**5.2 Overview of water allocation and land reform in South Africa**

88 Current Issues of Water Management

One water governance related issue in particular that is of current interest and perceived national importance in South Africa is that of Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) (Hobbs, 2010). This issue has recently featured considerably in the country's newspapers and electronic media, where investigative journalists have flagged their concerns about it from various angles (Funke et al., in press). Acid mine water started decanting from abandoned underground mine workings close to Krugersdorp on the West Rand of the Gauteng Province in 2002. Now, the potential volume of AMD from the Witwatersrand Goldfield

AMD, or the uncontrolled discharge of polluted water from defunct gold mining operations into surface and ground water resources, presents a serious threat to the receiving environment and has severe socio-economic and environmental impacts. Specifically, these impacts include the release of chemical contaminants into water resources, persistent environmental damage long after mine closure, and negative impacts on the health and safety of communities living in the vicinity of mining operations (Hobbs, 2010). There is no indication that the AMD threat will subside in the foreseeable future as mining operations

Fig. 4. Mining areas and minerals particularly susceptible to the formation of AMD (Hobbs

Having sketched a picture of the climatic conditions in South Africa, an overview of water allocation and land reform in South Africa is presented to explain how the government

chose to follow this reform path and what the results have been to date.

remain active throughout South Africa as evident on the map below.

alone amounts to 350 Ml/day (Hobbs, 2010).

4 … Coal [a) Waterberg, b) Mapungubwe, c) Pafuri]

6 … Gold and Uranium (Witwatersrand)

10 … Copper and Phophate (Phalaborwa)

and Kennedy, 2010)

1 … Coal (Emalahleni) 2 … Coal (Mpumalanga) 3 … Coal (Kwazulu-Natal)

5 … Coal (Free State)

7 … Gold and Uranium a) Free State, b) North West] 8 … Platinum and Chrome a) Western Bushveld, b) Estern Bushveld 9 … Gold (Limpopo)

11 … Gold (Barberton) 12 … Copper (Okiep)

South Africa's political transformation formalised by the country's first democratic elections in 1994 brought with it a host of progressive reforms in the water and agricultural sectors. The Water Services Act was ratified in 1997 and the landmark National Water Act in 1998 (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The National Water Act is in line with other international reforms in water management. It prioritises decentralised water management and common property aspects of water; separates ownership of land from ownership of water; confirms the need to ensure that aquatic ecosystems receive sufficient water to function properly; stipulates the need to ensure that neighbouring states utilise shared water resources equitably; and prioritises the right of all South Africans to have adequate access to wholesome supplies of water (DWAF, 1997). The National Water Act is regarded, along with the EU Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000), as a pioneer of an international wave of reform and one of the most innovative and far-reaching water laws in the world, which has set the benchmark for new ways of managing water resources (Woodhouse, 2008; Ashton et al, 2008; Postel and Richter, 2003).

However, the necessary goal of redressing past racial and gender inequality means that South Africa's water reform is expected to deliver on changes in process (holistic, decentralised, participatory and economically cost effective), social outcomes (Woodhouse, 2008) as well as ensuring higher environmental standards as stipulated in the 1998 National Water Act. According to Woodhouse, "The prospect of redistribution from existing 'haves' to 'have nots' raises considerably the political risks and expectations attached to the implementation of reform" (Woodhouse, 2008: 3).

In line with the South African government's social redress priority, the land reform programme intends to transfer approximately 30% of white-owned commercial farms to "new" black commercial farmers by 2014 in an effective and sustainable manner (Cousins and Scoones, 2010). The land reform programme in the country has three different dimensions namely, land restitution, land redistribution and tenure reform. The restitution component of the policy aims to return land that was taken away forcibly from black people during apartheid, or to provide those affected with financial compensation. It targets both rural and urban lands. The land redistribution dimension aims to equitably share resources by transferring land from white to black people so that the land ownership share of black people is increased. This is considered necessary because black people make up the large majority of the South African population but have less land compared to the white population. For instance, in 1991 they held only about 13.9 % (17 million ha) of the national land (Lyne and Darroch, 2003). The land tenure reform dimension aims to enhance the tenure security of vulnerable people, such as workers and their families residing on private commercial farms as well as people living in the former homelands.

