**2. Dialogue of the deaf?**

In the early history of sociology many founders of the field sought out the key subject of its research. However, for subsequent generations of sociologists such questioning has gradually lost its importance and urgency. But the matter did not disappear definitively; on the contrary, in some contemporary debates it has returned to the professional scene. Evidence of this is the controversy concerning the relationship between sociology and history.

In the book *Central Problems in Social Theory* the author Anthony Giddens [1979: 230] argued that there are no logical nor methodological reasons for distinguishing between the social sciences and history. This claim was shortly thereafter bolstered by the influential representative of the British historical sociology, Philip Abrams [1982: 2], who formulated the argument that the history and sociology are and always have been one and the same thing. Giddens himself then again tried to argue this position in perhaps his most important theoretical work, *The Constitution of Society* (1984 [1988]), in which he states that there is

History and Sociology: What is Historical Sociology? 405

not entirely dependent on "relics" but can produce data itself and thereby generate its evidence. Field research produces materials that previously did not exist. Therefore sociology with respect to history is in a substantially better position, but loses the delicacy and care in dealing with sources which characterises the work of historians. According to Goldthorpe this is markedly evident only in works which are developed in the field of historical sociology; the author [ibid.: 222-223] has in mind especially two key exponents of

Goldhorpe finds a serious methodological problem in works that attempt to generalize the sociological perspective on historical processes. He points out that for historical sociologists analysis of secondary sources becomes the source of their findings rather than exploration of original sources ("relics"); historical sociologists draw their information from the literature written by historians. This leads to situations where, alongside data taken from historians, sociologists unreflectively adopt their interpretation. Goldthorpe does not consider sociologists' handling of sources – acquired by historians with great effort and even more cautiously interpreted - as sufficiently reliable and scientific. The author points to the great reliance of sociologists on extensive yet necessarily selective reference to historical literature to support sociological concepts and theories. He believes that sociologists should deal with the past only where necessary with regard to the nature of the investigated fact, and that in this case they would then have to work with the original sources as historians. Goldthorp concludes by labelling history and sociology as two *significantly different intellectual enterprises* [ibid.: 225]. The author does not believe that sociologists can create a great theory of a "transhistorical" type. Any suggestion that sociology and history may be considered ''one'' the author considers as wrong and dangerously misleading and he recommends that

Goldthorp's essay provoked a number of polemical reactions, some of which were given space in the British Journal of Sociology in 1994. Michael Mann [1994: 37] disagreed with Goldthorp's thesis that sociology should deal only with contemporary societies; to Mann sociology is the science of societies overall, regardless of the duration of their existence. Joseph M. Bryant [1994: 13-14] rejects the conception that historical sociology should be considered as a kind of secondary structure lacking sufficient empirical basis. He points out that the work of historians and sociologists has two components; the first is "reportage" *(reporting*), the second ''interpretation''. Reportage refers to the data and information that is available; interpretation tries to find meaning and significance in these data. Relevance and value relate not to the data only, but to the internal consistency and cogency of their interpretation. Nicos Mouzelis [1994: 35] adds that all historians who have created great synthetic works have worked basically with the same secondary material used by historical

A few years later, Gertraude Mikl-Horke [1999a] took up the debate. The Austrian considers Goldthorpe's requirement that sociology abandon engaging in history to be overwrought. She says that he overlooks the fact that every social reality has an historical nature and all sociological data will finally become part of history. Mikl-Horke [ibid.: 11] mentions that in empirical research historical and social science methods are closer and Goldthorpe does not take this into account; methods of hermeneutics and criticism of sources, mathematical analysis and statistical methods are just as much methods of sociology as history. The author, with reference to J. G. Droysen, notes that historical research is based

this discipline, Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol.

sociologists refrain from engaging in exploration in the field of history.

sociologists, and are thus exposed to the same methodological problems.

nothing that would prove the difference between the historical and social sciences sufficiently and rationally. Historical research is social science research, and vice versa [Giddens 1988: 416]. If there is a boundary then it is established simply by division of labour on a common subject, rather than any logical or methodological schism.

Whether Giddens claim is accepted or not, the fact remains that sociologists and historians do not speak the same language. Peter Burke [1989: 10] in this connection recalls the statement of Fernand Braudel about a "dialogue of the deaf". In Burke's view [ibid.: 11], the problem requires seeing not only two different professions, but structures with different languages, values and styles of thinking, shaped by differences in education and training: for sociologists, numbers, for historians, words; sociologists recognising rules and ignoring variations, historians stressing the individual and specific.

