**7. The differentiation of society and its functionality**

Luhmann's remodeled version of functional analysis constructed around the concept of contingency is quite defensible and elegant. It offers promising ways to handle situations where analyzed phenomena are at the intersection of many systems, and part of this contextualization procedure is also the societal positioning of a phenomenon by way of theoretical specification of the structural specifica of modern society (see e.g. Nassehi, 2006:375-468; Vogd, 2009). However, behind the differentiation processes there is no 'immament' teleology to be found, which would, in relation to the survival imperatives of society, mould the process to increasingly effective forms of division and organization of labour (see, for example, Tyrell, 1978). Instead, the differentiation process is conceptualized as an evolvement of different kind of contexts structuring communication in their own different ways, with no scripts behind the process. These contexts are 'thickenings' of communication, the function of which is to make the acceptance of respective communicative offers more probable, and thus the continuation of interaction more likely (Nassehi, 2002:455).

In the differentiation process, generalized symbolic media such as money, power, truth, justice and so on, have an essential role to play, because it is their function especially, as Luhmann (1997:316) says, to increase the prospects of getting the communicative offers accepted, particularly in situations where the always present possibility of outright rejection or questioning is more probable. For example, money as a generalized media of exchange results in more effective bargaining by making it both easier and quicker. The episode is simplified by paying a required amount of money for the item of trade without having to dedicate time to discussing the commensurateness of values of the objects of exchange. In the same way, justice or legal order with its code legal/illegal simplifies social interaction by absorbing social conflicts into its procedures and normative regulations, leaving the participants no choice but to accept the legal decision (Luhmann, 1993a, 1996; 1997:332-58). Accordingly the differentiation of society happens as an evolvement of different 'connection routines' of communication, facilitated by the generalized symbolic media, which in relation to each other, appear as indifferent system contexts. Therefore, transactions mediated by money cumulate to economy, scientific allegations chain to form a scientific subsystem, art structures a system through art works referring to former works and anticipating next. Indifference in this connection means that the elements of different subsystems are not transferable from one system to another; thus e.g. money is not a scientific truth, a piece of art work is not a justified legal decision. However many linkages, structural and operational couplings there may be between the systems, they do not merge (Luhmann, 1997:359-96; Nassehi, 2004).

Luhmann's differentiation theory is by no means without its problems. It is difficult for many subsystems of society, such as art, health care and education to find a code or generalized symbolic media of their own, or choose between the many possible candidates (Luhmann, 1997:407-408; see also for example, Sevänen, 2008; Stollberg, 2009). This is a

solutions, with attention paid at the same time to the fact that solutions are dependent on how and by which problem definitions and structures problems are solved elsewhere in a

Luhmann's remodeled version of functional analysis constructed around the concept of contingency is quite defensible and elegant. It offers promising ways to handle situations where analyzed phenomena are at the intersection of many systems, and part of this contextualization procedure is also the societal positioning of a phenomenon by way of theoretical specification of the structural specifica of modern society (see e.g. Nassehi, 2006:375-468; Vogd, 2009). However, behind the differentiation processes there is no 'immament' teleology to be found, which would, in relation to the survival imperatives of society, mould the process to increasingly effective forms of division and organization of labour (see, for example, Tyrell, 1978). Instead, the differentiation process is conceptualized as an evolvement of different kind of contexts structuring communication in their own different ways, with no scripts behind the process. These contexts are 'thickenings' of communication, the function of which is to make the acceptance of respective communicative offers more probable, and thus the continuation of interaction more likely

