Description

<sup>1</sup>From mouth to

<sup>3</sup>Inlet of Boardman

<sup>5</sup>Keystone Pond &

<sup>6</sup>Inlet of Keystone to

Inlet of Brown Bridge Pond to

substitute sites for the Boardman.

**Table 11.** Boardman River paddling site characteristics

substitute sites. The results appear in Table 12.

Country Trail follow the Boardman.

forks

Current whitewater quality

**Table 10.** Coefficients calibrated to local conditions and scaled to fishing model

Mathematically modeling site-choice for paddling on the Boardman River requires identifying both site characteristics and parameterization of the relative importance that paddlers attach to each of these characteristics. One study [24] presents a statistical model for paddling; however, it was developed for a different location and population. This study reflects whitewater paddling opportunities in Ireland. Although topography in Ireland is likely more varied than that of northern Lower Michigan, the Irish study considers a range of whitewater sites.

To apply this study [24], we calibrated the parameters to reflect the specifics of the Boardman River and the surrounding area. To accomplish this calibration for site characteristics, we rely on the perceptions of recreators, a tactic which has professional acceptance [25] because it is the recreators' perceptions of the site's characteristics, whether aligned with factual information or not, that drive site selection. The [24] researchers query paddlers' opinions by asking them to rate the rivers they paddle on a 1–5 scale. The relevant site characteristics are:



We replicate this on the Boardman River by conducting an informal survey similar to the one used by [24], which reveals paddler's opinions on the site characteristics of the Boardman River and other nearby rivers. In the questionnaire, we ask respondents to rate their perceptions of the Boardman's features with respect to paddling on a 1–5 scale. The one exception to this 1–5 scale is the perceived quality of whitewater, which is based on a 0– 4 scale.9 Table 11 below reflects the average of the responses we received, and Table 10 above shows the coefficients calibrated to local conditions.

<sup>9</sup> Although Irish whitewaters are based on a 1–5 scale, we converted that to a 0–4 scale for this assessment to reflect the likely perceived absence of whitewater for portions of the Boardman River.

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 173


**Table 11.** Boardman River paddling site characteristics

172 Environmental Land Use Planning

of whitewater sites.

site characteristics are:

 perceived crowding perceived water pollution perceived scenic quality

perceived whitewater quality

perceived quality and safety of parking

perceived predictability of the water level prior to arrival.

above shows the coefficients calibrated to local conditions.

likely perceived absence of whitewater for portions of the Boardman River.

Parameter Mean

Whitewater quality 2,82 Parking quality -2,04 Crowding 2,19 Water quality -1,39 Scenic rating 2,99 Predictability of water level -0,92

**Table 10.** Coefficients calibrated to local conditions and scaled to fishing model

Mathematically modeling site-choice for paddling on the Boardman River requires identifying both site characteristics and parameterization of the relative importance that paddlers attach to each of these characteristics. One study [24] presents a statistical model for paddling; however, it was developed for a different location and population. This study reflects whitewater paddling opportunities in Ireland. Although topography in Ireland is likely more varied than that of northern Lower Michigan, the Irish study considers a range

To apply this study [24], we calibrated the parameters to reflect the specifics of the Boardman River and the surrounding area. To accomplish this calibration for site characteristics, we rely on the perceptions of recreators, a tactic which has professional acceptance [25] because it is the recreators' perceptions of the site's characteristics, whether aligned with factual information or not, that drive site selection. The [24] researchers query paddlers' opinions by asking them to rate the rivers they paddle on a 1–5 scale. The relevant

We replicate this on the Boardman River by conducting an informal survey similar to the one used by [24], which reveals paddler's opinions on the site characteristics of the Boardman River and other nearby rivers. In the questionnaire, we ask respondents to rate their perceptions of the Boardman's features with respect to paddling on a 1–5 scale. The one exception to this 1–5 scale is the perceived quality of whitewater, which is based on a 0– 4 scale.9 Table 11 below reflects the average of the responses we received, and Table 10

9 Although Irish whitewaters are based on a 1–5 scale, we converted that to a 0–4 scale for this assessment to reflect the

We used information from Trails.com and the Michigan Atlas and Gazetteer [26] to compile a list of substitute sites. The list included the Au Sable, the Betsie, the Pine, and the Platte Rivers. As part of the questionnaire described above, we included a question about these substitutes and asked respondents to rate them in the same way that they rated the Boardman. Additionally, we provided the respondents with an opportunity to name other substitute sites and rate them. The responses to the questionnaire identified four potential substitute sites for the Boardman.

Table 12 below provides the information on the perceived site characteristics for the substitute sites. The second column of Table 12 contains an estimate of the total number of paddling days for the substitute sites. This number is a necessary input for modeling. We used a similar methodology to the top-down approach using verifiable data. The MDNR provides an estimate of the number of paddling days statewide [27]. Based on an estimate of the miles of navigable river statewide [28], we estimated the average number of days that a typical river mile supports. We applied that number to the number of river miles for the substitute sites. The results appear in Table 12.

The Boardman River enhances the recreation experience for a variety of trail activities, including hiking, walking, biking, and horseback riding. Several segments of the Boardman River support designated trails, particularly around the impoundments. In the segments farther upstream, portions of the Michigan Shore-to-Shore Riding Trail and the North Country Trail follow the Boardman.


The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 175

Because no appropriate empirically estimated site-choice model is available for trail activities, we develop site characteristics and parameters, based on expert judgment, and link them to the fishing and paddling model. For site characteristics, we have selected scenic quality and trail miles as the relevant site characteristic. As the paddling model also incorporates scenic beauty, we import the scenic beauty coefficient from the paddling specification, and apply it to the trail activities model. To specify the importance of trail miles, we rely on expert judgment. Table 14 contains the calibrated importance parameters

Parameter Mean Variance

Recreational spending by residents is not included in this assessment. The rationale behind this distinction is that local spending is transferred from one sector to another in the local economy [32–34]. If, for example, changes in the Boardman River result in increased recreational usage by residents, these residents may spend more money on bait, bottled water, and canoe rentals. However, it also means that locals spend less on other local activities. This specification assumes these local expenditure differentials offset one another with respect to local economic impacts. To estimate current expenditures on the Boardman River, we

Table 15 details the results of our research. For each of the four recreational activities, this table contains estimates of the spending per activity day. In some cases, a range is provided, which is explained below on a study-by-study basis. All estimates have been converted to 2007 dollars using a composite created from various consumer price indices (CPIs) that best reflect the expenditure categories. For example, if the original study provided a breakdown that revealed that one-third of the spending went toward lodging, one-third was spent on gas, and one-third was spent in restaurants, we created a composite inflation factor weighted to reflect the CPIs for lodging, gasoline, and restaurant meals at one-third each.

Recreational activity Dollars spent per visitor day (U.S. \$ 2007) Source

\$23,65 to \$74,58 [36]

\$96,87 [32]

\$14,06 [38]

\$29,23 [32]

Fishing \$24,27 [35]

Paddling \$37,10 [37]

Camping \$48,34 to \$65,29 [36]

Hiking \$18,87 to \$72,47 [36]

**Table 15.** Sources of recreational spending estimates

researched the publicly available information on recreation expenditures, by activity.

Scenic beauty 2,99 0,009085

**Table 14.** Coefficients calibrated to local conditions and scaled to fishing model

for trail activities.

Trail miles

**Table 12.** Current conditions of the representative substitute paddling sites

Public pressure estimates for trail activity days along the Boardman River are not readily available for most segments. We use a "top down" approach to estimate trail activity pressure. This approach starts with a total number of activity days and then allocates these days to sites based on trail miles. The trails along the Boardman River are used not exclusively for hiking, but also for biking, walking, and horseback riding. These latter activities can occur on streets and concrete sidewalks in neighborhoods, paved roads in rural areas, and on land without any developed trails. We have based our estimate of the number of Boardman River trail days on data that primarily reflect day hiking.

Table 13 shows the estimated number of days of trail activities on the Boardman River under current conditions. The number of resident days ranges from about 72,000 to 154,000 days per season while the number of visitor days ranges from about 18,000 to more than 23,000 days per season.

For the visitor days in the other segments, we use a similar methodology as we did for the resident days in these segments. The total number of visitor days is gleaned from tourism studies [29–31].


**Table 13.** Annual trail activity days on the Boardman River

Because no appropriate empirically estimated site-choice model is available for trail activities, we develop site characteristics and parameters, based on expert judgment, and link them to the fishing and paddling model. For site characteristics, we have selected scenic quality and trail miles as the relevant site characteristic. As the paddling model also incorporates scenic beauty, we import the scenic beauty coefficient from the paddling specification, and apply it to the trail activities model. To specify the importance of trail miles, we rely on expert judgment. Table 14 contains the calibrated importance parameters for trail activities.


**Table 14.** Coefficients calibrated to local conditions and scaled to fishing model

174 Environmental Land Use Planning

Number of trips

Current whitewater quality

**Table 12.** Current conditions of the representative substitute paddling sites

Segment Resident days Visitor days

**Table 13.** Annual trail activity days on the Boardman River

1 12 000 to 14 000 3 000 to 4 000 2 20 000 to 24 000 5 000 to 6 500 3 1 500 to 4 000 500 to 625 4 4 000 to 11 000 1 000 to 1 250 5 2 000 to 6 000 700 to 875 6a 800 to 2 000 300 to 375 6b 5 000 to 15 000 2 000 to 2 500 7 4 500 to 13 000 1 500 to 1 875 8 5 000 to 14 000 2 000 to 2 500 9 11 500 to 33 000 1 200 to 1 500 10 6 000 to 18 000 900 to 1 125 Total 72 300 to 154 000 18 100 to 23 125

Parking Crowding

Public pressure estimates for trail activity days along the Boardman River are not readily available for most segments. We use a "top down" approach to estimate trail activity pressure. This approach starts with a total number of activity days and then allocates these days to sites based on trail miles. The trails along the Boardman River are used not exclusively for hiking, but also for biking, walking, and horseback riding. These latter activities can occur on streets and concrete sidewalks in neighborhoods, paved roads in rural areas, and on land without any developed trails. We have based our estimate of the number of Boardman River trail days on data that primarily reflect day

Table 13 shows the estimated number of days of trail activities on the Boardman River under current conditions. The number of resident days ranges from about 72,000 to 154,000 days per season while the number of visitor days ranges from about 18,000 to more than

For the visitor days in the other segments, we use a similar methodology as we did for the resident days in these segments. The total number of visitor days is gleaned from tourism

Au Sable 54 000 0,0 3,7 3,7 4,7 4,0 4,5 Betsie 15 000 0,3 3,7 3,7 4,3 4,3 3,5 Pine River 11 000 2,0 4,7 3,7 4,7 5,0 4,5 Platte River 4 000 0,2 3,2 1,8 4,8 4,1 4,8

Water quality (pollution)

Scenic rating

Predictability of water level

Substitute sites

hiking.

23,000 days per season.

studies [29–31].

Recreational spending by residents is not included in this assessment. The rationale behind this distinction is that local spending is transferred from one sector to another in the local economy [32–34]. If, for example, changes in the Boardman River result in increased recreational usage by residents, these residents may spend more money on bait, bottled water, and canoe rentals. However, it also means that locals spend less on other local activities. This specification assumes these local expenditure differentials offset one another with respect to local economic impacts. To estimate current expenditures on the Boardman River, we researched the publicly available information on recreation expenditures, by activity.

Table 15 details the results of our research. For each of the four recreational activities, this table contains estimates of the spending per activity day. In some cases, a range is provided, which is explained below on a study-by-study basis. All estimates have been converted to 2007 dollars using a composite created from various consumer price indices (CPIs) that best reflect the expenditure categories. For example, if the original study provided a breakdown that revealed that one-third of the spending went toward lodging, one-third was spent on gas, and one-third was spent in restaurants, we created a composite inflation factor weighted to reflect the CPIs for lodging, gasoline, and restaurant meals at one-third each.


**Table 15.** Sources of recreational spending estimates

Site-specific data on the pressure of the Boardman River by campers are not readily available. However, an approximation can be developed from publicly available data based on information gleaned from various websites [39–40] and presented in Table 16. Only segments 8 and 9 have developed campsites. With the exception of Ranch Rudolph, all of the campgrounds along the Boardman are State Forest Campgrounds (SFCs).

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 177

Segment number Camping nights

8 3 000 to 5 000 9 1 000 to 1 500

Total 4 000 to 6 500

Fishing \$298 200 Paddling \$317 400 Camping \$207 300 Trail activities \$1 110 300 Total \$1 933 200

tailored to the Boardman River assessment.

**Table 17.** Annual number of camping nights spent along the Boardman River

the Boardman River spend almost \$2 million per year in the local economy.

Activity Recreational spending (U.S. \$/year)

**Table 18.** Current level of recreational spending by visitors to the Boardman River

the local economy from recreational visitors to the Boardman River.

Mean expenditures for each recreation activity are shown in Table 18. The table shows that visitors to the Boardman River spend almost \$2 million per year in the local economy. More than half of these expenditures are associated with trail activities by visitors. Table 18 shows the amount of visitor spending for each recreation activity. In total, recreational visitors to

To estimate impacts to the local economy, we used a program developed by researchers at Michigan State University called the Michigan Tourism Spending and Economic Impact Model (MITEIM).10 As described above, this program estimates economic impacts to the local economy by tracing the flow of the tourism dollars (direct effects) through the local economy. It provides an estimate of the sales, jobs, income, and tax revenues that accrue to

Tourism spending accounts for over \$1,3 million in direct sales to the local economy. Direct sales are less than the tourism expenditures due to the leakages from the local economy described earlier. When indirect and induced effects are included, the addition to the local

10 Some of these researchers were also involved in the development of IMPLAN (Impact Analysis for Planning). MITEIM is based on the same concept and parameters as IMPLAN. See reference [42]. We selected it for use in this assessment because it is specific to tourism in Michigan. We believe this program provides an impact analysis more

1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6a 0 6b 0 7 0

10 0

Based on this information, we use data from the MDNR to estimate the seasonal occupancy for a typical SFC site. The MDNR provides an estimate of the number of SFC campsites throughout the state [27]. The MDNR has also estimated the number of statewide camping nights at those SFCs annually from 2000 through 2006 [40]. Dividing the number of camping nights at SFCs by the number of SFC sites yields the typical number of camping nights that a campsite hosts during the season. Because camping activity likely varies from year to year due to weather differences, we use the range of seasonal days to estimate the occupancy of a typical SFC campsite during the season.


Sources: [39–40]

**Table 16.** Campsites along the Boardman River

According to the MDNR [27], virtually all camping occurs outside of the county of residence. Thus, for purposes of this assessment, we assume that all Boardman River campers are not residents of either Grand Traverse or Kalkaska County. The number of camping nights presented in Table 17 will be used in the tourism expenditures assessment presented elsewhere. This table shows that the number of annual camping nights spent along the Boardman River is between 4 000 and 6 500. The majority of these nights are located in Segment 8.

#### The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 177


**Table 17.** Annual number of camping nights spent along the Boardman River

176 Environmental Land Use Planning

typical SFC campsite during the season.

**Table 16.** Campsites along the Boardman River

8

located in Segment 8.

Sources: [39–40]

Site-specific data on the pressure of the Boardman River by campers are not readily available. However, an approximation can be developed from publicly available data based on information gleaned from various websites [39–40] and presented in Table 16. Only segments 8 and 9 have developed campsites. With the exception of Ranch Rudolph, all of

Based on this information, we use data from the MDNR to estimate the seasonal occupancy for a typical SFC site. The MDNR provides an estimate of the number of SFC campsites throughout the state [27]. The MDNR has also estimated the number of statewide camping nights at those SFCs annually from 2000 through 2006 [40]. Dividing the number of camping nights at SFCs by the number of SFC sites yields the typical number of camping nights that a campsite hosts during the season. Because camping activity likely varies from year to year due to weather differences, we use the range of seasonal days to estimate the occupancy of a

Segment Number Name of Campground Number of Campsites 1 None 0 2 None 0 3 None 0 4 None 0 5 None 0 6a None 0 6b None 0 7 None 0

> Forks SFC 8 Scheck's Place SFC 30

> Ranch Rudolph 25

9 Guerney Lake SFC 36 10 None 0 Total 149

According to the MDNR [27], virtually all camping occurs outside of the county of residence. Thus, for purposes of this assessment, we assume that all Boardman River campers are not residents of either Grand Traverse or Kalkaska County. The number of camping nights presented in Table 17 will be used in the tourism expenditures assessment presented elsewhere. This table shows that the number of annual camping nights spent along the Boardman River is between 4 000 and 6 500. The majority of these nights are

Scheck's Place Trail Camp (SFC) 50 (based on space for 200

individuals)

the campgrounds along the Boardman are State Forest Campgrounds (SFCs).

Mean expenditures for each recreation activity are shown in Table 18. The table shows that visitors to the Boardman River spend almost \$2 million per year in the local economy. More than half of these expenditures are associated with trail activities by visitors. Table 18 shows the amount of visitor spending for each recreation activity. In total, recreational visitors to the Boardman River spend almost \$2 million per year in the local economy.


**Table 18.** Current level of recreational spending by visitors to the Boardman River

To estimate impacts to the local economy, we used a program developed by researchers at Michigan State University called the Michigan Tourism Spending and Economic Impact Model (MITEIM).10 As described above, this program estimates economic impacts to the local economy by tracing the flow of the tourism dollars (direct effects) through the local economy. It provides an estimate of the sales, jobs, income, and tax revenues that accrue to the local economy from recreational visitors to the Boardman River.

Tourism spending accounts for over \$1,3 million in direct sales to the local economy. Direct sales are less than the tourism expenditures due to the leakages from the local economy described earlier. When indirect and induced effects are included, the addition to the local

<sup>10</sup> Some of these researchers were also involved in the development of IMPLAN (Impact Analysis for Planning). MITEIM is based on the same concept and parameters as IMPLAN. See reference [42]. We selected it for use in this assessment because it is specific to tourism in Michigan. We believe this program provides an impact analysis more tailored to the Boardman River assessment.

economy exceeds \$2 million. Almost 40 local jobs can be attributed to Boardman River visitors. Personal income refers to the portion of direct sales that become salaries and wages in the local economy. It is the contribution to the local economy, not counting the costs of non-labor inputs. Finally, the local tax revenue, associated with Traverse City's hotel tax is approximately \$7 000 per year.11

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

Total current assessed value (U.S. \$ millions)

Total no. of acres

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 179

parcels within ½ mile

Street Dam 1 304 233 \$137

Sabin Dam 166 403 \$9

Boardman Dam 61 504 \$5

Brown Bridge Dam 493 4 759 \$40

Pond to forks 69 576 \$5

The study [44] also has other features that correspond to the Boardman River assessment area. For example, the impoundments in this study are relatively small in size, ranging from 8 acres to 194 acres. The sizes of these impoundments correspond fairly well to the sizes of

Three of the Boardman River dams were used for electricity production. It is possible that

An equation including the hydraulic head, flow rate of the water, and a horsepower conversion constant is used to calculate the hydropower potential of the Boardman River

The constant is formed by taking the weight of water, 64,6 lb/ft3, and dividing it by the horsepower constants consisting of 550 ft lbs multiplied by 0,7457 kWh, both values are

The head for Sabin Dam (20 feet), Boardman Dam (41 feet), and Brown Bridge Dam (33 feet) were reported in the dam brochure from Traverse City Light and Power. The flow rate of the water is available from the U.S. Geological Survey Surface-Water Daily statistics for the Boardman River, site #04126970, which is located above Brown Bridge Road on the Boardman River at latitude 44°39'24", longitude –85°26'12". The daily flow rate is given in cubic feet per second and is the mean value for each day. This mean value can be used for

Power Head Flow Constant 64,4 / 550 0,7457 (13)

2 Boardman Lake 1 778 403 \$130

4 Sabin Pond 42 305 \$4

7 Brown Bridge Pond 8 276 \$1

9 North branch N/A — — 10 South branch N/A — — Total 3 921 7 459 \$331

Segment Description Number of residential

<sup>1</sup>From mouth to Union

<sup>5</sup>Keystone Pond and

<sup>6</sup>Inlet of Keystone to

<sup>8</sup>Inlet of Brown Bridge

**Table 19.** Residential property near the Boardman River

the impoundments along the Boardman River.

they could be used for electricity again.

equivalent to the unit of 1 horsepower.

dams.

<sup>3</sup>Inlet of Boardman Lake to

Changes to the dams on the Boardman River may affect property values, particularly residential property values. Commercial and industrial properties derive their values for their utility in generating an income stream. Changes in the Boardman River are unlikely to affect the income-generating ability of the nearby commercial and industrial properties.

Public lands generate value to society from their public uses, which we will capture through the recreation analyses. We do not anticipate that the current uses that of the public lands surrounding the Boardman River are likely to change with a change in the management strategy of one or more dams. That is, we would still expect these lands to support fishing, paddling, camping, and hiking to some extent even if one or more of the dams are removed. While the public lands have an asset value, it can only be realized through the sale of the land to a private party. Because we do not anticipate that changes in the Boardman River will result in the sale of public lands, we do not believe that a meaningful change in the public lands' asset value will occur.

We rely on a geographic information systems (GIS) database provided by Grand Traverse County [43] to describe the current values and key characteristics of the residential properties near the Boardman River.12 Table 19 summarizes these key features for residential properties within ½ mile of the Boardman River or its impoundments, by segment. The information in the table includes the number of residential parcels, the number of parcels with frontage, the total number of acres across the parcels, and the total assessed value of all of the properties. This table shows that there are nearly 4 000 residential parcels within a ½ mile of the Boardman River. For these parcels, the total amount of acreage sums to nearly 7 500 and their total value is more than \$331 million.

To estimate changes in residential property values associated with removal of one or more of the dams along the Boardman River, we adapt a statistical model developed by [44]. This study investigates the differences in value of residential properties near small impoundments and free-flowing rivers relative to properties near a recently removed impoundment. One of the most important features was that the study contain empirical analysis consistent with predicting changes in value that correspond to the potential dam removal scenarios for the Boardman River. The Provencher, Sarakinos, and Meyer study does so.

<sup>11</sup> To the extent that some visitors stay outside of Traverse City, then this estimate is an overestimate.

<sup>12</sup> Admittedly, the database from Grand Traverse County does not include residential properties in Kalkaska County. However, properties along the Boardman River in Kalkaska County are in Segments 9 and 10, well upstream from any of the dams. Dam removal will not materially affect properties in Kalkaska County.

