**5. Methodology**

through better water management" ([20] p. 5). The SMID approach relied on two major directions which were seen as appropriate for attaining the envisioned goal. One component of the work called Social Mobilization aimed at making the WUA known and understood by the villagers in order to generate "ownership, social, monetary and labor support from the water users to the WUA" ([21] p. 1) to its WUA and an overall wider "inclusion of the large share of water users and their concerns into the decision making processes of the WUA" ([20] p. 1). The second direction was called Institutional Development which stressed the importance of WUA's organizational growth as an entity with managerial and governance mandates. Within this component of SMID, the WUA was expected to improve its capacities to manage water distribution, its financial operations, and resolve water-related conflicts. For the purposes of both, social mobilization and institutional strengthening of the WUA, the SMID approach prescribed a selection of so-called "social mobilizers,"' that is, a widely accepted term for teams which conduct social mobilization [20]. The social mobilizers were responsible not only for the dissemination of the information about the role and usefulness of the WUA to the various stakeholders as mentioned above, but also (and with prior training) for the formation of subclusters identified as the Water User Groups (WUG). Formally, WUG were defined as autonomous informal self-organized groups of people united by the proximity of their land to a particular irrigation source, that is, canal/ditch/pump (later called a "hydrological unit") who manage their own irrigation system to support WUA and account to it [22]. WUG, thus, represented a lower level in a multi-tier system of WUA, where the representative of each WUG participated in the decision-making by becoming a constituent in a WUA council.

The BMBF-UNESCO project was implemented in Khorezm province, 1 of the 12 provinces of Uzbekistan, which adjoins the environmental damaged Aral Sea and where about third of population lives below the poverty line of 1 USD per day [16]. Located 250 km south of the

are used for irrigated agriculture [16]. The climate is arid with hot and dry summers and cold winters with precipitation of less than 100 mm per annum [16]. Irrigated agriculture is the mainstay of economy in the province accounting for about 67% of the total regional GDP [17]. Of 1.5 million of Khorezmian population, over 70% live in rural areas engaged in cotton, wheat, and rice production as private farmers or peasants [4]. Private farmers crop cotton, wheat, rice, and fodder maize [4]. Cotton occupies 50% of irrigated cropland and consumes about 40% of the total water supply of the region [4]. It contributes 16% to the GDP and earns almost all of the total export revenues of Khorezm province [4]. As explained above, the production of cotton and wheat follows the state procurement system, that is, the government enforces regulations on the acreage for each crop and production quantities to be submitted to the state at the fixed price, also determined by the state. In return, it ensures supply and delivery of water, diesel, fertilizers, and some other required inputs [4]. All this applies to private farmers only. Small holders cultivate potatoes, vegetables, fruits, as well as wheat and fodder [18]. They have garden plots around their houses typically about 0.12 ha and an additional

of dry arid desert of which 270,000 hectares

**4. Local irrigation system**

70 Water and Sustainability

present shores of the Aral Sea, it covers 6800 km<sup>2</sup>

The aim of the research was to explore the everyday practices of the local women smallholders as their agriculture was being transformed toward sustainable practices. Fieldwork took place in Spring and Summer, 2011 in Khorezm province in Uzbekistan when the BMBF-UNESCO project was nearing its end. Ethnographic approach was selected for this study to capture and document the nuanced and complex nature of the everyday lives of the informants as immersed in social practices, institutional structures, and a local culture. Participant observations and in-depth interviews were used with individual women smallholders and members of their families. A total of 40 local women smallholders provided information in the in-depth interview and also allowed the researcher to conduct participant observations in their homes, fields, gardens, etc. All these women had kitchen gardens and tamorka where they cultivated and all of them had their male partners away from home in labor migration.

A total of nine key informant interviews were carried out with farm managers, representatives of WUA, and upper institutions of water management. Expert interviews were also carried out in Bonn, Germany, with the implementers of the BMBF-UNESCO project. Analysis of institutional text was also used.

### **6. Women's costs of sustainability**

It is in this context that I find it important to describe the everyday struggle women smallholders in Khorezm live through as they ensure the livelihoods and subsistence for their families. These women typically cultivate a backyard garden and an additional plot of land located in some distance away from home. The backyard gardens are used intensively for growing vegetables and fruits. Hey till the land by hand with shovel and hoe. Double cropping is widely used to ensure harvest of potatoes and onions in the beginning of the agricultural season and late cropping of beans, carrots, maize, sorghum, and millet. The tamorka plots are used twice each season for producing winter wheat followed by rice or maize in the summer. Most household also keep animals and poultry. About 50% of the stallholders also work during the agricultural season on the private farmers' land for cash or in kind payment [23]. Household food production and agriculture are essential for the food and livelihood security for most rural household despite other income generating activities that the household members can become involved in [2].

or piped gas. For example, baking bread is done outside with the use of mud stoves heated by firewood that women must prepare in advance. This extends these women's labor inputs by large margins. Food security is maintained using various means including producing sufficient supplies of canned vegetables and fruits which women regularly do in the summer. Canning is a good example of the complexity of their everyday work. Observing one of the respondents, Nargiza, does it demonstrates that it involves an entire day of concentration, damage control, and coordination. Nargiza woke up earlier that morning to make sure that she does the cleaning and milking of the cow before her canning endeavor. She brought buckets of water from the community well and used it to wash about 30 big glass jars which were then sterilized with a use of an old boiling kettle. Each jar was put on the top of it upside-down and boiled for about 5 min. Lids were sterilized, too, in a separate kettle. At the same time, she washed cucumbers, onions, and garlic and cleaned them of endings. Then she washed tomatoes, chopped some of them and whirled the pieces in an old semi-automatic washing machine, and rubbed them through a sieve. The resulting tomato juice was then boiled in of the three large pots built-in the mud stoves outside the house. In another pot, she would boil the vegetables in water. She would then bring a hot sterilized glass jar from the house and fill it with boiling vegetables. For this she would use a ladle and fish the vegetables from it with her bare fingers. The jar will then be filled with boiling tomato juice. She would then put salt and vinegar and put the lid on top of the jar for further tightening. This work took place at 45°C heat and interrupted by occasionally feeding the oven with brushwood, bringing clean water and taking away the dirty one, and attending to small children to prevent them from harm. This illustration is useful in understanding the reality of smallholder women's everyday routine work. Not to forget that cattle breeding and cropping, shared with male partners, are now completely done by women themselves. The double burden makes the lives of these women dense, busy, and hectic, even though they do not complain but see as something that simply "must be done." Most smallholder households grow in their field food that provides almost full subsistence for their families for at least 10 months. For example, tamorka fields normally yields about 1 ton of flour which is sufficient for 12 months for a family of 8 people. Families which planted potatoes after harvesting wheat would have enough to consume it throughout a year. However, there are risks and serious challenges to women's successful small-scale agriculture, which may undermine wellbeing of family. I learn about these challenges as I talked to women who complained that they had very little opportunities to irrigate their fields. The irrigation water in the village is rationed and arrives once in 2 weeks and women often miss it. Nargiza, for example, said that she was away from home and did not "catch" the water twice in the season. Other respondents shared experience such as Munara's who "must open her ditch upon hearing about the water arrival. The water can arrive at any moment during a day or night. If a person is not at home, the water bypasses this person's land." The problem goes beyond women's not having consistent and reliable information. Some of them complaint that "even if we know that the water is there, the water is limited and there is no guarantee that it will reach us …" Another respondent shared that last time the irrigation water arrived to their village, they "did not manage to irrigate their kitchen garden and field because after the private farmer had used the water, nothing was left for them." Such accounts clearly demonstrate that women-smallholders experience difficulties with accessing the irrigation water and suffer

Sustainability of Irrigation in Uzbekistan: Implications for Women Farmers

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73

The household labor is divided according to gender and generations [24]. Women are typically responsible for keeping the house in order, gardening the household plots and kitchen gardens, weeding, milking cows, processing food, and carrying out small-scale trade [25]. Women make up a large proportion of the sub-contracted workers in the private farmers' fields. Men, if they are not abroad seeking work, are normally responsible for arranging agricultural contracts, arranging irrigation turns, and irrigating the household plots. Children from age of 10 work alongside adults in the fields; at even younger age, they herd animals and help with gardening, food processing, and house chores. Elderly people often look after very young children, and their pensions provide extra cash income.

Labor migration has become an important source of income in Uzbekistan, and like in many post-soviet countries, rural households rely heavily on remittances for their cash income. Between 2000 and 2014, the total number of labor emigrants from Uzbekistan varied between 600,000 and 700,000 persons of which about 550,000 migrated to Russia [26]. Remittances from Russia only form 16% of Uzbekistan's economy [26]. Because migration is predominantly undertaken by males, women's workload has greatly increased [2]. Most labor migrants tend to be largely absent during the agricultural season leaving this burden entirely on the shoulders of those who stay at home. Women acquired new tasks such as soil fertilization, planting, irrigating and harvesting, as well as learning to organize their time to accomplish their intensified work. Ethnographic observations of smallholder women's everyday lives demonstrate their packed schedules which begin from dawn and last till midnight with only a short break in the extreme heat of the middays. The daily work includes cleaning the outside area, tending to animals and poultry, cultivating their fields, cooking meals, producing dairies, baking bread from scratch, doing laundry, harvesting vegetables or fruits, working in the garden, milking the cows, cleaning around the house, etc. Days become so busy for these women that sometimes ethnographic observations could not include conversing with them due to her attention labor-intensive tasks, noise, voices of crying or playing children around. All these activities are performed with little or no basic household equipment, running water, or piped gas. For example, baking bread is done outside with the use of mud stoves heated by firewood that women must prepare in advance. This extends these women's labor inputs by large margins. Food security is maintained using various means including producing sufficient supplies of canned vegetables and fruits which women regularly do in the summer. Canning is a good example of the complexity of their everyday work. Observing one of the respondents, Nargiza, does it demonstrates that it involves an entire day of concentration, damage control, and coordination. Nargiza woke up earlier that morning to make sure that she does the cleaning and milking of the cow before her canning endeavor. She brought buckets of water from the community well and used it to wash about 30 big glass jars which were then sterilized with a use of an old boiling kettle. Each jar was put on the top of it upside-down and boiled for about 5 min. Lids were sterilized, too, in a separate kettle. At the same time, she washed cucumbers, onions, and garlic and cleaned them of endings. Then she washed tomatoes, chopped some of them and whirled the pieces in an old semi-automatic washing machine, and rubbed them through a sieve. The resulting tomato juice was then boiled in of the three large pots built-in the mud stoves outside the house. In another pot, she would boil the vegetables in water. She would then bring a hot sterilized glass jar from the house and fill it with boiling vegetables. For this she would use a ladle and fish the vegetables from it with her bare fingers. The jar will then be filled with boiling tomato juice. She would then put salt and vinegar and put the lid on top of the jar for further tightening. This work took place at 45°C heat and interrupted by occasionally feeding the oven with brushwood, bringing clean water and taking away the dirty one, and attending to small children to prevent them from harm.

**6. Women's costs of sustainability**

become involved in [2].

72 Water and Sustainability

It is in this context that I find it important to describe the everyday struggle women smallholders in Khorezm live through as they ensure the livelihoods and subsistence for their families. These women typically cultivate a backyard garden and an additional plot of land located in some distance away from home. The backyard gardens are used intensively for growing vegetables and fruits. Hey till the land by hand with shovel and hoe. Double cropping is widely used to ensure harvest of potatoes and onions in the beginning of the agricultural season and late cropping of beans, carrots, maize, sorghum, and millet. The tamorka plots are used twice each season for producing winter wheat followed by rice or maize in the summer. Most household also keep animals and poultry. About 50% of the stallholders also work during the agricultural season on the private farmers' land for cash or in kind payment [23]. Household food production and agriculture are essential for the food and livelihood security for most rural household despite other income generating activities that the household members can

The household labor is divided according to gender and generations [24]. Women are typically responsible for keeping the house in order, gardening the household plots and kitchen gardens, weeding, milking cows, processing food, and carrying out small-scale trade [25]. Women make up a large proportion of the sub-contracted workers in the private farmers' fields. Men, if they are not abroad seeking work, are normally responsible for arranging agricultural contracts, arranging irrigation turns, and irrigating the household plots. Children from age of 10 work alongside adults in the fields; at even younger age, they herd animals and help with gardening, food processing, and house chores. Elderly people often look after very

Labor migration has become an important source of income in Uzbekistan, and like in many post-soviet countries, rural households rely heavily on remittances for their cash income. Between 2000 and 2014, the total number of labor emigrants from Uzbekistan varied between 600,000 and 700,000 persons of which about 550,000 migrated to Russia [26]. Remittances from Russia only form 16% of Uzbekistan's economy [26]. Because migration is predominantly undertaken by males, women's workload has greatly increased [2]. Most labor migrants tend to be largely absent during the agricultural season leaving this burden entirely on the shoulders of those who stay at home. Women acquired new tasks such as soil fertilization, planting, irrigating and harvesting, as well as learning to organize their time to accomplish their intensified work. Ethnographic observations of smallholder women's everyday lives demonstrate their packed schedules which begin from dawn and last till midnight with only a short break in the extreme heat of the middays. The daily work includes cleaning the outside area, tending to animals and poultry, cultivating their fields, cooking meals, producing dairies, baking bread from scratch, doing laundry, harvesting vegetables or fruits, working in the garden, milking the cows, cleaning around the house, etc. Days become so busy for these women that sometimes ethnographic observations could not include conversing with them due to her attention labor-intensive tasks, noise, voices of crying or playing children around. All these activities are performed with little or no basic household equipment, running water,

young children, and their pensions provide extra cash income.

This illustration is useful in understanding the reality of smallholder women's everyday routine work. Not to forget that cattle breeding and cropping, shared with male partners, are now completely done by women themselves. The double burden makes the lives of these women dense, busy, and hectic, even though they do not complain but see as something that simply "must be done." Most smallholder households grow in their field food that provides almost full subsistence for their families for at least 10 months. For example, tamorka fields normally yields about 1 ton of flour which is sufficient for 12 months for a family of 8 people. Families which planted potatoes after harvesting wheat would have enough to consume it throughout a year.

However, there are risks and serious challenges to women's successful small-scale agriculture, which may undermine wellbeing of family. I learn about these challenges as I talked to women who complained that they had very little opportunities to irrigate their fields. The irrigation water in the village is rationed and arrives once in 2 weeks and women often miss it. Nargiza, for example, said that she was away from home and did not "catch" the water twice in the season. Other respondents shared experience such as Munara's who "must open her ditch upon hearing about the water arrival. The water can arrive at any moment during a day or night. If a person is not at home, the water bypasses this person's land." The problem goes beyond women's not having consistent and reliable information. Some of them complaint that "even if we know that the water is there, the water is limited and there is no guarantee that it will reach us …" Another respondent shared that last time the irrigation water arrived to their village, they "did not manage to irrigate their kitchen garden and field because after the private farmer had used the water, nothing was left for them." Such accounts clearly demonstrate that women-smallholders experience difficulties with accessing the irrigation water and suffer a great degree of uncertainty about not only "when" but also about "whether" they would be able to irrigate their fields. This uncertainty worries them because failure to access the irrigation endangers the success of their agriculture. These women learnt to use their specific knowledge and engage in various strategies to ensure that they do irrigate their plots. One of the respondents from a tail end part of her village shared her strategy, "If I see that ilatkom [a member of a village council] is going to the village council leader I know they will discuss water. So, I wait till he goes back and then run to him and ask about when the water can be expected." Another respondent said, "If I see on the street a hydro-technician, I run to him and ask when the water will come." Another interview demonstrated even more ingenuity, as she told me: "I know that the water will come soon when I hear the gritting sound coming from the farmer's land. I know this is his pump being started. Then I know there will be water."

These outcomes, apparently, contradict the original policy/project promise and their effects in relation to these smallholders. The project's approach and participatory promise were to bring social assistance to the most vulnerable groups and, as mentioned above to "improve livelihoods of the rural inhabitants." Elsewhere, I explored in detail these contradictory findings and map out institutional process, which organized the local experiences in such a way [28]. Here, the argument focuses on making visible the voices of these women smallholders who were made invisible in how national and international address the Aral Sea crisis through bringing the concept of sustainability into these people's everyday lives. The national effort to make irrigation water use more efficient introduced the policy of rationing which was carefully regulated through established hierarchies, procedures, operations, etc. The international European actors engaged in transfer of knowledge and expertise and worked with the local WUA. Yet, they all missed not only the needs and interests of the women smallholders

Sustainability of Irrigation in Uzbekistan: Implications for Women Farmers

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79732

75

Ethnographic data show some presence of women smallholder organization within the village. To provide just one example, it is useful to turn to a smallholder woman whom I call Gulnara. Gulnara is a retired school teacher whose neighbors were refused irrigation services by the WUA due to a long history of fights between the WUA and the people. Gulnara took on a mediating role and served her street for the last 5 years. When interviewed, she supervised irrigation of about 50 households and managed the organization of the related processes through village level lobbying, mobilizing people to clean the irrigation infrastructure, collecting fees, and keeping careful accounting of her work. Stories like Gulnaras suggest that local women engage in social activism and actively engage in the kinds of local dynamics that the project aimed at attaining. However, neither Gulnara nor other women like her have never been invited to any project activities and remained unknown to the project staff. I tend to see this loss for the project's commitment to a bottom-up approach and its goal to bring more

Ethnographic data showed that women smallholders have specific needs and interests in having reliable and sufficient access to water to continue growing their crops. This was vital to their subsistence, livelihoods, health, and lives. These women also contribute to community-based local water management leading water distribution and taking control of shared resources. However, these active women experience hardships in obtaining dependable access to irrigation sources. In the context of lacking any systematic information about scheduling of irrigation water, its delivery and quantity, these women engage in a number of creative strategies to learn about water availability. However, these strategies involve considerable amounts of physical work as well as emotional labor that must be invested in exchange of valuable knowledge about the water. This happens in the context where most of the women's already busy workloads have been added considerably due to their male partner out migration. Importantly, this happens in the conditions of the government's and international project's policies to accord water management and water use with the notion of sustainability. The government politics of

but also their potential contributions.

social justice.

**7. Conclusion**

These methods, simplistic as they appear, are, in fact, hard work, too. The women must physically and regularly watch for the mobility of the individuals, stay alert to "catch" them as they move around the village. These methods require that women develop and maintain good relationships with these few individuals whom they turn for information. They are then required to engage in small talk, display friendliness, deference, empathy, concerns, etc., while simultaneously suppressing their own feelings, frustrations, and anticipations. Literature classifies it as emotional labor and describes the emotional labor economy is an unfair and stressful work factors associated with negative attitudes, behaviors, and poor health [27]. Women smallholders must maintain their everyday agriculture in the conditions of high uncertainty. When the water for irrigation will arrive, for how long and how much are the questions that are often left with no clear and systematic responses. Living with such level of uncertainty is also a hard psychological work which involves anxiety, worry, out of control, hopelessness, and helplessness. These women must learn to live part of their lives in the conditions of chaos and randomness which can be very scary.

Finding a way to manage and live with such uncertainty in order to bring a sense of order and predictability. But the reduction of uncertainty also involves considerable amounts of physical work. Uncertainty forces the women smallholders to resort to a number of timeconsuming and labor-intensive strategies. Most women must physically go to canal to see if the water is flowing. The distance to the canal may range from 50 m to more than several kilometers of unpaved roads from a woman's house. For instance, Firuza takes 2 h by her donkey-harnessed cart to reach her field and look at the canal. If the water is not flowing, this long journey is undertaken in vain. If the water is there, she queues with other smallholders and waits until she can open her ditch and let the water flow into her plot of land. Depending on the water pressure, irrigating one plot takes from 40 min to 5 h. This adds up to long hours of work, added to the additional hours of journey back and forth to the village. Mavluda walks or uses her bicycle to go to the canal. By bicycle, it takes her 20 min to reach the place, and she has to do this once in every 2–3 days during the vegetation season. She says: "There is no one to ask or to telephone. Once I was lucky and learnt about the water from a neighbor who is employed at the farm and knew about it." However, regardless of the creativity, they introduce into their already multilayered and complex everyday work, they often fail to do the irrigation work because they either do not get timely information or do not manage to be physically present in their fields when the water comes, or else the water is already used up.

These outcomes, apparently, contradict the original policy/project promise and their effects in relation to these smallholders. The project's approach and participatory promise were to bring social assistance to the most vulnerable groups and, as mentioned above to "improve livelihoods of the rural inhabitants." Elsewhere, I explored in detail these contradictory findings and map out institutional process, which organized the local experiences in such a way [28]. Here, the argument focuses on making visible the voices of these women smallholders who were made invisible in how national and international address the Aral Sea crisis through bringing the concept of sustainability into these people's everyday lives. The national effort to make irrigation water use more efficient introduced the policy of rationing which was carefully regulated through established hierarchies, procedures, operations, etc. The international European actors engaged in transfer of knowledge and expertise and worked with the local WUA. Yet, they all missed not only the needs and interests of the women smallholders but also their potential contributions.

Ethnographic data show some presence of women smallholder organization within the village. To provide just one example, it is useful to turn to a smallholder woman whom I call Gulnara. Gulnara is a retired school teacher whose neighbors were refused irrigation services by the WUA due to a long history of fights between the WUA and the people. Gulnara took on a mediating role and served her street for the last 5 years. When interviewed, she supervised irrigation of about 50 households and managed the organization of the related processes through village level lobbying, mobilizing people to clean the irrigation infrastructure, collecting fees, and keeping careful accounting of her work. Stories like Gulnaras suggest that local women engage in social activism and actively engage in the kinds of local dynamics that the project aimed at attaining. However, neither Gulnara nor other women like her have never been invited to any project activities and remained unknown to the project staff. I tend to see this loss for the project's commitment to a bottom-up approach and its goal to bring more social justice.

### **7. Conclusion**

a great degree of uncertainty about not only "when" but also about "whether" they would be able to irrigate their fields. This uncertainty worries them because failure to access the irrigation endangers the success of their agriculture. These women learnt to use their specific knowledge and engage in various strategies to ensure that they do irrigate their plots. One of the respondents from a tail end part of her village shared her strategy, "If I see that ilatkom [a member of a village council] is going to the village council leader I know they will discuss water. So, I wait till he goes back and then run to him and ask about when the water can be expected." Another respondent said, "If I see on the street a hydro-technician, I run to him and ask when the water will come." Another interview demonstrated even more ingenuity, as she told me: "I know that the water will come soon when I hear the gritting sound coming from the farmer's land. I know this is his pump being started. Then I know there will be water."

