the more active a voter with mean characteristics is on social media, the more likely she/he was to vote for Trump. We also find that the more aware the mean voter was of the media (TV, radio, reading newspaper) and the more interested she/he was in the news, the less likely she/he was to vote for Trump. Even

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

though the mean voter's awareness of the campaign impacted the mean voter's decision, the stances on social and economic issues, perceived ideologies, and voter sociodemographic had a greater impact on her/his voting decision.

The 2016 US election was the first election in which a candidate adopted a Twitter platform to communicate directly with voters. Our results indicate that future candidates should capitalize on this low-cost approach to bridging the gap between themselves and voters. Hong [7] argues that social media allows the voter to self-select in the form of a "follow" or "friend" to reinforce their ideological positions. Trump sent almost four times more tweets than Clinton did, finding many supporters along the way (see Ref. [9]). Furthermore, social media tends to react to salient ideas more easily and faster and therefore is more likely to benefit political extremists (see Ref. [7]). Although voter awareness has a lower impact than say, race, in the 2016 election, it still influenced the mean voter's choice of candidate. Future candidates can learn from the 2016 election as it may have changed the political campaign battleground forever.

#### Acknowledgements

We wish to acknowledge the Department of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier University who provided funding to Lauren Dique for this project.

#### Thanks

preferred model specification, includes all of the previous variables plus the "other" policy variables and gives the best fit according to the decision criteria statistics. The sign and significance of the coefficients of all variables except the economic dimension, attend, and social media are significant and stable across model specifications. The economic dimension becomes insignificant in column (6) after introducing other policy variables, which improves the model fit as seen in the decision criteria

We take an alternative approach to the fixed effects used in the literature by incorporating the real swingness of each state as reported by Politico in June 2016 prior to the election. Tables 5 and 6 show that the full model with the state

The logit coefficients given in Tables 5 and 6 do not measure the marginal effect that a variable has on the probability of voting for Trump. As shown in Eqs. (3)–(5), this probability varies in a nonlinear manner with changes in variable xk while holding all other variables at their mean. A positive marginal effect indicates that an increase in the variable results in an increased probability that an individual with mean characteristics votes for Trump (relative to Clinton), whereas a negative

Table 7 shows the marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump of each variable and their significant levels holding all other variables at their mean (given in column 2). A white voter that has the mean characteristics in all the other variables is 31.6% (which is significantly different from zero) more likely to vote for Trump relative to Clinton. A mean voter who approves of using the military for securing the oil supply is 14.2% more likely to vote for Trump, who cares about the environment is 54.1% less likely to vote for Trump, and who views themselves as very liberal on the ideology scale is 22.9% less likely to vote for Trump. An increase in the level of education, from say high school to some college, decreases the

In this paper, we examine which factors influence the probability that an individual votes for Trump relative to Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential election. Our major contribution is the addition of variables that measure voters' awareness of the electoral campaign after controlling for other factors that the literature finds significantly affect voters' choice of US Presidential candidate. Others in the literature include the number of advertising per capita or the amounts spent on advertising. We opt for a different approach by looking at the effect of the media on voters' choices by using data at the voter level. That is, our awareness variables measure voters' direct interest in the news, their use of social media, and their interest in the electoral campaign. By measuring variables at the voter level, we capture the impact that voters' media awareness had on their voting decisions. We also estimate voters' position along the economic and social dimensions to study the influence the disutility voters derive from candidates adopting positions that differ from their ideal

We estimate a set of binomial logit regressions to examine the probability that a voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our results indicate that the more active a voter with mean characteristics is on social media, the more likely she/he was to vote for Trump. We also find that the more aware the mean voter was of the media (TV, radio, reading newspaper) and the more interested she/he was in the news, the less likely she/he was to vote for Trump. Even

swingness variable gives a better fit to the data.

marginal effect decreases this probability.

probability of voting for Trump by almost 4%.

policies had on their voting decisions.

statistics.

Elections - A Global Perspective

6. Conclusion

88

We wish to thank Prof. Ryan Merlin Yonk and members of the Department of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier University for their useful comments on how to improve this paper.

#### A. Appendix



Variable Question Coding (and no tax increases). The point in the middle means that the budget should be balanced with equal amounts of spending

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

that apply) (1) read a blog, (2) watched TV news, (3) read a newspaper in print or online, (4) listened to a radio news program or talk radio, or (5) used social media (such as Facebook or

media (such as Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter)? Posted a story, photo, video, or link about politics; Posted a comment about politics; Read a story or watched a video about politics; Followed a political event; Forwarded a story, photo, video, or link about politics to friends

political meetings (such as school board

political sign (such as a lawn sign or

money to a candidate, campaign, or

Question: How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups?

Question: How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups?

State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Law enforcement

1. Strongly disagree 2. Somewhat disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Somewhat agree 5. Strongly agree

social media

1. Yes 2. No

1. Yes 2. No

1. Yes 2. No

1. Yes 2. No

1. Very liberal 2. Liberal 3. Somewhat liberal 4. Middle of the road 5. Somewhat conservative 6. Conservative 7. Very conservative

1. Very liberal 2. Liberal 3. Somewhat liberal 4. Middle of the road 5. Somewhat conservative 6. Conservative 7. Very conservative

1. Greatly increase 2. Slightly increase 3. Maintain 4. Slightly decrease 5. Greatly decrease

This variable is taken as an aggregate. The higher the coded number the greater their awareness

This variable is taken as an aggregate. The higher the social media variable the more active the voter was on

cuts and tax increases Racism Question: I often find myself fearful of people of other races

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Aware In the past 24 hours have you (check all

Social media Did you do any of the following on social

Attend During the past year, did you attend local

or city council)?

bumper sticker)?

Signs During the past year, did you put up a

Work During the past year, did you work for a candidate or campaign?

Donate During the past year, did you donate

Hillary Clinton

Donald Trump

Ideology (Clinton)

Ideology (Trump)

State spending on law enforcement

91

political organization?

YouTube)?


Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

Variable Question Coding

1. Oppose 2. Support

1. Support 2. Oppose

1. Oppose 2. Favor

1. Cut domestic first 2. Cut domestic second 3. Cut domestic last

1. Very conservative 2. Conservative 3. Somewhat conservative 4. Middle of the road 5. Somewhat liberal 6. Liberal 7. Very liberal

1. No 2. Yes

1. No 2. Yes

1. Greatly decrease 2. Slightly decrease 3. Maintain 4. Slightly increase 5. Greatly increase

increases in taxes

prefer spending cuts

The values range between 0 and 100. The closer to 0 the more they prefer

The closer to 100 the more they

1. Gotten much better 2. Gotten better 3. Stayed the same 4. Gotten worse 5. Gotten much worse

Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice

Over the past year the nation's economy

support or oppose each of the following proposals? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit

approximately 1 trillion dollar this year. If the Congress were to balance the budget, it would have to consider cutting defense spending, cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social Security), or raising taxes to cover the deficit. Please rank the options below from what would you most prefer that the Congress do to what you would least prefer they do: (1) cut defense spending, (2) cut domestic spending, and (3) raise taxes

Abortion Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?

Gun control On the issue of gun regulation, do you

Gay marriage Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?

Ideology (self) How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups?

Military a Would you approve of the use of US

Military b Would you approve of the use of US

terrorist camp?

below? Welfare

Tax increases If your state were to have a budget deficit

military troops in ensuring the supply of

military troops in order to destroy a

State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas

this year, it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 100% tax increases (and no spending cuts) to 100% spending cuts

Yourself

oil?

State spending on welfare

90

The federal budget deficit is

has…?

Elections - A Global Perspective

Economic problems

Federal spending


#### Table A.1.

Variable description and coding.


Author details

93

Lauren Dique and Maria Gallego\*

Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

\*Address all correspondence to: mgallego@wlu.ca

provided the original work is properly cited.

#### Table A.2. Politico's classification of states (June 2016).<sup>a</sup>

Estimating the Effect of Voters' Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964

#### Author details

Variable Question Coding

Do you support or oppose each of the

1. Support 2. Oppose

1. Support 2. Oppose

1. Most of the time 2. Some of the time 3. Only now and then 4. Hardly at all

This variable is taken as an aggregate, if individual said support to one or more of the environmental policies they are coded as a higher value (2)

Increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services

Increase prison sentences for felons who have already committed two or more

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others are not that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public

Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Give Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions; Raise required fuel efficiency for the average automobile from 25 mpg to 35 mpg; Require a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase somewhat CC16\_333d; Strengthen enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs

Republican Democratic Swing Alabama Nebraska California New York Colorado Alaska North Dakota Connecticut Oregon Florida Arizona Oklahoma Delaware Rhode Island Michigan Arkansas South Carolina District Vermont Iowa Indiana South Dakota Hawaii Washington Nevada

Idaho Tennessee Illinois New Hampshire Kansas Texas Maine Pennsylvania Kentucky Utah Maryland North Carolina

Louisiana West Virginia Massachusetts Ohio Missouri Wyoming Minnesota Virginia Montana New Jersey Wisconsin

following proposals?

Crime policy b Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?

serious or violent crimes

affairs?

US jobs

Variable description and coding.

Crime policy a

Elections - A Global Perspective

Interest in the news

Environmental policy

Table A.1.

a

92

See Ref. [12].

Politico's classification of states (June 2016).<sup>a</sup>

Table A.2.