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 179


**Table 19.** Residential property near the Boardman River

178 Environmental Land Use Planning

properties.

million.

does so.

approximately \$7 000 per year.11

public lands' asset value will occur.

economy exceeds \$2 million. Almost 40 local jobs can be attributed to Boardman River visitors. Personal income refers to the portion of direct sales that become salaries and wages in the local economy. It is the contribution to the local economy, not counting the costs of non-labor inputs. Finally, the local tax revenue, associated with Traverse City's hotel tax is

Changes to the dams on the Boardman River may affect property values, particularly residential property values. Commercial and industrial properties derive their values for their utility in generating an income stream. Changes in the Boardman River are unlikely to affect the income-generating ability of the nearby commercial and industrial

Public lands generate value to society from their public uses, which we will capture through the recreation analyses. We do not anticipate that the current uses that of the public lands surrounding the Boardman River are likely to change with a change in the management strategy of one or more dams. That is, we would still expect these lands to support fishing, paddling, camping, and hiking to some extent even if one or more of the dams are removed. While the public lands have an asset value, it can only be realized through the sale of the land to a private party. Because we do not anticipate that changes in the Boardman River will result in the sale of public lands, we do not believe that a meaningful change in the

We rely on a geographic information systems (GIS) database provided by Grand Traverse County [43] to describe the current values and key characteristics of the residential properties near the Boardman River.12 Table 19 summarizes these key features for residential properties within ½ mile of the Boardman River or its impoundments, by segment. The information in the table includes the number of residential parcels, the number of parcels with frontage, the total number of acres across the parcels, and the total assessed value of all of the properties. This table shows that there are nearly 4 000 residential parcels within a ½ mile of the Boardman River. For these parcels, the total amount of acreage sums to nearly 7 500 and their total value is more than \$331

To estimate changes in residential property values associated with removal of one or more of the dams along the Boardman River, we adapt a statistical model developed by [44]. This study investigates the differences in value of residential properties near small impoundments and free-flowing rivers relative to properties near a recently removed impoundment. One of the most important features was that the study contain empirical analysis consistent with predicting changes in value that correspond to the potential dam removal scenarios for the Boardman River. The Provencher, Sarakinos, and Meyer study

12 Admittedly, the database from Grand Traverse County does not include residential properties in Kalkaska County. However, properties along the Boardman River in Kalkaska County are in Segments 9 and 10, well upstream from any

11 To the extent that some visitors stay outside of Traverse City, then this estimate is an overestimate.

of the dams. Dam removal will not materially affect properties in Kalkaska County.

The study [44] also has other features that correspond to the Boardman River assessment area. For example, the impoundments in this study are relatively small in size, ranging from 8 acres to 194 acres. The sizes of these impoundments correspond fairly well to the sizes of the impoundments along the Boardman River.

Three of the Boardman River dams were used for electricity production. It is possible that they could be used for electricity again.

An equation including the hydraulic head, flow rate of the water, and a horsepower conversion constant is used to calculate the hydropower potential of the Boardman River dams.

$$\text{Power} = \text{Head} \bullet \text{Flow} \bullet \text{Constant} \left(64, 4 \;/ \; 550 \bullet 0, 7457 \right) \tag{13}$$

The constant is formed by taking the weight of water, 64,6 lb/ft3, and dividing it by the horsepower constants consisting of 550 ft lbs multiplied by 0,7457 kWh, both values are equivalent to the unit of 1 horsepower.

The head for Sabin Dam (20 feet), Boardman Dam (41 feet), and Brown Bridge Dam (33 feet) were reported in the dam brochure from Traverse City Light and Power. The flow rate of the water is available from the U.S. Geological Survey Surface-Water Daily statistics for the Boardman River, site #04126970, which is located above Brown Bridge Road on the Boardman River at latitude 44°39'24", longitude –85°26'12". The daily flow rate is given in cubic feet per second and is the mean value for each day. This mean value can be used for each of the 24 hours in a day. Current data supported are only from the date 30 September 2007 and earlier. If the rate of flow is below 100 cubic feet per second (CFS), then the efficiency of the power produced is reduced, therefore; any hourly rate that is below 100 CFS, is not calculated and the rate for that hour is zero.

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 181

under this alternative than current conditions do, consequently changing recreational paddling opportunities. The former impoundments are predicted to become more scenic,

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 25 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$112 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,38 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourism-

In addition to the recreation and tourism changes described above, Alternative 25 will result in likely changes in residential property values in parcels near Sabin Pond and Keystone Pond. We find that the value of an individual residential parcel in the vicinity of Sabin Pond and Keystone Pond could fall, on average, by as much as 6 percent following removal of the dams, if all other influences on property values are held constant. About two years after the removal, the affected properties are predicted to begin to increase in value. Twenty years after removal, the properties, on average, could increase in value by as much as 18 percent, or approximately one percent per year, relative to current

Initially if Alternative 25 were implemented, within ½ mile of the Boardman River the aggregate assessed value of the properties could fall by as much as \$0,6 million. Over time, the aggregate assessed value may increase by as much as \$1,7 million. The present value of the stream of property value impacts is \$1,04 million. When considering the results, it is important to keep in mind that calculated changes in value represent the expected change associated only with dam removal. Changes in market values are likely to occur over time

In terms of the property value impacts, it is important to understand several aspects. First, the impacts will not be equally distributed across residents of Grand Traverse County. Initially, individual property owners may experience a decline in the value of their individual properties that is proportionally greater than the overall impact. Over time, those same owners may experience a gain in value that is proportionally greater than the overall impact. Second, the statistical model applied for this assessment represents the average impact. Not all affected properties will experience the average impact. Some individual parcels may increase or decrease in value in amounts greater to, or less than, the predicted

With fish passage modifications on all four dams, we anticipate that recreation opportunities will improve in some of the Boardman River segments. Specifically, these modifications will improve fishing somewhat in the river segments downstream of Brown Bridge Pond. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve somewhat. The dam modifications will permit the passage of

as well.

conditions.

average impact. Alternative 41a:

based jobs will increase by 4 jobs.

for reasons unrelated to dam removal.

An important feature of the annual profit function is that while hourly quantities of generation are easily identified, hourly prices of electricity and RECs going forward through time. In markets that are expected to transition to deregulation, the uncertainty of future prices and resultant low availability of consistent price estimates further complicates the problem.

## **2. Conclusions**

The socioeconomic impacts associated with alternative outcomes for the Boardman River dams were evaluated by performing counterfactual experiments that simulate changes in the current conditions that arise from various disposition alternatives. These simulations estimate changes in recreational usage, tourism expenditures, property values, and electricity production that result in changes in one or more of the existing dams. Corresponding changes in the river characteristics that influence recreation, property values, and electricity production were estimated for each alternative. These were used to quantify the associated changes in social welfare for various alternatives, providing an empirical basis for decision-making. There were 91 potential management options across the four dams. Of these, the following seven were evaluated most closely.

### Alternative 1:

Alternative 1 is repairing and retaining the dams. The repairs to the dams will not materially alter the fishing or recreation opportunities, or the existing nature of the impoundments. We predict no measurable impact on resident recreation values, visitor expenditures, or property values. The characteristics of the existing fishery will not change. Nor will the paddling opportunities. We expect no changes to the existing trails and campsites. Similarly, we predict no changes in property values associated with the implementation of Alternative 1.

#### Alternative 25:

With the removal of Sabin and Boardman dams, we anticipate that the corresponding changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will change the recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. Under Alternative 25, the impoundments associated with these dams will become free-flowing river segments. The removal of the dams will change the nature of the fishery for several segments. Specifically, anadromous species are predicted to become available as far upstream as the Brown Bridge Dam. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve somewhat. Boardman Lake, however, will continue to offer warm water fishing experiences. Moreover, some segments will offer more "whitewater" under this alternative than current conditions do, consequently changing recreational paddling opportunities. The former impoundments are predicted to become more scenic, as well.

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 25 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$112 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,38 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourismbased jobs will increase by 4 jobs.

In addition to the recreation and tourism changes described above, Alternative 25 will result in likely changes in residential property values in parcels near Sabin Pond and Keystone Pond. We find that the value of an individual residential parcel in the vicinity of Sabin Pond and Keystone Pond could fall, on average, by as much as 6 percent following removal of the dams, if all other influences on property values are held constant. About two years after the removal, the affected properties are predicted to begin to increase in value. Twenty years after removal, the properties, on average, could increase in value by as much as 18 percent, or approximately one percent per year, relative to current conditions.

Initially if Alternative 25 were implemented, within ½ mile of the Boardman River the aggregate assessed value of the properties could fall by as much as \$0,6 million. Over time, the aggregate assessed value may increase by as much as \$1,7 million. The present value of the stream of property value impacts is \$1,04 million. When considering the results, it is important to keep in mind that calculated changes in value represent the expected change associated only with dam removal. Changes in market values are likely to occur over time for reasons unrelated to dam removal.

In terms of the property value impacts, it is important to understand several aspects. First, the impacts will not be equally distributed across residents of Grand Traverse County. Initially, individual property owners may experience a decline in the value of their individual properties that is proportionally greater than the overall impact. Over time, those same owners may experience a gain in value that is proportionally greater than the overall impact. Second, the statistical model applied for this assessment represents the average impact. Not all affected properties will experience the average impact. Some individual parcels may increase or decrease in value in amounts greater to, or less than, the predicted average impact.

### Alternative 41a:

180 Environmental Land Use Planning

problem.

**2. Conclusions** 

evaluated most closely.

Alternative 1:

Alternative 1. Alternative 25:

CFS, is not calculated and the rate for that hour is zero.

each of the 24 hours in a day. Current data supported are only from the date 30 September 2007 and earlier. If the rate of flow is below 100 cubic feet per second (CFS), then the efficiency of the power produced is reduced, therefore; any hourly rate that is below 100

An important feature of the annual profit function is that while hourly quantities of generation are easily identified, hourly prices of electricity and RECs going forward through time. In markets that are expected to transition to deregulation, the uncertainty of future prices and resultant low availability of consistent price estimates further complicates the

The socioeconomic impacts associated with alternative outcomes for the Boardman River dams were evaluated by performing counterfactual experiments that simulate changes in the current conditions that arise from various disposition alternatives. These simulations estimate changes in recreational usage, tourism expenditures, property values, and electricity production that result in changes in one or more of the existing dams. Corresponding changes in the river characteristics that influence recreation, property values, and electricity production were estimated for each alternative. These were used to quantify the associated changes in social welfare for various alternatives, providing an empirical basis for decision-making. There were 91 potential management options across the four dams. Of these, the following seven were

Alternative 1 is repairing and retaining the dams. The repairs to the dams will not materially alter the fishing or recreation opportunities, or the existing nature of the impoundments. We predict no measurable impact on resident recreation values, visitor expenditures, or property values. The characteristics of the existing fishery will not change. Nor will the paddling opportunities. We expect no changes to the existing trails and campsites. Similarly, we predict no changes in property values associated with the implementation of

With the removal of Sabin and Boardman dams, we anticipate that the corresponding changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will change the recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. Under Alternative 25, the impoundments associated with these dams will become free-flowing river segments. The removal of the dams will change the nature of the fishery for several segments. Specifically, anadromous species are predicted to become available as far upstream as the Brown Bridge Dam. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve somewhat. Boardman Lake, however, will continue to offer warm water fishing experiences. Moreover, some segments will offer more "whitewater"

With fish passage modifications on all four dams, we anticipate that recreation opportunities will improve in some of the Boardman River segments. Specifically, these modifications will improve fishing somewhat in the river segments downstream of Brown Bridge Pond. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve somewhat. The dam modifications will permit the passage of

anadromous fish species as far upstream as the north and south branches. The existing impoundments will continue to support only warm water fisheries. None of the modifications will result in improvements to the existing whitewater features or scenic quality of the segments. Additionally, we do not anticipate any changes in property values associated with the dam modifications.

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 183

impoundment is predicted to become more scenic, as well. The existing warm water fisheries for Boardman Lake, Keystone Pond, and Brown Bridge Pond will not be materially

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 43 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$133 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,50 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourism-

In addition to impacts on recreation values and tourism expenditures, the removal of Sabin Dam will likely affect the property values of residential parcels near the existing impoundment. The above discussion related to Alternative 25 provides the context and caveats associated with estimated changes in property values. Total assessed value of residential parcels within ½ mile of the Boardman River would change if Alternative 43 were implemented. Initially, the aggregate assessed value of the properties could fall by as much as \$0,2 million. Over time, the aggregate assessed value may increase by as much as

With the removal of Sabin, Boardman, and Brown Bridge Dams, we anticipate that the corresponding changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will result in changes in recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. Under this alternative, Sabin Pond, Keystone Pond, and Brown Bridge Pond will become free-flowing river segments. The removal of these dams will change the nature of the fishery not only for the existing impoundments, but for other segments as well. Specifically, anadromous fish species are predicted to become available as far upstream as the north and south branches. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve. Boardman Lake, however, will continue to offer warm water fishing experiences. Moreover, some segments will offer more "whitewater" under this alternative than current conditions do, consequently changing recreational paddling opportunities. The former

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 79 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$241 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,58 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourism-

Finally, property values near the current impoundments will likely be affected by the dam removals. The above discussion related to Alternative 25 provides the context and caveats associated with estimated changes in property values that result from the implementation of

affected.

Alternative 79:

based jobs will increase by 4 jobs.

\$0,7 million. The present value of this change is \$0,43 million.

impoundments are predicted to become more scenic, as well.

based jobs will increase by 5 jobs.

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 41 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$83 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,44 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourismbased jobs will increase by 4 jobs per year.

#### Alternative 41b:

Alternative 41b adds re-powering each of the dams to the fish passage modifications of Alternative 41a. Because the re-powering does not influence the river differently from 41a, impacts are identical except for the value of electricity generated. Electricity quantities are identified using a combination of river flow and dam-specific information, including head and turbine efficiency as identified in [45]. At the expected level of hourly generation and historical hourly prices annual revenues are estimated at \$452 000. Michigan's "21st Century Electric Energy Plan" [46] recommends a portfolio standard that requires load-serving entities to provide 10 percent of their energy sales from renewable energy options by the end of 2015.13 Load-serving entities can meet the standard in several ways including buying qualifying renewable energy credits.14 Revenue from renewable energy credits is estimated at \$15 per megawatt hour beginning in 2015. With this value and electricity prices that increase at 3% the estimated net present value over 30 years for re-powering the dams is \$9 100 000.

#### Alternative 43:

With the removal of Sabin dam and modifications of Boardman and Brown Bridge Dams, we anticipate that changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will alter recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. Under this alternative, Sabin Pond will become a free-flowing river segment. The removal of Sabin Dam will change the nature of the fishery for this segment. In addition, the dam modifications will permit the passage of anadromous species as far upstream as the north and south branches. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve. Moreover, some segments will offer more "whitewater" under this alternative than current conditions do, consequently changing recreational paddling opportunities. The former

<sup>13</sup> The Michigan Public Service Commission will review the performance of the program before 2015 and decide whether to extend the goal to 20 percent of energy sales from renewable energy options by the end of 2025.

<sup>14</sup> A renewable energy credit is a "unique, independently certified, verifiable record of the production of one megawatt hour of renewable energy."

impoundment is predicted to become more scenic, as well. The existing warm water fisheries for Boardman Lake, Keystone Pond, and Brown Bridge Pond will not be materially affected.

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 43 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$133 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,50 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourismbased jobs will increase by 4 jobs.

In addition to impacts on recreation values and tourism expenditures, the removal of Sabin Dam will likely affect the property values of residential parcels near the existing impoundment. The above discussion related to Alternative 25 provides the context and caveats associated with estimated changes in property values. Total assessed value of residential parcels within ½ mile of the Boardman River would change if Alternative 43 were implemented. Initially, the aggregate assessed value of the properties could fall by as much as \$0,2 million. Over time, the aggregate assessed value may increase by as much as \$0,7 million. The present value of this change is \$0,43 million.

#### Alternative 79:

182 Environmental Land Use Planning

Alternative 41b:

100 000.

Alternative 43:

hour of renewable energy."

associated with the dam modifications.

based jobs will increase by 4 jobs per year.

anadromous fish species as far upstream as the north and south branches. The existing impoundments will continue to support only warm water fisheries. None of the modifications will result in improvements to the existing whitewater features or scenic quality of the segments. Additionally, we do not anticipate any changes in property values

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 41 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$83 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,44 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourism-

Alternative 41b adds re-powering each of the dams to the fish passage modifications of Alternative 41a. Because the re-powering does not influence the river differently from 41a, impacts are identical except for the value of electricity generated. Electricity quantities are identified using a combination of river flow and dam-specific information, including head and turbine efficiency as identified in [45]. At the expected level of hourly generation and historical hourly prices annual revenues are estimated at \$452 000. Michigan's "21st Century Electric Energy Plan" [46] recommends a portfolio standard that requires load-serving entities to provide 10 percent of their energy sales from renewable energy options by the end of 2015.13 Load-serving entities can meet the standard in several ways including buying qualifying renewable energy credits.14 Revenue from renewable energy credits is estimated at \$15 per megawatt hour beginning in 2015. With this value and electricity prices that increase at 3% the estimated net present value over 30 years for re-powering the dams is \$9

With the removal of Sabin dam and modifications of Boardman and Brown Bridge Dams, we anticipate that changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will alter recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. Under this alternative, Sabin Pond will become a free-flowing river segment. The removal of Sabin Dam will change the nature of the fishery for this segment. In addition, the dam modifications will permit the passage of anadromous species as far upstream as the north and south branches. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve. Moreover, some segments will offer more "whitewater" under this alternative than current conditions do, consequently changing recreational paddling opportunities. The former

13 The Michigan Public Service Commission will review the performance of the program before 2015 and decide

14 A renewable energy credit is a "unique, independently certified, verifiable record of the production of one megawatt

whether to extend the goal to 20 percent of energy sales from renewable energy options by the end of 2025.

With the removal of Sabin, Boardman, and Brown Bridge Dams, we anticipate that the corresponding changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will result in changes in recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. Under this alternative, Sabin Pond, Keystone Pond, and Brown Bridge Pond will become free-flowing river segments. The removal of these dams will change the nature of the fishery not only for the existing impoundments, but for other segments as well. Specifically, anadromous fish species are predicted to become available as far upstream as the north and south branches. In addition, catch rates for anadromous fish species in western Grand Traverse Bay are predicted to improve. Boardman Lake, however, will continue to offer warm water fishing experiences. Moreover, some segments will offer more "whitewater" under this alternative than current conditions do, consequently changing recreational paddling opportunities. The former impoundments are predicted to become more scenic, as well.

Relative to current conditions, implementing Alternative 79 will increase the welfare of resident recreators by approximately \$241 000. This welfare increase represents the present value over 30 years. In addition, we expect tourism spending to increase. The present value estimate of the increase in tourism spending over 30 years is \$1,58 million. Finally, once the fishery improvements have realized their maximum potential, we expect that the tourismbased jobs will increase by 5 jobs.

Finally, property values near the current impoundments will likely be affected by the dam removals. The above discussion related to Alternative 25 provides the context and caveats associated with estimated changes in property values that result from the implementation of

Alternative 79. The total assessed value of residential parcels within ½ mile of the Boardman River would change if Alternative 79 were implemented. Initially, the aggregate assessed value of the properties could fall by as much as \$0,6 million. Over time, the aggregate assessed value may increase by as much as \$1,9 million. The associated present value is \$1,18 million.

The Role of Socioeconomic and Behavioral Modeling

in an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Dam-Management Study: Case Study of the Boardman River Dams 185

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Alternative 81:

With the removal of Sabin, Boardman, and Brown Bridge Dams and modifications to the Union Street Dam, we anticipate that the corresponding changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will result in changes in recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. However, in the expert judgment of the fisheries biologists working on this project, the measurable changes to recreation opportunities are no different from those that will occur under Alternative 79. The estimated economic value associated with residents' recreation experiences and the estimated increase in tourism spending and jobs are as reported above. Similarly, because the dam removals are the same under Alternative 79 and Alternative 81, the estimated impacts on property values under Alternative 81 are the same as those under Alternative 79, which are reported above.

Based on the results of the integrated process, the dam owners decided to remove the Sabin, Boardman, and Brown Bridge dams and modify the Union Street dam for fish passage. Stated environmental benefits include enhancing and restoring 3.4 miles of native cold water habitat, reconnecting 160 miles of high-quality river habitat, and restoring more than 250 acres of wetlands. Brown Bridge dam has been drawn down, and is scheduled for removal in summer 2012. Environmental permitting for removing the other dams is underway.

## **Author details**

Matthew F. Bingham and Jason C. Kinnell *Veritas Economic Consulting, Cary, NC, USA* 

## **3. References**


[4] McFadden D (1981) Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice. In: Manski C, McFadden D, editors. Structural Analysis of Discrete Data. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. pp. 198-272.

184 Environmental Land Use Planning

\$1,18 million.

Alternative 81:

above.

underway.

**Author details** 

**3. References** 

297 p.

Matthew F. Bingham and Jason C. Kinnell *Veritas Economic Consulting, Cary, NC, USA* 

Cambridge University Press. 220 p.

Economics 3(4): 303-328.

Alternative 79. The total assessed value of residential parcels within ½ mile of the Boardman River would change if Alternative 79 were implemented. Initially, the aggregate assessed value of the properties could fall by as much as \$0,6 million. Over time, the aggregate assessed value may increase by as much as \$1,9 million. The associated present value is

With the removal of Sabin, Boardman, and Brown Bridge Dams and modifications to the Union Street Dam, we anticipate that the corresponding changes in stream hydrology and fish habitats will result in changes in recreation opportunities associated with the Boardman River. However, in the expert judgment of the fisheries biologists working on this project, the measurable changes to recreation opportunities are no different from those that will occur under Alternative 79. The estimated economic value associated with residents' recreation experiences and the estimated increase in tourism spending and jobs are as reported above. Similarly, because the dam removals are the same under Alternative 79 and Alternative 81, the estimated impacts on property values under Alternative 81 are the same as those under Alternative 79, which are reported

Based on the results of the integrated process, the dam owners decided to remove the Sabin, Boardman, and Brown Bridge dams and modify the Union Street dam for fish passage. Stated environmental benefits include enhancing and restoring 3.4 miles of native cold water habitat, reconnecting 160 miles of high-quality river habitat, and restoring more than 250 acres of wetlands. Brown Bridge dam has been drawn down, and is scheduled for removal in summer 2012. Environmental permitting for removing the other dams is

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**Section 3** 

**Role of Governments, Community Grants,** 

**Use Planning** 

**and Tradable Permits in Environmental Land** 


**Role of Governments, Community Grants, and Tradable Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning** 

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**Chapter 9** 

© 2012 Smith, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,

© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,

distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Community grants are used by a wide variety of government and non-government bodies at different levels across many jurisdictions. They may be particularly prevalent among local and regional governments and in policy sectors where community development is an approach or goal. Yet there has been little rigorous research into this practice. Few formal evaluation studies have been reported. There is no available synthesis of the rationale behind such programs, effective process designs, or their success in achieving intended outcomes. Planners and other professionals who initiate such programs may have little more than intuition to guide them. Thus, the objective of this Chapter is to review the literature on the use of community grants as a tool for urban and regional planning practice. This review is supplemented with evidence from the author's own experience of these programs within two western Canadian provinces; while these cases are specific to a particular geographic and political context, the findings are likely generalizable to urban governments in (at the least) other Western liberal democratic regimes. The Chapter concludes by drawing on the literature and cases to make suggestions for urban planning professionals about how to effectively use community granting as a community

A working definition of community grants is as follows: "the provision of funding to community groups or organizations by outside parties through a competitive application process" [1: p. 242]. My focus here is primarily upon what I define as small grants, from several hundred to a few thousand US or Canadian dollars—which is typically a miniscule proportion of the funders' total budget. Micro-grants [2-3] and mini-grants [4-6] are other terms which have been used to describe funding allocations

**Community Grants as an** 

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

Neale Smith

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/51560

**1. Introduction** 

development tool.

of this size.

