**3. The commons**

Considering rural sustainability, the commons could play an important part because, if managed, natural resources are used without destroying the ecological balance of an area. In general terms, a common is a piece of land owned by one person or organisa‐ tion over which other people can exercise certain traditional rights. Commons have a very long history in Europe, the most famous examples are the forest commons in Brit‐ ain which are still in operation after thousands of years (ABC, 2001). Short (2008, p. 195) found that over a period of 500 years common land evolved as being distinct from other types of land because, while the ownership of the land remained private, the same land was subject to rights of common. These rights were held by other individuals that enti‐ tled them to specified products from that land.

Any commons system demands rules. According to Short (2008, p. 195) over the whole of Europe, previously rules were developed independently and, as a consequence, they were complex and the rights varied from one common to another. Today, there are almost 8,700 registered units of common land in England and Wales, representing 3% of the land area in England and 8% in Wales. Legislation is necessary, the last Commons Act was passed in 2006, "to promote sustainable management into the 21st century" (Short, 2008, p. 195).

#### **3.1. The contemporary common**

Elinor Ostrom wrote a thought-provoking book, *Governing the Commons* (1990a). She re‐ searched the system of the commons and was convinced that it offers an alternative to the traditional (mis)use of land and natural resources. She also provided the following advice to those who want to enter into a contemporary common:

Any group that attempts to manage a common resource (e.g. aquifers, judicial systems, pastures) for optimal sustainable

production must solve a set of problems in order to create institutions for collective actions; there is some evidence that fol‐

lowing a small set of design principles in creating these institutions can overcome these problems (Ostrom, 1990b, n.p.).

Here are Ostrom's (1990a,) principles which have been the basis of long-enduring common property resources (CPR) institutions:


better: they have less family poverty, lower unemployment and higher percentages of farms realising cash gains compared to agriculture dependent counties in states without such laws.

Anti-corporate farming laws do not exist in Australia and there are, as far as could be ascer‐ tained, no comparative Australian studies so far regarding the overall well-being of small farming families in an environment of corporate farming. However, it is assumed that small family farms are disadvantaged when corporate enterprises operate in the same location and

Considering rural sustainability, the commons could play an important part because, if managed, natural resources are used without destroying the ecological balance of an area. In general terms, a common is a piece of land owned by one person or organisa‐ tion over which other people can exercise certain traditional rights. Commons have a very long history in Europe, the most famous examples are the forest commons in Brit‐ ain which are still in operation after thousands of years (ABC, 2001). Short (2008, p. 195) found that over a period of 500 years common land evolved as being distinct from other types of land because, while the ownership of the land remained private, the same land was subject to rights of common. These rights were held by other individuals that enti‐

Any commons system demands rules. According to Short (2008, p. 195) over the whole of Europe, previously rules were developed independently and, as a consequence, they were complex and the rights varied from one common to another. Today, there are almost 8,700 registered units of common land in England and Wales, representing 3% of the land area in England and 8% in Wales. Legislation is necessary, the last Commons Act was passed in 2006,

Elinor Ostrom wrote a thought-provoking book, *Governing the Commons* (1990a). She re‐ searched the system of the commons and was convinced that it offers an alternative to the traditional (mis)use of land and natural resources. She also provided the following advice to

Any group that attempts to manage a common resource (e.g. aquifers, judicial systems, pastures) for optimal sustainable production must solve a set of problems in order to create institutions for collective actions; there is some evidence that fol‐ lowing a small set of design principles in creating these institutions can overcome these problems (Ostrom, 1990b, n.p.).

"to promote sustainable management into the 21st century" (Short, 2008, p. 195).

In the following section, an old system is being reinvented, the commons.

within the same line of business.

282 Environmental Change and Sustainability

tled them to specified products from that land.

those who want to enter into a contemporary common:

**3.1. The contemporary common**

**3. The commons**


For CPRs that are parts of contemporary systems:

**8.** Nested enterprises. Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolu‐ tion, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises (p. 90).

These principles seem, at first glance, complex and difficult to implement, however, every institution has its guidelines which need to be followed in order for it to function. If people are serious about rural sustainability and about maintaining farming families, the price to pay may be adherence to these rules. They would need to be negotiated according to different groups and different needs.

