**5. Conclusion**

In conclusion, I would like to return to some issues that I raised earlier. As we have seen, Varela's "neurophenomenology" highlights some of the neural correlates of consciousness. But as I said, if this were all, it would aggravate rather than solv‑ ing Chalmers' "hard problem." But in fact it is not all. Varela's main point—which may be well missed by those reading it as one more academic text—is that if we really wish to address the phenomenon of consciousness, we must be prepared to take into account the fact that it is a phenomenon that is only properly instantiated in the form of *first-person subjectivity.* And this means that if we wish to seriously engage with it, we cannot escape the necessity of ourselves bringing into play our *own* individual consciousness. Varela writes:

*"One must take seriously the double challenge my proposal represents. First, it demands a re-learning and a mastery of the skill of phenomenological description. Second: a call for transforming the style and values of the research community itself.* *To the long-standing tradition of objectivist science this sounds anathema, and it is. But this is not a betrayal of science: it is a necessary extension and complement. Science and experience constrain and modify each other as in a dance. This is where the potential for transformation lies. It is also the key for the difficulties this position has found within the scientific community. It requires us to leave behind a certain image of how science is done, and to question a style of training in science which is part of the very fabric of our cultural identity".*

The consequence is that with respect to the "hard problem," the nature of "hard" becomes reframed in two senses:

1.It is hard work to train and stabilize new methods to explore experience.

2.It is hard to change the habits of science in order for it to accept that new tools are needed for the transformation of what it means to conduct research on mind and for the training of succeeding generations.

Interestingly enough, a similar theme comes up with respect to the concept of enaction. As I have already indicated, there is potentially an existential dimension to enaction; scientists are after all human beings, as thus like all living organisms *enact* their lived world every minute of every day. Taking this personally, it means that I am actually *responsible* for the quality of what my enacted world leads me to experience. We are on dangerous ground here for "normal science": science is supposed to aim at objectivity; and it is very widely supposed that attaining objectivity requires the elimination of subjectivity. But subjectivity, if it is assumed as such, is neither more nor less than first‑ person experience as lived from the inside; and we have just seen that precisely, which is at the core of enaction. In other words, enaction, if it is taken seriously in what I person‑ ally see as its core, poses a manifest threat to our normal functioning as scientists.

Of course what happens is that any "normal" scientist will seek to defuse this threat – both individually and as a community. I do hope I am not being pretentious or disdainful here; I think I understand too well what is going on, because I know the cost. But still I do want to stand my ground, to stand up, and be counted. I maintain that if enaction is defused, it is betrayed. I propose that we take a closer look at this.

One of the main ways—certainly not the only one—that enaction defused is by converting it into a much safer research program of what has been called "4E cogni‑ tion" [8]. The "4Es" are: embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted cognition. This is a smart move (if one is indeed trying to defuse enaction so as to get back into the comfort zone of "normal" science), for the following reason. Varela himself envisaged enaction as the framework for a possible paradigm in Cognitive Science, and others have attempted to follow up on this [3]. Now, in any such attempt, the notions that cognition is embodied, embedded (it is more usual to say "situated"), and extended undeniably play key roles. So as a proponent of "existential enac‑ tion," I cannot protest against the association of enaction with the other three "Es." However, what I can and do protest about is adding in "enacted" as an ancillary element at the end of the list. In my view, these three E's are *subservient* to the over‑ riding theme of enaction. Mixing them up indiscriminately, in the way that is done by proponents of the "4Es," leads to missing the wood for the trees.

To sum up, then, I would like to conclude by an invitation. As I have tried to explain, the neuroscience of consciousness potentially opens up a breach in our normal function‑ ing as scientists; it offers the opportunity for those so inclined to introduce a subjective, existential dimension into their work. Of course, one can bring a horse to the water, but one cannot force him to drink. This is particularly so here, where intimate personal atti‑ tudes are at stake. But I hope that I have done enough to make the invitation appealing.

*Neurophenomenology, Enaction, and Autopoïesis DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.85262*
