**4. Climate change**

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) has summarized the evidence for climate change, its likely impacts, and possible mitigation and adaptation measures. Heattrapping by so-called greenhouse gases, most importantly carbon dioxide (CO2), is warming the global climate (IPCC, 2007, p. 2). Most emissions (57%) of these gases come from fossil fuel burning, with an additional 17% contribution from deforestation, decay of organic matter, and peat (IPCC, 2007, p. 5). Deforestation is largely driven by expanding populations bringing additional land under cultivation. A breakdown of emissions by sector attributes nearly 14% to agriculture and another 17% to forestry, although these figures do not include other post-farm contributions from the food system. Agriculture accounts for roughly 50% of methane emissions (mostly from rice paddies and ruminant animals) and 70% of nitrous oxide emissions (mostly associated with nitrogen fertilizer) (IPCC, 1996, pp. 49-53).

Climate change will have significant impact on agricultural productivity and consequently on food security (Table 1).

Fossil Fuel and Food Security 285

Climate change clearly will afflict agriculture and overall human well-being in the 21st century. Along with other challenges to food security, climate impacts on agriculture will exert upward pressure on food prices. Policy action to mitigate climate change by putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions, especially from fossil fuel combustion, will increase fossil fuel prices and further impact food security. Yet another complication is diversion of cropland to biofuel production, which has forged a tight link between the prices of oil and of biofuels (Figure 8). As shown and discussed in Section 6 (Figure 11), this linkage extends to

Fig. 7. Comparison of actual and projected emissions with multiple emission scenarios from

emissions. The highest solid line represents the fossil-fuel intensive scenario (Raupach, 2007,

the IPCC (2000, solid lines). The outer dashed lines show the full range of projected

Fig. 8. Linkage between gasoline and ethanol prices (FAO, 2011b, p. 80).

updated by Canadell, 2011).

food prices. Further discussion of the impact of biofuels appears in Section 6.4.

Agricultural systems have long adapted to slow variations in climate and it is likely that they will do so under the projected warming of the 21st century. Nevertheless, climate change impacts on global agriculture already have had demonstrable negative effects on agricultural output (Lobell, Schlenker, & Costa-Roberts, 2011). Beyond such impacts, a growing rate of extreme events promises to be especially disruptive. The correlated events of the 2010 drought in Russia and flooding in Pakistan (Lau & Kim, 2011) had global consequences through their impact on food prices. In particular, high food prices in the Middle East, which resulted in part from unavailability of Russian grain, along with other obvious social and political factors, contributed to the political unrest that unseated several governments (Lagi, Bertrand, & Bar-Yam, 2011). Although no individual weather event, much less individual civil events, can be attributed solely to climate change, models consistently predict increasing frequency of extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007, p. 13). Together, both cumulative slow impacts and severe local events will exacerbate the challenge of achieving global food security.


Table 1. Projected impacts of climate change on agriculture, forestry, and ecosystems (IPCC, 2007, p. 13)

Global diplomatic action to mitigate climate change has stalled. Most nations that ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol have made significant progress toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as have individual states in the U.S. and many cities around the world. With the two largest emitters, China and the United States, at loggerheads, current negotiations seem likely to remain stalled (Bodansky, 2011). In the absence of a wide-ranging international agreement, business as usual prevails, with emissions rising even faster than most earlier projections by the IPCC (Figure 7).

Agricultural systems have long adapted to slow variations in climate and it is likely that they will do so under the projected warming of the 21st century. Nevertheless, climate change impacts on global agriculture already have had demonstrable negative effects on agricultural output (Lobell, Schlenker, & Costa-Roberts, 2011). Beyond such impacts, a growing rate of extreme events promises to be especially disruptive. The correlated events of the 2010 drought in Russia and flooding in Pakistan (Lau & Kim, 2011) had global consequences through their impact on food prices. In particular, high food prices in the Middle East, which resulted in part from unavailability of Russian grain, along with other obvious social and political factors, contributed to the political unrest that unseated several governments (Lagi, Bertrand, & Bar-Yam, 2011). Although no individual weather event, much less individual civil events, can be attributed solely to climate change, models consistently predict increasing frequency of extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007, p. 13). Together, both cumulative slow impacts and severe local events will exacerbate the

**Likelihood** 

Virtually certain

Very likely

Very likely

Table 1. Projected impacts of climate change on agriculture, forestry, and ecosystems