Ostrom discussed advantages and problems associated with the system. There was, for instance, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, an influential article written by Garrett Hardin in 1968 (pp. 1-28). Hardin's argument was that the environment will be destroyed "whenever many individuals use a scarce resource in common" (Ostrom, 1990a, p. 2). The purpose of his article was to demonstrate that tragic consequences can follow mistaken morality. This morality relates to expectations of equal justice and universal human rights of participants of commons. To stop such losses external intervention or control is needed. Hardin (1968) argued that "freedom in a common brings ruin to all" (p. 1244). In 1991 he redefined his argument somewhat but reiterates that his "conventional wisdom"... "holds true for unmanaged commons". In 1998 he, again, emphasised that "overuse of resources reduces carrying capacity, ruin is inevitable" (p. 3). Ostrom agreed with Hardin's 1968 criticism to a certain extent but believed that certain principles (rules and regulations) could prevent a tragedy.

Since the writer of this chapter is of the opinion that common property resources systems could have positive consequences for rural sustainability (including the family farm), here is a summary of the Australian experience.

#### **3.2. The Tilbuster Commons**

The experimental Tilbuster Commons project existed between 1999 and 2004. A group of four landholders and their families selected the land "on the basis of their shared values, concerns and future aspirations" (Williamson et al., 2003, p. 23).

Source: http://www.southdevon-cattle.com.au/armidale.htm

**Figure 2.** A close look at the area where the Tilbuster Commons were established in 1999.

The four families with adjoining landholdings in the Tilbuster Valley, 20 km north of Armidale in New South Wales, Australia, established *a common property resource system,* embracing some 1300 hectares. Funded with a A\$208,000 grant from Land & Water Australia, and facilitated by staff from the Institute of Rural Futures at the University of New England, the group's objective was to produce a legal framework for a self-help resource management institution that was not only viable in their own circumstances but which could be transferred to other groups of landholders in different locations (Brunckhorst, 2003). The key assumptions underpinning this framework can be related to what Tosh (2006) classified as a *prescriptive* historical analogy. It draws on the past to recover best practices that can be adopted in the present: in this case lessons learned from the commons of England.

Source: http://www.southdevon-cattle.com.au/armidale.htm

284 Environmental Change and Sustainability

armidale-regional-archives-repository

**Figure 1.** Tilbuster Commons was established close to Armidale, New South Wales, Australia.

Source: http://www.records.nsw.gov.au/state-archives/resources-for/people-in-regional-nsw/regional-repositories/

**Figure 2.** A close look at the area where the Tilbuster Commons were established in 1999.

**Figure 3.** According to Brunckhorst and Coop (2003, p. 16), the Tilbuster Commons involves the collective manage‐ ment of four previously individual properties. The changes management is providing opportunities for increased effi‐ ciencies in agricultural production, more sustainable agricultural management practices, long term conservation and maintenance of rate basalt associated ecosystems and the restoration of woodland and stream environment.

Williamson et al. (2003) reported that two years of preliminary discussion provided an important vehicle for the group to begin building the necessary social capital which is required for the transformation towards whole system planning, resource allocation and collective decision-making. The independent owners and managers of properties realised their plans for an improved lifestyle and a more sustainable environment could easily fail if a common ground was not established. This common ground is embedded in social capital, relating to the cohesiveness of people in a community; it comprises trust, reciprocity and exchanges between individuals to make co-operation possible. It took a further eighteen months of planning legal structures and corporate arrangements. The group created a private company which provided for informal tenancy at will with the landholders being lessors and the company being the lessee. This arrangement allowed to start rotational grazing across all properties. The informal tenancy became a fixed term lease, providing stability and protection for both individuals, retaining land title, and the company, using and managing the whole resource base represented by all properties. Issues considered were livestock, grazing and pasture management and allocation of conservation and environmental rehabilitation areas. There were also issues associated with the operation of the commons (management, book‐ keeping, accounting), allocation of land to the common (private use of small areas, particularly around each member's home), key infrastructure, development of a formula which represent‐ ed the interests of each member in the common, and allocation of land and resources to the maintenance of ecosystem function. According to Williamson et al. (2003), the group gave the commons a new lease of life: cross-boundary farming is important for sustainable Australian agriculture. In 2001, The *Tilbuster Commons Pty Ltd* was registered and the group started to function as a business in the next financial year.