**Instrument of Planning Practice** 

## **Chapter 9**

## **Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice**

Neale Smith

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/51560

## **1. Introduction**

Community grants are used by a wide variety of government and non-government bodies at different levels across many jurisdictions. They may be particularly prevalent among local and regional governments and in policy sectors where community development is an approach or goal. Yet there has been little rigorous research into this practice. Few formal evaluation studies have been reported. There is no available synthesis of the rationale behind such programs, effective process designs, or their success in achieving intended outcomes. Planners and other professionals who initiate such programs may have little more than intuition to guide them. Thus, the objective of this Chapter is to review the literature on the use of community grants as a tool for urban and regional planning practice. This review is supplemented with evidence from the author's own experience of these programs within two western Canadian provinces; while these cases are specific to a particular geographic and political context, the findings are likely generalizable to urban governments in (at the least) other Western liberal democratic regimes. The Chapter concludes by drawing on the literature and cases to make suggestions for urban planning professionals about how to effectively use community granting as a community development tool.

A working definition of community grants is as follows: "the provision of funding to community groups or organizations by outside parties through a competitive application process" [1: p. 242]. My focus here is primarily upon what I define as small grants, from several hundred to a few thousand US or Canadian dollars—which is typically a miniscule proportion of the funders' total budget. Micro-grants [2-3] and mini-grants [4-6] are other terms which have been used to describe funding allocations of this size.

© 2012 Smith, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2012 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

## **2. Community grants in British Columbia: A descriptive overview**

There is no exhaustive list or record of community granting programs. Given their widespread use, to prepare any comprehensive inventory is probably a hopeless task and out of date before it is even begun. Nevertheless, to demonstrate how community grants are being used in one contemporary setting, I provide this overview from the province of British Columbia, Canada. A simple web search easily finds these and many other examples.

Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice 193

prevention5. The city of New Westminster offers grants for arts and culture, amateur sports, environmental awareness and education, and other areas6; this is likely quite typical of the

The Union of BC Municipalities, the peak association representing the province's local governments, oversaw a Community Health Promotion Fund from 2005-20097. This \$5 million pool of funds was used to support applications on healthy living and chronic disease prevention projects. Over this period, 146 projects were funded; groups within the city of Vancouver received money in three of the four fiscal years. These were larger grants than in many other cases, being up to \$35,000 in some instances. Skill development and partnership

British Columbia's Ministry of Health has also set aside envelopes of funding that could be and were used for community granting. An example is the Community Food Action Initiative, offered in all five of the province's regionally-based health authorities (RHAs). It supports projects related to food security, broadly defined. After a three-year pilot phase (2005-2008) this program was taken up by the health authorities and funded through their core budgets. Some evaluation reports are available [8-10]. Within the city of Vancouver, the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority (VCHA) has offered since 2008 health promotion

Other sectors, too, such as justice or recreation, are involved in the granting game. Thus, the above is an illustrative rather than a comprehensive overview, but serves to demonstrate the range of granting activity which occurs in different sectors often overlapping within a geographic jurisdiction. As it also suggests, there is extensive commonality between urban planning projects with community development intent and health promotion efforts in the health sector. Many of the projects funded through health promotion community grant projects could have equally easily been supported by grant programs initiated by a city or town planning department; many of the same community organizations regularly receive grants from both areas. The social determinants of health, and social sustainability, are concepts around which urban planning and health promotion overlap [11-12]. That local governments have a crucial role in creating conditions for health is an original premise of the healthy cities/communities movement pursued in Europe, North America, Australia and

Community Foundations and other not-for-profit, third sector organizations such as the United Way also undertake community granting on an on-going basis. Substantial amounts of money can be involved here. Fifty (50) community foundations across the province of British Columbia belong to the national association, Community Foundations of Canada. Several of these, including the Vancouver Foundation, operate in the Lower Mainland/Fraser Valley region of the province. The Vancouver Foundation disbursed \$41

7 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, http://www.ubcm.ca/EN/main/funding/healthy-communities/community-

range of activities funded by many other local governments across BC and elsewhere.

creation were some of the outcomes measured across the funded projects [7].

grants through its Healthy Living Program.

5 City of North Vancouver, http://www.cnv.org//server.aspx?c=3&i=211

6 City of New Westminster, http://www.newwestcity.ca/business/grants/community\_grants.php

elsewhere [13-18].

health-promotion-fund.html

**Figure 1.** British Columbia's Lower Mainland

A number of local governments in the Lower Mainland region of the province, the metropolitan Vancouver area, have at least one grant program administered by the municipality. For instance, in the city of Vancouver, the Greenest City Neighbourhood Grants1 most recently funded 16 community groups for projects in areas such as waste reduction, local food, and active transportation. The Community Enhancement Partnership Program in the city of Surrey2 offers grants of up to \$3000 to local groups or residents for projects to beautify their neighbourhoods. Gardens and landscaping, graffiti removal, and decorative lighting are some examples of what might be funded. The city of Richmond has a formal policy which sets aside grants in three areas: arts and culture, parks and recreation, and health and social development3. In the city's 2012 budget, the only line item to receive additional money was the grant program4. In the city of North Vancouver, an annual grant process distributes money to community groups for both operating expenses and particular project initiatives. Funding is also offered in specific areas such as child care, sustainability, housing, and violence

<sup>1</sup> City of Vancouver, http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20110614/documents/a2.pdf

<sup>2</sup> City of Surrey, http://www.surrey.ca/files/cepp\_2012\_overview.pdf

<sup>3</sup> City of Richmond, http://www.richmond.ca/services/socialplan/citygrant.htm

<sup>4</sup> City of Richmond, http://www.richmond.ca/news/city/2012budgetsapproved.htm

prevention5. The city of New Westminster offers grants for arts and culture, amateur sports, environmental awareness and education, and other areas6; this is likely quite typical of the range of activities funded by many other local governments across BC and elsewhere.

192 Environmental Land Use Planning

**Figure 1.** British Columbia's Lower Mainland

1 City of Vancouver, http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20110614/documents/a2.pdf

2 City of Surrey, http://www.surrey.ca/files/cepp\_2012\_overview.pdf 3 City of Richmond, http://www.richmond.ca/services/socialplan/citygrant.htm 4 City of Richmond, http://www.richmond.ca/news/city/2012budgetsapproved.htm

**2. Community grants in British Columbia: A descriptive overview** 

There is no exhaustive list or record of community granting programs. Given their widespread use, to prepare any comprehensive inventory is probably a hopeless task and out of date before it is even begun. Nevertheless, to demonstrate how community grants are being used in one contemporary setting, I provide this overview from the province of British Columbia, Canada. A simple web search easily finds these and many other examples.

A number of local governments in the Lower Mainland region of the province, the metropolitan Vancouver area, have at least one grant program administered by the municipality. For instance, in the city of Vancouver, the Greenest City Neighbourhood Grants1 most recently funded 16 community groups for projects in areas such as waste reduction, local food, and active transportation. The Community Enhancement Partnership Program in the city of Surrey2 offers grants of up to \$3000 to local groups or residents for projects to beautify their neighbourhoods. Gardens and landscaping, graffiti removal, and decorative lighting are some examples of what might be funded. The city of Richmond has a formal policy which sets aside grants in three areas: arts and culture, parks and recreation, and health and social development3. In the city's 2012 budget, the only line item to receive additional money was the grant program4. In the city of North Vancouver, an annual grant process distributes money to community groups for both operating expenses and particular project initiatives. Funding is also offered in specific areas such as child care, sustainability, housing, and violence The Union of BC Municipalities, the peak association representing the province's local governments, oversaw a Community Health Promotion Fund from 2005-20097. This \$5 million pool of funds was used to support applications on healthy living and chronic disease prevention projects. Over this period, 146 projects were funded; groups within the city of Vancouver received money in three of the four fiscal years. These were larger grants than in many other cases, being up to \$35,000 in some instances. Skill development and partnership creation were some of the outcomes measured across the funded projects [7].

British Columbia's Ministry of Health has also set aside envelopes of funding that could be and were used for community granting. An example is the Community Food Action Initiative, offered in all five of the province's regionally-based health authorities (RHAs). It supports projects related to food security, broadly defined. After a three-year pilot phase (2005-2008) this program was taken up by the health authorities and funded through their core budgets. Some evaluation reports are available [8-10]. Within the city of Vancouver, the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority (VCHA) has offered since 2008 health promotion grants through its Healthy Living Program.

Other sectors, too, such as justice or recreation, are involved in the granting game. Thus, the above is an illustrative rather than a comprehensive overview, but serves to demonstrate the range of granting activity which occurs in different sectors often overlapping within a geographic jurisdiction. As it also suggests, there is extensive commonality between urban planning projects with community development intent and health promotion efforts in the health sector. Many of the projects funded through health promotion community grant projects could have equally easily been supported by grant programs initiated by a city or town planning department; many of the same community organizations regularly receive grants from both areas. The social determinants of health, and social sustainability, are concepts around which urban planning and health promotion overlap [11-12]. That local governments have a crucial role in creating conditions for health is an original premise of the healthy cities/communities movement pursued in Europe, North America, Australia and elsewhere [13-18].

Community Foundations and other not-for-profit, third sector organizations such as the United Way also undertake community granting on an on-going basis. Substantial amounts of money can be involved here. Fifty (50) community foundations across the province of British Columbia belong to the national association, Community Foundations of Canada. Several of these, including the Vancouver Foundation, operate in the Lower Mainland/Fraser Valley region of the province. The Vancouver Foundation disbursed \$41

<sup>5</sup> City of North Vancouver, http://www.cnv.org//server.aspx?c=3&i=211

<sup>6</sup> City of New Westminster, http://www.newwestcity.ca/business/grants/community\_grants.php

<sup>7</sup> Union of British Columbia Municipalities, http://www.ubcm.ca/EN/main/funding/healthy-communities/communityhealth-promotion-fund.html

million in its most recent yearly program8. It is important to note that not all foundations limit recipients of their largesse to those operating within their own municipality. To the author's knowledge, whether there are or should be significant differences in the rationale for and design of grant programs between the public and not-for-profit sectors is a question that has not been previously studied.

Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice 195

community planning, argued that the project had symbolic rather than practical value, in that it might generate conversation about sustainable food systems; one participant called the mini-fields a 'living billboard' [22]. Conversely, the symbolic aspect was precisely what many critics, such as City Caucus blog, attacked9. Clearly however, the program fit the criteria established by city staff, and it is enthusiastically championed in some quarters.

**3.2. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Healthy Living Program: community** 

Since 2008, this program has funded 22 community groups, out of 86 applicants in total. Approximately \$134,000 has been disbursed; the available budget for this program has been less than 15% of the amount requested by interested community participants. This

Grants are presently available for a maximum of \$8000, for discrete project activities to be carried out over a planned one-year time span. Projects are mandated to focus on at least one of the Healthy Living Program (HLP)'s priority areas of healthy eating, active living, and tobacco reduction. Projects must substantially target individuals between 35-64 years of age, from an identified disadvantaged or vulnerable population: e.g., low-income, aboriginal, or high-risk ethno-cultural communities. Eligible recipient organizations are non-profit community-based groups or organizations located in (and/or primarily serving a population within) the geographic boundaries of the city of Vancouver. Applicants are expected to obtain support of community partner agencies. A mid-term report and final report are expected, as is participation in a Showcase event, during which each project can

HLP initiates each call for proposals 3 months prior to deadline. The grant is promoted through health promotion websites and newsletters as well as by health authority staff. There is some evidence that communications are being re-broadcast through community channels; e.g., community agency blog or Twitter feed. Technical assistance, in the form of consultation with HLP staff members, is available and potential applicants are encouraged to avail themselves of this support, though it is not a requirement for successful application. All received applications are pre-screened by HLP staff to ensure that they address the health promotion pillars and target disadvantaged groups. Projects out of area, asking for ineligible items, or incompletely documented are also excluded at this stage. Those which qualify are further assessed by HLP staff. Applications are ranked on the basis of points, and most highly ranked applications are funded until the available grant monies are exhausted. The current scoring tool consists of 11 questions, of which nine are ranked on a scale of 0-2

Unlikely the Greenest City grants, the media attention provided to this health authority program has been largely positive. One physical fitness initiative, Healthiest Winner, which

9 City Caucus Blog, http://archive.citycaucus.com/2011/07/foi-reveals-green-grants-about-thought-experiments-and-

and two are rated on a scale of 0-1. The range of possible scores is thus 0-20.

substantial response indicates great local interest and support.

highlight its activities and accomplishments.

**grants** 

symbolism

## **3. Case examples**

This section describes in more detail two of the contemporary Vancouver examples of community grant programs noted above. The information is derived from document review, supplemented with some interviews of government managers and grant recipients. This is meant to give a sense of how such programs operate in practice and how they are received by community members.

## **3.1. City of Vancouver, Greenest City Neighbourhood Grants**

In 2011, this initiative funded 16 community groups. A total of 54 community projects were proposed, with funding requests amounting to more than five times the total pool of \$100,000 available for allocation. This interest was despite the fact that there were only three weeks between the date when information was publicly posted on the city's website and the submission deadline. City social media channels, such as Facebook and Twitter, were used for publicity. Proposals were reviewed by staff from four city departments, and recommendations on funding forwarded to Council for approval.

Registered not-for-profit organizations and societies based in the city of Vancouver were eligible to apply. Priority was given to proposals that were innovative, included community partnership, leveraged additional resources, and had plans for sustainability. Grants could range between \$2000 and \$25,000 and projects had a one-year period for implementation actual allocations ranged from \$2000 to \$15,500, with an average of \$6250. The largest projects were required to submit a completed Outcome Measurement Framework (identical to one used by the United Way and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority). This required identification of inputs, activities, outputs and short-term outcomes, along with associated indicators—that is, a form of logic model [19-20]. For all projects, a written evaluation report is required, including submission of digital photographs illustrating program success.

The Greenest City grants were funded during a civic election year. Because they appeared to be closely associated with the philosophical agenda of Vancouver's governing municipal party, some of the grants were seized upon by the mayor's opponents in an attempt to create controversy. One particular grant of \$5000, which had been awarded to the Environmental Youth Alliance for "Lawns to Loaves", was particularly contentious. While this project aimed to educate urban children about agriculture and food production, one component (in which volunteers turned their front lawns into miniature wheat fields) was derided as 'silly', 'wacky' and 'goofy' [21-22]. William Rees, well-known local professor of

<sup>8</sup> Vancouver Foundation, http://www.vancouverfoundation.ca

community planning, argued that the project had symbolic rather than practical value, in that it might generate conversation about sustainable food systems; one participant called the mini-fields a 'living billboard' [22]. Conversely, the symbolic aspect was precisely what many critics, such as City Caucus blog, attacked9. Clearly however, the program fit the criteria established by city staff, and it is enthusiastically championed in some quarters.

194 Environmental Land Use Planning

**3. Case examples** 

that has not been previously studied.

received by community members.

million in its most recent yearly program8. It is important to note that not all foundations limit recipients of their largesse to those operating within their own municipality. To the author's knowledge, whether there are or should be significant differences in the rationale for and design of grant programs between the public and not-for-profit sectors is a question

This section describes in more detail two of the contemporary Vancouver examples of community grant programs noted above. The information is derived from document review, supplemented with some interviews of government managers and grant recipients. This is meant to give a sense of how such programs operate in practice and how they are

In 2011, this initiative funded 16 community groups. A total of 54 community projects were proposed, with funding requests amounting to more than five times the total pool of \$100,000 available for allocation. This interest was despite the fact that there were only three weeks between the date when information was publicly posted on the city's website and the submission deadline. City social media channels, such as Facebook and Twitter, were used for publicity. Proposals were reviewed by staff from four city departments, and

Registered not-for-profit organizations and societies based in the city of Vancouver were eligible to apply. Priority was given to proposals that were innovative, included community partnership, leveraged additional resources, and had plans for sustainability. Grants could range between \$2000 and \$25,000 and projects had a one-year period for implementation actual allocations ranged from \$2000 to \$15,500, with an average of \$6250. The largest projects were required to submit a completed Outcome Measurement Framework (identical to one used by the United Way and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority). This required identification of inputs, activities, outputs and short-term outcomes, along with associated indicators—that is, a form of logic model [19-20]. For all projects, a written evaluation report is required, including submission of digital photographs illustrating program success.

The Greenest City grants were funded during a civic election year. Because they appeared to be closely associated with the philosophical agenda of Vancouver's governing municipal party, some of the grants were seized upon by the mayor's opponents in an attempt to create controversy. One particular grant of \$5000, which had been awarded to the Environmental Youth Alliance for "Lawns to Loaves", was particularly contentious. While this project aimed to educate urban children about agriculture and food production, one component (in which volunteers turned their front lawns into miniature wheat fields) was derided as 'silly', 'wacky' and 'goofy' [21-22]. William Rees, well-known local professor of

**3.1. City of Vancouver, Greenest City Neighbourhood Grants** 

recommendations on funding forwarded to Council for approval.

8 Vancouver Foundation, http://www.vancouverfoundation.ca

## **3.2. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Healthy Living Program: community grants**

Since 2008, this program has funded 22 community groups, out of 86 applicants in total. Approximately \$134,000 has been disbursed; the available budget for this program has been less than 15% of the amount requested by interested community participants. This substantial response indicates great local interest and support.

Grants are presently available for a maximum of \$8000, for discrete project activities to be carried out over a planned one-year time span. Projects are mandated to focus on at least one of the Healthy Living Program (HLP)'s priority areas of healthy eating, active living, and tobacco reduction. Projects must substantially target individuals between 35-64 years of age, from an identified disadvantaged or vulnerable population: e.g., low-income, aboriginal, or high-risk ethno-cultural communities. Eligible recipient organizations are non-profit community-based groups or organizations located in (and/or primarily serving a population within) the geographic boundaries of the city of Vancouver. Applicants are expected to obtain support of community partner agencies. A mid-term report and final report are expected, as is participation in a Showcase event, during which each project can highlight its activities and accomplishments.

HLP initiates each call for proposals 3 months prior to deadline. The grant is promoted through health promotion websites and newsletters as well as by health authority staff. There is some evidence that communications are being re-broadcast through community channels; e.g., community agency blog or Twitter feed. Technical assistance, in the form of consultation with HLP staff members, is available and potential applicants are encouraged to avail themselves of this support, though it is not a requirement for successful application. All received applications are pre-screened by HLP staff to ensure that they address the health promotion pillars and target disadvantaged groups. Projects out of area, asking for ineligible items, or incompletely documented are also excluded at this stage. Those which qualify are further assessed by HLP staff. Applications are ranked on the basis of points, and most highly ranked applications are funded until the available grant monies are exhausted. The current scoring tool consists of 11 questions, of which nine are ranked on a scale of 0-2 and two are rated on a scale of 0-1. The range of possible scores is thus 0-20.

Unlikely the Greenest City grants, the media attention provided to this health authority program has been largely positive. One physical fitness initiative, Healthiest Winner, which

<sup>9</sup> City Caucus Blog, http://archive.citycaucus.com/2011/07/foi-reveals-green-grants-about-thought-experiments-andsymbolism

was aimed to draw non-traditional members to community recreation facilities, was lauded by one newspaper columnist, herself a participant [23-24]. The program manager has suggested that this coverage brought a cascade of interest. The program has been sustained and expanded since its initial funding, but continues to be unable to meet all the public demand.

Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice 197

this sense, granting programs may be less interested in the nature of projects which are planned and more concerned with bringing people together and building skills [29]. This can fall within the rubric of community capacity building, where generalized skills and problem-solving ability are often highly valued outcomes [30]. It appears to be common in Canada; according to Phillips, "most large municipalities help build community capacity by providing grants to community organizations and by co-production of services" [31:

Public administration and management literatures in the past years have increasingly concluded that many of the issues facing governments are 'wicked' problems which frequently are beyond the means of any one jurisdiction or sector to resolve. Thus there have been calls for community governance [31], and the strengthening of collaborative and cooperative multi-sector networks which can mobilize resources from many sources [32]. Community grants may be seen as in line with this prescription, though they go only a small ways towards its realization given that they manifest large differences in power and authority between the funder and the recipient. There is similarly literature around the concept of co-production; this argues that it is increasingly necessary for the public and society at large to contribute with formal governments to the design and implementation of services [33]. Again, while community granting accords with this line of thought, it cannot be seen as more than a small step in that direction, as grant projects provide only small-scale and narrowly targeted programs which are supplemental to the established programming

While community organizations seem most commonly to obtain grants in order to carry out specific activities (for example, to promote active living through walking clubs, or healthy eating through community kitchens and gardens), they can also be awarded for the creation of community plans [6, 34-35]. However the latter is less likely to be a regular feature of grant programs as it would encourage more frequent challenges to the professional

Based on the experiences above and the literature in general, we next consider some of the key challenges which must be addressed if community grant programs are to be effectively

To begin with, funders must carefully think through the process which they have in mind. Several important aspects should be addressed, only the most prominent of which can be identified here. One of these is timeline. It seems clear that very short timelines between the issue and close of a community grants call will disadvantage the least established community organizations, those with few full-time staff, or those which are least connected to the current political leadership and least likely to be tuned into the themes and language with which it sympathizes. Many granting programs require projects to be implemented and completed within one calendar or fiscal year; however it is important to recognize that preparation, recruitment and other activities can fall behind schedule in under-resourced

activity of governments and institutionalized community agencies.

implemented by municipal planning department staff and others.

expertise of the funders themselves.

**5. Common challenges** 

p.66].

## **4. Conceptual rationale(s) for community grants as a planning tool**

Previous research has found little documentation or formal assessment of the rationale for and objectives of community grant programs [1, 25-26]. Literature, however, does suggest that the following conceptual arguments can serve to justify community grants as a policy instrument: community organization and mobilization; devolving or decentralizing decision making and increasing public engagement; and social capital formation and community capacity building.

Often, decision makers have issues which they perceive to be priorities (e.g., as identified through social or epidemiological statistics and other forms of scientific evidence). They may wish to garner community and public support for action on this agenda. Grants, then, can be a means to identify others in the community who are concerned about these same issues and willing to put their own efforts towards addressing them. They might also identify those who can be persuaded to adopt these government preferences as their own. That is, grants might be a means of mobilizing the community behind policies and programs focused on the funder's priorities [27]. Many grant programs appear to do this through articulating a handful of areas upon which eligible proposals must be based, such as described above for the Greenest City priorities of transportation, local food, trees/greening and zero waste, or the VCHA Healthy Living Program's emphasis on eating, physical activity and tobacco reduction. Only rarely do grant programs leave problem identification entirely up to community applicants. Those originating in the healthy communities model or focused on broad determinants of health seem to be the main exceptions [15, 17].

Advocates of decentralizing or devolving decision making are constantly seeking ways to bring key choices within the scope of those closest to the 'grassroots'. Grants can do this, in a limited way on particular issues, by giving community groups and organizations some ability to decide how public resources are spent. Of course, because grant amounts are quite small and projects which they fund typically time-limited, they seldom have the potential to result in dramatic community transformation. Grantees are also constrained by the terms of their grant, which typically are aligned in support of existing government or funder preferences, as described above. Peer allocation, or involving community representatives directly in judging the competitive applications, rather than leaving this solely in the hands of paid bureaucrats or political leaders, would be a further step in empowering local decision making but this appears to be relatively less often undertaken.