74 Water and Sustainability

These methods, simplistic as they appear, are, in fact, hard work, too. The women must physically and regularly watch for the mobility of the individuals, stay alert to "catch" them as they move around the village. These methods require that women develop and maintain good relationships with these few individuals whom they turn for information. They are then required to engage in small talk, display friendliness, deference, empathy, concerns, etc., while simultaneously suppressing their own feelings, frustrations, and anticipations. Literature classifies it as emotional labor and describes the emotional labor economy is an unfair and stressful work factors associated with negative attitudes, behaviors, and poor health [27]. Women smallholders must maintain their everyday agriculture in the conditions of high uncertainty. When the water for irrigation will arrive, for how long and how much are the questions that are often left with no clear and systematic responses. Living with such level of uncertainty is also a hard psychological work which involves anxiety, worry, out of control, hopelessness, and helplessness. These women must learn to live part of their lives in

Finding a way to manage and live with such uncertainty in order to bring a sense of order and predictability. But the reduction of uncertainty also involves considerable amounts of physical work. Uncertainty forces the women smallholders to resort to a number of timeconsuming and labor-intensive strategies. Most women must physically go to canal to see if the water is flowing. The distance to the canal may range from 50 m to more than several kilometers of unpaved roads from a woman's house. For instance, Firuza takes 2 h by her donkey-harnessed cart to reach her field and look at the canal. If the water is not flowing, this long journey is undertaken in vain. If the water is there, she queues with other smallholders and waits until she can open her ditch and let the water flow into her plot of land. Depending on the water pressure, irrigating one plot takes from 40 min to 5 h. This adds up to long hours of work, added to the additional hours of journey back and forth to the village. Mavluda walks or uses her bicycle to go to the canal. By bicycle, it takes her 20 min to reach the place, and she has to do this once in every 2–3 days during the vegetation season. She says: "There is no one to ask or to telephone. Once I was lucky and learnt about the water from a neighbor who is employed at the farm and knew about it." However, regardless of the creativity, they introduce into their already multilayered and complex everyday work, they often fail to do the irrigation work because they either do not get timely information or do not manage to be physically present in their fields when the water comes, or else the water is already used up.

the conditions of chaos and randomness which can be very scary.

Ethnographic data showed that women smallholders have specific needs and interests in having reliable and sufficient access to water to continue growing their crops. This was vital to their subsistence, livelihoods, health, and lives. These women also contribute to community-based local water management leading water distribution and taking control of shared resources. However, these active women experience hardships in obtaining dependable access to irrigation sources. In the context of lacking any systematic information about scheduling of irrigation water, its delivery and quantity, these women engage in a number of creative strategies to learn about water availability. However, these strategies involve considerable amounts of physical work as well as emotional labor that must be invested in exchange of valuable knowledge about the water. This happens in the context where most of the women's already busy workloads have been added considerably due to their male partner out migration. Importantly, this happens in the conditions of the government's and international project's policies to accord water management and water use with the notion of sustainability. The government politics of rationing was introduced as part of sustainable and rational water use. The BMBF-UNSECO project's enhancement of WUAs was another promising social innovation which was expected to lead to improvements for all. However, as observed from the data on the ground, the trickledown effect did not happen for the women smallholders. They continue to suffer shortages of irrigation water, risking their own subsistence, and those of their families, while the high-level talks about sustainability continue to overwhelm various international fora. At the moment, as what the women's experiences show, sustainability is achieved at the expenses of women smallholders' time, health and, ultimately, lives. These outcomes of water sustainability as a policy and practice are unfair and contradictory, thus, call for attention and subsequent actions from professionals, developers, planners, and policy makers. What appears necessary at this point is to promote policy and development action that would base their strategies on broad and in-depth research of the everyday relevancies and actualities among the prospective beneficiaries in order to be able to initiate discussions about how to integrate their interests and concerns into sustainability programming. Serious attention to how women can both benefit from and contribute to water sustainability policies and projects must become habitual in the development and professional circles.

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2007;**35**:47-72

00-VanAtta.pdf

Studies. 2001;**53**:885-901

Michigan Press; 1998

[Accessed: 15-06-2018]

statement [Accessed: 15-06-2018]

Working Paper Series; 2011

IAMO; 2008. pp. 89-105

2008;**20**:1-3

### **Conflict of interest**

No conflict of interest is involved in this publication and related research.

### **Notes/Thanks/Other declarations**

The research was made possible with funds from the German Academic Exchange Program (DAAD) and Fiat Panis Foundation.

### **Author details**

Elena Kim

Address all correspondence to: kim\_el@auca.kg

American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

### **References**


[3] Micklin P. The Aral Sea disaster. Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences. 2007;**35**:47-72

rationing was introduced as part of sustainable and rational water use. The BMBF-UNSECO project's enhancement of WUAs was another promising social innovation which was expected to lead to improvements for all. However, as observed from the data on the ground, the trickledown effect did not happen for the women smallholders. They continue to suffer shortages of irrigation water, risking their own subsistence, and those of their families, while the high-level talks about sustainability continue to overwhelm various international fora. At the moment, as what the women's experiences show, sustainability is achieved at the expenses of women smallholders' time, health and, ultimately, lives. These outcomes of water sustainability as a policy and practice are unfair and contradictory, thus, call for attention and subsequent actions from professionals, developers, planners, and policy makers. What appears necessary at this point is to promote policy and development action that would base their strategies on broad and in-depth research of the everyday relevancies and actualities among the prospective beneficiaries in order to be able to initiate discussions about how to integrate their interests and concerns into sustainability programming. Serious attention to how women can both benefit from and contribute to water sustainability policies and projects must become habitual in the

development and professional circles.

**Notes/Thanks/Other declarations**

Address all correspondence to: kim\_el@auca.kg

American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Journal of Agrarian Change. 2003;**3**:225-256

(DAAD) and Fiat Panis Foundation.

No conflict of interest is involved in this publication and related research.

The research was made possible with funds from the German Academic Exchange Program

[1] Ismailova A, Baynazarov E. Analysis of the agrarian land reform in Uzbekistan during

[2] Kandiyoti D. The cry for land: Agrarian reform, gender and land rights in Uzbekistan.

the Soviet era and after transition. EU Agrarian Law. 2015;**2**:61-67

**Conflict of interest**

76 Water and Sustainability

**Author details**

Elena Kim

**References**


[17] Manschadi AM, Oberkircher L, Tischbein B, Conrad C, Hornidge A-K, Bhaduri A, Schorcht G, Lamers JPL, Vlek PLG. "White gold" and Aral Sea disaster—Towards more efficient use of water resource in the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan. Lohmann Information. 2010;**45**:34-47

**Chapter 6**

**Provisional chapter**

**Comparison of Water Resources Community Self-**

**Comparison of Water Resources Community** 

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.84194

**Management Mode between China and Tanzania**

**Self-Management Mode between China and Tanzania**

Due to limited rainfall and uneven spatial and temporal distribution of water resources, water has become a restraining factor in agriculture and livestock production of China and Tanzania. As it is most considered as common-pool resource, the management of water resources is a complex issue in agricultural and pastoral industry. Traditional water management modes include nationalization and marketization, but complete market-oriented or government management could not reach the sustainable use of water resource due to nonexclusive and interconnected features of water. Therefore, China and Tanzania introduced water resources community self-management in rural arid areas. Farmers as resource users in community conducted mutual supervision and mutual benefit to realize reasonable, fair, and sustainable use of water resources. However, community self-management is restricted by formal institution from the government of China, and Tanzania's community self-management relies on the financial and technical support from foreign NGOs; the communities' ability to obtain benefit needed to be improved. We compare water resources community self-management mode in China and Tanzania through case studies, put forward the differences of self-management mode in two countries, and analyze the characteristics of successful water resources community self-

**Keywords:** water resources use, community self-management, farmers' livelihood,

© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,

distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Dan Li and Mngereza Mzee Miraj

Dan Li and Mngereza Mzee Miraj

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84194

**Abstract**

management mode.

China, Tanzania

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter


#### **Comparison of Water Resources Community Self-Management Mode between China and Tanzania Comparison of Water Resources Community Self-Management Mode between China and Tanzania**

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.84194

Dan Li and Mngereza Mzee Miraj Dan Li and Mngereza Mzee Miraj

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84194

#### **Abstract**

[17] Manschadi AM, Oberkircher L, Tischbein B, Conrad C, Hornidge A-K, Bhaduri A, Schorcht G, Lamers JPL, Vlek PLG. "White gold" and Aral Sea disaster—Towards more efficient use of water resource in the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan. Lohmann Information.

[18] Bobojonov I. Modeling crop and water allocation under uncertainty in irrigated agriculture. A case study on the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan [thesis]. Center for Development

[19] Martius C, Froebrich J, Nuppenau E-A.Water resource management for improving environmental security and rural livelihoods in the irrigated Amu Darya lowlands. In: Brauch HG, Oswald Spring Ú, Grin J, Mesjasz C, Kameri-Mbote P, Chadha Behera N, Chourou B, Krummenacher H, editors. Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts 4. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York:

[20] Abdullaev I, Franz J, Oberkircher L, Hoffman I, Nizamedinkhodjaeva N, Ataev J, Ul Hassan M, Lamers J, Tischbein B, Schorcht G, Jumaniyazova Q, Djanibekov N. Work Plan of Follow the Innovation Activity. Group 3. Improving Livelihoods of Rural Inhabitants through Better Water Management. Improving WUA Performance through Social Mobilization and Institutional Development. Bonn: Center for Development

[21] Ul Hassan M, Hornidge AK. 'Follow the Innovation'—The Second Year of a Joint Experimentation and Learning Approach to Transdisciplinary Research in Uzbekistan. Bonn:

[22] Abdullaev A, Kazbekov J, Manthritilake H, Jumaboev K. Water user groups in Central Asia: Emerging form of collective action in irrigation water management. Water

[23] Veldwisch GJA, Bock BB. Dehkans, diversification and dependencies: Rural transformation in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Journal of Agrarian Change. 2011;**11**:581-197

[24] Nizamedinkhodjayeva N, Bock B, Mollinga PP. The role of subsistence agriculture for rural livelihoods in the Khorezm province of Uzbekistan. In: Manschadi A, Lamers JPA, editors. Restructuring Land- and Water Use in Khorezm the Region, Uzbekistan. Bonn:

[25] Spoor M. The rural development challenge of transition. In: Spoor M, editor. The Political Economy of Rural Livelihoods in Transition Economies; Land, Peasants and

[26] Prague Process. Republic of Uzbekistan. Migration Profile Light. Available from: https://

[27] Jeung D-Y, Kim C, Change S-J. Emotional labor and burnout: A review of the literature.

[28] Kim E. International development and research in Central Asia. Exploring the knowledge-based social organization of gender [thesis]. Center for Development Research:

Resources Management. 2009;**24**:10-29. DOI: 10.1007/s11269-009-9484-4

Centre for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn; 2013

Rural Poverty in Transition. Abingdon: Routledge; 2009. pp. 1-10

www.pragueprocess.eu/en/documents/category/5-migration-profiles

Yonsei Medical Journal. 2018;**59**:187-193. DOI: 10.3349/ymj.2018.59.2.187

2010;**45**:34-47

78 Water and Sustainability

Research: University of Bonn; 2008

Research, University of Bonn; 2008

ZEF Working Paper Series; 2010

University of Bonn; 2014

Springer; 2009. pp. 749-762

Due to limited rainfall and uneven spatial and temporal distribution of water resources, water has become a restraining factor in agriculture and livestock production of China and Tanzania. As it is most considered as common-pool resource, the management of water resources is a complex issue in agricultural and pastoral industry. Traditional water management modes include nationalization and marketization, but complete market-oriented or government management could not reach the sustainable use of water resource due to nonexclusive and interconnected features of water. Therefore, China and Tanzania introduced water resources community self-management in rural arid areas. Farmers as resource users in community conducted mutual supervision and mutual benefit to realize reasonable, fair, and sustainable use of water resources. However, community self-management is restricted by formal institution from the government of China, and Tanzania's community self-management relies on the financial and technical support from foreign NGOs; the communities' ability to obtain benefit needed to be improved. We compare water resources community self-management mode in China and Tanzania through case studies, put forward the differences of self-management mode in two countries, and analyze the characteristics of successful water resources community selfmanagement mode.

**Keywords:** water resources use, community self-management, farmers' livelihood, China, Tanzania

© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **1. Introduction**

#### **1.1. Water resources in arid regions in China and Africa**

Water is the basis for the survival and sustainable development of the human society. With the development of the society and economy, the water crisis caused by the lack of water resources and water pollution has become one of the key factors restricting the economic and social development. Nowadays, arid and semiarid regions in the world account for about 40% of the total land area, while the freshwater resources on the earth only account for 1.6% of the water resources on the earth's surface. About 40% of the global population in more than 80 countries is facing serious water crisis [1]. With the trend of global warming, the area of arid and semiarid regions will accelerate its expansion, which is expected to account for more than 50% of the global land surface by the end of the twenty-first century. In addition, three-quarters of the arid and semiarid region expansion will occur in developing countries, exposing developing countries to the risk of further land degradation and aggravating the poverty of people in arid and semiarid regions [2]. The United Nations Water Conference pointed out that the next crisis after the oil crisis is the water crisis [3].

The inland arid zone of Northwest China is located at the north of the 35°N and the west of 106°E, including Xinjiang, the Hexi Corridor in Gansu province, and Inner Mongolia region, west of Helan mountain, accounts for about 24.5% of the total land area of China [4]. The northwest arid region consists of mountains and basins. Rivers originate from the mountain area flows to the basin. The distribution of water resources determines that the surface runoff and groundwater resources of the area are the key factors and ties to maintain the economic development and ecological environment balance of the middle and lower reaches. The climatic conditions of inland drainage area show a significantly difference, with precipitation ranging from 300–1000 mm in the alpine region to 100–200 mm in the plain region, and seasonal variation was obvious. Precipitation is mostly concentrates from June to August, and drought was common in winter and spring (**Figure 1** [5]). Under the constraints of water resources distribution and climatic condition, the inland river valley ecological environment system usually forms the argo-pastoral transitional zone with pastoralism and irrigated agriculture, which is the fragile ecological environment zone. With the increase of population, the development of social economy, and the exploitation and utilization of soil and water resources, a series of hydrological and ecological environment changes have been occurred. As a result of the drought caused by the reduction of water resources, grassland reclamation, and overgrazing, the grassland area in river valley is reduced and seriously degraded. Grassland degradation caused the decline and disappearance of some dominant herbage species and thus the decline of biodiversity [6]. From 1958 to 2005, the forage yield in Northwest China decreased by 75.4% [7].

impacts on agriculture and livestock grazing over large space and time scales. The impacts are driven by the high vulnerability of the natural environment and are exacerbated by prevailing local and external economic and political conditions [10], which can be associated with development of famine and may be accompanied by the spread of disease. The population of SSA is over 870 million people and is expected to at least double by the mid-twenty-first century. Coupled with expected overall drying with climate change, in particular in Southern Africa and parts of West Africa [11–13], there are worrisome implications for water resources

**Figure 1.** Seasonal mean precipitation (1950–2008) in Xinjiang, China, for (a) December–February, (b) March–May,

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Water resources in SSA is linked to the high seasonal and inter annual variability in rainfall (**Figure 2** [14]). In general, seasonal rainfall higher than 500 mm is required to sustain healthy agriculture, highlighting the tenuous nature of agro-pastoral livelihoods in the transitional regions between semiarid and arid regions in some parts of SSA. In northern Tanzania, the rainy season is generally from November to April, and well-defined dry season is in

The shortage and the imbalance of spatial and temporal distribution of water resources have become the bottleneck of economic growth and social development in arid regions. With the increase of population and the expansion of industrial and agricultural production and urbanization, the residents in arid regions have an increasing demand for water resources. Many ways have been taken to expand the scale of water resources development. While obtaining

sustainability use and food security.

(c) June–August, and (d) September–November.

July–September.

In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), drought area accounts for 20% of land but accounts for over 80% of the affected population [8]. Much of the continent is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, which makes it particularly susceptible to climate variability. Almost 70% of the labor force is engaged in agricultural work, and agriculture contributes to about 25% of average gross domestic product (GDP) across the continent [9]. The limited water resources have direct Comparison of Water Resources Community Self-Management Mode between China and Tanzania http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84194 81

**1. Introduction**

80 Water and Sustainability

China decreased by 75.4% [7].

**1.1. Water resources in arid regions in China and Africa**

pointed out that the next crisis after the oil crisis is the water crisis [3].

Water is the basis for the survival and sustainable development of the human society. With the development of the society and economy, the water crisis caused by the lack of water resources and water pollution has become one of the key factors restricting the economic and social development. Nowadays, arid and semiarid regions in the world account for about 40% of the total land area, while the freshwater resources on the earth only account for 1.6% of the water resources on the earth's surface. About 40% of the global population in more than 80 countries is facing serious water crisis [1]. With the trend of global warming, the area of arid and semiarid regions will accelerate its expansion, which is expected to account for more than 50% of the global land surface by the end of the twenty-first century. In addition, three-quarters of the arid and semiarid region expansion will occur in developing countries, exposing developing countries to the risk of further land degradation and aggravating the poverty of people in arid and semiarid regions [2]. The United Nations Water Conference

The inland arid zone of Northwest China is located at the north of the 35°N and the west of 106°E, including Xinjiang, the Hexi Corridor in Gansu province, and Inner Mongolia region, west of Helan mountain, accounts for about 24.5% of the total land area of China [4]. The northwest arid region consists of mountains and basins. Rivers originate from the mountain area flows to the basin. The distribution of water resources determines that the surface runoff and groundwater resources of the area are the key factors and ties to maintain the economic development and ecological environment balance of the middle and lower reaches. The climatic conditions of inland drainage area show a significantly difference, with precipitation ranging from 300–1000 mm in the alpine region to 100–200 mm in the plain region, and seasonal variation was obvious. Precipitation is mostly concentrates from June to August, and drought was common in winter and spring (**Figure 1** [5]). Under the constraints of water resources distribution and climatic condition, the inland river valley ecological environment system usually forms the argo-pastoral transitional zone with pastoralism and irrigated agriculture, which is the fragile ecological environment zone. With the increase of population, the development of social economy, and the exploitation and utilization of soil and water resources, a series of hydrological and ecological environment changes have been occurred. As a result of the drought caused by the reduction of water resources, grassland reclamation, and overgrazing, the grassland area in river valley is reduced and seriously degraded. Grassland degradation caused the decline and disappearance of some dominant herbage species and thus the decline of biodiversity [6]. From 1958 to 2005, the forage yield in Northwest

In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), drought area accounts for 20% of land but accounts for over 80% of the affected population [8]. Much of the continent is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, which makes it particularly susceptible to climate variability. Almost 70% of the labor force is engaged in agricultural work, and agriculture contributes to about 25% of average gross domestic product (GDP) across the continent [9]. The limited water resources have direct

**Figure 1.** Seasonal mean precipitation (1950–2008) in Xinjiang, China, for (a) December–February, (b) March–May, (c) June–August, and (d) September–November.

impacts on agriculture and livestock grazing over large space and time scales. The impacts are driven by the high vulnerability of the natural environment and are exacerbated by prevailing local and external economic and political conditions [10], which can be associated with development of famine and may be accompanied by the spread of disease. The population of SSA is over 870 million people and is expected to at least double by the mid-twenty-first century. Coupled with expected overall drying with climate change, in particular in Southern Africa and parts of West Africa [11–13], there are worrisome implications for water resources sustainability use and food security.

Water resources in SSA is linked to the high seasonal and inter annual variability in rainfall (**Figure 2** [14]). In general, seasonal rainfall higher than 500 mm is required to sustain healthy agriculture, highlighting the tenuous nature of agro-pastoral livelihoods in the transitional regions between semiarid and arid regions in some parts of SSA. In northern Tanzania, the rainy season is generally from November to April, and well-defined dry season is in July–September.

The shortage and the imbalance of spatial and temporal distribution of water resources have become the bottleneck of economic growth and social development in arid regions. With the increase of population and the expansion of industrial and agricultural production and urbanization, the residents in arid regions have an increasing demand for water resources. Many ways have been taken to expand the scale of water resources development. While obtaining

Due to the mobility, recycling, and public characteristics of water resources, most national laws stipulate that the ownership of water resources belongs to the state, and the state has the right of allocation and final decision-making of water resources. In fact, the ownership, management, and use of water resources are separate. The ownership of water resources in China belongs to the government, the use of water resources by industries and agriculture should be under administrative permission, and the water use license cannot be traded on the market [15]. The government allocates limited water amount by administrative means, and researchers explore various methods to optimize water allocation, in order to maximize the economic, social, and environmental benefits. However, due to the conflict of interests among the water use stakeholders, it is impossible to achieve the optimal allocation of water resources in practice. At the same time, the regulation of water price fails to reflect water value, and this rationing system eventually leads to the general expansion of demand, further exacerbating the contradictions between the stakeholders and increasing the difficulty and

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On the other hand, developed countries usually adopt the method of establishing water resources trading market. Based on the clear definition and initial use right of distribution of the water resources, the use right of water resources exchanges among regions, basins, upstream and downstream, industries, and households through market mechanism. Under the law of value, water price and water resources value could be adjusted and matched, and the distorted situation that water resources are priceless or low could be changed. According to the development of the market economy, economic leverage is used to regulate water prices, and the government only carries out macro supervision in this process [16]. However, as water is an irreplaceable vital resource, complete marketization will also face many problems according to water resources characteristics, such as the definition of initial water resources allocation mode and water users' short-sighted behaviors driven by interests, which will

Besides government and market, Ostrom proposed the third option in "Governing the Commons," namely the self-organization and management of common-pool resources [17]. Based on the analysis of several classic models including Hardin's "The Tragedy of Commons" and "Prisoner's Dilemma" and Olson's "The Logic of Collective Action," the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality was drawn. According to Ostrom, the defects of traditional game analysis methods and the theoretical assumptions they rely on were deviated from the real situation, such as rational person assumption, complete information access, independent action, noncommunication, and first-order game. Ostrom took small-scale common-pool resources as an example and demonstrated that a group of limited rational person communicated and interacted with each other in the process of sharing natural resources. They could obtain more information on resources and other actors' behavior and develop effective common-pool resources use contract through self-raised funds. Ostrom analyzed the possibility of community self-management theoretically. In Ostrom's theory, although limited rational actor did not have complete information, they could increase their understanding of other actors through communication in the process of the game, fully understand each person's influence on common-pool resources, and then change their own strategies to

confusion of management.

obtain more benefits.

cause the failure of water resources market.