In the differentiation process, generalized symbolic media such as money, power, truth, justice and so on, have an essential role to play, because it is their function especially, as Luhmann (1997:316) says, to increase the prospects of getting the communicative offers accepted, particularly in situations where the always present possibility of outright rejection or questioning is more probable. For example, money as a generalized media of exchange results in more effective bargaining by making it both easier and quicker. The episode is simplified by paying a required amount of money for the item of trade without having to dedicate time to discussing the commensurateness of values of the objects of exchange. In the same way, justice or legal order with its code legal/illegal simplifies social interaction by absorbing social conflicts into its procedures and normative regulations, leaving the participants no choice but to accept the legal decision (Luhmann, 1993a, 1996; 1997:332-58). Accordingly the differentiation of society happens as an evolvement of different 'connection routines' of communication, facilitated by the generalized symbolic media, which in relation to each other, appear as indifferent system contexts. Therefore, transactions mediated by money cumulate to economy, scientific allegations chain to form a scientific subsystem, art structures a system through art works referring to former works and anticipating next. Indifference in this connection means that the elements of different subsystems are not transferable from one system to another; thus e.g. money is not a scientific truth, a piece of art work is not a justified legal decision. However many linkages, structural and operational couplings there may be between the systems, they do not merge (Luhmann, 1997:359-96;

Luhmann's differentiation theory is by no means without its problems. It is difficult for many subsystems of society, such as art, health care and education to find a code or generalized symbolic media of their own, or choose between the many possible candidates (Luhmann, 1997:407-408; see also for example, Sevänen, 2008; Stollberg, 2009). This is a

**7. The differentiation of society and its functionality** 

system.

(Nassehi, 2002:455).

Nassehi, 2004).

problem, which I will not go into. It is only a reminder that Luhmann's theory is more like toolbox, a 'distancing' way to approach social phenomena rather than a readymade theory.

In this connection, two aspects already mentioned in the foregoing discussion related to Luhmann's differentiation conception are of interest. Firstly, the process happens not as the differentiation *of* society but as processes *in* society by way of forming different kinds of separate communication –'thickening' contexts. To underline this difference, Luhmann (1997:595-609) refers to this process with the concept of 'Ausdifferenzierung' instead of 'Differenzierung' (differentiation) and defines it as a replication of the system/environment distinction inside the system, which is itself based on this distinction; in this case, communication being distinguished from its environment. This is strongly reminiscent of the 'German' branch of differentiation theory in which the process is seen as cultivating different kinds of separate and selective ways of linking communications and meaning, whether they be called cultural systems (Dilthey) or life orders (Weber), each having their own peculiar logic of connectivity or rationality. In this respect, Luhmann's theory is what comes to differentiation of society, but a variation of this 'old theme'. Secondly, in contrast to that postulated in theories of functional prerequisites of the existence of society, Luhmann's theory has no aprioristic or necessary reasons for the existence of differentiation in the form that it has taken in modern western societies. It is an end effect of a historical (and an evolutionary) process, where among the many problems and their different solutions arising in daily practice (variation), some are chosen (selection) and have an effect in the long run (restabilization), and even beyond the limits of the narrow interactive contexts of their origin, to formulate it with the help of the tripartite structure of the basic mechanisms of evolutionary change (Luhmann, 1997:456-97).

The process being cut out of all the necessity and teleology, the reasons for society having the structural shape it has in modern (western) societies are only to be found on the basis of 'hard' historical-reconstructive work (Luhmann, 1976:291; 1997:358). In this respect, the evolutionary mechanism behind the process of (macro level) changes in society are more like speciation, the isolation of a group and its formation into a reproductive community closed to itself and finally bringing about a new species, than adaptation, selection and reproduction of the specific traits of biological or social systems on the basis of the evolutionary advantages the trait, that is, the function offers to its carriers. This was recently hinted at by Rudolf Stichweh (2007:532-36). Whereas in the latter case functionality is behind the selection mechanism adapting the system to its environment, the former process has nothing to do with functionality in this sense. Using functionalist terminology in this (adaptionists) sense may be completely misleading what comes to (speciationist) macroevolutionary level of system formation. Its sphere of validity is below that level explaining changes in, for example, institutional structure or forms of practice on the basis of adaptive advantages. As Hendrik Wortmann (2007:105) succinctly formulates, functions are established in systems, not the other way round.

Nevertheless, Wortmann misses the point by reducing Luhmann's form of functional analysis to a form of 'typological essentialism', content to classify empirical phenomena into different functional circles, defined more or less from an outside perspective. He (2007:104) fails to notice of the dynamism in Luhmann's functionalism which comes from the speciationist way of delineating the differentiation process, and which not only makes 'finegrained' empirical analysis possible, but in the full meaning of the word, necessary.

