**Social Science as a Complex and Pluri-Disciplinary System: Economics as Example**

David John Farmer *Virginia Commonwealth University, USA* 

#### **1. Introduction**

104 Social Sciences and Cultural Studies – Issues of Language, Public Opinion, Education and Welfare

Zhang, Yingjin. The City in Modern Chinese Literature and Film. Standord: Standford

Epistemic pluralism, including such perspectives as neuroscience, is a promising strategy for transforming the language games of social science – for putting any and all social sciences in what Wilson (1998) calls consilience, In other words, this paper addresses social science as a complex and pluri-disciplinary system. Epistemic refers to knowing, and pluralism can refer to a minimal strategy of more than one way. Rather than a minimal strategy, the paper recommends epistemic pluralism as a grand strategy that will be explained for individual social sciences as referring to a multiplicity of perspectives.

I sympathize with those who want a massive restructuring of the social sciences. I applaud attempts in the United States of the National Science Foundation to work toward what was conceptualized as the lost unity (to the extent that it ever existed) of the social sciences. These National Science Foundation attempts, and earlier in the 1920s attempts by agencies like the Social Science Research Council, were largely unsuccessful. Sometimes they were counterproductive in increasing the number of social sciences, e.g., adding trans-disciplines. A major problem for a complete restructuring for the social sciences is that complete victory is unlikely: the fragmented organizational status quo is often even more inhibiting than the substantive. I don't think it is adequate to seek such broadening of the language game of social science primarily *organizationally* – seeking salvation through either a massive or a less massive top-down structure of disciplinary reform. I do see a grand strategy of epistemic pluralism as a feasible opportunity to avoid the organizational solution. If that leads eventually to re-restructuring (as it may), that is fine. But meantime, a more attractive aim (helped by the catalytic power of neuroscience) is shorter term – major language game tweaking, with powerful programmatic results.

*"the frontiers of the individual sciences… are incessantly shifting and… there is no point in trying to define them either by subject or by method. This applies particularly to economics, which is not a science in the sense in which acoustics is one, but rather an aggregation of illcoordinated and overlapping fields of research in the same sense as is medicine" (Joseph Schumpeter, 1954, p. 10)* 

Epistemic pluralism – a grand strategy including neuroscience - is open to all the social sciences and to the social sciences as a whole, and this paper parallels what I have written

Social Science as a Complex and Pluri-Disciplinary System: Economics as Example 107

For the first (the metrics used), listen to the argument that the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy uses in his preface to "Mis-measuring our lives: Why GDP doesn't add up" (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010). "I hold a firm belief: We will not change our behavior unless we change the ways we measure our economic performance… A tremendous revolution awaits us – we can all feel it. This revolution is inconceivable without deeply challenging the way we represent the consequences of what we undertake, the results of what we do… " (Sakozy, 2010, p. vii). The Commission that the President of France set up makes clear that its principal emphasis is choice of statistics (i.e. choice of elements of its language), rather than particular policies. But it does suggest that it would shape public policy for the better if society were to adopt a different metric for measuring our economic lives. The Commission recognizes what has been widely noted in the literature, and that is the limits of the Gross Domestic Product metric. Twelve recommendations advocate a new or substitute metric, replacing the current GDP. The Commission starts with better measures of economic performance in a complex society, e.g., when evaluating material well-being, looking at income and consumption rather than production. It also holds that well-being is multidimensional, and that objective and subjective dimensions of well-being are both important. One of its recommendations, for instance, is that quality of life indicators in all the dimensions (e.g. including people's health, education, personal activities and environmental conditions) should assess inequalities in a comprehensive way. The Commission notes that "what we measure shapes what we collectively strive to pursue – and what we pursue determines what we measure – the report and its implementation may have significant impact on the way in which our societies look to themselves and, therefore, on the way in which policies are designed, implemented and assessed" (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010, p. 6). The way that my "economic" language (or any other of my language games) is limited will in turn limit my recognition of the "economic" or related world. Some would add that in this manner the social sciences are socially constructed, and their

construction in turn shapes what they know about their worlds.