**Figure 2.** Seasonal mean precipitation (1950–2008) in Africa for (a) December–February, (b) March–May, (c) June–August, and (d) September–November.

temporary economic benefits, it has caused serious negative impacts on the ecological environment. Understanding the ecological environment and the farmers' livelihood needs and changes in arid regions; managing limited water resources scientifically and rationally developing the maximum economic, social, and ecological benefits of scarce water resources; and ensuring the sustainable use of water resources have always been the key concerns of the arid region research.

#### **1.2. Management of water resources in arid regions**

Water resources management can be divided into government regulation, water rights trading market, and community self-organization management according to the different distribution modes of water resources property rights.

Due to the mobility, recycling, and public characteristics of water resources, most national laws stipulate that the ownership of water resources belongs to the state, and the state has the right of allocation and final decision-making of water resources. In fact, the ownership, management, and use of water resources are separate. The ownership of water resources in China belongs to the government, the use of water resources by industries and agriculture should be under administrative permission, and the water use license cannot be traded on the market [15]. The government allocates limited water amount by administrative means, and researchers explore various methods to optimize water allocation, in order to maximize the economic, social, and environmental benefits. However, due to the conflict of interests among the water use stakeholders, it is impossible to achieve the optimal allocation of water resources in practice. At the same time, the regulation of water price fails to reflect water value, and this rationing system eventually leads to the general expansion of demand, further exacerbating the contradictions between the stakeholders and increasing the difficulty and confusion of management.

On the other hand, developed countries usually adopt the method of establishing water resources trading market. Based on the clear definition and initial use right of distribution of the water resources, the use right of water resources exchanges among regions, basins, upstream and downstream, industries, and households through market mechanism. Under the law of value, water price and water resources value could be adjusted and matched, and the distorted situation that water resources are priceless or low could be changed. According to the development of the market economy, economic leverage is used to regulate water prices, and the government only carries out macro supervision in this process [16]. However, as water is an irreplaceable vital resource, complete marketization will also face many problems according to water resources characteristics, such as the definition of initial water resources allocation mode and water users' short-sighted behaviors driven by interests, which will cause the failure of water resources market.

Besides government and market, Ostrom proposed the third option in "Governing the Commons," namely the self-organization and management of common-pool resources [17]. Based on the analysis of several classic models including Hardin's "The Tragedy of Commons" and "Prisoner's Dilemma" and Olson's "The Logic of Collective Action," the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality was drawn. According to Ostrom, the defects of traditional game analysis methods and the theoretical assumptions they rely on were deviated from the real situation, such as rational person assumption, complete information access, independent action, noncommunication, and first-order game. Ostrom took small-scale common-pool resources as an example and demonstrated that a group of limited rational person communicated and interacted with each other in the process of sharing natural resources. They could obtain more information on resources and other actors' behavior and develop effective common-pool resources use contract through self-raised funds. Ostrom analyzed the possibility of community self-management theoretically. In Ostrom's theory, although limited rational actor did not have complete information, they could increase their understanding of other actors through communication in the process of the game, fully understand each person's influence on common-pool resources, and then change their own strategies to obtain more benefits.

temporary economic benefits, it has caused serious negative impacts on the ecological environment. Understanding the ecological environment and the farmers' livelihood needs and changes in arid regions; managing limited water resources scientifically and rationally developing the maximum economic, social, and ecological benefits of scarce water resources; and ensuring the sustainable use of water resources have always been the key concerns of the arid

**Figure 2.** Seasonal mean precipitation (1950–2008) in Africa for (a) December–February, (b) March–May, (c) June–August,

Water resources management can be divided into government regulation, water rights trading market, and community self-organization management according to the different distri-

region research.

and (d) September–November.

82 Water and Sustainability

**1.2. Management of water resources in arid regions**

bution modes of water resources property rights.

In Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), collective action of resources needed to solve three problems, such as the problem of supply of the current institution, the problem of credible commitment, and the problem of mutual monitoring. As for the supply of the institution, Ostrom believed that cooperation balance should be generated through multiple games among community members based on current institution, in order to form a series of mutual beneficial situation and an informal system of community mutual trust. As for credible commitment, Ostrom argued that self-management groups should develop effective regulations and take appropriate supervision and sanction measures to ensure that community members follow the rules. As for mutual monitoring, Ostrom believed that after the establishment of regulations and the commitment to follow the rules, the implementation of the regulation and the allocation and use of common-pool resources in accordance with regulation should be monitored.

Northern part of Tanzania is among the six districts forming Kilimanjaro Region. The district is subdivided into three divisions which are Lyamungo, Machame, and Masama. The district has 14 wards, 60 villages, and 11 urban streets. Saaki spring is the biggest source of water which serves people who live in Hai town where the district headquarters is situated and is also serving people who live in the villages. Generally, the Saaki spring is approximated to

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S village is located in the middle of the district, which belongs to Masama division. The list of water user households was gathered in village registers. Most of the villagers participated in

The study used a qualitative approach to describe the current status of water resources community self-management in China and Tanzania case. As supplementary, quantitative approaches help to measure data from the field work study. The two approaches complemented each other in gathering data to create valuable information for understanding com-

Primary data on community participation in water resources management were collected from the respondents. Field research was completed using semi-structured interviews with households in 2015. Interviewees were selected by purposive and simple random sampling. Eighty-three households in M village (China) and 80 households in S village (Tanzania) were interviewed, more than 15% of the total household number in two villages. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the key informants from the village level who were knowledgeable and responsible for developmental issues and water resources management in their respective areas of work. Simple random sampling technique was used to select households in the study area to represent the specific and detailed information. Interviews focus on water use and management in agriculture and livestock production and the perceptions and opinions of interviewees on environmental and social changes. Additional interviews of local government officials, water engineers, and NGO technicians provided overall information.

In the late 1970s, as China transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy, the Household Land Contract System (HLCS) was implemented. The land was contracted to individual households while formally remaining the collective ownership. According to the HLCS, all agricultural outputs are owned by the household except for the state agricultural tax (which was canceled in 2006). Land use privatization greatly increased labor productivity and rural economic development and thus helped numerous farmers climb out of

serve the population of more than 58,003 people who live in the villages and streets.

agriculture production. The population of the village was 3793 in 532 households.

munity participation in water resources management.

**3.1. Institution supply: use rights of water resources**

**2.2. Data and methods**

**3. Results**

*3.1.1. China*

poverty (Lin, 1994).

Therefore, we compared two typical cases of water resources community self-management in China and Tanzania; described the details of the cases from the supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring aspects; analyzed the internal difference between China case and Tanzania case; and thus put forward effective community self-management mode that has a positive impact on natural resources and the livelihood of farmers.

## **2. Material and methods**

#### **2.1. Study area**

#### *2.1.1. China*

Xinjiang's Yili valley agro-pastoral zone is stratified by elevation, transitioning from lowaltitude semiarid agriculture at elevations below 1000 m to humid alpine meadow pastoralism at elevations above 1000 m. The annual precipitation below 1000 m is 400–500 mm [18]. With relatively abundant snowmelt from the Tian Shan mountains, the valley's lowlands and riparian corridors provide a significant share of Xinjiang's irrigated agriculture, whereas the middle and upper regions of the mountains are humid alpine meadow grassland that has been used for extensive livestock grazing (mainly sheep but also cows, goats, horses, and some camels) for a thousand years.

M village is located on the western slope of the Tian Shan mountains in the headwaters of the Yili River, in the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. Pastoralism and agriculture coexist, and the former plays a dominant role. There were 558 households with 2273 people, of which 50% were Kazakhs (village statistics). Natural pasture area is about 9333 ha. Farmland area is about 504 ha.

#### *2.1.2. Tanzania*

The study was conducted in Hai district specifically at Saaki spring as a case study. In the recent years, there has been a tendency of cutting trees around the Mountain Kilimanjaro on the side of Hai district which impact in the shortage of water around the district causing serious problem at Saaki spring and Hai district as a whole. Hai district which is situated in the Northern part of Tanzania is among the six districts forming Kilimanjaro Region. The district is subdivided into three divisions which are Lyamungo, Machame, and Masama. The district has 14 wards, 60 villages, and 11 urban streets. Saaki spring is the biggest source of water which serves people who live in Hai town where the district headquarters is situated and is also serving people who live in the villages. Generally, the Saaki spring is approximated to serve the population of more than 58,003 people who live in the villages and streets.

S village is located in the middle of the district, which belongs to Masama division. The list of water user households was gathered in village registers. Most of the villagers participated in agriculture production. The population of the village was 3793 in 532 households.

#### **2.2. Data and methods**

In Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), collective action of resources needed to solve three problems, such as the problem of supply of the current institution, the problem of credible commitment, and the problem of mutual monitoring. As for the supply of the institution, Ostrom believed that cooperation balance should be generated through multiple games among community members based on current institution, in order to form a series of mutual beneficial situation and an informal system of community mutual trust. As for credible commitment, Ostrom argued that self-management groups should develop effective regulations and take appropriate supervision and sanction measures to ensure that community members follow the rules. As for mutual monitoring, Ostrom believed that after the establishment of regulations and the commitment to follow the rules, the implementation of the regulation and the allocation and use of common-pool resources in accordance with

Therefore, we compared two typical cases of water resources community self-management in China and Tanzania; described the details of the cases from the supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring aspects; analyzed the internal difference between China case and Tanzania case; and thus put forward effective community self-management mode that

Xinjiang's Yili valley agro-pastoral zone is stratified by elevation, transitioning from lowaltitude semiarid agriculture at elevations below 1000 m to humid alpine meadow pastoralism at elevations above 1000 m. The annual precipitation below 1000 m is 400–500 mm [18]. With relatively abundant snowmelt from the Tian Shan mountains, the valley's lowlands and riparian corridors provide a significant share of Xinjiang's irrigated agriculture, whereas the middle and upper regions of the mountains are humid alpine meadow grassland that has been used for extensive livestock grazing (mainly sheep but also cows, goats, horses, and

M village is located on the western slope of the Tian Shan mountains in the headwaters of the Yili River, in the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. Pastoralism and agriculture coexist, and the former plays a dominant role. There were 558 households with 2273 people, of which 50% were Kazakhs (village statistics). Natural pasture area is about 9333 ha. Farmland area is about 504 ha.

The study was conducted in Hai district specifically at Saaki spring as a case study. In the recent years, there has been a tendency of cutting trees around the Mountain Kilimanjaro on the side of Hai district which impact in the shortage of water around the district causing serious problem at Saaki spring and Hai district as a whole. Hai district which is situated in the

has a positive impact on natural resources and the livelihood of farmers.

regulation should be monitored.

**2. Material and methods**

some camels) for a thousand years.

**2.1. Study area**

84 Water and Sustainability

*2.1.1. China*

*2.1.2. Tanzania*

The study used a qualitative approach to describe the current status of water resources community self-management in China and Tanzania case. As supplementary, quantitative approaches help to measure data from the field work study. The two approaches complemented each other in gathering data to create valuable information for understanding community participation in water resources management.

Primary data on community participation in water resources management were collected from the respondents. Field research was completed using semi-structured interviews with households in 2015. Interviewees were selected by purposive and simple random sampling. Eighty-three households in M village (China) and 80 households in S village (Tanzania) were interviewed, more than 15% of the total household number in two villages. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the key informants from the village level who were knowledgeable and responsible for developmental issues and water resources management in their respective areas of work. Simple random sampling technique was used to select households in the study area to represent the specific and detailed information. Interviews focus on water use and management in agriculture and livestock production and the perceptions and opinions of interviewees on environmental and social changes. Additional interviews of local government officials, water engineers, and NGO technicians provided overall information.

### **3. Results**

#### **3.1. Institution supply: use rights of water resources**

#### *3.1.1. China*

In the late 1970s, as China transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy, the Household Land Contract System (HLCS) was implemented. The land was contracted to individual households while formally remaining the collective ownership. According to the HLCS, all agricultural outputs are owned by the household except for the state agricultural tax (which was canceled in 2006). Land use privatization greatly increased labor productivity and rural economic development and thus helped numerous farmers climb out of poverty (Lin, 1994).

However, water resources have the integral characteristics. The law claims that water resources are owned by the state. The Chinese government has many departments involved in water resources management, but there is no independent and complete water resources management center, which lacks unified and coordinated management at the government level. Compared with industrial water use, agricultural irrigation water is generally dispersed, random, and low marketable. It is difficult to establish a standard water resources trading market, and under the premise of state-owned water resources, it is also difficult for farmers to obtain the independent water resources use rights and to be water resources traders. On the other hand, since ancient times, the nomadic Kazak people lived in tribes, shared information with their relatives, and helped each other in agricultural and pastoral production, providing a good cultural foundation for the community self-management model.

enough water. Or, the imperfect rotation management mechanism led to missed watering of some households. Now, under the guidance of the village government, M village had gradually formed a mode of community self-management of water resources allocation. First of all, a water manager was elected on the villager meetings at the beginning of each year, and the farmers in village acted as water manager in turn. The water manager was responsible for collecting water fees and managing the canals, resolving farmers' water use disputes, and prohibiting water theft. The salary of water manager is 10% of the water fee. The water supply of the canal was from June to September. The water fee increased from 24.05 dollar/ha in 1984 to 72.14 dollar/ha in 2015. Each household paid 50% of the water bill in June and another 50% in September. Besides the salary of the water manager, the remaining 90% of the water fee is paid to the village cooperation for the reinforcement and seepage prevention of the canal. Households who paid water fee took turns to irrigate their farmlands from upstream to downstream, the diameter of irrigation pipes was fixed, and each household could irrigate for a maximum of 48 hours, after

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87

which irrigation water was rotated to the next household (**Figure 3**).

**Figure 3.** The canal diagram of M village.

### *3.1.2. Tanzania*

The land in Tanzania belongs to private landowners, and landowners were entitled to spring water on their land. Before African independence, the state played a negligible role in the allocation of water rights and the development of water resources [17]. After 1964 (Republic of Tanzania foundation), the water use rights were controlled and regulated by the state, but landowners still had the right to use public water in public streams.

The right of private owners to use water in rural areas which had its source on the land or flowed over the land was a direct consequence of their landownership. Although there was no finality over the ownership of water, the use of water was derived from and linked to the ownership of land.

China and Tanzania all experienced land use privatization. However, the water property has always been rather vague. Water resources was owned by village collective in China, but owned by landowners in Tanzania. China's government has much more authority in water management than Tanzania. However, water use rights need to be distributed to private household in practice. No matter in China or Tanzania, community is the actual main body of the water resources use.

#### **3.2. Credible commitment: water use regulation establishment**

#### *3.2.1. China*

In M village, rain-fed farmlands and livestock drink water use were mostly from river and precipitation, which did not relate to the allocation of water resources. The water resources community self-management was mainly reflected in the irrigation of irrigated farmland through water canal.

The Household Land Contract System was introduced in 1984, according to the privatization use of farmland, the sorted by position and used in turn allocation way of water resources for each household was formed. Due to the unstable water volume of the canal, farmers did not pay the irrigation water fee at first, and the water resources management was quite chaotic. The upstream households of the canal might use more water, and downstream households had no enough water. Or, the imperfect rotation management mechanism led to missed watering of some households. Now, under the guidance of the village government, M village had gradually formed a mode of community self-management of water resources allocation. First of all, a water manager was elected on the villager meetings at the beginning of each year, and the farmers in village acted as water manager in turn. The water manager was responsible for collecting water fees and managing the canals, resolving farmers' water use disputes, and prohibiting water theft. The salary of water manager is 10% of the water fee. The water supply of the canal was from June to September. The water fee increased from 24.05 dollar/ha in 1984 to 72.14 dollar/ha in 2015. Each household paid 50% of the water bill in June and another 50% in September. Besides the salary of the water manager, the remaining 90% of the water fee is paid to the village cooperation for the reinforcement and seepage prevention of the canal. Households who paid water fee took turns to irrigate their farmlands from upstream to downstream, the diameter of irrigation pipes was fixed, and each household could irrigate for a maximum of 48 hours, after which irrigation water was rotated to the next household (**Figure 3**).

**Figure 3.** The canal diagram of M village.

However, water resources have the integral characteristics. The law claims that water resources are owned by the state. The Chinese government has many departments involved in water resources management, but there is no independent and complete water resources management center, which lacks unified and coordinated management at the government level. Compared with industrial water use, agricultural irrigation water is generally dispersed, random, and low marketable. It is difficult to establish a standard water resources trading market, and under the premise of state-owned water resources, it is also difficult for farmers to obtain the independent water resources use rights and to be water resources traders. On the other hand, since ancient times, the nomadic Kazak people lived in tribes, shared information with their relatives, and helped each other in agricultural and pastoral production, providing

The land in Tanzania belongs to private landowners, and landowners were entitled to spring water on their land. Before African independence, the state played a negligible role in the allocation of water rights and the development of water resources [17]. After 1964 (Republic of Tanzania foundation), the water use rights were controlled and regulated by the state, but

The right of private owners to use water in rural areas which had its source on the land or flowed over the land was a direct consequence of their landownership. Although there was no finality over the ownership of water, the use of water was derived from and linked to the

China and Tanzania all experienced land use privatization. However, the water property has always been rather vague. Water resources was owned by village collective in China, but owned by landowners in Tanzania. China's government has much more authority in water management than Tanzania. However, water use rights need to be distributed to private household in practice. No matter in China or Tanzania, community is the actual main body of

In M village, rain-fed farmlands and livestock drink water use were mostly from river and precipitation, which did not relate to the allocation of water resources. The water resources community self-management was mainly reflected in the irrigation of irrigated farmland

The Household Land Contract System was introduced in 1984, according to the privatization use of farmland, the sorted by position and used in turn allocation way of water resources for each household was formed. Due to the unstable water volume of the canal, farmers did not pay the irrigation water fee at first, and the water resources management was quite chaotic. The upstream households of the canal might use more water, and downstream households had no

a good cultural foundation for the community self-management model.

landowners still had the right to use public water in public streams.

**3.2. Credible commitment: water use regulation establishment**

*3.1.2. Tanzania*

86 Water and Sustainability

ownership of land.

the water resources use.

through water canal.

*3.2.1. China*

#### *3.2.2. Tanzania*

Water resources community self-management was implemented in Tanzania by UBWS (Uroki-Bomang'ombe Water Supply). They sent technicians, made guidebook and gathered villagers' representatives to discuss the baseline environmental conditions, mapped and interpreted water resources present situation, analyzed resource user and stakeholder, and developed the action, monitoring, and evaluation plan. However, when the farmers were asked whether they knew who was responsible for the management of Saaki spring, 55% of the farmers had the idea that the one who is responsible for Saaki spring management is the water authority and district government, and only 12.5% had the view that it was managed by the community-based group.

they were not satisfied because they were not involved in decision-making. Moreover, 9.2% of the farmers commented that plans of managing the spring were not well implemented and the cost of connecting water was too high. In general, farmers held the view that there was poor community management of the spring water. They asserted that they want to get more

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The big challenge which faced community participation was limited involvement in the management of the spring. Other challenges included difficulty to protect the spring, poor supervision of water source, the cutting down of trees for firewood, and cleaning the spring.

From the analysis of two cases of water resources self-management in China and Tanzania, the different property rights system of water resources in China and Africa leads to the different impeller of community self-management, and the final results are also different. The impeller of China is the village government, while the impeller of Tanzania is NGO. To form an effective water resources community self-management mode in arid regions, the following

**1.** Full participation of the community member contributes to the rational allocation of water

In Tanzania, the large community was not given the chance to participate at various stages like planning, implementation, and evaluation. Only few, especially village leaders, claimed to participate in all stages. However, every villager participated in electing a water use supervisor and agreed with the water rotational use regulation in China. People needed to be involved from the earliest stage to the upper one during the self-management procedure. Water resources managed without the participation of the community in decision-making, planning, implementation, and evaluation are often not properly maintained

When carrying out community self-management, the majority of the farmers should be involved in participatory meetings, participatory planning, protecting the water source, supervising the water sources, and training on water source preservation. It is the responsibility of the local government to make sure that the large community is involved in the whole process. It will lead to community participation, pollution control and information

Information dissemination was very crucial for the community in order to promote community participation in the process of water self-management. Adequate information sharing leads to optimal goal achievement and relationship building; hence, the effective and efficient dissemination of accurate information to the public is essential. Informing and educating those who participate in community projects could make them permanently able to defend their own interests (Abrahamsson, 1977). Thus, participation supports the

**2.** Effective information sharing is conducive to the water resources use regulation.

involved in meetings and planning in the future.

and hence lack sustainability (NAWAPO, 2002).

sharing, and hence the sustainability of water resources.

**4. Discussion**

points need to be noted:

resources.

More than 50% of the farmers claimed that they were not involved in the planning activities, but they were involved in planting trees, cleaning the water source, and securing the water source. No more than 10% of the farmers involved in and participating in water regulation discussion meetings. This shows that the community has not been adequately involved in the spring management meetings, which indicates the need to seriously address it.

Fifty-five percent of the farmers disagreed on the statement that Saaki spring was managed through information sharing. There is much to be done to improve the information sharing of community in the management of the spring. What is more is that some of the community members even did not understand the existing regulations governing the spring. About 30% of the farmers were aware that cutting trees nearby the source of water, farming around the water source, trespassing, feeding animals, dumping poisonous wastes, and washing clothes were prohibited by the laws.

### **3.3. Mutual monitoring performance: farmers' perception and water use efficiency**

#### *3.3.1. China*

As for community self-management, after the establishment of the water resources use regulations, the effective supervision and punishment mechanism were particularly important. Eighty percent of farmers in M village believed that the existing irrigation water allocation and rotation system in village are effective in improving the water use efficiency. However, there is still a gap with the optimal efficiency, which is caused by the imperfect management system and serious waste of water. In particular, although the water manager was elected by all the villagers, he/ she was also belonged to farmer households in the village. When irrigating his own farmland or the farmland of his relatives, his supervision might be ineffective and unfair. On the other hand, when the water disputes between villagers occurred, water manager had no absolute authority to judge the problem as national judicial departments and also had no right to enforce households who caused the problem to compensate for damage. The water manager was just a mediator, persuaded both sides to put down the disputation and carry out a harmonious solution. Most of the time, the disputation still destroyed social mutual trust between farmer households.