Lauren Dique and Maria Gallego\* Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

\*Address all correspondence to: mgallego@wlu.ca

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### References

[1] Rutledge DP. How Obama Won the Social Media Battle in the 2012 Presidential Campaign [Internet]. 2013 (January 25). Available from: http:// mprcenter.org/blog/2013/01/howobama-won-the-social-media-battle-inthe-2012-presidential-campaign/

[2] Fernando G. How Social Media Helped Trump Take Over the World [Internet]. 2016 (November 30). Available from: http://www.news.com. au/finance/work/leaders/howdonald-trump-used-social-media-totake-over-the-world/news-story/ 97567c6a71fb6aa8940fb2d4f133dd68

[3] Schofield N, Claassen C, Gallego M, Ozdemir U. Empirical and formal models of the United States presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. In: Schofield N, Caballero G, editors. The Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer; 2011. pp. 217-258. DOI: 10.1007/978-3- 642-19519-8\_10

[4] Narayanswamy A, Cameron D, Gold M. How Much Money is Behind Each Campaign? The Washington Post. 2017 (February 1). Available from: https:// www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ politics/2016-election/campaignfinance/?noredirect=on

[5] Huber GA, Arceneaux K. Identifying the persuasive effects of presidential advertising. American Journal of Political Science. 2007;51(4):957-977. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00291.x

[6] Gordon B, Hartmann W. Advertising effects in presidential elections. Marketing Science. 2013;32(1):19-35. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1120.0745

[7] Hong S. Who benefits from Twitter? Social media and political competition in the U.S. House of Representatives. Government Information Quarterly.

2013;30(4):464-472. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.giq.2013.05.009

[8] Clarke HD, Kornberg A, Scotto TJ, Reifler J, Sanders D, Stewart MC, et al. Yes we can! Valence politics and electoral choice in America, 2008. Electoral Studies. 2011;30(3):450-461. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. electstud.2010.11.013

[9] Keegan J. Clinton vs. Trump: How They Used Twitter. The Wall Street Journal [Internet]. 2016 (July 19). Available from: http://graphics.wsj. com/clinton-trump-twitter/

[10] Gallego M, Schofield N. Modelling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections. In: Gallego M, Schofield N, editors. The Political Economy of Social Choices. Springer; 2016. pp. 123-152

[11] Gallego M, Schofield M. Modelling the effect of campaign advertising on US Presidential elections when differences across states. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2017, 2017;90:160-181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. mathsocsci.2016.09.002

[12] Mahtesian C. What are the Swing States in 2016? Politico. 2016 (June 15). Available from: https://www.politico. com/blogs/swing-states-2016-election/ 2016/06/what-are-the-swing-states-in-2016-list-224327

**95**

**Chapter 6**

**Abstract**

obstacles facing women in politics

**1. Introduction**

How Italian Female Local and

National Politicians Perceive

and Cope with Obstacles in a

Gatekeeping Political Culture

In spite of decades of women's political battles, there is a persistent underrepresentation of women in legislative bodies, with only 23.8% in 2018. In this chapter, we discuss theories and empirical studies that have explored what kind of obstacles female politicians are more likely to meet and how they cope with them, when they face more hurdles, and why we need more women elected to political office. Furthermore, we report the results of several studies, which have involved 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Results of these studies show that female politicians face mainly external obstacles as the gatekeeping theory maintains. Women find obstacles all along their political career supporting labyrinth hypotheses. Females at all levels of political involvement scored higher in self-transcendence values that emphasize concern for the welfare of others, partially confirming the politics of presence theory. Female politicians were also more open to change and less conservation oriented than their male colleagues. Our findings in

general support ethical struggles for a more balanced gender representation.

**Keywords:** female politicians, gatekeeping, gender differences, personal values,

The aim of this chapter is primarily twofold. First, we seek to identify which obstacles among those postulated by different theories are hardest to cope with for female local and national politicians, and when in their career paths they face most difficulties. Elected women tend in fact to leave politics more often than men (revolving door syndrome); thus, knowing which obstacles they face more frequently will permit us to focus on political battles more precisely. The second aim of this chapter is to document why in this individualistic world, burdened with huge economic inequalities and environmental problems, we need to have more women in local and national political positions. We present empirical data that show that female and male voters differ in core political values and in their basic values, women score higher in self-transcendence values which emphasize concern for the welfare of others, and for the environment, while men have higher

*Donata Francescato and Minou Ella Mebane*

#### **Chapter 6**

References

[1] Rutledge DP. How Obama Won the

2013;30(4):464-472. https://doi.org/

[8] Clarke HD, Kornberg A, Scotto TJ, Reifler J, Sanders D, Stewart MC, et al. Yes we can! Valence politics and electoral choice in America, 2008. Electoral Studies. 2011;30(3):450-461.

[9] Keegan J. Clinton vs. Trump: How They Used Twitter. The Wall Street Journal [Internet]. 2016 (July 19). Available from: http://graphics.wsj.

[10] Gallego M, Schofield N. Modelling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections. In: Gallego M, Schofield N, editors. The Political Economy of Social Choices. Springer;

[11] Gallego M, Schofield M. Modelling the effect of campaign advertising on US Presidential elections when

differences across states. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2017, 2017;90:160-181.

[12] Mahtesian C. What are the Swing States in 2016? Politico. 2016 (June 15). Available from: https://www.politico. com/blogs/swing-states-2016-election/ 2016/06/what-are-the-swing-states-in-

10.1016/j.giq.2013.05.009

https://doi.org/10.1016/j. electstud.2010.11.013

com/clinton-trump-twitter/

2016. pp. 123-152

2016-list-224327

https://doi.org/10.1016/j. mathsocsci.2016.09.002

Presidential Campaign [Internet]. 2013 (January 25). Available from: http:// mprcenter.org/blog/2013/01/howobama-won-the-social-media-battle-inthe-2012-presidential-campaign/

Social Media Battle in the 2012

Elections - A Global Perspective

[2] Fernando G. How Social Media Helped Trump Take Over the World [Internet]. 2016 (November 30). Available from: http://www.news.com.

au/finance/work/leaders/howdonald-trump-used-social-media-totake-over-the-world/news-story/ 97567c6a71fb6aa8940fb2d4f133dd68

elections in 2000 and 2004. In: Schofield N, Caballero G, editors. The Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer; 2011. pp. 217-258. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-

642-19519-8\_10

finance/?noredirect=on

[3] Schofield N, Claassen C, Gallego M, Ozdemir U. Empirical and formal models of the United States presidential

[4] Narayanswamy A, Cameron D, Gold M. How Much Money is Behind Each Campaign? The Washington Post. 2017 (February 1). Available from: https:// www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ politics/2016-election/campaign-

[5] Huber GA, Arceneaux K. Identifying the persuasive effects of presidential advertising. American Journal of Political Science. 2007;51(4):957-977. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00291.x

[6] Gordon B, Hartmann W. Advertising

[7] Hong S. Who benefits from Twitter? Social media and political competition in the U.S. House of Representatives. Government Information Quarterly.

effects in presidential elections. Marketing Science. 2013;32(1):19-35. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1120.0745

94

## How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles in a Gatekeeping Political Culture

*Donata Francescato and Minou Ella Mebane*

#### **Abstract**

In spite of decades of women's political battles, there is a persistent underrepresentation of women in legislative bodies, with only 23.8% in 2018. In this chapter, we discuss theories and empirical studies that have explored what kind of obstacles female politicians are more likely to meet and how they cope with them, when they face more hurdles, and why we need more women elected to political office. Furthermore, we report the results of several studies, which have involved 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Results of these studies show that female politicians face mainly external obstacles as the gatekeeping theory maintains. Women find obstacles all along their political career supporting labyrinth hypotheses. Females at all levels of political involvement scored higher in self-transcendence values that emphasize concern for the welfare of others, partially confirming the politics of presence theory. Female politicians were also more open to change and less conservation oriented than their male colleagues. Our findings in general support ethical struggles for a more balanced gender representation.

**Keywords:** female politicians, gatekeeping, gender differences, personal values, obstacles facing women in politics

#### **1. Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is primarily twofold. First, we seek to identify which obstacles among those postulated by different theories are hardest to cope with for female local and national politicians, and when in their career paths they face most difficulties. Elected women tend in fact to leave politics more often than men (revolving door syndrome); thus, knowing which obstacles they face more frequently will permit us to focus on political battles more precisely. The second aim of this chapter is to document why in this individualistic world, burdened with huge economic inequalities and environmental problems, we need to have more women in local and national political positions. We present empirical data that show that female and male voters differ in core political values and in their basic values, women score higher in self-transcendence values which emphasize concern for the welfare of others, and for the environment, while men have higher self-enhancement (power and achievement) values. Then, we present scientific evidence in favor of theorists of the politics of presence hypothesis that these gender differences among voters persist even when women are elected to political positions and have to operate in male-dominated contexts. Finally, we argue that it is crucial to have a large number of women in powerful political positions since they may support different policy priorities that will allow us to better handle the main social and political challenges we face today.

Women are underrepresented in politics in most countries (on average in the world, 23.8% of women are in national parliaments) [1]. Different theories try to explain this persistent political gender gap in legislative bodies. Some theories have explored what kind of obstacles female politicians are more likely to encounter and how they cope with them. Researchers in this area have varied academic backgrounds, ranging from sociology, political science, and political psychology to gender studies. They have thus emphasized obstacles hypothesized by one or two specific theories focusing either on societal structure, institutional aspects which hindered women's access to political career, or explored the theories which examined hurdles women encounter after being elected (e.g., gatekeeping, gender stereotypes, work-family balance, and attitudes of mass media) [2]. Other theories have focused on when women encounter most obstacles. The "glass ceiling" theoretical approach maintains that women find more obstacles primarily on approaching high leadership roles. "Labyrinth" theory supporters instead argue that women encounter more obstacles than men all along their careers paths [2, 3]. Theorists of the politics of presence [4] have focused on why we need more women elected to political office hypothesizing that they have personality traits and hold values different from their male colleagues.

In this chapter, we discuss these theoretical approaches and the results of several studies, which have involved 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females).

The first part of our research with female politicians aimed to build two reliable instruments: (WO) Women's Perceived Obstacles and (WOC) Women's Coping Efficacy in Politics, to explore which kind of hurdles postulated by different theories such as gatekeeping, gender role, mass media, and work and family balance were more present for women elected to local and national offices and how women coped with different kinds of obstacles they encountered. We also tried to ascertain whether women find hurdles all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling supporters maintain. Furthermore, we examined how personality traits and personal values account for political career self-efficacy beliefs and career progression, among women legislators, since no published studies have tried to examine how dispositional variables and self-efficacy beliefs operate in concert to account for women's political career progression, in samples of women elected to top positions such as members of parliament.