Peter Burke [1989: 9-10] believes that both disciplines are threatened by a dangerous narrowing of perspective. Historians specializing in a particular problem tend to perceive it as something unique, preventing them from seeing it as a combination of elements with parallels in other places. Sociologists contrariwise have a tendency to generalize everything through the eyes of contemporary experience and to ignore the perspective of long-term historical processes and social changes. The relationship between the two professions is also marked by a number of myths and stereotypes: sociologists have been perceived by historians as people whose abstract jargon lacks sensitivity to particular places and times while historians have had the image of quixotic collectors unable to analyse their knowledge with sophistication and precision.

While many social scientists today believe that the boundaries separating sociology and history should be overcome, there are those who very strongly kick against it. One of them is John H. Goldthorpe, who in 1991 published an essay on this subject which provoked a very strong reaction. It is pertinent to note that Goldthorpe had studied history in the 1950s at University College London. He compares the research approaches of both sociology and history and claims that they differ not only in orientation, either towards the past or to the present, but because historians emphasize their findings as time-space localised whereas sociologists believe their understanding transcends space-time coordinates. Goldthorpe levels his ire in particular at colleagues who airily entered into writing what he scornfully calls "grand historical sociology" – sociological conceptions of history.

Goldthorpe [1991: 212] begins by recalling the time when, as a student of history, he adopted a methodological standard - something like a "catechism" of methods, starting with the question: *What is an historical fact (?),* and continued with the answer: *An historical fact is an inference from the relics* (historical fact is what is inferred from what remains - "relics"). The author reasserts the thesis that the past can be identified only by the form in which it physically survived. Such remains may vary, being natural objects (bones), artefacts (tools, weapons, buildings, works of art) or- as is usual- written documents ("objectivised communication").

On the issue of "relics" Goldthorpe notes that their number (if concerning a specific time) is finite and incomplete (their number may decrease due to destruction, but it cannot grow). What historians press for, is to discover new, undiscovered remains and add them to those that are already known, to serve as a reservoir of evidence for the formulation of statements. In comparison, sociology has, the author claims, one substantial privilege, namely that it is

nothing that would prove the difference between the historical and social sciences sufficiently and rationally. Historical research is social science research, and vice versa [Giddens 1988: 416]. If there is a boundary then it is established simply by division of labour

Whether Giddens claim is accepted or not, the fact remains that sociologists and historians do not speak the same language. Peter Burke [1989: 10] in this connection recalls the statement of Fernand Braudel about a "dialogue of the deaf". In Burke's view [ibid.: 11], the problem requires seeing not only two different professions, but structures with different languages, values and styles of thinking, shaped by differences in education and training: for sociologists, numbers, for historians, words; sociologists recognising rules and ignoring

Peter Burke [1989: 9-10] believes that both disciplines are threatened by a dangerous narrowing of perspective. Historians specializing in a particular problem tend to perceive it as something unique, preventing them from seeing it as a combination of elements with parallels in other places. Sociologists contrariwise have a tendency to generalize everything through the eyes of contemporary experience and to ignore the perspective of long-term historical processes and social changes. The relationship between the two professions is also marked by a number of myths and stereotypes: sociologists have been perceived by historians as people whose abstract jargon lacks sensitivity to particular places and times while historians have had the image of quixotic collectors unable to analyse their knowledge

While many social scientists today believe that the boundaries separating sociology and history should be overcome, there are those who very strongly kick against it. One of them is John H. Goldthorpe, who in 1991 published an essay on this subject which provoked a very strong reaction. It is pertinent to note that Goldthorpe had studied history in the 1950s at University College London. He compares the research approaches of both sociology and history and claims that they differ not only in orientation, either towards the past or to the present, but because historians emphasize their findings as time-space localised whereas sociologists believe their understanding transcends space-time coordinates. Goldthorpe levels his ire in particular at colleagues who airily entered into writing what he scornfully

Goldthorpe [1991: 212] begins by recalling the time when, as a student of history, he adopted a methodological standard - something like a "catechism" of methods, starting with the question: *What is an historical fact (?),* and continued with the answer: *An historical fact is an inference from the relics* (historical fact is what is inferred from what remains - "relics"). The author reasserts the thesis that the past can be identified only by the form in which it physically survived. Such remains may vary, being natural objects (bones), artefacts (tools, weapons, buildings, works of art) or- as is usual- written documents ("objectivised

