**5. The school and ethical pluralism**

### **5.1. On ethical pluralism**

The problem, however, is that it is not possible to unconditionally ascribe to the principle of proactivity the universality that applies to moral principles such as the Golden Rule. It is a similar situation with responsibility. In the case of responsibility, it is necessary to ask "responsibility to whom and for what," and in the case of proactivity, we have to ask "proactivity with whom and in what." Responsible (proactive) cooperation in an immoral action—in fraud, for example— is immoral. The essence of the moral thus cannot be defined either by responsibility or by proactivity. The same applies to other values such as freedom and justice. In reality, moral dilemmas are not clarified for us by values or their content. The response to dilemmas is to think about the quality of the objective that the individual is attempting to achieve responsibly, proactively and fairly. It follows from this that it is not possible to conclude directly from the *content* of a value whether a moral decision is good or bad. It is, for example, difficult to say in an absolute sense what is just. Lempert [12] thinks that expressing a *negative* assessment, in other words defining what is *not* just, is easier than assessing what is just. The value of justness, for example, becomes relevant in the case of an apology for or criticism of social inequality. But who in society should be the measure of what equal treatment or equal access to social goods actually means? May we (or should we) consider equity in access to goods on the basis of how this is experienced by

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those sections of society that feel discriminated against or underprivileged?

and they accept as a value towards which they strive for its own sake.

Attention is also drawn to the different position of "values" in education by the theory of social domains, which distinguishes between the moral and conventional domain and the domain of personal choice [15, 5]. This theory recommends that schools act differently in relation to the different domains. They should deal more tolerantly with personal choices and treat infringements

Numerous discussions also draw attention to the fact that in the case of education for values it is necessary to take into account the nature of different values. Oser and Althof [13] believed that fundamental values should be given a special place in education compared to concrete values. Concrete values (possessing a toy, visiting a friend, helping the poor) should be preferences which can be established through observation of a concrete individual in concrete life circumstances and which may therefore be exposed to constant judgement. This also resolves to a certain extent the question of sensitivity to context. The problem, however, lies with fundamental values. In the opinion of Oser and Althof, it is not possible to understand these values when we are thinking of something concrete, and it is therefore simply not possible to judge them in concrete situations because, by their nature, they have universal value. This is a question that is also triggered in the case of human rights. On the one hand, they demand concrete engagement, while on the other, as commonly universal rights, they are not sufficiently transparent, particularly when it comes to their mutual hierarchy, when, for example, insults and hate speech are propagated in the name of the right to freedom of speech. Fundamental values (responsibility, justice, freedom, equality) should be able to be proved by intercultural studies, by the fact that some values are above concrete values and also above culturally specific values and we are able to attribute them the same moral criteria everywhere [14] stand these values when we are thinking of something concrete, and it is therefore simply context. According to Oser and Althof, taking context into account in the education process could, in the case of fundamental values, lead to a relativisation of values and to a dilution of them that would make it impossible for young people to adopt a value as something that is their own

Ethical pluralism needs to be explained in more detail, since I am thinking here not only of a diversity of values, but of something deeper, of the pluralism of ethical discourses or paradigms. If we follow the structure of ethical discourses used by Kymlicka in *Contemporary Political Philosophy* [17], we find that political philosophies are characterised by three ethical discourses: liberal (libertarian), communitarian and the ethics of care. I shall begin by giving a brief and general definition of all three discourses. The *libertarian* discourse places freedom and autonomy in the foreground. Its key value or virtue is justice, and human rights are its key civilisational achievement. *Communitarianism* places commitment to the community in the foreground. Its key value is the common good, within which social rights are fundamental values and solidarity is a fundamental virtue. The *ethics of care* is focused on the intimate sphere of life, on the quality of interpersonal relations, on a feeling of connection and human closeness. Its fundamental virtue is positive acknowledgement of one's neighbour.

In contemporary public life, politics and even theory, attitudes towards these ethical discourses are not balanced. The ethics of care is the discourse that is most frequently pushed to one side. It is often said that it does not belong to public life but to family, friendship and other intimate spheres. Infringements of human rights are manifold (migrants, poverty, precarious employment); social practices are woeful in terms of the realisation of human rights and are characterised by the interests of capital and the private and particular interests of various social groups. When it comes to values, *it is not their content and message that are important but practice*, in other words what we have really achieved on their basis. Can the blame for poor practices be attributed to an implementation of human rights into which specific ideological models of an atomised society are inscribed, models which cause an inadequate social reality and prevent us from creating a culture of justice and the safeguarding of human rights in society? At least two ideological models deserve to be exposed as such an obstacle: *legal logic* and *moral individualism*.