The objective of our last study, that involved both men and women elected to political office, was to test the theory of presence that hypothesizes that women and men hold diverse interests and values and that women elected would still have similar values to women and therefore represent them more adequately than their male colleagues.

#### **2. What kind of obstacles are women more likely to encounter in their political career and how they cope with them**

Several studies from various theoretical viewpoints have tried to understand which factors promote or undermine women's political career [2, 5]. Structural

**97**

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles…*

approach supporters maintain that women's underrepresentation in politics might be related to their past lower social status, lower levels of education, lower control of financial capitals, and fewer work occasions [5]. The institutional approach focuses on the role of: party rules and electoral laws, and access to funds for campaigning, in hindering or favoring women's political participation [2, 5].1

gatekeeping approach suggests that men systematically control all the most relevant political positions and literally keep the gates shut to women, by excluding them on purpose at the entry level and opposing their career progress [4, 6]. Alternatively, family and work balancing theories [7] claim that it is harder for women to be elected and remain in high political offices since their family responsibilities limit

Gender differences theories maintain that many cultural and personal factors, such as political empowerment, influence women's political experiences [5, 8]. Theorists who employ the term gender differences emphasize that these differences develop from acquired social expectations of what masculine and feminine means and that political underrepresentation of women is related to the characteristics conventionally associated to men and women [2, 9]. Theorists of mass media and political personalization highlight the importance of successfully campaigning to be elected in politic office. As politics has become more personalized, individual characteristics of politicians (e.g., their values, their personality traits, and their appearance) have a greater impact than in the past and the role of mass media has become more fundamental in drawing attention to the personal characteristics of politicians [10]. According to the *mass-media* hypothesis, women in politics have more difficulties to access media than men and are represented differently [11]. A close review of the literature reveals that few studies have involved top and middle level women politicians to investigate if they perceive the obstacles they encounter in their political career as deriving from situational, gatekeeping, gender differences, or mass media variables, and most of all, how they cope with them. Empirical studies in this field, involving women politicians, are scarce and reveal

For instance, some studies indicated that women politicians have problems remaining in politics because of family issues [12]. Others [13], instead, have shown that most

<sup>1</sup> The last Italian Electoral law (2017), has a mixed voting system: 37% of seats are gained using a first past the post electoral system and 61% using a proportional system (one round of voting). Also this new electoral law (also known also as Rosato) enables the same candidate to run for more offices simultaneously. In the past the multiple candidacy has allowed, party leaders to control the rank-and-file by promoting the election of those candidates who were most loyal to the leader. With the Rosato election law, however, this is no longer possible since when the candidate is elected in more than one multi-member constituency, they are given the seat in the constituency where their party has the lowest percentage of votes. Moreover, a candidate elected both in a single-member district and in one or more multi-member districts wins the seat of single-member district. Concerning gender equality the Rosato law requires that party lists must be filled using the 'zipper' system. Furthermore, none of the candidates from the same party can be present in single-member districts or at the top of the list more than 60% of the time. Although the Rosato law tried to promote the equal representation of women, in the last election (2018) in Italy, though women comprised 44% of the total population of candidates for the Chamber, the percentage of women among elected deputies was just 36%. The multiple candidacy system was partially responsible for this result, since, according to the zipper system the seats left vacant by elected women were assigned to male candidates from the same party. In our interviews many women c complained that the committees who decided placement on electoral lists had primarily male components and put women in locations were the party had fewer chances to fare well. (Data available at: https://constitution-unit.com/2018/05/08/

female members of parliament were aided by partners, children, and parents.

how-italy-experienced-yet-another-electoral-system-and-why-it-may-soon-change-it-again/).

The

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

their career opportunities [3, 5].

contrasting findings.

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

approach supporters maintain that women's underrepresentation in politics might be related to their past lower social status, lower levels of education, lower control of financial capitals, and fewer work occasions [5]. The institutional approach focuses on the role of: party rules and electoral laws, and access to funds for campaigning, in hindering or favoring women's political participation [2, 5].1 The gatekeeping approach suggests that men systematically control all the most relevant political positions and literally keep the gates shut to women, by excluding them on purpose at the entry level and opposing their career progress [4, 6]. Alternatively, family and work balancing theories [7] claim that it is harder for women to be elected and remain in high political offices since their family responsibilities limit their career opportunities [3, 5].

Gender differences theories maintain that many cultural and personal factors, such as political empowerment, influence women's political experiences [5, 8]. Theorists who employ the term gender differences emphasize that these differences develop from acquired social expectations of what masculine and feminine means and that political underrepresentation of women is related to the characteristics conventionally associated to men and women [2, 9]. Theorists of mass media and political personalization highlight the importance of successfully campaigning to be elected in politic office. As politics has become more personalized, individual characteristics of politicians (e.g., their values, their personality traits, and their appearance) have a greater impact than in the past and the role of mass media has become more fundamental in drawing attention to the personal characteristics of politicians [10]. According to the *mass-media* hypothesis, women in politics have more difficulties to access media than men and are represented differently [11].

A close review of the literature reveals that few studies have involved top and middle level women politicians to investigate if they perceive the obstacles they encounter in their political career as deriving from situational, gatekeeping, gender differences, or mass media variables, and most of all, how they cope with them. Empirical studies in this field, involving women politicians, are scarce and reveal contrasting findings.

For instance, some studies indicated that women politicians have problems remaining in politics because of family issues [12]. Others [13], instead, have shown that most female members of parliament were aided by partners, children, and parents.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

social and political challenges we face today.

ordinary citizens (49% females).

self-enhancement (power and achievement) values. Then, we present scientific evidence in favor of theorists of the politics of presence hypothesis that these gender differences among voters persist even when women are elected to political positions and have to operate in male-dominated contexts. Finally, we argue that it is crucial to have a large number of women in powerful political positions since they may support different policy priorities that will allow us to better handle the main

Women are underrepresented in politics in most countries (on average in the world, 23.8% of women are in national parliaments) [1]. Different theories try to explain this persistent political gender gap in legislative bodies. Some theories have explored what kind of obstacles female politicians are more likely to encounter and how they cope with them. Researchers in this area have varied academic backgrounds, ranging from sociology, political science, and political psychology to gender studies. They have thus emphasized obstacles hypothesized by one or two specific theories focusing either on societal structure, institutional aspects which hindered women's access to political career, or explored the theories which examined hurdles women encounter after being elected (e.g., gatekeeping, gender stereotypes, work-family balance, and attitudes of mass media) [2]. Other theories have focused on when women encounter most obstacles. The "glass ceiling" theoretical approach maintains that women find more obstacles primarily on approaching high leadership roles. "Labyrinth" theory supporters instead argue that women encounter more obstacles than men all along their careers paths [2, 3]. Theorists of the politics of presence [4] have focused on why we need more women elected to political office hypothesizing that they have personality traits and hold values different from their male colleagues. In this chapter, we discuss these theoretical approaches and the results of several studies, which have involved 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249

The first part of our research with female politicians aimed to build two reliable instruments: (WO) Women's Perceived Obstacles and (WOC) Women's Coping Efficacy in Politics, to explore which kind of hurdles postulated by different theories such as gatekeeping, gender role, mass media, and work and family balance were more present for women elected to local and national offices and how women coped with different kinds of obstacles they encountered. We also tried to ascertain whether women find hurdles all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling supporters maintain. Furthermore, we examined how personality traits and personal values account for political career self-efficacy beliefs and career progression, among women legislators, since no published studies have tried to examine how dispositional variables and self-efficacy beliefs operate in concert to account for women's political career progression, in samples of women elected to top positions such as members of parliament. The objective of our last study, that involved both men and women elected to political office, was to test the theory of presence that hypothesizes that women and men hold diverse interests and values and that women elected would still have similar values to women and therefore represent them more adequately than their

**2. What kind of obstacles are women more likely to encounter in their** 

Several studies from various theoretical viewpoints have tried to understand which factors promote or undermine women's political career [2, 5]. Structural

**political career and how they cope with them**

**96**

male colleagues.

<sup>1</sup> The last Italian Electoral law (2017), has a mixed voting system: 37% of seats are gained using a first past the post electoral system and 61% using a proportional system (one round of voting). Also this new electoral law (also known also as Rosato) enables the same candidate to run for more offices simultaneously. In the past the multiple candidacy has allowed, party leaders to control the rank-and-file by promoting the election of those candidates who were most loyal to the leader. With the Rosato election law, however, this is no longer possible since when the candidate is elected in more than one multi-member constituency, they are given the seat in the constituency where their party has the lowest percentage of votes. Moreover, a candidate elected both in a single-member district and in one or more multi-member districts wins the seat of single-member district. Concerning gender equality the Rosato law requires that party lists must be filled using the 'zipper' system. Furthermore, none of the candidates from the same party can be present in single-member districts or at the top of the list more than 60% of the time. Although the Rosato law tried to promote the equal representation of women, in the last election (2018) in Italy, though women comprised 44% of the total population of candidates for the Chamber, the percentage of women among elected deputies was just 36%. The multiple candidacy system was partially responsible for this result, since, according to the zipper system the seats left vacant by elected women were assigned to male candidates from the same party. In our interviews many women c complained that the committees who decided placement on electoral lists had primarily male components and put women in locations were the party had fewer chances to fare well. (Data available at: https://constitution-unit.com/2018/05/08/ how-italy-experienced-yet-another-electoral-system-and-why-it-may-soon-change-it-again/).