#### *3.3.2. Tanzania*

From the interview, majority (81.2%) of households were not satisfied with the management of Saaki spring, while only 18.8% were satisfied. The majority (63.9%) of people claimed that they were not satisfied because they were not involved in decision-making. Moreover, 9.2% of the farmers commented that plans of managing the spring were not well implemented and the cost of connecting water was too high. In general, farmers held the view that there was poor community management of the spring water. They asserted that they want to get more involved in meetings and planning in the future.

The big challenge which faced community participation was limited involvement in the management of the spring. Other challenges included difficulty to protect the spring, poor supervision of water source, the cutting down of trees for firewood, and cleaning the spring.

## **4. Discussion**

*3.2.2. Tanzania*

88 Water and Sustainability

were prohibited by the laws.

*3.3.1. China*

*3.3.2. Tanzania*

Water resources community self-management was implemented in Tanzania by UBWS (Uroki-Bomang'ombe Water Supply). They sent technicians, made guidebook and gathered villagers' representatives to discuss the baseline environmental conditions, mapped and interpreted water resources present situation, analyzed resource user and stakeholder, and developed the action, monitoring, and evaluation plan. However, when the farmers were asked whether they knew who was responsible for the management of Saaki spring, 55% of the farmers had the idea that the one who is responsible for Saaki spring management is the water authority and district government, and only 12.5% had the view that it was managed by the community-based group. More than 50% of the farmers claimed that they were not involved in the planning activities, but they were involved in planting trees, cleaning the water source, and securing the water source. No more than 10% of the farmers involved in and participating in water regulation discussion meetings. This shows that the community has not been adequately involved in the

spring management meetings, which indicates the need to seriously address it.

**3.3. Mutual monitoring performance: farmers' perception and water use efficiency**

As for community self-management, after the establishment of the water resources use regulations, the effective supervision and punishment mechanism were particularly important. Eighty percent of farmers in M village believed that the existing irrigation water allocation and rotation system in village are effective in improving the water use efficiency. However, there is still a gap with the optimal efficiency, which is caused by the imperfect management system and serious waste of water. In particular, although the water manager was elected by all the villagers, he/ she was also belonged to farmer households in the village. When irrigating his own farmland or the farmland of his relatives, his supervision might be ineffective and unfair. On the other hand, when the water disputes between villagers occurred, water manager had no absolute authority to judge the problem as national judicial departments and also had no right to enforce households who caused the problem to compensate for damage. The water manager was just a mediator, persuaded both sides to put down the disputation and carry out a harmonious solution. Most of the time, the disputation still destroyed social mutual trust between farmer households.

From the interview, majority (81.2%) of households were not satisfied with the management of Saaki spring, while only 18.8% were satisfied. The majority (63.9%) of people claimed that

Fifty-five percent of the farmers disagreed on the statement that Saaki spring was managed through information sharing. There is much to be done to improve the information sharing of community in the management of the spring. What is more is that some of the community members even did not understand the existing regulations governing the spring. About 30% of the farmers were aware that cutting trees nearby the source of water, farming around the water source, trespassing, feeding animals, dumping poisonous wastes, and washing clothes From the analysis of two cases of water resources self-management in China and Tanzania, the different property rights system of water resources in China and Africa leads to the different impeller of community self-management, and the final results are also different. The impeller of China is the village government, while the impeller of Tanzania is NGO. To form an effective water resources community self-management mode in arid regions, the following points need to be noted:

**1.** Full participation of the community member contributes to the rational allocation of water resources.

In Tanzania, the large community was not given the chance to participate at various stages like planning, implementation, and evaluation. Only few, especially village leaders, claimed to participate in all stages. However, every villager participated in electing a water use supervisor and agreed with the water rotational use regulation in China. People needed to be involved from the earliest stage to the upper one during the self-management procedure. Water resources managed without the participation of the community in decision-making, planning, implementation, and evaluation are often not properly maintained and hence lack sustainability (NAWAPO, 2002).

When carrying out community self-management, the majority of the farmers should be involved in participatory meetings, participatory planning, protecting the water source, supervising the water sources, and training on water source preservation. It is the responsibility of the local government to make sure that the large community is involved in the whole process. It will lead to community participation, pollution control and information sharing, and hence the sustainability of water resources.

**2.** Effective information sharing is conducive to the water resources use regulation.

Information dissemination was very crucial for the community in order to promote community participation in the process of water self-management. Adequate information sharing leads to optimal goal achievement and relationship building; hence, the effective and efficient dissemination of accurate information to the public is essential. Informing and educating those who participate in community projects could make them permanently able to defend their own interests (Abrahamsson, 1977). Thus, participation supports the integration of interests through an intensive exchange of information among concerned actors and lays the foundation for cooperation and establishment of the sense of ownership for the sustainability of the water resources.

[5] Yin G, Li L, Meng X, et al. A research of precipitation trend and fluctuation in Xinjiang from 1979 to 2013. Journal of North China University of Water Resources and Electric

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91

[6] Wang G, Cheng G. The utilization of water resource and its influence on eco-environment in the northwest arid area of China. Journal of Natural Resources. 1999;**14**:110-116

[7] Sun H, Li W, Xu Y. Climate-productivity of grassland and its response to climate change

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[9] Dixon J, Gulliver A, Gibbon D. Farming Systems and Poverty: Improving Farmers'

[10] Haile M. Weather patterns, food security and humanitarian response in sub-Saharan Africa. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 2005;**360**:2169-2182.

[11] Sheffield J, Wood EF. Projected changes in drought occurrence under future global warming from multi-model, multi-scenario, IPCC AR4 simulations. Climate Dynamics.

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in Ili River Basin, Xinjiang, China. Acta Prataculturae Sinica. 2010;**6**:55-61

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The local government could provide important technology guideline, database, experience, and ideas that could lead to practical, relevant, achievable, and acceptable community self-management solutions.

**3.** The combination of formal and informal institutions is conducive to the effective mutual monitoring.

Community self-management mainly relies on community informal management system. On this basis, appropriate intervention of formal systems may be helpful to water resources management. Formal institutions could ensure community members follow the rules and punish those who violate the rules more effectively. For example, the supervision and punishment in the water resources use regulations can be raised to the formal level. There are laws to be followed in the performance of the water management regulations, and an independent monitoring organization for villagers can be set up to strengthen the intensity of supervision, punishment, and mediation. On the basis of the complete participation of all members, communication, and information sharing mechanism, the involvement of the formal system can avoid the negative influence of the farmers' social relations on the mutual supervision performance within the community under the informal system.

## **Author details**

Dan Li\* and Mngereza Mzee Miraj

\*Address all correspondence to: lidan0617@live.com

Peking University, Beijing, China

### **References**


[5] Yin G, Li L, Meng X, et al. A research of precipitation trend and fluctuation in Xinjiang from 1979 to 2013. Journal of North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power. 2017;**28**:20-27. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-5634.2017.05.003

integration of interests through an intensive exchange of information among concerned actors and lays the foundation for cooperation and establishment of the sense of owner-

The local government could provide important technology guideline, database, experience, and ideas that could lead to practical, relevant, achievable, and acceptable commu-

**3.** The combination of formal and informal institutions is conducive to the effective mutual

Community self-management mainly relies on community informal management system. On this basis, appropriate intervention of formal systems may be helpful to water resources management. Formal institutions could ensure community members follow the rules and punish those who violate the rules more effectively. For example, the supervision and punishment in the water resources use regulations can be raised to the formal level. There are laws to be followed in the performance of the water management regulations, and an independent monitoring organization for villagers can be set up to strengthen the intensity of supervision, punishment, and mediation. On the basis of the complete participation of all members, communication, and information sharing mechanism, the involvement of the formal system can avoid the negative influence of the farmers' social relations on the mutual supervision performance within the community

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ship for the sustainability of the water resources.

nity self-management solutions.

under the informal system.

Dan Li\* and Mngereza Mzee Miraj

Peking University, Beijing, China

\*Address all correspondence to: lidan0617@live.com

**Author details**

**References**

588-4.50066-X

monitoring.

90 Water and Sustainability


**Section 2**

**Water Dynamics and Economics**

**Water Dynamics and Economics**

**Chapter 7**

**Provisional chapter**

**Economic Instruments to Combat Eutrophication: A**

**Economic Instruments to Combat Eutrophication: A** 

Eutrophication of aquatic ecosystems is a functional process triggered by excessive nutrient inputs into water courses. It causes disruption to ecosystems, with impacts on associated goods and services, which consequently might not be provided in a sustainable way. These impacts have served to politicize the issue in recent years. In this chapter, we present the main lessons learned from an international literature review on the economic aspects of eutrophication, first with the purpose of managing the problem in France and second in the context of a European research project. This study aims to help public decision-making in the reduction of this water pollution. By analyzing past experiences and the results of recent modeling work, it allows to avoid a number of pitfalls and focus

Natural environments are no longer able to assimilate without harming all the pollution caused by human activities. Many rivers, coasts, and water bodies suffer from eutrophication [1, 2]. While the induced costs are difficult to estimate, they must be taken into account in public policies relating to agricultural and urban development. Eutrophication is triggered by excessive nutrient inputs, mainly nitrogen and phosphorus [3], causing increased levels of biomass in aquatic ecosystems. This can result in major disruption to aquatic ecosystems and may also impact associated goods and services, economic activities, and human health. The main sources of this pollution are agricultural activities, discharge from urban waste water treatment plants, and individual sewage treatment systems. The principal economic issues

**Keywords:** economics, eutrophication, regulation, incentive, public policy

© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,

distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.79666

Jean-Philippe Terreaux and Jean-Marie Lescot

Jean-Philippe Terreaux and Jean-Marie Lescot

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79666

**Abstract**

on efficient solutions.

**1. Introduction**

**Survey**

**Survey**

#### **Economic Instruments to Combat Eutrophication: A Survey Economic Instruments to Combat Eutrophication: A Survey**

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.79666

Jean-Philippe Terreaux and Jean-Marie Lescot Jean-Philippe Terreaux and Jean-Marie Lescot

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.79666

#### **Abstract**

Eutrophication of aquatic ecosystems is a functional process triggered by excessive nutrient inputs into water courses. It causes disruption to ecosystems, with impacts on associated goods and services, which consequently might not be provided in a sustainable way. These impacts have served to politicize the issue in recent years. In this chapter, we present the main lessons learned from an international literature review on the economic aspects of eutrophication, first with the purpose of managing the problem in France and second in the context of a European research project. This study aims to help public decision-making in the reduction of this water pollution. By analyzing past experiences and the results of recent modeling work, it allows to avoid a number of pitfalls and focus on efficient solutions.

**Keywords:** economics, eutrophication, regulation, incentive, public policy

### **1. Introduction**

Natural environments are no longer able to assimilate without harming all the pollution caused by human activities. Many rivers, coasts, and water bodies suffer from eutrophication [1, 2]. While the induced costs are difficult to estimate, they must be taken into account in public policies relating to agricultural and urban development. Eutrophication is triggered by excessive nutrient inputs, mainly nitrogen and phosphorus [3], causing increased levels of biomass in aquatic ecosystems. This can result in major disruption to aquatic ecosystems and may also impact associated goods and services, economic activities, and human health. The main sources of this pollution are agricultural activities, discharge from urban waste water treatment plants, and individual sewage treatment systems. The principal economic issues

© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

are the following: What is the best way to define and implement acceptable trade-offs by different stakeholders? How can economic activities and eutrophication be balanced in urban and rural territories while respecting the principles of sustainable development in a context of global change?

(concentration levels for different pollutants), and once these thresholds are exceeded, eco-

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In this situation, as Xepapadeas observes in [6], it is better to couple ecological models and economic models. Such a representation makes it possible to take into account and combine elements such as strategic interactions between economic agents, non-convexities induced by nonlinear loops, different spatial and temporal scales, and the representation of different spatial and temporal dynamics. However, this may require the implementation of complex models. A new form of arbitration must then be found between the simplicity of representations and their realism. Neglecting the phenomena of bifurcation or irreversibility can thus

Two objectives can be pursued: maximizing the net benefit of actions or minimizing costs with a given objective (see, e.g., Gren in [7] for a comparison of two possibilities applied to the Baltic Sea). Bryhn et al. insist in [8] that the costs of actions foreseen must in any case be compared to the expected benefits: for example, the Baltic Sea Action Plan signed in 2007 appears to have costed € 3 billion per year. It is then important to minimize the risk of waste

However, Huppes stressed in [9] that the direct and/or indirect costs of environmental policies are quite complex to define and calculate. For the latter, for example, public authorities bear the costs of control, the disputes arising from them, the costs of research needed for effective actions, companies bearing the costs of constraints, administrative costs, litigation

Additionally, these costs generally have a dynamic aspect (variation over time) that further complicates decision-making. Finally, transaction costs (negotiation costs, consultation costs, system administration costs, decision-making costs, etc.) are often far from insignificant but depend on intervention by public authorities, especially for diffuse pollution (see, e.g.,

For policies relating to the agricultural community, von Blottnitz et al. recall in [11] that the way in which policies are implemented also impacts agricultural employment and business linked to the sector, as well as income and production for farmers (see Arata et al. in [12] for

It is also necessary to determine who will bear these direct and indirect costs: Modifying certain practices (conditions of the use of fertilizers in agriculture, crop rotation as studied by Power et al. in [13], wastewater treatment modalities) will be reflected in prices (of agricultural products) and taxes (for local water purification) and may also result in a modification of the risks incurred (e.g., risk on the level of the agricultural income, on the quantity of production of food products, with repercussions going beyond the prices). In cost-benefit analyzes, it is essential not to put more emphasis on the present costs but to take better account of the long-term benefits to the environment through a judicious choice of the discount rate that

system dynamics evolve, making it difficult to define optimal policies.

lead to economically or ecologically undesirable states.

of such big sums for more or less effective measures.

**2.2. Cost-benefit analyses**

McCann and Easter in [10]).

an example of reduction of livestock).

must also incorporate uncertainties (see Ludwig et al. in [14]).

costs, etc.

France is one of the countries affected by this phenomenon [1]. In view of this, the French government asked various research centers to carry out a literature review on the nature of the eutrophication, its causes and consequences, and potential mitigation measures. A total of 4000 documents (books, peer-reviewed articles) were analyzed in early 2017. In this article, we present part of this work, focusing exclusively on the economic aspects of public policy relating to this problem. For this purpose, 932 articles were selected from the Econlit and Scopus databases. Only the 382 most relevant of those were selected, following a review of their abstracts. More recent works were added later in the context of the Collaborative Land-Sea Integration Platform (COASTAL) research project.

In this chapter, we will focus exclusively on methodological works, using examples from case studies to illustrate a number of points. This will allow us to learn valuable lessons concerning the possible tools that could be developed for public decision-makers. In Section 2, we present general issues surrounding eutrophication prevention, namely, difficulty in defining a clear objective, difficulty in carrying out cost-benefit analyses, and the associated uncertainty and irreversibilities. We will also examine the consequences of combined pollution, both in terms of causes and effects. In Section 3, we explore possible ways of reducing pollution, followed by a more detailed presentation of the tools that can be used to deal with both diffuse and point source pollution in agricultural and domestic areas. The conclusion, in Section 4, summarizes the main lessons that can be learned from this work.

## **2. Difficulties in combatting eutrophication**

### **2.1. Defining objectives**

First of all, objectives have to be defined: without this first stage, it is difficult to rank possible actions and to subsequently evaluate the efficiency of policies. As shown by Naevdal in [4], there is generally an optimal level of eutrophication, which is neither the search for a total absence of eutrophication, which would involve too great a cost for society (lack of economic activities, high purification of water), nor the acceptance, without seeking improvement, of harmful levels of eutrophication. From an economic point of view, the most effective control of a pollutant is achieved when the marginal abatement costs are equal among all those responsible for discharges and when these costs are equal to the marginal benefit of a better water quality (see also Iho et al. in [5]).

That said, in most cases, information on marginal benefits is not available, and biophysical sciences (e.g., natural sciences) will set emission reduction targets based on environmental motives. In this case, the problem is how to achieve (for the best price) a given level of total discharge (or a water quality level), which is agreed upon through political channels. Further complicating the picture, eutrophication is most often linked to threshold effects (concentration levels for different pollutants), and once these thresholds are exceeded, ecosystem dynamics evolve, making it difficult to define optimal policies.

In this situation, as Xepapadeas observes in [6], it is better to couple ecological models and economic models. Such a representation makes it possible to take into account and combine elements such as strategic interactions between economic agents, non-convexities induced by nonlinear loops, different spatial and temporal scales, and the representation of different spatial and temporal dynamics. However, this may require the implementation of complex models. A new form of arbitration must then be found between the simplicity of representations and their realism. Neglecting the phenomena of bifurcation or irreversibility can thus lead to economically or ecologically undesirable states.

### **2.2. Cost-benefit analyses**

are the following: What is the best way to define and implement acceptable trade-offs by different stakeholders? How can economic activities and eutrophication be balanced in urban and rural territories while respecting the principles of sustainable development in a context

France is one of the countries affected by this phenomenon [1]. In view of this, the French government asked various research centers to carry out a literature review on the nature of the eutrophication, its causes and consequences, and potential mitigation measures. A total of 4000 documents (books, peer-reviewed articles) were analyzed in early 2017. In this article, we present part of this work, focusing exclusively on the economic aspects of public policy relating to this problem. For this purpose, 932 articles were selected from the Econlit and Scopus databases. Only the 382 most relevant of those were selected, following a review of their abstracts. More recent works were added later in the context of the Collaborative Land-

In this chapter, we will focus exclusively on methodological works, using examples from case studies to illustrate a number of points. This will allow us to learn valuable lessons concerning the possible tools that could be developed for public decision-makers. In Section 2, we present general issues surrounding eutrophication prevention, namely, difficulty in defining a clear objective, difficulty in carrying out cost-benefit analyses, and the associated uncertainty and irreversibilities. We will also examine the consequences of combined pollution, both in terms of causes and effects. In Section 3, we explore possible ways of reducing pollution, followed by a more detailed presentation of the tools that can be used to deal with both diffuse and point source pollution in agricultural and domestic areas. The conclusion, in Section 4, sum-

First of all, objectives have to be defined: without this first stage, it is difficult to rank possible actions and to subsequently evaluate the efficiency of policies. As shown by Naevdal in [4], there is generally an optimal level of eutrophication, which is neither the search for a total absence of eutrophication, which would involve too great a cost for society (lack of economic activities, high purification of water), nor the acceptance, without seeking improvement, of harmful levels of eutrophication. From an economic point of view, the most effective control of a pollutant is achieved when the marginal abatement costs are equal among all those responsible for discharges and when these costs are equal to the marginal benefit of a better

That said, in most cases, information on marginal benefits is not available, and biophysical sciences (e.g., natural sciences) will set emission reduction targets based on environmental motives. In this case, the problem is how to achieve (for the best price) a given level of total discharge (or a water quality level), which is agreed upon through political channels. Further complicating the picture, eutrophication is most often linked to threshold effects

of global change?

96 Water and Sustainability

Sea Integration Platform (COASTAL) research project.

marizes the main lessons that can be learned from this work.

**2. Difficulties in combatting eutrophication**

**2.1. Defining objectives**

water quality (see also Iho et al. in [5]).

Two objectives can be pursued: maximizing the net benefit of actions or minimizing costs with a given objective (see, e.g., Gren in [7] for a comparison of two possibilities applied to the Baltic Sea). Bryhn et al. insist in [8] that the costs of actions foreseen must in any case be compared to the expected benefits: for example, the Baltic Sea Action Plan signed in 2007 appears to have costed € 3 billion per year. It is then important to minimize the risk of waste of such big sums for more or less effective measures.

However, Huppes stressed in [9] that the direct and/or indirect costs of environmental policies are quite complex to define and calculate. For the latter, for example, public authorities bear the costs of control, the disputes arising from them, the costs of research needed for effective actions, companies bearing the costs of constraints, administrative costs, litigation costs, etc.

Additionally, these costs generally have a dynamic aspect (variation over time) that further complicates decision-making. Finally, transaction costs (negotiation costs, consultation costs, system administration costs, decision-making costs, etc.) are often far from insignificant but depend on intervention by public authorities, especially for diffuse pollution (see, e.g., McCann and Easter in [10]).

For policies relating to the agricultural community, von Blottnitz et al. recall in [11] that the way in which policies are implemented also impacts agricultural employment and business linked to the sector, as well as income and production for farmers (see Arata et al. in [12] for an example of reduction of livestock).

It is also necessary to determine who will bear these direct and indirect costs: Modifying certain practices (conditions of the use of fertilizers in agriculture, crop rotation as studied by Power et al. in [13], wastewater treatment modalities) will be reflected in prices (of agricultural products) and taxes (for local water purification) and may also result in a modification of the risks incurred (e.g., risk on the level of the agricultural income, on the quantity of production of food products, with repercussions going beyond the prices). In cost-benefit analyzes, it is essential not to put more emphasis on the present costs but to take better account of the long-term benefits to the environment through a judicious choice of the discount rate that must also incorporate uncertainties (see Ludwig et al. in [14]).

As regards the benefit side, the task is not easy either. For example, the assessment of the environmental or social benefits linked to less eutrophication are the subject of numerous papers (see [1]); but due to a lack of space, we cannot develop this aspect here.

limit that would induce a changeover. This is the case here with the potentially slow dynam-

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There are many sources of eutrophication, and these sources may interact or have cross impacts. Gren et al. show in [22] how simultaneously taking into account nitrogen and phosphorus to control pollution in the Baltic Sea reduces the overall cost of abatement by about

Kuosmanen and Laukkanen recall in [23] that reducing pollution requires a compromise between the reductions of these different pollutants. For example, the Helsinki Convention set 50% reduction targets for nitrate and phosphate emissions to combat eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. From an economic point of view, there is no reason to expect such uniform rates to

Given a source of pollution, its effects can take different forms, and it is preferable to take all of them into account in calculations. For example, von Blottnitz et al. indicate in [11] that the effects of the use of nitrogen fertilizers are climate change due to the production of these fertilizers, other pollutants emitted into the atmosphere during this production, the greenhouse effect induced by the application of fertilizers, eutrophication, drinking water pollution, and damage due to the emission of volatile substances (especially NH3) from these fertilizers.

