**3. The institution sociology within the institution knowledge**

Now it should be better to come back to our first question: can sociology help us to live a better life? But in order to answer such a question we should at first solve some preliminary problems.

Pointing out that institutions supply the best ways to realize all kinds of social practices, it's evident that to live a better life depends on which social practices we have to realize: for example, legal or criminal ones. And it depends as well on which relationships we have with such social practices: for example, whether we are gangsters or good citizens. But generally speaking and adopting in this case a relativistic attitude, we can say that they can help us, some way, to live a better life.

But then, is sociology an institution? If so, is it a good or a bad one? And in any case, in which way could sociology help us to live a better life? But at last, what means "to live a better life"? As we could see, the question is manifold and not plain.

We can start from the fact that knowledge is an institution. "Knowledge" corresponds to the Greek term *Sophia,* the friends of which have been named philosophers. In ancient Greece during the classic period (since the VI century b.C.) for the first time someone tried to detect the nature in order to give sense to the world around without referring to religion. Formerly in Greece, so as by all other known civilizations, only religion gave sense to the world, and only the priests were authorized to interpret it. Among the first philosophers, all laymen, some ones were also mathematicians (Thales, Pythagoras), while Chaldean mathematicians were priests. So in Greece mathematics and philosophy were for the first time considered features of a laïc knowledge. Until it circulated within a closed social milieu, this kind of knowledge was considered not so dangerous. But when Socrates began to spread this new critical attitude, he was convicted for corrupting Athenian youth: actually he was showing

Can Sociology Help Us to Live a Better Life ? A Phenomenological Approach to Clinical Sociology 157

face the same problem if we speak about *experiences* instead of facts: because experiences

Why do empirical common sense statements seem to be fit, while logical and more generally scientific ones give no confidence when grounded on a sheer empirical basis? Because of their difference from the point of view of the respective *pragmatic* functions. The later presuppose a mirroring function of mind and, consequently, of the speech: then they imply a metaphysical involvement in the problem of *reality*. Whilst the former can be verified or falsified only by everyday experience: if you ground your behaviour on a false statement,

Could a scientist adopt the same criterion? Of course: since he (she) would agree about taking his (her) statements only as interpretations of the state of things in order to carry on some new step of his (her) project (for example, some new step of the research he (she) is working about). From this point of view, *true* doesn't mean *corresponding to the reality (or to* 

On the other hand, Lakatos told us that many scientists and philosophers, among whom some physicists as Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, thought that scientific theories are neither true nor false, but simply *conventions* working as *instruments* (whence such an attitude is named *conventionalism*). Someone could note a close resemblance between such conventionalism and our pragmatic empiricism (the foregoing theory). Actually there is some resemblance, but we have to mind also important differences between the both: conventionalism deals mainly with *theories* (systems of statements describing a phenomenon); while pragmatic empiricism deals not only with theories but also with basic statements (describing single experiences). Moreover (and more important), conventionalism considers theories only as instruments for *forecasting*: that's essentially to *know the future*, to *reproduce a (future) reality* in

But anyway, putting aside the pragmatic dimension, the both outlooks share the same thesis about knowledge, and particularly about science: that scientific theories haven't to be considered *true* nor *false*, but only *fit* or *unfit* (to preview some effects, or to gain some outcomes). At last we could also say that our pragmatic empiricism is a variant of conventionalism, where the value *truth* is assimilated to *fitness*, so as it happens in the

*Truth*, on the other hand, has no better chance by other philosophical schools, different from the ones we have just spoken about. For example, according with anarchist theories *à la* Feyerabend, science has had an important political function during the first centuries of Modern Age, when it has contributed to destroy the traditional, well arranged idea of universe, the *Kosmos* of the Greeks or the Creation of God. But nowadays it has become a big business and an arena where different theories and schools struggle each other against, for prevailing independently on the respective relation with *truth*. According with Feyerabend, epistemological anarchists seem as Dadaïsts, but we could add that they renew some well known attitudes of ancient Sophists. In any case, they radically undervalue the quest for truth, but by their relativism they bar the way to any effort to introduce some order (as

These remarks about epistemological anarchism couldn't anyway stop us from admitting that science, becoming a big business, has only shown more clearly a phenomenon really

conventional as it may be) within the complex and complicated world we live in.

our mind; whereas pragmatic empiricism looks mainly at action.

pertain to our world of life independently on the *reality* of the things there involved.

you cannot pursue your aim. Stop!