Global diplomatic action to mitigate climate change has stalled. Most nations that ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol have made significant progress toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as have individual states in the U.S. and many cities around the world. With the two largest emitters, China and the United States, at loggerheads, current negotiations seem likely to remain stalled (Bodansky, 2011). In the absence of a wide-ranging international agreement, business as usual prevails, with emissions rising even faster than most earlier

**Agricultural/forestry/ecosystem Impact** 

environments; decreased yields in warmer environments; increased

Reduced yields in warmer areas due to heat stress; increased danger of

Damage to crops; soil erosion, inability to cultivate land due to

yields/crop damage and failure; increased livestock deaths; increased

Damage to crops; windthrow (uprooting) of trees; damage to coral

estuaries, and fresh water systems

waterlogging of soils

risk of wildfire

Likely Salinisation of irrigation water,

reefs

Land degradation; lower

Increased yield in colder

insect outbreaks

wildfire

challenge of achieving global food security.

Over most land areas, warmer and fewer cold days and nights, warmer and more frequent hot days and nights

Warm spells/heat waves. Frequency increases over

Heavy precipitation events. Frequency increases over

Area affected by drought

Intense tropical cyclone

Increased incidence of extreme high sea levels (excludes tsunamis)

projections by the IPCC (Figure 7).

(IPCC, 2007, p. 13)

most land areas

most areas

**Phenonomenon & Trend Estimated** 

increases Likely

activity increases Likely

Climate change clearly will afflict agriculture and overall human well-being in the 21st century. Along with other challenges to food security, climate impacts on agriculture will exert upward pressure on food prices. Policy action to mitigate climate change by putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions, especially from fossil fuel combustion, will increase fossil fuel prices and further impact food security. Yet another complication is diversion of cropland to biofuel production, which has forged a tight link between the prices of oil and of biofuels (Figure 8). As shown and discussed in Section 6 (Figure 11), this linkage extends to food prices. Further discussion of the impact of biofuels appears in Section 6.4.

Fig. 7. Comparison of actual and projected emissions with multiple emission scenarios from the IPCC (2000, solid lines). The outer dashed lines show the full range of projected emissions. The highest solid line represents the fossil-fuel intensive scenario (Raupach, 2007, updated by Canadell, 2011).

Fig. 8. Linkage between gasoline and ethanol prices (FAO, 2011b, p. 80).

Fossil Fuel and Food Security 287

The 2010 IEA World Energy Outlook projects slowly increasing oil production (less than 1% per year) to about 96 million barrels per day (Mb/d) in 2035, with falling production in producing fields compensated by oil fields yet to be developed and others yet to be found (Figure 9). The projected growth is insufficient to meet escalating demand from developing countries, especially China and India. Furthermore, successive IEA projections have been declining: 121 Mb/d in 2004, 116 Mb/d in 2006, 102 Mb/d in 2008, and 96 Mb/d in 2010. Moreover, IEA projections have been criticized by the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas. For example, Aleklett et al. (2010) project just 76 Mb/d in 2030,

Fig. 9. Oil production by type in the IEA preferred New Policies scenario (IEA, 2010).

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2035

exacerbate difficulties for the poor to maintain food access.

**5.2 Coal** 

0

20

40

60

80

100

mb/d

A major issue here is the lack of transparency about oil reserves by national oil companies, especially in Saudi Arabia. To what extent does excess capacity exist to stabilize oil prices in the coming decades? Beyond that, to what extent can unconventional sources, such as deep water fields, tar sands and shale oil raise future production and defer sharp price increases and limit volatility? One characteristic of these resources is that they yield less energy returned in sale product for the energy invested in discovery and production (Guilford et al., 2011). Consequently, they require greater energy investment and therefore greater capital investment to produce. As a result, the future even the relatively near future—will hold higher oil prices. Besides direct impact on the cost of agricultural production, higher oil prices will increase pressure to divert cropland from food to biofuel production, raising food prices even more. Both trends will

2030

Unconventional oil Natural gas liquids Crude oil: fields yet to be found

Crude oil: fields yet to be developed Crude oil: currently producing fields

Coal produces 48% of electricity in the United States (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2011a) and approximately 42% in the world (EIA, 2011b, Table 66) Many utilities promote coal-burning as a low-cost alternative, but recent studies suggest that the often quoted 200 years of coal supply, both globally and in the US, is a serious overestimate.

Heinberg (2009) reviewed several available investigations and concluded that exhaustion of high quality coal reserves and infrastructure limitations on development and marketing of

26 Mb/d less than the 2008 IEA projection for 2030.
