**2. The early critique of functionalism**

The indisputable connection with the spirit of the times however did not do much to smooth functionalism's way; it has been an object of harsh criticism from the beginning on. It could be claimed with good reason that the main points of criticism, which have been repeated in critiques ever since, were already formulated in 'anti-sociological' writings (Merz-Benz and

although it seems to have disappeared along with ongoing industrialism with its incessant social tumults and the thriving utilitarian individualism caused by it. Secondly, by doing so, the task was to encourage confidence in the possibilities of humans to bring about order and

The above-mentioned model of social differentiation based on the analogy with a biological organism is in sociology called the 'decomposition paradigm' of social differentiation on the grounds that social change in this model is conceptualized as similar to the development of an organism from an undifferentiated embryo to the fully matured form composed of functionally differentiated parts, each specialized in different tasks necessary for the survival of the organism. The concept of function in this model has a two-fold meaning: structural and dynamical. From the structural point of view, the concept of function directs attention to the different parts and their relationships and to their respective tasks in the whole. From the dynamical point of view, the concept of function allows one to see the processes of change as the unfolding of functional differentiation, as the development of an entity from unspecific and undifferentiated, different functions merging 'homogeneity' to fully developed, in specialized tasks differentiated 'heterogeneity', to use Herbert Spencer's vocabulary (Maynz, 1988:14; Stichweh, 1994; Tyrell, 1998:129-34; Stichweh, 2007:534). Hartmann Tyrell (1998:125) has quite justifiably claimed that the differentiation problematic in sociology has been so tightly interwoven with the organism –optics that even the significance of this bond is mostly left unnoticed in sociology. This claim is also tenable for the method of functionalism, the functional analysis. It is still understood predominantly and rather straightforwardly through the organism metaphor, as will be shown below.

Although the 'biologically' inspired theorizing of the founding fathers nowadays seems very outdated, then it was a very modern strand of thought, because the former substance – centered thought was substituted by thinking in relational terms. The reference of the concepts was no longer in the preconceptually existing 'ontic' entities; the concepts with their references take on meaning in accordance with the reciprocal relations they are set to. As Ernst Cassirer (1990 [1910]:403), one of the first who thematized the change happening, says in his early book *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*: 'In this way we don't recognize things but we recognize materially (gegenständlich) by during the flow of the same kind of experience contents setting certain kind of limitations and by fixing certain durable elements and reciprocal connections'. In mathematical notation this is expressed by the formula 'y=f(x)', in which both the abandonment of ontological and epistemological 'constants' and the dependency of all values on operations come to the fore. This means that the only constant in functionalism is uncertainty in terms of the observation and its objects, and consequently in terms of knowledge *per se*, as Armin Nassehi (2008a:91) says. Functionalism is so clearly part of the breakthrough of modern science, in which the status of scientific knowledge radically changed as the view of relativity of all knowledge, its dependency on

language and observations and the resulting uncertainty gained a stronger hold.

The indisputable connection with the spirit of the times however did not do much to smooth functionalism's way; it has been an object of harsh criticism from the beginning on. It could be claimed with good reason that the main points of criticism, which have been repeated in critiques ever since, were already formulated in 'anti-sociological' writings (Merz-Benz and

**2. The early critique of functionalism** 

mould their social world according to their wishes and needs.

Wagner, 2001) at the turn of the twentieth century. For Wilhelm Dilthey (1923 [1883]:90, 105- 9) the differentiation theory à la Comte and Spencer, built upon an analogy with the biological organism, or conceptualized through 'bioteleology' as Hartmann Tyrell (1998:131) characterizes it, was nothing but a form progressive philosophy of history. According to its theory of the phases of history, it believed it had found not only the real telos of historical changes, but also the scientific devices to control and assist the development of societies. According to Dilthey (1923 [1883]:104-9) the conceptual apparatus and methods of the late 19th century human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) had already outdated theories based on 'naturalistic metaphysics', as he in one connection characterizes them.