Contingency Theoretical Functionalism and the Problem of Functional Differentiation 69

comes to play an important role in Luhmann's analysis, the subsystems of society in a strict

There is still one possibility to argue on behalf of the functionality of the subsystems, which is weaker but in a sense tangential to justification based on functional prerequisites of the existence of society. Even if function analysis is above all a scheme of observation and not the principle guiding the formation of different subsystems, the latter is not a totally excluded possibility. One special feature of systems composed of communication episodes is that they are, especially since the development of writing, able to take themselves as targets of a kind of 'second order observation' and form descriptions of themselves from the point of view of their respective 'leading difference' (true/not true, legal/illegal and so on) constituting their specific point of reference ( that is, function) to the social system as a whole (Luhmann, 1982; 1984:404-11, 593-616; 1990:479; 1997:757). This process, in which the distinction of system and environment is put to productive use inside the systems, also allows a new form of rationality, systems rationality, as a surrogate for the unified rationality coming into being, for instance, through the Habermasian discourses and public deliberation. Maybe this concept of rationality, by which rationality is decomposed to different subsystemic rationalities and defined by the degree they are able to take into account their effects on their social and natural environments, and rebound thereof (Luhmann, 1984:617-46; see also Kneer, 1992) in their own descriptions and workings, offers a way to justify the talk about functional subsystems. One could say that subsystems, no matter how they have come into being in first the place, are functional insofar as they are

oriented at least to some degree in accordance with rationality defined in this way.

The concept of self-description is not without its problems (Kieselring, 2000; Bonacker, 2003:266-75), for instance, belong theories related to different functional spheres such as economic theories or legal theories to the respective functional subsystem or to the subsystem of science. If the former is the case, that seems to blur the distinction between the subsystems; if the latter is the case, the question seems to be one of external descriptions (Fremdbeschreibung) rather than of self-descriptions. It seems unquestionable that descriptions have effects, and often quite unexpected ones on the functioning of systems. The financial crisis, the aftermaths of which we now are living, has shown this. It was partly caused by new financial instruments developed in the chambers of economics departments at different universities. However, to have an effect on these theories by widening their horizons from narrow 'substantial' topics specific to their fields to take into account the wider context (society) is, as the reception of Luhmann's own theory in the different branches of social sciences and humanities has shown, extremely difficult (see, for example, de Berg and Schmidt, 2000). In addition, we should not forget, to use Loet Leydesdorff's (2009) vocabulary, that social systems are socially distributed systems, in which operations linking communication happen at the same time in countless interactive and organizational contexts and with very different premises and anticipations of the future. This feature makes the subsystems rather insensitive to any kind of guidance, however self-reflective that may be. As Armin Nassehi (2007:170) points out, functional subsystems are constituted by operations but do not have the capability to do operations. As modern society itself (Luhmann, 1992:126), the subsystems are without a 'centre or top' thus mirroring society in

sense lose their status as *functional* subsystems.

their own structures.

Luhmann's functional analysis is not restricted to analysis of dispositional abilities of a unit together with classification of social phenomena accordingly. As Stichweh (2007:534; see also Milligan, 2010:264) points out, Luhmann has a keen interest in 'genealogical' aspect of differentiation, interpreted as a genesis of a new system via a new a new system/environment –distinction. Luhmann was not altogether free of the need to find some kind of an aprioristic foundation for the evolutionary process of change. However, both of these 'ventures', the attempt to give an account of generalized symbolic media via the concept of double contingency and the problematic of causal attribution related to it (1997:332-38), as well the attempt to anchor them to different ways of taking into account the corporeality of human existence via the concept of symbiotic symbols (1997:378-82), have remained more or less sketches. Luhmann (1984:406-9) in some connections also hints at using differentiation theory with the idea of functional orientation as a key to interpret evolution, as Wortmann (2007:99-100) claims in his earlier mentioned criticism. However, already Luhmann's most important concept related to differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung), contradicts this kind of straightforward configuration of differentiation and evolution theories.