*facts)*, but rather *fit to pursue our aim*.

everyday speech.

them the possibility to refer to a truth not depending on religion. And by this way he was disconcerting young people as far as they were trying the first experience of the Weberian *Entzeuberung* of the world. But at last the game was over: laïcization of knowledge was made.

Starting from the first Greek philosophers until Newton and even longer, the word "philosophy" has been synonymous of "high knowledge" (to distinguish it from the "low knowledge" of peasants, craftsmen and housewives). Christian theologians and philosophers have tried, since the first centuries of Christendom, to reconcile philosophy with religion, and mostly to reabsorb the former within the latter. But at last the both remained reciprocally independent, for the sources as well as for the style of reasoning, notwithstanding the fact that the both aimed to give sense to the world as a whole. So when philosophers, during the Renaissance and the earl Modern Age, began to put aside the problem of the sense of the world by abolishing *teleology* (the discourse concerning the *ends* of the nature), modern *science* came into the world as a new kind of knowledge, really different from both philosophy and theology.

This description of the birth of modern science, though the best known in the schools, might be considered too plain, somewhat trivial as far as historians of science could tell a story much more complicated. We can only say, at this concern, that we haven't described the historical process of its coming into the world, but rather that of the *ideal type* (Weber) of modern science. Then we couldn't anywhere try realized the perfect theoretical model of modern science, corresponding to the one above illustrated, but we can single out only some relevant features of it.

First of all, we can state that, according with such ideal type, science would share with knowledge in general the basic couple of values they refer to: the couple *true/false*. As a matter of fact, indeed, when we want interpret a statement from the point of view of the institution *knowledge*, we have to ascertain whether it is *true* or *false (not true)*. But when we refer to *truth* within our discourse we have to pay attention to the context where such discourse is placed: when the context refers mainly to the institution *religion*, truth is strictly related with God and His messages; when it refers mainly to metaphysics taken as a chapter of philosophy, truth is related with some kind of reality existing somewhere with a nature independent on us and on our relationships with it. In both cases *truth* pertains to somewhat real (God or Nature, or Nature as God: Spinoza). But this is an hypostatical use of a concept that originally refers to the speech, not to things or persons: so a more suitable use of *truth* is that of the common sense, when for example we say "it is true that it rains", or "it is true that I had a headache", or "please, say the truth!". The common sense use of the concept of *truth*, indeed, is strictly related with the so called *low knowledge*, since the craftsmen' world of life as well as that of housewives are overall included in the everyday life.

The common sense statements are strictly empirical: they are true until a new experience give them the lie. Could the same be said with regard to the statement by the logic Tarski "Snow is white only if and until snow is white"? I'm not sure. Because Tarski refers to the *fact* that snow is white, and the same do all those empiricist philosophers that Lakatos names *positivists*: according with whom statements are true if, and only if they are proved by *facts*. But only a metaphysical assumption could authorize us to presuppose a relationship between speeches and *facts* (existing somewhere independently on us). While we wouldn't

them the possibility to refer to a truth not depending on religion. And by this way he was disconcerting young people as far as they were trying the first experience of the Weberian *Entzeuberung* of the world. But at last the game was over: laïcization of knowledge was

Starting from the first Greek philosophers until Newton and even longer, the word "philosophy" has been synonymous of "high knowledge" (to distinguish it from the "low knowledge" of peasants, craftsmen and housewives). Christian theologians and philosophers have tried, since the first centuries of Christendom, to reconcile philosophy with religion, and mostly to reabsorb the former within the latter. But at last the both remained reciprocally independent, for the sources as well as for the style of reasoning, notwithstanding the fact that the both aimed to give sense to the world as a whole. So when philosophers, during the Renaissance and the earl Modern Age, began to put aside the problem of the sense of the world by abolishing *teleology* (the discourse concerning the *ends* of the nature), modern *science* came into the world as a new kind of knowledge, really

This description of the birth of modern science, though the best known in the schools, might be considered too plain, somewhat trivial as far as historians of science could tell a story much more complicated. We can only say, at this concern, that we haven't described the historical process of its coming into the world, but rather that of the *ideal type* (Weber) of modern science. Then we couldn't anywhere try realized the perfect theoretical model of modern science, corresponding to the one above illustrated, but we can single out only some

