**4.2. Scenarios of intelligent (or highly sophisticated, insiders') terrorism**

*Intelligent* terrorism (*IT*) is a deliberate unauthorized interference into the process of designing, building, and/or operating the CES aimed at increasing its existing vulnerabilities and creating new ones in the system so that these input vulnerabilities, insider's knowledge of the system, and access to its elements are used for future realization of most disastrous scenarios of a terrorist attack.

*IT* implies:

**Figure 4.** The scenario tree for technological terrorism.

**4.1. Scenarios of technological terrorism**

• Breaking through the *CES* protection system

to devise the most efficient attack scenarios.

• Assess the *CES* scenario tree and determine the end states *ES*<sup>∗</sup>

secondary catastrophic processes outside the *CES.*

and information (*I*) stored or processed at the *CES*

engineering system capable of:

264 Probabilistic Modeling in System Engineering

ary and cascade losses

barriers.

Scenarios of technological terrorism (*SТТ*) imply powerful unauthorized impacts at complex

• Initiating secondary catastrophic processes due to hazardous substances (*W*), energy (*E*),

• Escalation of the accident outside the *CES* boundaries with substantially increased second-

Technological terrorism is based on taking advantage of the existing vulnerability of the sys-

• Analyze the *CES* structure and vulnerability, i.e., to reveal potential sources of secondary catastrophic processes (stocks of *W,E,I*), the weak points in the *CES* protection systems, and

• Calculate the strength of the initial impacts that might break through the *CES* protection

Scenarios of technological terrorism do not require that the attacking party have any insider information and can inflict point impacts imperceptible by the *CES* monitoring systems;

capable of initiating major

tem. To perform an attack of technological terrorism, it is necessary to preliminarily:

• Identify the *CES* key elements and links whose failure would disrupt the system.


As a rule, scenarios *of IT* require that a member of a terrorist group penetrate into the staff of the organization that is designing, building, or operating the *CES*. The terrorist must possess insider's information on the *CES* and be able to perform well-camouflaged actions in order to weaken protection systems and create latent defects undetectable by the existing monitoring systems.

Consequently intelligent terrorism implicates detailed knowledge of the *CES* structure and working principles. It also implies awareness of its existing and potential vulnerabilities, possible end states, possible scenarios of accident propagation, and initial impacts that can trigger them. Additionally, *IT* can anticipate distortion of the success scenario, formulate false targets, and generate new disastrous scenarios.

Attacks of intelligent terrorism can be carried out at any stage of the *CES*'s life cycle:


**Figure 5.** The scenario tree for intelligent terrorism.

Intelligent terrorism implies maximal level of the terrorist competence (comprehensive knowledge of the *CES* and its control, operation, and protection barriers), which enables it to select the most disastrous accident scenarios and find the most effective way of their initiation, disconnection, or disruption of the *CES* monitoring systems in order to prevent prompt response to failures. The assessment of the attack scenarios is made through a hybrid scenario tree that in case of *IT* could be more complicated (**Figure** 5). It incorporates several attack trees describing the abilities and resources of terrorists and the decision tree describing the system's vulnerability.

The model is based on the assumption that all the players act in such a way as to minimize their maximum losses. This strategy is governed by so-called minimax criterion: Counterterrorist players don't know which attack scenario the terrorist group will select, that is why they should choose the defense strategy that results in the lowest possible worst-case expected losses.

Graph 1 (**Figure** 7) represents an influence diagram from the perspective of terrorists. It allows one to assess (a) the probabilities that the specified attack scenario will result in damage and


; *v*1) − *Z*(*s*1) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ *W*(*s*<sup>1</sup>

; *v*1) − *Z*(*s*2) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ *W*(*s*<sup>2</sup>

; *v*1) − *Z*(*sn*) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ *W*(*sn*

; *vj*) × *P*(*V* = *vj*

.

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)] (*i* = 1,  2,  … ,  *n*), (3)

(4)

⎤

⎥

⎦

; *vm*) − *Z*(*s*1)

; *vm*) − *Z*(*s*2)

; *vm*) − *Z*(*sn*)

(b) the expected utility of terrorist of different attack scenarios<sup>1</sup>

; *v*0) − *Z*(*s*1) *W*(*s*<sup>1</sup>

; *v*0) − *Z*(*s*2) *W*(*s*<sup>2</sup>

; *v*0) − *Z*(*sn*) *W*(*sn*

Figures on the diagram are conditional and are presented for the illustrative purpose.

) = ∑ *j*=0 *m* [*Ut*(*si*

⎡

*W*(*s*<sup>1</sup>

**Figure 6.** Multi-sided terrorist risk assessment model.

*W*(*s*<sup>2</sup>

*W*(*sn*

⋅ ⋅ ⋅

⎢

⎣

; *vj*) is an element of utility matrix.

*EU*(*si*

*i*

where *Ut*(*<sup>s</sup>*

1