In addition, Brink et al. describe in [24] how emissions of one pollutant may have impacts (positive or negative) on emissions of other pollutants. Some of them have local effects (e.g., on the eutrophication of rivers), while others have only an overall effect (greenhouse gases). These indirect effects, as well as their local or global nature, are most often ignored by decision-makers, whereas taking them into account would reduce the total cost of environmental

Different instruments can be used to reduce water pollution: generally they will consist in incentives, regulations, physical facilities (e.g., buffer zones), or a combination of these. Within the framework of a "command and control" system, the regulator indicates the technical measures that should be taken and verifies that they are effective. For example, different types of standards can be related to agricultural inputs or individual treatment systems. Several problems emerge, all more or less linked to the information that the regulator has on the effectiveness of the measures imposed, the reality of their implementation, the diversity

Latacz-Lohman and Hodge showed in [25] how the first generation of European agri-environmental measures have used this method, for example, with dates and concentrations of livestock manure application on agricultural land, while more recently market instruments

ics of phosphorus in sediments.

**2.4. Cross aspects of pollutions**

15% compared to a separate approach.

produce a socially optimal reduction.

protection, for a given objective.

**3.1. Different tools**

**3. Means to reduce water pollution**

of local situations, and their impact on that effectiveness.

The challenge is to find a method to fight eutrophication that is either incentivizing or binding and which will result in an acceptable balance for all parties (farmers, taxpayers, those benefiting from water quality, etc.), while taking into account the constraints that apply to everybody (agricultural markets fluctuating, overall tax burden compared to other countries, etc.).

### **2.3. Uncertainties, irreversibility, and robustness of solutions**

The results of the various studies are generally derived from models or reasoning subject to numerous uncertainties. Some uncertainties affecting decision-making are described by Singh et al. in [15]: it may take the form of the impossibility of defining a single probability distribution for the most important parameters for the underlying model or to have a single well-defined objective to capture the simultaneous and divergent interests of the main stakeholders. This was already highlighted by Wladis et al. in [16], although it is often ignored by decision-makers.

Turner et al. in [17] also emphasize this fact in a context of scientific uncertainty. One management objective may be to maintain a certain stability of the environment, with parameters remaining within certain limits.

Lempert and Collins in [18] work in a completely different context, which involves making a decision in uncertainty when the links between actions and their consequences are relatively unknown. No attempt is made to seek the optimality of the solution in the context of the assumptions made and of the supposed value of the parameters. The objective is to have a solution that may be less efficient but more robust, namely, less sensitive to assumptions and satisfactory for a relatively wide range of future parameters and conditions, while keeping some options open.

Another difficulty is how to take into account fluctuations in pollutant emissions over time and not just take into consideration average values. This can lead to the simultaneous introduction of a number of different instruments, each pursuing a certain goal (reduction of average pollution, peak pollution).

An adaptive management model is described by Bond and Loomis in [19], where agents use small-scale experiments to test assumptions about global system responses. It is therefore necessary to arbitrate between collecting information and managing the system to achieve the objective (e.g., to move toward an optimal level of pollution). Agents can thus voluntarily deviate from the optimum trajectory for this purpose. Generally, it is understood that this method leads to better and more informed decisions when there are significant uncertainties.

It was within this framework that Ludwig et al. in [20] implemented a profit optimization model related to agricultural activities minus the costs associated with the eutrophication of a downstream lake. They show that the interaction of slow and fast variables can create resilient or vulnerable systems. To manage such a system, the solution may be to monitor appropriate slow variables and take action before it is too late. An approach based on quasi-option values (see Henry in [21]) would lead to a reduction in pollutants so as to remain below this possible limit that would induce a changeover. This is the case here with the potentially slow dynamics of phosphorus in sediments.

#### **2.4. Cross aspects of pollutions**

As regards the benefit side, the task is not easy either. For example, the assessment of the environmental or social benefits linked to less eutrophication are the subject of numerous

The challenge is to find a method to fight eutrophication that is either incentivizing or binding and which will result in an acceptable balance for all parties (farmers, taxpayers, those benefiting from water quality, etc.), while taking into account the constraints that apply to everybody (agricultural markets fluctuating, overall tax burden compared to other countries, etc.).

The results of the various studies are generally derived from models or reasoning subject to numerous uncertainties. Some uncertainties affecting decision-making are described by Singh et al. in [15]: it may take the form of the impossibility of defining a single probability distribution for the most important parameters for the underlying model or to have a single well-defined objective to capture the simultaneous and divergent interests of the main stakeholders. This was already highlighted by Wladis et al. in [16], although it is often ignored by decision-makers. Turner et al. in [17] also emphasize this fact in a context of scientific uncertainty. One management objective may be to maintain a certain stability of the environment, with parameters

Lempert and Collins in [18] work in a completely different context, which involves making a decision in uncertainty when the links between actions and their consequences are relatively unknown. No attempt is made to seek the optimality of the solution in the context of the assumptions made and of the supposed value of the parameters. The objective is to have a solution that may be less efficient but more robust, namely, less sensitive to assumptions and satisfactory for a relatively wide range of future parameters and conditions, while keeping

Another difficulty is how to take into account fluctuations in pollutant emissions over time and not just take into consideration average values. This can lead to the simultaneous introduction of a number of different instruments, each pursuing a certain goal (reduction of aver-

An adaptive management model is described by Bond and Loomis in [19], where agents use small-scale experiments to test assumptions about global system responses. It is therefore necessary to arbitrate between collecting information and managing the system to achieve the objective (e.g., to move toward an optimal level of pollution). Agents can thus voluntarily deviate from the optimum trajectory for this purpose. Generally, it is understood that this method leads to better and more informed decisions when there are significant uncertainties. It was within this framework that Ludwig et al. in [20] implemented a profit optimization model related to agricultural activities minus the costs associated with the eutrophication of a downstream lake. They show that the interaction of slow and fast variables can create resilient or vulnerable systems. To manage such a system, the solution may be to monitor appropriate slow variables and take action before it is too late. An approach based on quasi-option values (see Henry in [21]) would lead to a reduction in pollutants so as to remain below this possible

papers (see [1]); but due to a lack of space, we cannot develop this aspect here.

**2.3. Uncertainties, irreversibility, and robustness of solutions**

remaining within certain limits.

age pollution, peak pollution).

some options open.

98 Water and Sustainability

There are many sources of eutrophication, and these sources may interact or have cross impacts. Gren et al. show in [22] how simultaneously taking into account nitrogen and phosphorus to control pollution in the Baltic Sea reduces the overall cost of abatement by about 15% compared to a separate approach.

Kuosmanen and Laukkanen recall in [23] that reducing pollution requires a compromise between the reductions of these different pollutants. For example, the Helsinki Convention set 50% reduction targets for nitrate and phosphate emissions to combat eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. From an economic point of view, there is no reason to expect such uniform rates to produce a socially optimal reduction.

Given a source of pollution, its effects can take different forms, and it is preferable to take all of them into account in calculations. For example, von Blottnitz et al. indicate in [11] that the effects of the use of nitrogen fertilizers are climate change due to the production of these fertilizers, other pollutants emitted into the atmosphere during this production, the greenhouse effect induced by the application of fertilizers, eutrophication, drinking water pollution, and damage due to the emission of volatile substances (especially NH3) from these fertilizers.

In addition, Brink et al. describe in [24] how emissions of one pollutant may have impacts (positive or negative) on emissions of other pollutants. Some of them have local effects (e.g., on the eutrophication of rivers), while others have only an overall effect (greenhouse gases). These indirect effects, as well as their local or global nature, are most often ignored by decision-makers, whereas taking them into account would reduce the total cost of environmental protection, for a given objective.

### **3. Means to reduce water pollution**

#### **3.1. Different tools**

Different instruments can be used to reduce water pollution: generally they will consist in incentives, regulations, physical facilities (e.g., buffer zones), or a combination of these. Within the framework of a "command and control" system, the regulator indicates the technical measures that should be taken and verifies that they are effective. For example, different types of standards can be related to agricultural inputs or individual treatment systems. Several problems emerge, all more or less linked to the information that the regulator has on the effectiveness of the measures imposed, the reality of their implementation, the diversity of local situations, and their impact on that effectiveness.

Latacz-Lohman and Hodge showed in [25] how the first generation of European agri-environmental measures have used this method, for example, with dates and concentrations of livestock manure application on agricultural land, while more recently market instruments have been put in place. However, as early as 1998, Cowan insisted in [26] that economic instruments, such as those presented later in this chapter, generally have a better potential in terms of cost-effectiveness than command and control methods.

one geographical location to another. It is quite understandable (see, e.g., Taylor et al. [31]) that there is no single optimum instrument for all farms and that the choice of an instrument remains largely dependent on resource conditions and production potentials that impact the costs of reducing pollution. Finally, in the agricultural sector, for example, inputs may differ from one farm to another: the use of chemical fertilizers will be taxed, while the use of fertilizers produced by the animals of the farm will not. Sometimes, it is useful to differentiate

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Tradable permits are another option, namely, permits to emit a pollutant that can be sold or bought on a market. These permits are either issued free of charge or initially sold by public authorities (entailing an additional cost for involved stakeholders). Von Blottnitz et al. outline in [11] the properties of this type of instrument. Gren and Elofssen present in [32] different variants, their potential interests, by applying these instruments to their case study (the Baltic Sea). This instrument is more flexible than a command and control system and does not require a lot of information about the polluter. With permits, pollution is immediately reduced, although the level needed for pollution reduction is initially unknown. But if the price of permits on the market is to be equal to the marginal cost of pollution reduction, the regulator should regularly adjust the quantity of permits issued until a socially acceptable situation is achieved. Similarly, Mitchell describes in [33] a system of permits for spreading

It should be noted that spatial heterogeneity has important effects on the level of benefits that can result from the exchange of permits to pollute, and this dimension must be taken into

In addition, Akao and Managi show in [35] the importance of taking into account inter-temporal aspects in order to have an efficient system. A free-rider phenomenon (i.e., some people benefit from the effort of others) can arise at different scales: at the macroeconomic level, for example, around the Baltic Sea, some countries may expect their neighbors to make the first efforts, thus diluting the overall impact of pollution. The same effect applies at the local level

Nonpoint source pollution is defined by the fact that the emissions of each agent are not directly observable at a reasonable cost. Xepapadeas describes in [36] three possible methods for reducing domestic and agricultural diffuse pollution, which are difficult to regulate due to information asymmetry between the polluter (who understands the effort needed to reduce effluents and the associated costs) and the regulator (who does not know them) and the random aspects between the polluter's actions (e.g., manure spreading) and the pollution

• The first is to consider that pollution is a function of certain production factors (inputs) and the developed instrument is a system of taxes, sometimes subsidies, to reduce these inputs. Rougoor recalls in [37] that the interest of a tax comes from the ease of implementing and the

account in implementing such a system (see Lankovski et al. in [34]).

for activities or people within the same watershed.

measures according to the activities or circumstances in which pollution is generated.

poultry manure in the Illinois Basin.

**3.2. Toolkits for diffuse pollution**

measured in downstream watercourses:

*3.2.1. General information*

Setting taxes and subsidies is less prescriptive, since the economic agent can refuse the subsidy or agree to pay the tax and continue as before. It provides incentives for the implementation of environment-friendly measures or discourages certain actions. In the case of subsidies, or payments for environmental services such as those described by Ma et al. in [27], arises the question of the financing capacities, and of "who bears the costs in the end".

In addition, a general problem emerges: Is it legitimate to finance the reduction of pollution, and is it not contrary to the polluter-pays principle? One possibility is to require the polluter to satisfy certain constraints in order to receive subsidies for other objectives (e.g., different agricultural subsidies). This is not a question of funding pollution reduction, but of making it a prerequisite for public aid.

One of the problems generally observed is that these constraints, whose costs to public authorities seem to be low, are often not very targeted or too general in their definition, making them largely ineffective. On the other hand, a certain inequity is created between the beneficiaries of the subsidies, since the cost for satisfying the constraints is not always proportional to the amount perceived.

For sites of specific interest, for example, of great environmental value, it is possible not to pay the owner for the opportunities foregone in protecting the environment, but to make reprehensible the actions harmful for the environment. In other words, the right to property is now accompanied by a duty to protect the natural environment in which that property is located (see Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge in [25]), and payments are made only for positive actions in favor of the environment.

As Romstad points out in [28], these subsidies can also be used to set up buffer zones or to protect wetlands, thus benefitting biodiversity and landscapes and lending less weight to the impression that polluters are subsidized. As for the establishment of wetlands, Byström et al. show in [29], theoretically and with an application in southwestern Sweden, that because the source of pollution is random (seasonal and annual variations), the efficiency of the wetlands is then also random.

In a very different region such as the Mississippi Basin, Roley et al. study and compare in [30] the cost and effectiveness of different measures such as wetlands, intermediate crops, and ditches in reducing nitrogen leakage. It must be noted that the combination of these various means is quite possible. As regards the parameterization of such actions, the system may evolve gradually as direct and indirect effects are observed, as available techniques evolve, and as the level of general pollution develops.

These subsidies, along with taxes, can be applied to inputs such as fertilizers used, and in this case, they are often easier to set up (because of lower transaction costs). The main problem comes from the fact that what is harmful is the pollutant, whereas what is taxed or subsidized is an input, and between the two, there is a whole process of transformation, which can differ from one agent to another. In addition, the impacts of pollutants can be very different from one geographical location to another. It is quite understandable (see, e.g., Taylor et al. [31]) that there is no single optimum instrument for all farms and that the choice of an instrument remains largely dependent on resource conditions and production potentials that impact the costs of reducing pollution. Finally, in the agricultural sector, for example, inputs may differ from one farm to another: the use of chemical fertilizers will be taxed, while the use of fertilizers produced by the animals of the farm will not. Sometimes, it is useful to differentiate measures according to the activities or circumstances in which pollution is generated.

Tradable permits are another option, namely, permits to emit a pollutant that can be sold or bought on a market. These permits are either issued free of charge or initially sold by public authorities (entailing an additional cost for involved stakeholders). Von Blottnitz et al. outline in [11] the properties of this type of instrument. Gren and Elofssen present in [32] different variants, their potential interests, by applying these instruments to their case study (the Baltic Sea). This instrument is more flexible than a command and control system and does not require a lot of information about the polluter. With permits, pollution is immediately reduced, although the level needed for pollution reduction is initially unknown. But if the price of permits on the market is to be equal to the marginal cost of pollution reduction, the regulator should regularly adjust the quantity of permits issued until a socially acceptable situation is achieved. Similarly, Mitchell describes in [33] a system of permits for spreading poultry manure in the Illinois Basin.

It should be noted that spatial heterogeneity has important effects on the level of benefits that can result from the exchange of permits to pollute, and this dimension must be taken into account in implementing such a system (see Lankovski et al. in [34]).

In addition, Akao and Managi show in [35] the importance of taking into account inter-temporal aspects in order to have an efficient system. A free-rider phenomenon (i.e., some people benefit from the effort of others) can arise at different scales: at the macroeconomic level, for example, around the Baltic Sea, some countries may expect their neighbors to make the first efforts, thus diluting the overall impact of pollution. The same effect applies at the local level for activities or people within the same watershed.

#### **3.2. Toolkits for diffuse pollution**

#### *3.2.1. General information*

have been put in place. However, as early as 1998, Cowan insisted in [26] that economic instruments, such as those presented later in this chapter, generally have a better potential in

Setting taxes and subsidies is less prescriptive, since the economic agent can refuse the subsidy or agree to pay the tax and continue as before. It provides incentives for the implementation of environment-friendly measures or discourages certain actions. In the case of subsidies, or payments for environmental services such as those described by Ma et al. in [27], arises the

In addition, a general problem emerges: Is it legitimate to finance the reduction of pollution, and is it not contrary to the polluter-pays principle? One possibility is to require the polluter to satisfy certain constraints in order to receive subsidies for other objectives (e.g., different agricultural subsidies). This is not a question of funding pollution reduction, but of making it

One of the problems generally observed is that these constraints, whose costs to public authorities seem to be low, are often not very targeted or too general in their definition, making them largely ineffective. On the other hand, a certain inequity is created between the beneficiaries of the subsidies, since the cost for satisfying the constraints is not always proportional to the

For sites of specific interest, for example, of great environmental value, it is possible not to pay the owner for the opportunities foregone in protecting the environment, but to make reprehensible the actions harmful for the environment. In other words, the right to property is now accompanied by a duty to protect the natural environment in which that property is located (see Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge in [25]), and payments are made only for positive

As Romstad points out in [28], these subsidies can also be used to set up buffer zones or to protect wetlands, thus benefitting biodiversity and landscapes and lending less weight to the impression that polluters are subsidized. As for the establishment of wetlands, Byström et al. show in [29], theoretically and with an application in southwestern Sweden, that because the source of pollution is random (seasonal and annual variations), the efficiency of the wetlands

In a very different region such as the Mississippi Basin, Roley et al. study and compare in [30] the cost and effectiveness of different measures such as wetlands, intermediate crops, and ditches in reducing nitrogen leakage. It must be noted that the combination of these various means is quite possible. As regards the parameterization of such actions, the system may evolve gradually as direct and indirect effects are observed, as available techniques evolve,

These subsidies, along with taxes, can be applied to inputs such as fertilizers used, and in this case, they are often easier to set up (because of lower transaction costs). The main problem comes from the fact that what is harmful is the pollutant, whereas what is taxed or subsidized is an input, and between the two, there is a whole process of transformation, which can differ from one agent to another. In addition, the impacts of pollutants can be very different from

terms of cost-effectiveness than command and control methods.

a prerequisite for public aid.

actions in favor of the environment.

and as the level of general pollution develops.

amount perceived.

100 Water and Sustainability

is then also random.

question of the financing capacities, and of "who bears the costs in the end".

Nonpoint source pollution is defined by the fact that the emissions of each agent are not directly observable at a reasonable cost. Xepapadeas describes in [36] three possible methods for reducing domestic and agricultural diffuse pollution, which are difficult to regulate due to information asymmetry between the polluter (who understands the effort needed to reduce effluents and the associated costs) and the regulator (who does not know them) and the random aspects between the polluter's actions (e.g., manure spreading) and the pollution measured in downstream watercourses:

• The first is to consider that pollution is a function of certain production factors (inputs) and the developed instrument is a system of taxes, sometimes subsidies, to reduce these inputs. Rougoor recalls in [37] that the interest of a tax comes from the ease of implementing and the associated transaction costs that are generally low. Negative aspects come from the absence of targeting in the case of problems restricted to a local area, where the scope of application of the tax does not correspond to that of pollutant emitting and more generally to the risk of a competitiveness decrease of the agricultural sector since production costs increase.

are the most able to reduce their emissions, although the cost of implementation is therefore much higher. Fezzi et al. worked in [41] on the costs for farmers of different measures to reduce eutrophication: They show, on a case study of watershed in England, the impact of the choice of a measure, especially the variability of this impact from one farm to another. In parallel, they recall the importance of the heterogeneity of soils and agricultural practices on the effects of

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In the case of the Baltic Sea, Turner et al. [43] show that if the reduction of inputs is the most effective measure, uniformity of reduction measures is not optimal because of different situ-

It is therefore important to think carefully as much about the local application modalities as the choice of an instrument. Konrad et al. use in [43] a spatialized agro-economic model to estimate the effect of different measures (Fjord Odense watershed) and show in particular that geographically targeted measures can lead to high transaction costs, in comparison with uniform measures, if only to define and then monitor their implementation. Xu et al. show in [44] how a well-chosen land use change, and modified agricultural management strategies,

Three types of incentives for preserving permanent grasslands or converting cultivated land into wetlands on the west coast of Sweden are compared by Gren in [45]: a lump sum payment for the areas concerned, a set of contracts from which the farmer will choose the most attractive for him (thus revealing information about his costs of preservation or conversion), or finally a mutual agreement negotiation that is generally eliminated because it is too time consuming. The choice between the two first possibilities depends on the form of the cost and

The use of nitrogen fertilizers is studied in [46] by Williamson in the United States. He reminds us that their use depends on the price of fertilizers, the cost of agricultural products, and the way in which farmers manage risks, along with their knowledge of the real need of crops for fertilizers. Hansen and Hansen develop in [47] an interesting method for controlling eutrophication induced by phosphorus pollution: rather than simply taxing phosphorus inputs, they suggest taxing the difference between imports of inputs and exports in the form of agricultural products. Although their model does not take into account hazards, it provides

an interesting perspective, especially since it includes storage of phosphorus in soil.

A system of nonlinear taxation and subsidies for reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution is described in [48] by Bontems et al. Farmers differ according to dimensions such as common knowledge (knowledge shared by a group of agents, in which everyone knows that they all share it), spreading areas, level of production, or private knowledge on the way to limit pollution for equal production. In this framework, the authors look for ways to compensate farmers who implement costly practices but lead to pollution reduction; a system of payments revealing private information on each farmer efficiency makes it possible to improve the effort

The payment of subsidies for the adoption of measures to reduce pollution may also be conditional on the outcomes. In that respect, Talberth shows in [49] that payment for grass strips under condition of performance is superior, in the sense that it allows to obtain a better reduc-

such measures, as did Konrad et al. in [42] for the Odense Fjord in Denmark.

may lead to an efficient phosphorus emission reduction.

distribution between farms to reduce pollution.

tion of nutrients for the same budget allocation.

ations between basins.

benefit functions of the farm.


Each option has advantages and disadvantages: for example, measuring inputs can cause excessive information costs in addition to other costs to reduce pollution but is anyway fairer than ambient tax. The latter are an easy way for the regulator to move the problem to a lower geographical level, relying on social control that is more possible within a smaller group. This system of collective punishment remains however particularly unfair and thus may be unacceptable. For this reason, when the third possibility is reasonably possible, it is generally preferred. Otherwise, measurement of inputs, if not too expensive, is a good second choice.