This is being demonstrated with increasing frequency by numerous cases at various levels of the life of society. Making decisions on infringement of human rights is sometimes too hard a nut to crack (in the sense of reaching a unanimous decision) even for Constitutional Court

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Naturally, though, we cannot conclude from the numerous inconsistent and contradictory legal decisions regarding human rights that the value system of human rights is empty and that we may arbitrarily fill it over and over again with experiences and concrete cases. Inconsistent decisions can only prove the vagueness and lack of transparency of the legal code of a right, but they say nothing about its value code. A concrete example illustrating the truth of this statement would be the September 2017 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights on whether a company monitoring private communications on workplace computers constitutes an infringement of employees' right to privacy [19]. The ruling adopted by the ECHR went against an earlier ruling by a Romanian court, yet even so was not an arbitrary decision. When making its ruling, the ECHR saw in the value of privacy a new dimension that *inherently belongs* to the value of privacy *but had previously been overlooked*. According to the court's judgement, this has the nature of a precedent, which means that it will be universally applicable to all future cases. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that it took a court—and one of the highest instance—to arrive at a new understanding of the ethical in a right. How can we expect the full value core of a right to be perceived by a citizen, by a teacher or, last but not least, by a child? How then is it even possible to devise education (*Bildung*) in the spirit of human rights? Should education (*Bildung*) become the study of case law and thus be instrumentalised and lose its formative (*Bildung*) sense? What is the answer to the eternal question "is it possible to learn virtue?" Yes, it is possible, but virtue is not knowledge though without knowledge it is not possible. Someone who does not know that any action can be dangerous, that it is possible to evaluate it as both good and evil, will see no danger or evil anywhere, nor will they be sensitised to it. But this is not enough for the creation of a culture of human rights, since emotions, volition and sensitivity to moral action are of central importance in the development of a culture. This can only be achieved in communication and only via intersubjective

judges, who have the ultimate competence for the protection of human rights.

interpretations based on value judgements of actions, motives and intention.<sup>3</sup>

**5.3. Human rights, moral individualism and the disproportion of rights and** 

The liberal logic by which the safeguarding of rights is posited in the Constitution also contains a particular problem, namely the understanding of the relation of obligations and responsibilities of the individual and the institution. Every right implies an obligation, but the question is:

In one seminar with students, we considered the case of the class teacher who wrote to the parents of all his pupils informing them of the marks obtained by each pupil. This is an infringement of the right to the protection of personal data and also a criminal offence; regardless of the teacher's purpose and motives for doing it. The dilemma which the seminar students attempted to answer was this: if a pupil discloses a classmate's marks, have they also infringed the latter's right to protection of personal data? They may have, but there are no sanctions in this case. In terms of the ethical assessment of such an action, the *question of their motives* remains open. An ethical dimension is thus established. *The ethicality of a given norm (in this case the right to the protection of personal data) thus only arises in the relationship of two equal subjects and* 

**obligations**

*does not belong to the norm in itself.*

3

#### **5.2. Human rights are not implemented in the legal order as ethical values but as legal norms**

I shall analyse the above statement by looking at how the concept of human rights is posited in Slovenia's Constitution, which, however, merely transposes constitutional solutions found in other European countries. Let us consider the following quotation from an interview with Jambrek, one of the fathers of the Constitution, published in a leading Slovene newspaper: "We were more interested in what to do with human rights [and] whether socio-economic rights belong in the chapter on human rights and fundamental freedoms. We unanimously agreed to consider as human rights and freedoms anything that is legally actionable. There are some 'rights' for which the individual cannot expect a court to approve their 'claim'. We therefore referred to these 'rights' as 'socio-economic relations'" [18].

Human rights are therefore legally codified and the ultimate responsibility for their understanding and interpretation lies with the court. This logic is also followed by the further legal instrumentalisation of rights in laws and other regulations at the state level and also at the level of rules within individual institutions, including in schools, in their own rules and regulations. This legal instrumentalisation of rights is, in my opinion, the origin of the incorrect perception of the role of rights in society, and precisely this perception has had numerous negative consequences. Among other things, it has prevented a culture of human rights from establishing itself in society as the foundation of an overall social ethos applying to the whole of the life of society, in all public social practices, and also in mutual relations, in other words in private life.

