**6. Two philosophical perspectives**

Philosophy answers the problem from two different perspectives: environmental ethics and political ecology. They both propose to reorient human activity in reference to two philosophical themes, namely ethics and politics. Environmental ethics, a North American movement, try to question our relation to the environment from the standpoint of morality and more precisely, the legitimacy of a protection of the environment. Why, morally, should we protect our environment?11 The main goal is to define our duties towards nature. To reach this goal, an ethical control of our technical abilities is insufficient; environmental ethics are dedicated to giving the natural element moral value. Their basic intuition is that non human elements must have something like an intrinsic value and must be considered for themselves. This value must be considered apart from the instrumental value of nature, which is easily definable by the many services that nature procures to humanity: resources, food and even aesthetic beauty. In this case, it is said that the environment is not synonymous of nature, an autonomous entity, because environment is still attached to the interest of the being surrounded. Such criticism leads to the proposition "Think like a mountain12" for example, which means that environmental ethics should adopt the perspective (and represent the interest) of an ecosystem and not a human collective point of view.

The other philosophical movement, political ecology, started in Europe and has now become an international theme. It developed around the anthropocentric project of protecting the natural environment of human societies. In this perspective, nature is considered as an objective condition of existence for human societies and this is the basic reason why it should be considered as a new object of research and political inquiry. It is accepted that the modern State has the responsibility to protect its citizens. Therefore, the State must protect the citizens from natural disasters, but also from pollution and the degradation of the environment. Because actions on the environment affect others by transforming the physical world, public policies should regulate these activities of transformation in order to protect society in general. What is at stake here is the regulation, by the State, of our actions on the environment.

Nevertheless, the practical objective of these two philosophies might not have been reached. For example, in regard to environmental ethics, although the American orientation towards a valuation of nature for itself has questioned the relation of the modern man with nature, it is still burdened with the problem of man's natural origin. A promotion of the respect for the absolute Other does not break down the borders between "humans" and "non humans", but only affirms the existence of the dichotomy. North American natural parks (including the Canadian ones) are the best example of this: the visitor must not leave any traces of his visit, which suggests that he is not at home in the natural environment. The park system

<sup>11</sup> For a presentation of the environmental ethics, see Catherine Larrère, 1997, *Les philosophies de l'environnement*, Paris, PUF.

<sup>12</sup> The well-known expression is from Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac*, 1949.

to the shaping of human societies. To summarize, we must admit that the understanding of the environmental crisis has challenged the theoretical apparatus of modernity because it

Philosophy answers the problem from two different perspectives: environmental ethics and political ecology. They both propose to reorient human activity in reference to two philosophical themes, namely ethics and politics. Environmental ethics, a North American movement, try to question our relation to the environment from the standpoint of morality and more precisely, the legitimacy of a protection of the environment. Why, morally, should we protect our environment?11 The main goal is to define our duties towards nature. To reach this goal, an ethical control of our technical abilities is insufficient; environmental ethics are dedicated to giving the natural element moral value. Their basic intuition is that non human elements must have something like an intrinsic value and must be considered for themselves. This value must be considered apart from the instrumental value of nature, which is easily definable by the many services that nature procures to humanity: resources, food and even aesthetic beauty. In this case, it is said that the environment is not synonymous of nature, an autonomous entity, because environment is still attached to the interest of the being surrounded. Such criticism leads to the proposition "Think like a mountain12" for example, which means that environmental ethics should adopt the perspective (and represent the

The other philosophical movement, political ecology, started in Europe and has now become an international theme. It developed around the anthropocentric project of protecting the natural environment of human societies. In this perspective, nature is considered as an objective condition of existence for human societies and this is the basic reason why it should be considered as a new object of research and political inquiry. It is accepted that the modern State has the responsibility to protect its citizens. Therefore, the State must protect the citizens from natural disasters, but also from pollution and the degradation of the environment. Because actions on the environment affect others by transforming the physical world, public policies should regulate these activities of transformation in order to protect society in general. What is at stake here is the regulation, by the State, of our actions on the

Nevertheless, the practical objective of these two philosophies might not have been reached. For example, in regard to environmental ethics, although the American orientation towards a valuation of nature for itself has questioned the relation of the modern man with nature, it is still burdened with the problem of man's natural origin. A promotion of the respect for the absolute Other does not break down the borders between "humans" and "non humans", but only affirms the existence of the dichotomy. North American natural parks (including the Canadian ones) are the best example of this: the visitor must not leave any traces of his visit, which suggests that he is not at home in the natural environment. The park system

11 For a presentation of the environmental ethics, see Catherine Larrère, 1997, *Les philosophies de* 

12 The well-known expression is from Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac*, 1949.

involves new categories incompatible with the nature-society dichotomy.

interest) of an ecosystem and not a human collective point of view.

**6. Two philosophical perspectives** 

environment.

*l'environnement*, Paris, PUF.

does not promote any real "direct" experience of nature (the opening schedules of many installations restrict this in a formal way), nor does it allow any beneficial co-evolutive human practices (like transhumance in the Alps). The dichotomy still remains, the conditions of normativity have simply been reversed and we are in the presence of a natural subsumption.

But also, if the environmental ethics' goal is to ultimately enact new policies capable of changing our relation to the environment, their efforts are concentrated on justifying moral interdictions and obligations in order to transform our ideological universe. Nevertheless, focusing on a moral dimension remains a vague enterprise. It does not imply to question the political and economic aspects of the situation that it questions. For this reason, we can fear that this project will remain inefficient because it fails to grasp the environmental crisis in its totality. Furthermore, it does not identify the social forces interested in considering nature as a pool of unlimited resources. Ignoring these considerations, environmental ethics must then rely on the only theoretical view left: an authoritarian imposition of new moral rules, only justified by philosophy, to modify our behaviour in regard to nature. An acceptation of their point of view by the concerned citizens is not considered.

