**5. Conclusions**

214 Social Sciences and Cultural Studies – Issues of Language, Public Opinion, Education and Welfare

applies under the following scenario *B(HR)-K(W)-OC(W)+B(HR)-OC(W) > B(MR)-K(W)*. Confronted with a weak and repressive government, civil society actors decide to protest if *E* is *(HR)-C(W)> S(HR)*. For this equilibrium to be valid the government must considerably gain from high repression. First, these gains can be monetary in that the government can extract certain natural resources from a region. Second, these gains can also be ideological in that they allow one religious or ethnic group to dominate the political and social life. Confronted with a weak government that harshly suppresses, the oppressed people or groups have a comparatively high tendency to resist and protest. They know that the state is

Empirical examples of this situation, which follow the backlash hypotheses, are multifold. Protests in such a scenario are often violent and turn into civil wars. It is often unclear, who prevails in these violent conflict, the regime or the protesters. A situation were a repressive regime prevailed was the Kurdish uprising against the repressive Iraqi government. The ruthless oppression of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein's regime provided incentives for these tribes to rise and fight for autonomy once they perceived a slight weakness in the regime. In 1991, after the first Gulf War these tribes saw the possibility for a successful upheaval and took up their arms. However, they were defeated by the Iraqi army in a very cruel way.

Sudan is another example, where a weak repressive state has been confronted with protest. However, contrary to the Iraq protests, the oppression of the non-Arab populations in the south by the Arab dominated government of the North, has led to perpetual conflict since 1983. In Sudan, the relatively weak government or government-related forces have not only repressed minorities, but have also engaged in atrocities and human rights violations for economic and ethnic reasons, thus spurring violence. This spiraling of protests and stronger repressions has led to a situation, where the government lost control over some parts of the country and has been unable of keeping up the order. In Sudan, as in other states including Somalia, the interaction between a weak state, high degrees of repression and protests have

Under a third scenario, protests against a weak, but strongly repressive regime can lead to a successful revolution. In such a situation the protesters prevail against the weak repressive government. An empirical example of this case would be the February Revolution in Russia in 1917. Weakened by World War I and confronted with a ruthless economic crisis (e.g. a severe famine), Tsar Nicolas II continued his autocratic and repressive rule. This infuriated large segments of the population and broke the loyalty of many civil servants including police and military officers. The Tsar was finally overthrown by massive protests, which he

The last equilibrium that leads to protest happens when the government is weak and moderately represses and the civil society actors protest despite merely moderate degrees of repression. This scenario, which confirms the hypothesis of the inverted U-curve, occurs when the regime is better off by weak repression than by strong repression (B(MR)-K(W)+B(MR)) > (B(HR)-K(W)-OC(W)+B(HR)-OC(W)). The protesters will turn out and engage in collective action if the expected utilities from protesting minus the costs from protesting are higher than the status quo: (E(MR)-C(W)>S(MR). This equilibrium is quite a common scenario because under some circumstances, a weak regime might be forced to lower its levels of repression. Reasons can be financial problems, impending sanctions or military interventions, a lack of qualified spies and supervisors, economic needs and reputational costs. If any or several of

weak and are aware that the government might not sustain perpetual challenges.

led to failed states.

was unable to quell.

Through a game theoretic framework I have shown the conditions under which both the inverted U relationship and the backlash hypothesis frequently occur. The inverted Urelationship applies when a weak regime engages in moderate degrees of repression and the civil society actors decide to protest. In many cases, these protests further weaken the government and trigger an overthrow of the regime. The backlash hypothesis prevails under two scenarios. Under the first scenario, the government is strong and represses harshly and civil society actors protest despite the strength of the government. As the examples of China and Burma reveal, these protests are often violently quelled and trigger subsequent periods of relative calm. Under the second scenario, the government represses harshly despite being weak. This scenario can lead to very volatile situations because the protesters have a lot to gain from protesting and the government has a lot to lose. Such a situation might spur protests and violent reactions, which can easily spiral into a civil war. The empirical examples of Sudan, Somalia, or the Democratic Republic of Congo fit this scheme.

Thus, protest can occur under three scenarios. None of these equilibria explains the repression protest nexus in all or the majority of the cases. Yet, each equilibrium has empirical referents

When do People Protest? – Using a Game Theoretic Framework to Shed Light

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**11**

Xiana Sotelo

*Spain* 

*Francisco de Vitoria University, Madrid* 

**Embracing Intersectional Analysis:**

**The Legacy of Anglo European Feminist**

During the past forty years, Gender/Women's Studies has developed into a well-established interdisciplinary site on inquiry and academic knowledge production, challenging traditional discipline's understandings of women's experiences from a critical perspective. Critical research and teaching on gender/sex, gendered hegemonies, gender relations, gender identity and social categories is today carried out in universities in many countries all over the world. Consequently, is possible to speak of feminist studies as a specific academic field of knowledge production (see Lykee 2010; Berger and Guidroz 2009). Interdisciplinary since its very origins, is mostly non-traditional, allowing for new synergies and cross-disciplinary dialogues to emerge between heterogeneous fields of theory and methodology. On this ground, one of the driving forces among diverse viewpoints has been the articulation of the paradigm gender along with other categories such as class, ethnicity and sexuality. Indeed, there is a line of continuity implied in a strong challenge to traditional sciences on the grounds that the social/cultural/human sciences throughout their history have sustained and legitimized biologically determinist approaches to sexes and culturally essentialist perceptions of gender. Within this framework, I approach Gender/Women's studies as a "vibrant and developing transnational phenomenon and web

Nonetheless, on the problem of theorizing women's experiences in an accurate, grounded and nuanced way, intersectional ways of thinking have a long and complicated history within academic Anglo-European feminist thought. Minority groups' claims of invisibility within a 'universal female gender' and against essentialist discourses of gender can be documented in the very origins of mainstream women's movement (see Garcia, 1997). However, long-standing clashes and misconceptions in regards to differences among women have resulted in one of the most fructiferous and insightful theoretical debates around the interlocking socio-cultural categories of gender that the Anglo-European academia has continuously witnessed over the past decades. Within this spirit, this chapter proposes a reading on the evolution and development of differences among women in a parallel movement towards intersectional analysis, to illustrate the historical and intellectual journey of an intersectional mindset, from its much disputed origins till its enthusiastic

**1. Introduction** 

of activity" (Lykke 2010; foreword).

**Theory to Social Sciences-Humanities** 