Williamson et al. (2003) discussed that the arrangement of a common property resource system, the collective decision-making, and trying to achieve the holistic goals of the group created some conflict of interest because the landholders were also directors of the company: with both hats on, individuals are considering the best options to benefit themselves and other members through the company. Hardin's *conventional wisdom* (1991), relating to *managed commons,* and Ostrom's principles *regarding governing commons* (1990a, p. 90) may have been an underlying force in establishing the rules of the *Tilbuster Commons* and maintaining its functioning for a while. Ostrom's guidelines reiterate Hardin's *conventional wisdom* and make clear that regula‐ tions are important for the management of commons or, as in this case, regarding crossboundary farming. Table 1 demonstrates how the *Tilbuster Commons* functioned.

What are the advantages of such a system? Table 1 (Williamson et al., 2003, p. 68) defines the differences between conventional property management and cross-boundary farming management. Under conventional property legislation primary producers are required to fully utilise the resources available within their own property in order to survive economically. Faced with various family and economic pressures and only a few resources at the landholders' disposal, there is often no option but to overuse the resources. Input costs tend to increase to help production and counter negative trends of water quality, parasite load; and production from the farmed and grazed areas is reduced. On the other hand, Williamson et al. (2003) found that the *Tilbuster Commons* could allocate the available resources more efficiently and effec‐ tively. The individual and collective benefits of the project included grazing over a much wider area, reduction of input costs, increase of production, improved pasture and weed manage‐ ment (no fertilisers used), water and drought management, as well as more effective pest control. Cropping for winter feed or purchase of feed was not necessary, neither was the provision of natural minerals for stock. The most important benefits included long term conservation and maintenance of ecosystems, restoration of woodlands and stream environ‐ ment, as well as the freeing up of time and labour. As a consequence of this, the families were able to get away for a holiday leaving the gate open when the livestock was on another property. Overall, by recognising the distinction between resource allocation and utilisation (the geographical elements) and land tenure (a part of the institutional elements), these landholders were able to consolidate their stock and graze them across all properties involved in the agreement.

Williamson et al. (2003) reported that two years of preliminary discussion provided an important vehicle for the group to begin building the necessary social capital which is required for the transformation towards whole system planning, resource allocation and collective decision-making. The independent owners and managers of properties realised their plans for an improved lifestyle and a more sustainable environment could easily fail if a common ground was not established. This common ground is embedded in social capital, relating to the cohesiveness of people in a community; it comprises trust, reciprocity and exchanges between individuals to make co-operation possible. It took a further eighteen months of planning legal structures and corporate arrangements. The group created a private company which provided for informal tenancy at will with the landholders being lessors and the company being the lessee. This arrangement allowed to start rotational grazing across all properties. The informal tenancy became a fixed term lease, providing stability and protection for both individuals, retaining land title, and the company, using and managing the whole resource base represented by all properties. Issues considered were livestock, grazing and pasture management and allocation of conservation and environmental rehabilitation areas. There were also issues associated with the operation of the commons (management, book‐ keeping, accounting), allocation of land to the common (private use of small areas, particularly around each member's home), key infrastructure, development of a formula which represent‐ ed the interests of each member in the common, and allocation of land and resources to the maintenance of ecosystem function. According to Williamson et al. (2003), the group gave the commons a new lease of life: cross-boundary farming is important for sustainable Australian agriculture. In 2001, The *Tilbuster Commons Pty Ltd* was registered and the group started to

Williamson et al. (2003) discussed that the arrangement of a common property resource system, the collective decision-making, and trying to achieve the holistic goals of the group created some conflict of interest because the landholders were also directors of the company: with both hats on, individuals are considering the best options to benefit themselves and other members through the company. Hardin's *conventional wisdom* (1991), relating to *managed commons,* and Ostrom's principles *regarding governing commons* (1990a, p. 90) may have been an underlying force in establishing the rules of the *Tilbuster Commons* and maintaining its functioning for a while. Ostrom's guidelines reiterate Hardin's *conventional wisdom* and make clear that regula‐ tions are important for the management of commons or, as in this case, regarding cross-

What are the advantages of such a system? Table 1 (Williamson et al., 2003, p. 68) defines the differences between conventional property management and cross-boundary farming management. Under conventional property legislation primary producers are required to fully utilise the resources available within their own property in order to survive economically. Faced with various family and economic pressures and only a few resources at the landholders' disposal, there is often no option but to overuse the resources. Input costs tend to increase to help production and counter negative trends of water quality, parasite load; and production from the farmed and grazed areas is reduced. On the other hand, Williamson et al. (2003) found that the *Tilbuster Commons* could allocate the available resources more efficiently and effec‐

boundary farming. Table 1 demonstrates how the *Tilbuster Commons* functioned.

function as a business in the next financial year.