For the second example, Wittgenstein's view of language limits may be illustrated in terms of two varieties of ideology (leaving aside other varieties) that return as promised to the saltwater economists v. freshwater economists, noted above. The saltwater conceptualize the market as requiring macro management and the freshwater conceptualize the market in terms of neoliberalism. The first set of language users will readily see what they would characterize as a "necessity" of macro market management that John Maynard Keynes first advocated in his 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, e.g., the desirability of government financial stimulation in time of recession. The second set of language users will have embraced neoliberalism, what is called the Washington consensus that started in 1979. Market fundamentalism maintains that, when markets are left alone, they will solve all economic problems. The market fundamentalists believe that the market gives better information than individual humans can obtain for themselves. So Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman (2009, p. 41) can write of the latter that "the belief in efficient financial markets blinded many if not most economists to the emergence of the biggest financial bubble in history." Milton Friedman could give a contrary instance of blindness.

For the third example, consider the contrasting views of rationality at the heart of mainstream economics. Shaun Hargreaves Heap, for instance, describes three different senses of economic rationality and their explanations and prescriptions. These three are the

elsewhere on these and related topics in terms of "social science" subjects like public administration and governance (e.g., Farmer, 2010; 2011, and 2012). A distinctive feature of this article is that the example is economics.

Why select Economics as an example? One good reason might be Schumpeter's comment about economics (quoted above): he held that in science the "process of specialization has never gone on according to any rational plan – whether explicitly preconceived or only objectively present – so that science as a whole has never attained a logically consistent architecture: it is a tropical forest, not a building erected accordingly to a blueprint" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 10). On the one hand, exceptionalist claims have been made for Economics, such as that it is unique among the social sciences in being rigorous. If it is the case that Economics is the Queen of the Social Sciences, it seems interesting to consider a subject that considers itself in that way. On the other hand, we can note that some, especially in Europe, are experiencing economics as being at a crossroads, e.g., Rosser, Holt & Colander, 2001.

This paper contains four sections. First, it discusses the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's description of a language game, with illustrations from economics. Second, it describes epistemic pluralism, referring to an example outside economics. Third, it sketches neuroscience and its relevance to economics in terms of neuroeconomics. Fourth, it analyzes the relevance of epistemic pluralism, using economics as an example for all social sciences and for social science as a whole.

#### **2. Language games**

Epistemic pluralism can be directed in the shorter run at upgrading the language game of any social science, and this can be illustrated in terms of economics. No less than any other subject, Economics has its set of language games. Some such language games are within the mainstream and some are at the circumference of the discipline. Toward the mainstream, for instance, it has been suggested that there is a difference (a difference between language games, in fact) in the United States on macro economics between "two great factions: saltwater economists (mainly in coastal U.S. universities), who have a more or less Keynesian vision of what recessions are all about; and 'freshwater' economists (mainly at inland schools), who consider that vision nonsense" (Krugman, 2009, p. 40): and we will return later to this saltwater v. freshwater example. Toward the circumference, there are alternative schools of thoughts, including those described by Prychitko (2003) and those like behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.

Wittgenstein emphasized the nature and the relevance of a language game. For him, the nature of language is essentially public and social; it is not a private matter. It is created and sustained interpersonally by a language community, and we participate in a variety of language games. Wittgenstein illustrates a primitive language by talking about a builder and his assistant; the words and the action constitute the game, as the builder calls out the words like block, pillar and slab, and the assistant brings the respective stone. Language is an activity or a form of life, a game.

On the relevance of language games, there is Wittgenstein's claim that "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 11). Wittgenstein's meaning (although often described) can be illustrated for economics in terms of contrasting metrics used, contrasting ideologies, and contrasting views of rationality.

elsewhere on these and related topics in terms of "social science" subjects like public administration and governance (e.g., Farmer, 2010; 2011, and 2012). A distinctive feature of

Why select Economics as an example? One good reason might be Schumpeter's comment about economics (quoted above): he held that in science the "process of specialization has never gone on according to any rational plan – whether explicitly preconceived or only objectively present – so that science as a whole has never attained a logically consistent architecture: it is a tropical forest, not a building erected accordingly to a blueprint" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 10). On the one hand, exceptionalist claims have been made for Economics, such as that it is unique among the social sciences in being rigorous. If it is the case that Economics is the Queen of the Social Sciences, it seems interesting to consider a subject that considers itself in that way. On the other hand, we can note that some, especially in Europe, are