Contradictory results emerge also with respect to gatekeeping. Most studies show ample evidence of discriminatory behaviors. Powerful men do not place female colleagues in strategic political positions [12], do not put many women on electoral lists [14], or insert them in the most unelectable places [15]. Male politicians marginalize women colleagues by not communicating vital information [13] or verbally assaulting them and interrupting them even when they are head of a meeting [16]. Moreover, male politicians tend to make negative remarks on the femininity of assertive female colleagues [17] and to assign women politicians mostly to health, education, equal opportunities, and welfare committees [18]. Furthermore, they devalue the success of women politicians by giving to "luck" the credit for their achievements [18]. These negative behaviors by colleagues have been found to push women to leave the offices more often than their male colleagues (the "revolving door syndrome") [13]. Other studies reveal that men also tend to resent successful women in politics, especially if they are married and have children [19]. Some research studies, however, found that powerful women also act as gatekeepers toward their younger female colleagues and do not team up to support their colleagues [13]. A few studies show also that women candidates receive as much support as their male colleagues [20].

With respect to individual characteristics of politicians, contrasting results emerge regarding political ambition [21]. Moreover, women politicians face today a cultural double bind since typical male behaviors are considered inappropriate for a woman and typical female behaviors are inappropriate for a politician [22]. Various authors [23] argue that a "feminized" conception of politics has emerged, in which the concept of leadership is related to the ability to help groups to work together to solve problems. This contrasts with the traditional view of politics as a fight to obtain power for one's party and defeat the others [23]. Other researches confirm this trend [24] revealing that leadership styles of politicians show significant gender differences: female politicians tend to use a leadership style that pursues consensus, while male politicians, a style that pursues personal power and control.

Moreover, as Stevens points out we still do not know which personal qualities women politicians need to persist in their political career and to gain leading political positions, maintaining their believes and values [2]. She hypothesizes that for women politicians to achieve these goals, personal empowerment and a blend of feminine and masculine characteristics might be very important [2].

Research on media and politics indicates that there is often a misrepresentation of women (e.g., more comments on their appearance and family, and less on their policies) and that women politicians appear less frequently in the media (e.g., they are less present in talk shows) [11].

A review of most empirical studies and theoretical approaches highlights that the obstacles encountered by women politicians can be divided into two broad categories: (a) the first "inner obstacles" are supported mostly by the gender and difference theory and work and family balance theory (e.g., such ambivalence toward total commitment to politics (long hours, high stress levels, highly competitive environment, etc.)) and (b) "external obstacles" are supported mostly by mass media and gatekeeping theories (e.g., masculine cultures; restricting entry into politics or to higher political positions or institutional party practices that hinder women; difficulties to gain access to media) [25].

Which of these challenges are more difficult to overcome by women politicians, and with which types of obstacles they cope better? Reviewing the existing literature, we had difficulties answering these questions, since to our knowledge there is lack of studies that included specific instruments measuring internal and external obstacles that women politicians encounter and how they cope with them.

**99**

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles…*

Our initial research [25] aimed therefore to build and validate specific instruments. We developed a Women Obstacles scale (WO), which included perceived obstacles derived from the four main theories. Furthermore, we built a scale called Women Coping Efficacy in Politics (WOC), which explored how well women

A sample of 349 Italian women politicians either elected to the national parliament (N = 109, 68.8%) or to local councils (N = 240, 10%) participated in this study. Participants' age varied from 18 to 78 years (mean age = 47.18; *SD* = 10.6), and they were all administered the WO, WOC scales, the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ ), and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ ). About 70 women were also interviewed in depth, and all could answer open-ended questions in a section of the survey. Our findings with respect to the WO scale show a two-dimensional scale: women in politics perceived both external and internal obstacles. Male gatekeeping behaviors and also lack of women mentors and discriminatory acts put in practice by other powerful political women were external hurdles most often perceived by female politicians. Also, difficulties with media were often mentioned. Internal obstacles included primarily feeling ambivalent to compete for positions of high power in politics because women disliked the highly competitive and conflictual work environment and feeling unable to balance family

The WOC scale resulted in a clear-cut four-factor structure of personal capabilities resembling the above-mentioned theoretical approaches: efficacy (1) in gaining access to mass media (e.g., "I can always gain visibility through television"), (2) in balancing work and family burden (e.g., "I can always manage my political task without sacrificing my private life"), (3) in self-empowering (e.g., "I can always pursue ambitious goals more effectively than my male colleagues"), and (4) in contrasting male gatekeeping (e.g., "I can always hold my own view when dealing with very

Having validated the WO and WOC scales we then began to explore the rather

In this research, we used the WO and WOC scales to ascertain if women find hurdles all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling theorists maintain. The second aim was to explore which kind of hurdles among those postulated by gatekeeping, gender role, mass media, and work and family balance theorists were more present for women elected to local and national office and how well they

Supporters of "glass ceiling" theory think that women encounter obstacles primarily when they approach high leadership roles [26]. Eagly and Carli [3] have argued that the glass ceiling interpretation is misleading because it erroneously implies that women have equal access to entry or middle level positions, facing obstacles only at the top. They underline that, compared to men, female politicians have to go through a "labyrinth" beset with obstacles all along their career paths. Given the widespread underrepresentation of women in elected political positions in most countries, it would be crucial to ascertain which theory best explains the difficulties women encounter in a traditionally male field such as politics. Yet, the available empirical studies of female politicians do not permit us to favor either the glass ceiling or the labyrinth hypothesis. Reviewing the literature, we found that most studies had involved only women elected to local office, and few have

controversial question of when female politicians encounter most hurdles.

**3. When do female politicians encounter most obstacles?**

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

politicians can cope with these obstacles.

and work [25].

powerful men") [25].

coped with these obstacles.

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

Our initial research [25] aimed therefore to build and validate specific instruments. We developed a Women Obstacles scale (WO), which included perceived obstacles derived from the four main theories. Furthermore, we built a scale called Women Coping Efficacy in Politics (WOC), which explored how well women politicians can cope with these obstacles.

A sample of 349 Italian women politicians either elected to the national parliament (N = 109, 68.8%) or to local councils (N = 240, 10%) participated in this study. Participants' age varied from 18 to 78 years (mean age = 47.18; *SD* = 10.6), and they were all administered the WO, WOC scales, the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ ), and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ ). About 70 women were also interviewed in depth, and all could answer open-ended questions in a section of the survey. Our findings with respect to the WO scale show a two-dimensional scale: women in politics perceived both external and internal obstacles. Male gatekeeping behaviors and also lack of women mentors and discriminatory acts put in practice by other powerful political women were external hurdles most often perceived by female politicians. Also, difficulties with media were often mentioned. Internal obstacles included primarily feeling ambivalent to compete for positions of high power in politics because women disliked the highly competitive and conflictual work environment and feeling unable to balance family and work [25].

The WOC scale resulted in a clear-cut four-factor structure of personal capabilities resembling the above-mentioned theoretical approaches: efficacy (1) in gaining access to mass media (e.g., "I can always gain visibility through television"), (2) in balancing work and family burden (e.g., "I can always manage my political task without sacrificing my private life"), (3) in self-empowering (e.g., "I can always pursue ambitious goals more effectively than my male colleagues"), and (4) in contrasting male gatekeeping (e.g., "I can always hold my own view when dealing with very powerful men") [25].

Having validated the WO and WOC scales we then began to explore the rather controversial question of when female politicians encounter most hurdles.

#### **3. When do female politicians encounter most obstacles?**

In this research, we used the WO and WOC scales to ascertain if women find hurdles all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling theorists maintain. The second aim was to explore which kind of hurdles among those postulated by gatekeeping, gender role, mass media, and work and family balance theorists were more present for women elected to local and national office and how well they coped with these obstacles.

Supporters of "glass ceiling" theory think that women encounter obstacles primarily when they approach high leadership roles [26]. Eagly and Carli [3] have argued that the glass ceiling interpretation is misleading because it erroneously implies that women have equal access to entry or middle level positions, facing obstacles only at the top. They underline that, compared to men, female politicians have to go through a "labyrinth" beset with obstacles all along their career paths. Given the widespread underrepresentation of women in elected political positions in most countries, it would be crucial to ascertain which theory best explains the difficulties women encounter in a traditionally male field such as politics. Yet, the available empirical studies of female politicians do not permit us to favor either the glass ceiling or the labyrinth hypothesis. Reviewing the literature, we found that most studies had involved only women elected to local office, and few have

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

support as their male colleagues [20].

are less present in talk shows) [11].

women; difficulties to gain access to media) [25].

Contradictory results emerge also with respect to gatekeeping. Most studies show ample evidence of discriminatory behaviors. Powerful men do not place female colleagues in strategic political positions [12], do not put many women on electoral lists [14], or insert them in the most unelectable places [15]. Male politicians marginalize women colleagues by not communicating vital information [13] or verbally assaulting them and interrupting them even when they are head of a meeting [16]. Moreover, male politicians tend to make negative remarks on the femininity of assertive female colleagues [17] and to assign women politicians mostly to health, education, equal opportunities, and welfare committees [18]. Furthermore, they devalue the success of women politicians by giving to "luck" the credit for their achievements [18]. These negative behaviors by colleagues have been found to push women to leave the offices more often than their male colleagues (the "revolving door syndrome") [13]. Other studies reveal that men also tend to resent successful women in politics, especially if they are married and have children [19]. Some research studies, however, found that powerful women also act as gatekeepers toward their younger female colleagues and do not team up to support their colleagues [13]. A few studies show also that women candidates receive as much

With respect to individual characteristics of politicians, contrasting results emerge regarding political ambition [21]. Moreover, women politicians face today a cultural double bind since typical male behaviors are considered inappropriate for a woman and typical female behaviors are inappropriate for a politician [22]. Various authors [23] argue that a "feminized" conception of politics has emerged, in which the concept of leadership is related to the ability to help groups to work together to solve problems. This contrasts with the traditional view of politics as a fight to obtain power for one's party and defeat the others [23]. Other researches confirm this trend [24] revealing that leadership styles of politicians show significant gender differences: female politicians tend to use a leadership style that pursues consensus, while male politicians, a style that pursues personal power and

Moreover, as Stevens points out we still do not know which personal qualities women politicians need to persist in their political career and to gain leading political positions, maintaining their believes and values [2]. She hypothesizes that for women politicians to achieve these goals, personal empowerment and a blend of

Research on media and politics indicates that there is often a misrepresentation of women (e.g., more comments on their appearance and family, and less on their policies) and that women politicians appear less frequently in the media (e.g., they

A review of most empirical studies and theoretical approaches highlights that the obstacles encountered by women politicians can be divided into two broad categories: (a) the first "inner obstacles" are supported mostly by the gender and difference theory and work and family balance theory (e.g., such ambivalence toward total commitment to politics (long hours, high stress levels, highly competitive environment, etc.)) and (b) "external obstacles" are supported mostly by mass media and gatekeeping theories (e.g., masculine cultures; restricting entry into politics or to higher political positions or institutional party practices that hinder

Which of these challenges are more difficult to overcome by women politicians, and with which types of obstacles they cope better? Reviewing the existing literature, we had difficulties answering these questions, since to our knowledge there is lack of studies that included specific instruments measuring internal and external

obstacles that women politicians encounter and how they cope with them.

feminine and masculine characteristics might be very important [2].

