**5. Summary and discussion**

This paper explored the interdependence between sports and media organizations by looking at the long lasting interdependence between Maccabi Tel-Aviv Basketball Club and the Israeli Public Channel. Benassi (1995), who examined organizational strategic alliances, criticizes the common view of these alliances as a provisional phenomenon, motivated primarily by financial considerations. He believes that strategic alliances are quite often a long-lasting phenomenon, used for various reasons other than financial ones. The interdependence between Maccabi Tel-Aviv and Channel 1 demonstrates this contention. The two organizations have been cooperating closely for almost 40 years, in a relationship which has been supplying both sides with various advantages in their respective markets. Hence, the alliance carried a strong symbiotic dimension, providing both sides with significant composite rent.

However, this symbiotic interdependence has often been accompanied by exploitive elements and behaviors. These exploitive elements have altered throughout the years, as the Public Channel lost its advantageous structural position and power relations shifted. In the monopolistic television era Maccabi Tel-Aviv used the broadcasts to attain higher revenues (mostly indirect ones) and establish its position as the "national" team, while for Channel 1 the broadcasts were a source of high ratings and national legitimacy. Nevertheless, Channel 1 clearly possessed more power in the relations, a fact that allowed it to avoid franchise royalties almost completely and achieve an exploitive rent.

In 1990 the tables have turned and Maccabi Tel-Aviv took the upper hand in the relationship. With the ingress of other players into the Israeli television market, the team's dependence on Channel 1 dropped dramatically, while the channel's dependence increased. Maccabi used this change to demand (and receive) extremely high royalties from Channel 1, which had lost all leverage for negotiation. The team's managers saw this as a fair and reasonable compensation for the many years in which the games were broadcast free of charge. In other words, the exploitation of the 1970s and 1980s was now rewarded by counter-exploitation, as the team rather than the channel began to enjoy exploitive rent.

The Israeli case serves as a classic example of the complex relations between sports organizations and media organizations. These relations are largely ones of symbiotic interdependence and composite rent. Media and Sports organizations often have mutual dependency in their efforts to maintain their status and power in popular Western culture. But alongside the composite rent earned from this cooperation, there are also power relations involved. When one organization is highly dependent on the other, it gives the latter a superior position, which will most likely be used to acquire exploitive rent.

This pattern is also well demonstrated in American sports. James Quirk and Rodney Fort (1999) examine the relations between the large professional sports leagues (the, NFL, MLB,

Whereas during the monopolistic era the team depended on the channel completely and was forced to give up any demand for significant compensations, the tables have now turned. In the post-monopolistic era Channel 1's dependence on the team became immense. As a result, the team could demand that the channel compensate it generously, regardless of

This paper explored the interdependence between sports and media organizations by looking at the long lasting interdependence between Maccabi Tel-Aviv Basketball Club and the Israeli Public Channel. Benassi (1995), who examined organizational strategic alliances, criticizes the common view of these alliances as a provisional phenomenon, motivated primarily by financial considerations. He believes that strategic alliances are quite often a long-lasting phenomenon, used for various reasons other than financial ones. The interdependence between Maccabi Tel-Aviv and Channel 1 demonstrates this contention. The two organizations have been cooperating closely for almost 40 years, in a relationship which has been supplying both sides with various advantages in their respective markets. Hence, the alliance carried a strong symbiotic dimension, providing both sides with

However, this symbiotic interdependence has often been accompanied by exploitive elements and behaviors. These exploitive elements have altered throughout the years, as the Public Channel lost its advantageous structural position and power relations shifted. In the monopolistic television era Maccabi Tel-Aviv used the broadcasts to attain higher revenues (mostly indirect ones) and establish its position as the "national" team, while for Channel 1 the broadcasts were a source of high ratings and national legitimacy. Nevertheless, Channel 1 clearly possessed more power in the relations, a fact that allowed it to avoid franchise

In 1990 the tables have turned and Maccabi Tel-Aviv took the upper hand in the relationship. With the ingress of other players into the Israeli television market, the team's dependence on Channel 1 dropped dramatically, while the channel's dependence increased. Maccabi used this change to demand (and receive) extremely high royalties from Channel 1, which had lost all leverage for negotiation. The team's managers saw this as a fair and reasonable compensation for the many years in which the games were broadcast free of charge. In other words, the exploitation of the 1970s and 1980s was now rewarded by counter-exploitation, as the team rather than the channel began to enjoy exploitive rent.

The Israeli case serves as a classic example of the complex relations between sports organizations and media organizations. These relations are largely ones of symbiotic interdependence and composite rent. Media and Sports organizations often have mutual dependency in their efforts to maintain their status and power in popular Western culture. But alongside the composite rent earned from this cooperation, there are also power relations involved. When one organization is highly dependent on the other, it gives the

This pattern is also well demonstrated in American sports. James Quirk and Rodney Fort (1999) examine the relations between the large professional sports leagues (the, NFL, MLB,

latter a superior position, which will most likely be used to acquire exploitive rent.

royalties almost completely and achieve an exploitive rent.

the channel's grave economic condition and the mild market demand for the games.

**5. Summary and discussion** 

significant composite rent.