On the issue of "relics" Goldthorpe notes that their number (if concerning a specific time) is finite and incomplete (their number may decrease due to destruction, but it cannot grow). What historians press for, is to discover new, undiscovered remains and add them to those that are already known, to serve as a reservoir of evidence for the formulation of statements. In comparison, sociology has, the author claims, one substantial privilege, namely that it is

calls "grand historical sociology" – sociological conceptions of history.

on a common subject, rather than any logical or methodological schism.

variations, historians stressing the individual and specific.

with sophistication and precision.

communication").

not entirely dependent on "relics" but can produce data itself and thereby generate its evidence. Field research produces materials that previously did not exist. Therefore sociology with respect to history is in a substantially better position, but loses the delicacy and care in dealing with sources which characterises the work of historians. According to Goldthorpe this is markedly evident only in works which are developed in the field of historical sociology; the author [ibid.: 222-223] has in mind especially two key exponents of this discipline, Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol.

Goldhorpe finds a serious methodological problem in works that attempt to generalize the sociological perspective on historical processes. He points out that for historical sociologists analysis of secondary sources becomes the source of their findings rather than exploration of original sources ("relics"); historical sociologists draw their information from the literature written by historians. This leads to situations where, alongside data taken from historians, sociologists unreflectively adopt their interpretation. Goldthorpe does not consider sociologists' handling of sources – acquired by historians with great effort and even more cautiously interpreted - as sufficiently reliable and scientific. The author points to the great reliance of sociologists on extensive yet necessarily selective reference to historical literature to support sociological concepts and theories. He believes that sociologists should deal with the past only where necessary with regard to the nature of the investigated fact, and that in this case they would then have to work with the original sources as historians. Goldthorp concludes by labelling history and sociology as two *significantly different intellectual enterprises* [ibid.: 225]. The author does not believe that sociologists can create a great theory of a "transhistorical" type. Any suggestion that sociology and history may be considered ''one'' the author considers as wrong and dangerously misleading and he recommends that sociologists refrain from engaging in exploration in the field of history.

Goldthorp's essay provoked a number of polemical reactions, some of which were given space in the British Journal of Sociology in 1994. Michael Mann [1994: 37] disagreed with Goldthorp's thesis that sociology should deal only with contemporary societies; to Mann sociology is the science of societies overall, regardless of the duration of their existence. Joseph M. Bryant [1994: 13-14] rejects the conception that historical sociology should be considered as a kind of secondary structure lacking sufficient empirical basis. He points out that the work of historians and sociologists has two components; the first is "reportage" *(reporting*), the second ''interpretation''. Reportage refers to the data and information that is available; interpretation tries to find meaning and significance in these data. Relevance and value relate not to the data only, but to the internal consistency and cogency of their interpretation. Nicos Mouzelis [1994: 35] adds that all historians who have created great synthetic works have worked basically with the same secondary material used by historical sociologists, and are thus exposed to the same methodological problems.

A few years later, Gertraude Mikl-Horke [1999a] took up the debate. The Austrian considers Goldthorpe's requirement that sociology abandon engaging in history to be overwrought. She says that he overlooks the fact that every social reality has an historical nature and all sociological data will finally become part of history. Mikl-Horke [ibid.: 11] mentions that in empirical research historical and social science methods are closer and Goldthorpe does not take this into account; methods of hermeneutics and criticism of sources, mathematical analysis and statistical methods are just as much methods of sociology as history. The author, with reference to J. G. Droysen, notes that historical research is based

History and Sociology: What is Historical Sociology? 407

Support for this can be found especially in the work of Peter Burke [1989: 12-34], who delves back to the 18th century to recall the time in which social theorists such as Charles-Louis Montesquieu (1689-1755), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) and John Millar (1753-1801) made important contributions both to the field of history and the history of pre-sociological thinking. At that time it was not problematic for political history, social history and presociological thinking to coexist and intertwine, as is illustrated by the works of British historian Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) and French historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874).