In my view, the legal codification of the content of rights implicitly means a devaluation of their value core, which also results in a loss of their ethical dimension. The ethical dimension in fact presupposes my subjective truth and responsibility towards others and the world in general. In legal codification, on the other hand, my subjective truth has no value, and until the court makes its ruling it is not clear whether, in a given case, we can talk about an infringement of a right or not. This, however, excludes the importance of the conscience, both in motivation for action and in judging that action. In judging an action or in the motivation for that action, the "silent inner voice" of the individual is therefore unimportant, since everything is ultimately dependent on how the matter turns out in the proceedings of formal judgements. This is being demonstrated with increasing frequency by numerous cases at various levels of the life of society. Making decisions on infringement of human rights is sometimes too hard a nut to crack (in the sense of reaching a unanimous decision) even for Constitutional Court judges, who have the ultimate competence for the protection of human rights.

In contemporary public life, politics and even theory, attitudes towards these ethical discourses are not balanced. The ethics of care is the discourse that is most frequently pushed to one side. It is often said that it does not belong to public life but to family, friendship and other intimate spheres. Infringements of human rights are manifold (migrants, poverty, precarious employment); social practices are woeful in terms of the realisation of human rights and are characterised by the interests of capital and the private and particular interests of various social groups. When it comes to values, *it is not their content and message that are important but practice*, in other words what we have really achieved on their basis. Can the blame for poor practices be attributed to an implementation of human rights into which specific ideological models of an atomised society are inscribed, models which cause an inadequate social reality and prevent us from creating a culture of justice and the safeguarding of human rights in society? At least two ideological models deserve to be exposed as such an obstacle: *legal logic* and *moral individualism*.

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**5.2. Human rights are not implemented in the legal order as ethical values but as** 

therefore referred to these 'rights' as 'socio-economic relations'" [18].

I shall analyse the above statement by looking at how the concept of human rights is posited in Slovenia's Constitution, which, however, merely transposes constitutional solutions found in other European countries. Let us consider the following quotation from an interview with Jambrek, one of the fathers of the Constitution, published in a leading Slovene newspaper: "We were more interested in what to do with human rights [and] whether socio-economic rights belong in the chapter on human rights and fundamental freedoms. We unanimously agreed to consider as human rights and freedoms anything that is legally actionable. There are some 'rights' for which the individual cannot expect a court to approve their 'claim'. We

Human rights are therefore legally codified and the ultimate responsibility for their understanding and interpretation lies with the court. This logic is also followed by the further legal instrumentalisation of rights in laws and other regulations at the state level and also at the level of rules within individual institutions, including in schools, in their own rules and regulations. This legal instrumentalisation of rights is, in my opinion, the origin of the incorrect perception of the role of rights in society, and precisely this perception has had numerous negative consequences. Among other things, it has prevented a culture of human rights from establishing itself in society as the foundation of an overall social ethos applying to the whole of the life of society, in all public social practices, and also in mutual relations, in other words in private life.

In my view, the legal codification of the content of rights implicitly means a devaluation of their value core, which also results in a loss of their ethical dimension. The ethical dimension in fact presupposes my subjective truth and responsibility towards others and the world in general. In legal codification, on the other hand, my subjective truth has no value, and until the court makes its ruling it is not clear whether, in a given case, we can talk about an infringement of a right or not. This, however, excludes the importance of the conscience, both in motivation for action and in judging that action. In judging an action or in the motivation for that action, the "silent inner voice" of the individual is therefore unimportant, since everything is ultimately dependent on how the matter turns out in the proceedings of formal judgements.

**legal norms**

Naturally, though, we cannot conclude from the numerous inconsistent and contradictory legal decisions regarding human rights that the value system of human rights is empty and that we may arbitrarily fill it over and over again with experiences and concrete cases. Inconsistent decisions can only prove the vagueness and lack of transparency of the legal code of a right, but they say nothing about its value code. A concrete example illustrating the truth of this statement would be the September 2017 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights on whether a company monitoring private communications on workplace computers constitutes an infringement of employees' right to privacy [19]. The ruling adopted by the ECHR went against an earlier ruling by a Romanian court, yet even so was not an arbitrary decision. When making its ruling, the ECHR saw in the value of privacy a new dimension that *inherently belongs* to the value of privacy *but had previously been overlooked*. According to the court's judgement, this has the nature of a precedent, which means that it will be universally applicable to all future cases. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that it took a court—and one of the highest instance—to arrive at a new understanding of the ethical in a right. How can we expect the full value core of a right to be perceived by a citizen, by a teacher or, last but not least, by a child? How then is it even possible to devise education (*Bildung*) in the spirit of human rights? Should education (*Bildung*) become the study of case law and thus be instrumentalised and lose its formative (*Bildung*) sense? What is the answer to the eternal question "is it possible to learn virtue?" Yes, it is possible, but virtue is not knowledge though without knowledge it is not possible. Someone who does not know that any action can be dangerous, that it is possible to evaluate it as both good and evil, will see no danger or evil anywhere, nor will they be sensitised to it. But this is not enough for the creation of a culture of human rights, since emotions, volition and sensitivity to moral action are of central importance in the development of a culture. This can only be achieved in communication and only via intersubjective interpretations based on value judgements of actions, motives and intention.<sup>3</sup>

