5.1. Probabilistic analysis of the remote monitoring system possibilities

For coal branch the developments of mine, buildings, and constructions should be equipped by a complex of systems and means that provide the organization and implementation of coal

Figure 10. The SUEK value chain includes "smart" systems everywhere.

work safety and technological and productions control in normal and emergency conditions. This complex of systems and means should be integrated into multifunctional safety system (MFSS) with the following main functions:


The usual approaches to critical infrastructure safety (CIS) which have been developed in last dozen years, based on many respects on subjective safety estimations "on places", have reached a high but not sufficient level of efficiency. For the account of interests of all interested parties and the further business development today, rethinking system possibilities of applied information technologies for increasing safety and extracting the innovative effects are not used fully till now.

Search of cardinal directions of improving CIS, favorable to business and the state, has led to comprehension of sharp necessity and expediency of creation and implementation of remote monitoring system (RMS) that is an important part of MFSS. RMS transforms an internal information support of separate CIS in a mode of a needed transparency and wide availability of CIS state in real time for all interested and responsible parties. Along with it on the basis of rational RMS implementation, the transition from the existing subjective expert approach to the risk-based approach for critical infrastructure safety receives necessary information filling.

The proposed probabilistic analysis of RMS operation in their influence on integral risks to lose system integrity is based on researching real remote monitoring systems implemented in Russia for oil and gas CIS. In application to composed and integrated CIS with RMS and without RMS, the earlier models, developed by authors, are used [1–10]. The received results are applicable for an analytical rationale of system requirements to RMS, system definition of the balanced preventive measures of systems, and subsystem and element integrity support at limitations on resources and admissible risks.

emergencies, minimization of a role of human factor regarding control, and supervising func-

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37

• Remote continuous monitoring of CIS condition in real time (gathering data about key parameters of technological processes; gathering and processing data of industrial inspection, the information of technical condition and equipment diagnostics, and the informa-

tion on the presence of failures and incidents; and results of system recovery, etc.)

• Display of parameter conditions and predictions with the necessary level of details

In this subsection analytical decomposition and the subsequent integration of complex systems are used according to propositions above in Sections 1–4. Admissible conditions (ranges) of traced parameters for each element, the reservation possibilities, implemented technologies of

RMS is intended for a possibility of prediction, the prevention of possible emergencies, minimization of a role of human factor regarding control, and supervising functions. It may be reached on the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on controllable parameters of objects monitored. For example, objects monitored for oil and gas CIS are the technological equipment and processes of extraction, transportation, refining, the

tions. The role of RMS is defined by their functions, to the basic of which concern:

• Analytical data processing

Figure 11. Example of reaction in real time.

• Prediction of risks to lose object integrity

the control, and recovery of integrity are considered.

personnel, systems, and means of safety support.

Requirements to monitoring and prognosis for critical systems are established at the level of many international standards, for example, ISO 17359, ISO 13381–1, ISO 13379, IEC 61508–1 [18–21], etc. Today, a monitoring of parameter conditions is carried out to increase reliability and industrial safety of critical systems, improve their health management, and provide predictive maintenance and operation efficiency. Here, critical systems are understood as objects of dangerous manufacture and the equipment, energy objects, power and transport systems, and others. Different data about current conditions of parameters become accessible in real time. So, for coal mine some of many dozens of heterogeneous parameters are for ventilation equipment (VE) (temperature of rotor and engine bearings, a current on phases, and voltage of stator) and for modular decontamination equipment (MDE) (vacuum in the pipeline, the expense and temperature of a metano-air mix in the pipeline before equipment, pressure in system of compressed air, etc.). Effects from RMS may be reached on the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on controllable parameters of objects monitored (see Figure 11). RMS is intended for a possibility of prediction, the prevention of possible Probabilistic Methods and Technologies of Risk Prediction and Rationale of Preventive Measures by Using… http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75109 37

Figure 11. Example of reaction in real time.

work safety and technological and productions control in normal and emergency conditions. This complex of systems and means should be integrated into multifunctional safety system

• Monitoring and prevention of conditions of occurrence of geodynamic, aerologic, and

The usual approaches to critical infrastructure safety (CIS) which have been developed in last dozen years, based on many respects on subjective safety estimations "on places", have reached a high but not sufficient level of efficiency. For the account of interests of all interested parties and the further business development today, rethinking system possibilities of applied information technologies for increasing safety and extracting the innovative effects are not

Search of cardinal directions of improving CIS, favorable to business and the state, has led to comprehension of sharp necessity and expediency of creation and implementation of remote monitoring system (RMS) that is an important part of MFSS. RMS transforms an internal information support of separate CIS in a mode of a needed transparency and wide availability of CIS state in real time for all interested and responsible parties. Along with it on the basis of rational RMS implementation, the transition from the existing subjective expert approach to the risk-based approach for critical infrastructure safety receives necessary information filling. The proposed probabilistic analysis of RMS operation in their influence on integral risks to lose system integrity is based on researching real remote monitoring systems implemented in Russia for oil and gas CIS. In application to composed and integrated CIS with RMS and without RMS, the earlier models, developed by authors, are used [1–10]. The received results are applicable for an analytical rationale of system requirements to RMS, system definition of the balanced preventive measures of systems, and subsystem and element integrity support at