Community organizations can be an important locus of social capital [28]; they create venues in which citizens can meet, build relationships, and create social networks. Access to grant money can catalyze the formation of new groups and energize existing ones. In this sense, granting programs may be less interested in the nature of projects which are planned and more concerned with bringing people together and building skills [29]. This can fall within the rubric of community capacity building, where generalized skills and problem-solving ability are often highly valued outcomes [30]. It appears to be common in Canada; according to Phillips, "most large municipalities help build community capacity by providing grants to community organizations and by co-production of services" [31: p.66].

Public administration and management literatures in the past years have increasingly concluded that many of the issues facing governments are 'wicked' problems which frequently are beyond the means of any one jurisdiction or sector to resolve. Thus there have been calls for community governance [31], and the strengthening of collaborative and cooperative multi-sector networks which can mobilize resources from many sources [32]. Community grants may be seen as in line with this prescription, though they go only a small ways towards its realization given that they manifest large differences in power and authority between the funder and the recipient. There is similarly literature around the concept of co-production; this argues that it is increasingly necessary for the public and society at large to contribute with formal governments to the design and implementation of services [33]. Again, while community granting accords with this line of thought, it cannot be seen as more than a small step in that direction, as grant projects provide only small-scale and narrowly targeted programs which are supplemental to the established programming activity of governments and institutionalized community agencies.

While community organizations seem most commonly to obtain grants in order to carry out specific activities (for example, to promote active living through walking clubs, or healthy eating through community kitchens and gardens), they can also be awarded for the creation of community plans [6, 34-35]. However the latter is less likely to be a regular feature of grant programs as it would encourage more frequent challenges to the professional expertise of the funders themselves.

## **5. Common challenges**

196 Environmental Land Use Planning

demand.

capacity building.

was aimed to draw non-traditional members to community recreation facilities, was lauded by one newspaper columnist, herself a participant [23-24]. The program manager has suggested that this coverage brought a cascade of interest. The program has been sustained and expanded since its initial funding, but continues to be unable to meet all the public

Previous research has found little documentation or formal assessment of the rationale for and objectives of community grant programs [1, 25-26]. Literature, however, does suggest that the following conceptual arguments can serve to justify community grants as a policy instrument: community organization and mobilization; devolving or decentralizing decision making and increasing public engagement; and social capital formation and community

Often, decision makers have issues which they perceive to be priorities (e.g., as identified through social or epidemiological statistics and other forms of scientific evidence). They may wish to garner community and public support for action on this agenda. Grants, then, can be a means to identify others in the community who are concerned about these same issues and willing to put their own efforts towards addressing them. They might also identify those who can be persuaded to adopt these government preferences as their own. That is, grants might be a means of mobilizing the community behind policies and programs focused on the funder's priorities [27]. Many grant programs appear to do this through articulating a handful of areas upon which eligible proposals must be based, such as described above for the Greenest City priorities of transportation, local food, trees/greening and zero waste, or the VCHA Healthy Living Program's emphasis on eating, physical activity and tobacco reduction. Only rarely do grant programs leave problem identification entirely up to community applicants. Those originating in the healthy communities model

or focused on broad determinants of health seem to be the main exceptions [15, 17].

decision making but this appears to be relatively less often undertaken.

Advocates of decentralizing or devolving decision making are constantly seeking ways to bring key choices within the scope of those closest to the 'grassroots'. Grants can do this, in a limited way on particular issues, by giving community groups and organizations some ability to decide how public resources are spent. Of course, because grant amounts are quite small and projects which they fund typically time-limited, they seldom have the potential to result in dramatic community transformation. Grantees are also constrained by the terms of their grant, which typically are aligned in support of existing government or funder preferences, as described above. Peer allocation, or involving community representatives directly in judging the competitive applications, rather than leaving this solely in the hands of paid bureaucrats or political leaders, would be a further step in empowering local

Community organizations can be an important locus of social capital [28]; they create venues in which citizens can meet, build relationships, and create social networks. Access to grant money can catalyze the formation of new groups and energize existing ones. In

**4. Conceptual rationale(s) for community grants as a planning tool** 

Based on the experiences above and the literature in general, we next consider some of the key challenges which must be addressed if community grant programs are to be effectively implemented by municipal planning department staff and others.

To begin with, funders must carefully think through the process which they have in mind. Several important aspects should be addressed, only the most prominent of which can be identified here. One of these is timeline. It seems clear that very short timelines between the issue and close of a community grants call will disadvantage the least established community organizations, those with few full-time staff, or those which are least connected to the current political leadership and least likely to be tuned into the themes and language with which it sympathizes. Many granting programs require projects to be implemented and completed within one calendar or fiscal year; however it is important to recognize that preparation, recruitment and other activities can fall behind schedule in under-resourced community groups. Grant recipients, in the author's experience, appreciate flexibility to adjust to unforeseen circumstances.

Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice 199

to grab grant money which is targeted to ever-changing priorities and the desire to back new, innovative, and pilot projects rather than the less exciting task of maintaining existing operations. Secondly, there is concern that community groups become dependent upon government funding and so suppress their political advocacy activities [37-38]—for fear of

Too much service delivery responsibility cannot be placed upon community grantees – they cannot be downloaded the obligation to assume what governments would normally be called on to do, if they are not also to be given the stable resources and authority required. Program and service delivery grants are prone to this weakness, since they occur outside of community participation in the larger social and economic planning decisions which set the context.

Though seemingly an uncommon opportunity, grant funding might be used for 'counterplanning' – providing community groups with resources to look in broader terms at how systems might be aligned to their needs. Advocacy planning is a historical precedent which urban planners might draw on when considering these issues [39-40]. Social action planning [41] and Alinsky-style organizing are other community-based efforts which tend not to fit within the scope of community grant efforts because they might also produce direct

Not all community organizations are created equal. A certain degree of organizational capacity is normally needed in order for groups to successfully compete for grants. Being able to interpret requests for proposal and reframe an organization's priorities in those terms – grantspersonship – may be a self-perpetuating skill. Likewise, designing, implementing and evaluating programs to improve community well-being are capacities which are not equally distributing across groups [5]. In recognition of such limits, funders can offer technical assistance to potential grantees. This can take a multitude of forms. One is logic modeling, another may be evaluation planning; many other options are possible. Another way to assist potential grantees is to provide standard data collection instruments. Assistance has been well-received by grantees as reported in the author's experience in both Alberta and British Columbia. Of course, when grant programs incorporate a technical assistance component, they require longer timeframes and more resources contributed upfront on the funders' part. This affects process design considerations as described earlier. Grant funded programs commonly wrestle with the issue of sustainability [42]. Grants are term-limited – one year for instance in the case of Greenest City and Healthy Living Program funds as described above –and rarely can recipients then apply for continuing or bridging funds. Yet a lot of groundwork is required in order to establish programs which can be taken up and maintained afterward; such work is seldom acknowledged or built into grant systems as an eligible category. Also, what it is that should be sustained?—it may be less important that a program be institutionalized than its benefits be continued [43]. Again, this might be a reason why capacity building is identified as an objective for grant programs. Finally, note that the absence of longitudinal research related to community grant initiatives makes it impossible to reach data-driven conclusions about the nature of efforts

'biting the hands that feed them'.

challenges to the funders' own established policy ideas.

which may or may not lead to continuation of funded project efforts.

Clear criteria matter. This allows all potential grantees to develop their best applications in light of what is deemed important by the funder; it allows those determining which projects are to be funded to compare one application against another in a meaningful way; and it makes the decisions transparent to outside observers who might wish to review or question them. But clear criteria matter only when they are consistently applied. Those who rate submitted proposals should, as much as possible, share an understanding of how key ideas are defined and what values they reflect. When committee members bring different and previously unarticulated values to the table, problems ensue [1]. It is probably easier to ensure consistent application when the decision makers come from the same organization, but having intersectoral participation enables a broader range of perspectives to be considered and a wider range of knowledge to be drawn upon. As noted above, community engagement might be most advanced when representatives of potential grantees or their constituencies are directly involved in allocating the available money. However, conflicts of interest might need to be controlled for.

Government spending in the present day is under much more scrutiny than may have historically been the case. New Public Management philosophies have been one source of this change [36]. Offering community grants thus becomes somewhat of a risk because the funder gives up the ability to directly manage projects for success. There are thus many questions about how accountability might be maintained [26]. Public-private partnerships might be one model; these typically are based upon detailed contract specifications with clearly defined deliverables. However, it may be hard to apply the same degree of formalization to agreements with modestly-resourced and semi-professional grantees. Grant programs appear more likely to rely upon requirements for performance measurement and evaluation. But these too can be overly onerous for community groups. In addition, they do not necessarily acknowledge different ways of knowing. Planners and other professionals may prefer quantitative measures which appear to give an objective account of whether or not changes are resulting at the community level, while for lay actors their knowledge of impact may derive from the experience of day-to-day immersion in community life, and the stories it generates—embedded experience to which government employees may not have access [26]. A particular challenge is that grant programs fund many different projects at the same time, efforts which target different audiences and employ distinct sets of activities. What kind of common measure might be applied to assess effectiveness across these contexts? Community capacity building might be specified as a common metric for grantees to report upon.

Acceptance of community grants also poses both short-term and long-term risks to the recipient. That is, concerns have been expressed in the literature that community agencies might be co-opted by their participation in such programs. For one, they might end up 'chasing dollars' and so directing their efforts toward actions which fit with government funder priorities rather than those which might suit their community and client stakeholders best. Consistency and continuity in programming might be sacrificed in order to grab grant money which is targeted to ever-changing priorities and the desire to back new, innovative, and pilot projects rather than the less exciting task of maintaining existing operations. Secondly, there is concern that community groups become dependent upon government funding and so suppress their political advocacy activities [37-38]—for fear of 'biting the hands that feed them'.

198 Environmental Land Use Planning

adjust to unforeseen circumstances.

interest might need to be controlled for.

to report upon.

community groups. Grant recipients, in the author's experience, appreciate flexibility to

Clear criteria matter. This allows all potential grantees to develop their best applications in light of what is deemed important by the funder; it allows those determining which projects are to be funded to compare one application against another in a meaningful way; and it makes the decisions transparent to outside observers who might wish to review or question them. But clear criteria matter only when they are consistently applied. Those who rate submitted proposals should, as much as possible, share an understanding of how key ideas are defined and what values they reflect. When committee members bring different and previously unarticulated values to the table, problems ensue [1]. It is probably easier to ensure consistent application when the decision makers come from the same organization, but having intersectoral participation enables a broader range of perspectives to be considered and a wider range of knowledge to be drawn upon. As noted above, community engagement might be most advanced when representatives of potential grantees or their constituencies are directly involved in allocating the available money. However, conflicts of

Government spending in the present day is under much more scrutiny than may have historically been the case. New Public Management philosophies have been one source of this change [36]. Offering community grants thus becomes somewhat of a risk because the funder gives up the ability to directly manage projects for success. There are thus many questions about how accountability might be maintained [26]. Public-private partnerships might be one model; these typically are based upon detailed contract specifications with clearly defined deliverables. However, it may be hard to apply the same degree of formalization to agreements with modestly-resourced and semi-professional grantees. Grant programs appear more likely to rely upon requirements for performance measurement and evaluation. But these too can be overly onerous for community groups. In addition, they do not necessarily acknowledge different ways of knowing. Planners and other professionals may prefer quantitative measures which appear to give an objective account of whether or not changes are resulting at the community level, while for lay actors their knowledge of impact may derive from the experience of day-to-day immersion in community life, and the stories it generates—embedded experience to which government employees may not have access [26]. A particular challenge is that grant programs fund many different projects at the same time, efforts which target different audiences and employ distinct sets of activities. What kind of common measure might be applied to assess effectiveness across these contexts? Community capacity building might be specified as a common metric for grantees

Acceptance of community grants also poses both short-term and long-term risks to the recipient. That is, concerns have been expressed in the literature that community agencies might be co-opted by their participation in such programs. For one, they might end up 'chasing dollars' and so directing their efforts toward actions which fit with government funder priorities rather than those which might suit their community and client stakeholders best. Consistency and continuity in programming might be sacrificed in order Too much service delivery responsibility cannot be placed upon community grantees – they cannot be downloaded the obligation to assume what governments would normally be called on to do, if they are not also to be given the stable resources and authority required. Program and service delivery grants are prone to this weakness, since they occur outside of community participation in the larger social and economic planning decisions which set the context.

Though seemingly an uncommon opportunity, grant funding might be used for 'counterplanning' – providing community groups with resources to look in broader terms at how systems might be aligned to their needs. Advocacy planning is a historical precedent which urban planners might draw on when considering these issues [39-40]. Social action planning [41] and Alinsky-style organizing are other community-based efforts which tend not to fit within the scope of community grant efforts because they might also produce direct challenges to the funders' own established policy ideas.

Not all community organizations are created equal. A certain degree of organizational capacity is normally needed in order for groups to successfully compete for grants. Being able to interpret requests for proposal and reframe an organization's priorities in those terms – grantspersonship – may be a self-perpetuating skill. Likewise, designing, implementing and evaluating programs to improve community well-being are capacities which are not equally distributing across groups [5]. In recognition of such limits, funders can offer technical assistance to potential grantees. This can take a multitude of forms. One is logic modeling, another may be evaluation planning; many other options are possible. Another way to assist potential grantees is to provide standard data collection instruments. Assistance has been well-received by grantees as reported in the author's experience in both Alberta and British Columbia. Of course, when grant programs incorporate a technical assistance component, they require longer timeframes and more resources contributed upfront on the funders' part. This affects process design considerations as described earlier.

Grant funded programs commonly wrestle with the issue of sustainability [42]. Grants are term-limited – one year for instance in the case of Greenest City and Healthy Living Program funds as described above –and rarely can recipients then apply for continuing or bridging funds. Yet a lot of groundwork is required in order to establish programs which can be taken up and maintained afterward; such work is seldom acknowledged or built into grant systems as an eligible category. Also, what it is that should be sustained?—it may be less important that a program be institutionalized than its benefits be continued [43]. Again, this might be a reason why capacity building is identified as an objective for grant programs. Finally, note that the absence of longitudinal research related to community grant initiatives makes it impossible to reach data-driven conclusions about the nature of efforts which may or may not lead to continuation of funded project efforts.

## **6. Conclusion**

Community grants are widely used by local governments and other jurisdictions in Canada and beyond. Yet there has been very little effort to systematically study these processes and their outcomes. In this chapter, I have looked at the conceptual rationales for why planners and other professionals might wish to use this tool, and the challenges and risks associated with it. I end with the following suggestions for planning professionals who may wish to use community grants as part of a suite of community development instruments.

Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice 201

important to decide what should be sustained. If it is the project or program, then options for completing the necessary groundwork of identifying and recruiting on-going sponsors should be built in as eligible expenses. However it is probably more common for transferrable knowledge and skills to be the most desired outcomes. This is likely why community capacity building recurs in the grants literature as both a process objective and

Done thoughtfully, grant programs can make a difference for individuals and communities. There is no shortage of examples from municipalities around the world. Yet there has so far been little synthesis of experiences or development of best practices in this sphere; this

*Centre for Clinical Epidemiology & Evaluation, Vancouver Coastal Health Research Institute,* 

*Centre for Health Promotion Studies, School of Public Health, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB,*

A portion of the chapter has been adapted from a 2012 report on community grants prepared for Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Healthy Living Program. The author thanks Lori Baugh Littlejohns for many years of collaboration in practice and research

[1] Smith, N., & Baugh Littlejohns, L. (2007). A case study in community grant funding:

[2] Hartwig, K.A., Bobbitt-Cooke, M., Zaharek, M.M., Nappi, S., Wykoff, R.F., & Katz, D. (2006). The value of microgrants for community-based health promotion: two models for practice and policy. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice 12, 90-96. [3] Paine-Andrews, A., Francisco, V.T., & Fawcett, S.B. (1994). Addressing community health concerns and implementing a microgrant program for self-help initiatives.

[4] Forster-Cox, S.C., Wiese, W.H., & MacLean, T.A. (1996). Health promotion mini-grants: grassroots implementation in New Mexico. American Journal of Health Promotion 10,

[5] Meit, M., Ettaro, L., Hamlin, B.N., & Piya, B. (2009). Rural public health financing: implications for community health promotion initiatives. Journal of Public Health

lessons learned. American Journal of Health Education 38, 242-248.

American Journal of Public Health 84, 316-318.

Management and Practice 15, 210-215.

chapter has offered an initial contribution towards that end.

*University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada* 

outcome.

**Author details** 

**Acknowledgement** 

related to this topic.

**7. References** 

183-184.

Neale Smith

*Canada* 

Targeted dollars – providing community grants for projects that meet a set of priorities determined by the funder – may be the best for community mobilization objectives. Openended calls might perhaps better serve community building. This could include 'counterplanning', in which grants might be provided for communities to develop their own visions for physical, social or economic development. Restricting grant proposals to topics determined by the funder is more likely than an open call to co-opt the voluntary sector into carrying out a government agenda, while unrestricted competitions may run a greater risk of funding projects that diverge from public and political preferences and are harder to justify from an accountability perspective. Any grant scheme then needs to consider these different risks and possible strategies for balancing them.

Community grants involve the allocation of public money, raised from the taxpayers' pockets, and so they must not be given out with wild abandon. But community organizations also may have limited skill and time to produce detailed performance measurement and evaluation reports. The sorts of quantitative measures which suit bureaucratic mindsets might be seen as burdensome and irrelevant by grantees. Therefore, planners looking at a grants program might be advised to develop a reporting scheme which combines formal indicators with other forms of evidence, such as stories of significant change [44]. Community capacity building can serve as an outcome measure which may be common to projects which otherwise use distinct approaches to reach divergent audiences. While media attention to community grants might be rare, planners will be best placed to respond to any controversy when the criteria for funding and processes by which decisions are made are transparent and auditable by outside observers.

The overall quality of both applications and funded projects seems likely to be higher when community organizations have access to technical assistance from the grantor. In the author's experience, recipients are most willing to go on record and express their appreciation for such procedures. This may well help to 'level the field' and ensure that more than a select group of organizations can compete for funds available. However, there is a danger that technical assistance might become another way of structuring or controlling what community groups do—that is, it might (unintentionally or otherwise) discourage creative but controversial ideas and steer applicants towards the safe middle road. Offering such support will also demand additional time and resources on the part of the funder and so should be designed into the process from the start.

Grant programs should consider the question of sustainability—will a one-time injection of resources make a long-term difference? For the practicing planner, it is probably most important to decide what should be sustained. If it is the project or program, then options for completing the necessary groundwork of identifying and recruiting on-going sponsors should be built in as eligible expenses. However it is probably more common for transferrable knowledge and skills to be the most desired outcomes. This is likely why community capacity building recurs in the grants literature as both a process objective and outcome.

Done thoughtfully, grant programs can make a difference for individuals and communities. There is no shortage of examples from municipalities around the world. Yet there has so far been little synthesis of experiences or development of best practices in this sphere; this chapter has offered an initial contribution towards that end.

## **Author details**

Neale Smith

200 Environmental Land Use Planning

Community grants are widely used by local governments and other jurisdictions in Canada and beyond. Yet there has been very little effort to systematically study these processes and their outcomes. In this chapter, I have looked at the conceptual rationales for why planners and other professionals might wish to use this tool, and the challenges and risks associated with it. I end with the following suggestions for planning professionals who may wish to

Targeted dollars – providing community grants for projects that meet a set of priorities determined by the funder – may be the best for community mobilization objectives. Openended calls might perhaps better serve community building. This could include 'counterplanning', in which grants might be provided for communities to develop their own visions for physical, social or economic development. Restricting grant proposals to topics determined by the funder is more likely than an open call to co-opt the voluntary sector into carrying out a government agenda, while unrestricted competitions may run a greater risk of funding projects that diverge from public and political preferences and are harder to justify from an accountability perspective. Any grant scheme then needs to consider these

Community grants involve the allocation of public money, raised from the taxpayers' pockets, and so they must not be given out with wild abandon. But community organizations also may have limited skill and time to produce detailed performance measurement and evaluation reports. The sorts of quantitative measures which suit bureaucratic mindsets might be seen as burdensome and irrelevant by grantees. Therefore, planners looking at a grants program might be advised to develop a reporting scheme which combines formal indicators with other forms of evidence, such as stories of significant change [44]. Community capacity building can serve as an outcome measure which may be common to projects which otherwise use distinct approaches to reach divergent audiences. While media attention to community grants might be rare, planners will be best placed to respond to any controversy when the criteria for funding and processes by which decisions

The overall quality of both applications and funded projects seems likely to be higher when community organizations have access to technical assistance from the grantor. In the author's experience, recipients are most willing to go on record and express their appreciation for such procedures. This may well help to 'level the field' and ensure that more than a select group of organizations can compete for funds available. However, there is a danger that technical assistance might become another way of structuring or controlling what community groups do—that is, it might (unintentionally or otherwise) discourage creative but controversial ideas and steer applicants towards the safe middle road. Offering such support will also demand additional time and resources on the part of the funder and

Grant programs should consider the question of sustainability—will a one-time injection of resources make a long-term difference? For the practicing planner, it is probably most

use community grants as part of a suite of community development instruments.

different risks and possible strategies for balancing them.

are made are transparent and auditable by outside observers.

so should be designed into the process from the start.

**6. Conclusion** 

*Centre for Clinical Epidemiology & Evaluation, Vancouver Coastal Health Research Institute, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Centre for Health Promotion Studies, School of Public Health, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada* 

## **Acknowledgement**

A portion of the chapter has been adapted from a 2012 report on community grants prepared for Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Healthy Living Program. The author thanks Lori Baugh Littlejohns for many years of collaboration in practice and research related to this topic.

## **7. References**


[6] Miller, E.K., Scofield, J.L. (2009). Slavic Village: incorporating active living into community development through partnerships. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 67, S377-S385.

Community Grants as an Instrument of Planning Practice 203

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[21] Hutchinson, B. (2011). There are plenty of reasons Vancouver no longer the world's

[22] Stueck, W. (2011). Backyard wheat fields produce food for green-policy debate. Globe &

[23] Thomas, S. (2010). Community centre seeks non-LuluLemon wearers for new health

[26] Smith, N. (2010). Incorporating local knowledge(s) in health promotion. Critical Public

[27] Pancer, S.M., & Nelson, G. (1989/90). Community-based approaches to health promotion: guidelines for community mobilization. International Quarterly of

[28] Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of the American

[29] Welsch, A., & Heying, C. (1999). Watershed management and community building: a case study of Portland's Community Watershed Stewardship Program. Administrative

[30] Hawe, P., King, L., Noort, M., Gifford, S. M. and Lloyd, B. (1998). Working invisibly: health workers talk about capacity building in health promotion. Health Promotion

[31] Phillips, S.D. (2010). 'You say you want an evolution?' From citizen to community engagement in Canadian cities. In Local Government in a Global World: Australia and Canada in Comparative Perspective. E. Brunet-Jailley and J.F. Martin, eds.

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[33] Brandsen, T., & Pestoff, V. (2006). Co-production, the third sector and the delivery of

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[35] GermAnn, K.; Smith, N.; & Baugh Littlejohns, L. (2001). A Healthy Communities Initiative in Rural Alberta: Building Rural Capacity for Health. In Issues Affecting Rural Communities (II): Proceedings of the Rural Communities and Identities in the Global Millennium Conference, J.C. Montgomery & A.D. Kitchenham, eds. Nanaimo, BC: Malaspina University College Rural Communities Research and Development Centre. [36] Hood, C. (1991). A public administration for all seasons. Public Administration 69, 3-19.

