**3.1.1 The great institutional water reforms**

In the 1980s, droughts provided an impressive impetus for changes in favour of a rapid expansion of private and groundwater based irrigation systems which, although they expanded or stabilised farm production, did it in the absence of effective regulatory arrangements and resulted in heavy aquifer depletion and in serious decline in the flow of several springs and watercourses that supported medium and small scale irrigation perimeters. The macro economic crisis of 1983 and subsequent economic liberalisation led to readjust agricultural institutions to allow them to cope with a market-oriented agricultural sector. The State decided to make the publicly managed large scale irrigation system more flexible and responsive to local needs. This involved the promotion and involvement of farmer organisations in water allocation and management through a revised legislation on Water Users Associations in 1990. WUAs were able to adjust positively but only in the context of small scale irrigation perimeters. In large scale irrigation perimeters, WUAs were still dependent on the State for funding and functioning. The revision of water pricing proved to depend on the involvement and empowerment given to the WUAs who refused to adhere to a 'full cost recovery' system they did not understand since they had had no say about the nature and make up of costs, nor in irrigation decisions.

Then, by the 1990s, there was little scope for further development of water resources through large scale schemes and the need to integrate surface and groundwater management became apparent. "The state was compelled to shift focus from water development and irrigated agriculture to the most difficult and challenging frontiers of water reallocation and integrated water resources management from the perspective of the whole economy" (Ait Kadi, 1998, in Doukkali, 2005, p. 83). The Water Law of 1995 was passed. It aimed at integrating and coordinating the allocation and management of all water resources and users under a single but decentralised institutional arrangement centred on river basin agencies (RBAs). De Miras and Le Tellier (2005) described the so called 'Loi 10- 95' as "establishing the legal framework for the politics of water for the next decades and includes a number of legal instruments aimed at addressing the problems of decreasing reserves of water, increasing water demand, increasing water prices and the deterioration of water quality and the environment" (p. 222). As Doukkali explained (2005, p. 73), the 1995 Water law had also assigned top priority to the security of the drinkable water supply: by 1990, most urban households had been provided secure access to water supplies – whilst only 14% of rural households had secure water supplies. The RBAs still work with water sector partners (such as WUAs) and have authority to manage surface water storage and

The dominant concerns for resource protection inherent in the 1914 and 1925 laws gave place to the emerging economic requirements of the independent country after 1956, and the Moroccan 'policy of dams', centred on irrigated agriculture, emerged. The State got involved in large scale development works and, "for the purposes of balancing growth requirements and poverty concerns, agricultural development became an important component of the economic strategy since the mid-1960s and through the 1970s and the 1980s" (Doukkali, 2005, p.78). The increase in State intervention in the water sector was then based on the 1969 Agricultural Investment Code. Since the 1980s, the emerging macroeconomic necessities and resource related constraints have prompted diverse types of water

In the 1980s, droughts provided an impressive impetus for changes in favour of a rapid expansion of private and groundwater based irrigation systems which, although they expanded or stabilised farm production, did it in the absence of effective regulatory arrangements and resulted in heavy aquifer depletion and in serious decline in the flow of several springs and watercourses that supported medium and small scale irrigation perimeters. The macro economic crisis of 1983 and subsequent economic liberalisation led to readjust agricultural institutions to allow them to cope with a market-oriented agricultural sector. The State decided to make the publicly managed large scale irrigation system more flexible and responsive to local needs. This involved the promotion and involvement of farmer organisations in water allocation and management through a revised legislation on Water Users Associations in 1990. WUAs were able to adjust positively but only in the context of small scale irrigation perimeters. In large scale irrigation perimeters, WUAs were still dependent on the State for funding and functioning. The revision of water pricing proved to depend on the involvement and empowerment given to the WUAs who refused to adhere to a 'full cost recovery' system they did not understand since they had had no say

Then, by the 1990s, there was little scope for further development of water resources through large scale schemes and the need to integrate surface and groundwater management became apparent. "The state was compelled to shift focus from water development and irrigated agriculture to the most difficult and challenging frontiers of water reallocation and integrated water resources management from the perspective of the whole economy" (Ait Kadi, 1998, in Doukkali, 2005, p. 83). The Water Law of 1995 was passed. It aimed at integrating and coordinating the allocation and management of all water resources and users under a single but decentralised institutional arrangement centred on river basin agencies (RBAs). De Miras and Le Tellier (2005) described the so called 'Loi 10- 95' as "establishing the legal framework for the politics of water for the next decades and includes a number of legal instruments aimed at addressing the problems of decreasing reserves of water, increasing water demand, increasing water prices and the deterioration of water quality and the environment" (p. 222). As Doukkali explained (2005, p. 73), the 1995 Water law had also assigned top priority to the security of the drinkable water supply: by 1990, most urban households had been provided secure access to water supplies – whilst only 14% of rural households had secure water supplies. The RBAs still work with water sector partners (such as WUAs) and have authority to manage surface water storage and

institutional reforms in Morocco.