NBA, and NHL) and American media. Similarly to previous research (e.g. Wenner 1989; Lever & Wheeler 1993; Koppett 1994; Williams 1994; Weingerten 2003) they talk about the symbiotic dimensions of this relationship and the mutual gains for both sports and media organizations in terms of revenues, popularity, and legitimacy. Yet, Quirk and Fort also notice the changing nature of power relations and exploitation, which have characterized the sports-media relationship along the years.

One prominent example comes from American Football. Until 1962, the National Football League (NFL) was operating under a court injunction, forbidding it from signing a leaguewide national TV contract. The fourteen teams had to separately negotiate and sign their TV contracts, and the TV networks used this to avoid high payments. When a new bill exempting league-wide television contracts from antitrust prosecution passed in 1962, the NFL became the sole negotiator of TV broadcasting rights. Consequently, the total TV income of all NFL teams rose sharply, from \$3.5 million in 1961 to \$16.2 million in 1964. While this initial increase may be explained with the underpayments by TV networks prior to the 1962 bill, broadcasting rights contracts have continued to increase dramatically ever since. By the end of the 1990s, the NFL, a monopoly in its field, has demanded (and received) TV contracts in the sum of more than two billion dollars per year. The national TV networks (CBS, NBC, ABC, Fox), however, all suffer from this monopolistic market. They all report enormous losses on their NFL contracts. The highly competitive environment and the fact that there is only one product to fight for, lead, according to Quirk and Fort, to excessive biddings, which are exploited by the NFL to acquire what I termed here an exploitive rent.

Quirk and Fort further examine the relationships between the major leagues and other prominent actors in their environment: fans, unions, players and cities. Once again, they show how these relationships provide the parties involved with a synergetic composite rent. For example, cities which host a successful professional sport franchise acquire reputation and publicity, while also providing their residents with a source of entertainment and local identification. Franchises, on their part, enjoy financial support, devoted fans, and new expensive sports stadiums, established and funded by taxpayers.

However, Quirk and Fort also demonstrate the exploitative dimension of this relationship. They contend that during the years, with ample support from the US government, the major leagues gradually turned into monopolies in their respective fields. With monopoly came enormous power, which the leagues now use to exploit and manipulate smaller cities. These smaller cities often see the sport team as a necessary resource for maintaining local reputation, and are therefore willing to do almost anything to retain the franchise. Under the threat of uprooting to another city and market, the franchises use their monopolistic power to demand conditions that would promise increased revenues, while imposing crushing financial hardships on cities that are already strapped with debt. Most notably, team owners demand that the cities provide publicly financed stadiums and arenas, or else the team would move to another city.

I argue that this combination of symbiosis/exploitation is not unique to the media and sports nexus or to the sports field in general. Rather, it is a common part of organizational interdependencies, which are seldom simplex. Organizational interrelations are often characterized by symbiotic interdependence, where cooperation and trust exist, and both sides share a composite rent. This pattern, however, exists side by side with some degree of

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## **6. References**


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**19** 

Marinus Ossewaarde *University of Twente,* 

*Netherlands* 

**Fulfilling the Promise of Sociology: Some Steps** 

Sociology can be defined as the study of society, that is, as thinking, writing and talking about that elusive thing called 'society'. The latter concept is highly ambiguous and contested among different sociologists. The same goes for all the main aspects of social life, like the market, corporation, state, community, science, technology, law, and so forth, which are also sociologically approached in different ways. The ambiguous nature of society therefore means that sociology, just like economics or political science, is divided and pluriform. In this chapter, sociology is introduced as a social activity, not only because sociologists are very much embedded in social life in general and in organizations in particular, but also because their sociologies have the potential to change society, both constructively and destructively. The close relation between theory and practice, not always recognized by scientists, lays responsibilities upon sociologists, which the latter cannot discard without betraying their scientific vocation. The ambiguity of that which they try to know already manifests itself in the clashing sociological theories about society, and about

Different sociological approaches to the study of society can be distinguished; their definitions of theory and science differ from each other. These various traditions can prove to be of great value to the reflexive sociologist who recognizes the ambivalence that is inherent to doing sociology. This awareness is the first prerequisite for a sociological dialogue and dialogical sociology, whereby clashing sociologies are allowed to interact, and eventually create new liberating perspectives and generate innovation. This dialogical approach does not only follow from the recognition of the ambiguous nature of society in general, and of organizations, be it a research lab, a business corporation, a public agency or an NGO, in particular, but also from the commitment to the European values of freedom and reason, as these have been understood by reflexive sociologists like C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner or Irving Louis Horowitz. Dialogue is the playground par excellence for representing Socratic reason in all domains of social existence. Hence, it is only through dialogical activities and the institutionalization of dialogue, or what radical sociologists have called the 'publics', that

Sociology is defined as the study of society and hence delivers knowledge of all aspects of social existence, including laboratory, corporate, public, military, academic, legal, and so

sociology can develop as a science, and avoids the alliance with reifying forces.

**1. Introduction** 

what are perceived to be its distinctive elements.

**2. Four theories of society** 

**for Generating Reflexivity in Organizations** 