In Luhmann's theory, the modern form of differentiation loses the necessity it has, for example, in Parsons' theory in the sense of 'adaptive upgrading', as being the most effective way of reducing complexity related to the environment and thus having apparent life supporting effects for the existence of society. The modern form of differentiation, or 'open access society' as it has recently been called (North, et al., 2009), characterized by institutional separation and individual freedom, undeniably has some 'evolutionary advantages' over other more closed forms of society. This stems from its flexibility and resulting ability to react rather rapidly to different changes occurring in society and its environment. Nevertheless, this is only a partial truth because, as Luhmann (1986) has argued, modern society seems in fact to be jeopardizing its 'material' conditions of existence because of environmental problems, to which it is unable to respond precisely just because of its form of differentiation. In addition, attributing some kind of necessity to the modern form of differentiation would be at grave odds with the theory like Luhmann's (1992:93- 129), which defines contingency to be the 'Eigenvalue' of modern society.

This raises the question, which Hartmann Tyrell (1998:144) also points at, namely, is it any more possible to speak about functional differentiation in connection with Luhmann's theory with its reformulated functional analysis? Johannes Berger (2003:221) answers this question negatively by claiming that the concept of functional differentiation is strictly speaking, incompatible with Luhmann's autopoietic, 'emergence paradigmatic' theory of constitution of social systems via communication. Berger has made his case, because defining the subsystems as at the same time autopoietic, self-referential and self-producing systems and as functional subsystems is somehow a *contradiction in adjecto*. An autopoietic system has, by definition, no other 'purposes' besides autopoiesis itself, regeneration itself. Autopoiesis, as Luhmann (1993a:553) says, is in no way an existence warrant or progress concept: it belongs to the same group as the chaos and catastrophe theories. Binding it to other purposes makes it, by definition, an allopoietic system, that is, a system directed from outside. As a corollary, if the systems are autopoietic, their development and reciprocal relations are, by nature, more than anything else the results of an historical process characterized by chance and contingency. This reasoning seem to support Andreas Reckwitz's (2003:67) conclusion that in the later phase, when the concept of autopoiesis

Luhmann's functional analysis is not restricted to analysis of dispositional abilities of a unit together with classification of social phenomena accordingly. As Stichweh (2007:534; see also Milligan, 2010:264) points out, Luhmann has a keen interest in 'genealogical' aspect of differentiation, interpreted as a genesis of a new system via a new a new system/environment –distinction. Luhmann was not altogether free of the need to find some kind of an aprioristic foundation for the evolutionary process of change. However, both of these 'ventures', the attempt to give an account of generalized symbolic media via the concept of double contingency and the problematic of causal attribution related to it (1997:332-38), as well the attempt to anchor them to different ways of taking into account the corporeality of human existence via the concept of symbiotic symbols (1997:378-82), have remained more or less sketches. Luhmann (1984:406-9) in some connections also hints at using differentiation theory with the idea of functional orientation as a key to interpret evolution, as Wortmann (2007:99-100) claims in his earlier mentioned criticism. However, already Luhmann's most important concept related to differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung), contradicts this kind of straightforward configuration of differentiation and evolution

In Luhmann's theory, the modern form of differentiation loses the necessity it has, for example, in Parsons' theory in the sense of 'adaptive upgrading', as being the most effective way of reducing complexity related to the environment and thus having apparent life supporting effects for the existence of society. The modern form of differentiation, or 'open access society' as it has recently been called (North, et al., 2009), characterized by institutional separation and individual freedom, undeniably has some 'evolutionary advantages' over other more closed forms of society. This stems from its flexibility and resulting ability to react rather rapidly to different changes occurring in society and its environment. Nevertheless, this is only a partial truth because, as Luhmann (1986) has argued, modern society seems in fact to be jeopardizing its 'material' conditions of existence because of environmental problems, to which it is unable to respond precisely just because of its form of differentiation. In addition, attributing some kind of necessity to the modern form of differentiation would be at grave odds with the theory like Luhmann's (1992:93-