IPAC/University of Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 55-80.

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reflexivity and accountability. Open University Press.

[24] Thomas, S. (2011). Program graduates embrace exercise. Vancouver Courier, April 8. [25] Smith, N. (1998). Lessons from a comparative study of community grant programs in Alberta health authorities. Paper presented to the Canadian Evaluation Society Annual

initiatives. Evaluation and Program Planning 28, 167-172.

most livable city. National Post, August 30.

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http://www.aihealthsolutions.ca/rtna/docs/Casebook03online%20Final%20Version.pdf


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[9] Van der Woerd, KA, Mactier JD, & Lederer, J. (2008). Community Food Action Initiative Evaluation, 2005-2006: Final Report. Vancouver, BC: Provincial Health Services

[10] Baugh Littlejohns, L., & Smith, N. (2007). Evaluation of Interior Health Community Action Programming in Population Health. Prepared on contract for Interior Health

[11] Polese, M. and Stren, R., (2000). The Social Sustainability of Cities. Toronto: University

[12] Baugh Littlejohns, L., & Smith, N. (2012). Building bridges between health promotion and social sustainability. In Knowledge Translation in Alberta: Health Research with Impact—KT Casebook, Volume 3. Edmonton: Alberta Innovates -- Health Solutions. 50-

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[18] Twiss, J.M., Duma, S., Look, V., Shaffer, G.S., & Watkins, A.C. (2000). Twelve years and counting: California's experience with a statewide healthy cities and communities

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[37] Ilcan, S. & Basok, T. (2004) Community government: voluntary agencies, social justice, and the responsibilization of citizens. Citizenship Studies 8, 129-144.

**Chapter 10** 

© 2012 Loehr, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,

© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,

distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

**The Role of Tradable Planning Permits** 

**A Stocktake of the German Discussion** 

The idea of tradable planning permits is subject to broad discussion in some developed countries such as Switzerland (for example, see [1]), but particularly in Germany (for

The German federal government intends to reduce the daily land consumption to 30 ha per day in 2020 [3]. In 13 years between 1993 and 2010, land consumption in Germany was significantly higher than 100 ha per day. In the other 5 years, the undershooting of the 100 ha mark has been mostly due to lower economic growth rates or an economic slump [4]. Particularly rural areas were affected by excessive land consumption. Almost 50% of the

In order to achieve the 30 ha target, there is a broad consensus about the necessity to support planning by means of economic instruments. In this discussion, tradable planning permits turned out to be the instrument of choice, at least among the scientists. In Germany, a lot of research has been underway on this issue for years now (for example, see [6]). Among others, a pilot project is also in preparation [7, 8], as it was planned in the coalition

The idea of tradable planning permits stems from the concept of tradable CO2 rights, more accurately the cap and trade system. Within the cap and trade regime, pollution rights should be limited in quantity and made tradable. Due to the cap on the pollution possible, the system is considered ecologically effective. If the mechanism is applied to the field of land use planning, the communal development plans are only legally valid if they are backed by planning permits, which have to be held by the communes. The communes – as

**in Environmental Land Use Planning:** 

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

Dirk Loehr

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/50469

converted land is sealed [5].

agreement of the current federal government [9].

**1. Introduction** 

example, see [2]).


## **The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning: A Stocktake of the German Discussion**

Dirk Loehr

204 Environmental Land Use Planning

153–8.

University Press.

Institute of Planners 1, 331–8.

Journal of Health Promotion 4.

[37] Ilcan, S. & Basok, T. (2004) Community government: voluntary agencies, social justice,

[38] Casey, J., & Dalton, B. (2006). The best of times, the worst of times: community sector advocacy in the age of 'compacts'. Australian Journal of Political Science 41, 33-48. [39] Davidoff, P. (1965). Advocacy and pluralism in planning. Journal of the American

[40] Forester, J. (1994). Bridging interests and community: advocacy planning and the challenges of deliberative democracy. Journal of the American Planning Association 60,

[41] Rothman, J. (1974). Planning and organizing for social change. New York: Columbia

[42] Wharf Higgins, J., Naylor, P., & Day, M. (2008). Seed funding for health promotion: sowing sustainability or skepticism? Community Development Journal 43, 210-221. [43] Green, L.W. (1989). Is institutionalization the proper role of grantmaking? American

[44] Dart, J., & Davies, R. (2003). A dialogical, story-based evaluation tool: the Most

Significant Change technique. American Journal of Evaluation 24, 137-155.

and the responsibilization of citizens. Citizenship Studies 8, 129-144.

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/50469

## **1. Introduction**

The idea of tradable planning permits is subject to broad discussion in some developed countries such as Switzerland (for example, see [1]), but particularly in Germany (for example, see [2]).

The German federal government intends to reduce the daily land consumption to 30 ha per day in 2020 [3]. In 13 years between 1993 and 2010, land consumption in Germany was significantly higher than 100 ha per day. In the other 5 years, the undershooting of the 100 ha mark has been mostly due to lower economic growth rates or an economic slump [4]. Particularly rural areas were affected by excessive land consumption. Almost 50% of the converted land is sealed [5].

In order to achieve the 30 ha target, there is a broad consensus about the necessity to support planning by means of economic instruments. In this discussion, tradable planning permits turned out to be the instrument of choice, at least among the scientists. In Germany, a lot of research has been underway on this issue for years now (for example, see [6]). Among others, a pilot project is also in preparation [7, 8], as it was planned in the coalition agreement of the current federal government [9].

The idea of tradable planning permits stems from the concept of tradable CO2 rights, more accurately the cap and trade system. Within the cap and trade regime, pollution rights should be limited in quantity and made tradable. Due to the cap on the pollution possible, the system is considered ecologically effective. If the mechanism is applied to the field of land use planning, the communal development plans are only legally valid if they are backed by planning permits, which have to be held by the communes. The communes – as

the planning authorities – and not the land owners are the holders of the planning permits. This is an important difference from "tradable development rights", where private-sector actors are the sellers and buyers (for example, see [10]).

The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning:



There is a central difference between the cap and trade on CO2 and the cap and trade on planning permits. Considering the consequences for global warming, it does not matter where the CO2 is emitted due to the diffusion characteristics of the greenhouse gas. Hence the task is to control a scale (maximal CO2 emissions anywhere) by capping the quantity of emissions. However, regarding land use planning, not only the scale but also the structure of land use has to be controlled. The quantity of land as a whole can hardly be extended. Instead, the relevant issue relates to changes in the structure of land use, which is for instance forestry, agriculture, industry, settlements etc. It is of central importance where the land use takes place and for which purpose. Hence CO2 permits are a homogenous good,

At present, the structure of land use is controlled by the planning system. According to the proponents of the tradable development rights idea, land use planning should not be

Planning is necessary to break up a possible Nash equilibrium [11] caused by the behaviour of land owners: If, in the absence of any planning, only the willingness to pay decides about land use patterns, a spatial disaster may result and people may run into a rationality trap. If, for example, German people were allowed to realize the favoured model of the detached one-family house in green surroundings, urban sprawl would happen, with negative

At the same time, planning is necessary to protect such forms with weak financial endowments which cause important positive external effects. If no plan provided public spaces e.g. for kindergartens and schools, such forms would have to compete with actors with a high willingness to pay (e.g. banks). Hence they could not be realized. However, without such facilities, the value of the area would often be lower than with them. Good planning should consider the variety of functions of land (e.g. ecological, spiritual). Such forms of land use that move beyond efficiency and profitability are not only important for the cohesion of the social system, but in many cases also for the resilience of the ecological system (for example, see [15]). Planning has to balance the competing demands of various stakeholders, including groups with low budgets and the protection

substituted but supported by the economic tool ("primacy of planning") [14].

with a unified planning permit and a unit price.

**3. Theoretical issues and review of literature** 

permission with a single price.

but land use rights shouldn't be.

**3.1. Consensus: Primacy of planning** 

ecological, economic and social impacts.

of nature.

A Stocktake of the German Discussion 207

Due to the trade, the scheme is also regarded as being efficient because only those actors with the lowest marginal abatement costs reduce the emissions. The permits can be bought and sold by the communes on an organized trading platform.

The cap on the permits helps to circumvent rationality traps (game theory) which otherwise would appear. In Germany, for instance, communes competed against each other to attract new inhabitants and industries in order to get more tax revenues and higher shares out of the financial equalization scheme. This competition was a race to the bottom in many cases. Among others, the results in many cases have been almost empty residential or commercial areas and high infrastructure costs. However, if a community waives the preparation of new building areas, the neighbouring municipality takes the chance.

Within the cap and trade scheme, such rationality traps might be broken up [11]: Due to the costs of the permits, only such communes whose benefits of land development exceed the costs of the permits will buy planning permits and carry out land development. If land conversion can be avoided at costs below the costs of the planning permits, communes waive the right to further development. Maybe they can also reconvert the land into a natural state. Hence, if there is no need for holding permits, such communes will sell them to other communes (for example, see [12]). If they do not sell the "free" rights, they will suffer opportunity costs. This means that communes with high marginal abatement costs (tax revenues, jobs etc.) are the buyers of the rights, while communes with low marginal abatement costs are the sellers. In the end, all marginal abatement costs equalize at the price of the tradable permits. In the trading planning permits scheme, the secondary market is the institutional heart of the mechanism.

Although it sounds quite appealing at first glance, we want to show that the application of the cap and trade scheme to land use planning is anything but self-evident and not a promising approach per se.

## **2. Hypothesis: No magic bullet**

Tradable planning permits are considered to be a sort of magic bullet. On the one hand, the cap on development permits makes the system effective. On the other hand, only those communes with the highest benefits (additional taxes and shares from financial equalization schemes) carry out the development. Communes with low opportunity costs waive the right to development. Hence the scheme is also efficient, because the planning rights are used at the locations with the highest benefits.

However, contrary to what intuition would suggest, we want to show that effectiveness and efficiency don't harmonize if the concept is applied to land use planning. In contrast, the cap and trade approach cannot meet the goals of efficiency and effectiveness at the same time ("incompatibility thesis") [13]. The argument is based on the following two statements:


## **3. Theoretical issues and review of literature**

206 Environmental Land Use Planning

actors are the sellers and buyers (for example, see [10]).

and sold by the communes on an organized trading platform.

building areas, the neighbouring municipality takes the chance.

institutional heart of the mechanism.

**2. Hypothesis: No magic bullet** 

the locations with the highest benefits.

promising approach per se.

the planning authorities – and not the land owners are the holders of the planning permits. This is an important difference from "tradable development rights", where private-sector

Due to the trade, the scheme is also regarded as being efficient because only those actors with the lowest marginal abatement costs reduce the emissions. The permits can be bought

The cap on the permits helps to circumvent rationality traps (game theory) which otherwise would appear. In Germany, for instance, communes competed against each other to attract new inhabitants and industries in order to get more tax revenues and higher shares out of the financial equalization scheme. This competition was a race to the bottom in many cases. Among others, the results in many cases have been almost empty residential or commercial areas and high infrastructure costs. However, if a community waives the preparation of new

Within the cap and trade scheme, such rationality traps might be broken up [11]: Due to the costs of the permits, only such communes whose benefits of land development exceed the costs of the permits will buy planning permits and carry out land development. If land conversion can be avoided at costs below the costs of the planning permits, communes waive the right to further development. Maybe they can also reconvert the land into a natural state. Hence, if there is no need for holding permits, such communes will sell them to other communes (for example, see [12]). If they do not sell the "free" rights, they will suffer opportunity costs. This means that communes with high marginal abatement costs (tax revenues, jobs etc.) are the buyers of the rights, while communes with low marginal abatement costs are the sellers. In the end, all marginal abatement costs equalize at the price of the tradable permits. In the trading planning permits scheme, the secondary market is the

Although it sounds quite appealing at first glance, we want to show that the application of the cap and trade scheme to land use planning is anything but self-evident and not a

Tradable planning permits are considered to be a sort of magic bullet. On the one hand, the cap on development permits makes the system effective. On the other hand, only those communes with the highest benefits (additional taxes and shares from financial equalization schemes) carry out the development. Communes with low opportunity costs waive the right to development. Hence the scheme is also efficient, because the planning rights are used at

However, contrary to what intuition would suggest, we want to show that effectiveness and efficiency don't harmonize if the concept is applied to land use planning. In contrast, the cap and trade approach cannot meet the goals of efficiency and effectiveness at the same time ("incompatibility thesis") [13]. The argument is based on the following two statements:

There is a central difference between the cap and trade on CO2 and the cap and trade on planning permits. Considering the consequences for global warming, it does not matter where the CO2 is emitted due to the diffusion characteristics of the greenhouse gas. Hence the task is to control a scale (maximal CO2 emissions anywhere) by capping the quantity of emissions. However, regarding land use planning, not only the scale but also the structure of land use has to be controlled. The quantity of land as a whole can hardly be extended. Instead, the relevant issue relates to changes in the structure of land use, which is for instance forestry, agriculture, industry, settlements etc. It is of central importance where the land use takes place and for which purpose. Hence CO2 permits are a homogenous good, but land use rights shouldn't be.

### **3.1. Consensus: Primacy of planning**

At present, the structure of land use is controlled by the planning system. According to the proponents of the tradable development rights idea, land use planning should not be substituted but supported by the economic tool ("primacy of planning") [14].

Planning is necessary to break up a possible Nash equilibrium [11] caused by the behaviour of land owners: If, in the absence of any planning, only the willingness to pay decides about land use patterns, a spatial disaster may result and people may run into a rationality trap. If, for example, German people were allowed to realize the favoured model of the detached one-family house in green surroundings, urban sprawl would happen, with negative ecological, economic and social impacts.

At the same time, planning is necessary to protect such forms with weak financial endowments which cause important positive external effects. If no plan provided public spaces e.g. for kindergartens and schools, such forms would have to compete with actors with a high willingness to pay (e.g. banks). Hence they could not be realized. However, without such facilities, the value of the area would often be lower than with them. Good planning should consider the variety of functions of land (e.g. ecological, spiritual). Such forms of land use that move beyond efficiency and profitability are not only important for the cohesion of the social system, but in many cases also for the resilience of the ecological system (for example, see [15]). Planning has to balance the competing demands of various stakeholders, including groups with low budgets and the protection of nature.

## **3.2. Thesis: Efficiency needs wide system boundaries**

Although the primacy of planning is wide consensus, in recent debates it has been argued that tradable planning permits may counteract land use planning [13]. The "incompatibility thesis" is based on the required design of a cap and trade regime. A major justification of the system is its efficiency. The efficiency of the cap and trade system is caused by differences in marginal abatement costs:

The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning:

system boundaries (in contrast to other tradable development rights schemes; for example,

There is also another reason why a working trade system would not be possible without wide boundaries: Narrow markets cause high price volatility of the permits. The higher the price volatility, the more insecure the economic success of abatement activities and the less abatement activities will take place. Thus the target is to set the condition for organized

**3.3. Thesis: Controlling structure by economic tools needs tightly segmented** 

Having shown the necessity for wide system boundaries in a cap and trade model, the next question is whether a land use structure – not a scale – can be controlled within such a system. We want to illustrate the problem within figure 1 below. The land use plan sets the allowed land use A (e.g. industry) at the maximum of CA. The maximal land use B (e.g. housing) is limited by CB. The marginal abatement costs (MAC) are MACA for land use type A and MACB for land use type B. For simplification purposes, the illustration doesn't

If a commune waives the right to development of additional sites, it has to suffer marginal abatement costs. Such marginal abatement costs are mainly opportunity costs. If, for instance, a residential area is not realized, a German municipality gets lower shares of the income tax revenues, lower property tax revenues and lower revenues out of the fiscal equalization scheme. If an industrial site cannot be realized, the opportunity costs also comprise lost business tax revenues. Also indirect effects have to be considered, such as income multiplier effects which otherwise would have been initiated by construction activities. All these interrelations and effects are quite complex and include feedbacks within the system. Basically, the scale of opportunity costs is not quite clear. Fiscal impact analysis could provide for more cost transparency, but it is in an early stage. Some fiscal impact tools used so far for residential areas turned out to have quite different performance; for industrial areas no reliable fiscal impact tool is available so far. Also within the abovementioned pilot model of tradable development rights the development of reliable fiscal impact analysis tools is acknowledged to be important in order to get a better idea about the

However, in the subsequent figure we assume, contrary to the facts, that there is an accurate idea about the volume of the marginal abatement costs of land use type A and B. Hence we can derive a mathematical function of MAC, being dependent on the scale of land use of the

First, let's assume that the caps for land use type A (CA) and B (CB) are set according to the land use plans. We assume that the land use planning also properly computes the marginal damages (MD), which are illustrated with the dotted line for both types of land use. With this theoretical "trick" we can take into account that planners care for quantity as well as for

see [13]). The scale target and the wide system boundaries are mutually dependent.

trade of the permits.

include more land use types.

marginal abatement costs.

different types.

**sub-markets** 

A Stocktake of the German Discussion 209


In the end, the marginal abatement costs of all the actors equal the market price of the planning permits. The higher the differences of marginal abatement costs of the acting communes, the higher the efficiency potential of the regime will be.

However, high differences in abatement costs can be achieved by a wide design in terms of space, time, participants and the objects of trade:


In Germany, in the last decade the preferred design is characterized by


Hence the efficiency potential can only be exhausted if the target is "scale" instead of "structure" (which would make sub-markets necessary). The scale target has to fix wide system boundaries (in contrast to other tradable development rights schemes; for example, see [13]). The scale target and the wide system boundaries are mutually dependent.

208 Environmental Land Use Planning

marginal abatement costs:

components;

**3.2. Thesis: Efficiency needs wide system boundaries** 

Although the primacy of planning is wide consensus, in recent debates it has been argued that tradable planning permits may counteract land use planning [13]. The "incompatibility thesis" is based on the required design of a cap and trade regime. A major justification of the system is its efficiency. The efficiency of the cap and trade system is caused by differences in


In the end, the marginal abatement costs of all the actors equal the market price of the planning permits. The higher the differences of marginal abatement costs of the acting

However, high differences in abatement costs can be achieved by a wide design in terms of








Hence the efficiency potential can only be exhausted if the target is "scale" instead of "structure" (which would make sub-markets necessary). The scale target has to fix wide

market price and marginal abatement costs is the profit from abatement.

communes, the higher the efficiency potential of the regime will be.

NGOs instead of only permitting communes as traders;

use differences in the marginal abatement costs over the timeline.

In Germany, in the last decade the preferred design is characterized by

space, time, participants and the objects of trade:

(e.g. whole of Germany, no single states);

states of the federation [16].

owning them (borrowing) [17].

has not been discussed seriously so far.

There is also another reason why a working trade system would not be possible without wide boundaries: Narrow markets cause high price volatility of the permits. The higher the price volatility, the more insecure the economic success of abatement activities and the less abatement activities will take place. Thus the target is to set the condition for organized trade of the permits.

## **3.3. Thesis: Controlling structure by economic tools needs tightly segmented sub-markets**

Having shown the necessity for wide system boundaries in a cap and trade model, the next question is whether a land use structure – not a scale – can be controlled within such a system. We want to illustrate the problem within figure 1 below. The land use plan sets the allowed land use A (e.g. industry) at the maximum of CA. The maximal land use B (e.g. housing) is limited by CB. The marginal abatement costs (MAC) are MACA for land use type A and MACB for land use type B. For simplification purposes, the illustration doesn't include more land use types.

If a commune waives the right to development of additional sites, it has to suffer marginal abatement costs. Such marginal abatement costs are mainly opportunity costs. If, for instance, a residential area is not realized, a German municipality gets lower shares of the income tax revenues, lower property tax revenues and lower revenues out of the fiscal equalization scheme. If an industrial site cannot be realized, the opportunity costs also comprise lost business tax revenues. Also indirect effects have to be considered, such as income multiplier effects which otherwise would have been initiated by construction activities. All these interrelations and effects are quite complex and include feedbacks within the system. Basically, the scale of opportunity costs is not quite clear. Fiscal impact analysis could provide for more cost transparency, but it is in an early stage. Some fiscal impact tools used so far for residential areas turned out to have quite different performance; for industrial areas no reliable fiscal impact tool is available so far. Also within the abovementioned pilot model of tradable development rights the development of reliable fiscal impact analysis tools is acknowledged to be important in order to get a better idea about the marginal abatement costs.

However, in the subsequent figure we assume, contrary to the facts, that there is an accurate idea about the volume of the marginal abatement costs of land use type A and B. Hence we can derive a mathematical function of MAC, being dependent on the scale of land use of the different types.

First, let's assume that the caps for land use type A (CA) and B (CB) are set according to the land use plans. We assume that the land use planning also properly computes the marginal damages (MD), which are illustrated with the dotted line for both types of land use. With this theoretical "trick" we can take into account that planners care for quantity as well as for quality of land use (for example, see [17]). Therefore, the planning target (CA and CB) corresponds perfectly with the intersection of marginal abatement costs and marginal damage of land use type A (EA) and B (EB).

Moreover, theoretically the marginal damage of land use type B can be expressed in equivalents of the marginal damage of land use type A. Such equivalents are useful for the definition of a universal cap. Analogous equivalents are also used in the greenhouse gas emission permit schemes. In the Kyoto regime for instance, global warming potentials (GWPs) are used in order to express the global warming potential of the other greenhouse gases in relation to CO2, whose GWP is standardized to 1. Hence, if caps for different land use types should reflect such equivalents (for simplification purposes a linear function is used below), we get for instance a function such as:

$$\mathbf{C}\_{\mathcal{B}} = \mathbf{e} \times \mathbf{C}\_{\mathcal{A}} \tag{1}$$

The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning:

types (A, B) MA CA CB MB



Sometimes, supporters suppose that the deviations and aberrations are negligible. Depending on the price of the permits, the position of the caps and the marginal abatement costs, the aberrations and welfare losses can be randomly quite high or low. There is no evidence for a correction mechanism, which might be able to reduce such aberrations systematically. Hence, overshootings and undershootings probably don't equalize in aggregation. The system is as effective as a poor marksman who is currently missing the target in different directions. Aggregating the shooting errors doesn't turn the poor

Against this background, we can describe the central system conflict as follows:

MDB

EB

PB MACA+B

IA IB

EA

**Figure 1.** Aberrations with a universal planning permit (adapted from [13])

From the figure above we may derive two important results:

P, MAC, MD

MACA

MDA

able to control scale but not structure.

the cap and trade system can be provided.

marksman into a champion.

**3.4. The "incompatibility thesis"** 

MACB

P\*

PA

A Stocktake of the German Discussion 211

MDA+B

Land

CA+B

The total cap results by aggregation of the caps of the individual land use types:

$$\mathbf{C}\_{\text{A}+\text{B}} = \mathbf{C}\_{\text{A}} \times \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{C}\_{\text{A}} \tag{2}$$

It is important to note that the equivalents only reflect an average consideration. However, different communes may have different structures of land use; thus the equivalents don't represent their individual situation.

In the subsequent diagram, the added marginal abatement costs (MACA+B) show the aggregate demand curve, and the aggregated cap (CA+B) shows the aggregate supply curve of all land used for settlement and traffic, set by the planning authorities. The intersection point determines the unit price of the universal development right P\* [13]. The illustration holds true for an individual municipality as well as for the aggregation of municipalities.