This paper contains four sections. First, it discusses the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's description of a language game, with illustrations from economics. Second, it describes epistemic pluralism, referring to an example outside economics. Third, it sketches neuroscience and its relevance to economics in terms of neuroeconomics. Fourth, it analyzes the relevance of epistemic pluralism, using economics as an example for all social sciences

Epistemic pluralism can be directed in the shorter run at upgrading the language game of any social science, and this can be illustrated in terms of economics. No less than any other subject, Economics has its set of language games. Some such language games are within the mainstream and some are at the circumference of the discipline. Toward the mainstream, for instance, it has been suggested that there is a difference (a difference between language games, in fact) in the United States on macro economics between "two great factions: saltwater economists (mainly in coastal U.S. universities), who have a more or less Keynesian vision of what recessions are all about; and 'freshwater' economists (mainly at inland schools), who consider that vision nonsense" (Krugman, 2009, p. 40): and we will return later to this saltwater v. freshwater example. Toward the circumference, there are alternative schools of thoughts, including those described by Prychitko (2003) and those like

Wittgenstein emphasized the nature and the relevance of a language game. For him, the nature of language is essentially public and social; it is not a private matter. It is created and sustained interpersonally by a language community, and we participate in a variety of language games. Wittgenstein illustrates a primitive language by talking about a builder and his assistant; the words and the action constitute the game, as the builder calls out the words like block, pillar and slab, and the assistant brings the respective stone. Language is

On the relevance of language games, there is Wittgenstein's claim that "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 11). Wittgenstein's meaning (although often described) can be illustrated for economics in terms of contrasting metrics

used, contrasting ideologies, and contrasting views of rationality.

experiencing economics as being at a crossroads, e.g., Rosser, Holt & Colander, 2001.

this article is that the example is economics.

and for social science as a whole.

behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.

an activity or a form of life, a game.

**2. Language games** 

For the first (the metrics used), listen to the argument that the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy uses in his preface to "Mis-measuring our lives: Why GDP doesn't add up" (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010). "I hold a firm belief: We will not change our behavior unless we change the ways we measure our economic performance… A tremendous revolution awaits us – we can all feel it. This revolution is inconceivable without deeply challenging the way we represent the consequences of what we undertake, the results of what we do… " (Sakozy, 2010, p. vii). The Commission that the President of France set up makes clear that its principal emphasis is choice of statistics (i.e. choice of elements of its language), rather than particular policies. But it does suggest that it would shape public policy for the better if society were to adopt a different metric for measuring our economic lives. The Commission recognizes what has been widely noted in the literature, and that is the limits of the Gross Domestic Product metric. Twelve recommendations advocate a new or substitute metric, replacing the current GDP. The Commission starts with better measures of economic performance in a complex society, e.g., when evaluating material well-being, looking at income and consumption rather than production. It also holds that well-being is multidimensional, and that objective and subjective dimensions of well-being are both important. One of its recommendations, for instance, is that quality of life indicators in all the dimensions (e.g. including people's health, education, personal activities and environmental conditions) should assess inequalities in a comprehensive way. The Commission notes that "what we measure shapes what we collectively strive to pursue – and what we pursue determines what we measure – the report and its implementation may have significant impact on the way in which our societies look to themselves and, therefore, on the way in which policies are designed, implemented and assessed" (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010, p. 6). The way that my "economic" language (or any other of my language games) is limited will in turn limit my recognition of the "economic" or related world. Some would add that in this manner the social sciences are socially constructed, and their construction in turn shapes what they know about their worlds.

For the second example, Wittgenstein's view of language limits may be illustrated in terms of two varieties of ideology (leaving aside other varieties) that return as promised to the saltwater economists v. freshwater economists, noted above. The saltwater conceptualize the market as requiring macro management and the freshwater conceptualize the market in terms of neoliberalism. The first set of language users will readily see what they would characterize as a "necessity" of macro market management that John Maynard Keynes first advocated in his 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, e.g., the desirability of government financial stimulation in time of recession. The second set of language users will have embraced neoliberalism, what is called the Washington consensus that started in 1979. Market fundamentalism maintains that, when markets are left alone, they will solve all economic problems. The market fundamentalists believe that the market gives better information than individual humans can obtain for themselves. So Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman (2009, p. 41) can write of the latter that "the belief in efficient financial markets blinded many if not most economists to the emergence of the biggest financial bubble in history." Milton Friedman could give a contrary instance of blindness.