This raises the question, which Hartmann Tyrell (1998:144) also points at, namely, is it any more possible to speak about functional differentiation in connection with Luhmann's theory with its reformulated functional analysis? Johannes Berger (2003:221) answers this question negatively by claiming that the concept of functional differentiation is strictly speaking, incompatible with Luhmann's autopoietic, 'emergence paradigmatic' theory of constitution of social systems via communication. Berger has made his case, because defining the subsystems as at the same time autopoietic, self-referential and self-producing systems and as functional subsystems is somehow a *contradiction in adjecto*. An autopoietic system has, by definition, no other 'purposes' besides autopoiesis itself, regeneration itself. Autopoiesis, as Luhmann (1993a:553) says, is in no way an existence warrant or progress concept: it belongs to the same group as the chaos and catastrophe theories. Binding it to other purposes makes it, by definition, an allopoietic system, that is, a system directed from outside. As a corollary, if the systems are autopoietic, their development and reciprocal relations are, by nature, more than anything else the results of an historical process characterized by chance and contingency. This reasoning seem to support Andreas Reckwitz's (2003:67) conclusion that in the later phase, when the concept of autopoiesis

129), which defines contingency to be the 'Eigenvalue' of modern society.

theories.

comes to play an important role in Luhmann's analysis, the subsystems of society in a strict sense lose their status as *functional* subsystems.

There is still one possibility to argue on behalf of the functionality of the subsystems, which is weaker but in a sense tangential to justification based on functional prerequisites of the existence of society. Even if function analysis is above all a scheme of observation and not the principle guiding the formation of different subsystems, the latter is not a totally excluded possibility. One special feature of systems composed of communication episodes is that they are, especially since the development of writing, able to take themselves as targets of a kind of 'second order observation' and form descriptions of themselves from the point of view of their respective 'leading difference' (true/not true, legal/illegal and so on) constituting their specific point of reference ( that is, function) to the social system as a whole (Luhmann, 1982; 1984:404-11, 593-616; 1990:479; 1997:757). This process, in which the distinction of system and environment is put to productive use inside the systems, also allows a new form of rationality, systems rationality, as a surrogate for the unified rationality coming into being, for instance, through the Habermasian discourses and public deliberation. Maybe this concept of rationality, by which rationality is decomposed to different subsystemic rationalities and defined by the degree they are able to take into account their effects on their social and natural environments, and rebound thereof (Luhmann, 1984:617-46; see also Kneer, 1992) in their own descriptions and workings, offers a way to justify the talk about functional subsystems. One could say that subsystems, no matter how they have come into being in first the place, are functional insofar as they are oriented at least to some degree in accordance with rationality defined in this way.

The concept of self-description is not without its problems (Kieselring, 2000; Bonacker, 2003:266-75), for instance, belong theories related to different functional spheres such as economic theories or legal theories to the respective functional subsystem or to the subsystem of science. If the former is the case, that seems to blur the distinction between the subsystems; if the latter is the case, the question seems to be one of external descriptions (Fremdbeschreibung) rather than of self-descriptions. It seems unquestionable that descriptions have effects, and often quite unexpected ones on the functioning of systems. The financial crisis, the aftermaths of which we now are living, has shown this. It was partly caused by new financial instruments developed in the chambers of economics departments at different universities. However, to have an effect on these theories by widening their horizons from narrow 'substantial' topics specific to their fields to take into account the wider context (society) is, as the reception of Luhmann's own theory in the different branches of social sciences and humanities has shown, extremely difficult (see, for example, de Berg and Schmidt, 2000). In addition, we should not forget, to use Loet Leydesdorff's (2009) vocabulary, that social systems are socially distributed systems, in which operations linking communication happen at the same time in countless interactive and organizational contexts and with very different premises and anticipations of the future. This feature makes the subsystems rather insensitive to any kind of guidance, however self-reflective that may be. As Armin Nassehi (2007:170) points out, functional subsystems are constituted by operations but do not have the capability to do operations. As modern society itself (Luhmann, 1992:126), the subsystems are without a 'centre or top' thus mirroring society in their own structures.

