4. Italian population projection

As mentioned, in order to properly estimate the structure of the Italian population in the coming years and, above all, in order to be able to isolate the components contextually involved in such a determination, it was chosen to make standard projections in an autonomous way so as to govern the individual variables and, eventually, assume alternative hypotheses on the individual components which interact in the formation of the future population.

In order to build the projections, the age structure of the population was derived from the official statistics ISTAT 2017, the latest available data [9]. The table of mortality, used to infer the survival rates [9], aimed to project the population in the next quinquennial age group, was available for 2010; the specific fertility [10] quotients by age were of 2011 (Tables 2a–c).

This heterogeneity of reference period must not be misleading in the projection framework, where the choices made are sufficiently aleatory and do not significantly affect the final data.

Rather, it should be clear that we are talking about future hypothesis, estimates, and, therefore, plausible (but certainly not real) values; one argument against it could rather be dictated by the fact that current indicators are largely used in referring to very variable demographic phenomena in order to estimate behaviors in the events of even 40 years ahead.

In any case, before going on, it would be better to underline some methodological limits of this technique, which may affect the results and, therefore, the indicators derived from them.


should be taken in the near future. In essence, therefore, the possibility to isolate the components of natality, mortality, and migration in the elaboration of projections allows us to make

Table 1 and Figure 2 show the evolution of the number of births between the first quarter of the last century and the present day. Table 1 highlights the specific trend of the natality level,

Until the Second World War, the birth level was still maintained high in values consistently above the million births per year, with inevitable fluctuations due, in large part, to the

In any case, the last conflict represented a sort of "threshold value," a kind of divide between the old and the new world, also from the behavioral point of view in relation to

In addition, the years after the Great War are also the years in which the reconstruction begins: Italy laboriously starts to develop and this goes at the same rate with great (demographic)

As mentioned, in order to properly estimate the structure of the Italian population in the coming years and, above all, in order to be able to isolate the components contextually involved in such a determination, it was chosen to make standard projections in an autonomous way so as to govern the individual variables and, eventually, assume alternative hypotheses on the individual components which interact in the formation of the future

In order to build the projections, the age structure of the population was derived from the official statistics ISTAT 2017, the latest available data [9]. The table of mortality, used to infer the survival rates [9], aimed to project the population in the next quinquennial age group, was available for 2010; the specific fertility [10] quotients by age were of 2011

This heterogeneity of reference period must not be misleading in the projection framework, where the choices made are sufficiently aleatory and do not significantly affect the final

Rather, it should be clear that we are talking about future hypothesis, estimates, and, therefore, plausible (but certainly not real) values; one argument against it could rather be dictated by the fact that current indicators are largely used in referring to very variable demographic phenom-

In any case, before going on, it would be better to underline some methodological limits of this technique, which may affect the results and, therefore, the indicators derived from them.

ena in order to estimate behaviors in the events of even 40 years ahead.

more probable assumptions about the future of the population itself.

approaching of the great crisis that would lead to disastrous conflict.

the demographic events and to the reproductive process in particular.

which affected and still continues to affect the social life in Italy.

achievements such as the sudden collapse of infant mortality.

4. Italian population projection

22 Advances in Health Management

population.

(Tables 2a–c).

data.

Table 2a. Female Italian population projected on 1 January.

The Future Population Health of the Industrialized Countries http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67819 23


Table 2b. Male Italian population projected on 1 January.


Age classes

0–4 5–9 10–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–34

35–39

40–44

45–49

50–54

55–59

60–64

65–69

70–74

75–79

80–84

85–89

90–94

95–99

Total

Source: our elaboration Table 2b. Male Italian population

 projected on 1 January.

 on ISTAT's data.