286 Environmental Change and Sustainability


**Table 1.** Four major property institutions in Australia and their ownership, rights and duties (Source: *Williamson, Brunckhorst & Kelly, Reinventing the Common, 2003, p. 68*).

The positive issues discussed above have to be offset by some adverse aspects of the system. Williamson et al. (2003) pointed out that the change of ownership means a change in direc‐ torship and this can create problems. When a property is sold, it affects the system by frag‐ menting the landholding and the directorship of the company. There is also the issue regarding succession planning: who will inherit the property? Will it go to the child(ren) of the owner who has passed away or will the property go to those who manage the farm? The terms in the lease need to clearly address these issues.

Brunckhorst (2003), following Ostrom, argued that:

The likelihood of users designing successful common property institutions will be enhanced if the group (or collective) is relatively small and stable; if it is relatively homogeneous, with the members using similar technologies and having similar values and expectations; if there is reciprocity and trust; and if the transaction costs for making and enforcing rules is low (p. 73).

This suggests that common property arrangements are well suited in scale to landholders struggling to maintain family farming operations. Yet a search of the literature reveals that attempts to duplicate implementation of the *Tilbuster Commons* model have, so far, not been successful.

#### **3.3. Complexities of the commons – as seen by Australian farmers**

According to the ABC's Landline program (2001), it was hoped that communal, cross-boun‐ dary farming, or the common property resources system, could be taken up in Australia to improve ecological sustainability. The *Tilbuster Commons* and the ideas that lay behind it at‐ tracted significant interest from practitioners of other disciplines and the media (Muenster‐ mann, 2009; Meinzen-Dick, 2008; Marshall, Fritsch & Dulhunty, 2005; Marshall, 2004; ABC TV Landline 2001). In this process, some critics (Hajkowicz, 2006) contend that common property took on the character of a universal panacea for a rural 'crisis' that was indiscrim‐ inately held to apply across Australia. Looking at the decrease of farming families, a crisis exist, however personal communication with academics who are also landholders and farm‐ ers, conveys it is over-emphasised. Muenstermann (2009) suggested that a common proper‐ ty resources system has the potential to confer greater benefits on small farmers struggling to be more viable than alternative arrangements such as co-operative or corporate farming. Co-operative arrangements usually do not extend beyond joint purchases of plant and ma‐ chinery or perhaps the pooling of labour at specified times of the year. Anecdotal evidence suggests that neighbours running sheep as a single flock is not unknown but less common, while joint action to address ecological issues is largely neglected. The Australian Natural Resource Management (2002) reasoned that "Australian farmers generally have a positive but pragmatic attitude towards environmental issues", hence "low farm incomes and high debt are likely to discourage adoption of sustainable practice" (p. 1).

Despite this finding, some farmers were trying to work collectively in order to address shared environmental concerns and to maximise financial gains, as the *Furracabad Valley Project* in northern New South Wales showed (Marshall et al., 2005). The project leader was a member of the Institute of Rural Futures who drew on the *Tilbuster* experience to assist the *Furracabad* farmers in consolidating their environmental gains. But whereas preliminary budgeting suggested that th project had the potential to deliver economic benefits, the project team was unsuccessful during the nine months of project organisation to secure a commitment to a common property regime by a sufficient number of participants. Accord‐ ing to Brunckhorst and Marshall (2006), the government supported project started with eighteen parties being interviewed, and five indicating "a serious interest in leasing their land to the proposed group farming arrangement within the near future" (p. 204). The fol‐ low-up workshop was only attended by four of the five members of the farm businesses. The individuals emphasised

"... the social and environmental advantages of joining the group farming arrangement, [but] they agreed that their

decisions to join would depend ultimately on evidence that they would benefit in economic terms" (Brunckhorst &

Marshall, 2006, p. 240).''

who has passed away or will the property go to those who manage the farm? The terms in the

The likelihood of users designing successful common property institutions will be enhanced if the group (or collective)

is relatively small and stable; if it is relatively homogeneous, with the members using similar technologies and having

similar values and expectations; if there is reciprocity and trust; and if the transaction costs for making and enforcing