The figure shows why a unit price causes economic incentives to violate the land use plans:


**Figure 1.** Aberrations with a universal planning permit (adapted from [13])

From the figure above we may derive two important results:

210 Environmental Land Use Planning

damage of land use type A (EA) and B (EB).

used below), we get for instance a function such as:

represent their individual situation.

the unit price P\*.

been necessary.

quality of land use (for example, see [17]). Therefore, the planning target (CA and CB) corresponds perfectly with the intersection of marginal abatement costs and marginal

Moreover, theoretically the marginal damage of land use type B can be expressed in equivalents of the marginal damage of land use type A. Such equivalents are useful for the definition of a universal cap. Analogous equivalents are also used in the greenhouse gas emission permit schemes. In the Kyoto regime for instance, global warming potentials (GWPs) are used in order to express the global warming potential of the other greenhouse gases in relation to CO2, whose GWP is standardized to 1. Hence, if caps for different land use types should reflect such equivalents (for simplification purposes a linear function is

The total cap results by aggregation of the caps of the individual land use types:

It is important to note that the equivalents only reflect an average consideration. However, different communes may have different structures of land use; thus the equivalents don't

In the subsequent diagram, the added marginal abatement costs (MACA+B) show the aggregate demand curve, and the aggregated cap (CA+B) shows the aggregate supply curve of all land used for settlement and traffic, set by the planning authorities. The intersection point determines the unit price of the universal development right P\* [13]. The illustration holds true for an individual municipality as well as for the aggregation of municipalities.

The figure shows why a unit price causes economic incentives to violate the land use plans:



C = e C B A (1)

C C eC AB A A (2)


Sometimes, supporters suppose that the deviations and aberrations are negligible. Depending on the price of the permits, the position of the caps and the marginal abatement costs, the aberrations and welfare losses can be randomly quite high or low. There is no evidence for a correction mechanism, which might be able to reduce such aberrations systematically. Hence, overshootings and undershootings probably don't equalize in aggregation. The system is as effective as a poor marksman who is currently missing the target in different directions. Aggregating the shooting errors doesn't turn the poor marksman into a champion.

## **3.4. The "incompatibility thesis"**

Against this background, we can describe the central system conflict as follows:


The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning:

In order to support the planning system ("primacy of planning"), the planning permits should best be defined in a tight manner which is in line with the categories of the planning system. For instance, if planners are thinking in categories such as residential, industrial or mixed areas, traffic etc., the planning permits should also follow these categories. This also facilitates the handling of the system. Planning permits should basically be mandatory for all sorts of developed areas. For instance, recreational space may have also negative

The caps could be administered on different administrative levels, e.g. at the level of the states, even at the level of regions (or in other countries: at county level). However, the administration needs a certain human capacity. In Germany, the 30 ha cap might be broken

However, within a tight definition of a variety of planning permits at a low administration level (e.g. region), the "markets" for each right would be quite narrow. Hence the allocation mechanism shouldn't be based on the secondary market (trade – "horizontal coordination") but on the primary market, namely auctions ("vertical coordination"). The auction of planning permits to the communes could be done periodically. Giving the focus to auction doesn't mean a complete ban on trade but a reduction of its significance. Due to the tight design of the sub-markets, organized trade wouldn't be possible anyway. Instead, over-thecounter trade would be feasible, regulated by the planning permits administration. Within the proposed design, different types of planning rights (residential, industrial etc.) were

The administration should also guarantee that it will take back the planning permits for a fixed price (based on the auction price). Thus communes could also think about changing the land use plans and the redevelopment of shrinking areas into the natural state. Deconstruction would be encouraged, because the communes could be sure about the

A system which is based on auction might be designed tightly with regard to space, time, participants and objects of the design. The system may work with only a few participants. It may work even at regional level. Within the auction, the development rights are allocated to those communes that can make the best use of them. Moreover, without the overshooting

Despite the segregation of sub-markets, the system is also efficient. However, in terms of efficiency it is not clear if such a cap and auction system will or will not compete with a cap and trade system, which is based on a single, universal development right. Nonetheless, if in doubt, recognizing the primacy of planning within the conflicts of goals means subordination of efficiency. From a system theory point of view, economic efficiency shouldn't be a guiding value [15] of superior significance anyway, at least not in land use management. Instead, the guiding value of efficiency has to be balanced with other guiding

and undershooting of the cap and trade regime, welfare losses also are avoided.

down into lower administrative levels without problems.

auctioned and traded at different prices.

**4.1. Cap and auction** 

ecological impacts.

compensation.

values.

A Stocktake of the German Discussion 213


The supporters of the tradable planning permits claim that planning should impose a correcting action if necessary. However, our argument is that precisely due to the counteracting economic signals, planning cannot impose such an action.

The problem could theoretically be solved by a variety of tightly segmented sub-markets with diverse price settings. Sub-markets which adapt the categories of land use planning (market segmentation in categorical terms) have been discussed e.g. by Henger and Schröter-Schlaack [17]. Spatial boundaries which limit the trading rights to regions with similar protection status (market segmentation in spatial terms) have been addressed e.g. by Williams [18], Walz et al. [16], Henger and Bizer [19]. However, in most countries such markets would be too small and thus inefficient [17]. At least in the German discussion, the conflict of goals which appears in the cap and trade scheme was decided in favour of efficiency and against market segmentation. Within a system with wide boundaries, such an incompatibility could perhaps be avoided in a few countries with high population and centralized land use planning systems, such as China. However, so far there is no sound research about the minimum size of such markets and the requirements for the land use planning system.

## **3.5. Addendum: Initial distribution**

Within a cap and trade system, the initial distribution might be done by auction or by providing the permits to the communes without costs (according to alternative allotment formulas). Simulation experiments with German municipalities related to the cap and trade scheme also showed that the initial distribution of rights is quite a critical issue, which may endanger acceptance [20]. In order to guarantee the acquis of the communes, discussions have so far favoured "grandfathering" schemes, in which the status quo of land consumption is not touched. However, such grandfathering schemes are probably less efficient than auction schemes [13, 17].

## **4. Results and discussion**

Basically, the required primacy of planning is not compatible with the system of tradable planning permits. If the basic idea of capping planning permits should be kept, a redesign of the regime is necessary.

## **4.1. Cap and auction**

212 Environmental Land Use Planning

infrastructure);




The supporters of the tradable planning permits claim that planning should impose a correcting action if necessary. However, our argument is that precisely due to the

The problem could theoretically be solved by a variety of tightly segmented sub-markets with diverse price settings. Sub-markets which adapt the categories of land use planning (market segmentation in categorical terms) have been discussed e.g. by Henger and Schröter-Schlaack [17]. Spatial boundaries which limit the trading rights to regions with similar protection status (market segmentation in spatial terms) have been addressed e.g. by Williams [18], Walz et al. [16], Henger and Bizer [19]. However, in most countries such markets would be too small and thus inefficient [17]. At least in the German discussion, the conflict of goals which appears in the cap and trade scheme was decided in favour of efficiency and against market segmentation. Within a system with wide boundaries, such an incompatibility could perhaps be avoided in a few countries with high population and centralized land use planning systems, such as China. However, so far there is no sound research about the minimum size of

Within a cap and trade system, the initial distribution might be done by auction or by providing the permits to the communes without costs (according to alternative allotment formulas). Simulation experiments with German municipalities related to the cap and trade scheme also showed that the initial distribution of rights is quite a critical issue, which may endanger acceptance [20]. In order to guarantee the acquis of the communes, discussions have so far favoured "grandfathering" schemes, in which the status quo of land consumption is not touched. However, such grandfathering schemes are probably less

Basically, the required primacy of planning is not compatible with the system of tradable planning permits. If the basic idea of capping planning permits should be kept, a redesign of

needs a diversity of prices with a diversity of certificates.

counteracting economic signals, planning cannot impose such an action.

such markets and the requirements for the land use planning system.

**3.5. Addendum: Initial distribution** 

efficient than auction schemes [13, 17].

**4. Results and discussion** 

the regime is necessary.

In order to support the planning system ("primacy of planning"), the planning permits should best be defined in a tight manner which is in line with the categories of the planning system. For instance, if planners are thinking in categories such as residential, industrial or mixed areas, traffic etc., the planning permits should also follow these categories. This also facilitates the handling of the system. Planning permits should basically be mandatory for all sorts of developed areas. For instance, recreational space may have also negative ecological impacts.

The caps could be administered on different administrative levels, e.g. at the level of the states, even at the level of regions (or in other countries: at county level). However, the administration needs a certain human capacity. In Germany, the 30 ha cap might be broken down into lower administrative levels without problems.

However, within a tight definition of a variety of planning permits at a low administration level (e.g. region), the "markets" for each right would be quite narrow. Hence the allocation mechanism shouldn't be based on the secondary market (trade – "horizontal coordination") but on the primary market, namely auctions ("vertical coordination"). The auction of planning permits to the communes could be done periodically. Giving the focus to auction doesn't mean a complete ban on trade but a reduction of its significance. Due to the tight design of the sub-markets, organized trade wouldn't be possible anyway. Instead, over-thecounter trade would be feasible, regulated by the planning permits administration. Within the proposed design, different types of planning rights (residential, industrial etc.) were auctioned and traded at different prices.

The administration should also guarantee that it will take back the planning permits for a fixed price (based on the auction price). Thus communes could also think about changing the land use plans and the redevelopment of shrinking areas into the natural state. Deconstruction would be encouraged, because the communes could be sure about the compensation.

A system which is based on auction might be designed tightly with regard to space, time, participants and objects of the design. The system may work with only a few participants. It may work even at regional level. Within the auction, the development rights are allocated to those communes that can make the best use of them. Moreover, without the overshooting and undershooting of the cap and trade regime, welfare losses also are avoided.

Despite the segregation of sub-markets, the system is also efficient. However, in terms of efficiency it is not clear if such a cap and auction system will or will not compete with a cap and trade system, which is based on a single, universal development right. Nonetheless, if in doubt, recognizing the primacy of planning within the conflicts of goals means subordination of efficiency. From a system theory point of view, economic efficiency shouldn't be a guiding value [15] of superior significance anyway, at least not in land use management. Instead, the guiding value of efficiency has to be balanced with other guiding values.

## **4.2. Completion by means of a financial equalization scheme**

The regime sketched out above has to face some serious counterarguments relating to political viability: In an auction, the powerful communes with a high willingness to pay will prevail. Moreover, the financial situation of the communes would be even more strained and the municipalities' acquis would be encroached (see section 3.5.). Hence the question is how to increase the acceptance of a cap and auction model.

The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning:

microeconomics, the dynamic incentive is pushed by the substitution effect, whereas the income effect is eliminated by the redistribution scheme ("Slutsky equation", see [24]).

Moreover, within this redistribution mechanism, an average access to the planning permits is granted, also for financially weak communes. The redistribution mechanism serves as an ecological financial equalization scheme between the municipalities. Not unlike a lease mechanism, communes with land consumption rates above average pay to communes with

The effects of the redistribution system are far reaching. To mention just some of them:




With regard to the technical implementation of the system, some minor problems have to be solved. For instance, in order to create equal conditions in the auction, the communes should pay into the land trust in the same "logical second" as the redistribution happens. This means the communes are only charged or rewarded by the balances (net position of pay-in and pay-out). Moreover, it has to be figured out on which administrative level the

land consumption rates below average.

compensate the bigger cities for their efforts.

and the value of existing properties.

A Stocktake of the German Discussion 215

On the one hand, certain transition regulations such as free development rights for existing settlements would certainly be helpful, but not nearly enough on their own.

On the other hand, the view of the discussion about climate policy might be promising. Within the Kyoto regime, it has not been possible to put in place effective caps, mainly because the problems of distribution and "climate justice" have not been solved yet [21]. The regime was based on "grandfathering". Hence those countries with the most aggressive occupancy of the atmosphere and most responsibility for the climate problem got most rights. This was considered as being unjust by countries with developing and emerging economies. Basically, the same holds true in terms of land use permits.

However, many of the objections mentioned above could be countered by establishing a redistribution mechanism. Within such a redistribution mechanism, the money paid by the communes in the auction could be firstly collected in a fund ("land trust"), which is administered by the affected communes. Second, the money is redistributed to the communes, preferably according to the number of their inhabitants (other redistribution keys are also possible). In this respect, all inhabitants are considered as "co-owners" of the planning permits, and thus they should participate in equal shares from the revenues of the auction. Considering the CO2 emission trading schemes, this idea has been popularized by Peter Barnes [22]. Applied to land use planning, a similar redistribution scheme has already been suggested by Krumm [23]. However, his proposal was based on a price-steering basis: Basically, communes should be charged for any new land conversion using a fixed rate per square meter. The money should be pooled in a fund and redistributed to the communes, preferably according to the number of citizens.

If redistribution to the communes were carried out according to the population, the payments into the "land trust" would be according to the land used per capita, whereas the redistribution would be according to the average use per capita. Hence, besides the cap, an additional incentive for a sustainable land use is implemented:


Because every commune tries to get net benefits out of the land trust, there will be a current dynamic incentive to carry out efficient and effective land use management. In terms of microeconomics, the dynamic incentive is pushed by the substitution effect, whereas the income effect is eliminated by the redistribution scheme ("Slutsky equation", see [24]).

214 Environmental Land Use Planning

**4.2. Completion by means of a financial equalization scheme** 

settlements would certainly be helpful, but not nearly enough on their own.

economies. Basically, the same holds true in terms of land use permits.

preferably according to the number of citizens.

additional incentive for a sustainable land use is implemented:

charge is a net contributor to the "land trust";

net beneficiary;

with the status quo.

how to increase the acceptance of a cap and auction model.

The regime sketched out above has to face some serious counterarguments relating to political viability: In an auction, the powerful communes with a high willingness to pay will prevail. Moreover, the financial situation of the communes would be even more strained and the municipalities' acquis would be encroached (see section 3.5.). Hence the question is

On the one hand, certain transition regulations such as free development rights for existing

On the other hand, the view of the discussion about climate policy might be promising. Within the Kyoto regime, it has not been possible to put in place effective caps, mainly because the problems of distribution and "climate justice" have not been solved yet [21]. The regime was based on "grandfathering". Hence those countries with the most aggressive occupancy of the atmosphere and most responsibility for the climate problem got most rights. This was considered as being unjust by countries with developing and emerging

However, many of the objections mentioned above could be countered by establishing a redistribution mechanism. Within such a redistribution mechanism, the money paid by the communes in the auction could be firstly collected in a fund ("land trust"), which is administered by the affected communes. Second, the money is redistributed to the communes, preferably according to the number of their inhabitants (other redistribution keys are also possible). In this respect, all inhabitants are considered as "co-owners" of the planning permits, and thus they should participate in equal shares from the revenues of the auction. Considering the CO2 emission trading schemes, this idea has been popularized by Peter Barnes [22]. Applied to land use planning, a similar redistribution scheme has already been suggested by Krumm [23]. However, his proposal was based on a price-steering basis: Basically, communes should be charged for any new land conversion using a fixed rate per square meter. The money should be pooled in a fund and redistributed to the communes,

If redistribution to the communes were carried out according to the population, the payments into the "land trust" would be according to the land used per capita, whereas the redistribution would be according to the average use per capita. Hence, besides the cap, an




Because every commune tries to get net benefits out of the land trust, there will be a current dynamic incentive to carry out efficient and effective land use management. In terms of Moreover, within this redistribution mechanism, an average access to the planning permits is granted, also for financially weak communes. The redistribution mechanism serves as an ecological financial equalization scheme between the municipalities. Not unlike a lease mechanism, communes with land consumption rates above average pay to communes with land consumption rates below average.

The effects of the redistribution system are far reaching. To mention just some of them:


With regard to the technical implementation of the system, some minor problems have to be solved. For instance, in order to create equal conditions in the auction, the communes should pay into the land trust in the same "logical second" as the redistribution happens. This means the communes are only charged or rewarded by the balances (net position of pay-in and pay-out). Moreover, it has to be figured out on which administrative level the system should be applied. Basically, the redistribution mechanism should be tied to the scope of the cap and auction scheme.

The Role of Tradable Planning Permits in Environmental Land Use Planning:

However, more research is necessary in order to deal with the details of the counterproposal outlined in this article. So far, in Germany politics has supported the cap and trade approach; as has the allocation of research funds. Critics who pointed out the incompatibility between effectiveness and efficiency in the cap and trade approach have been pushed aside. This also holds true for the combination of caps, auction and redistribution, which couldn't be assessed so far. However, in experimental simulations the acceptance of the cap and trade regime among the practitioners was obviously not very high. Among others, the results of the cap and trade game turned out to be quite sensitive in terms of an increase of the complexity of the framework [20]. In contrast, at least the redistribution approach of Krumm was highly accepted (here, basically, also no fiscal impact assessment is necessary) [26]. Maybe it is time to widen the scope of the research

paradigm to extend beyond the cap and trade regime.

Raumentwicklung 4/5: 297-306.

Project Number 3710 16 106.

Berlin.

Schwerpunktprogramms, Berlin, 147 p.

*Trier University of Applied Sciences, Environmental Campus Birkenfeld, Germany* 

Schweiz. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung 4/5: 273-280.

Städtebau und Ökonomie. Wirtschaftsdienst 11: 800-802.

nachhaltiges Flächenmanagement. Berlin: Difu pp. 11-27.

[8] Homepage of the project "Forum Flächenzertifikate". Available: http://www.ufz.de/index.php?de=21103 Accessed 2012 Mar 15

http://www.refina-info.de. Accessed: 2012, Mar 15.

[1] Zollinger F, Seidl I (2005) Flächenzertifikate für eine nachhaltige Raumentwicklung? – Ein Konzept für Baden-Württemberg und Erkenntnisse aus der Übertragung auf die

[2] Kriese U (2005) Handelbare Flächenfestsetzungskontingente – Anforderungen an ein Mittel zur Beendigung des Landschaftsverbrauchs. Informationen zur

[3] Federal Ministry for the Environment, Natural Conservation and Nuclear Safety (1998) Nachhaltige Entwicklung in Deutschland – Entwurf eines umweltpolitischen

[4] Penn-Bressel G (2011) Flächenneuinanspruchnahme – Wirkungen auf Umwelt,

[5] Frerichs S, Lieber M, Preuß T (2010) Flächen- und Standortinformationen erheben und bewerten – Methoden und Konzepte für ein nachhaltiges Flächenmanagement. In: Frerichs, S, Lieber, M, Preuß, T, editors. Flächen- und Standortbewertung für ein

[6] Homepage of the "Refina" research programme, funded by the federal government:

[7] Federal Ministry for the Environment, Natural Conservation and Nuclear Safety (2010) Environment research plan (Umweltforschungsplan) 2010. Project Z 6 – 91 054/84,

[9] CDU, CSU, FDP (2009) Wachstum, Bildung, Zusammenhalt, Coalition Agreement.

**Author details** 

**6. References** 

Dirk Loehr

A Stocktake of the German Discussion 217

One should be clear about the fact that no money for natural protection would be raised within the redistribution scheme. However, modifications are possible: If, for instance, a natural park as a common public good has to be financed, the redistribution could be carried out after first deducting the expenses for covering the park. Such decisions depend on the land trust and the planning authorities. A legal basis for the cooperation arrangement is necessary.

The proposed model may be appealing, but it is not a "silver bullet". The framework has to be completed by other instruments. For instance, the price of real estate may rise due to successful capping of planning rights. Thus, access problems for socially weak groups might be caused. Hence a suitable land taxation system which transfers shares of land rents and land value to the community would be desirable for example.

## **5. Conclusions**

The concept of tradable planning permits transforms the idea of the CO2 cap and trade regime to spatial planning. Analyzing the tool, we have at least to refer to effectiveness (planning, ecology), allocation (economy) and distributional aspects (social).

Regarding effectiveness, there is a broad consensus about the primacy of planning. Any economic tool should support planning instead of substituting it. However, planning land is not the same as planning the maximum permissible load of CO2 in the atmosphere. The former requires a planning of structure, the latter a planning of scale, since it is irrelevant where the emission takes place.

Planning the structure of land use cannot be supported by a unit price, as a result of a universal certificate for all types of land use (for settlement and traffic). In contrast, a variety of sub-markets are necessary, with a different price setting. Meanwhile, more and more planners are also becoming sceptical about the supporting effects of a cap and trade regime.

Supporting the planning of a structure within a variety of sub-markets may be inferior compared with the efficiency of a cap and trade system with wide system boundaries. On the other hand, efficiency losses due to overshooting or undershooting might be avoided. The efficiency losses might be minimized by auctioning the permits to the needy communes on the primary market ("vertical allocation"). Although trade shouldn't be forbidden, an organized secondary market is dispensable (subordination of a "horizontal allocation mechanism"). Moreover, both systems would have to prevent strategic acquisitions of permits (impediment of development in other communes by an artificial shortage of supply), e.g. by a current devaluation of the permits.

Regarding the blueprint of CO2 trade, a comprehensive arrangement on a global scale has so far failed due to distribution disputes. Also a cap and auction system for planning permits wouldn't be acceptable particularly for communes with a weak financial endowment if there were no correction. This is the reason why the cap and auction regime should be completed by a redistribution mechanism which is based on equal stakes in the scarce land use opportunities.

However, more research is necessary in order to deal with the details of the counterproposal outlined in this article. So far, in Germany politics has supported the cap and trade approach; as has the allocation of research funds. Critics who pointed out the incompatibility between effectiveness and efficiency in the cap and trade approach have been pushed aside. This also holds true for the combination of caps, auction and redistribution, which couldn't be assessed so far. However, in experimental simulations the acceptance of the cap and trade regime among the practitioners was obviously not very high. Among others, the results of the cap and trade game turned out to be quite sensitive in terms of an increase of the complexity of the framework [20]. In contrast, at least the redistribution approach of Krumm was highly accepted (here, basically, also no fiscal impact assessment is necessary) [26]. Maybe it is time to widen the scope of the research paradigm to extend beyond the cap and trade regime.

## **Author details**

Dirk Loehr

216 Environmental Land Use Planning

**5. Conclusions** 

where the emission takes place.

supply), e.g. by a current devaluation of the permits.

scope of the cap and auction scheme.

land value to the community would be desirable for example.

system should be applied. Basically, the redistribution mechanism should be tied to the

One should be clear about the fact that no money for natural protection would be raised within the redistribution scheme. However, modifications are possible: If, for instance, a natural park as a common public good has to be financed, the redistribution could be carried out after first deducting the expenses for covering the park. Such decisions depend on the land trust and the planning authorities. A legal basis for the cooperation arrangement is necessary. The proposed model may be appealing, but it is not a "silver bullet". The framework has to be completed by other instruments. For instance, the price of real estate may rise due to successful capping of planning rights. Thus, access problems for socially weak groups might be caused. Hence a suitable land taxation system which transfers shares of land rents and

The concept of tradable planning permits transforms the idea of the CO2 cap and trade regime to spatial planning. Analyzing the tool, we have at least to refer to effectiveness

Regarding effectiveness, there is a broad consensus about the primacy of planning. Any economic tool should support planning instead of substituting it. However, planning land is not the same as planning the maximum permissible load of CO2 in the atmosphere. The former requires a planning of structure, the latter a planning of scale, since it is irrelevant

Planning the structure of land use cannot be supported by a unit price, as a result of a universal certificate for all types of land use (for settlement and traffic). In contrast, a variety of sub-markets are necessary, with a different price setting. Meanwhile, more and more planners are also becoming sceptical about the supporting effects of a cap and trade regime. Supporting the planning of a structure within a variety of sub-markets may be inferior compared with the efficiency of a cap and trade system with wide system boundaries. On the other hand, efficiency losses due to overshooting or undershooting might be avoided. The efficiency losses might be minimized by auctioning the permits to the needy communes on the primary market ("vertical allocation"). Although trade shouldn't be forbidden, an organized secondary market is dispensable (subordination of a "horizontal allocation mechanism"). Moreover, both systems would have to prevent strategic acquisitions of permits (impediment of development in other communes by an artificial shortage of

Regarding the blueprint of CO2 trade, a comprehensive arrangement on a global scale has so far failed due to distribution disputes. Also a cap and auction system for planning permits wouldn't be acceptable particularly for communes with a weak financial endowment if there were no correction. This is the reason why the cap and auction regime should be completed by a redistribution mechanism which is based on equal stakes in the scarce land use opportunities.