However, according to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform's (DRDLR's) Strategic Plan for 2009-2012, by the end of the 2007/08 financial year the combined programme had only achieved 4.9 million ha. Cumulatively, from 1994 to the second quarter of 2008/09, the National Land Reform Programme had achieved just over 5.1 million hectares of land delivery. This means that from 1994 the yearly average output of 0.371 million ha has been less than one third of the expected 1.23 million required to meet the 2014 target. More importantly, it has been acknowledged that 90% of land reform projects on redistributed farming land have failed (Pressley, 2010).

Integration Challenges of Water and Land Reform – A Critical Review of South Africa 91

Additionally, even though parallel processes of water allocation and land reform have been of high priority to the South African government, both have had less than satisfactory results. Water allocation and land reform processes have both had redistributive, socioeconomic and social redress objectives, through which the South African government intended to make water and land vehicles for rural economic transformation. However, in many respects, the state has failed to live up to its reform objectives, facing backlogs, falling short of its targets, and contributing little to improving the productivity of beneficiaries of the water allocation and land reform programmes. A commonly cited reason for this failure is the uncoordinated nature of the land reform and water allocation reform policy formulation processes as well as the uncoordinated nature of their implementation. While the South African government has put in place several trans-sectoral instruments, procedures and principles to accommodate dual sectoral policy objectives, these two

Problems with the land reform process include the fact that the land and water reform targets set at the national level have not been matched by meaningful implementation on the ground. The land reform programme in South Africa has been characterised by a slow pace of land redistribution and has failed to impact significantly on the land tenure systems prevailing on commercial farms and in the communal areas (Hall, 2009; Greenberg, 2010). In addition, the "willing-buyer-willing-seller" approach is only able to transfer modest amounts of land to a small minority of the rural population, while leaving the underlying structure of the agrarian economy largely intact (Walker, 2005). The perception exists that most of the land that has already been redistributed is not being used as productively as originally planned. There have also not been significant livelihood benefits for the majority of the beneficiaries (Lahiff, 2008; Cousins and Scoones, 2010; Greenberg, 2010). This is probably as a result of weak delivery systems and institutions, inadequate budgets, topdown implementation (with the high expectations of a passive citizenry) and very poor

Another major shortcoming of the land redistribution process is the lack of resources made available for post-transfer support and adequate resources to beneficiaries (Turner and Ibsen, 2000; Cousins, 2005). Various studies have shown that beneficiaries experience severe problems accessing services such as credit, training, extension advice, transport and ploughing services, veterinary services, and access to input and produce markets (HSRC 2003; Hall 2004; Bradstock 2005; Lahiff 2007). Other challenges include the types of beneficiaries accessing the programme, drawn out transfer periods, lack of transparency and possible illegitimate activities of local government institutions, the often inappropriate models of land-use being imposed on beneficiaries, the general failure of post-settlement support and, ultimately, the generally disappointing performance of land reform projects (Aliber and Mokoena, 2000; CASE, 2006). In addition land may be transferred to groups who may not be interested in agriculture or have any agricultural experience, rather than motivated, interested and experienced individuals (De Lange et al., 2004). Farms are also often transferred in their entirety, rather than divided into smaller, more manageable units

In terms of training emerging farmers, a number of difficulties exist. Agricultural training colleges have been characterised by low student numbers, which has meant a shift from

sectoral reforms still seem to operate in relative isolation of each other.

**5.3 Problems with the land reform process** 

provision of agricultural support (Greenberg, 2010).

for small-scale farming purposes (Van Koppen, 2009).

In parallel to the land reform process, the water reform process has also been underway, with one of its central pillars being the Water Allocation Reform Strategy of 2008. Water Allocation Reform (WAR) aims to provide water for subsistence farming or for sustaining basic livelihoods, and to start a development path of commercial and competitive water use in support of broad based black economic empowerment. Thus the water allocation process must be undertaken in a fair, reasonable and consistent manner and existing lawful uses will not be arbitrarily curtailed (DWAF, 2006). Furthermore, the strategy aims to allocate 30% of available water to black people. By 2024 the target is 60%, half of which should be under control of black women.

Currently, 15% of water use licenses are allocated to historically disadvantaged individuals for irrigation purposes. By 2011/12 the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) plans to address the existing backlog of issuing licenses and is aiming to increase this target to 40% by 2013/14 (PLAAS 2009). DWA also wants to review progress towards integrated water, rural development and land reform by 2013/14 (PLAAS, 2009).