The perspective of political ecology is somewhat different, it is not concerned with a submission to the natural order. It can be seen as an extension of the Enlightenment as it promotes the construction of a society based on the moral rule of reason. It simply adds to the original political project of the Enlightenment new aspects of human activities. In this perspective, the logic of political ecology presents itself as pragmatic. It asserts the dominant economic paradigm, as noted by Catherine Larrère13, by confusing interests and values. In other words, it shares the same presuppositions concerning the economic paradigm. We can therefore doubt the capacity of political ecology to modify our society's inscription in nature.

It is obviously clear that this project is in opposition with environmental ethics: nature is left aside to promote the cultural framework; we are in the presence of a subsumption of the natural order under the cultural order. As Descola remarks, a rational management of nature is at the end not profitable to its enactors as it leads, potentially, to the transformation of the world into a gigantic zoo; in this perspective, the survival of the blue whale or the preservation of Antarctica is carried out but only tributary to human conventions14. But is there not an essential difference, although difficult to grasp, between knowing oneself to be living in a managed, constructed environment and living in a world not conditioned by human activity? Does ecological concern lead to living in a zoo? What is at stake is the confrontation, more or less direct and more or less intense, with a human intention; and the possibility to avoid it. For the western world, this difference is essential because it relates to the concept of the Other, the Alterity, a concept which is described by Descola as a human constant. But unfortunately, political ecology has left aside the theoretical means to understand, or simply grasp, this Alterity.

<sup>13</sup> Catherine Larrère, « L'Éthique environnementale : axiologie ou pragmatisme? », chapter 2, *Leçons de philosophie économique*, Tome II : Économie normative et philosophie morale, Paris : Alain Leroux et Pierre Livet, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Philippe Descola, "Constructing natures. Symbolic ecology and social practice", *art. cit*.,p.97

The Nature-Society Controversy in France: Epistemological and Political Implications 51

proposition might seem strange coming from a man whose position was officially against practices of purifications and the dichotomy of nature and culture. In fact, Bruno Latour proposes a sorting device that allows to think and build new associations between humans and non humans. More precisely, he does not object to certain practices of purification given that they allow to think the hybridization of the world and follow it. Instead of putting trust in the difference between facts and values, Latour proposes to operate the distinction

Latour uses the distinction between facts and values to build two tests necessary to Democracy, each one associated with a chamber. The first is the identification of the candidates to the collective; the second is an exploration of the possible assemblies. The existence of the first chamber shows how a certain practice of purification is necessary when a complex situation is being resolved, creating a climate of perplexity. The second chamber, for its part, puts into light the existence of propensities that condition each one's perception of the different assembling. This second chamber stands as a moment of classification, or consultation that makes it essential to the construction of Democracy. According to Latour, this model's main strength is to prevent the establishment from assembling on the basis of presuppositions. As a safeguard measure, the tests make sure a regime of equality is put into action in respect to all the candidates to the new assembling. This device also promotes a principle of precaution in regard to our typifications and presuppositions preceding the consultation of "human" and "non human" participants. In this manner, a dispute becomes an occasion to question the nature of our partners and, if necessary, to reconstruct alliances from "human" and "non human" entities. All conflicts are then potentially related to a

But practically, one might ask, how is it possible to organize a consultation about a collective composed of cars, humans (drivers or not) and frogs? Latour's answer is straightforward: the factoring of "non humans" is done with the help of consultation devices proper to them. It is no more extravagant than to think about democratic consultations for humans. The factoring of "non humans" must be done with devices that allow them to appear as reliable testifiers -that is- that allow them to express their preferences18. This position involves the possibility of a direct consultation and the creation of a device adapted to this task. According to Latour, it is worth attempting, as many experiences have shown. When frogs are confronted to a new adapted device, for example a new pond or a frog-adapted overpass, they are able to express a choice. This observation gives a new responsibility to science- and also to research, as it elevates this activity as the major resource for technical Democracy. When science is applied to equip "non humans" with proper devices for the expression of their preferences, it is then possible to talk about an alliance of science and

<sup>17</sup> What is really contested by Latour's reconstruction efforts is not the distinction between facts and values, but the establishment of two distinct classes, a practice that prevents from exploring many possible compositions from candidates to integration into collectives. This theoretical limit seems to be

18 In another context, Isabelle Stengers (1993, 1996, 1997) establishes a relation between consultation devices for non humans and laboratory experiments. She proposes to consider the extreme scarcity of successful consultations, from the point of view of the devices making them possible, in both human and non human history. Facing such a rare incident, we should celebrate the successful consultation.

between facts and values17 on a temporal scale.

question of legitimate recognition.

an obstacle to Democracy.

In a similar way, Jean-Paul Curnier developed in *L'Écologie politique au miroir*15 the intuition according to which ecology would be the end of the political project. Human being has become the work of human being, and this means that the goal of politics has been reached. But this humanization does not have a humanist end; it is not a process of emancipation in which human being would be all together creation, creator and object of his work (in a Marxist view), but it serves a new form of reflexive control (human being facing his city, his nature, his world: producer, product and condition of his production; man in charge of his self-production)16. Thus, ecology brings the end of politics, because there isn't any collective choice anymore. What is left of political action is no more a production of the world, in reaction to possible conflicts, but a possibility to complain to a system that cannot be accused in itself, but only considered as an irreducible fact. Curnier claims that we are moving from a political consciousness to the complaining consciousness (one can observe this phenomenon in regard to the increase of the legal sphere). This position shares many aspects with Latour's diagnosis. For both authors, the submission of politics to nature causes the ruin of politics. In response to this diagnosis, Latour works on a practical research program aiming at opening up another perspective.