 29,456,321

 0.04

 28,967,283

 28,270,804

 27,427,381

 26,465,192

 25,391,161

 24,200,314

 22,901,358

 21,549,768

 20,230,620

 26,716

 154,221

 448,203

 826,785

 1,227,379

 0.748313 0.594712

0.418676

0.235102

0.137514

 36,258

 44,117

 48,399

 53,765

 49,338

 59,560

 56,056

 61,276

 70,392

 187,652

 205,863

 228,690

 209,857

 253,338

 238,433

 260,636

 299,411

 308,613

 491,699

 546,221

 501,239

 605,094

 569,492

 622,523

 715,137

 737,117

 712,704

 918,463

 842,826

 1,017,457

 957,593

 1,046,765

 1,202,494

 1,239,452

 1,198,402

 1,023,101

 1,126,302

 1,359,668

 1,279,669

 1,398,833

 1,606,940

 1,656,328

 1,601,472

 1,367,210

 1,184,171

 1,322,775

 0.851469

 1,596,850

 1,502,895

 1,642,846

 1,887,256

 1,945,259

 1,880,833

 1,605,707

 1,390,739

 1,290,178

 1,757,419

 0.908633

 1,654,017

 1,808,041

 2,077,027

 2,140,862

 2,069,958

 1,767,167

 1,530,583

 1,419,911

 1,338,880

 1,755,003

 0.942458

 1,918,430

 2,203,839

 2,271,572

 2,196,339

 1,875,061

 1,624,032

 1,506,603

 1,420,625

 1,350,874

 1,990,139

 0.963968

 2,286,216

 2,356,481

 2,278,436

 1,945,149

 1,684,737

 1,562,918

 1,473,727

 1,401,368

 1,379,781

 2,337,449

 0.978082

 2,409,288

 2,329,495

 1,988,739

 1,722,491

 1,597,942

 1,506,752

 1,432,772

 1,410,701

 1,410,147

 2,441,662

 0.986741

 2,360,796

 2,015,462

 1,745,636

 1,619,414

 1,526,998

 1,452,024

 1,429,657

 1,429,095

 1,285,385

 2,380,558

 0.991699

 2,032,333

 1,760,248

 1,632,970

 1,539,781

 1,464,179

 1,441,624

 1,441,058

 1,296,145

 1,203,398

 2,043,171

 0.994695

 1,769,636

 1,641,678

 1,547,992

 1,471,987

 1,449,312

 1,448,743

 1,303,057

 1,209,815

 1,122,090

 1,776,419

 0.996181

 1,647,971

 1,553,926

 1,477,629

 1,454,868

 1,454,296

 1,308,052

 1,214,453

 1,126,391

 1,070,477

 1,653,304

 0.996774

 1,558,954

 1,482,411

 1,459,575

 1,459,002

 1,312,285

 1,218,383

 1,130,036

 1,073,941

 1,034,623

 1,563,396

 0.997159

 1,486,634

 1,463,734

 1,463,159

 1,316,024

 1,221,854

 1,133,256

 1,077,001

 1,037,571

 999,182

 1,490,426

 0.997456

 1,467,467

 1,466,891

 1,319,381

 1,224,970

 1,136,146

 1,079,747

 1,040,217

 1,001,731

 950,170

 1,469,325

 0.998736

 1,468,748

 1,321,051

 1,226,521

 1,137,584

 1,081,114

 1,041,534

 1,002,999

 951,373

 887,921

1,469,465

 0.999512

 1,321,696

 1,227,120

 1,138,140

 1,081,642

 1,042,043

 1,003,489

 951,838

 888,355

 828,086

1,322,506

 0.999388

 1,227,872

 1,138,837

 1,082,305

 1,042,681

 1,004,104

 952,421

 888,899

 828,593

 780,447

24 Advances in Health Management

 Male 01/01/2016

 Px=Lx+s/Lx

 Male population

2021

 2026

 2031

 2036

 2041

 2046

 2051

 2056

 2061

 projected at the 01-01

> Table 2c. Total population (male + female) projected on 1 January.

The Future Population Health of the Industrialized Countries http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67819 25 It seems obvious that, while talking about projections of such a distant time (2061), at least 40% of the population living at that time is a population that still has to be born; a population that will inevitably bring with them habits, customs, traditions, and ideas that probably have not yet been formed in the current social and political scenarios. This could also mean a different way of facing problems, such as reproductive life, family, and social organization.

At present, moreover, the path of that idea of political unity of Europe would seem less likely: in fact, Europe is struggling to feel truly one people also because of the undeniable, great tradition that distinguishes the individual peoples of Europe.

Certainly, the emergence or not of a strong (social and/or political) movement of restoration of the autonomous economies or the definitive success of the European community project might make it necessary to rewrite the pages of history entirely different from one another, which, although not universally accepted, certainly influence the demographic behavior of the future generations.

A further consideration which is necessary before carrying out the analysis concerns the immigration component, which must not be confused with the foreign component among population (currently) residing in Italy.

More than 4,030,000 foreigners entered the register [11] on 31 December (equal to over 7% of the population): they are regularly included in these calculations and are sufficiently adapted to the behaviors of native population in order to considerably modify therein the future demographic behavior.

On the other hand, the focus here is on the immigrant component that powers our population with an annual balance of about 230,000 foreign nationals resident in Italy (280,000 registrations from abroad against 40,000 cancellations).

This part of the population, without considering that illegal immigration which is by its nature difficult to quantify (and moreover with all attempts to estimate since the 1980s, badly failed), could affect the final results of the projection, but precisely because of absolute randomness, it remains an absolutely uncontrolled portion on which it is more appropriate to make specific ad hoc comments.

Of course, as always, to put forward a hypothesis about values so distant in time may turn out to be a scientific quirk rather than a real possibility of analysis, because, in any case, any method utilized may return plausible values only, ignoring, de facto, possible major shifts in socio-demographic behavior of the population.

In any case, in light of these premises, the projection of the population was made under the assumption, as already mentioned, that it is closed and so made in the absence of migratory movements. This choice, not made randomly, really intends to answer the initial assumption, which turns out to be: what would happen to the future generations of workers if the population were projected as it is in the future?