Compulsory licensing is an integral part of the Water Allocation Reform programme (DWAF, 2004). This allows for water currently allocated to users to be re-allocated to previously disadvantaged people. All commercial water users must now register their water use and will have to apply for a water use license (DWAF, 2004). In practice, however, not much re-allocation of water has occurred. In fact, the process of compulsory licensing has not yet started with only three pilot studies being carried out in various provinces. Similarly, of the 1212 ad hoc licenses for new water use that had been allocated by 2006, 98% were for non-historically disadvantaged individuals. Van Koppen et al. (2009) argue that for administration-proficient, larger-scale users, obtaining a license simply means submitting an application. The DWA appears to have very limited capacity to evaluate and judge each application on its own merits, check on-site or enforce the licensing process. Administrative pressure, and the proven threat that vested applicants can report any delays to the Water Tribunal, pushes officials towards allocating whatever is being asked for. The redistributive potential of water allocation reform risks fading away amid these legal complexities and to the detriment of small-scale users.

A parallel process to land and water sector reform is agricultural policy reform, which pays particular attention to irrigation policy. The overall objective of the agricultural policy reform process is to create more opportunities for smallholders and resource-poor farmers to improve productivity and contribute more to the mainstream economy. This notion was supported by the African National Congress (ANC)'s 2007 Polokwane conference, during which the importance was stressed of integrating smallholders into the formal value chain and linking them with markets. The problem is that there is insufficient support for the agricultural sector, which means that plans related to the agricultural sector cannot easily be carried out. This situation has not been helped by the fact that national government has reallocated resources from agriculture to other priority areas during the recent global economic depression. Agriculture is seen as a declining sector, as opposed to urban areas, which are seen as the future of the country (Greenberg, 2010).

So, despite efforts at socio-economic and political transformation, the legacy of apartheid policies has resulted in most available land and water for irrigation remaining in the hands of the large-scale commercial farming sector, low productivity levels of land transferred to beneficiaries of land reform, insufficient post-settlement support, very little knowledge by farmers of their use rights, and overall food security concerns to name a few.

Additionally, even though parallel processes of water allocation and land reform have been of high priority to the South African government, both have had less than satisfactory results. Water allocation and land reform processes have both had redistributive, socioeconomic and social redress objectives, through which the South African government intended to make water and land vehicles for rural economic transformation. However, in many respects, the state has failed to live up to its reform objectives, facing backlogs, falling short of its targets, and contributing little to improving the productivity of beneficiaries of the water allocation and land reform programmes. A commonly cited reason for this failure is the uncoordinated nature of the land reform and water allocation reform policy formulation processes as well as the uncoordinated nature of their implementation. While the South African government has put in place several trans-sectoral instruments, procedures and principles to accommodate dual sectoral policy objectives, these two sectoral reforms still seem to operate in relative isolation of each other.

## **5.3 Problems with the land reform process**

90 Current Issues of Water Management

In parallel to the land reform process, the water reform process has also been underway, with one of its central pillars being the Water Allocation Reform Strategy of 2008. Water Allocation Reform (WAR) aims to provide water for subsistence farming or for sustaining basic livelihoods, and to start a development path of commercial and competitive water use in support of broad based black economic empowerment. Thus the water allocation process must be undertaken in a fair, reasonable and consistent manner and existing lawful uses will not be arbitrarily curtailed (DWAF, 2006). Furthermore, the strategy aims to allocate 30% of available water to black people. By 2024 the target is 60%, half of which should be

Currently, 15% of water use licenses are allocated to historically disadvantaged individuals for irrigation purposes. By 2011/12 the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) plans to address the existing backlog of issuing licenses and is aiming to increase this target to 40% by 2013/14 (PLAAS 2009). DWA also wants to review progress towards integrated water,

Compulsory licensing is an integral part of the Water Allocation Reform programme (DWAF, 2004). This allows for water currently allocated to users to be re-allocated to previously disadvantaged people. All commercial water users must now register their water use and will have to apply for a water use license (DWAF, 2004). In practice, however, not much re-allocation of water has occurred. In fact, the process of compulsory licensing has not yet started with only three pilot studies being carried out in various provinces. Similarly, of the 1212 ad hoc licenses for new water use that had been allocated by 2006, 98% were for non-historically disadvantaged individuals. Van Koppen et al. (2009) argue that for administration-proficient, larger-scale users, obtaining a license simply means submitting an application. The DWA appears to have very limited capacity to evaluate and judge each application on its own merits, check on-site or enforce the licensing process. Administrative pressure, and the proven threat that vested applicants can report any delays to the Water Tribunal, pushes officials towards allocating whatever is being asked for. The redistributive potential of water allocation reform risks fading away amid these legal complexities and to