**98**

control.

involved national and local politicians at the same time; so we do not know which obstacles are perceived by women politicians at any level, as labyrinth theory would predict, and which prevail primarily at higher levels of political achievement, as glass ceiling theory would predict. Even less was known about how elected women politicians cope with and overcome the obstacles they were likely to find, and which they found more difficult to cope with. So we did a pilot study [13], based primarily on interviews with male and female local politicians but with a small sample of national male and female representatives. We found that the national congresswomen, being on average over 55, were less likely than local representatives to report problems balancing family-work obligations. Half of the national congresswomen had no children, while the other half had grown children. Compared to women of the political left, women of the right felt better able to balance workfamily requirements, reporting receiving much support from husbands, children, and their own parents or relatives. They also felt more ready to occupy high positions in spite of their male colleagues' opposition. They could envision themselves as party leaders in the future more often than women of the left. The women of the left were more likely to state that they had problems showing their ambition too openly, did not feel qualified enough for top positions, and did not want to face the extreme competition and conflict that reaching a top position usually entails. Right-wing local and national politicians also had significantly higher scores on an empowerment scale than their left-wing peers, especially in the subscale measuring leadership propensity and capacity to reach goals.

Then, we did another study [27] in which we confronted two competing theories (glass ceiling or labyrinth) on why women still represent a small minority of elected politicians. We hypothesized that the labyrinth hypothesis would be sustained, and both local (lower level) and national (higher level) women politicians would report similar obstacles in pursuing their political careers. We also wanted to investigate how women elected coped with these obstacles, taking into account our previous study [13], we hypothesized that right-wing politicians would have greater self-reported ability to cope with the obstacles presented by mass media, work-family balance, and gatekeeping. We used the same sample of 349 local and national politicians involved in the study on perceived obstacles, analyzing in more depth the differences in answers to both WO and WOC between local and national politicians.

Our results on the WO overall seem to give more support to the labyrinth theory: both local and national politicians perceived more external obstacles, deriving primarily from hostile attitudes of their male colleagues, as gatekeeping theory (e.g., see [4, 6]) would predict. Internal obstacles included having trouble conciliating political engagements and family commitments, as other studies have shown [12], and also feeling ill at ease with some aspect of political life. For instance, top political positions were perceived as too stressful and demanding, so some women chose not to compete for them because they did not want to live "mutilated" lives, a choice that supports gender stereotype theories [23].

In general, results on the WOC showed a similar pattern for both local and national politicians, giving further indirect support to the labyrinth hypothesis. Both groups found it hardest to cope with the difficulties of accessing media, particularly national television, and easiest to confront male colleagues who exhibited gatekeeping attitudes and behaviors. Both groups had an intermediate level of difficulty in keeping their sense of empowerment high.

Local women were more able than national women to remain empowered and maintain high self-esteem even in the face of difficulties. This might depend on their younger age. However, further analysis showed that age affected only the perceived ability to conciliate public and private life. More specifically, women over 50 reported more perceived efficacy in coping with conciliation.

**101**

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles…*

**3.1 Interaction effects between political orientation and level of political** 

We had hypothesized, on the basis of the earlier pilot study [13], that right-wing women politicians would portray themselves as better able to cope with obstacles. Our hypothesis has been confirmed in all four typologies of problems: balance issues, access to media, maintaining high levels of empowerment, and gatekeeping. National women politicians of the left also perceived more internal and external obstacles (WO) than the other groups, confirming the trend found in the pilot study [13]. The national women of the left also described themselves as less able to cope than the other groups in accessing the media, in feeling empowered, and in confronting gatekeeping behaviors. The glass ceiling theory thus derives some support from this particular group of politicians. What might explain this peculiarity? We can hypothesize that women of the left have been in parliament for a longer time in Italy (while most women politicians of the right have increased their presence only in the last two decades). They thus may be more aware both from historical and personal experiences of the difficulties women politicians still face in a highly masculine culture. It is also conceivable that right-wing ideologies favor some forms of personal empowerment: right-wing ideals have always emphasized the rightfulness of hierarchies, perhaps making it easier for a national woman politician on the right to feel ambitious and empowered, while leftist ideologies have tended to promote egalitarianism, making it perhaps harder to legitimize aspiring to top positions. Right-wing women politicians may also be drawn from a pool of well-born local notables, who feel empowered from their family background. They may have personality traits, which propel them to more optimistic views and greater

**4. Exploring traits and values as determinant of political orientation and** 

Personality has a critical role in political orientation [10]; however, while most studies have relied on direct methods when assessing personality of voters, most of the research on personality of politicians relied on indirect measures [28]. In this study [29], we compared 106 women members of parliament and 864 voters using the Big Five questionnaire and Schwartz's basic values questionnaire. Schwartz focuses on 10 motivationally distinct basic values: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. These can be grouped into four broader dimensions: self-enhancement (power and achievement), which includes pursuit of self-interest; self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence), which underlines concern for the welfare of others; openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), which emphasizes independence of thought and action and readiness for new experience; and conservation (security, conformity and tradition), which includes self-restriction, order, and resistance to change. Hedonism is not clearly located in one of the four dimensions, as it shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement. All of these values are measured through a Portrait Values Questionnaire, which has been tested and evaluated in more than 50 countries [30]. In this research [29], with female members of the parliament we examined the extent to which differences in traits and values contribute to ideological orientation of politicians and voters of rival coalitions. We found that traits and values contributed more to partisanship of politicians than of voters, and that there were higher significant differences in traits and values of left-wing and right-wing female politicians than of right-wing and left-wing voters. Since no males were included in this study, we could not examine gender differences.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

self-confidence in their ability to overcome obstacles.

**perceived career efficacy**

**engagement**

#### **3.1 Interaction effects between political orientation and level of political engagement**

We had hypothesized, on the basis of the earlier pilot study [13], that right-wing women politicians would portray themselves as better able to cope with obstacles. Our hypothesis has been confirmed in all four typologies of problems: balance issues, access to media, maintaining high levels of empowerment, and gatekeeping. National women politicians of the left also perceived more internal and external obstacles (WO) than the other groups, confirming the trend found in the pilot study [13]. The national women of the left also described themselves as less able to cope than the other groups in accessing the media, in feeling empowered, and in confronting gatekeeping behaviors. The glass ceiling theory thus derives some support from this particular group of politicians. What might explain this peculiarity?

We can hypothesize that women of the left have been in parliament for a longer time in Italy (while most women politicians of the right have increased their presence only in the last two decades). They thus may be more aware both from historical and personal experiences of the difficulties women politicians still face in a highly masculine culture. It is also conceivable that right-wing ideologies favor some forms of personal empowerment: right-wing ideals have always emphasized the rightfulness of hierarchies, perhaps making it easier for a national woman politician on the right to feel ambitious and empowered, while leftist ideologies have tended to promote egalitarianism, making it perhaps harder to legitimize aspiring to top positions. Right-wing women politicians may also be drawn from a pool of well-born local notables, who feel empowered from their family background. They may have personality traits, which propel them to more optimistic views and greater self-confidence in their ability to overcome obstacles.

#### **4. Exploring traits and values as determinant of political orientation and perceived career efficacy**

Personality has a critical role in political orientation [10]; however, while most studies have relied on direct methods when assessing personality of voters, most of the research on personality of politicians relied on indirect measures [28]. In this study [29], we compared 106 women members of parliament and 864 voters using the Big Five questionnaire and Schwartz's basic values questionnaire. Schwartz focuses on 10 motivationally distinct basic values: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. These can be grouped into four broader dimensions: self-enhancement (power and achievement), which includes pursuit of self-interest; self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence), which underlines concern for the welfare of others; openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), which emphasizes independence of thought and action and readiness for new experience; and conservation (security, conformity and tradition), which includes self-restriction, order, and resistance to change. Hedonism is not clearly located in one of the four dimensions, as it shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement. All of these values are measured through a Portrait Values Questionnaire, which has been tested and evaluated in more than 50 countries [30]. In this research [29], with female members of the parliament we examined the extent to which differences in traits and values contribute to ideological orientation of politicians and voters of rival coalitions. We found that traits and values contributed more to partisanship of politicians than of voters, and that there were higher significant differences in traits and values of left-wing and right-wing female politicians than of right-wing and left-wing voters. Since no males were included in this study, we could not examine gender differences.

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

leadership propensity and capacity to reach goals.

choice that supports gender stereotype theories [23].

difficulty in keeping their sense of empowerment high.