Requirements to monitoring and prognosis for critical systems are established at the level of many international standards, for example, ISO 17359, ISO 13381–1, ISO 13379, IEC 61508–1 [18–21], etc. Today, a monitoring of parameter conditions is carried out to increase reliability and industrial safety of critical systems, improve their health management, and provide predictive maintenance and operation efficiency. Here, critical systems are understood as objects of dangerous manufacture and the equipment, energy objects, power and transport systems, and others. Different data about current conditions of parameters become accessible in real time. So, for coal mine some of many dozens of heterogeneous parameters are for ventilation equipment (VE) (temperature of rotor and engine bearings, a current on phases, and voltage of stator) and for modular decontamination equipment (MDE) (vacuum in the pipeline, the expense and temperature of a metano-air mix in the pipeline before equipment, pressure in system of compressed air, etc.). Effects from RMS may be reached on the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on controllable parameters of objects monitored (see Figure 11). RMS is intended for a possibility of prediction, the prevention of possible

• The control of technological process conformity to the set normative in real time.

(MFSS) with the following main functions:

limitations on resources and admissible risks.

• Application of counteremergency protection systems.

technogenic danger.

36 Probabilistic Modeling in System Engineering

used fully till now.

emergencies, minimization of a role of human factor regarding control, and supervising functions. The role of RMS is defined by their functions, to the basic of which concern:


In this subsection analytical decomposition and the subsequent integration of complex systems are used according to propositions above in Sections 1–4. Admissible conditions (ranges) of traced parameters for each element, the reservation possibilities, implemented technologies of the control, and recovery of integrity are considered.

RMS is intended for a possibility of prediction, the prevention of possible emergencies, minimization of a role of human factor regarding control, and supervising functions. It may be reached on the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on controllable parameters of objects monitored. For example, objects monitored for oil and gas CIS are the technological equipment and processes of extraction, transportation, refining, the personnel, systems, and means of safety support.

The role of RMS is defined by their functions, to the basic of which concern:

• Remote continuous monitoring of CIS condition in real time (gathering data about key parameters of technological processes; gathering and processing data of industrial inspection, the information of technical condition and equipment diagnostics, and the information on the presence of failures and incidents; and results of system recovery, etc.)

When not all system elements and subsystems are captured by RMS capabilities, two subsystems, operated in different time scales, are cooperated in the CIS. A part of CIS, captured RMS, is served in real time, and the other part is in a usual time scale (with information gathering by a principle "as it is possible to receive"). In many critical situations, this usual time scale cannot be characterized as adequate to a reality. With the use of the offered approach, the system with usual control (UC), used for CIS, i.e., without RMS application, can be estimated. Generally, the analyzed critical infrastructure is presented as a combination "System+RMS" and usual "System without RMS." And, "System+RMS" is a combination of "Structure for RMS" and "RMS" (see Figure 12). For these systems some measures of the information delivery may not answer requirements of real time—"System+RMS" because

Probabilistic Methods and Technologies of Risk Prediction and Rationale of Preventive Measures by Using…

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75109

39

All the great number of the factors characterizing threats to analyzed critical infrastructure is considered as 100%, and total frequency of dangerous deviations is designated through λ∑. Frequency of potentially dangerous deviations traced by "System + RMS" is designated (λRMS). Frequency of occurrence of other potentially dangerous deviations which are not

For "System + RMS" the RMS operation quality during the time of prediction Тgiven is evaluated by probability РRMS(Тgiven). And, the risk of critical deviation for safety during the time of prediction Тgiven, designated as RRMS(Тgiven), can be evaluated by the earlier methods [2–3, 5–17]. For the usual "System without RMS," the same measures РUC(Тgiven) and RUC(Тgiven)

Then, in general form, the risk R(Тgiven) to lose integrity for analyzed critical infrastructure

RMS operation quality is inadequate and "System without RMS" without RMS.

traced by RMS (i.e., for "System without RMS") is designated (λ<sup>∑</sup> λRMS).

can be used with specified value of input for probabilistic modeling.

during the time of prediction Тgiven can be evaluated by the formula:

Figure 12. Decomposition of analyzed critical infrastructure to fill influence of RMS.


Unlike the usual control which is carried out at enterprises (when the state supervising body in the field of industrial safety and frequently also the enterprise/holding bodies of the industrial safety control receive the information only upon incident or failure, not possessing the actual information about deviations at an initial stage when still it is possible to prevent failure), RMS translates the control, a transparency of CIS conditions, the important real-time information (about the facts and predictions), and also necessity of proper response to critical deviations for absolutely new time scale characterized as the scale of real time, measured by secondsminutes.

Effects from the remote control can be reached only when quality of RMS operation is provided. It means that it is reliable and timely producing the complete, valid, and, if needed, confidential information by RMS.