First of all, we can state that, according with such ideal type, science would share with knowledge in general the basic couple of values they refer to: the couple *true/false*. As a matter of fact, indeed, when we want interpret a statement from the point of view of the institution *knowledge*, we have to ascertain whether it is *true* or *false (not true)*. But when we refer to *truth* within our discourse we have to pay attention to the context where such discourse is placed: when the context refers mainly to the institution *religion*, truth is strictly related with God and His messages; when it refers mainly to metaphysics taken as a chapter of philosophy, truth is related with some kind of reality existing somewhere with a nature independent on us and on our relationships with it. In both cases *truth* pertains to somewhat real (God or Nature, or Nature as God: Spinoza). But this is an hypostatical use of a concept that originally refers to the speech, not to things or persons: so a more suitable use of *truth* is that of the common sense, when for example we say "it is true that it rains", or "it is true that I had a headache", or "please, say the truth!". The common sense use of the concept of *truth*, indeed, is strictly related with the so called *low knowledge*, since the craftsmen' world

of life as well as that of housewives are overall included in the everyday life.

The common sense statements are strictly empirical: they are true until a new experience give them the lie. Could the same be said with regard to the statement by the logic Tarski "Snow is white only if and until snow is white"? I'm not sure. Because Tarski refers to the *fact* that snow is white, and the same do all those empiricist philosophers that Lakatos names *positivists*: according with whom statements are true if, and only if they are proved by *facts*. But only a metaphysical assumption could authorize us to presuppose a relationship between speeches and *facts* (existing somewhere independently on us). While we wouldn't

made.

different from both philosophy and theology.

relevant features of it.

face the same problem if we speak about *experiences* instead of facts: because experiences pertain to our world of life independently on the *reality* of the things there involved.

Why do empirical common sense statements seem to be fit, while logical and more generally scientific ones give no confidence when grounded on a sheer empirical basis? Because of their difference from the point of view of the respective *pragmatic* functions. The later presuppose a mirroring function of mind and, consequently, of the speech: then they imply a metaphysical involvement in the problem of *reality*. Whilst the former can be verified or falsified only by everyday experience: if you ground your behaviour on a false statement, you cannot pursue your aim. Stop!

Could a scientist adopt the same criterion? Of course: since he (she) would agree about taking his (her) statements only as interpretations of the state of things in order to carry on some new step of his (her) project (for example, some new step of the research he (she) is working about). From this point of view, *true* doesn't mean *corresponding to the reality (or to facts)*, but rather *fit to pursue our aim*.

On the other hand, Lakatos told us that many scientists and philosophers, among whom some physicists as Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, thought that scientific theories are neither true nor false, but simply *conventions* working as *instruments* (whence such an attitude is named *conventionalism*). Someone could note a close resemblance between such conventionalism and our pragmatic empiricism (the foregoing theory). Actually there is some resemblance, but we have to mind also important differences between the both: conventionalism deals mainly with *theories* (systems of statements describing a phenomenon); while pragmatic empiricism deals not only with theories but also with basic statements (describing single experiences). Moreover (and more important), conventionalism considers theories only as instruments for *forecasting*: that's essentially to *know the future*, to *reproduce a (future) reality* in our mind; whereas pragmatic empiricism looks mainly at action.

But anyway, putting aside the pragmatic dimension, the both outlooks share the same thesis about knowledge, and particularly about science: that scientific theories haven't to be considered *true* nor *false*, but only *fit* or *unfit* (to preview some effects, or to gain some outcomes). At last we could also say that our pragmatic empiricism is a variant of conventionalism, where the value *truth* is assimilated to *fitness*, so as it happens in the everyday speech.

*Truth*, on the other hand, has no better chance by other philosophical schools, different from the ones we have just spoken about. For example, according with anarchist theories *à la* Feyerabend, science has had an important political function during the first centuries of Modern Age, when it has contributed to destroy the traditional, well arranged idea of universe, the *Kosmos* of the Greeks or the Creation of God. But nowadays it has become a big business and an arena where different theories and schools struggle each other against, for prevailing independently on the respective relation with *truth*. According with Feyerabend, epistemological anarchists seem as Dadaïsts, but we could add that they renew some well known attitudes of ancient Sophists. In any case, they radically undervalue the quest for truth, but by their relativism they bar the way to any effort to introduce some order (as conventional as it may be) within the complex and complicated world we live in.