50 reported more perceived efficacy in coping with conciliation.

involved national and local politicians at the same time; so we do not know which obstacles are perceived by women politicians at any level, as labyrinth theory would predict, and which prevail primarily at higher levels of political achievement, as glass ceiling theory would predict. Even less was known about how elected women politicians cope with and overcome the obstacles they were likely to find, and which they found more difficult to cope with. So we did a pilot study [13], based primarily on interviews with male and female local politicians but with a small sample of national male and female representatives. We found that the national congresswomen, being on average over 55, were less likely than local representatives to report problems balancing family-work obligations. Half of the national congresswomen had no children, while the other half had grown children. Compared to women of the political left, women of the right felt better able to balance workfamily requirements, reporting receiving much support from husbands, children, and their own parents or relatives. They also felt more ready to occupy high positions in spite of their male colleagues' opposition. They could envision themselves as party leaders in the future more often than women of the left. The women of the left were more likely to state that they had problems showing their ambition too openly, did not feel qualified enough for top positions, and did not want to face the extreme competition and conflict that reaching a top position usually entails. Right-wing local and national politicians also had significantly higher scores on an empowerment scale than their left-wing peers, especially in the subscale measuring

Then, we did another study [27] in which we confronted two competing theories (glass ceiling or labyrinth) on why women still represent a small minority of elected politicians. We hypothesized that the labyrinth hypothesis would be sustained, and both local (lower level) and national (higher level) women politicians would report similar obstacles in pursuing their political careers. We also wanted to investigate how women elected coped with these obstacles, taking into account our previous study [13], we hypothesized that right-wing politicians would have greater self-reported ability to cope with the obstacles presented by mass media, work-family balance, and gatekeeping. We used the same sample of 349 local and national politicians involved in the study on perceived obstacles, analyzing in more depth the differences in answers to both WO and WOC between local and national

Our results on the WO overall seem to give more support to the labyrinth theory:

both local and national politicians perceived more external obstacles, deriving primarily from hostile attitudes of their male colleagues, as gatekeeping theory (e.g., see [4, 6]) would predict. Internal obstacles included having trouble conciliating political engagements and family commitments, as other studies have shown [12], and also feeling ill at ease with some aspect of political life. For instance, top political positions were perceived as too stressful and demanding, so some women chose not to compete for them because they did not want to live "mutilated" lives, a

In general, results on the WOC showed a similar pattern for both local and national politicians, giving further indirect support to the labyrinth hypothesis. Both groups found it hardest to cope with the difficulties of accessing media, particularly national television, and easiest to confront male colleagues who exhibited gatekeeping attitudes and behaviors. Both groups had an intermediate level of

Local women were more able than national women to remain empowered and maintain high self-esteem even in the face of difficulties. This might depend on their younger age. However, further analysis showed that age affected only the perceived ability to conciliate public and private life. More specifically, women over

**100**

politicians.

In another research [31], we examined the potential explanatory role of personality traits and values as determinants of perceived political career efficacy and career progression in women elected to the national parliaments.

Our findings show that political women with higher levels of extraversion are more likely to attain higher scores in perceived self-efficacy in contrasting male gatekeeping, in balancing work and family duties, in gaining access to mass media, as well as in being able to set and pursue ambitious political goals. Our results are consistent with similar studies in organizational psychology, which maintain that extraversion is advantageous in job settings due to its positive relation to career decidedness, goal stability, and cognitive clarity [32]. Among personal values, self-transcendence had a greater impact since it was positively associated with two forms of efficacy: in dealing with gatekeeping and empowerment obstacles. These results confirm in part previous studies that have shown the importance of holding universalistic values for political efficacy and participation [33]. Moreover, a tied comparison of traits and values revealed that personality traits "trumped" personal values in the prediction of career efficacy beliefs.

With respect to prediction of career progression—operatively defined as the difference between the age at which each participant started her political activity and the age at which she was elected for the first time (the smaller the difference is, the quicker the career)—we were able to show not only that both traits (particularly extraversion) and values were correlated with this objective career outcome but also that personality is likely to have a distal effect on career outcomes that is mediated by career efficacy beliefs (particularly empowerment).

#### **5. Why is it important to have more female politicians elected: gender differences in personal values of national and local Italian politicians, activists, and voters**

The last decades have witnessed a strong debate over women's underrepresentation in politics. Politics of presence supporters [4] maintain that it does matter who is a representative, and that is very important for women to be involved in setting the agenda, since women and men hold different interests and values. According to this theoretical approach, female politicians' behaviors, attitudes, and values should mirror those of women voters [34]. Politics of presence can be studied analyzing political choices and activities of female politicians, but Lovenduski and Norris [35] maintain that behavioral measures (e.g., legislative voting) are influenced by backbench activities and offer therefore a limited view of the impact of women in politics and that an alternative systematic and reliable method to attest the hypotheses of the politics of presence theory is analyzing attitudes and values of females and male representatives. Indeed, if women and male politicians do hold similar values, then it will be rather questionable that women in public office can really make a difference (e.g., supporting "women's issues"). Values are envisioned and assessed in different ways by political scientists and by social and personality psychologists. The former include mostly in their research "core political values" such as social equality, civil right, liberty of expression, etc. (e.g., see [36]), while personality psychologists focus in their studies on "basic personal values." Basic personal values theory [30] defines values as desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. Different studies [37] maintain that focusing on personal values is relevant since it allows us to predict how people elected in public office might conduct themselves in unpredicted circumstances. In addition, basic value priorities tend to be more permanent and less affected by recent events than political attitudes.

**103**

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles…*

**5.1 Empirical evidence of gender differences in politics and basic personal values** 

An analysis [36] of the political science literature on gender differences on political issues of the last three decades shows that there is a broad political gender gap in attitudes and behaviors, (e.g., women tend to favor more programs on health care, education, promoting employment and stricter gun control; they are less likely than men to support death penalty and the use of military force to resolve international conflicts). This difference is due principally to the different socialization experiences of men and women, who end up supporting distinctive values. Feminine values are: collaboration, empathy, equality, a belief we are all entitled to human rights, a preference for pacific solutions to fights, and a sense of community and the feeling of being part of something bigger than our selves. Men are socialized to endorse masculine values such as antagonism, hostility, and individualism. Therefore, they tend to make decisions mostly based on what suits them better and is best for them and they tend to favor more the use of force when necessary to manage foreign conflicts. Research on voters has shown a strong association between political behaviors and values [38]. Empirical studies on political values

Instead, contradictory results characterize the studies on gender gap values among politicians. Some research studies provide evidence that women elected in public office hold feminine values. Norris and Lovenduski's research [39] showed that women of British Parliament had more feminist and leftist radical values than their male colleagues; however, political orientation had a stronger impact on values and policies. In line with these findings, other studies [12] based in the United States, which included male and female politicians at the state levels, also highlighted different priorities. Among the priorities of women politicians were issues of women, children, and families. Other research, instead, showed that male and female politicians were more alike, holding similar values. A Swedish research that involved members of the parliament [40] showed only a small difference between men and women's attitudes on most of the issues investigated, since they both valued social goals. Also, another qualitative research on British politics (based on interviews) highlighted more similarities between female and male politicians [41]. Instead, in a qualitative study [11], the Italian female representatives interviewed perceived their male colleagues as more power oriented. Moreover, these female politicians noted that their personal values of caring for the commonwealth and for

Political values have received more attention on the debate on representation with respect to personal values; however, in order to address politics of presence, we need additional studies to focus on personal values. Recent evidence [37], in fact, found that basic personal values underlie political ideologies and attitudes, and core political values (e.g., people who give greatest importance to security and power will tend to support policies that favor patriotism). The authors [37] highlight that the pattern of correlations between basic values and core political values reveal their shared motivational structure. They claim that the coherent structure of motivations that organizes basic values also structures core political values. For instance, the political values of equality, civil liberties, and—on the other side—free enterprise reveal the motivational opposition of universalism and benevolence versus power and achievement values. Therefore, the primary motivational conflict

concerning these political values is self-interest versus interest for others.

to explore whether women politicians, of different levels, have values similar to most female voters. The few systematic studies on gender differences in personal

In order to study the theory of presence, personal values seem particularly suited

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

**among voters and politicians**

give support to the politics of presence theory.

women's issues helped them face hurdles [11].

#### **5.1 Empirical evidence of gender differences in politics and basic personal values among voters and politicians**

An analysis [36] of the political science literature on gender differences on political issues of the last three decades shows that there is a broad political gender gap in attitudes and behaviors, (e.g., women tend to favor more programs on health care, education, promoting employment and stricter gun control; they are less likely than men to support death penalty and the use of military force to resolve international conflicts). This difference is due principally to the different socialization experiences of men and women, who end up supporting distinctive values. Feminine values are: collaboration, empathy, equality, a belief we are all entitled to human rights, a preference for pacific solutions to fights, and a sense of community and the feeling of being part of something bigger than our selves. Men are socialized to endorse masculine values such as antagonism, hostility, and individualism. Therefore, they tend to make decisions mostly based on what suits them better and is best for them and they tend to favor more the use of force when necessary to manage foreign conflicts. Research on voters has shown a strong association between political behaviors and values [38]. Empirical studies on political values give support to the politics of presence theory.

Instead, contradictory results characterize the studies on gender gap values among politicians. Some research studies provide evidence that women elected in public office hold feminine values. Norris and Lovenduski's research [39] showed that women of British Parliament had more feminist and leftist radical values than their male colleagues; however, political orientation had a stronger impact on values and policies. In line with these findings, other studies [12] based in the United States, which included male and female politicians at the state levels, also highlighted different priorities. Among the priorities of women politicians were issues of women, children, and families. Other research, instead, showed that male and female politicians were more alike, holding similar values. A Swedish research that involved members of the parliament [40] showed only a small difference between men and women's attitudes on most of the issues investigated, since they both valued social goals. Also, another qualitative research on British politics (based on interviews) highlighted more similarities between female and male politicians [41]. Instead, in a qualitative study [11], the Italian female representatives interviewed perceived their male colleagues as more power oriented. Moreover, these female politicians noted that their personal values of caring for the commonwealth and for women's issues helped them face hurdles [11].

