**3. On the later history of functionalistic thinking**

Critique directed at functionalism from the very beginning did not in any case slow down its rise to becoming the reigning paradigm in the social sciences. Although it is not possible to speak about a uniform theory, the period until the mid-20th century, when Talcott Parsons formulated his structural-functionalistic theory based on the concept of the functional necessities of society, which is a certain kind of systematization and codification of the tradition, was a time of functionalism's triumphal march in anthropology (for example Malinowski, Levi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown) as well as in sociology. Illustrative of the tradition's significance is that Kingsley Davis in his presidential address to the American Sociological Association's annual meeting in 1959 states that speaking of functional analysis as a special method of its own is misleading. And Davis claims (1959:757), referring to the

the 'family' of differentiation theories, especially to the form of differentiation theory that was explicitly spelled out by Wilhelm Dilthey. Hartman Tyrell (1998:138-45) is one of the few who has paid attention to this continuum. He has argued that parallel to Dilthey, who understood differentiation not as a differentiation of society but as processes happening in society via the constitution of different cultural systems (including law, art, religion), Weber speaks about the rise of different kinds of incommensurable life orders (Lebensordnungen), each following their own kind of logic and ways of rationalization. Accordingly, as Weber (1988 [1920-1921) spells out in the famous 'Zwischenbetrachtung' in his sociological studies on religion, their reciprocal relationships are not only supportive of each other as is often presumed in the decomposition paradigm, but vary from beneficial via indifferential to

Therefore, the question of the processes of differentiation is not about the partition of society into different task-specific subsystems, vis-à-vis the division of labour in organizations. It is about the constitution of different cultural systems, each of them having their own peculiar relevance criterion for processing meaning and the logic of development based on it, not reducible to intentions of individuals or their acts of giving meaning. Cultural systems are, as Dilthey (1923 [1883]:45) in one connection says, in regard to individual acts of meaning giving second order concepts. There is remarkable similarity here to the way Niklas Luhmann outlines social systems in his theory. For Luhmann the subsystems of society are second order phenomena; they are based on second order observation, that is, each subsystem of society processes communicative meanings according to its own specific code (true/false, legal/illegal etc.) and rules (theories, laws etc.). The subsystems and their borders are so constituted and maintained in the self-referential process of recursive making and remaking of connections between respective differently specified events, communicative operations; the different systemic networking processes have a sort of 'Eigenlogik' in respect to each other and to individuals' psychic processing of communicative meanings (Luhmann, 1984:148-90; 1997:743-88). Taking into consideration the similarities in the approach to differentiation in these theories, Hartmann Tyrell´s (1998) and Alois Hahn´s (1999) assertions that there is a clear continuum from Dilthey and Weber to Luhmann seems to be well grounded. Tyrell (1998:145) even defines it to be a specific German tradition of differentiation theory with no equivalents elsewhere, and claims (1994:395) that Luhmann's way of characterizing modern society as 'polycontextural', as a 'society without a top or centre', would have come to Dilthey and Weber as no surprise.

Critique directed at functionalism from the very beginning did not in any case slow down its rise to becoming the reigning paradigm in the social sciences. Although it is not possible to speak about a uniform theory, the period until the mid-20th century, when Talcott Parsons formulated his structural-functionalistic theory based on the concept of the functional necessities of society, which is a certain kind of systematization and codification of the tradition, was a time of functionalism's triumphal march in anthropology (for example Malinowski, Levi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown) as well as in sociology. Illustrative of the tradition's significance is that Kingsley Davis in his presidential address to the American Sociological Association's annual meeting in 1959 states that speaking of functional analysis as a special method of its own is misleading. And Davis claims (1959:757), referring to the

**3. On the later history of functionalistic thinking** 

openly conflicting.

structural-functional theory, that leaving terminological matters aside, functional analysis is what all sociologists actually do, whether they admit it or not, because it is synonymous with sociological analysis, alternatives to it being reductionist anti-theoretical empiricism and ideological or moralistic thinking in the disguise of sociology. However, the tides were changing, and against the Davis' credo and manifesto, functionalism fell under heavy criticism, the object of which was especially functionalism in the form Talcott Parsons had given it in his structural-functionalistic phase. Functionalism was gradually marginalized up to the point, where Anthony Giddens (1977:96) at the end of 70's could assert that functionalism was no longer worthy of being a serious discussion partner.

Giddens's judgment of the death of functionalism was premature. Parsons' functionalistic heritage lives on as can be seen from the numerous writings of neofunctionalistic theorists, who have not only reworked it to answer the criticism, but also extended the analysis from its former reference point of the nation state to an analysis of wider globalization processes (see, for example, Alexander, 1998; Münch, 2001). Functionalism also pops up in places where it could least be expected to be found, namely in the tradition of critical theory à la Jürgen Habermas (1981), where it has a central place in his systems concept, so much so that he tries to present it under the subtitle 'A critique of functionalist reason'. In that part of Habermas's theory, the influence of one of his main contestants, Niklas Luhmann's brand of functionalism is clearly discernible. There are good reasons to argue that Luhmann, and the systems theoretical sociology inaugurated by him, has done the most in recent theoretical discussion to bring functionalism, both as a method analysis and as a substantial theory of society, to the fore again.

However, an interesting point to note concerning Luhmann's theory is that as a differentiation theory of society, it is connected to a tradition of thinking that is deeply hostile to functionalism, both as a method and theory, as was pointed out in the above discussion concerning the 'German tradition' of differentiation theory. Two questions concerning Luhmann's theory follow from this. Firstly, the abandonment of the decomposition paradigm means that Luhmann is compelled to frame the idea of functional analysis differently, both in terms of its starting points and in terms of its usage; but how does Luhmann do it? Secondly, if functional analysis is disengaged from the decomposition paradigm, is it any longer possible to speak about functional differentiation, or has the terminology plainly become misleading in this context? Luhmann offers his functionalism and concept of functional analysis as a remedy to the problems of functionalism we discuss later, but what is the price to be paid for this reformulation and what are its advantages?