Also Max Weber (1988 [1922]:1-145, 291-383) dissociates himself from all kind of 'collectivistic' and 'organic' speculations, as well from the holism-related thinking of the German historical school and the doctrines of sociology (1985 [1922]:1-11). Society as a concept had for Weber no such comparable theoretical status as it had and still has in the differentiation theories based on the decomposition paradigm, in which society is both the benefiter of the outputs of function systems and the guarantor of the integration of these specialized subsystems (Parsons, 1966; Tyrell, 1994). Nor does Weber allow functionalism as method the same kind of significance it has in the decomposition paradigm –as a way of analyzing or explaining social phenomena on the basis of their supposed tasks or accomplishments. Functional descriptions alone, according to Weber, are insufficient as explanations, although as heuristic or preliminary questions they could at best direct attention to an analysis of social action relevant to the phenomena requiring explanation. As Weber insisted, however, an adequate sociological explanation of social phenomena is possible only on the basis of an 'interpretative' understanding of social action. Consistently with his rejection of functionalism, and of the progressivism the decomposition paradigm implies, Weber mainly refrains from using the concept of differentiation in his writings. On those few occasions he that does, the differentiation thematic is attached to the different life spheres (Lebensordnungen) in their specificity and their peculiar ways of rationalizing and, as Tyrell (1994:394-96; 1998:142-43) points out, not to the society as a whole, which is interpreted as a carrier of the differentiation process.

Both of the above-mentioned critiques, Dilthey's argument about the decomposition paradigmatic differentiation theory as a new form of a teleological philosophy of history; and Weber's insistence on the heuristic nature of functional considerations and the need to replace them in the last instance with explanations based on the action and interactions of individuals, recur again and again in the critiques of functionalism. The presumption of the goal directness of the historical processes of metamorphosis of societies, together with the supposition of the unilinearity of the processes of change in different societies, are the standard targets of criticism of functional theories, and of one of their offspring: modernization theories (see, for example, Elster, 1978:187-225; Berger, 1996). The claims of the insufficiency of the functionalistic argumentations and the need to replace them by explanations based on the action frame of reference are also recurrent themes in the critiques (see, for example, Giddens, 1984:293-97; Schwinn, 2003).

One interesting aspect of Dilthey's and Weber's theorizing, which is of great importance in the following argumentation, needs to be noted here. Due to his 'society abstinence' and reluctance to speak about differentiation, it often passes unnoticed that Weber's theory (together with Georg Simmel's differentiation vision, left out here) nevertheless belongs to

Contingency Theoretical Functionalism and the Problem of Functional Differentiation 59

structural-functional theory, that leaving terminological matters aside, functional analysis is what all sociologists actually do, whether they admit it or not, because it is synonymous with sociological analysis, alternatives to it being reductionist anti-theoretical empiricism and ideological or moralistic thinking in the disguise of sociology. However, the tides were changing, and against the Davis' credo and manifesto, functionalism fell under heavy criticism, the object of which was especially functionalism in the form Talcott Parsons had given it in his structural-functionalistic phase. Functionalism was gradually marginalized up to the point, where Anthony Giddens (1977:96) at the end of 70's could assert that

Giddens's judgment of the death of functionalism was premature. Parsons' functionalistic heritage lives on as can be seen from the numerous writings of neofunctionalistic theorists, who have not only reworked it to answer the criticism, but also extended the analysis from its former reference point of the nation state to an analysis of wider globalization processes (see, for example, Alexander, 1998; Münch, 2001). Functionalism also pops up in places where it could least be expected to be found, namely in the tradition of critical theory à la Jürgen Habermas (1981), where it has a central place in his systems concept, so much so that he tries to present it under the subtitle 'A critique of functionalist reason'. In that part of Habermas's theory, the influence of one of his main contestants, Niklas Luhmann's brand of functionalism is clearly discernible. There are good reasons to argue that Luhmann, and the systems theoretical sociology inaugurated by him, has done the most in recent theoretical discussion to bring functionalism, both as a method analysis and as a substantial theory of