#### *3.2.2. Nonpoint source agricultural pollutions*

Agriculture is often an important source of nonpoint source pollution that because of its characteristics should be tackled in a particular way. Generally, solving diffuse agricultural pollution problems cannot rely on any one single solution: Pretty recalls in [38] that agriculture is, by definition, multifunctional (in the sense that it produces different goods together) and possibly the source of different negative externalities but also positive ones (landscapes, carbon sequestration, limitation of floods, etc.). The variety of situations and problems to be solved leads to various deftly articulated solutions to encourage certain practices and to dissuade others, ranging from advice to regulatory or legal measures, and to the use of various economic instruments. As Saysel shows in [39], it is sometimes simply a matter of giving regular and relevant information to agents, for example, on the judicious use of fertilizers depending on the situation. For farmers, financial variables (notably income) are the main basis on which measures are adopted or refused. On the other hand, those located in the most at-risk areas for eutrophication are not necessarily the most likely to adopt them. Grammatikopoulou et al. in [40] have shown for Finland that it is more efficient to implement targeted measure, e.g., for farmers who are the most able to reduce their emissions, although the cost of implementation is therefore much higher. Fezzi et al. worked in [41] on the costs for farmers of different measures to reduce eutrophication: They show, on a case study of watershed in England, the impact of the choice of a measure, especially the variability of this impact from one farm to another. In parallel, they recall the importance of the heterogeneity of soils and agricultural practices on the effects of such measures, as did Konrad et al. in [42] for the Odense Fjord in Denmark.

associated transaction costs that are generally low. Negative aspects come from the absence of targeting in the case of problems restricted to a local area, where the scope of application of the tax does not correspond to that of pollutant emitting and more generally to the risk of

a competitiveness decrease of the agricultural sector since production costs increase.

contract (e.g., reduction of pollution against subsidies).

is a good second choice.

102 Water and Sustainability

*3.2.2. Nonpoint source agricultural pollutions*

a set of possible contracts or subsidies, the most suitable one for him.

• The second is to observe pollution, for example, downstream (at the outlet) of a small watershed, to set an acceptable threshold, and to implement an ambient tax, or a global fine paid by all potential polluters irrespective of actual pollution, when it cross the defined limit; a subsidy may also be awarded where the measure gives a result below the threshold. Compared to a more systematic method of taxation, the first aim is to have a more efficient action because it is adapted to a more accurate geographical area and, on the other hand, to introduce collective responsibility of the farmers or inhabitants concerned. Conditional voluntary contracts can thus be set up, giving that way interest to everyone to respect the

• The third is to establish, where it is feasible and cost-effective, a system to control individual pollution and to tax any inappropriate behavior or excessive pollution. This means transforming nonpoint source pollution to point source pollution, which is already the case, for example, for the control of individual septic tanks. It is also possible to allow the polluter to demonstrate the true level of effort he is willing to contribute by choosing from

Each option has advantages and disadvantages: for example, measuring inputs can cause excessive information costs in addition to other costs to reduce pollution but is anyway fairer than ambient tax. The latter are an easy way for the regulator to move the problem to a lower geographical level, relying on social control that is more possible within a smaller group. This system of collective punishment remains however particularly unfair and thus may be unacceptable. For this reason, when the third possibility is reasonably possible, it is generally preferred. Otherwise, measurement of inputs, if not too expensive,

Agriculture is often an important source of nonpoint source pollution that because of its characteristics should be tackled in a particular way. Generally, solving diffuse agricultural pollution problems cannot rely on any one single solution: Pretty recalls in [38] that agriculture is, by definition, multifunctional (in the sense that it produces different goods together) and possibly the source of different negative externalities but also positive ones (landscapes, carbon sequestration, limitation of floods, etc.). The variety of situations and problems to be solved leads to various deftly articulated solutions to encourage certain practices and to dissuade others, ranging from advice to regulatory or legal measures, and to the use of various economic instruments. As Saysel shows in [39], it is sometimes simply a matter of giving regular and relevant information to agents, for example, on the judicious use of fertilizers depending on the situation. For farmers, financial variables (notably income) are the main basis on which measures are adopted or refused. On the other hand, those located in the most at-risk areas for eutrophication are not necessarily the most likely to adopt them. Grammatikopoulou et al. in [40] have shown for Finland that it is more efficient to implement targeted measure, e.g., for farmers who In the case of the Baltic Sea, Turner et al. [43] show that if the reduction of inputs is the most effective measure, uniformity of reduction measures is not optimal because of different situations between basins.

It is therefore important to think carefully as much about the local application modalities as the choice of an instrument. Konrad et al. use in [43] a spatialized agro-economic model to estimate the effect of different measures (Fjord Odense watershed) and show in particular that geographically targeted measures can lead to high transaction costs, in comparison with uniform measures, if only to define and then monitor their implementation. Xu et al. show in [44] how a well-chosen land use change, and modified agricultural management strategies, may lead to an efficient phosphorus emission reduction.

Three types of incentives for preserving permanent grasslands or converting cultivated land into wetlands on the west coast of Sweden are compared by Gren in [45]: a lump sum payment for the areas concerned, a set of contracts from which the farmer will choose the most attractive for him (thus revealing information about his costs of preservation or conversion), or finally a mutual agreement negotiation that is generally eliminated because it is too time consuming. The choice between the two first possibilities depends on the form of the cost and benefit functions of the farm.

The use of nitrogen fertilizers is studied in [46] by Williamson in the United States. He reminds us that their use depends on the price of fertilizers, the cost of agricultural products, and the way in which farmers manage risks, along with their knowledge of the real need of crops for fertilizers. Hansen and Hansen develop in [47] an interesting method for controlling eutrophication induced by phosphorus pollution: rather than simply taxing phosphorus inputs, they suggest taxing the difference between imports of inputs and exports in the form of agricultural products. Although their model does not take into account hazards, it provides an interesting perspective, especially since it includes storage of phosphorus in soil.

A system of nonlinear taxation and subsidies for reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution is described in [48] by Bontems et al. Farmers differ according to dimensions such as common knowledge (knowledge shared by a group of agents, in which everyone knows that they all share it), spreading areas, level of production, or private knowledge on the way to limit pollution for equal production. In this framework, the authors look for ways to compensate farmers who implement costly practices but lead to pollution reduction; a system of payments revealing private information on each farmer efficiency makes it possible to improve the effort distribution between farms to reduce pollution.

The payment of subsidies for the adoption of measures to reduce pollution may also be conditional on the outcomes. In that respect, Talberth shows in [49] that payment for grass strips under condition of performance is superior, in the sense that it allows to obtain a better reduction of nutrients for the same budget allocation.

It is also important to avoid falling victim to deadweight effects, with high-cost measures and questionable effectiveness. This is mentioned by Dupraz et al. [50], who note that there is often an advantage to be gleaned from putting in place measures aimed at avoiding limit effects, e.g., applying to a minimum proportion of the farm's surface area or a minimum of intensity. Their model shows that this risk is increased by the information asymmetry that exists between regulators and farmers.

Motivations of Swedish owners for changing their individual treatment facilities, for achieving a better sewage treatment in order to reduce eutrophication, are examined in [56] by Wallin et al. Owners are motivated more by broader benefits (e.g., an improved functioning of their treatment system) and by fairness relative vis-à-vis other owners (that should not be exempted from the same changes), than by environmental concerns. In this context, economic incentives should work, while increased inspections would contribute to a sense of equity in

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105

Domestic, agricultural, or industrial sewage treatment plants are the main sources of point source water pollution, defined by the fact that the emissions of pollutants into the environment come from an identifiable source. Therefore regulations and incentives are generally

Moreover, wastewater can be reused for agriculture or green areas, in compliance with current water quality regulations. In this context, Verlicchi et al. provide in [57] a cost-benefit analysis of the implementation of a post-treatment zone of sewage by planted filters for the city of Ferrara (Italy). Overall, the result of the cost-benefit analysis is positive, despite the use of a discount rate of 5%. It is particularly interesting from an environmental point of view, by reducing the effluent discharged into the watercourse, and also at the urban level by the

With respect to wastewater treatment, Piao et al. compare in [58] different ways of treating sludge from sewage treatment plants and their indirect effects on eutrophication but also on their potential for global warming, toxicity to humans, and acidification of the natural environment. The incineration of sludge, with ultimate waste treatment, seems to be the best

In most cases, implementing measures is not straightforward because of the different stakeholders involved and the various sources of pollution. Löwgren describes in [59] a process of stakeholder consultation, as called for by the European Union, in the form of two meetings of 1 day, each with a few dozen people, on measures to be taken to combat eutrophication in a watershed in Sweden. The author indicates that the results obtained are not representative in any statistical sense. Farmers are commonly referred to as the guilty party in cases of eutrophication, and they tend to defend themselves by drawing attention to shared responsibility with other professionals. While it is relatively easy to identify the impacts of agriculture, it is much more difficult to assess their benefits: food production, support for certain types of biodiversity, cultural heritage, and open spaces are often seen as given, and farmers no longer draw credit from these externalities either in monetary terms or even in the context of this kind of reflection.

However while cooperation between residents, businesses, and farmers is particularly important in order to combat eutrophication, Iwasa et al. show in [60] from a general model that this can lead to complicated dynamics in the natural environment. This is because the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate depends on the cooperation of others, as well as on the overall environmental concerns of society. In the model, two factors will affect the decision of

addition to communication means on the merits of such changes.

easier to implement than in the case of diffuse pollution.

**3.4. Practical conditions for implementation of measures**

**3.3. Tools for point source pollution**

creation of recreational spaces.

method for these four dimensions.

Changes in plowing practices are much more difficult to encourage, as shown in [51] by Orderud and Vogt in a study on an area southeast of Oslo, Norway. For the authors, the solution is to increase farmers' knowledge on the environmental issues and on the phosphorus cycle so that farmers could understand the complexity of the process and not be discouraged by immediate inconclusive results.

Kling presents in [52] an agro-economic model linking land use and resulting nitrate and phosphate pollution. The model is applied on two watersheds feeding the Mississippi River (USA) and makes it possible to test the effects of intermediate crops aiming at reducing eutrophication. He stresses the advantage of linking this type of model with a representation of farmers' behavior.

Establishing drinking water catchment areas with farming constraints that are compulsory and not financially compensated, and other areas where proposed measures are voluntary and financially compensated, is an option examined in [53] by Osborn and Cook, with a case study in the island of Thanet in the Northeastern part of Kent (UK). The authors address the issue of scale when defining zones: it should be not too coarse, so as not to unnecessarily penalize agriculture, and not too refined, for example, only around drinking water catchments for effectiveness purposes. Similarly, Balana et al. in [54], using an environmental, agronomic, and economic model applied to an agricultural area in eastern Scotland, determine the costs and effectiveness of implementing buffer zones along watercourses. They show, on the one hand, that for the same effectiveness in terms of phosphorus reduction, induced costs can be reduced by about 20% just by varying the width of these zones, rather than imposing buffer zones of a uniform width. They show that costs increase exponentially as a function of the amount of nitrate withdrawn.

#### *3.2.3. Domestic diffuse pollution*

Withers et al., working on five case studies in Europe (England, Ireland (two cases), Scotland, Norway), show in [55] that the number of individual treatment systems for domestic wastewater such as septic tanks is generally undervalued, which in turn makes other potential sources of eutrophication, in particular agriculture, responsible for the pollution observed.

Beyond the number, the performance of this type of treatment system is difficult to assess, because of a lack of information on their technical characteristics (implantation, age, level of maintenance, proximity to a watercourse, etc.). Although these systems often represent a small part of the nutrient load (mostly less than 10% on annual average in case studies), they can provide significant concentrations during certain periods, particularly in summer, and periods of low water. Increased owners' awareness of the need to properly maintain their sewage treatment facilities can be a fairly effective and inexpensive way to substantially improve the situation.

Motivations of Swedish owners for changing their individual treatment facilities, for achieving a better sewage treatment in order to reduce eutrophication, are examined in [56] by Wallin et al. Owners are motivated more by broader benefits (e.g., an improved functioning of their treatment system) and by fairness relative vis-à-vis other owners (that should not be exempted from the same changes), than by environmental concerns. In this context, economic incentives should work, while increased inspections would contribute to a sense of equity in addition to communication means on the merits of such changes.

### **3.3. Tools for point source pollution**

It is also important to avoid falling victim to deadweight effects, with high-cost measures and questionable effectiveness. This is mentioned by Dupraz et al. [50], who note that there is often an advantage to be gleaned from putting in place measures aimed at avoiding limit effects, e.g., applying to a minimum proportion of the farm's surface area or a minimum of intensity. Their model shows that this risk is increased by the information asymmetry that

Changes in plowing practices are much more difficult to encourage, as shown in [51] by Orderud and Vogt in a study on an area southeast of Oslo, Norway. For the authors, the solution is to increase farmers' knowledge on the environmental issues and on the phosphorus cycle so that farmers could understand the complexity of the process and not be discouraged

Kling presents in [52] an agro-economic model linking land use and resulting nitrate and phosphate pollution. The model is applied on two watersheds feeding the Mississippi River (USA) and makes it possible to test the effects of intermediate crops aiming at reducing eutrophication. He stresses the advantage of linking this type of model with a representation of

Establishing drinking water catchment areas with farming constraints that are compulsory and not financially compensated, and other areas where proposed measures are voluntary and financially compensated, is an option examined in [53] by Osborn and Cook, with a case study in the island of Thanet in the Northeastern part of Kent (UK). The authors address the issue of scale when defining zones: it should be not too coarse, so as not to unnecessarily penalize agriculture, and not too refined, for example, only around drinking water catchments for effectiveness purposes. Similarly, Balana et al. in [54], using an environmental, agronomic, and economic model applied to an agricultural area in eastern Scotland, determine the costs and effectiveness of implementing buffer zones along watercourses. They show, on the one hand, that for the same effectiveness in terms of phosphorus reduction, induced costs can be reduced by about 20% just by varying the width of these zones, rather than imposing buffer zones of a uniform width. They show that costs increase exponentially as a function of the

Withers et al., working on five case studies in Europe (England, Ireland (two cases), Scotland, Norway), show in [55] that the number of individual treatment systems for domestic wastewater such as septic tanks is generally undervalued, which in turn makes other potential sources of eutrophication, in particular agriculture, responsible for the pollution observed.

Beyond the number, the performance of this type of treatment system is difficult to assess, because of a lack of information on their technical characteristics (implantation, age, level of maintenance, proximity to a watercourse, etc.). Although these systems often represent a small part of the nutrient load (mostly less than 10% on annual average in case studies), they can provide significant concentrations during certain periods, particularly in summer, and periods of low water. Increased owners' awareness of the need to properly maintain their sewage treatment facilities can be a fairly effective and inexpensive way to substantially

exists between regulators and farmers.

by immediate inconclusive results.

farmers' behavior.

104 Water and Sustainability

amount of nitrate withdrawn.

*3.2.3. Domestic diffuse pollution*

improve the situation.

Domestic, agricultural, or industrial sewage treatment plants are the main sources of point source water pollution, defined by the fact that the emissions of pollutants into the environment come from an identifiable source. Therefore regulations and incentives are generally easier to implement than in the case of diffuse pollution.

Moreover, wastewater can be reused for agriculture or green areas, in compliance with current water quality regulations. In this context, Verlicchi et al. provide in [57] a cost-benefit analysis of the implementation of a post-treatment zone of sewage by planted filters for the city of Ferrara (Italy). Overall, the result of the cost-benefit analysis is positive, despite the use of a discount rate of 5%. It is particularly interesting from an environmental point of view, by reducing the effluent discharged into the watercourse, and also at the urban level by the creation of recreational spaces.

With respect to wastewater treatment, Piao et al. compare in [58] different ways of treating sludge from sewage treatment plants and their indirect effects on eutrophication but also on their potential for global warming, toxicity to humans, and acidification of the natural environment. The incineration of sludge, with ultimate waste treatment, seems to be the best method for these four dimensions.

#### **3.4. Practical conditions for implementation of measures**

In most cases, implementing measures is not straightforward because of the different stakeholders involved and the various sources of pollution. Löwgren describes in [59] a process of stakeholder consultation, as called for by the European Union, in the form of two meetings of 1 day, each with a few dozen people, on measures to be taken to combat eutrophication in a watershed in Sweden. The author indicates that the results obtained are not representative in any statistical sense. Farmers are commonly referred to as the guilty party in cases of eutrophication, and they tend to defend themselves by drawing attention to shared responsibility with other professionals. While it is relatively easy to identify the impacts of agriculture, it is much more difficult to assess their benefits: food production, support for certain types of biodiversity, cultural heritage, and open spaces are often seen as given, and farmers no longer draw credit from these externalities either in monetary terms or even in the context of this kind of reflection.

However while cooperation between residents, businesses, and farmers is particularly important in order to combat eutrophication, Iwasa et al. show in [60] from a general model that this can lead to complicated dynamics in the natural environment. This is because the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate depends on the cooperation of others, as well as on the overall environmental concerns of society. In the model, two factors will affect the decision of each agent: the cost of action for the environment and social pressure. For a lake, social pressure will generally increase with the level of pollution. In total, there are different positive or negative return forces, involving potentially varied dynamics.

**1.** The temporal dimension, with irreversibility in particular that may arise when crossing certain limits (e.g., a concentration level of a pollutant). This phenomenon can be taken

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**2.** Pollution often has several causes, and the choice to fight against one or several of them simultaneously or alternatively is far from being neutral on economic results. This is true both for the choice to take action against nitrogen and/or phosphorus in agriculture and to act preferentially or simultaneously on the domestic or agricultural sector or even to

**3.** Pollutions are often multiple (eutrophication, greenhouse effect, etc.), and efficiencies can be gained by taking that into account. Conversely, by taking into consideration the multiple benefits of reducing pollution, it is possible to consider alternatives that would

**4.** The random nature of emissions modifies their effects in terms of eutrophication and may lead to the simultaneous introduction of different instruments. Furthermore, in this case, it may be preferable to seek certain robustness for these solutions, rather than optimality in one direction or the other. There will always be uncertainties, particularly those related to an imperfect knowledge of biophysical phenomena. It is not possible to wait until everything is known before acting. Adaptive management (by updating objectives, tools, or

**5.** The heterogeneous nature of sources, of the agents concerned, etc. cannot be neglected.

On the whole, it is not conceivable to copy a solution that has proved its worth in one context to solve another problem. On the other hand, lessons can be learned from successes or failures in very different situations. Ecological engineering solutions, apart from the development of buffer zones and wetlands, can have quite risky indirect effects. Sometimes, the question should be asked as to the comparative advantages of modest measures across large geograph-

Finally, it should be noted that throughout this bibliographical analysis, the absence of ideal solutions and the interest of targeted policies designed for particular situations were highlighted. It is often case-driven instruments that can help to solve problems if they have been first properly identified and analyzed and if the solutions under consideration have been

We thank the European Union for its financial support to the COASTAL project through the Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement n° 773782) and the members of the French scientific expertise on eutrophication for the enriching exchanges. We also thank Sybille de Mareschal (Irstea, Clermont-Ferrand, France) for her assistance in finding the

into account with an appropriate representation of the systems.

arbitrate between diffuse pollution and point source pollution.

parameters, through experiments) can be a solution in this context.

ical areas or more substantial ones in smaller areas.

assessed in their different implications.

**Acknowledgements**

bibliographic references.

otherwise be unprofitable.

Should then decisions be decentralized? Elofsson, working on pollution in the Baltic Sea, recalls in [61] that regional agencies managing water in a basin generally have a more detailed knowledge of local conditions than structures operating at a wider geographical scale, such as the European Union for this case study. It would therefore be interesting to decentralize decisions when assessing the means of reducing eutrophication. On the other hand, there is a risk that regional agencies will act according to their own interests rather than those of the higher-level structure. The model developed actually shows, for the case of the Baltic Sea study, that this effect is not particularly marked.

On this basis, what is the best way to decentralize? Kroiss examines in [62] various empirical strategies for protecting the Danube Basin and shows that much of the technical problems of water protection can be solved through national, regional, or local initiatives.

He mainly distinguishes two possible approaches: definition of an environmental standard or a precautionary method. The environmental standard indicates a minimum level of water quality, which must be satisfied everywhere, and the effectiveness of each treatment is thereby deduced, in particular from the dilution capacities of the natural environment. For the precautionary method, a minimum reduction in pollution or effluent quality must be achieved, regardless of the quality of the watercourse or its dilution or retention capacity.

Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages (the precautionary approach being preferable for international problems, since the definition of environmental standards is more suited to the management of national basins or where the administration of a basin is centralized). In practice a combination of both would seem preferable. In fact, for the Danube, the main problem is not the translation of these methods in the texts but their actual implementation in practice.

### **4. Conclusion: lessons to be learnt from past experiences**

In defining policies to combat eutrophication, the objective should be defined by models that simultaneously combine biophysical and economic aspects, and not by setting objectives for the state of the system, and then trying to minimize the costs of actions to be carried out. Other approaches can be taken, such as attempting to improve the current situation (e.g., Lake Apopka in Florida described by Fonyo and Boggess in [63]). For the economy, benefits must be compared to costs, whatever the tools used for the implementation of public decisions: command and control, regulation from taxes and subsidies, taxes depending on the results obtained locally ("ambient taxes"), and emission permits distributed free of charge or sold in auction. Uniform measures, such as a percentage reduction of emissions, are generally inefficient, and free-rider behavior is to be expected among some stakeholders.

Five main factors of the problem are often underestimated, as shown above or in practical examples described in the literature but which we do not have the place to present here:


On the whole, it is not conceivable to copy a solution that has proved its worth in one context to solve another problem. On the other hand, lessons can be learned from successes or failures in very different situations. Ecological engineering solutions, apart from the development of buffer zones and wetlands, can have quite risky indirect effects. Sometimes, the question should be asked as to the comparative advantages of modest measures across large geographical areas or more substantial ones in smaller areas.

Finally, it should be noted that throughout this bibliographical analysis, the absence of ideal solutions and the interest of targeted policies designed for particular situations were highlighted. It is often case-driven instruments that can help to solve problems if they have been first properly identified and analyzed and if the solutions under consideration have been assessed in their different implications.

## **Acknowledgements**

each agent: the cost of action for the environment and social pressure. For a lake, social pressure will generally increase with the level of pollution. In total, there are different positive or

Should then decisions be decentralized? Elofsson, working on pollution in the Baltic Sea, recalls in [61] that regional agencies managing water in a basin generally have a more detailed knowledge of local conditions than structures operating at a wider geographical scale, such as the European Union for this case study. It would therefore be interesting to decentralize decisions when assessing the means of reducing eutrophication. On the other hand, there is a risk that regional agencies will act according to their own interests rather than those of the higher-level structure. The model developed actually shows, for the case of the Baltic Sea

On this basis, what is the best way to decentralize? Kroiss examines in [62] various empirical strategies for protecting the Danube Basin and shows that much of the technical problems of

He mainly distinguishes two possible approaches: definition of an environmental standard or a precautionary method. The environmental standard indicates a minimum level of water quality, which must be satisfied everywhere, and the effectiveness of each treatment is thereby deduced, in particular from the dilution capacities of the natural environment. For the precautionary method, a minimum reduction in pollution or effluent quality must be achieved,

Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages (the precautionary approach being preferable for international problems, since the definition of environmental standards is more suited to the management of national basins or where the administration of a basin is centralized). In practice a combination of both would seem preferable. In fact, for the Danube, the main problem is not the translation of these methods in the texts but their actual implementation in practice.