#### **5.3. Human rights, moral individualism and the disproportion of rights and obligations**

The liberal logic by which the safeguarding of rights is posited in the Constitution also contains a particular problem, namely the understanding of the relation of obligations and responsibilities of the individual and the institution. Every right implies an obligation, but the question is:

<sup>3</sup> In one seminar with students, we considered the case of the class teacher who wrote to the parents of all his pupils informing them of the marks obtained by each pupil. This is an infringement of the right to the protection of personal data and also a criminal offence; regardless of the teacher's purpose and motives for doing it. The dilemma which the seminar students attempted to answer was this: if a pupil discloses a classmate's marks, have they also infringed the latter's right to protection of personal data? They may have, but there are no sanctions in this case. In terms of the ethical assessment of such an action, the *question of their motives* remains open. An ethical dimension is thus established. *The ethicality of a given norm (in this case the right to the protection of personal data) thus only arises in the relationship of two equal subjects and does not belong to the norm in itself.*

whose? Merely of the institution that is supposed to protect that right or can it also trigger the universal sense of obligation of every individual towards others? In this connection, Kymlicka recapitulates the position of Sandel and Taylor when they attribute moral individualism to liberalism [17]. Moral individualism derives from the thesis that rights take precedence over all other moral concepts such as obligations, the common good, civic virtues and personal virtues. Moral individualism understands the individual as the basic unit of moral value, which means that it requires the derivation of the duties of higher units (the community) from obligations towards individuals. In this way, the burden of duty is essentially shifted from the individual to institutions. This is the impression created by constitutional solutions, namely human rights and fundamental freedoms are only infringed by the institutions of formal power.

as socio-economic relations" and not as rights. "The current Constitution, for example, talks about the social state, but this is not operationalised. Not even the Constitutional Court has occupied itself much with this principle to date" [18]. Thus, there exist outside the legal order, alongside individual human rights, certain special "rights" for which, under legal logic, liberal discourse does not recognise the same status in society as is enjoyed by individual rights. The consequence of this is that individual rights take precedence over social rights in society. An even more radical conclusion is possible. This legal structure even negates social rights as rights, since it refers to them as socio-economic relations, in other words as an economic category. In this way, liberal ideology destroys the balance between human individuality and sociality. If we follow the communitarian critique, by adopting the principal of the primacy of rights, liberalism places other moral concepts (duty, common good) into the background [17]. A hierarchical relationship is established between individuality and sociality, the consequence of which is that sociality and social rights are necessarily marginalised in society. Not only that, but virtues that are important for the social society, and *solidarity is in first place* here, become mere ideals to be used for educational purposes or in the charitable campaigns of civil society and the public media. Yet politics, faithful to the logic of economising and balancing public finances, first intervenes in the social sphere. It therefore also has a constitutional basis in the fact that social rights are not rights but socio-economic relations. This empowers its moral position, since it does not infringe constitutional social rights but rather, as some nonchalantly put it, is merely coordinating economic and social relations with real possibilities. In accordance with the liberal attitude towards individual or social human rights, the state pushes social issues to the margins and is not capable of eliminating even its own poverty. The marginalisation of the social and the preference given to individual rights is in essence a class issue. The state based on the rule of law plainly protects above all the category of individual human rights (we know how this works in practice), so when we talk about justice in society, references to the rule of law are an increasingly frequent mantra, while nothing is heard about the social state. The hierarchy of the individual and the social is not theoretically justified, not least because it is impossible to realise individual rights in a socially unjust society, just as it is impossible to create a just society if the rights of the individual are not guaranteed. Extreme communitarians, among whom Kymlicka also includes Marxists, would claim that in a true community the principles of justice are unnecessary and that justice is merely a remedial virtue [17]. It is thus only relevant in society because of the mistakes caused by an unjust social order. Some remarkable illustrations of this can also be found in former Yugoslav education policy. For example, the principle according to which only a unified (common) school is a fair school, while all forms of differentiation, heterogenisation and individualisation are unfair. The word "fairness" did not appear in education policy documents, and unity was a synonym for the fair school. On the other hand, pedagogy and psychology critically observed that the unified school cannot be fair because it neglects the individual and functions as a Procrustean bed. Unsuccessfully. For more on this, see Medveš [20]. The theory of justice as a "remedial" virtue can even explain the illusion of socialist ideology that, thanks to the "just social system," human rights are not necessary in such a society. This was a mask used to excuse infringements of human rights.