(planning, ecology), allocation (economy) and distributional aspects (social).

*Trier University of Applied Sciences, Environmental Campus Birkenfeld, Germany* 

## **6. References**


 [10] LeJava, J P (2009) Transfer of Development Rights in New Jersey – A background paper, New Jersey. Available: http://www.dvrpc.org/TDR/pdf/2009-10\_LeJava\_ Background\_Paper.pdf Accessed 2012 Mar 15.

**Chapter 11** 

© 2012 Aarts and Lokhorst, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,

**The Role of Government in Environmental Land** 

**Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective** 

*Dynamics and developments in the design and implementation of Dutch nature policies* 

*their land in case it had been located in the planned ecological infrastructure.* 

*decided to realise the implementation of the NPP by means of participation.* 

*In 1990 the Dutch parliament accepted the Nature Policy Plan (NPP), designed to conserve and develop nature over the next 30 years. The original plan was developed by ecologists and biologists with little involvement of the agricultural sector. Consequently the plan was about plants and animals, about biodiversity and valuable landscapes and about the realisation of a socalled ecological infrastructure that should connect isolated pieces of nature in the Netherlands. Nothing was said about farmers' behaviours related to nature whereas the implementation of the plan asked a lot from the farmers: they should start working in a nature-friendly way, or sell* 

*The NPP, in its original form, was the result of a centrally organized decide-announce-defend strategy (DAD): internally decided upon, publicly announced, and, because of a fierce public resistance, firmly defended. This strategy has clearly resulted in non-acceptance of the NPP by the majority of the Dutch farmers who did not immediately see advantages for them, but from whom cooperation was needed for a successful implementation. Therefore the government* 

*A longitudinal study of such a participation process in the Drentsche Aa area in the north of the Netherlands, has shown that the ambition of Dutch nature conservation policymakers to involve multiple actors (farmers, citizens, recreationists) in nature policy processes has resulted in different patterns of citizen involvement (Van Bommel et al., 2008). A group of citizens appeared who wanted to be involved as stakeholders, but found that they had different views than the decision makers. Even though they were allowed to express their views in discussion meetings, it was clear that these views would not be taken into account. Roughly speaking, citizens who did agree upon the proposals were included, whereas those who did not agree were excluded from the participatory process. As a consequence, the process ended up just reproducing the government's dominant discourse. The citizens with different views and perspectives – not coincidently a group that mainly consisted of farmers - did not feel respected or represented because what was* 

and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Noelle Aarts and Anne Marike Lokhorst

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/50684

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter


## **The Role of Government in Environmental Land Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective**

Noelle Aarts and Anne Marike Lokhorst

Additional information is available at the end of the chapter

http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/50684

218 Environmental Land Use Planning

Tübingen: IAW. 136 p.

Background\_Paper.pdf Accessed 2012 Mar 15.

Strukturwandel, Munich: Droemer. 464 p.

Landschaftsplanung 42 (2): 39-47.

2002 Accessed 2012 Mar 20.

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 331 p.

für neue Ziele. Berlin / Bonn: Difu. 109 p.

Inc. 506 p.

Cooperative\_Games\_Nash.pdf. Accessed 2012 Mar 15.

[10] LeJava, J P (2009) Transfer of Development Rights in New Jersey – A background paper, New Jersey. Available: http://www.dvrpc.org/TDR/pdf/2009-10\_LeJava\_

[11] Nash J F (1950) Non-cooperative Games; Ph.D. Thesis; Princeton University: Princeton, USA. Available: http://www.princeton.edu/mudd/news/faq/topics/Non-

[12] Krumm R (2004) Nachhaltigkeitskonforme Flächennutzungspolitik – Ökonomische Steuerungsinstrumente und deren gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz, IAW research report,

[13] Loehr D (2006) Handelbare Flächenausweisungskontingente: Eine gute Idee auf

[14] Bovet J (2006) Handelbare Flächenausweisungsrechte aus Steuerungsinstrument zur

[15] Bossel H (1998) Globale Wende – Wege zu einem gesellschaftlichen und ökologischen

[16] Walz R et al. (2005) Gestaltung eines Modells handelbarer Flächenausweisungskontingente unter Berücksichtigung ökologischer, ökonomischer, rechtlicher und sozialer Aspekte, Final Report. Research Project, funded by the Federal Environmental Office, Project Number 203 16 123/03, Dessau-Roßlau. 170 p. Available:

http://opus.kobv.de/zlb/volltexte/2009/7870/pdf/3839.pdf. Accessed 2012 Mar 15. [17] Henger R, Schröter-Schlaack C (2008) Designoptionen für den Handel mit Flächenausweisungsrechten in Deutschland, Land Use Economics and Planning – Discussion Paper, No. 08-02, University of Göttingen, September. Available:

[18] Williams R C (2003) Cost-Effectiveness vs. Hot Spots: Determining the optimal size of emissions permit trading zones. University of Texas at Austin Working Paper. [19] Henger R, Bizer K (2008). Tradable Planning Permits for Land-use Control in Germany.

[20] Küpfer C et al. (2010) Handelbare Flächenausweisungszertifikate – Experiment Spiel.Raum: Ergebnisse einer Simulation in 14 Kommunen. Naturschutz und

[21] Wicke L (2006) Das Versagen des Kyoto-Protokolls in seiner jetzigen Form und seine

[22] Barnes P, Pomerance R (2000): Pie in the Sky – The Battle for Atmospheric Scarcity Rent, Washington. Available: http://community-wealth.org/\_pdfs/articles-publications/

[23] Krumm R (2002) Die Baulandausweisungsumlage als ökonomisches Steuerungsinstrument einer nachhaltigen Flächenpolitik. IAW Discussion Papers 7. Available: http://iaw.edu/iaw/De:Publikationen:IAW-Reihen:IAW-Diskussionspapiere:

[24] Varian H (1992) Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd ed., New York: W.W. Norton & Company

[25] Christaller W (1933) : Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland. 2nd ed. 1968. Darmstadt:

[26] Preuß T et al. (2007) Perspektive Flächenkreislaufwirtschaft, Vol. 3: Neue Instrumente

http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/80714.html Accessed 2012 Mar 15.

Land Use Economics and Planning – Discussion Paper No. 08-01.

commons/ paper-barnes-pomerance.pdf Accessed 2012 Mar 20.

strukturelle Weiterentwicklung. Zeitschrift für Sozialökonomie 150: 3-9.

Abwegen, in: Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 4: 529-544.

Reduzierung der Flächeninanspruchnahme. Natur und Recht 6: 473-479.

*Dynamics and developments in the design and implementation of Dutch nature policies* 

*In 1990 the Dutch parliament accepted the Nature Policy Plan (NPP), designed to conserve and develop nature over the next 30 years. The original plan was developed by ecologists and biologists with little involvement of the agricultural sector. Consequently the plan was about plants and animals, about biodiversity and valuable landscapes and about the realisation of a socalled ecological infrastructure that should connect isolated pieces of nature in the Netherlands. Nothing was said about farmers' behaviours related to nature whereas the implementation of the plan asked a lot from the farmers: they should start working in a nature-friendly way, or sell their land in case it had been located in the planned ecological infrastructure.* 

*The NPP, in its original form, was the result of a centrally organized decide-announce-defend strategy (DAD): internally decided upon, publicly announced, and, because of a fierce public resistance, firmly defended. This strategy has clearly resulted in non-acceptance of the NPP by the majority of the Dutch farmers who did not immediately see advantages for them, but from whom cooperation was needed for a successful implementation. Therefore the government decided to realise the implementation of the NPP by means of participation.* 

*A longitudinal study of such a participation process in the Drentsche Aa area in the north of the Netherlands, has shown that the ambition of Dutch nature conservation policymakers to involve multiple actors (farmers, citizens, recreationists) in nature policy processes has resulted in different patterns of citizen involvement (Van Bommel et al., 2008). A group of citizens appeared who wanted to be involved as stakeholders, but found that they had different views than the decision makers. Even though they were allowed to express their views in discussion meetings, it was clear that these views would not be taken into account. Roughly speaking, citizens who did agree upon the proposals were included, whereas those who did not agree were excluded from the participatory process. As a consequence, the process ended up just reproducing the government's dominant discourse. The citizens with different views and perspectives – not coincidently a group that mainly consisted of farmers - did not feel respected or represented because what was* 

© 2012 Aarts and Lokhorst, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2012 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*relevant to them was not part of the so-called formal perspective of the government and thus was ignored. Meaningful participation was no longer possible for them, and this resulted in active, self-organized powerful resistance to the policy.* 

The Role of Government in Environmental Land Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective 221

**Figure 1.** Interaction between government (G) and citizens (C): an instrumental perspective

**Figure 2.** Policy instruments for behaviour change (Van Woerkum et al, 1999)

behaviours.

Let us take a closer look to the instruments a government has available for steering citizens'

As can be seen in Figure 2, several policy instruments are available for governments looking to change behaviour. Within this perspective, regulation is not seen as a way to codify existing practices, but rather as an instrument to change the behaviour of people, and to facilitate that change. For several reasons it is not easy to develop and implement new rules. First, developing new regulation takes a lot of time as many different actors are involved in such a process. Second, especially in matters of nature conservation, many citizens, and certainly many farmers, are inclined to react negatively to regulation, for the very reason that such intervention takes place. Regulation undermines their feeling of freedom, ownership, and responsibility for looking after their own environment (Aarts and Van

*Today more and more initiatives can be found involving farmers who organize themselves in interaction with other actors in the countryside, sharing similar problems or similar ideals, and explicitly avoiding the involvement of governments. The reason is that they no longer want to be confronted with policies that have been designed without their involvement and thus do not fit neither daily farming practices nor their identity as a farmer. In addition, they do not want to be dependent on the continuously changing rules and restrictions that they encounter when they, for instance, try to apply for a subsidy such as the Agri-Environment Scheme. Instead, they experiment and invest together, in collective management of nature at their farms, in collective meadow ownership, or in new co-operations for the production of biogas as an alternative energy source. These self-organizing initiatives are characterized by high commitment and responsibility, resulting in responsible and sustainable behaviours that go beyond the individual.* 

## **1. Introduction**

In search of ways to influence citizens' decision making concerning land use, governments are continuously expanding their repertoire of strategic tools to steer people in the desired direction. These strategic tools range from policy instruments such as subsidies and agrienvironmental schemes, that are used to reward desired nature related behaviours of farmers, to forms of participation trajectories in which citizens are invited to participate in policy processes related to the design and use of public spaces (Aarts and Leeuwis, 2010); a phenomenon also referred to as governance (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).

While such tools might appear promising and seem to offer a wide range of steering options for governments and policy makers, they each have some serious drawbacks that might hinder or even backfire on effective policy making. In this chapter we critically reflect on the downsides of the so called instrumental approach. Participative policy making is discussed as an alternative way of getting things done. We argue that both approaches have their unique fallbacks and share some features that lead them to be sub-optimal. Therefore the network perspective is added, which implies alternative conceptualisations of change, communication and planning. The chapter concludes with a plea for valuing an integral perspective, based on all three perspectives. Such an integral perspective does not offer a 100% guarantee for successful steering, but does enlarge the space for development of policies for land use planning and rural development that are the result of a process of cocreation between government and societal actors, and that therefore have gradually become acceptable, suitable and effective.

## **2. The instrumental perspective**

A common perspective on implementing governmental policies is the instrumental perspective: governments develop policies that are implemented with the help of a set of strategic tools, also referred to as policy instruments.

**Figure 1.** Interaction between government (G) and citizens (C): an instrumental perspective

**1. Introduction** 

acceptable, suitable and effective.

**2. The instrumental perspective** 

strategic tools, also referred to as policy instruments.

*self-organized powerful resistance to the policy.* 

*relevant to them was not part of the so-called formal perspective of the government and thus was ignored. Meaningful participation was no longer possible for them, and this resulted in active,* 

*Today more and more initiatives can be found involving farmers who organize themselves in interaction with other actors in the countryside, sharing similar problems or similar ideals, and explicitly avoiding the involvement of governments. The reason is that they no longer want to be confronted with policies that have been designed without their involvement and thus do not fit neither daily farming practices nor their identity as a farmer. In addition, they do not want to be dependent on the continuously changing rules and restrictions that they encounter when they, for instance, try to apply for a subsidy such as the Agri-Environment Scheme. Instead, they experiment and invest together, in collective management of nature at their farms, in collective meadow ownership, or in new co-operations for the production of biogas as an alternative energy source. These self-organizing initiatives are characterized by high commitment and responsibility, resulting in responsible and sustainable behaviours that go beyond the individual.* 

In search of ways to influence citizens' decision making concerning land use, governments are continuously expanding their repertoire of strategic tools to steer people in the desired direction. These strategic tools range from policy instruments such as subsidies and agrienvironmental schemes, that are used to reward desired nature related behaviours of farmers, to forms of participation trajectories in which citizens are invited to participate in policy processes related to the design and use of public spaces (Aarts and Leeuwis, 2010); a

While such tools might appear promising and seem to offer a wide range of steering options for governments and policy makers, they each have some serious drawbacks that might hinder or even backfire on effective policy making. In this chapter we critically reflect on the downsides of the so called instrumental approach. Participative policy making is discussed as an alternative way of getting things done. We argue that both approaches have their unique fallbacks and share some features that lead them to be sub-optimal. Therefore the network perspective is added, which implies alternative conceptualisations of change, communication and planning. The chapter concludes with a plea for valuing an integral perspective, based on all three perspectives. Such an integral perspective does not offer a 100% guarantee for successful steering, but does enlarge the space for development of policies for land use planning and rural development that are the result of a process of cocreation between government and societal actors, and that therefore have gradually become

A common perspective on implementing governmental policies is the instrumental perspective: governments develop policies that are implemented with the help of a set of

phenomenon also referred to as governance (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).

Let us take a closer look to the instruments a government has available for steering citizens' behaviours.

**Figure 2.** Policy instruments for behaviour change (Van Woerkum et al, 1999)

As can be seen in Figure 2, several policy instruments are available for governments looking to change behaviour. Within this perspective, regulation is not seen as a way to codify existing practices, but rather as an instrument to change the behaviour of people, and to facilitate that change. For several reasons it is not easy to develop and implement new rules. First, developing new regulation takes a lot of time as many different actors are involved in such a process. Second, especially in matters of nature conservation, many citizens, and certainly many farmers, are inclined to react negatively to regulation, for the very reason that such intervention takes place. Regulation undermines their feeling of freedom, ownership, and responsibility for looking after their own environment (Aarts and Van

Woerkum, 1994). The physical environment can stimulate a certain behaviour, for example: playing grounds for children, recreation areas for tourists, museum for learning facilities. It can also hinder undesirable behaviour, for example: fences around valuable natural sites or roadblocks. Governments can try and (re-)design such environments as to promote the desired behaviour. Group pressure can be an important strategy to involve target groups in a policy program, but is hard to organize (for a successful example, see Lokhorst et al., 2010). More often it arises from an effective resonance between the results of other policy instruments. Money can be used as an incentive (subsidies) or as a disincentive (taxes). Finally, communication can be used when not much can be expected from other instruments. Different communication strategies are then applied to persuade people to change their behaviours (Petty and Caccioppo, 1986).

The Role of Government in Environmental Land Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective 223

implementation. We should thus search for different ways of policymaking. Instead of the instrumental perspective in which the government is both the initiator and director of the policy process, the participation perspective, involving stakeholders in the process of policy-

The participation perspective can be seen as a response to conceptualizations of steering that reflect great confidence in the malleability of society, but nevertheless do not often give the expected results (Glasbergen, 1995; Aarts and Van Woerkum, 2002; Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2005). Governments invite citizens with the aim to let them contribute to the

**Figure 3.** Interaction between government (G), statkeholders (S) and citizens (C): a participation

The idea of public participation is not new. Since the late 1980s, public participation in land use issues has become the dominant discourse, in the Netherlands, but also outside the Netherlands (see Idrissou et al, 2011). Public participation may take place at (or across) various government levels. At the Dutch national level for instance, public meetings have been organized to discuss with citizens issues such as genetic modification of food products and nature conservation policies. In addition, citizen panels of the Ministry of Food and Nature are regularly consulted for the development of policies for sustainable food production. At the local level it is common that citizens are consulted for the design of

development for problem solution, has become a leading paradigm.

**3. The participation perspective** 

development and implementation of policies.

perspective

public space in their neighbourhood.

Most plans in the domain of spatial policies consist of a combination of instruments. They encompass regulation, facilities (like roads, water supply, etc.) and financial measures. As far as subsidies are involved, there is reason to be careful. Lokhorst et al. (in press a) critically review financial compensation in the domain of nature conservation. In Europe, these conservation measures are stimulated by agri-environment schemes (AES). However, as Lokhorst et al. (in press a) argue, financially rewarding conservation practices may create a dependency that is self-sustaining, costly, and therefore vulnerable. First of all, such financial policies are dependent on the current political climate and are thus susceptible to change. Indeed, many schemes on both the country and the European level have been altered or have even ceased to exist over the past years. Second, rewarding a behaviour can cause a decline in intrinsic motivation for this behaviour, a process called the "crowding out effect" (Frey, 1997). In this scenario, receiving a reward for performing a behaviour leads people to attribute their behaviour to this reward, causing a shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation. Should the reward then be taken away, people will no longer be motivated to perform the behaviour. Therefore, the vulnerability of financially dependent conservation practices are a threat to their continuity over longer time spans. Preliminary evidence for this idea was found in a study on the social psychological underpinnings of both subsidized and non-subsidized conservation (Lokhorst et al., 2011). In this study it was found that farmers' intention to engage in non-subsidized conservation was better explained by psychological aspects of their motivation than their intention to engage in subsidized conservation. While their motivation to perform subsidized conservation was driven mainly by their attitudes, when it came to non-subsidized conservation, feelings of moral obligation and self-identity played an important role. That is, farmers who saw themselves as the kind of people who conserve nature, and who felt that this was the right thing to do, were more likely to engage in non-subsidized conservation. For these farmers, conservation had become part of who they are, and their behavior is less likely to be affected by (changes in) financial policies.

Policies that have been developed without involving the people who are responsible for the implementation are not easy to implement. Such policies will only be accepted when people have the impression that they will benefit from the policy. This may be the case when subsidies are applied, however, as we have shown, this leads to a risky and unstable implementation. We should thus search for different ways of policymaking. Instead of the instrumental perspective in which the government is both the initiator and director of the policy process, the participation perspective, involving stakeholders in the process of policydevelopment for problem solution, has become a leading paradigm.

## **3. The participation perspective**

222 Environmental Land Use Planning

financial policies.

change their behaviours (Petty and Caccioppo, 1986).

Woerkum, 1994). The physical environment can stimulate a certain behaviour, for example: playing grounds for children, recreation areas for tourists, museum for learning facilities. It can also hinder undesirable behaviour, for example: fences around valuable natural sites or roadblocks. Governments can try and (re-)design such environments as to promote the desired behaviour. Group pressure can be an important strategy to involve target groups in a policy program, but is hard to organize (for a successful example, see Lokhorst et al., 2010). More often it arises from an effective resonance between the results of other policy instruments. Money can be used as an incentive (subsidies) or as a disincentive (taxes). Finally, communication can be used when not much can be expected from other instruments. Different communication strategies are then applied to persuade people to

Most plans in the domain of spatial policies consist of a combination of instruments. They encompass regulation, facilities (like roads, water supply, etc.) and financial measures. As far as subsidies are involved, there is reason to be careful. Lokhorst et al. (in press a) critically review financial compensation in the domain of nature conservation. In Europe, these conservation measures are stimulated by agri-environment schemes (AES). However, as Lokhorst et al. (in press a) argue, financially rewarding conservation practices may create a dependency that is self-sustaining, costly, and therefore vulnerable. First of all, such financial policies are dependent on the current political climate and are thus susceptible to change. Indeed, many schemes on both the country and the European level have been altered or have even ceased to exist over the past years. Second, rewarding a behaviour can cause a decline in intrinsic motivation for this behaviour, a process called the "crowding out effect" (Frey, 1997). In this scenario, receiving a reward for performing a behaviour leads people to attribute their behaviour to this reward, causing a shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation. Should the reward then be taken away, people will no longer be motivated to perform the behaviour. Therefore, the vulnerability of financially dependent conservation practices are a threat to their continuity over longer time spans. Preliminary evidence for this idea was found in a study on the social psychological underpinnings of both subsidized and non-subsidized conservation (Lokhorst et al., 2011). In this study it was found that farmers' intention to engage in non-subsidized conservation was better explained by psychological aspects of their motivation than their intention to engage in subsidized conservation. While their motivation to perform subsidized conservation was driven mainly by their attitudes, when it came to non-subsidized conservation, feelings of moral obligation and self-identity played an important role. That is, farmers who saw themselves as the kind of people who conserve nature, and who felt that this was the right thing to do, were more likely to engage in non-subsidized conservation. For these farmers, conservation had become part of who they are, and their behavior is less likely to be affected by (changes in)

Policies that have been developed without involving the people who are responsible for the implementation are not easy to implement. Such policies will only be accepted when people have the impression that they will benefit from the policy. This may be the case when subsidies are applied, however, as we have shown, this leads to a risky and unstable The participation perspective can be seen as a response to conceptualizations of steering that reflect great confidence in the malleability of society, but nevertheless do not often give the expected results (Glasbergen, 1995; Aarts and Van Woerkum, 2002; Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2005). Governments invite citizens with the aim to let them contribute to the development and implementation of policies.

**Figure 3.** Interaction between government (G), statkeholders (S) and citizens (C): a participation perspective

The idea of public participation is not new. Since the late 1980s, public participation in land use issues has become the dominant discourse, in the Netherlands, but also outside the Netherlands (see Idrissou et al, 2011). Public participation may take place at (or across) various government levels. At the Dutch national level for instance, public meetings have been organized to discuss with citizens issues such as genetic modification of food products and nature conservation policies. In addition, citizen panels of the Ministry of Food and Nature are regularly consulted for the development of policies for sustainable food production. At the local level it is common that citizens are consulted for the design of public space in their neighbourhood.

Practices of public participation, however, do not always result in success. In the first place, we can notice a limited reach in society. Concrete efforts to organize participation in most cases do not involve more than a selected group of citizens, namely the so-called stakeholders that have an interest in the problem domain of which representatives are invited by the government to discuss and negotiate problem-definitions and possible solutions. There are many citizens who are not willing or not able to get their problem perceptions on the agenda of the government. Research of the way governments act in cases of conflict in public space shows that several preconditions have to be met before policywindows are opened (Van Lieshout et al, 2008; see also Kingdon, 2002). The problem should be well-defined and solvable, and the political context should ask for dealing with the issue. We touch upon the phenomenon of self-referentiality as an inherent characteristic of governments, reducing reality to what is measurable and solvable (Wagemans, 2002).