However, there have been distinct divisions since the mid-19th century when the approach advocated by the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) began to dominate. In his view historical science should be based on the systematic and critical research of sources whose aim was to show the past as it "actually was" (*zu zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen*) [Wiersing 2007: 369]. Ranke's historiography is consequently oriented towards political history, which could be studied on the basis of official documents. This tendency was additionally supported by the professionalization of history, as the first scientific institutes and periodicals arose. Meanwhile governments financially supported the writing of history that could serve as a tool of propaganda and state education of citizens. In this situation the works of social and cultural historians began to be viewed as disorganized, insufficiently

Amongst others, this was the fate of Jacob Christoph Burckhardt (1818-1897), whose work *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860) did not meet with success at the time of its creation and has been recognized only subsequently as a large and significant work. A certain exception occurred in France with the historian (and teacher of Émile Durkheim) Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889), whose book about the ancient village *La Cité antique* (1864) won respect even though it combined historical and sociological perspectives. By contrast in Germany the historian Karl Lamprecht ran into harsh criticism and misunderstanding (1856-1915), when, against the prevailing individualism and the belief that great men make history (Heinrich von Treitschke), he attempted to construct a social,

Since the 19th century, many historians have recoiled from sociology because it seems too abstract, simplifying and unable to catch the uniqueness of particular events. On the theoretical and methodological level this problem was taken up by German philosophers Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and others [Käsler 1978: 142- 162]. Dilthey emphasised the difference between the natural sciences, which strive to explain (*erklären*) "from outside" and humanistic sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), whose

Windelband described natural sciences as "nomothetic", aimed at the discovery of general laws, and the humanities as "idiographic", tasked with describing single, unique events. Many sociologists have used this boundary between idiographic and nomothetic sciences to explain the difference between history, whose thinking is oriented particularly and descriptively, and sociology, whose task is to obtain generalizations. For history, sociology thus becomes a pseudoscience using methods suitable for enquiry into nature rather than

At the end of the 19th century this sifting of ideas was spurred on by the controversies in economics known as *Methodenstreit* (a dispute over methods) between the Austrian School

scientific and incompatible with new professional standards.

economic and cultural history [Wiersing 2007: 474 - 477].

objective is "internal" understanding (*verstehen*).

human history.

not only on "relics", i.e. existing available traces, artefacts and documents, but also on "traditions". Goldthorpe thus ignores cultural history such as the history of mentalities, ways of thinking, everydayness and collective memory. Part of the past is part of the present and touches the current - either in its orientation, or (in institutions and structures) as a conditioning framework. Inspired by previous discussions Mikl-Horke [ibid.: 22] attempted to define certain conditions which historical sociology should respect in its observations. These include: understanding theory as means and not ends; respectful but not uncritical treatment of historical scientific findings; if possible, working with sources; interpretive caution regarding general, structural factors; and understanding the present as something that is historically based.

Even in the early 1980s Philip Abrams [1982: 300] optimistically claimed that during the previous two decades works had been published of such theoretical self-confidence that the idea that sociology had to be theoretical and history descriptive was clearly an anachronism; the deeper the theoretical dimension of historical science became, the more obvious it was that the assumption of professional historians, excluding theory from their field, was unjustifiable. However, although in recent years some rapprochement has occurred between history and sociology, mainly thanks to historical sociology, it is not possible to overlook the fact that communication and cooperation between the two disciplines is still very complicated and not deepening much. Sociologists have their own views about history, and historians make their way with some basic sociological concepts. The significance of Goldthorp's paper [1991] lies in the discussion that it provoked, bringing the relationship between the two disciplines to the fore. While not denying that the approach to history found among historical sociologists differs in many respects from that of historians, it may not be inferred that sociology should be a theoretical discipline while the task of history is to focus on the gathering of facts and their description.

Though Goldthorp's effort to enforce a sharp dividing line between history and sociology is very problematic, his critique of historical sociology was justified to some extent. Among other things, the lesson can be drawn that sociology cannot address history only with its own perspectives and ignore in so doing the methodological procedures and conventions characteristic of the historical science. It would be a mistake for historical sociologists to be uninterested in methodological discussions on the interpretation of historical sources, using historical literature only as a "stone-quarry" for raw materials from which to create farreaching constructions. Besides, it must be remembered that even today historical sociology is exposed to the "temptation" to create concepts that could be dangerously close to what Karl R. Popper [2000] once disparagingly described as historicism (the assumption that historical development has a given, binding character due to the nature of discernible universal laws of history by which the future may be anticipated). It is obvious that approaching history requires theory; therefore the question is not "theory - yes or no", but the adequacy of such theories.