A parallel process to land and water sector reform is agricultural policy reform, which pays particular attention to irrigation policy. The overall objective of the agricultural policy reform process is to create more opportunities for smallholders and resource-poor farmers to improve productivity and contribute more to the mainstream economy. This notion was supported by the African National Congress (ANC)'s 2007 Polokwane conference, during which the importance was stressed of integrating smallholders into the formal value chain and linking them with markets. The problem is that there is insufficient support for the agricultural sector, which means that plans related to the agricultural sector cannot easily be carried out. This situation has not been helped by the fact that national government has reallocated resources from agriculture to other priority areas during the recent global economic depression. Agriculture is seen as a declining sector, as opposed to urban areas,

So, despite efforts at socio-economic and political transformation, the legacy of apartheid policies has resulted in most available land and water for irrigation remaining in the hands of the large-scale commercial farming sector, low productivity levels of land transferred to beneficiaries of land reform, insufficient post-settlement support, very little knowledge by

farmers of their use rights, and overall food security concerns to name a few.

rural development and land reform by 2013/14 (PLAAS, 2009).

which are seen as the future of the country (Greenberg, 2010).

under control of black women.

the detriment of small-scale users.

Problems with the land reform process include the fact that the land and water reform targets set at the national level have not been matched by meaningful implementation on the ground. The land reform programme in South Africa has been characterised by a slow pace of land redistribution and has failed to impact significantly on the land tenure systems prevailing on commercial farms and in the communal areas (Hall, 2009; Greenberg, 2010). In addition, the "willing-buyer-willing-seller" approach is only able to transfer modest amounts of land to a small minority of the rural population, while leaving the underlying structure of the agrarian economy largely intact (Walker, 2005). The perception exists that most of the land that has already been redistributed is not being used as productively as originally planned. There have also not been significant livelihood benefits for the majority of the beneficiaries (Lahiff, 2008; Cousins and Scoones, 2010; Greenberg, 2010). This is probably as a result of weak delivery systems and institutions, inadequate budgets, topdown implementation (with the high expectations of a passive citizenry) and very poor provision of agricultural support (Greenberg, 2010).

Another major shortcoming of the land redistribution process is the lack of resources made available for post-transfer support and adequate resources to beneficiaries (Turner and Ibsen, 2000; Cousins, 2005). Various studies have shown that beneficiaries experience severe problems accessing services such as credit, training, extension advice, transport and ploughing services, veterinary services, and access to input and produce markets (HSRC 2003; Hall 2004; Bradstock 2005; Lahiff 2007). Other challenges include the types of beneficiaries accessing the programme, drawn out transfer periods, lack of transparency and possible illegitimate activities of local government institutions, the often inappropriate models of land-use being imposed on beneficiaries, the general failure of post-settlement support and, ultimately, the generally disappointing performance of land reform projects (Aliber and Mokoena, 2000; CASE, 2006). In addition land may be transferred to groups who may not be interested in agriculture or have any agricultural experience, rather than motivated, interested and experienced individuals (De Lange et al., 2004). Farms are also often transferred in their entirety, rather than divided into smaller, more manageable units for small-scale farming purposes (Van Koppen, 2009).

In terms of training emerging farmers, a number of difficulties exist. Agricultural training colleges have been characterised by low student numbers, which has meant a shift from

Integration Challenges of Water and Land Reform – A Critical Review of South Africa 93

In addition, very few water-use licenses have actually been awarded and taken up by emerging black commercial farmers. This means that farmers often have to put production on hold until a license is granted even though other infrastructure may be in place (Surplus People Project, 2007). Evidence is also increasing that many water and land reform projects are not leading to meaningful and efficient productivity on most of the "new" black-owned irrigated farms. The challenge is, amongst others, to synchronise reform programmes in irrigation areas and ensure that beneficiaries hold secure land and water use entitlements. According to Van Koppen et al. (2009), in implementing land restitution and redistribution as part of the land reform programme, there was at first little collaboration between the former Department of Land Affairs (DLA) (now Department of Rural Development and Land Reform) and the former Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) (now Department of Water Affairs). Riparian water rights were not always completely registered as part of the land entitlement. Also, in a few cases, water rights tied to land under claim were sold, leaving an asset of lesser value. Without readily available registers of land under claim, the DWAF could not easily track this problem. In the late 1990s, however, it introduced a policy that the trading of water rights of land under claim should not be approved. Further coordination has since been established between the DWAF, the provincial Departments of Agriculture and the provincial governments with the signing of a

memorandum of understanding on collaboration on land and water reform in 2008.

water use entitlements to the "new" farmers.

and which do not provide sufficient guidance to new farmers.