Contingency Theoretical Functionalism and the Problem of Functional Differentiation 71

become more or less disputable in modern society (Luhmann, 1997:43). Secondly, it would reduce the historical interest on the formation of subsystems to a kind of reconstruction of a gradual historical realization of the normative ideal à la Immanuel Kant's (1993 [1784]) 'Idee

There is still one possibility left to argue for the functionality of subsystems in a weaker sense also in this context of the 'German' type of differentiation theory. This is related to the fact that subsystems are the 'thickenings' of communication, effective ways of reducing contingency with the society-wide relevance discussed earlier; in this respect, they have become necessary, since they are very hard to replace effectually and extensively with other mechanisms reducing contingency (Nassehi, 2004:102). They are further cemented in society because subsystems are highly dependent on each other and connected to each other by different mechanisms of operational and structural couplings. The subsystem of economy, for example, is dependent on the predictability of its social environment, the subsystem of law creates with its legal decisions, and vice versa, legal organizations are unable to work without the resources coming from the economic subsystem. Necessity, which in this connection justifies the talk about functionality, is not the necessity of earlier functional theories, which relates to the functional exigencies of the existence and development of society, but necessity in a much weaker sense. It is related to the fact that certain 'problem solutions' with society-wide significance also have far reaching effects on problem formations in other contexts of communication, including leaving their imprints on the set of possible solutions to the problems (Luhmann, 1970a:20-21). Necessity in this relative sense is a consequence (of differentiation) rather than a cause and relates to the 'dearbitration' (to use Peter Fuchs' (2003:206) expression) of the problem construction and

Luhmann's theory is not a predication of the 'end of history' (Stark, 2003:234, 244), according to which the development of society has reached its final form or destination, a state of solicitation after which there can only be quantitative changes, not the coming into being of new subsystems, not to speak of the radical changes in the differentiation principle itself. The theory does not exclude these possibilities; quite the contrary. Luhmann (1984:162-63) draws a parallel between his form of functional analysis and Edmunds Husserl's phenomenological reduction by claiming that the driving force behind the analysis is pure analytical interest, as it was for Husserl, which demands that all other possible interests or fixed points of approach are bracketed off to whatsoever they may relate to: justification, criticism, improvement and so on. Reference to Husserl in this connection is not incidental, so significant has Husserl's influence been to Luhmann's system theory and sociology overall (Srubar, 1989; Knudsen, 2006; Nassehi, 2007). Luhmann (1993b: 258-59) sums up the guiding principle of his sociology, the programme of 'sociological enlightenment', in his farewell lecture in Bielefeld by pointing out that the purpose of sociology is not to steer society, but to inform it by opening up new ways of

seeing things through showing the contingent nature of existing arrangements.

However, as sociological questions it is also interested in the persistence of different ways of conditioning contingency. In addition, it asks us to pay attention to the effects, negative as well as positive depending on the point of view, which changes in the differentiation of society are likely to bring about – be they in the form of development of new kinds of subsystems, changes in configurations of how the subsystems relate to each other, or

zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht'.

solution.

The problems related to this conception do not end here. The vocabulary of functionality in this sense awakens the perennial problem of defining the reference unit in respect to which something may be said to be functional. To this problem Luhmann's answers are no more valid than those given when Hempel launched his criticism of functionalism (Schwinn, 2001:58-91). This problematic has even been exacerbated in modern global conditions, where the nation-state society, the reference point of Luhmann's analysis notwithstanding the contrary assertions (Stichweh, 2007:528-30), has lost its standing, and the western form of modernity has given way to multiple modernities, each defining and configuring the subsystems in their own special way. The horizon of society dissolves into multiple horizons (Nassehi, 2006:425-437), as does the rationality built on (theoretical) subsystemic self– reflection, leaving no common denominator.