These remarks about epistemological anarchism couldn't anyway stop us from admitting that science, becoming a big business, has only shown more clearly a phenomenon really

Can Sociology Help Us to Live a Better Life ? A Phenomenological Approach to Clinical Sociology 159

A single member could feel uncomfortable with some of his (her) own patterns, because it seems to be unfit to pursue the expected aim. In such case, he (she) could compare this pattern with the collective culture, and then he (she) could look for modify it in order to make it more fit; but he (she) could also engage him(her)self for a change in the collective culture (that's a very hard political task, indeed). When social change becomes more and more fast, and local communities are put in always closer relationships with a bigger context, even with a global one, then confusion of patterns becomes very likely, deception of

Such discontent dips its roots within the global social and cultural change, but it is felt at last by single people or little groups within their world of life. For them it becomes a *social* 

Very often such discontent is considered as a kind of mental trouble and moves a psychological intervention. But usually its real roots don't plunge in a mental disease: on the contrary, they refer to social phenomena which can be studied and understood in their

That's the reason why just during the first decades after industrial revolution, people needed for the first time some kind of knowledge which could help to understand, by scientific methods, the increasing social change consequent to that big phenomenon. And Comte proposed to name it "sociology". That's also the reason why during the XX century the rushing increase of social change gave a so strong impetus to sociological knowledge: sociologists have the task of studying the relationships between social phenomena (or also between other kinds of phenomena and at least one social phenomenon) in order to give

European sociologists at first paid the most attention to the big social phenomena, in order to map out the mega-trends of human development. So their work remained very close to that of historians, on the one hand, and to that of social philosophers on the other one. Later (namely in America with the Chicagoan school) sociologists turned their attention to local social problems by empirical research, but mostly with a descriptive approach. R.K. Merton the first, at the middle of XX century, tried to connect each other theory and research, proposing to develop theories of middle range, able to help us to better explain particular social problems. But afterwards sociologists have not always followed such very wise

Nevertheless, they continue to face day by day *social problems*: situations where people feel uncomfortable with something related with their social context. That makes an important difference between sociology and other (hard) sciences. When sociologists don't want to map out a big historical-theoretical picture of human development, they must not take the themes upon which to make research from the work (theoretical as well as empirical) of preceding sociologists (so as it happens with physicists, chemists or mathematicians), but rather from direct or indirect experience of actual and present social problems. As a matter of fact they are almost all *clinical sociologists*: that's sociologists aiming to give people

But sociologists are neither physicians nor thaumaturgists: they only manage a scientific knowledge which aims to make understandable the relationships between different

actually an answer enabling them to better face their difficult situation.

expectations is very frequent and discontent is widespread.

mutual relationships. And this is indeed a sociological task.

*problem*.

them a sense.

proposition.

concerning the whole history of high knowledge. One could ask indeed how far through the history the truth principle has worked as a sheer justification (or mystification) of interest and power clashes: for example between philosophical schools in ancient Greece, or during the rising of the Royal Society, or around the awarding of Nobel Prizes. According with Lakatos, Polanyi has to be considered the strongest supporter of this "authoritarian" view over the history of science: it's a matter of fact that to establish which scientific theory has to prevail implies a power role; while on the other hand, to get so recognized involves winning a relevant role of power.

Such authoritarian view is considered by Lakatos as one of the philosophical theories concerning the relation between science and truth; but in my opinion it is much more a sociological than a philosophical view over science and its history. And as a sociological theory it points out some absolutely real phenomena, even if it doesn't face the problem of the nature of truth (a philosophical one) nor that of its function in the society (a sociological one).

While on the other hand it helps us to point out the sociological nature of (high) knowledge and of science, taken as institutions. Indeed pre-modern philosophy was an institution, inside which there were other institutions so as the Platonic Academy, the ancient schools of rhetoric, the universities of the Middle Ages, etc. But also the new science is an institution, with its system of meanings and its new particular institutions: the Royal Society, the laboratories, the new scientific academies, later the policlinics, and overall the universities. All these particular institutions can be summed up to give place to the so called Scientific Community: the supreme judge over the outcomes of all subjects working within science, from the utterances of which comes the sense of all their work in general, as well as the meaning of each particular behaviour of theirs.

A philosopher of science aiming to establish the best criteria for pursuing the *truth* may be much troubled by such discourse; but a sociologist has to interpret it as the way to understand what really happens (and likely couldn't not happen) in the relationships between knowledge and society. Which actually can be interpreted as it follows.

