**2.1. Plato and elements of the aesthetic experience**

The legacy of platonic thought on beauty and its perception is of incommensurable value. Plato never developed an aesthetic, as such [9], but the ideas that he developed in *Hippias Major*, *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* focus explicitly on aesthetic themes. In the literature, it is common to find the caricature that the platonic idea of beauty is the good and the truthful. According to Beyer [9], Plato distinguishes three levels of beauty: (a) beauty of the body (physical beauty, health, wealth, etc.), as described in *Hippias Major*; (b) beauty of the soul, such as virtue, as described in *Phaedrus* and (c) beauty of 'wisdom', as synthesised in *Symposium*.

In short, we can argue that for Plato, supreme beauty is housed within the idea of good and truth, incorporating within it beauties of lesser worth, such as those of the senses and the soul. It is needless to point out how this notion of beauty has permeated western culture from its very roots onwards. In fact, Aristotle, the stoics, Epicureans, Seneca and, later on, Plotinus, to differing extents correlate beauty with good, truth and usefulness.

To our judgement, a distinction between the beautiful and the good—as determined by subjective experience at the moment of experiencing a phenomenon—does appear to exist: that is the fact that the beautiful appears beautiful, even though it does not belong to me, whereas the good is something that I desire; I want it. For example, if we were to imagine a thirsty person who comes across a beautiful stream with water in it, that person is highly unlikely to stop to observe the beauty of that water but will simply drink from it to quench his thirst. Nonetheless, the water running in the stream will continue to appear beautiful to the eyes of that person, even if nobody drinks from it. Thus, the feeling of beauty is independent from the feeling of desire. This notion brings us to the philosophy of Kant and his idea of beauty and the sublime.

#### **2.2. Kant and the aesthetic experience**

The great contribution of Kant to aesthetic contemplation can be found in his *Critique of Judgement* [10] and lies in the notion that it is selfless. For Kant, the observation of something that is beautiful does not bestow any benefit; pleasure arises only from the act of observing something that is beautiful. He states that the contemplation of beauty is a source of pleasure, but it is a pleasure that does not lie in the idea of possessing the object of our contemplation, which is also universally recognised as being beautiful.

Bayer [9] describes this notion as follows: beauty is that which produces a universally shared pleasure. Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* proposes that, alongside the faculties for knowing and desiring, there is a third faculty, which is that of judging. He claims that an aesthetic experience is an encounter that happens within the subject. The faculty of aesthetic judgement, or of perceiving and analysing beauty, does not know or desire; its dimension is purely subjective and is expressed as a feeling of pleasure or disgust, and it is not a cognitive experience. Only through the aforementioned feelings does it perceive the nature of phenomena. For Kant, such a feeling is universal. An object that is judged to be beautiful will be perceived as such by all observers and will be universally communicable.

Two aspects of mindfulness are of particular relevance to the contributions that mindfulness can bring to the aesthetic experience. The first is that beauty has nothing to do with that which is good or pleasing, due to the fact that these belong to the realm of desire. Mindfulness, on the other hand, is opposed to desire. Furthermore, beauty is also unrelated to that which is 'useful and perfect' [9], in the sense that beauty does not pursue a transcendental goal. Beauty is immanent to the beautiful being and lacking in metaphysics. Kantian thought, in many ways, is far removed from the traditional contemplative vision that we attempt to explore in this chapter; however, we can argue that, for Kant, the aesthetic experience does not desire or yearn to arrive anywhere other than where it already is, as is also the case in mindfulness.

The second strand of Kant's thought that appears to be especially relevant to the ideas that we aim to explore in this chapter is that beauty, as an experience, does not transcend beyond the immediate. It cannot occur outside of, or beyond, the pleasure that is experienced in the moment [11]. Furthermore, the bodily sensations that he relates to pleasure, health and well-being have 'no purpose whatsoever' [11]. This shares similarities with the Buddhist notion that mental events are lacking in inherent meaning and that to practise the capacity for focussing attention on the present moment or, as Gunaratana [12] puts it, of being an observer who disappears, leaving in his absence the pure act of observation, represents the quintessence of how the contemplative traditions regard the emergence of aesthetic experiences.

#### **2.3. Heidegger and elements of aesthetic experience**

the fact that the beautiful appears beautiful, even though it does not belong to me, whereas the good is something that I desire; I want it. For example, if we were to imagine a thirsty person who comes across a beautiful stream with water in it, that person is highly unlikely to stop to observe the beauty of that water but will simply drink from it to quench his thirst. Nonetheless, the water running in the stream will continue to appear beautiful to the eyes of that person, even if nobody drinks from it. Thus, the feeling of beauty is independent from the feeling of desire. This notion brings us to the philosophy of Kant and his idea of beauty and the sublime.

