*2.5.3.1. Jinja*

In Jinja, the interviews with public health officers revealed that the municipal authority has a budget for SWM which is mostly funded by the central government. There are also fees collect‐ ed from business premises (Ugshs20,000 - USD14 per business)2 and a dumping fee at the dis‐ posal site but all these go to the central reserve at the council where they tend to be absorbed by overall council expenditures. The Director of Environment informed that the authority actual‐ ly has relative autonomy in putting up its own budget, see [18]. Yet it is evident that because most of the funds come from the central government and they are conditional, it is unlikely that adequate resources would be set aside for waste management compared to other 'important' municipal services. For the year 2008, the budgeted expenditure for waste management was Ugshs69,600,000 (USD49,714) but the actual expenditure came to Ugshs120,000,000 (USD85,714) reflecting a deficit of about Ugshs50,000,000 (USD35,714) on the budget.

Payments from the local authority to the contractors are made as per the number of skips emp‐ tied to the disposal grounds. The contractor earns Ugshs28,000 (USD20) per small skip (3 tons) emptied and Ugshs30,000 (USD21.4) for a bigger skip (3.5 tons) emptied. On average the con‐ tractor serving the two divisions empties 18 skips per day while the one serving Mpumudde division empties on average 7 skips per day. In addition, the contractors use local authority ve‐ hicles for transporting the skips to the dumpsite. They hire the vehicles at Ugshs100,000 (USD71.43) per truck per month. They cover the costs for minor and major repairs and fuel as well. The drivers of the trucks are however employed by the local authority and not by the con‐ tractors themselves. This is to allow the authority to control and monitor the disposal of waste because the contractor is paid as per the number of skips emptied. One outstanding aspect of the Jinja arrangement which is not the case for Mwanza and Kisumu (and which is also contra‐ ry to the 'markets' arrangement), is that households do not pay for the service. The reticence to pay for SWM is because households are convinced that it is the responsibility of the council to provide the service and at no cost. This conviction remains very strong so that attempts to intro‐ duce a fee of Ugshs.2000 (USD1.42) per household per month were not successful. This is likely to affect the robustness of service provision as a fee on waste could probably have been ringfenced and used on SWM instead of entirely relying on transfers from central government. giv‐ en that the Service satisfaction from the household survey stands at 62.6% (where n=130).

#### *2.5.3.2. Mwanza*

In Mwanza, the study learned that the council also gets most of its SWM funds from the cen‐ tral government. There are additional funds from the fee charged at the dumping site and also from the fee charged to CBOs to have their waste transferred to the dumping ground

<sup>2</sup> At an exchange rate of Kshs 70 to USD 1 at the time the study was conducted. Kshs 1 to Ugshs 20, Kshs1 to Tshs 20

but like in Jinja, these funds end up at the central reserve in the local authority. The solid waste manager informed the study that SWM is not properly defined in the authority's overall budget but that their total expenditures for the year 2007 went up to Tshs210,900,000 (USD150,643). This figure like the one in Jinja is small compared to the expenditures in Kisu‐ mu and this could be linked to the fact that the costs incurred in Jinja and Mwanza are shared by the council and the private sector contracted to provide SWM services.

The contractors in Mwanza charge different rates for SWM for different land uses but all households pay a standard fee of Tshs400 (USD0.28) per household per month. From the survey 96.4% (where n=165) of households pay for waste collection. Interestingly though on‐ ly 51% of these are satisfied with service provision. Possible reasons for this could be that the largest percentage of service providers are CBOs who, as it emerged from the field inter‐ views, have no incentive to invest and improve SWM given that it is an annual contract. This could impact on their level of professionalism. It is also possible that the population has very high levels of expectation about the performance of the contractors. A number of the households gave recommendations in line with improving the skills of CBOs, improving the infrastructure used for collection, showing that they expect more than they are receiving.

The CBOs pay Tshs8000 (USD5.7) per trip to the local authority for transferring waste to the disposal grounds. The private companies however take their own waste to the disposal grounds and pay for its disposal. In addition, the CBOs and the private companies that have been awarded the SWM contracts are paid by the city council at a rate of USD1.2 for every 300m length of tarmac road that is cleaned daily.

### *2.5.3.3. Kisumu*

Just like the other two towns, the networks refers to occasional involvement of other actors

In Jinja, the interviews with public health officers revealed that the municipal authority has a budget for SWM which is mostly funded by the central government. There are also fees collect‐

posal site but all these go to the central reserve at the council where they tend to be absorbed by overall council expenditures. The Director of Environment informed that the authority actual‐ ly has relative autonomy in putting up its own budget, see [18]. Yet it is evident that because most of the funds come from the central government and they are conditional, it is unlikely that adequate resources would be set aside for waste management compared to other 'important' municipal services. For the year 2008, the budgeted expenditure for waste management was Ugshs69,600,000 (USD49,714) but the actual expenditure came to Ugshs120,000,000

Payments from the local authority to the contractors are made as per the number of skips emp‐ tied to the disposal grounds. The contractor earns Ugshs28,000 (USD20) per small skip (3 tons) emptied and Ugshs30,000 (USD21.4) for a bigger skip (3.5 tons) emptied. On average the con‐ tractor serving the two divisions empties 18 skips per day while the one serving Mpumudde division empties on average 7 skips per day. In addition, the contractors use local authority ve‐ hicles for transporting the skips to the dumpsite. They hire the vehicles at Ugshs100,000 (USD71.43) per truck per month. They cover the costs for minor and major repairs and fuel as well. The drivers of the trucks are however employed by the local authority and not by the con‐ tractors themselves. This is to allow the authority to control and monitor the disposal of waste because the contractor is paid as per the number of skips emptied. One outstanding aspect of the Jinja arrangement which is not the case for Mwanza and Kisumu (and which is also contra‐ ry to the 'markets' arrangement), is that households do not pay for the service. The reticence to pay for SWM is because households are convinced that it is the responsibility of the council to provide the service and at no cost. This conviction remains very strong so that attempts to intro‐ duce a fee of Ugshs.2000 (USD1.42) per household per month were not successful. This is likely to affect the robustness of service provision as a fee on waste could probably have been ringfenced and used on SWM instead of entirely relying on transfers from central government. giv‐ en that the Service satisfaction from the household survey stands at 62.6% (where n=130).