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Kymlicka establishes an interesting dynamic of historical development between liberalism and communitarianism. "In the 1970s, the central concepts were justice and rights, as liberals

This liberal logic, however, has long-term consequences in the way it understands the origin of infringements of human rights and probably contains the kernel of the views of a certain section of the public, including teachers and educators, that only citizens have rights, while institutions only have obligations, at least as far as the rights of the individual are concerned. Similar views regarding the disproportion of rights and obligations also prevail among those working in education. It is true that among them we also find absurd views, for example, that students today have too many obligations, but the majority consider, more realistically and in accordance with the communitarian critique of liberalism, that there is a disproportion between the rights and obligations of the school and students/parents, because the school only has obligations while students/parents only have rights. This opinion, then, is not the arbitrary view of those affected, but rather has its theoretical basis in the communitarian critique of the liberal model of moral individualism, which has written itself into human rights, not into their nature, but into their implementation in the legal order. The liberal discourse and moral individualism simply cannot be accepted as universal in pedagogical reflection on the educational aims and educational concept of the public school. This platform is too narrow for education (*Bildung*) for values, because it forgets the sense of community and the quality of interpersonal relations between people in everyday interactions.

#### **5.4. Communitarianism and solidarity in the creation of a just society of common good**

So far, we have only touched on the theme of moral individualism in a single question, namely the question of what kind of relationship between the rights of the individual (student/parent) and the obligations of the institution (school) is created by the model of moral individualism. We have shown how awareness of this issue is strategically important for the school, in particular, for the planning and implementation of the concept of education. Yet this question does not clarify all the consequences, including some significant consequences, that moral individualism has for the school. More important for the recognition of weakness of doctrine of moral individualism than the question of who has rights and who has obligations is the question of whether important rights, values and virtues exist in society that are insufficiently recognised as a result of liberal discourse. Let us look once again at part of the statement of the former constitutional lawyer and co-creator of Slovenia's constitution, Jambrek, in the interview cited. Jambrek says "there are some 'rights' for which the individual cannot expect a court to approve their 'claim'," and that these have therefore "found their place in our Constitution as socio-economic relations" and not as rights. "The current Constitution, for example, talks about the social state, but this is not operationalised. Not even the Constitutional Court has occupied itself much with this principle to date" [18]. Thus, there exist outside the legal order, alongside individual human rights, certain special "rights" for which, under legal logic, liberal discourse does not recognise the same status in society as is enjoyed by individual rights. The consequence of this is that individual rights take precedence over social rights in society. An even more radical conclusion is possible. This legal structure even negates social rights as rights, since it refers to them as socio-economic relations, in other words as an economic category. In this way, liberal ideology destroys the balance between human individuality and sociality. If we follow the communitarian critique, by adopting the principal of the primacy of rights, liberalism places other moral concepts (duty, common good) into the background [17]. A hierarchical relationship is established between individuality and sociality, the consequence of which is that sociality and social rights are necessarily marginalised in society. Not only that, but virtues that are important for the social society, and *solidarity is in first place* here, become mere ideals to be used for educational purposes or in the charitable campaigns of civil society and the public media. Yet politics, faithful to the logic of economising and balancing public finances, first intervenes in the social sphere. It therefore also has a constitutional basis in the fact that social rights are not rights but socio-economic relations. This empowers its moral position, since it does not infringe constitutional social rights but rather, as some nonchalantly put it, is merely coordinating economic and social relations with real possibilities. In accordance with the liberal attitude towards individual or social human rights, the state pushes social issues to the margins and is not capable of eliminating even its own poverty. The marginalisation of the social and the preference given to individual rights is in essence a class issue. The state based on the rule of law plainly protects above all the category of individual human rights (we know how this works in practice), so when we talk about justice in society, references to the rule of law are an increasingly frequent mantra, while nothing is heard about the social state.

whose? Merely of the institution that is supposed to protect that right or can it also trigger the universal sense of obligation of every individual towards others? In this connection, Kymlicka recapitulates the position of Sandel and Taylor when they attribute moral individualism to liberalism [17]. Moral individualism derives from the thesis that rights take precedence over all other moral concepts such as obligations, the common good, civic virtues and personal virtues. Moral individualism understands the individual as the basic unit of moral value, which means that it requires the derivation of the duties of higher units (the community) from obligations towards individuals. In this way, the burden of duty is essentially shifted from the individual to institutions. This is the impression created by constitutional solutions, namely human rights