However, an interesting point to note concerning Luhmann's theory is that as a differentiation theory of society, it is connected to a tradition of thinking that is deeply hostile to functionalism, both as a method and theory, as was pointed out in the above discussion concerning the 'German tradition' of differentiation theory. Two questions concerning Luhmann's theory follow from this. Firstly, the abandonment of the decomposition paradigm means that Luhmann is compelled to frame the idea of functional analysis differently, both in terms of its starting points and in terms of its usage; but how does Luhmann do it? Secondly, if functional analysis is disengaged from the decomposition paradigm, is it any longer possible to speak about functional differentiation, or has the terminology plainly become misleading in this context? Luhmann offers his functionalism and concept of functional analysis as a remedy to the problems of functionalism we discuss later, but what is the price to be paid for this reformulation and what are its advantages?

To give a short description of the basic premises of functional analysis is to say that the main interest of functional analysis is on the effects or consequences of the phenomena, quite the contrary to causal observations, where attention is on preceding events and factors as explanations and reasons for the existence of a phenomenon under consideration. To count as a functional relation, inference from effects to the existence of a phenomenon requires that two further conditions be fulfilled. Firstly, the consequences, which are of main interest in functional analysis, should not be based on the conscious intentions to bring them about. That is, they should not be the results of goal-directed actions that specifically aim at bringing into being the phenomenon because of its longed for effects, even if social

functionalism was no longer worthy of being a serious discussion partner.

society, to the fore again.

**4. What is functional analysis and for what?** 

the 'family' of differentiation theories, especially to the form of differentiation theory that was explicitly spelled out by Wilhelm Dilthey. Hartman Tyrell (1998:138-45) is one of the few who has paid attention to this continuum. He has argued that parallel to Dilthey, who understood differentiation not as a differentiation of society but as processes happening in society via the constitution of different cultural systems (including law, art, religion), Weber speaks about the rise of different kinds of incommensurable life orders (Lebensordnungen), each following their own kind of logic and ways of rationalization. Accordingly, as Weber (1988 [1920-1921) spells out in the famous 'Zwischenbetrachtung' in his sociological studies on religion, their reciprocal relationships are not only supportive of each other as is often presumed in the decomposition paradigm, but vary from beneficial via indifferential to openly conflicting.

Therefore, the question of the processes of differentiation is not about the partition of society into different task-specific subsystems, vis-à-vis the division of labour in organizations. It is about the constitution of different cultural systems, each of them having their own peculiar relevance criterion for processing meaning and the logic of development based on it, not reducible to intentions of individuals or their acts of giving meaning. Cultural systems are, as Dilthey (1923 [1883]:45) in one connection says, in regard to individual acts of meaning giving second order concepts. There is remarkable similarity here to the way Niklas Luhmann outlines social systems in his theory. For Luhmann the subsystems of society are second order phenomena; they are based on second order observation, that is, each subsystem of society processes communicative meanings according to its own specific code (true/false, legal/illegal etc.) and rules (theories, laws etc.). The subsystems and their borders are so constituted and maintained in the self-referential process of recursive making and remaking of connections between respective differently specified events, communicative operations; the different systemic networking processes have a sort of 'Eigenlogik' in respect to each other and to individuals' psychic processing of communicative meanings (Luhmann, 1984:148-90; 1997:743-88). Taking into consideration the similarities in the approach to differentiation in these theories, Hartmann Tyrell´s (1998) and Alois Hahn´s (1999) assertions that there is a clear continuum from Dilthey and Weber to Luhmann seems to be well grounded. Tyrell (1998:145) even defines it to be a specific German tradition of differentiation theory with no equivalents elsewhere, and claims (1994:395) that Luhmann's way of characterizing modern society as 'polycontextural', as a 'society without a top or centre', would have come to Dilthey and Weber as no surprise.