The two above-discussed possibilities, the first coming close to the idea of functional prerequisites but ruled out by the basic premises of the theory that builds on the concept of contingency; the second taking the concept of reflection as its pillar but being at least unconvincing in its substantiation, seem to fail. What then would be the reference point (problem) that allows to us to speak of functionality, or as Luhmann (1997:163) in one connection says, of 'the advantages of the full actualization of functional differentiation', in regard to the modern (western) form of differentiation of society? One possibility is to argue that its functionality relates to some normative ideal, which the modern form of differentiation of society helps to bring to fruition. This interpretation is not so far- fetched, as it at first sight might appear, not in terms of the tradition of functionalistic differentiation thought nor even in the case of Luhmann's theory, as strange as this claim might sound nowadays. Several theorists, as Hans Joas (2008:207) states, have seen in differentiation theory a way to resist totalitarian aspirations, and it has been used to explain the coming into being of totalitarian regimes by way of a retarded or inhibited differentiation process. Alternatively, differentiation that happens too quickly has also been seen as having the same effect. Talcott Parsons (1966 [1942]-a, 1966 [1942]-b) accounts for appearance of Nazi-regime, according to which the rapid changes in factors such as the economy, technology, administration and culture caused an upheaval to which the integrative subsystem of society was unable to react at the same tempo. It left the society in a state of anomie, to use Durkheim's expression, susceptible 'to free floating aggression' and a coup de état by the Nazis, and lead to dedifferentiation of society by putting politics at the head. This kind of theorizing is not at all unfamiliar to Luhmann, rather the other way round. His first book accentuating differentiation theory *Grundrechte als Institution* concerning the function of basic and human rights as institutions, analyzed these rights as kind of repairing and blocking mechanism. Their function is to prevent to political systems' inherent tendency to extend their grip into every corner of society, thus heading to the dedifferentiation that happened e.g. in Nazi-totalitarianism (Luhmann, 1965:135; see also Verschraegen, 2002; Tyrell, 2006:298-99; Mascareño and Chernilo, 2009:86; Thornhill, 2009).

This kind of contrafactual use of functional analysis aiming at explicating the conditions of possibility of the coming into being or flourishing of social phenomena such as democracy, is a valid and interesting type of analysis on its own (see e.g. Giddens, 1977). However, in regard to Luhmann's analysis and how he profiles it in later phases, it is troublesome in two respects. Firstly, it is contrary to his expressed intention to offer a detached analysis of society without binding it to any specific value assertion, ideals or norms, all of which have

The problems related to this conception do not end here. The vocabulary of functionality in this sense awakens the perennial problem of defining the reference unit in respect to which something may be said to be functional. To this problem Luhmann's answers are no more valid than those given when Hempel launched his criticism of functionalism (Schwinn, 2001:58-91). This problematic has even been exacerbated in modern global conditions, where the nation-state society, the reference point of Luhmann's analysis notwithstanding the contrary assertions (Stichweh, 2007:528-30), has lost its standing, and the western form of modernity has given way to multiple modernities, each defining and configuring the subsystems in their own special way. The horizon of society dissolves into multiple horizons (Nassehi, 2006:425-437), as does the rationality built on (theoretical) subsystemic self–

The two above-discussed possibilities, the first coming close to the idea of functional prerequisites but ruled out by the basic premises of the theory that builds on the concept of contingency; the second taking the concept of reflection as its pillar but being at least unconvincing in its substantiation, seem to fail. What then would be the reference point (problem) that allows to us to speak of functionality, or as Luhmann (1997:163) in one connection says, of 'the advantages of the full actualization of functional differentiation', in regard to the modern (western) form of differentiation of society? One possibility is to argue that its functionality relates to some normative ideal, which the modern form of differentiation of society helps to bring to fruition. This interpretation is not so far- fetched, as it at first sight might appear, not in terms of the tradition of functionalistic differentiation thought nor even in the case of Luhmann's theory, as strange as this claim might sound nowadays. Several theorists, as Hans Joas (2008:207) states, have seen in differentiation theory a way to resist totalitarian aspirations, and it has been used to explain the coming into being of totalitarian regimes by way of a retarded or inhibited differentiation process. Alternatively, differentiation that happens too quickly has also been seen as having the same effect. Talcott Parsons (1966 [1942]-a, 1966 [1942]-b) accounts for appearance of Nazi-regime, according to which the rapid changes in factors such as the economy, technology, administration and culture caused an upheaval to which the integrative subsystem of society was unable to react at the same tempo. It left the society in a state of anomie, to use Durkheim's expression, susceptible 'to free floating aggression' and a coup de état by the Nazis, and lead to dedifferentiation of society by putting politics at the head. This kind of theorizing is not at all unfamiliar to Luhmann, rather the other way round. His first book accentuating differentiation theory *Grundrechte als Institution* concerning the function of basic and human rights as institutions, analyzed these rights as kind of repairing and blocking mechanism. Their function is to prevent to political systems' inherent tendency to extend their grip into every corner of society, thus heading to the dedifferentiation that happened e.g. in Nazi-totalitarianism (Luhmann, 1965:135; see also Verschraegen, 2002;