This liberal logic, however, has long-term consequences in the way it understands the origin of infringements of human rights and probably contains the kernel of the views of a certain section of the public, including teachers and educators, that only citizens have rights, while institutions only have obligations, at least as far as the rights of the individual are concerned. Similar views regarding the disproportion of rights and obligations also prevail among those working in education. It is true that among them we also find absurd views, for example, that students today have too many obligations, but the majority consider, more realistically and in accordance with the communitarian critique of liberalism, that there is a disproportion between the rights and obligations of the school and students/parents, because the school only has obligations while students/parents only have rights. This opinion, then, is not the arbitrary view of those affected, but rather has its theoretical basis in the communitarian critique of the liberal model of moral individualism, which has written itself into human rights, not into their nature, but into their implementation in the legal order. The liberal discourse and moral individualism simply cannot be accepted as universal in pedagogical reflection on the educational aims and educational concept of the public school. This platform is too narrow for education (*Bildung*) for values, because it forgets the sense of community and the

and fundamental freedoms are only infringed by the institutions of formal power.

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quality of interpersonal relations between people in everyday interactions.

**good**

**5.4. Communitarianism and solidarity in the creation of a just society of common** 

So far, we have only touched on the theme of moral individualism in a single question, namely the question of what kind of relationship between the rights of the individual (student/parent) and the obligations of the institution (school) is created by the model of moral individualism. We have shown how awareness of this issue is strategically important for the school, in particular, for the planning and implementation of the concept of education. Yet this question does not clarify all the consequences, including some significant consequences, that moral individualism has for the school. More important for the recognition of weakness of doctrine of moral individualism than the question of who has rights and who has obligations is the question of whether important rights, values and virtues exist in society that are insufficiently recognised as a result of liberal discourse. Let us look once again at part of the statement of the former constitutional lawyer and co-creator of Slovenia's constitution, Jambrek, in the interview cited. Jambrek says "there are some 'rights' for which the individual cannot expect a court to approve their 'claim'," and that these have therefore "found their place in our Constitution The hierarchy of the individual and the social is not theoretically justified, not least because it is impossible to realise individual rights in a socially unjust society, just as it is impossible to create a just society if the rights of the individual are not guaranteed. Extreme communitarians, among whom Kymlicka also includes Marxists, would claim that in a true community the principles of justice are unnecessary and that justice is merely a remedial virtue [17]. It is thus only relevant in society because of the mistakes caused by an unjust social order. Some remarkable illustrations of this can also be found in former Yugoslav education policy. For example, the principle according to which only a unified (common) school is a fair school, while all forms of differentiation, heterogenisation and individualisation are unfair. The word "fairness" did not appear in education policy documents, and unity was a synonym for the fair school. On the other hand, pedagogy and psychology critically observed that the unified school cannot be fair because it neglects the individual and functions as a Procrustean bed. Unsuccessfully. For more on this, see Medveš [20]. The theory of justice as a "remedial" virtue can even explain the illusion of socialist ideology that, thanks to the "just social system," human rights are not necessary in such a society. This was a mask used to excuse infringements of human rights.

Kymlicka establishes an interesting dynamic of historical development between liberalism and communitarianism. "In the 1970s, the central concepts were justice and rights, as liberals attempted to define a coherent alternative to utilitarianism. In the 1980s, the keywords became community and membership, as communitarians attempted to show how liberal individualism was unable to account for, or to sustain, the communal sentiments, identities, and boundaries needed for any feasible political community" [17].

As it is impossible to reconcile liberalism and communitarianism, the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are irreconcilable [24]. Despite their universality, human rights, in their formalised and instrumentalised conception, simply do not reach into the intimate sphere of private life, where conflictual social situations, adultery, lack of love or compassion, abuse of trust, harm, humiliation and so on are not usually described in terms of infringements of someone's human rights. This means that some other dimension appears in the regulation of private and, above all, intimate relationships, a dimension not encompassed by human rights. It is the sphere of values that cannot be characterised as just or unjust: friendship, love, respect, compassion and responsibility. The theorists of justice, or at least of its mainstream, have avoided treating and judging familial relationships with the criteria of justice: "Classical liberals, for example, assumed that the (male-headed) family is a biologically determined unit, and that justice only refers to the conventionally determined relations between families. Hence the natural equality they discuss is of fathers as representatives of families, and the social contract they discuss governs relations between families. Justice refers to the 'public' realm, where adult men deal with other adult men in accordance with mutually agreed upon conventions. Familial relationships,

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on the other hand, are 'private', governed by natural instinct or sympathy" [17].

meaning and should also be taken into account in public life [24].