In defining policies to combat eutrophication, the objective should be defined by models that simultaneously combine biophysical and economic aspects, and not by setting objectives for the state of the system, and then trying to minimize the costs of actions to be carried out. Other approaches can be taken, such as attempting to improve the current situation (e.g., Lake Apopka in Florida described by Fonyo and Boggess in [63]). For the economy, benefits must be compared to costs, whatever the tools used for the implementation of public decisions: command and control, regulation from taxes and subsidies, taxes depending on the results obtained locally ("ambient taxes"), and emission permits distributed free of charge or sold in auction. Uniform measures, such as a percentage reduction of emissions, are generally inef-

Five main factors of the problem are often underestimated, as shown above or in practical examples described in the literature but which we do not have the place to present here:

water protection can be solved through national, regional, or local initiatives.

regardless of the quality of the watercourse or its dilution or retention capacity.

**4. Conclusion: lessons to be learnt from past experiences**

ficient, and free-rider behavior is to be expected among some stakeholders.

negative return forces, involving potentially varied dynamics.

study, that this effect is not particularly marked.

106 Water and Sustainability

We thank the European Union for its financial support to the COASTAL project through the Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement n° 773782) and the members of the French scientific expertise on eutrophication for the enriching exchanges. We also thank Sybille de Mareschal (Irstea, Clermont-Ferrand, France) for her assistance in finding the bibliographic references.

### **Conflict of interest**

We have no pecuniary or other personal interests, direct or indirect, to declare in relation with the subject of this work.

[11] Von Blottnitz H, Rabl A, Boiadjiev D, Taylor T, Arnold S. Damage costs of nitrogen fertilizer in Europe and their internalization. Journal of Environmental Planning and

Economic Instruments to Combat Eutrophication: A Survey

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[12] Arata L, Peerlings J, Sckokai P. Manure market as a solution for the nitrates directive in Italy. New Medit: Mediterranean Journal of Economics, Agriculture and Environment.

[13] Power JF, Wiese R, Flowerday D. Managing farming systems for nitrate control: A research review from management systems evaluation areas. Journal of Environmental

[14] Ludwig D, Brock WA, Carpenter SR, Uncertainty in discount models and environmental accounting. Ecology and Society. 2005;**10**(2):13. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyand-

[15] Singh R, Reed PM, Keller K. Many-objective robust decision making for managing an ecosystem with a deeply uncertain threshold response. Ecology and Society. 2015;**20**(3):12

[16] Wladis D, Rosen L, Kros H. Risk-based decision analysis of atmospheric emission alternatives to reduce ground water degradation on the European scale. Ground Water. 1999;

[17] Turner RK, Bateman IJ, Georgiou S, Jones A, Langford IH. An ecological economics approach to the management of a multi-purpose coastal wetland. In: Working Paper— Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment. 2001. pp. 1-36 [18] Lempert RJ, Collins MT.Managing the risk of uncertain threshold responses: Comparison of robust, optimum, and precautionary approaches. Risk Analysis. 2007;**27**:1009-1026 [19] Bond CA, Loomis JB. Using numerical dynamic programming to compare passive and active learning in the adaptive management of nutrients in shallow lakes. Canadian

[20] Ludwig D, Carpenter S, Brock W. Optimal phosphorus loading for a potentially eutro-

[21] Henry C. Option values in the economics of irreplaceable assets. Review of Economic

[22] Gren IM, Savcavchuk OP, Jansson T. Cost-effective spatial and dynamic management of

[23] Kuosmanen T, Laukkanen M. (In)efficient environmental policy with interacting pollut-

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a eutrophied Baltic Sea. Marine Resource Economics. 2013;**28**:263-284

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### **Author details**

Jean-Philippe Terreaux\* and Jean-Marie Lescot

\*Address all correspondence to: jean-philippe.terreaux@irstea.fr

Irstea Bordeaux, ETBX Research Unit, Cestas, France

### **References**


[11] Von Blottnitz H, Rabl A, Boiadjiev D, Taylor T, Arnold S. Damage costs of nitrogen fertilizer in Europe and their internalization. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management. 2006;**49**:413-433

**Conflict of interest**

108 Water and Sustainability

the subject of this work.

Jean-Philippe Terreaux\* and Jean-Marie Lescot

Recycling. 2017;**122**:94-105

1999;**30**:419-431

Irstea Bordeaux, ETBX Research Unit, Cestas, France

\*Address all correspondence to: jean-philippe.terreaux@irstea.fr

ité, Quae, France. 2018. 128. p. ISBN 978-2-7592-2756-3

Sources, Prevention and Reversal. 2010. pp. 103-134

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**Author details**

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**Chapter 8**

Provisional chapter

**Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an**

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.80902

The Mississippi River Basin Healthy Watersheds Initiative (MRBI) program launched by the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) aims to improve the water quality within the Mississippi River Basin. Lake Conway Point Remove (LCPR) watershed, being one of the MRBI watersheds, is a potential candidate for evaluating the effectiveness of MRBI program. Recommended best management practices (BMPs) for LCPR watershed are pond, wetland, pond and wetland, cover crops, vegetative filter strips, grassed waterways, and forage and biomass planting. Before simulating these practices, it is essential to prepare the data needed for model setup to avoid the issue of garbage in, garbage out. This chapter focuses on detailed steps of preparing the data for model setup along with the calibration and validation of the model. The calibration and validation results were within the acceptable bounds. The results from this study provide the data to help simulate the MRBI best management practices effectively and prioritize

an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

**Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program**

monitoring needs for collecting watershed response data in LCPR.

Keywords: best management practices, modeling, water quality, SWAT, MRBI

The Mississippi River Basin Healthy Watersheds Initiative (MRBI) program aims at implementing best management practices (BMPs) to control water quality. Quantifying the impacts of BMPs is important to demonstrate the worth of the MRBI program. Out of various MRBIselected watersheds, the Lake Conway Point Remove (LCPR) watershed is the one listed in the 2011–2016 priority watershed by the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) [1, 2].

> © 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,

distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in

Gurdeep Singh and Mansoor Leh

Gurdeep Singh and Mansoor Leh

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80902

Abstract

1. Introduction

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter


#### **Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program** Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.80902

Gurdeep Singh and Mansoor Leh Gurdeep Singh and Mansoor Leh

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80902

#### Abstract

[55] Withers PJA, May L, Jarvie HP, Jordan P, Doody D, Foy RH, Bechmann M, Cooksley S, Dils R, Deal N. Nutrient emissions to water from septic tank systems in rural catchments: Uncertainties and implications for policy. Environmental Science and Policy. 2012;

[56] Wallin A, Zannakis M, Johansson LO, Molander S. Influence of interventions and internal motivation on Swedish homeowners' change of on-site sewage systems. Resources,

[57] Verlicchi P, Al Aukidy M, Galletti A, Zambello E, Zanni G, Masotti L. A project of reuse of reclaimed wastewater in the Po Valley, Italy: Polishing sequence and cost benefit

[58] Piao W, Kim Y, Kim H, Kim M, Kim C. Life cycle assessment and economic efficiency analysis of integrated management of wastewater treatment plants. Journal of Cleaner

[59] Löwgren M. The water framework directive: Stakeholder preferences and catchment management strategies—Are they reconcilable? Ambio: A Journal of the Human

[60] Iwasa Y, Uchida T, Yokomizo H. Nonlinear behavior of the socio-economic dynamics for

[61] Elofsson K. Climate change and regulation of nitrogen loads under moral hazard.

[62] Kroiss H. Water protection strategies-critical discussion in regard to the Danube river

[63] Fonyo CM, Boggess WG. Coordination of public and private action. A case study of lake

lake eutrophication control. Ecological Economics. 2007;**63**:219-229

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basin. Water Science and Technology. 1999;**39**(8):185-192

restoration. Water Resources Bulletin. 1989;**25**:309-317

**24**:71-82

112 Water and Sustainability

Conservation and Recycling. 2013;**76**:27-40

Production. 2016;**113**:325-337

Environment. 2005;**34**:501-506

analysis. Journal of Hydrology. 2012;**432**(433):127-136

The Mississippi River Basin Healthy Watersheds Initiative (MRBI) program launched by the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) aims to improve the water quality within the Mississippi River Basin. Lake Conway Point Remove (LCPR) watershed, being one of the MRBI watersheds, is a potential candidate for evaluating the effectiveness of MRBI program. Recommended best management practices (BMPs) for LCPR watershed are pond, wetland, pond and wetland, cover crops, vegetative filter strips, grassed waterways, and forage and biomass planting. Before simulating these practices, it is essential to prepare the data needed for model setup to avoid the issue of garbage in, garbage out. This chapter focuses on detailed steps of preparing the data for model setup along with the calibration and validation of the model. The calibration and validation results were within the acceptable bounds. The results from this study provide the data to help simulate the MRBI best management practices effectively and prioritize monitoring needs for collecting watershed response data in LCPR.

Keywords: best management practices, modeling, water quality, SWAT, MRBI

### 1. Introduction

The Mississippi River Basin Healthy Watersheds Initiative (MRBI) program aims at implementing best management practices (BMPs) to control water quality. Quantifying the impacts of BMPs is important to demonstrate the worth of the MRBI program. Out of various MRBIselected watersheds, the Lake Conway Point Remove (LCPR) watershed is the one listed in the 2011–2016 priority watershed by the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) [1, 2].

© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Field studies can be laborious and time-consuming; therefore, watershed modeling technique is generally used for analyzing the effects of BMPs on water quality. The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT, [3]) model was selected for this study. The SWAT model has been widely applied across the globe to assess the impact of various BMPs [4]. SWAT has also been applied to various watersheds in Arkansas—L'Anguille River Watershed [5, 6], Cache River Watershed [7], and Illinois River Watershed [8]. SWAT allows modifications of various parameters to simulate BMPs [9] and was applied at various spatial and temporal scales [10]. SWAT has been used to simulate impacts of land uses and BMPs [11, 12], develop maximum daily load plans [13, 14], and evaluate impacts on water quality [15, 16]. However, before simulating BMPs, it is essential to acquire and process the data needed for setting up a good model.

cropland. An increase in urbanization, in parts of the watershed, has occurred since 1999. The subwatersheds within LCPR along with the area and hydrological unit codes (HUC) can be

Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

The objective of this task was to collect and organize all data needed for the SWAT model setup at a 12-digit hydrological unit code within the LCPR watershed. Geospatial, watershed management,

 Trimble creek-west fork point remove creek 77.0 111102030102 Brock creek 113.1 111102030101 Devils creek-west fork point remove creek 88.2 111102030107 Barns branch-east fork point remove creek 102.7 111102030204 Galla creek 118.0 111102030303 Whig creek-Arkansas river 106.3 111102030302 Mountain view-east fork point remove creek 97.8 111102030201 Upper clear creek 120.4 111102030103 Rock creek-west fork point remove creek 156.2 111102030105 Sunny side creek-east fork point remove creek 100.9 111102030202 Lower clear creek 106.5 111102030104 Prairie creek-east fork point remove creek 106.9 111102030203 Gum log creek 130.4 111102030106 Portland bottoms-Arkansas river 90.9 111102030503 Headwaters rocky Cypress creek 100.1 111102030501 Jim creek-Palarm creek 92.4 111102030402 Little creek-Palarm creek 106.8 111102030403 Beaverdam creek-Arkansas river 88.0 111102030507 Little Palarm creek-Palarm creek 89.9 111102030405 Taylor creek-Arkansas river 65.1 111102030506 Tupelo bayou 110.8 111102030505 Outlet rocky cypress creek 70.5 111102030502 Pierce creek-Palarm creek 100.0 111102030404 Little cypress creek-Palarm creek 53.4 111102030401 Overcup creek 81.1 111102030205 Khun Bayou-Arkansas River 131.1 111102030304 Long Lake-Harris creek 148.2 111102030301 Point remove creek 80.2 111102030206 Miller Bayou-Arkansas river 116.4 111102030504

) HUC no.

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115

Subwatershed Subwatershed name Area (km<sup>2</sup>

Table 1. List of HUC 12 subwatersheds and area in LCPR watershed.

seen in Table 1.

2.2. Data preparation

The goal of this chapter is to describe the steps in detail for acquiring and processing the data needed to set up, calibrate, and validate the SWAT model for the LCPR watershed.

### 2. Methodology

#### 2.1. Study area

The Lake Conway Point Remove (LCPR) watershed is a 2950 km<sup>2</sup> (1140 miles<sup>2</sup> ) watershed located in central Arkansas within the counties of Conway, Faulkner, Perry, Pope, Pulaski, Van Buren, and Yell (Figure 1). The watershed has mixed land uses of forest, pasture, urban, and

Figure 1. Lake Conway Point Remove watershed.

cropland. An increase in urbanization, in parts of the watershed, has occurred since 1999. The subwatersheds within LCPR along with the area and hydrological unit codes (HUC) can be seen in Table 1.

#### 2.2. Data preparation

Field studies can be laborious and time-consuming; therefore, watershed modeling technique is generally used for analyzing the effects of BMPs on water quality. The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT, [3]) model was selected for this study. The SWAT model has been widely applied across the globe to assess the impact of various BMPs [4]. SWAT has also been applied to various watersheds in Arkansas—L'Anguille River Watershed [5, 6], Cache River Watershed [7], and Illinois River Watershed [8]. SWAT allows modifications of various parameters to simulate BMPs [9] and was applied at various spatial and temporal scales [10]. SWAT has been used to simulate impacts of land uses and BMPs [11, 12], develop maximum daily load plans [13, 14], and evaluate impacts on water quality [15, 16]. However, before simulating BMPs, it is essential to acquire and process the data needed for setting up a good model.

The goal of this chapter is to describe the steps in detail for acquiring and processing the data

located in central Arkansas within the counties of Conway, Faulkner, Perry, Pope, Pulaski, Van Buren, and Yell (Figure 1). The watershed has mixed land uses of forest, pasture, urban, and

) watershed

needed to set up, calibrate, and validate the SWAT model for the LCPR watershed.

The Lake Conway Point Remove (LCPR) watershed is a 2950 km<sup>2</sup> (1140 miles<sup>2</sup>

2. Methodology

Figure 1. Lake Conway Point Remove watershed.

2.1. Study area

114 Water and Sustainability

The objective of this task was to collect and organize all data needed for the SWAT model setup at a 12-digit hydrological unit code within the LCPR watershed. Geospatial, watershed management,


Table 1. List of HUC 12 subwatersheds and area in LCPR watershed.

water quantity, and point source data that were available and usable at the time of modeling were collected and reorganized in a consistent format for use in the SWAT model.

### 2.2.1. Elevation

The elevation dataset was retrieved at a 5 m resolution from GeoStor. This 5 m dataset was resampled to a 10 m resolution to reduce the size of huge files and increase the computation efficiency. The elevation map for LCPR can be seen in Figure 2.

### 2.2.2. Soils

The soil data were acquired from the Soil Survey Geographic (SSURGO) database for all LCPR counties in Arkansas and combined to make a soil map for the entire watershed. The SSURGO is the most comprehensive and detailed soil dataset available for LCPR. The soil map for LCPR can be seen in Figure 3.

2.2.3. Land use/land cover

2.2.4. Climate

and land cover map for LCPR can be seen in Figure 4.

Land use and land cover data were acquired for 1999, 2004, and 2006 from GeoStor. Forest area was observed to be the most dominant land use and cover in the LCPR watershed. All land use and land covers were reclassified to make it compatible with the SWAT model. The land use

Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

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117

Figure 3. Soil map of Lake Conway Point Remove watershed, Arkansas, showing major soil series.

Climatic data specifically daily precipitation and maximum and minimum temperature data were obtained from 90 climate stations from the NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Data are available from 1980 to 2012 for at least one of the climatic parameters. The procedure recommended by USDA-ARS in developing SWAT-formatted climate data were followed. Daily climate data were obtained using an inverse distance-weighted interpolation algorithm. The average data were calculated for each subwatershed using a pseudo-weather

Figure 2. Lake Conway Point Remove watershed elevation.

Figure 3. Soil map of Lake Conway Point Remove watershed, Arkansas, showing major soil series.

#### 2.2.3. Land use/land cover

Land use and land cover data were acquired for 1999, 2004, and 2006 from GeoStor. Forest area was observed to be the most dominant land use and cover in the LCPR watershed. All land use and land covers were reclassified to make it compatible with the SWAT model. The land use and land cover map for LCPR can be seen in Figure 4.

#### 2.2.4. Climate

water quantity, and point source data that were available and usable at the time of modeling

The elevation dataset was retrieved at a 5 m resolution from GeoStor. This 5 m dataset was resampled to a 10 m resolution to reduce the size of huge files and increase the computation

The soil data were acquired from the Soil Survey Geographic (SSURGO) database for all LCPR counties in Arkansas and combined to make a soil map for the entire watershed. The SSURGO is the most comprehensive and detailed soil dataset available for LCPR. The soil map for LCPR

were collected and reorganized in a consistent format for use in the SWAT model.

efficiency. The elevation map for LCPR can be seen in Figure 2.

2.2.1. Elevation

116 Water and Sustainability

2.2.2. Soils

can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 2. Lake Conway Point Remove watershed elevation.

Climatic data specifically daily precipitation and maximum and minimum temperature data were obtained from 90 climate stations from the NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Data are available from 1980 to 2012 for at least one of the climatic parameters. The procedure recommended by USDA-ARS in developing SWAT-formatted climate data were followed. Daily climate data were obtained using an inverse distance-weighted interpolation algorithm. The average data were calculated for each subwatershed using a pseudo-weather

Figure 4. Land use and land cover in the Lake Conway Point Remove watershed.

station. NCDC validation results at each calibration station using leave-one-out cross-validation technique can be seen in Table 2. NEXRAD data were obtained from the Arkansas Basin River Forecasting Center (ABRFC).

#### 2.2.5. Streamflow

The flow data are available for the West Fork Point Remove Creek near the Hattieville monitoring station from the US Geological Survey (USGS). This monitoring station is located in subwatershed 3 and covers approximately 20% of LCPR. The flow data were split between surface and baseflow using the baseflow filter program by [17].

#### 2.2.6. Point sources

Point source data were obtained from the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) and was processed in the SWAT-compatible format. Point source data were available for flow, total suspended solids, organic nitrogen, organic and mineral phosphorus, nitrate nitrogen, ammonia nitrogen, and carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand (CBOD). Locations for active point source facility that was incorporated in the SWAT model can be seen in Table 3.

2.2.7. Cattle grazing, manure deposition, and poultry litter application

NEXRAD detection conditioned on exceeding a given threshold gauge observations (DRAIN).

Station Parameter DRAIN<sup>1</sup> DNO\_RAIN2 ME3 d<sup>4</sup> PBIAS<sup>5</sup>

PRCP 0.94 0.86 0.12 0.95 0.3 0.83 0.83 15.48 45.03

Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

PRCP 0.90 0.81 0.23 0.85 0.7 0.56 0.55 24.37 69.37

PRCP 0.68 0.84 1.85 0.67 5.9 0.24 0.03 34.7 99.07

TMAX 4.05 1 1.8 0.99 0.99 9.03 11.83

TMAX 2.42 0.99 1 0.95 0.95 13.71 22.57

TMIN 9.94 0.99 8.3 0.97 0.95 14.79 19.68

TMIN 6.76 0.99 6.9 0.96 0.95 13.11 20.5

Conway, AR, USA PRCP 0.91 0.79 0.64 0.87 1.9 0.59 0.58 23.53 63.56 Dardanelle, AR, USA PRCP 0.95 0.79 0.51 0.85 1.5 0.54 0.52 24.55 71.4 Hattieville, AR, USA PRCP 0.95 0.82 0.08 0.92 0.2 0.74 0.73 18.13 57.15 Morrilton, AR, USA PRCP 0.90 0.82 0.97 0.9 2.8 0.69 0.68 19.84 59.78

Perry, AR, USA PRCP 0.90 0.82 1.19 0.89 3.3 0.65 0.64 21.71 64.82

Conway, AR, USA TMAX 0.45 0.99 0.2 0.95 0.95 14.49 22.31 Dardanelle, AR, USA TMAX 5.02 0.99 2.2 0.95 0.94 15.14 22.95 Morrilton, AR, USA TMAX 1.9 0.99 0.8 0.94 0.94 17.39 23.86

Conway, AR, USA TMIN 7.55 0.98 7.1 0.95 0.94 15.59 22.75 Dardanelle, AR, USA TMIN 7.89 0.99 7.8 0.95 0.95 14.18 21.36 Morrilton, AR, USA TMIN 5.27 0.98 5.7 0.94 0.94 15.89 23.35

Center Ridge, 4.S, AR,

North Little Rock Airport, AR, USA

Russellville Municipal Airport, AR, USA

North Little Rock Airport, AR, USA

North Little Rock Airport, AR, USA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Russellville Municipal Airport, AR, USA

Mean error (ME).

Index of agreement (d).

Coefficient of determination (R2).

Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency (NSE).

Root-mean-square error (RMSE).

using leave-one-out cross-validation.

Mean absolute error (MAE).

Percent bias (PBIAS).

NEXRAD detects no rainfall event (DNO\_RAIN).

Russellville Municipal Airport, AR, USA

USA

% R2<sup>6</sup> NSE<sup>7</sup> MAE<sup>8</sup> RMSE<sup>9</sup>

119

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80902

seen below.

The detailed method for estimating pastures that should be receiving litter applications can be

Table 2. NCDC precipitation and minimum and maximum temperature validation results at each calibration station


1 NEXRAD detection conditioned on exceeding a given threshold gauge observations (DRAIN). 2 NEXRAD detects no rainfall event (DNO\_RAIN).

3 Mean error (ME).

station. NCDC validation results at each calibration station using leave-one-out cross-validation technique can be seen in Table 2. NEXRAD data were obtained from the Arkansas Basin River

The flow data are available for the West Fork Point Remove Creek near the Hattieville monitoring station from the US Geological Survey (USGS). This monitoring station is located in subwatershed 3 and covers approximately 20% of LCPR. The flow data were split between

Point source data were obtained from the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) and was processed in the SWAT-compatible format. Point source data were available for flow, total suspended solids, organic nitrogen, organic and mineral phosphorus, nitrate nitrogen, ammonia nitrogen, and carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand (CBOD). Locations for active point source facility that was incorporated in the SWAT model can be seen in

surface and baseflow using the baseflow filter program by [17].