People build their culture each one by him(her)self, so as we have seen above. Each personal culture consists of cultural patterns: in other words, ways to solve little and big problems of the everyday life, mostly meeting the approval of the referring social group.(By the way, we could point out that this is the reason why it is so difficult to rescue deviant people, when they live their everyday life within a social milieu where their deviant cultural patterns are shared by the most other members). The process by which the content of a personal culture becomes widespread inside its milieu is imitation of successful patterns: there is no need of so much discourse, nor verbal elaboration and conceptualization, because imitation of a concrete successful behaviour is enough.

But all this happens within the boards of everyday life; primitive societies, where almost all experiences of each member took place within the everyday life, and where social communication was quite face to face, were characterized by fully shared cultural patterns. As societies are becoming more and more complex, on the contrary, people make different experiences and give them a different sense; then they begin to need to compare each other their cultural patterns, and by this way to build a collective culture. But the last one is always somewhat different from those pertaining to each one of the single members of the community.

concerning the whole history of high knowledge. One could ask indeed how far through the history the truth principle has worked as a sheer justification (or mystification) of interest and power clashes: for example between philosophical schools in ancient Greece, or during the rising of the Royal Society, or around the awarding of Nobel Prizes. According with Lakatos, Polanyi has to be considered the strongest supporter of this "authoritarian" view over the history of science: it's a matter of fact that to establish which scientific theory has to prevail implies a power role; while on the other hand, to get so recognized involves winning

Such authoritarian view is considered by Lakatos as one of the philosophical theories concerning the relation between science and truth; but in my opinion it is much more a sociological than a philosophical view over science and its history. And as a sociological theory it points out some absolutely real phenomena, even if it doesn't face the problem of the nature

While on the other hand it helps us to point out the sociological nature of (high) knowledge and of science, taken as institutions. Indeed pre-modern philosophy was an institution, inside which there were other institutions so as the Platonic Academy, the ancient schools of rhetoric, the universities of the Middle Ages, etc. But also the new science is an institution, with its system of meanings and its new particular institutions: the Royal Society, the laboratories, the new scientific academies, later the policlinics, and overall the universities. All these particular institutions can be summed up to give place to the so called Scientific Community: the supreme judge over the outcomes of all subjects working within science, from the utterances of which comes the sense of all their work in general, as well as the

A philosopher of science aiming to establish the best criteria for pursuing the *truth* may be much troubled by such discourse; but a sociologist has to interpret it as the way to understand what really happens (and likely couldn't not happen) in the relationships

People build their culture each one by him(her)self, so as we have seen above. Each personal culture consists of cultural patterns: in other words, ways to solve little and big problems of the everyday life, mostly meeting the approval of the referring social group.(By the way, we could point out that this is the reason why it is so difficult to rescue deviant people, when they live their everyday life within a social milieu where their deviant cultural patterns are shared by the most other members). The process by which the content of a personal culture becomes widespread inside its milieu is imitation of successful patterns: there is no need of so much discourse, nor verbal elaboration and conceptualization, because imitation of a

But all this happens within the boards of everyday life; primitive societies, where almost all experiences of each member took place within the everyday life, and where social communication was quite face to face, were characterized by fully shared cultural patterns. As societies are becoming more and more complex, on the contrary, people make different experiences and give them a different sense; then they begin to need to compare each other their cultural patterns, and by this way to build a collective culture. But the last one is always somewhat different from those pertaining to each one of the single members of the

between knowledge and society. Which actually can be interpreted as it follows.

of truth (a philosophical one) nor that of its function in the society (a sociological one).

a relevant role of power.

meaning of each particular behaviour of theirs.

concrete successful behaviour is enough.

community.

A single member could feel uncomfortable with some of his (her) own patterns, because it seems to be unfit to pursue the expected aim. In such case, he (she) could compare this pattern with the collective culture, and then he (she) could look for modify it in order to make it more fit; but he (she) could also engage him(her)self for a change in the collective culture (that's a very hard political task, indeed). When social change becomes more and more fast, and local communities are put in always closer relationships with a bigger context, even with a global one, then confusion of patterns becomes very likely, deception of expectations is very frequent and discontent is widespread.

Such discontent dips its roots within the global social and cultural change, but it is felt at last by single people or little groups within their world of life. For them it becomes a *social problem*.