Generally, system analysis of RMS operation consists in evaluation of reliability, timeliness, completeness, validity, and confidentiality of the used information. In special cases for compound subsystems and system elements, not all measures may be used. For example, for a subsystem of information security enough to use the measures to evaluate protection from an unauthorized access and information confidentiality during the given time period. Dependence of the purposes of researching RMS can be decomposed to the level of compound subsystems and separate elements (see Figure 6).

In this case according to the system engineering principles, the operation quality of every component should be evaluated.

For evaluating integral RMS operation quality, the next measure is proposed: the probability of providing reliable and timely representation of the complete, valid, and confidential information during the given time (РRMS(Тgiven)).

In general case

where all measures are calculated by the models proposed in Section 2.

For complex structures the ideas of combination of the models is proposed in [15]. It allows in an automatic mode to generate new models at the expense that there is possible evaluation of the measures above.

When not all system elements and subsystems are captured by RMS capabilities, two subsystems, operated in different time scales, are cooperated in the CIS. A part of CIS, captured RMS, is served in real time, and the other part is in a usual time scale (with information gathering by a principle "as it is possible to receive"). In many critical situations, this usual time scale cannot be characterized as adequate to a reality. With the use of the offered approach, the system with usual control (UC), used for CIS, i.e., without RMS application, can be estimated. Generally, the analyzed critical infrastructure is presented as a combination "System+RMS" and usual "System without RMS." And, "System+RMS" is a combination of "Structure for RMS" and "RMS" (see Figure 12). For these systems some measures of the information delivery may not answer requirements of real time—"System+RMS" because RMS operation quality is inadequate and "System without RMS" without RMS.

The role of RMS is defined by their functions, to the basic of which concern:

• Analytical data processing

38 Probabilistic Modeling in System Engineering

confidential information by RMS.

component should be evaluated.

In general case

the measures above.

tion during the given time (РRMS(Тgiven)).

subsystems and separate elements (see Figure 6).

minutes.

• Prediction of risks to lose CIS integrity

• Remote continuous monitoring of CIS condition in real time (gathering data about key parameters of technological processes; gathering and processing data of industrial inspection, the information of technical condition and equipment diagnostics, and the informa-

tion on the presence of failures and incidents; and results of system recovery, etc.)

Unlike the usual control which is carried out at enterprises (when the state supervising body in the field of industrial safety and frequently also the enterprise/holding bodies of the industrial safety control receive the information only upon incident or failure, not possessing the actual information about deviations at an initial stage when still it is possible to prevent failure), RMS translates the control, a transparency of CIS conditions, the important real-time information (about the facts and predictions), and also necessity of proper response to critical deviations for absolutely new time scale characterized as the scale of real time, measured by seconds-

Effects from the remote control can be reached only when quality of RMS operation is provided. It means that it is reliable and timely producing the complete, valid, and, if needed,

Generally, system analysis of RMS operation consists in evaluation of reliability, timeliness, completeness, validity, and confidentiality of the used information. In special cases for compound subsystems and system elements, not all measures may be used. For example, for a subsystem of information security enough to use the measures to evaluate protection from an unauthorized access and information confidentiality during the given time period. Dependence of the purposes of researching RMS can be decomposed to the level of compound

In this case according to the system engineering principles, the operation quality of every

For evaluating integral RMS operation quality, the next measure is proposed: the probability of providing reliable and timely representation of the complete, valid, and confidential informa-

For complex structures the ideas of combination of the models is proposed in [15]. It allows in an automatic mode to generate new models at the expense that there is possible evaluation of

where all measures are calculated by the models proposed in Section 2.

• Display of CIS conditions and predictions with the necessary level of details

All the great number of the factors characterizing threats to analyzed critical infrastructure is considered as 100%, and total frequency of dangerous deviations is designated through λ∑. Frequency of potentially dangerous deviations traced by "System + RMS" is designated (λRMS). Frequency of occurrence of other potentially dangerous deviations which are not traced by RMS (i.e., for "System without RMS") is designated (λ<sup>∑</sup> λRMS).

For "System + RMS" the RMS operation quality during the time of prediction Тgiven is evaluated by probability РRMS(Тgiven). And, the risk of critical deviation for safety during the time of prediction Тgiven, designated as RRMS(Тgiven), can be evaluated by the earlier methods [2–3, 5–17]. For the usual "System without RMS," the same measures РUC(Тgiven) and RUC(Тgiven) can be used with specified value of input for probabilistic modeling.

Then, in general form, the risk R(Тgiven) to lose integrity for analyzed critical infrastructure during the time of prediction Тgiven can be evaluated by the formula:

Figure 12. Decomposition of analyzed critical infrastructure to fill influence of RMS.

where expression in square brackets is a probability of successful operation of analyzed critical infrastructure. Depending on the made risk definition in special cases, it can be interpreted as probability of safe or reliable operation or probability of norm observance for critical parameters of the equipment or others in the conditions of associated potential threats. The case λ<sup>∑</sup> = λRMS means full capture of critical infrastructure by RMS capabilities.