Political values have received more attention on the debate on representation with respect to personal values; however, in order to address politics of presence, we need additional studies to focus on personal values. Recent evidence [37], in fact, found that basic personal values underlie political ideologies and attitudes, and core political values (e.g., people who give greatest importance to security and power will tend to support policies that favor patriotism). The authors [37] highlight that the pattern of correlations between basic values and core political values reveal their shared motivational structure. They claim that the coherent structure of motivations that organizes basic values also structures core political values. For instance, the political values of equality, civil liberties, and—on the other side—free enterprise reveal the motivational opposition of universalism and benevolence versus power and achievement values. Therefore, the primary motivational conflict concerning these political values is self-interest versus interest for others.

In order to study the theory of presence, personal values seem particularly suited to explore whether women politicians, of different levels, have values similar to most female voters. The few systematic studies on gender differences in personal

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

In another research [31], we examined the potential explanatory role of personality traits and values as determinants of perceived political career efficacy and

Our findings show that political women with higher levels of extraversion are more likely to attain higher scores in perceived self-efficacy in contrasting male gatekeeping, in balancing work and family duties, in gaining access to mass media, as well as in being able to set and pursue ambitious political goals. Our results are consistent with similar studies in organizational psychology, which maintain that extraversion is advantageous in job settings due to its positive relation to career decidedness, goal stability, and cognitive clarity [32]. Among personal values, self-transcendence had a greater impact since it was positively associated with two forms of efficacy: in dealing with gatekeeping and empowerment obstacles. These results confirm in part previous studies that have shown the importance of holding universalistic values for political efficacy and participation [33]. Moreover, a tied comparison of traits and values revealed that personality traits "trumped" personal

With respect to prediction of career progression—operatively defined as the difference between the age at which each participant started her political activity and the age at which she was elected for the first time (the smaller the difference is, the quicker the career)—we were able to show not only that both traits (particularly extraversion) and values were correlated with this objective career outcome but also that personality is likely to have a distal effect on career outcomes that is mediated

**5. Why is it important to have more female politicians elected: gender differences in personal values of national and local Italian politicians,** 

The last decades have witnessed a strong debate over women's underrepresentation in politics. Politics of presence supporters [4] maintain that it does matter who is a representative, and that is very important for women to be involved in setting the agenda, since women and men hold different interests and values. According to this theoretical approach, female politicians' behaviors, attitudes, and values should mirror those of women voters [34]. Politics of presence can be studied analyzing political choices and activities of female politicians, but Lovenduski and Norris [35] maintain that behavioral measures (e.g., legislative voting) are influenced by backbench activities and offer therefore a limited view of the impact of women in politics and that an alternative systematic and reliable method to attest the hypotheses of the politics of presence theory is analyzing attitudes and values of females and male representatives. Indeed, if women and male politicians do hold similar values, then it will be rather questionable that women in public office can really make a difference (e.g., supporting "women's issues"). Values are envisioned and assessed in different ways by political scientists and by social and personality psychologists. The former include mostly in their research "core political values" such as social equality, civil right, liberty of expression, etc. (e.g., see [36]), while personality psychologists focus in their studies on "basic personal values." Basic personal values theory [30] defines values as desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. Different studies [37] maintain that focusing on personal values is relevant since it allows us to predict how people elected in public office might conduct themselves in unpredicted circumstances. In addition, basic value priorities tend to be more permanent and less affected by

career progression in women elected to the national parliaments.

values in the prediction of career efficacy beliefs.

by career efficacy beliefs (particularly empowerment).

**activists, and voters**

**102**

recent events than political attitudes.

values among voters found small but significant differences. Males scored higher on self-enhancement values (power and achievement) and females higher on self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence) [42, 43]. Furthermore, previous studies have revealed that basic personal values predicted political orientation, across cultural contexts and political systems (e.g., see [10]) and our recent study involving women politicians confirmed this trend [29].

An analysis of the literature, taking into consideration different approaches, revealed that in order to legitimize the claims of politics of presence, investigating if women politicians have personal values more similar to female voters and different from male politicians, we needed to control also for political orientation and different levels of political experience. Some authors, in fact, have maintained that becoming involved in politics may modify values, so that simply being a female politician does not ensure that they will hold feminine values. To fill the literature gap we investigated if women, at all levels of political engagement, still held values of transcendence that correspond to those of female voters, as theory of presence maintains or personal values would vary at different levels of political involvement (e.g., activists, politicians elected to local and national political office).

To our knowledge, no previous studies have examined these issues involving male and female voters, activists, and politicians. Moreover, Wängnerud [44] in her research pointed out that there was a need for empirical studies of the politics of presence theory, particularly in countries where the political gender gap is higher than in Northern European ones. Italy ranks low in the Global Gender Gap Index, 50th among 144 countries [45]. Furthermore, Italy has a strongly masculine culture [9, 46].

Our most recent research [47] therefore aimed to investigate if gender differences in personal values were still present among activists, and local and national politicians. We also tried to determine if, in line with previous studies on voters, self-transcendence values were more strongly held by women and self-enhancement by men at all levels of political activities even after controlling for political orientation. Furthermore, since we are not aware of previous research that has examined gender differences in conservation and openness to change in people actively involved in politics, we explored whether gender-specific values for conservation and openness to change are similar at all levels of political participation.

A total 4533 participants were recruited for the study: 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Participants were given a shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 2003).

Our findings give additional support for the politics of presence theory since females, at all levels of political involvement, showed higher levels of selftranscendence values (that express concern for the welfare of others).

Our results lend support to previous studies [42, 43], self-transcendence values were more important for women; moreover, this specific gender difference was present at all levels of political activities, among activists, and local and national politicians, even after controlling for political orientation. However, our results did not show significant gender differences in self-enhancement values, in contrast to earlier studies [42, 43]. Self-enhancement values were somewhat higher for male voters, activists, and local politicians; however, unlike previous results reported in literature, female national politicians had slightly higher scores than their male colleagues. Furthermore, our findings show that female politicians were also more open to change and less conservation oriented than their male colleagues. These results significantly differ from previous research among voters, where females were less open to change and more conservation oriented than males [42, 43].

**105**

female voters.

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles…*

Women are underrepresented in in politics in most countries (on average in the world, 23.8% of women are in the parliament [1]. This gender gap has stimulated theoretical and empirical studies to discover which obstacles most hinder female politicians, when these hurdles are more present, and why we need more women in

To answer some of these questions, we constructed and validated two scales (WO women obstacles, and WOC Women coping efficacy in politics) that included items derived from each of four main theories (gatekeeping, mass media, life balance, and gender role). Results showed that female politicians faced primarily external obstacles (gatekeeping behaviors by male colleagues and difficult access to main stream media). Internal obstacles were cited less frequently and provided

No general coping efficacy helped politicians face all these different hurdles. Each type of hurdle required a set of different personal capabilities, developed through experience with hostile, powerful men (for gatekeeping problems), or obtaining help and support from family members (for life-balance hurdles). Local politicians developed strategies to gain access to local media while national politicians had more problems accessing big national networks and used social media (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, etc.). Finally, those who felt empowered were better able to pursue ambitious goals related to the values that brought them to political activism in the first place. In some interviews, women stated clearly how important it was for them to uphold their feminine values

We also investigated the role of personality traits in coping with obstacles. Our findings indicated that being talkative, assertive, energetic, and dominant helps women overcome many different obstacles. Our results therefore supported authors who maintain that dispositional variables of politicians are important in the attainment of political success [10, 48], and that personality traits should be considered when selecting candidates. Moreover, to try to diminish women's underrepresentation in parliaments, we should also promote empowerment-training programs that increase female politicians' capacity to have high aspirations, to preserve their selfconfidence in achieving ambitious goals even in hostile settings, and to strengthen

We then tried to ascertain when women find hurdles, if all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling supporters maintain. We hypothesized that the labyrinth hypothesis would be sustained, and both local (lower level) and national (higher level) women politicians would report similar obstacles in pursuing their political careers. We also hypothesized that right-wing politicians would have greater self-reported ability to cope with the obstacles presented by mass media, work-family balance, and gatekeeping. Results supported both of our hypotheses. Further studies should explore if differences between right-wing and left-wing

Our last research is the first study that we are aware, to directly measure personal values of female and male members of the parliament, local politicians, and activists through the PVQ [30] and to test the theory of politics of presence's hypothesis that women elected to political office would represent women better than male politicians, because they would still hold values similar to those of

Our results confirmed that the self-transcendence gender differences in voters can be found among politicians. This supports politics of presence claims that it could matter whether there are men or women in elected political positions. Female

some support for work-life balance and gender role theories.

and their femininity to contrast the prevalent warrior, masculine culture.

female politicians found in Italy are also present in other countries.

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

**6. Conclusions**

our legislative bodies.

extrovert attitudes and behavior.

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

#### **6. Conclusions**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

national political office).

values among voters found small but significant differences. Males scored higher on self-enhancement values (power and achievement) and females higher on self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence) [42, 43]. Furthermore, previous studies have revealed that basic personal values predicted political orientation, across cultural contexts and political systems (e.g., see [10]) and our recent

An analysis of the literature, taking into consideration different approaches, revealed that in order to legitimize the claims of politics of presence, investigating if women politicians have personal values more similar to female voters and different from male politicians, we needed to control also for political orientation and different levels of political experience. Some authors, in fact, have maintained that becoming involved in politics may modify values, so that simply being a female politician does not ensure that they will hold feminine values. To fill the literature gap we investigated if women, at all levels of political engagement, still held values of transcendence that correspond to those of female voters, as theory of presence maintains or personal values would vary at different levels of political involvement (e.g., activists, politicians elected to local and

To our knowledge, no previous studies have examined these issues involving male and female voters, activists, and politicians. Moreover, Wängnerud [44] in her research pointed out that there was a need for empirical studies of the politics of presence theory, particularly in countries where the political gender gap is higher than in Northern European ones. Italy ranks low in the Global Gender Gap Index, 50th among 144 countries [45]. Furthermore, Italy has a strongly masculine culture [9, 46]. Our most recent research [47] therefore aimed to investigate if gender differences in personal values were still present among activists, and local and national politicians. We also tried to determine if, in line with previous studies on voters, self-transcendence values were more strongly held by women and self-enhancement by men at all levels of political activities even after controlling for political orientation. Furthermore, since we are not aware of previous research that has examined gender differences in conservation and openness to change in people actively involved in politics, we explored whether gender-specific values for conservation

and openness to change are similar at all levels of political participation.