**6. Education as communication or education (***Bildung***) as** 

**internalisation**

Today, we have gone beyond the view that was voiced when the ethics of care first emerged, namely that it is an erroneous moral discourse in that it allows a separation of gender-divided moral perception and gender-divided morals. We have also gone beyond the opinion that the ethics of justice should apply to the public sphere and the ethics of care to the private sphere. In contrast to such a division, we can accept the opinion of Carol Gilligan and numerous feminists that the ethics of care, though characteristic of private relationships, also has a public

Theorists of the ethics of care draw attention to the importance of values or virtues that have a more emotional and intellectual basis, in contrast to the predominantly rational virtues of libertarian and communitarian ethics. These include a sense of connection, one's network of relationships, proximity, nurturing relationships, sensitivity, compassion, empathy, loyalty, kindness, mutual assistance, moderation, solidarity, sympathy, care for others and, last but not least, the Golden Rule of ethics. Another of the fundamental virtues is *recognition of the other, the different, as a human being*. Recognition of the other is, in relation to every human being, something more fundamental, more elemental, which enables or establishes a relationship as a human relationship. This is the acceptance of the other into a relationship, even though in a given moment we may hate them or resist them, though they fill us with compassion and are generally different from us. Recognition is the basis for heterogenisation, the opposite of domination and homogenisation. This is recognition and acknowledgement of the other as a human being.

Teachers play an important role in combining different ethical discourses in educational practice. The teacher must be capable of ensuring, *as a mediator in communication*, the interweaving

When it comes to school and education (*Bildung*), the hierarchy established by liberalism between individuality and sociality is a significant obstacle to the development of civic virtues and the moral image of the young generation. Just as education subordinated only to the values of communitarianism, in other words only to the common good, would be one-sided, so education that only emphasises the principle of autonomy and individual freedom while ignoring communitarian values, the common good, equality, brotherhood and the *coexistence of all people and coexistence with the environment and nature* is one-sided education.

Thus, the liberal libertarian understanding of human rights cannot represent that universality that is supposed to provide the holistic education (*Bildung*) of the human being. It falls short in value terms when it comes to defining the aims of education. Social rights and the spirit of common good represent other obligations and virtues that cannot be derived from human rights as implemented in the legal order. From a systemically ethical point of view, it would be disastrous for the school to neglect or abandon the development of these values and virtues that encompass areas such as, as Galston puts it: social, economic, political and general social virtues. We tend to put solidarity in first place among fundamental social virtues, while in the opinion of numerous authors [21, 22] these also include virtues such as empowerment, loyalty (but not servility) and courage. In the economic sphere, they include virtues such as understanding social systems, knowledge of the frameworks of public finance, enterprise, technological innovation, knowledge about the ways in which crises develop and function, activity within various trends of economic movements and labour ethics; political virtues, on the other hand, include, for example, sensitivity to the state of rights in society, knowledge of the constitutional system, social participation and so on.

#### **5.5. The ethics of care, a key value or virtue**

The ethics of care could be referred to as the third ethical force to develop in the twentieth century alongside the ethics of justice and communitarian ethics. Its peculiarity is that it does not try to be rationally universalistic but instead seeks the origin of the moral in the context of interpersonal relations, since only a relationship of care causes a motivational shift towards one's fellow human beings, which triggers moral judgement and reflection.

The ethics of care gives priority to "immediate proximity" [23] and is derived from the context of relations rather than from formal values. Perhaps H. Arendt puts it best: "In so far as morality is more than the sum total of *mores* [and also rights – Author's note], of customs and standards of behaviour solidified through tradition and valid on the ground of agreements, both of which change with time, it has, at least politically, no more to support itself than the good will to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to make promises and to keep them" [9]. And, let us add, without referring to criteria that would be applied in the form of moral norms from outside.