Very often such discontent is considered as a kind of mental trouble and moves a psychological intervention. But usually its real roots don't plunge in a mental disease: on the contrary, they refer to social phenomena which can be studied and understood in their mutual relationships. And this is indeed a sociological task.

That's the reason why just during the first decades after industrial revolution, people needed for the first time some kind of knowledge which could help to understand, by scientific methods, the increasing social change consequent to that big phenomenon. And Comte proposed to name it "sociology". That's also the reason why during the XX century the rushing increase of social change gave a so strong impetus to sociological knowledge: sociologists have the task of studying the relationships between social phenomena (or also between other kinds of phenomena and at least one social phenomenon) in order to give them a sense.

European sociologists at first paid the most attention to the big social phenomena, in order to map out the mega-trends of human development. So their work remained very close to that of historians, on the one hand, and to that of social philosophers on the other one. Later (namely in America with the Chicagoan school) sociologists turned their attention to local social problems by empirical research, but mostly with a descriptive approach. R.K. Merton the first, at the middle of XX century, tried to connect each other theory and research, proposing to develop theories of middle range, able to help us to better explain particular social problems. But afterwards sociologists have not always followed such very wise proposition.

Nevertheless, they continue to face day by day *social problems*: situations where people feel uncomfortable with something related with their social context. That makes an important difference between sociology and other (hard) sciences. When sociologists don't want to map out a big historical-theoretical picture of human development, they must not take the themes upon which to make research from the work (theoretical as well as empirical) of preceding sociologists (so as it happens with physicists, chemists or mathematicians), but rather from direct or indirect experience of actual and present social problems. As a matter of fact they are almost all *clinical sociologists*: that's sociologists aiming to give people actually an answer enabling them to better face their difficult situation.

But sociologists are neither physicians nor thaumaturgists: they only manage a scientific knowledge which aims to make understandable the relationships between different

Can Sociology Help Us to Live a Better Life ? A Phenomenological Approach to Clinical Sociology 161

This technique consists of making partners (patients for the psychoanalysts, members of a little or big community, for sociologists) conscious of the whole net of phenomena (variables) inside which the pain flows. At first this could increase the pain, but then professionals must intervene for helping to try some change in some point of the net where

For the members of a community (a big or a little one) consciousness not only of the whole net of variables defining their situation, but also of their power for influencing it in some direction, could be undoubtedly a factor of strengthening the *identity* of single members as well as of the group as a whole. Where identity is, at last, the image each one (single or group) has of his (her) Self compared with that they think *Generalized Other* have of the same Self (Mead, Corsale). While, in its turn, the content of such image consists at last, for the single members, of the net of cultural patterns (i.e. the personal culture) he (she) has interiorized during his (her) lifelong socialization. And for the groups or communities, it consists of the collective culture members have built by comparing each other and finally by sharing mutually cultural patterns coming from the members (among whom the leaders of

But coming back to our question posed at the beginning of our discourse, what is finally a *good life*? If one looks at a happy life, neither sociology nor anyone other could really help him (her) in such direction. But if one looks at a life with a strong and gratified identity, then

I said "could" and not "can", because nobody can assure us that members of the community helped by sociologists are actually able to change their situation in a positive direction. But that derives from the human nature (of the members as well as of sociologists), to which

Berger P., Berger B., Kellner H. (1974): *The Homeless Mind. Modernization and Consciousness.*

Feyerabend P.K. (1975): *Against Method. Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge*. NBL Goffman E. (1967): *Interaction Ritual. Essay in Face-toFace behaviour*. Garden City, Doubleday

Granovetter M. (1985): "Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of

Popper K.R. (1969): *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. London,

Berne E. (1971): *Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy.* It. Tr. Roma, Astrolabio Corsale M. (2010): *L'attore sociale e la principessa Turandot*. Torino, L'Harmattan

Embeddedness". In *American Journal of Sociology,* 91, pp. 481-510 Kierkegaard S. (1956): *Aut-Aut. Estetica ed etica nella personalità.* It. Tr. Milano, Mondadori Lakatos I., Feyerabend P.K. (1995): *Sull'orlo della scienza. Pro e contro il metodo*. It. Tr.

Merton R.K. (1949): *Social Theory and Social Structure.* New York, The Free Press Parsons T. (1937): *The Structure of Social Action*. New York, The Free Press

it is possible, and to experience the outcomes of such a change.

sociology could really be useful. And namely clinical sociology.