A total 4533 participants were recruited for the study: 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Participants were given a shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 2003).

Our findings give additional support for the politics of presence theory since

females, at all levels of political involvement, showed higher levels of selftranscendence values (that express concern for the welfare of others).

Our results lend support to previous studies [42, 43], self-transcendence values were more important for women; moreover, this specific gender difference was present at all levels of political activities, among activists, and local and national politicians, even after controlling for political orientation. However, our results did not show significant gender differences in self-enhancement values, in contrast to earlier studies [42, 43]. Self-enhancement values were somewhat higher for male voters, activists, and local politicians; however, unlike previous results reported in literature, female national politicians had slightly higher scores than their male colleagues. Furthermore, our findings show that female politicians were also more open to change and less conservation oriented than their male colleagues. These results significantly differ from previous research among voters, where females were less open to change and more conservation

study involving women politicians confirmed this trend [29].

**104**

oriented than males [42, 43].

Women are underrepresented in in politics in most countries (on average in the world, 23.8% of women are in the parliament [1]. This gender gap has stimulated theoretical and empirical studies to discover which obstacles most hinder female politicians, when these hurdles are more present, and why we need more women in our legislative bodies.

To answer some of these questions, we constructed and validated two scales (WO women obstacles, and WOC Women coping efficacy in politics) that included items derived from each of four main theories (gatekeeping, mass media, life balance, and gender role). Results showed that female politicians faced primarily external obstacles (gatekeeping behaviors by male colleagues and difficult access to main stream media). Internal obstacles were cited less frequently and provided some support for work-life balance and gender role theories.

No general coping efficacy helped politicians face all these different hurdles. Each type of hurdle required a set of different personal capabilities, developed through experience with hostile, powerful men (for gatekeeping problems), or obtaining help and support from family members (for life-balance hurdles). Local politicians developed strategies to gain access to local media while national politicians had more problems accessing big national networks and used social media (Twitter, Facebook, blogs, etc.). Finally, those who felt empowered were better able to pursue ambitious goals related to the values that brought them to political activism in the first place. In some interviews, women stated clearly how important it was for them to uphold their feminine values and their femininity to contrast the prevalent warrior, masculine culture.

We also investigated the role of personality traits in coping with obstacles. Our findings indicated that being talkative, assertive, energetic, and dominant helps women overcome many different obstacles. Our results therefore supported authors who maintain that dispositional variables of politicians are important in the attainment of political success [10, 48], and that personality traits should be considered when selecting candidates. Moreover, to try to diminish women's underrepresentation in parliaments, we should also promote empowerment-training programs that increase female politicians' capacity to have high aspirations, to preserve their selfconfidence in achieving ambitious goals even in hostile settings, and to strengthen extrovert attitudes and behavior.

We then tried to ascertain when women find hurdles, if all along their political career as labyrinth theorists hypothesize or primarily when competing for top political positions as glass ceiling supporters maintain. We hypothesized that the labyrinth hypothesis would be sustained, and both local (lower level) and national (higher level) women politicians would report similar obstacles in pursuing their political careers. We also hypothesized that right-wing politicians would have greater self-reported ability to cope with the obstacles presented by mass media, work-family balance, and gatekeeping. Results supported both of our hypotheses. Further studies should explore if differences between right-wing and left-wing female politicians found in Italy are also present in other countries.

Our last research is the first study that we are aware, to directly measure personal values of female and male members of the parliament, local politicians, and activists through the PVQ [30] and to test the theory of politics of presence's hypothesis that women elected to political office would represent women better than male politicians, because they would still hold values similar to those of female voters.

Our results confirmed that the self-transcendence gender differences in voters can be found among politicians. This supports politics of presence claims that it could matter whether there are men or women in elected political positions. Female politicians higher in transcendence values (benevolence and universalism) may favor policies that promote equality, civil liberties, and social welfare; they may be more willing to increase funds for medical care, education, and fighting violence against women. They will support more laws for gun control and against capital punishment and the use of force to resolve conflicts [36, 37]. To have documented significant self-transcendence gender differences among women and men at all levels for political involvement in a country with low level of gender equality such as Italy is an important finding, given that many countries present low levels of gender equality worldwide.

We also want to underline another interesting finding, local and national female politicians were more open to change and less conservative than their male colleagues, while among voters, normally, men were more open to change and less conservative. This finding does not support the politics of presence' theory, since women politicians differ in those two values from women voters. However, these results would please those activists who claim that a higher number of women may revitalize politics which is now held in low opinions by many voters [49]. Our results also may give some support to activists in women's movements who argue that female representatives are more likely than men to challenge the status quo [50]. Women who become politicians, thus accessing a career in a prevalently male field, are probably women who are willing to break the traditional gender schemata, and therefore more open to change in other domains also. Our female politicians moreover scored lower in conservation values than both their male colleagues and women voters. They therefore would be more likely to oppose policies related to traditional moralism, law and order, and blind patriotism, which are the core political values that are held [37] by people with conservative personal values. Further studies should examine if our results related to conservation and openness to change are confirmed in other countries with different indexes of gender equality.

We also found that women politicians who survive and thrive in hostile maledominated political institutions have high level of personal empowerment and a blend of feminine and masculine characteristics as some feminist authors have hypothesized [2]. Taken together, then, the results of our different studies bring more scientific evidence in support for more gender balance in political representation. We are aware that our research has several limits. While we have a broadly representative sample of female members of parliament (70%), we have less representative samples of males in parliament, and of local politicians and activists. Moreover, future research should measure personal values, political decisions, and other behaviors of male and female politicians.

**107**

**Author details**

Donata Francescato1

1 Sapienza University, Rome, Italy

provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

\* and Minou Ella Mebane2

2 University Telematica Giustino Fortunato, Benevento, Italy

\*Address all correspondence to: mc0938@mclink.it

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles…*

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

*How Italian Female Local and National Politicians Perceive and Cope with Obstacles… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81728*

### **Author details**

*Elections - A Global Perspective*

equality worldwide.

with different indexes of gender equality.

male and female politicians.

politicians higher in transcendence values (benevolence and universalism) may favor policies that promote equality, civil liberties, and social welfare; they may be more willing to increase funds for medical care, education, and fighting violence against women. They will support more laws for gun control and against capital punishment and the use of force to resolve conflicts [36, 37]. To have documented significant self-transcendence gender differences among women and men at all levels for political involvement in a country with low level of gender equality such as Italy is an important finding, given that many countries present low levels of gender

We also want to underline another interesting finding, local and national female politicians were more open to change and less conservative than their male colleagues, while among voters, normally, men were more open to change and less conservative. This finding does not support the politics of presence' theory, since women politicians differ in those two values from women voters. However, these results would please those activists who claim that a higher number of women may revitalize politics which is now held in low opinions by many voters [49]. Our results also may give some support to activists in women's movements who argue that female representatives are more likely than men to challenge the status quo [50]. Women who become politicians, thus accessing a career in a prevalently male field, are probably women who are willing to break the traditional gender schemata, and therefore more open to change in other domains also. Our female politicians moreover scored lower in conservation values than both their male colleagues and women voters. They therefore would be more likely to oppose policies related to traditional moralism, law and order, and blind patriotism, which are the core political values that are held [37] by people with conservative personal values. Further studies should examine if our results related to conservation and openness to change are confirmed in other countries

We also found that women politicians who survive and thrive in hostile maledominated political institutions have high level of personal empowerment and a blend of feminine and masculine characteristics as some feminist authors have hypothesized [2]. Taken together, then, the results of our different studies bring more scientific evidence in support for more gender balance in political representation. We are aware that our research has several limits. While we have a broadly representative sample of female members of parliament (70%), we have less representative samples of males in parliament, and of local politicians and activists. Moreover, future research should measure personal values, political decisions, and other behaviors of

**106**

Donata Francescato1 \* and Minou Ella Mebane2

1 Sapienza University, Rome, Italy

2 University Telematica Giustino Fortunato, Benevento, Italy

\*Address all correspondence to: mc0938@mclink.it

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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[29] Caprara G, Francescato D, Mebane M, Sorace R, Vecchione M. Personality foundations of ideological divide: A comparison of women members of parliament and women voters in Italy. Political Psychology. 2010;**31**:739-762. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00780

[30] Schwartz SH. Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In: Zanna M, editor. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Orlando, FL: Academic Press; 1992. pp. 1-65

[31] Francescato D, Mebane M, Giacomantonio M., Lauriola M. (under evaluation). Dispositional variables and coping skills of fast tract women politicians

[32] Multon KD, Heppner MJ, Lapan RT. An empirical derivation of career decision subtypes in a high school sample. Journal of Vocational Behavior. 1995;**47**:76-92. DOI: 10.1006/ jvbe.1995.1030

[33] Jowell R, Roberts C, Fitzgerald R, Eva G. Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally. Lessons from the European Social Survey. London: Sage Publications; 2007

[34] Goren P. Party identification and core political values. American Journal of Political Science. 2005;**49**:881-896. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00161.x

[35] Lovenduski J, Norris P. Westminster women: The politics of presence. Political Studies. 2003;**51**:84-102. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00414

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**111**

Section 4

Elections in Historical

Context