As it is impossible to reconcile liberalism and communitarianism, the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are irreconcilable [24]. Despite their universality, human rights, in their formalised and instrumentalised conception, simply do not reach into the intimate sphere of private life, where conflictual social situations, adultery, lack of love or compassion, abuse of trust, harm, humiliation and so on are not usually described in terms of infringements of someone's human rights. This means that some other dimension appears in the regulation of private and, above all, intimate relationships, a dimension not encompassed by human rights. It is the sphere of values that cannot be characterised as just or unjust: friendship, love, respect, compassion and responsibility. The theorists of justice, or at least of its mainstream, have avoided treating and judging familial relationships with the criteria of justice: "Classical liberals, for example, assumed that the (male-headed) family is a biologically determined unit, and that justice only refers to the conventionally determined relations between families. Hence the natural equality they discuss is of fathers as representatives of families, and the social contract they discuss governs relations between families. Justice refers to the 'public' realm, where adult men deal with other adult men in accordance with mutually agreed upon conventions. Familial relationships, on the other hand, are 'private', governed by natural instinct or sympathy" [17].

attempted to define a coherent alternative to utilitarianism. In the 1980s, the keywords became community and membership, as communitarians attempted to show how liberal individualism was unable to account for, or to sustain, the communal sentiments, identities, and bound-

When it comes to school and education (*Bildung*), the hierarchy established by liberalism between individuality and sociality is a significant obstacle to the development of civic virtues and the moral image of the young generation. Just as education subordinated only to the values of communitarianism, in other words only to the common good, would be one-sided, so education that only emphasises the principle of autonomy and individual freedom while ignoring communitarian values, the common good, equality, brotherhood and the *coexistence* 

Thus, the liberal libertarian understanding of human rights cannot represent that universality that is supposed to provide the holistic education (*Bildung*) of the human being. It falls short in value terms when it comes to defining the aims of education. Social rights and the spirit of common good represent other obligations and virtues that cannot be derived from human rights as implemented in the legal order. From a systemically ethical point of view, it would be disastrous for the school to neglect or abandon the development of these values and virtues that encompass areas such as, as Galston puts it: social, economic, political and general social virtues. We tend to put solidarity in first place among fundamental social virtues, while in the opinion of numerous authors [21, 22] these also include virtues such as empowerment, loyalty (but not servility) and courage. In the economic sphere, they include virtues such as understanding social systems, knowledge of the frameworks of public finance, enterprise, technological innovation, knowledge about the ways in which crises develop and function, activity within various trends of economic movements and labour ethics; political virtues, on the other hand, include, for example, sensitivity to the state of rights in society, knowledge of

The ethics of care could be referred to as the third ethical force to develop in the twentieth century alongside the ethics of justice and communitarian ethics. Its peculiarity is that it does not try to be rationally universalistic but instead seeks the origin of the moral in the context of interpersonal relations, since only a relationship of care causes a motivational shift towards

The ethics of care gives priority to "immediate proximity" [23] and is derived from the context of relations rather than from formal values. Perhaps H. Arendt puts it best: "In so far as morality is more than the sum total of *mores* [and also rights – Author's note], of customs and standards of behaviour solidified through tradition and valid on the ground of agreements, both of which change with time, it has, at least politically, no more to support itself than the good will to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to make promises and to keep them" [9]. And, let us add, without referring to criteria that would

one's fellow human beings, which triggers moral judgement and reflection.

*of all people and coexistence with the environment and nature* is one-sided education.

aries needed for any feasible political community" [17].

86 New Pedagogical Challenges in the 21st Century - Contributions of Research in Education

the constitutional system, social participation and so on.

be applied in the form of moral norms from outside.

**5.5. The ethics of care, a key value or virtue**

Today, we have gone beyond the view that was voiced when the ethics of care first emerged, namely that it is an erroneous moral discourse in that it allows a separation of gender-divided moral perception and gender-divided morals. We have also gone beyond the opinion that the ethics of justice should apply to the public sphere and the ethics of care to the private sphere. In contrast to such a division, we can accept the opinion of Carol Gilligan and numerous feminists that the ethics of care, though characteristic of private relationships, also has a public meaning and should also be taken into account in public life [24].

Theorists of the ethics of care draw attention to the importance of values or virtues that have a more emotional and intellectual basis, in contrast to the predominantly rational virtues of libertarian and communitarian ethics. These include a sense of connection, one's network of relationships, proximity, nurturing relationships, sensitivity, compassion, empathy, loyalty, kindness, mutual assistance, moderation, solidarity, sympathy, care for others and, last but not least, the Golden Rule of ethics. Another of the fundamental virtues is *recognition of the other, the different, as a human being*. Recognition of the other is, in relation to every human being, something more fundamental, more elemental, which enables or establishes a relationship as a human relationship. This is the acceptance of the other into a relationship, even though in a given moment we may hate them or resist them, though they fill us with compassion and are generally different from us. Recognition is the basis for heterogenisation, the opposite of domination and homogenisation. This is recognition and acknowledgement of the other as a human being.