For the third example, consider the contrasting views of rationality at the heart of mainstream economics. Shaun Hargreaves Heap, for instance, describes three different senses of economic rationality and their explanations and prescriptions. These three are the

Social Science as a Complex and Pluri-Disciplinary System: Economics as Example 109

Let us re-explain. Mainstream social sciences and economics have each yielded some valuable results without utilizing any other perspectives except their own. Again, economics and other social sciences have used one or a minimal number of different perspectives. These individual perspectives have also produced enriching results. Yet, by itself and in isolation, a solitary way of looking can be misleading. Similarly, a minimal strategy of using perspectives can give only parts of puzzles, parts of the road map. A grand strategy, rather than a minimal strategy, of epistemic pluralism can yield a quantum gain in understandings. There is no wish to claim that a minimal strategy is never to be preferred. How many lenses are best for a grand strategy? In an ideal world such as might exist on Mount Olympus, my supposition is that all lenses are best. However, in the world of theory and practice, selection is inevitable, and I would err toward robust perspectives. As I have mentioned before (e.g., Farmer, 2010), the optimal number of perspectives to analyze X depends on such factors as purpose, the nature of X, and the importance of X. Arnold Modell considers that studying the biology of meaning requires a strategy "that includes the philosophy of language, linguistics, cognitive science, neurobiology, and psychoanalysis" (Modell, 2003, p. 1). Some may wish to include not only disciplines and schools of thought but also artistic practices, e.g., for what they can contribute to exploration of emotional, affective and emphatic cognition (e.g., see Lopez-Varela, 2010). E.O. Wilson (1998) offers the grandest of grand strategies when writing about consilience and the unity of knowledge

The preference in my own study of Public Administration was to use eleven perspectives (Farmer, 2010). These perspectives were Public Administration from a traditional perspective, from a business, from an economic, from a political, from a critical theory, from a post-structural, from a psychoanalytic, from a neuroscience, from a feminist, from an ethical, and from a data perspective. And clearly there are many more candidate perspectives. The selected perspectives were used to identify insights about five Public Administration elements that were used as vehicles, as it were, for examining implications for Public Administration theory and practice. The five vehicles were the different kinds of planning, the different kinds of management, the meaning and relevance of what underlies public administration (e.g. the social construction of relevant societal beliefs and attitudes), the scope of public administration, and the extent of imaginative creativity in public administration.

Of the selected perspectives, here are only three examples of these perspectives and illustrations of insights suggested to Public Administration. First, the business perspective could tell Public Administration about the relevance of supply chain management (SCM). Second, the political perspective could lead to insights for Public Administration about how lobbying and money warp the administration of policy and co-shape policies, e.g., buying contracts and jobs. Third, the post-structural (or postmodern) could inform Public Administration more fully how the hyperreal accentuates fear. The hyperreal refers to items or events that, rather than being merely real or unreal, are perceived as more real than real.

The twelfth informal annual conference of the Society for Neuroeconomics was held in Evanston, Illinios, in, Sept-Oct, 2011. It was entitled *Neuroscience: Decision Making and the Brain*. It described itself as aiming "to promote interdisciplinary collaborations and

(uniting the sciences, and ultimately with the humanities).

**4. Neuroscience and its relevance** 

instrumental (which he describes as the sense that is typical in mainstream economics), the procedural and the expressive. Under the instrumental rationality assumption, the individual person acts so as to satisfy his preferences best. Such rationality "is located in the means-ends framework as the choice of the most efficient means for the achievement of given ends" (Heap, 1989, p. 6). The procedural version portrays the individual as a rule follower, and such behavior is procedurally rational. Herbert Simon and his "satisficing" principle would be an example. By expressive, Heap takes rationality to be concerned with ends pursued rather than with the actions taken in pursuit of them" (Heap, 1989, p. 6). By contrast, there are "alternative" economics (like Behavioral Economics, noted earlier) that do not make the same assumptions about rational economic man.

The aim of epistemic pluralism is to tweak our language games. The argument here is that what is needed is a grand strategy, utilizing a multiplicity of perspectives. Let's explain.