Goffman E. (1974): *Frame Analysis.* New York, Harper & Row

Mead G.H. (1966) : *Mind, Self and Society*. It. Tr. Firenze, Barbera

Parsons T. (1951): *The Social System.* New York, The Free Press

the group play a main role).

almightiness is not granted.

New York, Random

**4. References** 

Milano, Cortina

Routledge

phenomena in society. How could such a knowledge help people to solve their problems? How, finally, should a clinical sociologist work?

To answer such a question we have first of all to remember that sociology doesn't pertain to the low knowledge, to that usually employed by the members in their everyday life: as a matter of fact indeed, ordinary members of a community think about their problems in their turn, and often build some kinds of theories about them. The way they build such theories is just the matter ethnomethodologists are mainly involved in. But if by this way ordinary people could well manage all their problems, nobody would have invented sociology.

Then sociology must pertain to the high knowledge. We have still seen how much problems would arise about the nature of science and of its methodology; even more problems would arise about the question whether sociology is a real science or not. But I suggest not to take a definite party in this debate, because anyway, in my opinion, it is not so useful: scholars make their research and pursue some outcomes (often very important ones) independently on the answers given to that questions (and almost all philosophers of science agree about that).

But in any case high knowledge must differ from the low one as to the *rigour*: its discourses can't be made casually nor approximately; they can't be built on sheer personal opinions, nor on some kind of wishful thinking. Rigour implies first of all a good faith from the part of the sociologist: he (she) has to take seriously the problem at stake in order to really help the social partner to feel fit with the answers given by sociology. In the second place, sociologists have to single out as much phenomena likely to be someway connected with that which gave rise to the problem, without deceiving him(her)self as well as the partner about the real cause of the problem: to seek the *causes* of a social phenomenon (then also of a problematic one) can be misleading, because social phenomena are usually so interconnected that the one can influence the other and vice-versa. Then actually we can only observe that a change in the one is very likely to modify the whole net of phenomena, but it is very difficult to forecast exactly how much and in which direction it will be modified.

In third place, rigour in the sociological discourse implies to clear all the premises of each reasoning as well as all consequences that one could forecast as likely. Thus any partner of the sociologist, should he (she) be a colleague or a layman, can verify his agreement or disagreement by furnishing arguments for it. Confronting and comparing such discourses could bring to a final agreement, or to an explicit disagreement, but the both grounded on clear basis.

Rigour is not only a moral rule for a scholar. In the case of a sociologist involved in solving some social problem it is necessary to avoid any kind of wishful thinking: that's a real danger, one of the worst, for people managing or feeling pain.

But rigour is not enough to implement a clinical approach in sociology, that is in its turn a condition for helping someone to live a better life. At this point sociologists have no remedy, no drug for directly helping partners feeling pain in the middle of a problematic situation. They only can resort to a technique still well known, coming from the professional experience of psychoanalysts: they too don't use indeed any drug to face the disease of their patients.

This technique consists of making partners (patients for the psychoanalysts, members of a little or big community, for sociologists) conscious of the whole net of phenomena (variables) inside which the pain flows. At first this could increase the pain, but then professionals must intervene for helping to try some change in some point of the net where it is possible, and to experience the outcomes of such a change.

For the members of a community (a big or a little one) consciousness not only of the whole net of variables defining their situation, but also of their power for influencing it in some direction, could be undoubtedly a factor of strengthening the *identity* of single members as well as of the group as a whole. Where identity is, at last, the image each one (single or group) has of his (her) Self compared with that they think *Generalized Other* have of the same Self (Mead, Corsale). While, in its turn, the content of such image consists at last, for the single members, of the net of cultural patterns (i.e. the personal culture) he (she) has interiorized during his (her) lifelong socialization. And for the groups or communities, it consists of the collective culture members have built by comparing each other and finally by sharing mutually cultural patterns coming from the members (among whom the leaders of the group play a main role).

But coming back to our question posed at the beginning of our discourse, what is finally a *good life*? If one looks at a happy life, neither sociology nor anyone other could really help him (her) in such direction. But if one looks at a life with a strong and gratified identity, then sociology could really be useful. And namely clinical sociology.

I said "could" and not "can", because nobody can assure us that members of the community helped by sociologists are actually able to change their situation in a positive direction. But that derives from the human nature (of the members as well as of sociologists), to which almightiness is not granted.