That is, to be more precise, what situation would be created to the relationship between outgoing generations and incoming generations in the labor market, if this demographic situation persisted?

It seems obvious that, while talking about projections of such a distant time (2061), at least 40% of the population living at that time is a population that still has to be born; a population that will inevitably bring with them habits, customs, traditions, and ideas that probably have not yet been formed in the current social and political scenarios. This could also mean a different way of facing problems, such as reproductive life, family, and social

At present, moreover, the path of that idea of political unity of Europe would seem less likely: in fact, Europe is struggling to feel truly one people also because of the undeniable, great

Certainly, the emergence or not of a strong (social and/or political) movement of restoration of the autonomous economies or the definitive success of the European community project might make it necessary to rewrite the pages of history entirely different from one another, which, although not universally accepted, certainly influence the demographic behavior of the future

A further consideration which is necessary before carrying out the analysis concerns the immigration component, which must not be confused with the foreign component among

More than 4,030,000 foreigners entered the register [11] on 31 December (equal to over 7% of the population): they are regularly included in these calculations and are sufficiently adapted to the behaviors of native population in order to considerably modify therein the future

On the other hand, the focus here is on the immigrant component that powers our population with an annual balance of about 230,000 foreign nationals resident in Italy (280,000 registrations

This part of the population, without considering that illegal immigration which is by its nature difficult to quantify (and moreover with all attempts to estimate since the 1980s, badly failed), could affect the final results of the projection, but precisely because of absolute randomness, it remains an absolutely uncontrolled portion on which it is more appropriate to make specific

Of course, as always, to put forward a hypothesis about values so distant in time may turn out to be a scientific quirk rather than a real possibility of analysis, because, in any case, any method utilized may return plausible values only, ignoring, de facto, possible major shifts in

In any case, in light of these premises, the projection of the population was made under the assumption, as already mentioned, that it is closed and so made in the absence of migratory movements. This choice, not made randomly, really intends to answer the initial assumption, which turns out to be: what would happen to the future generations of workers if the popula-

tradition that distinguishes the individual peoples of Europe.

organization.

26 Advances in Health Management

generations.

demographic behavior.

ad hoc comments.

population (currently) residing in Italy.

from abroad against 40,000 cancellations).

socio-demographic behavior of the population.

tion were projected as it is in the future?

The analysis, then, was carried out by building quinquennial projections between 2016 and 2061, a time when the strength of the generations born in the baby boom (and living boom) era should have exhausted, and that at that date they should be really residual by then from the quantitative point of view.

The projections, built with the standard method, have been built for five-year periods, so they are available every five years from 2016 to 2061, but for the obvious need for space, only some significant years that are functional to the initial hypothesis are reported here.

Reaffirming once again the weakness of precision resulting from having fixed, inexorably, the law of mortality and the law of current fertility, under the assumption that they be unchanged for the next half century (not entirely appropriate assumption, but not too dissimilar from reality, except for some small correction factors), the results of elaboration return values open to interesting considerations.

First, the wave of those born in the baby boom era is now coming to the end of the race. In 2061, only very few representatives of this "era" will still be alive, leaving behind them much

Figure 3. (a) Pyramid of Italian population, 2016. Source: our elaboration on ISTAT's data; (b) pyramid of Italian population, 2041. Source: our elaboration on ISTAT's data.

less consistent generations. These generations, although saved certainly by survival rates,5 are, at the individual age, better than those that preceded them, will not be able to "replace" the generations of their predecessors. In simple terms, the Italian population is destined to decline

<sup>5</sup> The survival rate expresses in relative terms how many people belonging to the current age will reach the next one. In scientific terms: px = (Lx+s)/Lx.

Figure 4. Pyramid of Italian population, 2061. Source: our elaboration on ISTAT's data.

substantially, starting already from the next few years with peaks of decline in the next two decades.

This situation is not only accompanied by the quantitative downsizing but will also reshape the population structure itself. In other words, the graphic representation of the population by age groups will hardly continue to be indicated as the "age pyramid" according to the data that will present themselves as a future scenario; it will rather have to be called the population "barrel" by age to reach, not so much time afterwards, the "inverted pyramid," where, for many years, (all those years for which the "baby-living-boom" lasted) the top of the graph will


Table 3. Percentage of population in age groups, Italy.

be much bigger than its bottom (despite in the presence of a slight recovery of women's fertility, which will, however, not be supported by an appropriate quantity of women available for procreation) [1].6

<sup>6</sup> Basically, as stated, the fertility rate will return increasing values due to the mother "in late" fertility recovery (35 years old and more); but the total of women in the age group available to procreate will be more bounded in the previous group, nullifying the effects of the improvement in the procreation propensity.

To confirm what has just been mentioned above, it is enough to observe what is shown in Figures 2 and 3a and b, which draw the age "pyramids" of the Italian population in 2016, 2041 (i.e., a quarter of century later), and 2061 (Figure 4, 45 years later) and in Tables 2a–c, which show the amount of the projections of the closed population, calculated from 2021 to 2061.