Figure 4. Land use and land cover in the Lake Conway Point Remove watershed.

Forecasting Center (ABRFC).

2.2.5. Streamflow

118 Water and Sustainability

2.2.6. Point sources

Table 3.

4 Index of agreement (d).

5 Percent bias (PBIAS).

6 Coefficient of determination (R2).

7 Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency (NSE).

8 Mean absolute error (MAE).

9 Root-mean-square error (RMSE).

Table 2. NCDC precipitation and minimum and maximum temperature validation results at each calibration station using leave-one-out cross-validation.

#### 2.2.7. Cattle grazing, manure deposition, and poultry litter application

The detailed method for estimating pastures that should be receiving litter applications can be seen below.


Detailed methods for estimating pastures that received litter application: 1. Create buffer of a random radius around the active poultry houses.

Table 3. Active point source facility location incorporated into the SWAT model.

6. Apply litter to pasture HRUs that fall under the best buffer radius.

3. Assuming a grazing density of 1 cow/0.8 ha of litter amended pasture, calculate the

No. Subbasin Facility NPDES\_ID Latitude Longitude 36 21 Conway Corporation, Tupelo Bayou WWTP AR0051951 35.05 92.54 37 22 City of Oppelo AR0047643 35.08 92.76 38 24 Faulkner County POID, Seven Point Lake Project AR0050903 35.02 92.18 39 25 Rogers Group, Inc. ARG500066 35.24 92.65 40 26 Lentz Sand and Gravel, LLC ARG500072 35.12 92.76 41 26 City of Atkins, South WWTP AR0034673 35.22 92.93 42 29 Rogers Group, Inc., Toad Suck Quarry AR0047104 35.11 92.56 43 29 City of Morrilton ARG160001 35.13 92.70 44 29 City of Menifee AR0049361 35.14 92.55 45 29 Gericorp, Inc. AR0048623 35.15 92.72

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121

The SWAT compatible data for cattle grazing, manure deposition, and poultry litter applica-

The pasture management schedule relating to specific operation and crop can be seen in

SWAT input parameters relating to ponding were PND\_FR, PND\_PSA (ha), PND\_PVOL

Table 6. SWAT input parameters relating to wetland were WET\_FR, WET\_NSA (ha),

), WET\_MXSA (ha), WET\_MXVOL 104 (m3

), PND\_ESA, PND\_EVOL, and PND\_VOL. These ponding parameters can be seen in

), and WET\_VOL 104(m<sup>3</sup>

).

4. Compare the calculated number of cows to the number of cows in the subwatershed. 5. Repeat steps 1–4 to obtain the best agreement between estimated numbers of cows.

2. Extract pasture areas under the buffer.

tion can be seen in Table 4.

2.2.9. Ponds and wetlands

WET\_NVOL 104 (m3

Table 5.

(104 m3

2.2.8. Urban pasture management

number of cows that can fit the buffer.

These wetland parameters can be seen in Table 7.


Table 3. Active point source facility location incorporated into the SWAT model.

Detailed methods for estimating pastures that received litter application:


No. Subbasin Facility NPDES\_ID Latitude Longitude 1 5 City of Pottsville AR0048011 35.23 93.05 2 6 City of Dardanelle AR0033421 35.19 93.14 3 6 Dardanelle water treatment plant ARG640149 35.21 93.15 4 6 Tyson Foods Inc., Dardanelle AR0036714 35.22 93.16 5 6 Russellville Water and Sewer System, City Corporation AR0021768 35.25 93.12 6 6 Freeman Brothers, Inc., d/b/a Bibler Brothers Lumber Company AR0044474 35.25 93.13 7 7 SEECO, Inc., J and R Farms SE1 AR0052221 35.43 92.56 8 7 Hamilton Aggregates ARG500026 35.44 92.54 9 8 Dover Water Works ARG640148 35.40 93.12 10 9 Quality Rock/Jerusalem Quarry ARG500039 35.39 92.80 11 10 KT Rock LLC ARG500031 35.41 92.67 12 11 SEECO, Inc., Campbell Thomas SE1 AR0052141 35.40 92.83 13 13 City of Atkins AR0034665 35.25 92.92 14 14 Environmental Solutions and Services, Inc. AR0051357 35.09 92.71 15 14 Green Bay Packaging, Inc., Arkansas Kraft Division AR0001830 35.10 92.74 16 16 Rogers Group, Inc., Beryl Quarry AR0047520 35.07 92.25 17 16 Roy Nunn ARG550322 35.07 92.37 18 16 Waste Water Management, Inc. d/b/a Oak Tree Subdivision AR0050792 35.08 92.35 19 16 Fritts Construction, Inc., Hayden's Place Subdivision AR0050253 35.09 92.34 20 16 BHT Investment Company, Inc. AR0044997 35.09 92.33 21 16 Rolling Creek POA AR0042536 35.11 92.33 22 16 Genesis Water Treatment, Inc. AR0051152 35.11 92.34

23 17 Faulkner County Public Facility Board, d/b/a Preston Community

24 17 Wilhelmina Cove property owner AR0048682 34.93 91.11 25 17 City of Conway, Stone Dam Creek AR0033359 35.05 92.44 26 17 Coreslab Structures (ARK), Inc. AR0050474 35.06 92.43 27 17 MAPCO Express, Inc. #3059 AR0045071 35.07 92.42 28 17 Flushing Meadows Water Treatment, Inc. AR0048879 35.06 92.37 29 17 Jesse Ferrel d/b/a Jesse Ferrel Rental Development AR0049832 35.09 92.37 30 18 City of Mayflower AR0037206 34.95 92.45 31 18 Carla Knight ARG550430 34.97 92.48 32 19 Construction Waste Management, Inc. Class IV Landfill AR0051764 34.93 92.44 33 19 Grassy Lake Apartments AR0050334 34.94 92.43 34 20 City of Bigelow AR0049999 35.00 92.61 35 20 City of Conway, Tucker Creek WWTP AR0047279 35.07 92.50

AR0050571 35.03 92.41

WW Utility

120 Water and Sustainability


The SWAT compatible data for cattle grazing, manure deposition, and poultry litter application can be seen in Table 4.

#### 2.2.8. Urban pasture management

The pasture management schedule relating to specific operation and crop can be seen in Table 5.

#### 2.2.9. Ponds and wetlands

SWAT input parameters relating to ponding were PND\_FR, PND\_PSA (ha), PND\_PVOL (104 m3 ), PND\_ESA, PND\_EVOL, and PND\_VOL. These ponding parameters can be seen in Table 6. SWAT input parameters relating to wetland were WET\_FR, WET\_NSA (ha), WET\_NVOL 104 (m3 ), WET\_MXSA (ha), WET\_MXVOL 104 (m3 ), and WET\_VOL 104(m<sup>3</sup> ). These wetland parameters can be seen in Table 7.


Date End No. of days Operation Comment Crop

1-Apr Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize BERM 1-May Planting Warm-season grass (Bermuda) BERM 15-May 31-Oct 170 Grazing BERM 15-Jun Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Jul Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Aug Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Sept Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Oct Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 1-Mar Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize BERM 15-May 30-Oct 170 Grazing BERM 15-Jun Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Jul Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Aug Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Sept Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 15-Oct Hay cutting 85% removal BERM 1-Apr Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize BERM

31-Aug Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize FESC 1-Sept Planting Cool-season grass (fescue) FESC 15-Mar 1-Jun 79 Grazing FESC 15-May Hay cutting 85% removal FESC 15-Jun Hay cutting 85% removal FESC 1-Sept Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize FESC 1-Oct Grazing FESC 15-Oct Hay cutting 85% removal FESC 21-Feb Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize FESC 15-Mar 1-Jun 79 Grazing FESC 15-May Hay cutting 85% removal FESC 15-Jun Hay cutting 85% removal FESC 1-Sept Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize FESC 1-Oct 30-Nov 61 Grazing FESC 21-Feb Fertilizer Poultry litter@1 ton/acre of auto-fertilize FESC

Table 5. Pasture management schedule incorporated into the SWAT model.

Cool-season grass (fescue)

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Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

Warm-season grass (Bermuda)

Table 4. Cattle grazing, manure deposition, and poultry litter application data incorporated into the SWAT model.

#### 2.3. Model setup

SWAT divides a watershed into subwatersheds and further subwatersheds into hydrological response units. User-defined approach for delineating subwatersheds was used. ArcSWAT


Table 5. Pasture management schedule incorporated into the SWAT model.

2.3. Model setup

122 Water and Sustainability

SWAT divides a watershed into subwatersheds and further subwatersheds into hydrological response units. User-defined approach for delineating subwatersheds was used. ArcSWAT

Table 4. Cattle grazing, manure deposition, and poultry litter application data incorporated into the SWAT model.

Subbasin Cattle grazing rate (kg/day/ha) Cattle manure deposition rate (kg/day/ha) Litter application/grazing

1 14.38 5.59 Yes 2 12.59 4.90 Yes 3 9.16 3.57 Yes 4 11.46 4.46 Yes 5 6.11 2.38 Yes 6 5.83 2.27 Yes 7 13.18 5.13 Yes 8 6.27 2.44 Yes 9 11.43 4.45 Yes 10 11.46 4.46 Yes 11 7.34 2.86 Yes 12 11.46 4.46 Yes 13 6.11 2.38 Yes 14 10.51 4.09 Yes 15 9.05 3.52 Yes 16 12.03 4.68 No 17 12.03 4.68 No 18 11.98 4.66 No 19 12.44 4.84 No 20 6.44 2.51 No 21 12.03 4.68 No 22 9.24 3.60 Yes 23 12.03 4.68 No 24 12.03 4.68 Yes 25 11.46 4.46 Yes 26 7.84 3.05 Yes 27 4.50 1.75 Yes 28 9.15 3.56 Yes 29 10.70 4.16 Yes


Table 6. Pond input parameters for each subwatershed.

was used to develop the SWAT2012 model with a revision number 635. A threshold of 0% for land use, 5% for soil, and 0% for slope was used to delineate HRUs resulting in 3402 HRUs. Some past studies reported the relationship between watershed response and HRU delineation approach [18, 19].

2.4. Calibration and validation

Table 7. Wetland input parameters for each subwatershed.

Subwatershed WET\_FR WET\_NSA

(ha)

WET\_NVOL 104

 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0249 65.97 32.99 219.90 109.95 6.60 0.0151 46.43 23.22 154.78 77.39 4.64 0.0004 1.38 0.69 4.61 2.30 0.14 0.0040 12.62 6.31 42.06 21.03 1.26 0.0001 0.15 0.08 0.50 0.25 0.02 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0018 7.18 3.59 23.92 11.96 0.72 0.0146 39.90 19.95 133.01 66.51 3.99 0.0093 27.84 13.92 92.79 46.39 2.78 0.0003 0.96 0.48 3.20 1.60 0.10 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0142 37.57 18.79 125.24 62.62 3.76 0.0058 15.53 7.77 51.78 25.89 1.55 0.0019 3.77 1.89 12.57 6.28 0.38 0.0052 17.23 8.62 57.45 28.72 1.72 0.0331 70.06 35.03 233.53 116.76 7.01 0.0017 5.04 2.52 16.79 8.40 0.50 0.0040 6.33 3.16 21.09 10.54 0.63 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0081 31.88 15.94 106.25 53.13 3.19 0.0002 0.81 0.41 2.70 1.35 0.08 0.0060 14.39 7.20 47.97 23.99 1.44 0.0364 127.13 63.56 423.75 211.88 12.71

WET\_MXSA (ha)

Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

WET\_MXVOL 104

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80902

WET\_VOL 104

(m<sup>3</sup> )

(m3 )

(m<sup>3</sup> )

Before calibrating a model, sensitivity analysis is usually performed to reduce the number of parameters. Latin hypercube (LH) one-at-a-time (OAT) method [20] was used to identify the sensitive parameters that might affect the output results. A total of 22 flow parameters were Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80902 


Table 7. Wetland input parameters for each subwatershed.

#### 2.4. Calibration and validation

was used to develop the SWAT2012 model with a revision number 635. A threshold of 0% for land use, 5% for soil, and 0% for slope was used to delineate HRUs resulting in 3402 HRUs. Some past studies reported the relationship between watershed response and HRU delineation

Subwatershed PND\_FR PND\_PSA (ha) PND\_PVOL (104 m<sup>3</sup>

Water and Sustainability

) PND\_ESA PND\_EVOL PND\_VOL

approach [18, 19].

Table 6. Pond input parameters for each subwatershed.

Before calibrating a model, sensitivity analysis is usually performed to reduce the number of parameters. Latin hypercube (LH) one-at-a-time (OAT) method [20] was used to identify the sensitive parameters that might affect the output results. A total of 22 flow parameters were tested, and the following 12 were found sensitive: SOL\_AWC, CN2, ALPHA\_BF, SOL\_K, CH\_N2, CH\_K2, CANMX, RCHRG\_DP, SURLAG, GW\_DELAY, OV\_N, and GW\_REVAP.

The model calibration period was from 1987 to 2006 and the validation period was from 2007 to 2012. The first 3 years of calibration period were selected as a warm-up period so that the model parameters can be initialized. The calibration started with baseflow followed by surface flow adjusting related parameters affecting baseflow and surface flow. The SWAT Check tool [21] was used before calibration to make sure that the simulated outputs were within the reasonable ranges. The Load Estimator (LOADEST) tool [22] was used on a water quality dataset available from Sept 2011 to Dec. 2012 at Hattieville and Apr. 2012 to Dec. 2012 at Morrilton. The regression coefficients were found to be statistically significant (p < 0.05) at Hattieville and Morrilton for sediment, total phosphorus, and nitrate nitrogen. The performance of the model was determined mainly using the coefficient of determination (R2 ).

### 3. Results and discussion

#### 3.1. Calibration and validation results

Various SWAT parameters that were calibrated along with their parameter ranges and final calibrated values can be seen in Table 8. The annual calibrated R2 for the total, surface, and

> baseflow was 0.83, 0.85, and 0.16. The validated R2 was 0.91, 0.93, and 0.60 for the total, surface, and baseflow. The monthly calibrated R2 was 0.73, 0.73, and 0.54 and validated R2 was 0.84, 0.78, and 0.76 for the total, surface, and baseflow, respectively. The calibration and validation scatter plots for total flow, surface flow, and baseflow can be seen in Figure 5. The validated R2 for water quality was 0.5–0.7 at Hattieville and 0.7–0.87 at Morrilton. The results are within acceptable limits of other modeling studies relating to limited data availability

35 98 CN + 1 Calibrated value

Definition MIN MAX Units Calibrated value Notes

0.01 500 mm/hr 6

Setting Up a Computer Simulation Model in an Arkansas Watershed for the MRBI Program

Maximum canopy storage 0 100 mm 6 Wu et al., [23]

sediment yield on highslope agricultural HRUs

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127

CANMX-Ag Maximum canopy storage 0 100 mm 2.8

Table 8. SWAT model parameter ranges and the final calibrated values.

Maximum canopy storage 0 100 mm 4

Maximum canopy storage 0 100 mm 0.1

SURLAG Surface runoff lag time 1 24 Days 2 Calibrated value HRU\_SLP Average slope steepness 0 1 m/m Reduce by 10% Based on identified high

SOL\_AWC Soil available water capacity 0 1 mm/mm SOL\_AWC 1.13 Calibrated value

Modeling studies are gaining popularity due to rapidness of insight generation before actually performing field experiments. The initiative led by the Mississippi River Basin focused on analyzing the water quality benefits from intended best management practices with the help of modeling studies. However, merely simulating best management practices will not be able to provide reliable results unless the model has been set up correctly and robust. This chapter focused on the detailed discussion for setting up the model to a point where the model setup procedure can be replicated. The model was set up with all relevant information, and each data

[24, 25].

File/ parameter

.hru CANMX-Forest

CANMX-Pasture

CANMX-Urban

.mgt

.sol

CH\_K2 Effective hydraulic conductivity

CN2 SCS runoff curve number for moisture condition II

4. Conclusions



Table 8. SWAT model parameter ranges and the final calibrated values.

baseflow was 0.83, 0.85, and 0.16. The validated R2 was 0.91, 0.93, and 0.60 for the total, surface, and baseflow. The monthly calibrated R2 was 0.73, 0.73, and 0.54 and validated R2 was 0.84, 0.78, and 0.76 for the total, surface, and baseflow, respectively. The calibration and validation scatter plots for total flow, surface flow, and baseflow can be seen in Figure 5. The validated R2 for water quality was 0.5–0.7 at Hattieville and 0.7–0.87 at Morrilton. The results are within acceptable limits of other modeling studies relating to limited data availability [24, 25].

### 4. Conclusions

tested, and the following 12 were found sensitive: SOL\_AWC, CN2, ALPHA\_BF, SOL\_K, CH\_N2, CH\_K2, CANMX, RCHRG\_DP, SURLAG, GW\_DELAY, OV\_N, and GW\_REVAP.

The model calibration period was from 1987 to 2006 and the validation period was from 2007 to 2012. The first 3 years of calibration period were selected as a warm-up period so that the model parameters can be initialized. The calibration started with baseflow followed by surface flow adjusting related parameters affecting baseflow and surface flow. The SWAT Check tool [21] was used before calibration to make sure that the simulated outputs were within the reasonable ranges. The Load Estimator (LOADEST) tool [22] was used on a water quality dataset available from Sept 2011 to Dec. 2012 at Hattieville and Apr. 2012 to Dec. 2012 at Morrilton. The regression coefficients were found to be statistically significant (p < 0.05) at Hattieville and Morrilton for sediment, total phosphorus, and nitrate nitrogen. The perfor-

mance of the model was determined mainly using the coefficient of determination (R2

Various SWAT parameters that were calibrated along with their parameter ranges and final calibrated values can be seen in Table 8. The annual calibrated R2 for the total, surface, and

0 1 0.95 Based on water balance

0 1 1 Based on water balance

0.02 0.2 0.072 Calibrated value

0 1000 750 Calibrated value

0 1 0.06 Calibrated value

0 5000 mm 800 Calibrated value

0.01 0.3 0.014 Calibrated value

Definition MIN MAX Units Calibrated value Notes

GW\_DELAY Groundwater delay 0 500 2 Calibrated value

ALPHA\_BF Baseflow alpha factor 0 1 Days 0.0932 Baseflow separation factor

3. Results and discussion

126 Water and Sustainability

ESCO Soil evaporation

File/ parameter

.bsn

.gw

.rte

3.1. Calibration and validation results

compensation factor

EPCO Plant uptake compensation factor

GW\_REVAP Groundwater "revap" coefficient

REVAPMN Threshold depth of water in the shallow aquifer for "revap" to occur

RCHRG\_DP Deep aquifer percolation fraction

GWQMN Threshold depth of water in

CH\_N2 Manning's "n" value for the main channel

the shallow aquifer required for return flow to occur

).

Modeling studies are gaining popularity due to rapidness of insight generation before actually performing field experiments. The initiative led by the Mississippi River Basin focused on analyzing the water quality benefits from intended best management practices with the help of modeling studies. However, merely simulating best management practices will not be able to provide reliable results unless the model has been set up correctly and robust. This chapter focused on the detailed discussion for setting up the model to a point where the model setup procedure can be replicated. The model was set up with all relevant information, and each data

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envsoft.2015.12.001

php/JOSH/article/view/280

DOI: 10.13031/2013.20411

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[2] USDA-NRCS. 2010 Mississippi River Basin Healthy Watershed Initiative Projects [Internet]. 2010. Available from: https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/ar/programs/

[3] Arnold JG, Srinivasan R, Muttiah RS, Williams JR. Large area hydrologic modeling and assessment part I: Model development. Journal of the American Water Resources Associ-

[4] Neitsch S, Arnold J, Kiniry J, Williams J. Soil & water assessment tool theoretical documentation version 2009. Texas Water Resources Institute; 2011:1-647. DOI: 10.1016/j.

[5] Singh G, Saraswat D, Sharpley A. A Sensitivity analysis of impacts of conservation practices on water quality in L'Anguille River Watershed, Arkansas. Water. 2018;10(4):443.

[6] Singh G, Saraswat D. Development and evaluation of targeted marginal land mapping approach in SWAT model for simulating water quality impacts of selected second generation biofeedstock. Environmental Modelling and Software. 2016;81:26-39. DOI: 10.1016/j.

[7] Kumar E. SWAT model simulation of bioenergy crop impacts on water quality in cache

[8] Pai N, Saraswat D, Daniels M. Identifying priority subwatersheds in the Illinois River drainage area in Arkansas watershed using a distributed modeling approach. Transac-

[9] Gassman PW, Reyes MR, Green CH, Arnold JG. The soil and water assessment tool: Historical development, applications, and future research directions. Transactions of the

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[12] Chaubey I, Chiang L, Gitau MW, Mohamed S. Effectiveness of best management practices in improving water quality in a pasture-dominated watershed. Journal of Soil and Water

river watershed [thesis]. Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas; 2015

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Figure 5. Calibration [left] and validation [right] scatter plots for total flow, surface flow, and baseflow.

preparation step has been explained in detail. The model was calibrated and validated for flow at Hattieville. Due to limited water quality data, the model was validated for sediment, total phosphorus, and nitrate nitrogen at Hattieville and Morrilton. The results were satisfactory and within the ranges reported by previous studies. Results from this study can be used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of MRBI-recommended agricultural BMPs for analyzing pollutant load reductions and improving water quality in similar data-limited watersheds.

### Conflict of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

### Author details

Gurdeep Singh<sup>1</sup> \* and Mansoor Leh<sup>2</sup>

\*Address all correspondence to: gurdeep.singh@climate.com


### References

preparation step has been explained in detail. The model was calibrated and validated for flow at Hattieville. Due to limited water quality data, the model was validated for sediment, total phosphorus, and nitrate nitrogen at Hattieville and Morrilton. The results were satisfactory and within the ranges reported by previous studies. Results from this study can be used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of MRBI-recommended agricultural BMPs for analyzing pollutant load reductions and improving water quality in similar data-limited watersheds.

Figure 5. Calibration [left] and validation [right] scatter plots for total flow, surface flow, and baseflow.

Conflict of interest

128 Water and Sustainability

Author details

Gurdeep Singh<sup>1</sup>

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

\* and Mansoor Leh<sup>2</sup>

1 The Climate Corporation, St Louis, MO, USA

\*Address all correspondence to: gurdeep.singh@climate.com

2 International Water Management Institute, Vientiane, Lao PDR


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