Tyrell, 2006:298-99; Mascareño and Chernilo, 2009:86; Thornhill, 2009).

This kind of contrafactual use of functional analysis aiming at explicating the conditions of possibility of the coming into being or flourishing of social phenomena such as democracy, is a valid and interesting type of analysis on its own (see e.g. Giddens, 1977). However, in regard to Luhmann's analysis and how he profiles it in later phases, it is troublesome in two respects. Firstly, it is contrary to his expressed intention to offer a detached analysis of society without binding it to any specific value assertion, ideals or norms, all of which have

reflection, leaving no common denominator.

become more or less disputable in modern society (Luhmann, 1997:43). Secondly, it would reduce the historical interest on the formation of subsystems to a kind of reconstruction of a gradual historical realization of the normative ideal à la Immanuel Kant's (1993 [1784]) 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht'.

There is still one possibility left to argue for the functionality of subsystems in a weaker sense also in this context of the 'German' type of differentiation theory. This is related to the fact that subsystems are the 'thickenings' of communication, effective ways of reducing contingency with the society-wide relevance discussed earlier; in this respect, they have become necessary, since they are very hard to replace effectually and extensively with other mechanisms reducing contingency (Nassehi, 2004:102). They are further cemented in society because subsystems are highly dependent on each other and connected to each other by different mechanisms of operational and structural couplings. The subsystem of economy, for example, is dependent on the predictability of its social environment, the subsystem of law creates with its legal decisions, and vice versa, legal organizations are unable to work without the resources coming from the economic subsystem. Necessity, which in this connection justifies the talk about functionality, is not the necessity of earlier functional theories, which relates to the functional exigencies of the existence and development of society, but necessity in a much weaker sense. It is related to the fact that certain 'problem solutions' with society-wide significance also have far reaching effects on problem formations in other contexts of communication, including leaving their imprints on the set of possible solutions to the problems (Luhmann, 1970a:20-21). Necessity in this relative sense is a consequence (of differentiation) rather than a cause and relates to the 'dearbitration' (to use Peter Fuchs' (2003:206) expression) of the problem construction and solution.

Luhmann's theory is not a predication of the 'end of history' (Stark, 2003:234, 244), according to which the development of society has reached its final form or destination, a state of solicitation after which there can only be quantitative changes, not the coming into being of new subsystems, not to speak of the radical changes in the differentiation principle itself. The theory does not exclude these possibilities; quite the contrary. Luhmann (1984:162-63) draws a parallel between his form of functional analysis and Edmunds Husserl's phenomenological reduction by claiming that the driving force behind the analysis is pure analytical interest, as it was for Husserl, which demands that all other possible interests or fixed points of approach are bracketed off to whatsoever they may relate to: justification, criticism, improvement and so on. Reference to Husserl in this connection is not incidental, so significant has Husserl's influence been to Luhmann's system theory and sociology overall (Srubar, 1989; Knudsen, 2006; Nassehi, 2007). Luhmann (1993b: 258-59) sums up the guiding principle of his sociology, the programme of 'sociological enlightenment', in his farewell lecture in Bielefeld by pointing out that the purpose of sociology is not to steer society, but to inform it by opening up new ways of seeing things through showing the contingent nature of existing arrangements.

However, as sociological questions it is also interested in the persistence of different ways of conditioning contingency. In addition, it asks us to pay attention to the effects, negative as well as positive depending on the point of view, which changes in the differentiation of society are likely to bring about – be they in the form of development of new kinds of subsystems, changes in configurations of how the subsystems relate to each other, or

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