The Role of Government in Environmental Land Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective 225

outside the formal process, groups of citizens regain what Foucault has called productive power (Van der Arend, 2007: 53), referring to a certain amount of autonomy and freedom. The risk is that governments who apply public participation as an additional form of instrumental steering - which is the case when space for negotiation is lacking – create their

It can be concluded that both the instrumental perspective and public participation that starts from a fixed policy tend to neglect the idea of citizens being active agents, interacting with each other and organizing themselves in order to attain their goals, for themselves and for others in their environment (Aarts & Leeuwis, 2010). A more advanced form of participation is the organizing of public commitment, in which an individual is asked to make a commitment to certain behaviour(s) in the presence of other people. In the social psychological literature, commitment-making is generally seen as a promising intervention technique (Abrahamse et al. 2005; De Young 1993; Dwyer et al. 1993; Katzev and Wang 1994) and has been shown to influence, a wide range of behaviours. Public commitment can influence behaviour in a number of ways (Lokhorst et al., in press b). First, it can change people's self-image such that the new behaviour becomes a part of their self- identity. Second, it can evoke a willingness to conform to either a societal or personal norm to engage in the behaviour in question. Third, it can set in motion a process generally referred to as cognitive elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), a process whereby the individual elaborates on the possible reasons to engage in the behaviour and strategies to accurately

perform the behaviour, resulting in a strong positive attitude towards the behaviour.

In the domain of nature conservation, commitment making has been shown to affect people's intention to engage in conservation. In a study by Lokhorst et al. (2010), farmers were invited to participate in study groups in which they received feedback on their current conservation efforts. In this setting, farmers were asked to publicly commit to improving these efforts. A year later it was found that those who had made such a commitment showed actual improvement in terms of intention to conserve and area of (semi-)natural habitat. Commitment making seems like an effective tool, but requires working together with local groups and small-scale networks in order to truly be effective. It needs, in other words, to be realised in direct interaction with the people involved. This invites us to

Already in the seventies the policy-scientist Scharpf (1978) argued that governments would lose their central and steering role. Scharpf referred to the tendency of increasing interweaving and organizational fragmentation within society. He predicted that governments would not be able to function without the co-operation of countless organizations and institutions. As a result, policy processes would have a 'network-like'

Today, the idea that policies are shaped by 'pulling' and 'pushing' in complex interactions between different stakeholders has become commonly understood. Policy-processes are

own powerful antagonists (Turnhout et al, 2010).

explore a third perspective: the network perspective.

**4. The network perspective** 

structure (Scharpf, 1978).

Second, related to public participation, both in literature and in reality, a rather limited view on how people actually behave can be experienced. Public participation often starts from rather simplistic and prejudged ideas concerning people's motivations, possibilities and restrictions as well as how they behave in groups. Very limited attention is paid to what actually happens between people, including, for instance, processes of community development, processes of inclusion and exclusion, and processes of changing powerrelationships, both within and between different groups in society. In addition, the reasonability and intelligence of people are systematically underestimated. Instead people are more often than not viewed as if they always behave in a completely selfish way, only concerned about money. For problems to be solved people only should change their behaviour: they should be open, honest, perfectly listening to each other and be ready to give in. In other words, it is not about understanding actual behaviours of people, but about striving after a sort of ideal behaviour that has to bring solutions.

Third, within the public participation model, instead of capitalizing on differences and diversity, we find a striving after consensus. In cases of complex land use issues this is in most cases neither realistic nor does it contribute to effective problem-solving because it takes away a lot of creativity and easily results in unsolvable impasses (Aarts and Leeuwis, 2010).

Finally, and maybe most important, efforts of public participation keep showing an obstinate illusion of central steering. It is still the government who defines the problem, including the direction for solution. The most important dilemmas of steering by participation concern matters of responsibility for the final result and of realizing ambitions, mainly expressed by the plea for the so-called 'primacy' of democratically elected bodies which is vested in the constitution. In the context of land use planning these dilemmas are often solved by simply denying people who bring in ideas that do not fit with the ambitions that have already been formulated by the government beforehand (Van Bommel et al, 2009; Turnhout et al, 2010). This may result in citizens that do not want to participate anymore, and instead start organizing themselves to realise their own ambitions in their own way. In other words, on the one hand, the government, in spite of their participation initiatives sticks to their power to decide what to do. On the other hand, by simply placing them outside the formal process, groups of citizens regain what Foucault has called productive power (Van der Arend, 2007: 53), referring to a certain amount of autonomy and freedom. The risk is that governments who apply public participation as an additional form of instrumental steering - which is the case when space for negotiation is lacking – create their own powerful antagonists (Turnhout et al, 2010).

It can be concluded that both the instrumental perspective and public participation that starts from a fixed policy tend to neglect the idea of citizens being active agents, interacting with each other and organizing themselves in order to attain their goals, for themselves and for others in their environment (Aarts & Leeuwis, 2010). A more advanced form of participation is the organizing of public commitment, in which an individual is asked to make a commitment to certain behaviour(s) in the presence of other people. In the social psychological literature, commitment-making is generally seen as a promising intervention technique (Abrahamse et al. 2005; De Young 1993; Dwyer et al. 1993; Katzev and Wang 1994) and has been shown to influence, a wide range of behaviours. Public commitment can influence behaviour in a number of ways (Lokhorst et al., in press b). First, it can change people's self-image such that the new behaviour becomes a part of their self- identity. Second, it can evoke a willingness to conform to either a societal or personal norm to engage in the behaviour in question. Third, it can set in motion a process generally referred to as cognitive elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), a process whereby the individual elaborates on the possible reasons to engage in the behaviour and strategies to accurately perform the behaviour, resulting in a strong positive attitude towards the behaviour.

In the domain of nature conservation, commitment making has been shown to affect people's intention to engage in conservation. In a study by Lokhorst et al. (2010), farmers were invited to participate in study groups in which they received feedback on their current conservation efforts. In this setting, farmers were asked to publicly commit to improving these efforts. A year later it was found that those who had made such a commitment showed actual improvement in terms of intention to conserve and area of (semi-)natural habitat. Commitment making seems like an effective tool, but requires working together with local groups and small-scale networks in order to truly be effective. It needs, in other words, to be realised in direct interaction with the people involved. This invites us to explore a third perspective: the network perspective.

## **4. The network perspective**

224 Environmental Land Use Planning

2010).

Practices of public participation, however, do not always result in success. In the first place, we can notice a limited reach in society. Concrete efforts to organize participation in most cases do not involve more than a selected group of citizens, namely the so-called stakeholders that have an interest in the problem domain of which representatives are invited by the government to discuss and negotiate problem-definitions and possible solutions. There are many citizens who are not willing or not able to get their problem perceptions on the agenda of the government. Research of the way governments act in cases of conflict in public space shows that several preconditions have to be met before policywindows are opened (Van Lieshout et al, 2008; see also Kingdon, 2002). The problem should be well-defined and solvable, and the political context should ask for dealing with the issue. We touch upon the phenomenon of self-referentiality as an inherent characteristic of

governments, reducing reality to what is measurable and solvable (Wagemans, 2002).

striving after a sort of ideal behaviour that has to bring solutions.

Second, related to public participation, both in literature and in reality, a rather limited view on how people actually behave can be experienced. Public participation often starts from rather simplistic and prejudged ideas concerning people's motivations, possibilities and restrictions as well as how they behave in groups. Very limited attention is paid to what actually happens between people, including, for instance, processes of community development, processes of inclusion and exclusion, and processes of changing powerrelationships, both within and between different groups in society. In addition, the reasonability and intelligence of people are systematically underestimated. Instead people are more often than not viewed as if they always behave in a completely selfish way, only concerned about money. For problems to be solved people only should change their behaviour: they should be open, honest, perfectly listening to each other and be ready to give in. In other words, it is not about understanding actual behaviours of people, but about

Third, within the public participation model, instead of capitalizing on differences and diversity, we find a striving after consensus. In cases of complex land use issues this is in most cases neither realistic nor does it contribute to effective problem-solving because it takes away a lot of creativity and easily results in unsolvable impasses (Aarts and Leeuwis,

Finally, and maybe most important, efforts of public participation keep showing an obstinate illusion of central steering. It is still the government who defines the problem, including the direction for solution. The most important dilemmas of steering by participation concern matters of responsibility for the final result and of realizing ambitions, mainly expressed by the plea for the so-called 'primacy' of democratically elected bodies which is vested in the constitution. In the context of land use planning these dilemmas are often solved by simply denying people who bring in ideas that do not fit with the ambitions that have already been formulated by the government beforehand (Van Bommel et al, 2009; Turnhout et al, 2010). This may result in citizens that do not want to participate anymore, and instead start organizing themselves to realise their own ambitions in their own way. In other words, on the one hand, the government, in spite of their participation initiatives sticks to their power to decide what to do. On the other hand, by simply placing them

Already in the seventies the policy-scientist Scharpf (1978) argued that governments would lose their central and steering role. Scharpf referred to the tendency of increasing interweaving and organizational fragmentation within society. He predicted that governments would not be able to function without the co-operation of countless organizations and institutions. As a result, policy processes would have a 'network-like' structure (Scharpf, 1978).

Today, the idea that policies are shaped by 'pulling' and 'pushing' in complex interactions between different stakeholders has become commonly understood. Policy-processes are considered as on-going negotiation processes of which it is difficult to predict the results. Not only do circumstances change continuously, the figurations that people form on the base of their mutual dependences, continuously change as well (Elias, 1970). They shift, according to what is happening between them and in the world around them.

The Role of Government in Environmental Land Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective 227

generations. This requires a pro-active attitude in contacting societal actors and opening negotiations with them. In short, governments must, on the one hand, 'set free' and, on the other hand, 'stay connected'. This third mode of operating is in part an alternative to the instrumental and the participation perspective, in that there may be domains in which a government wants to delegate responsibility to societal forces without the deliberate organization of a participatory process. However, even when a government chooses for an instrumental mode or wants to organize a participation trajectory (e.g for reasons of creating legitimacy and / or formal commitment), there will be a need to make use of a network perspective. As we have seen, self-organizing dynamics will emerge, whether a government likes it or not. Hence, governments will have to develop the capacity to apply the three perspectives in an alternating way, and forge connections between them when

In sum, integrating the three perspectives results in a set of relevant points of attention for governments when relating with society in order to develop and implement environmental

1. being constantly alert, by watching and being continuously informed about what is

2. providing the opportunity for coincidences to take place, by promoting and valuing

5. problematizing the issue of societal accountability, instead of being focused only on

In line with the dominance of the instrumental approach, we have become used to interpreting processes of change as goal-oriented activities where the use of a certain set of instruments will lead to the desired effect. However, most changes come about in a very different way. When looking to society from a network perspective we become aware of the fact that in many cases it is not as much the causality that determines the course of things, but rather the confluence of events at a certain point in time. In other words, it is the specific context that is the deciding factor. Moreover, whether it is a marriage, an economic crisis, the image of an organisation, or the design and use of land, structures and changes cannot be understood or explained by the behaviour of an involved individual (Elias, 1970, p. 148). Mutual interdependence between people and the way in which this is formed ultimately determine the course of things. People's activities and behaviours must therefore be understood and explained from the social bonds they have formed via the networks they are

6. intervening if needed which implies a clear feeling of direction (see Aarts et al., 2007);

7. working together with existing local groups and small-scale networks

**5. Alternative views on change, communication and planning** 

3. creating room for experimentation, by leaving some space between rules and reality; 4. connecting to what moves people, by co-constructing recognizable and understandable

needed.

land use policies:

diversity;

stories;

happening in society;

rules and legislation;

part of. In the words of Norbert Elias:

**Figure 4.** Interaction between government (G) and citizens (C): a network perspective

In view of unexpected developments decisions can (and will) be revised continuously. Thus, policies will eventually take shape in the interactions between different parties, involved in a network of a specific policy-domain and constantly trying to influence the process. This insight asks for further exploring the significance of a network perspective for the development and implementation of land use policies.

The network perspective refers to an endless collection of what Manual Castells (2004) calls 'interacting nodes', either people who have a special position or a combination of roles and functions that enable them to connect different networks, or specific technologies or policies that make different networks become active (Van Dijk et al, 2011). Such networks are neither centrally steered nor fixed, but instead constantly shaped through the pushing and pulling by different stakeholders who continuously do efforts to influence the situation. The network perspective thus starts from the assumption that people, instead of being passive and opportunistic, are active agents, interacting with each other and organizing themselves in order to get things done. In this perspective the role of governments is not to organize and manage a top-down or bottom-up process, but rather anticipate and make use of the self-organizing ability and initiatives of people. Operating in this mode has important implications for how a government interacts with society in order to get things done. It implies that governments must be alert, and constantly gather information about what happens in society, paying attention to informal networks. In doing so, it must develop a sensitivity for coinciding developments, and create room for experimentation especially 'where rules are not applied or are not yet developed' (Hüsken and De Jonge, 2005: 7). It may also need to redirect emergent developments at an early stage in case these are likely to go against the public interest and / or have unacceptable effects for specific groups of future generations. This requires a pro-active attitude in contacting societal actors and opening negotiations with them. In short, governments must, on the one hand, 'set free' and, on the other hand, 'stay connected'. This third mode of operating is in part an alternative to the instrumental and the participation perspective, in that there may be domains in which a government wants to delegate responsibility to societal forces without the deliberate organization of a participatory process. However, even when a government chooses for an instrumental mode or wants to organize a participation trajectory (e.g for reasons of creating legitimacy and / or formal commitment), there will be a need to make use of a network perspective. As we have seen, self-organizing dynamics will emerge, whether a government likes it or not. Hence, governments will have to develop the capacity to apply the three perspectives in an alternating way, and forge connections between them when needed.

226 Environmental Land Use Planning

considered as on-going negotiation processes of which it is difficult to predict the results. Not only do circumstances change continuously, the figurations that people form on the base of their mutual dependences, continuously change as well (Elias, 1970). They shift,

according to what is happening between them and in the world around them.

**Figure 4.** Interaction between government (G) and citizens (C): a network perspective

development and implementation of land use policies.

In view of unexpected developments decisions can (and will) be revised continuously. Thus, policies will eventually take shape in the interactions between different parties, involved in a network of a specific policy-domain and constantly trying to influence the process. This insight asks for further exploring the significance of a network perspective for the

The network perspective refers to an endless collection of what Manual Castells (2004) calls 'interacting nodes', either people who have a special position or a combination of roles and functions that enable them to connect different networks, or specific technologies or policies that make different networks become active (Van Dijk et al, 2011). Such networks are neither centrally steered nor fixed, but instead constantly shaped through the pushing and pulling by different stakeholders who continuously do efforts to influence the situation. The network perspective thus starts from the assumption that people, instead of being passive and opportunistic, are active agents, interacting with each other and organizing themselves in order to get things done. In this perspective the role of governments is not to organize and manage a top-down or bottom-up process, but rather anticipate and make use of the self-organizing ability and initiatives of people. Operating in this mode has important implications for how a government interacts with society in order to get things done. It implies that governments must be alert, and constantly gather information about what happens in society, paying attention to informal networks. In doing so, it must develop a sensitivity for coinciding developments, and create room for experimentation especially 'where rules are not applied or are not yet developed' (Hüsken and De Jonge, 2005: 7). It may also need to redirect emergent developments at an early stage in case these are likely to go against the public interest and / or have unacceptable effects for specific groups of future In sum, integrating the three perspectives results in a set of relevant points of attention for governments when relating with society in order to develop and implement environmental land use policies:


## **5. Alternative views on change, communication and planning**

In line with the dominance of the instrumental approach, we have become used to interpreting processes of change as goal-oriented activities where the use of a certain set of instruments will lead to the desired effect. However, most changes come about in a very different way. When looking to society from a network perspective we become aware of the fact that in many cases it is not as much the causality that determines the course of things, but rather the confluence of events at a certain point in time. In other words, it is the specific context that is the deciding factor. Moreover, whether it is a marriage, an economic crisis, the image of an organisation, or the design and use of land, structures and changes cannot be understood or explained by the behaviour of an involved individual (Elias, 1970, p. 148). Mutual interdependence between people and the way in which this is formed ultimately determine the course of things. People's activities and behaviours must therefore be understood and explained from the social bonds they have formed via the networks they are part of. In the words of Norbert Elias:

*'From this intertwining, from the interdependence of people comes an order of a very specific nature, an order that is more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of each individual person that forms a part of the entwinement' (Elias, 1982, p. 240).* 

The Role of Government in Environmental Land Use Planning: Towards an Integral Perspective 229

Incremental planning is based on the presumption that we may make mistakes and miss things (Frissen, 2007). With processual planning, we do have a goal (strategic intent), but the way to get there is not determined. We bet on probable situations, act and reflect on the outcomes. Furthermore, creativity, empathy, a sense of timing and even humour are

These views of change, communication and planning make clear that there are no recipes or methodologies for strategic planning, nor are there guarantees of success. However, if we take dynamics and relative unpredictability as our basis, we are better able to act consciously and respond to specific contexts more adequately. In other words*, we can become better planners if we take into account our limited ability to plan*. A good strategist is like a coach who follows a game closely, looks at what the players are doing and, based on that, gives instructions for moments at which action can be taken. After all, ambitions are realized in interactions with the players, and optimal use is made of the circumstances as they occur at

Governments will never be 100% successful in steering their citizens; self-organized dynamics and other unexpected developments will continuously emerge. Therefore governments need to recognize the added value of an integral perspective and develop the capacity to apply this perspective. Although a lack of control may be uncomfortable for planners and governments, unpredictability is also an opportunity for the emergence of unexpected perspectives and ideas that may support the solution of problems in the domain of environmental planning. Several developments in the world of planning are already oriented to a broader perspective on society. Our contribution is meant to support this new

Aarts, M.N.C. & C.M.J. van Woerkum (1994). *Wat heet natuur? De communicatie tussen overheid en boeren over natuur en natuurbeleid (What is nature? Communication between* 

important preconditions for a constructive process.

particular moments.

thinking in a meaningful way

*Wageningen University, The Netherlands* 

*Wageningen University, The Netherlands* 

*ASCoR (Amsterdam School for Communication Research), The Netherlands* 

**Author details** 

Anne Marike Lokhorst

**7. References** 

Corresponding Author

 \*

Noelle Aarts \*

**6. Conclusion** 

The focus on interdependence and interaction in relation to change also creates the necessity for a broader view of communication. Thinking in terms of individual senders and receivers, messages and channels, misses the target when we aim for an integral perspective on land use planning. In a broader view of communication, the interactions between people and groups of people are the unit of analysis. It is in such interactions that meanings are constructed, confirmed or contested. The dynamics brought about by communication are part of a whole variety of networks in which meanings are continuously negotiated.

The emphasis on interactions as the source and carrier of change stands in sharp contrast with the tendency to plan in terms of goal / means that characterises our society and in which many planners still seem to believe. It is high time that we start applying the alternative planning models that have been developed by now (Whittington, 2001; Stacey & Griffin, 2005; Stacey, 2001). The common essence of these models is that they encompass context and dynamics.

**Figure 5.** Planning change

Contingency planning is a well-known concept, the basis of which is concrete situations and work is done from one moment to the next. Related to this is incremental planning, dubbed 'muddling through' by Lindblom (1959). The thought behind this is that causal patterns in both social and physical reality are so complicated that centrally driven, top-down interventions have too many unintended and therefore undesired effects. Such encompassing interventions are also undesired from a normative perspective because they assume that there is one regulating point of view and preclude all other rival views. Incremental planning is based on the presumption that we may make mistakes and miss things (Frissen, 2007). With processual planning, we do have a goal (strategic intent), but the way to get there is not determined. We bet on probable situations, act and reflect on the outcomes. Furthermore, creativity, empathy, a sense of timing and even humour are important preconditions for a constructive process.

These views of change, communication and planning make clear that there are no recipes or methodologies for strategic planning, nor are there guarantees of success. However, if we take dynamics and relative unpredictability as our basis, we are better able to act consciously and respond to specific contexts more adequately. In other words*, we can become better planners if we take into account our limited ability to plan*. A good strategist is like a coach who follows a game closely, looks at what the players are doing and, based on that, gives instructions for moments at which action can be taken. After all, ambitions are realized in interactions with the players, and optimal use is made of the circumstances as they occur at particular moments.

## **6. Conclusion**

228 Environmental Land Use Planning

context and dynamics.

**Figure 5.** Planning change

*'From this intertwining, from the interdependence of people comes an order of a very specific nature, an order that is more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of each individual* 

The focus on interdependence and interaction in relation to change also creates the necessity for a broader view of communication. Thinking in terms of individual senders and receivers, messages and channels, misses the target when we aim for an integral perspective on land use planning. In a broader view of communication, the interactions between people and groups of people are the unit of analysis. It is in such interactions that meanings are constructed, confirmed or contested. The dynamics brought about by communication are

The emphasis on interactions as the source and carrier of change stands in sharp contrast with the tendency to plan in terms of goal / means that characterises our society and in which many planners still seem to believe. It is high time that we start applying the alternative planning models that have been developed by now (Whittington, 2001; Stacey & Griffin, 2005; Stacey, 2001). The common essence of these models is that they encompass

Contingency planning is a well-known concept, the basis of which is concrete situations and work is done from one moment to the next. Related to this is incremental planning, dubbed 'muddling through' by Lindblom (1959). The thought behind this is that causal patterns in both social and physical reality are so complicated that centrally driven, top-down interventions have too many unintended and therefore undesired effects. Such encompassing interventions are also undesired from a normative perspective because they assume that there is one regulating point of view and preclude all other rival views.

part of a whole variety of networks in which meanings are continuously negotiated.

*person that forms a part of the entwinement' (Elias, 1982, p. 240).* 

Governments will never be 100% successful in steering their citizens; self-organized dynamics and other unexpected developments will continuously emerge. Therefore governments need to recognize the added value of an integral perspective and develop the capacity to apply this perspective. Although a lack of control may be uncomfortable for planners and governments, unpredictability is also an opportunity for the emergence of unexpected perspectives and ideas that may support the solution of problems in the domain of environmental planning. Several developments in the world of planning are already oriented to a broader perspective on society. Our contribution is meant to support this new thinking in a meaningful way

## **Author details**

Noelle Aarts \* *Wageningen University, The Netherlands ASCoR (Amsterdam School for Communication Research), The Netherlands* 

Anne Marike Lokhorst *Wageningen University, The Netherlands* 

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## *Edited by Seth Appiah-Opoku*

Environmental Land Use Planning brings together leading scholars in the field of environmental problem solving to examine environmental problems and effects on land uses; analytical methods and tools in the field; and the role of governments, community grants and tradable permits in environmental planning. The chapters are based on empirical research from countries around the globe including Canada, USA, China, Nigeria, Germany, Serbia, Venezuela, and Brazil. The book discusses such issues as predicting changes in land use pattern, ecological footprint analysis, socioeconomic and behavioral modeling, and flood control approaches. It is insightful and serves as an important resource and reference material on environmental management.

Environmental Land Use Planning

Environmental Land Use

Planning

*Edited by Seth Appiah-Opoku*

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