**5. Consciousness as a vehicle of interaction**

Nonetheless, in case of formation of social knowledge predicted by the two-process theory [6], it is important to identify possible mechanisms of accessing the content within such complex capacity. The two-level account proposed by Arango-Muñoz [6] implies that activation of the current content occurs via the interaction which depends on a specific level of processing and a specific psychological context (either related to oneself or other people). This model indicates that higher-order inferential mechanisms should interact with the low-level control and monitoring mechanisms activated in the automatic and unconscious way. Thus, this interactionist account suggests that at the lower level there is no conscious control or monitoring of others' behavior as well as no conscious attribution when handling a specific psychological context of individual either related to the self or others. Clearly, this conclusion is contradicted with common sense that people are often aware of their attributions and can finally formulate accurate and realistic interpretations about others even though they initially produced false attributions.

How conscious control or evaluation of social cognition is then possible? It should be emphasized that interactionists (see [6]) claim no explicit architecture of consciousness mechanisms that are responsible for managing the information content within the system. In our opinion, cognitive architecture of such system needs to include a conscious access mechanism that ensures accessibility of information understood as activation through the interaction. Here, we will argue that a combination of the two-level structures of mindreading and metacognition [6] along with a global broadcasting architecture of consciousness [25, 33, 34] is a reasonable theoretical proposal that explains how conscious access contributes in formation of accurate social knowledge.