This suggests that common property arrangements are well suited in scale to landholders struggling to maintain family farming operations. Yet a search of the literature reveals that attempts to duplicate implementation of the *Tilbuster Commons* model have, so far, not been

According to the ABC's Landline program (2001), it was hoped that communal, cross-boun‐ dary farming, or the common property resources system, could be taken up in Australia to improve ecological sustainability. The *Tilbuster Commons* and the ideas that lay behind it at‐ tracted significant interest from practitioners of other disciplines and the media (Muenster‐ mann, 2009; Meinzen-Dick, 2008; Marshall, Fritsch & Dulhunty, 2005; Marshall, 2004; ABC TV Landline 2001). In this process, some critics (Hajkowicz, 2006) contend that common property took on the character of a universal panacea for a rural 'crisis' that was indiscrim‐ inately held to apply across Australia. Looking at the decrease of farming families, a crisis exist, however personal communication with academics who are also landholders and farm‐ ers, conveys it is over-emphasised. Muenstermann (2009) suggested that a common proper‐ ty resources system has the potential to confer greater benefits on small farmers struggling to be more viable than alternative arrangements such as co-operative or corporate farming. Co-operative arrangements usually do not extend beyond joint purchases of plant and ma‐ chinery or perhaps the pooling of labour at specified times of the year. Anecdotal evidence suggests that neighbours running sheep as a single flock is not unknown but less common, while joint action to address ecological issues is largely neglected. The Australian Natural Resource Management (2002) reasoned that "Australian farmers generally have a positive but pragmatic attitude towards environmental issues", hence "low farm incomes and high

Despite this finding, some farmers were trying to work collectively in order to address shared environmental concerns and to maximise financial gains, as the *Furracabad Valley Project* in northern New South Wales showed (Marshall et al., 2005). The project leader was a

**3.3. Complexities of the commons – as seen by Australian farmers**

debt are likely to discourage adoption of sustainable practice" (p. 1).

lease need to clearly address these issues.

288 Environmental Change and Sustainability

rules is low (p. 73).

successful.

Brunckhorst (2003), following Ostrom, argued that:

The participants were interested to advance towards the business plan for the group farm‐ ing enterprise. However, at the next meeting one of these businesses had lost interest in join‐ ing, which, in turn, raised concerns that the deal may become unbalanced, given that one of the remaining businesses would be contributing three-quarters of the area. It was decided that a group farming enterprise was not viable with this decreased level of committed inter‐ est. The project did not progress.

A cross-disciplinary study by Pannell, Marshall, Barr, Curtis, Vanclay and Williamson (2006) regarding the adoption of conservation practices by rural landholders tried to under‐ stand why adoption of rural innovations seems to only occur when landholders perceive them as enhancing their personal goals. It is a provocative study, concluding that the "rela‐ tive advantage" is the major concern. "Relative advantage" relates to the superiority of what is being superseded and to "the capacity to deliver sufficient economic and benefits" (p. 1407). The whole process of adopting innovative practices is "influenced by the characteris‐ tics of individual landholders, their families and broader social environments and by the characteristics of the innovation" (p. 1409), and "there is no guarantee that a landholder's subjective beliefs will ultimately lead them to a final decision that is actually the one most likely to best achieve their goals" (p. 1409).

This is an important finding: subjectivity can easily override objectivity when farmers and/or landholders consider innovations. Pannell et al. (2006) determined that because of the way decisions were being made ("heterogeneity of circumstances"), they were only able to discuss "trends and tendencies, rather than deterministic relationships" (p. 1410). But the authors made the point that "economic factors" drive adoption of innovation (p. 1411). It seems that personal gains are more important than community and / or environmental inter‐ ests.

But an article by Marshall (2004) showed a different picture. He discussed his experiences in working with a jointly owned irrigation company in the Murray Darling Basin, an existing common property regime, which led him to conclude that preparedness to co-operate in im‐ plementing agreed plans is "more sensitive to socially oriented factors like perceptions of community benefits … than it is to the private materialistic considerations - like distributive fairness and business security" (p. 271).

May be the difference in outcome can be related to the difference of ownership, for instance private property versus common resource? Overall it is argued here that contemplation of, and investigation into the legal complexities of a successful common property resources sys‐ tem and the rules that are needed to guard against free-riders, sit uneasily with the indi‐ vidualism that remains strong in many Australian farmers.