The great contribution of Kant to aesthetic contemplation can be found in his *Critique of Judgement* [10] and lies in the notion that it is selfless. For Kant, the observation of something that is beautiful does not bestow any benefit; pleasure arises only from the act of observing something that is beautiful. He states that the contemplation of beauty is a source of pleasure, but it is a pleasure that does not lie in the idea of possessing the object of our contemplation,

Bayer [9] describes this notion as follows: beauty is that which produces a universally shared pleasure. Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* proposes that, alongside the faculties for knowing and desiring, there is a third faculty, which is that of judging. He claims that an aesthetic experience is an encounter that happens within the subject. The faculty of aesthetic judgement, or of perceiving and analysing beauty, does not know or desire; its dimension is purely subjective and is expressed as a feeling of pleasure or disgust, and it is not a cognitive experience. Only through the aforementioned feelings does it perceive the nature of phenomena. For Kant, such a feeling is universal. An object that is judged to be beautiful will be perceived as

Two aspects of mindfulness are of particular relevance to the contributions that mindfulness can bring to the aesthetic experience. The first is that beauty has nothing to do with that which is good or pleasing, due to the fact that these belong to the realm of desire. Mindfulness, on the other hand, is opposed to desire. Furthermore, beauty is also unrelated to that which is 'useful and perfect' [9], in the sense that beauty does not pursue a transcendental goal. Beauty is immanent to the beautiful being and lacking in metaphysics. Kantian thought, in many ways, is far removed from the traditional contemplative vision that we attempt to explore in this chapter; however, we can argue that, for Kant, the aesthetic experience does not desire or yearn to arrive anywhere other than where it already is, as is also the case in mindfulness. The second strand of Kant's thought that appears to be especially relevant to the ideas that we aim to explore in this chapter is that beauty, as an experience, does not transcend beyond the immediate. It cannot occur outside of, or beyond, the pleasure that is experienced in the moment [11]. Furthermore, the bodily sensations that he relates to pleasure, health and well-being have 'no purpose whatsoever' [11]. This shares similarities with the Buddhist notion that mental events are lacking in inherent meaning and that to practise the capacity for focussing attention on the present moment or, as Gunaratana [12] puts it, of being an observer who disappears, leaving in his absence the pure act of observation, represents the quintessence of how the contem-

**2.2. Kant and the aesthetic experience**

210 Perception of Beauty

which is also universally recognised as being beautiful.

such by all observers and will be universally communicable.

plative traditions regard the emergence of aesthetic experiences.

A third author who cannot be ignored in the relationship between modern philosophy and the contemplative experience is Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Needless to say, we cannot explore his entire body of work nor all of his philosophical propositions, but we will consider the part of his philosophy that has become known as the 'second Heidegger' [13] and, more specifically, two texts that consider the aesthetic experience: The Origin of the Work of Art (1935–1936) and Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry (1937).

In the second Heidegger, a new metaphysics arises, a turning point to which Heidegger would return again and again to discuss the issue of forgetfulness of being, the human tendency to think from the entity, instead of the being. In later texts, starting from the idea of the being, Heidegger explores concepts that share a deep similarity with oriental ideas such as emptiness, serenity and silence. It is beyond the reach of this chapter to provide an in-depth exploration of these ideas. Nonetheless, starting from this concept of the self, we can review his idea of the aesthetic experience, as it unfolds in The Origin of the Work of Art and Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry. The central argument in both texts is that art and beauty are spaces where truth is manifested, or, in other words, beauty is the 'instauration of the being and of the truth' [14]. But what does Heidegger mean with this idea? For him, truth is nothing less than the discovery of the being; truth manifested in beauty is not a property of logical judgement, as argued by Kant, but it is the primary manifestation of the being. Heidegger names this process, in which beauty is capable of revealing the being, *alétheia*, which can be understood as revelation or disclosure. De la Vega describes the process as follows: 'Truth, then, is given first in a separate dimension from understanding. And, according to Heidegger's aesthetic theory, the essence of the work of art is to place in truth a being, to disclose its truth' [15]. In our interpretation, for Heidegger, the αἴσθησις (aisthesis) is direct perception, such as it is understood in classical Greek philosophy, and, in that sense, the aisthesis, or direct perception, 'discovers' something, revealing the ontological nature of beings. This is not an intellectual process (noesis), but more accurately one that is opposed to it. That is why De la Vega claims that aisthesis is inseparable from the truth [15]. Heidegger himself succinctly argues: 'Beauty is one of the ways of presenting the truth as disclosure' [16]. He also states that in the process of *alétheia*, something is illuminated, the being of the entities can be observed thanks to the capacity to perceive beings directly.

It is worth pointing out that numerous authors from the past and present centuries who have made enormous contributions to the development of the idea of an aesthetic experience rooted in philosophy, art and artistic production remain overlooked in this chapter, for example, Dewey (1859–1952), Beardsley (1915–1985), Danto (1924–2013) and Shustermann (1949).