Project, 2007).

There have also been arguments that question the wisdom of transferring land and water to beneficiaries who may not be able to use it productively. According to such narratives, attempts to address equity needs must be balanced with the consideration that many existing lawful water users are making productive, efficient and beneficial use and are contributing to socio-economic stability and growth (Adger et al., 2001; Forsyth, 2003). There is also an argument that if reallocations take place too quickly, the result is likely to be economic and environmental damage as emerging users struggle to establish productive uses of the reallocated water (Forsyth, 2003). These narratives have influenced government thinking and contributed to the maintenance of the status quo instead of rapid allocation of

Another factor affecting the uptake of water use entitlements is that many emerging farmers are not sufficiently capacitated to understand their water needs, the scales and rates of payment for water rights, use and management of water or their roles and responsibilities on Water User Associations. On the other hand, large scale commercial farmers who have historically used water for productive purposes are more knowledgeable about administrative processes and can easily apply and obtain water licenses. It is therefore important that the capacity constraints experienced by emerging farmers be recognised and addressed if they are to begin to make a more meaningful contribution (Surplus People

In cases where new farmers start irrigating their lands, they often do not properly determine the optimum irrigation potential of their farms. This means that chances for underutilisation are high (Backeberg, 2005). In addition, Joubert and Kruger (2005) attribute the high failure rates of the new farmers to inadequate appraisal of farm potential (e.g. marginal farms that have been offered for sale), and unrealistic business plans designed by consultants who are only interested in maximising their commission paid by government,

training extension officers to training farmers directly. The Agricultural Sector Education and Training Authority (AgriSETA) was established to provide work-based, functional training in agriculture. This institution is flooded with requests for training assistance from both farm workers and land reform beneficiaries. However, it only approves very few of these applications. For instance, in 2006/07 AgriSETA received 16245 applications for learnerships (only 400 were approved) and 59000 applications for skills programmes (only 475 were approved) (Greenberg, 2010).

In addition, the public agricultural extension office has declined over the past 15-20 years. In 2008, 2152 agricultural extension officers, who assist farmers and land reform beneficiaries, were active in South Africa. Of these 60% were working in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo. There is currently a ratio of one officer to 878 farmers (which is comparable to India, Zambia and Zimbabwe who face similar agricultural issues). The Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) has an Extension Recovery Plan in place which is aimed at reviving public extension services by increasing numbers and reskilling public extension officers. This initiative is however not planned or budgeted for in all provincial departments. The potential role of community-based extension workers as auxilliaries can also be considered (Greenberg, 2010).

In terms of power asymmetries in the agricultural sector, an alliance of conservative landowners, agricultural economists, officials and analysts has been promoting the need for sustainable commercial viability among emerging farmers (Doyer, 2004). This orientation does not sufficiently capture and address the historical inequities of land and water ownership and rural poverty (Vink and Van Rooyen, 2009; Walker, 2005). The 2005 National Land Summit tried to address this problem by calling for land redistribution to be embedded within a wider agrarian reform process that focuses on poverty reduction and creating opportunities for smallholder farmers. This idea has however not been developed in more detail and it is not clear what this may mean for beneficiary selection, programme design, post-transfer support and agricultural policy in general (Lahiff, 2008). The weaknesses mentioned above reflect deep-seated structural and implementation shortcomings as well as inappropriateness of current redistribution models.

Another challenge is the role of traditional leaders, which has not been clearly defined. Traditional leaders continue to perform unregulated land administration functions outside of any legal framework. These functions would otherwise exceed the capacity of local government. As a result, functions of traditional leaders are not matched or aligned to the planning and development functions of elected local government, which in some cases is resulting in a stand-off between these two institutions. It is therefore important to find a solution to this issue (Manona, 2009).
