**11. Comparison of possibilities of unauthorized fission materials proliferation at different technologies of fuel cycles**

Nonproliferation regime in common case is supplied by IAEA control. With control the possibility of proliferation is limited by value less than detection error. The base of this error is inaccuracy of mass detection at chemical reprocessing of irradiated in core material. Typical value of the error can be in our case ~0.1 % from reprocessed mass of 233U.

For thermal reactor of 1000 MW requirement in 233U is about 10 kg per annum. Accordingly, in ideal case of reprocessing conducting, possible error in 233U is less than 10 g per annum. If inaccuracy of the error is 10 %, than proliferation is not much than 1 g per annum. For minimal warhead in this case is needed more than 1000 years. This term exceeds possible duration not only a terrorist organization but even a terrorist state.