**3.1.1 The great institutional water reforms** 

about the nature and make up of costs, nor in irrigation decisions.

allocation, groundwater pumping and water pollution and quality. Their main responsibility is to prepare river basin management plans that are respectful of IWRM principles and well integrated in the twenty year National Water Master Plan, as indicated by the national government through the heavy inputs it provides in such enterprises. As Doukkali explains, the RBAs have considerable managerial and regulatory responsibilities beside their role in developing and supplying water. They can monitor and regulate water use and quality as well as plan and organise flood control and water related emergencies within their respective basins. That third institutional phase, that of the 1990s, therefore changed once again the configuration of water actors on the national scene. It also changed it on the international scene, since it is at that point that the government of Morocco decided to significantly reorganise its water administration and to promote the private sector in water resource development and management. Thus, the concessions for water distribution in four large cities (Tangier, Casablanca, Rabat and Tetouan) were granted to private water companies, and the private sector involvement was also extended to the irrigation sector in 2002, encouraged by World Bank enthousiasts, through two projects – the construction of a transmission pipeline (Guerdane project) and a distribution network (the Gharb project).

In the urban context, political choices related to water management options are characterised by three main phases, as Haouès-Joune explains. The final phase of the Protectorate (1946- 1953) was one during which the urbanism strategy was to ensure that the poorest communities could have access to urban services. In practice, that meant that efforts were put into providing services through infrastructures whose costs would be optimised. From the end of the 1970s, efforts were then put into identifying water tariffs that would be economically viable whilst still allowing the poorest communities to have access to water and water services. This was done in a context where the management and growth of accommodation was not well coordinated with the management of the water sector. Until the 1990s, water distribution was done both through 'régies' and through public services. To simplify, until the 1990s, the *institutional organisational* system, lead by the State, was as follows in the water sector (Allain-El Mansouri, 2005, p.166). Consultation bodies, such as the Superior Water and Climate Council, created in 1981, were aimed at coordinating the various actors in the water sector. *Administrative bodies* were originally represented by the Interior Ministry (through 'régies') and the Land, Environment and Water management Ministry. The creation of the Secretary of State for Water was aimed at illustrating the political will to prioritise water issues in the context of moves towards sustainable development strategies. At a local level, the directors of the 'agences de bassins' were in charge of implementing water policies imposed from above. *Public establishments* such as the ONEP (National Office in charge of drinkable water and régies) were in charge of the planning, production and provision of water in urban and rural centres and are autonomous financially. Finally, *local interventions* were undertaken by local collectivities and users associations.

Major changes took place in the 1990s with regards to political choices in the water sector. The risks of real water shortage had then increased in the country, together with the difficulties in meeting a growing demand for water because of the heavy expenditures associated with the equipment of new large scale infrastructures such as big dams, water transfers, water pollution treatment, and more extensive groundwater exploitation. The 1990s were marked by a desperate need to start saving water (water leakages were estimated to reach 40% of the resources provided), to improve water treatment and recycling, and to diminish the water infrastructure bills. Choices to be made were perceived as being technical

From Traditional to Modern Water Management Systems;

to a whole new 'Moroccan environmental ethics'.

denied life

others

sectors

Table 2. Principles of water ethical practices

on an equitable basis

**3.2 'New waves' in Moroccan water ethics** 

independent way.

politics can have.

Transparency and universal access to information

Integrated Water Management (IWRM)

Source: COMEST, 2004

Reflection on the Evolution of a 'Water Ethic' in Semi-Arid Morocco 249

environment and sustainable development'. Such a radical step, even if not fully accompanied by practical measures (yet), illustrates the wish of Mohamed the VIth and its government to approach development and economic issues in a more integrated and more

The new Environmental Charter thus emerged at a time when governance issues were being questioned and debated, and water management issues therefore found themselves linked

In previous sections, we explored how both the technical and political dimensions of water management in Morocco evolved throughout time. We saw that technical choices also had political dimensions. Here, we are going to examine the ethical implications that water

Human dignity There is no life without water and those to whom it is denied are

Participation All individuals, especially the poor, must be involved in water

Human equality All persons ought to be provided with the basic necessities of life

Common Good Water is a common good, and without proper water management human potential and dignity diminishes Stewardship Protection and careful use of water resources is needed for

sustainable use of life-enabling ecosystems

Empowerment The requirement to facilitate participation in planning and

Inclusiveness Water management policies must address the interests of all who

influence management

recognized in fostering this process Solidarity Upstream and downstream interdependence within a watershed

planning and management with gender and poverty issues

the need for an integrated water management approach

continually poses challenges for water management resulting in

intergenerational and intra-generational equity and promotes the

management means much more than to allow an opportunity for consultation. Best ethical practice will enable stakeholders to

live in a water catchment area. Minority interests must be protected as well as those of the poor and other disadvantaged

If data is not accessible in a form that can be understood, an opportunity will arise for an interested party to disadvantage

A means to ensure equitable, economically sound and environmentally sustainable management of water resources

as well as socio-political. In practice, Morocco chose to manage the resource in a semi private, semi public way. This resulted in the State delegating water management and treatment as well as electricity provision to private companies. Thus, the Spanish consortium REDAL1 was put in charge of water distribution in Rabat, for instance. The *concession* is defined as a convention through which a public body gives the mission of exploiting a public service following certain conditions that are described in detail in a list of duties and requirements, and against a payment that, most of the time, comes from tax payers' money, to a 'concessionnaire' of its choice. This has been described as *gestion déléguée*. The resulting 'marketisation' of water in Morocco has been considered unsatisfactory, on two fronts. With current poverty levels, especially in urban environments, identifying appropriate water pricing has been a difficult problem to solve and the macro-economic situation a difficult terrain in which to integrate a natural resource market. The *gestion déléguée* therefore encountered a few hic ups, with REDAL1 being stopped after 3 years (instead of 30) and replaced by the great Veolia Environment. On a second front, politically speaking, this water management system has been far from operating in a participatory manner.

This is how the 1990s approaches led to the creation of the new Moroccan Environmental Charter.