In Mwanza, the study learned that the council also gets most of its SWM funds from the cen‐ tral government. There are additional funds from the fee charged at the dumping site and also from the fee charged to CBOs to have their waste transferred to the dumping ground

2 At an exchange rate of Kshs 70 to USD 1 at the time the study was conducted. Kshs 1 to Ugshs 20, Kshs1 to Tshs 20

(USD85,714) reflecting a deficit of about Ugshs50,000,000 (USD35,714) on the budget.

and a dumping fee at the dis‐

like NEMA, LVRLAC, LVBC, UN-Habitat, Practical Action amongst others.

ed from business premises (Ugshs20,000 - USD14 per business)2

*2.5.3. Resources*

226 Environmental Change and Sustainability

*2.5.3.2. Mwanza*

*2.5.3.1. Jinja*

For Kisumu, SWM receives its funds from a conservancy fee of USD 0.67 charged per house‐ hold per month through the water bill, but this includes only those households that have metered water connection (that is connected to the central grid). There are also other funds originating from the dumping fee charged at USD1.4 per load of a pick-up truck. Businesses, particularly the markets and other commercial areas, are charged for SWM through their business license. The other percentage of funds for SWM comes from what is transferred from the national government to the local authority - the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF). All these contributions combined are however, not sufficient to adequately run the SWM system for the municipality as a whole. In the financial year 2006/07, the annual in‐ come from solid waste management was USD70,000 against an annual expenditure of about USD420,000.

Kisumu's scenario differs from the other two urban centres when it comes to the payment systems. The areas that are served by the local authority have their costs taken care of in the water bill and some of the households responded that they pay for waste as part of their house rent. The private companies are operating in open competition and work purely on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis. From the survey, their services are mostly offered in high and middle income estates. Payments are made at the end of the month as per a verbal agreement with the household. CBOs who operate mostly in middle and low income areas also charge fees agreed upon with each household. Given the high number of informal oper‐ ators, fees charged for waste collection varies but the average fees for different residential areas are revealed through the household survey as shown in table 5 below.


**Table 5.** Payment Rates for SWM services. Source: Household Field Survey in Kisumu

The survey revealed that 79.4 % (where n=93) pay for waste collection and the service satis‐ faction from these households stands at 70.6%.

#### *2.5.4. Discourse*

When collecting primary data, there was a lot of hype from the local authority officers re‐ garding privatization of solid waste management services. This was particularly the case in Mwanza and Jinja where non-state actors have been formally involved in service provision. The term privatization has been applied to three different methods of increasing the activity of the private sector in providing public services: 1) private sector choice, financing, and production of a service;2) public-sector choice and financing with private sector production of the service selected; 3) and deregulation of private firms providing services. In the first case, the entire responsibility for a service is transferred from the public sector to the private sector, and individual consumers select and purchase the amount of services they desire from private providers. For example, solid-waste collection is provided by private firms in some communities. The second version of privatization refers to joint activity of the public and private sectors in providing services. In this case, consumers select and pay for the quantity and type of service desired through government, which then contracts with private firms to produce the desired amount and category of service. Although the government pro‐ vides for the service, a private firm carries out the actual execution of it. The government determines the service level and pays the amount specified in the contract, but leaves deci‐ sions about production decisions to the private firm. The third form of privatization means that government reduces or eliminates the regulatory restrictions imposed on private firms providing specific services. The cases studied are neither here nor there as far as privatiza‐ tion is concerned and therefore based on discussions presented in [3], the paper settles on network governance to describe the desirable direction for the arrangements in the three ur‐ ban centres. A network approach to governance is decentring the state as the unique organ for governance and replacing it with pluricentric forms of governance. Networks permit in‐ ter-organizational interactions of exchange, concerted action, and joint production in a for‐ mal or informal manner. These networks vary in composition from domain to domain, but they are likely to consist of government agencies, key legislators, pressure groups, relevant private companies and civil society organisations such as NGOs and CBOs [19]. Also citi‐ zens themselves may be engaged in such network arrangements but this has to be achieved through constructive reciprocities, as they can not be forced through formal state interven‐ tions. This network perspective shows many similarities with the popular notion of partner‐ ships in governance seeking to determine the respective roles of public as well as private actors in collaborating to improved public services [20]. Network governance arrangements intend to achieve their objectives through the combined efforts of these different sets of ac‐ tors, but the respective roles and responsibilities of the actors involved remain distinct while the state is no longer the sole locus of authority. This is however not the case in the three urban centres where the state is still the locus of authority. Yet given the outcome of the sur‐ veys and interviews, network arrangement is a desirable option because its flexibility allows diverse social actors to engage actively in finding concrete options for providing sustainable solid waste management services and does not force them to wait until national and urban state authorities are willing and able to engage.
