**7. For a control over the moderns' excessive hybridization**

Latour's epistemological position has political implications: it leads to the deconstruction of the many biases resulting from the practices of purification. For instance, formal democracy can be criticized. Although it seems obvious that a truly equalitarian society must address issues concerning the situations that create inequalities, formal democracy does not take these situations into account. Furthermore, the true democratization of society requires a double rupture, both epistemological and institutional. Latour has made political propositions, redefining the ecological question in the following manner : how is it possible to find the right place for science in a democracy? His political propositions can be interpreted as an attempt to reach a compromise. He will not do without modern science, since it is quite relevant to qualify human and non human entities in some specific contexts, but he also refuses to give it as much political weight as the modern paradigm does when dealing with environmental issues.

In his book *Les politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en politique,* Latour addresses the issue of the Moderns' excessive, because unconscious, hybridization. The author suggests a reorganization of public debates and decision making processes built around two "moments", symbolized as two chambers, "moments" from which are constituted the participants to the common world. The first chamber's function is to identify the entities implied in a problematic situation. The second chamber classifies the different scenarios. In other words, the first chamber is built around the questions: "how many are we?" and "who are we?" and the second around the question "how can we live together?". Essentially, bicameralism does not properly break away from the fact-value distinction, but it organizes distinct procedures susceptible to guarantee its legitimacy. It aims at separating the actions leading to the production of the different facts and values. This theoretical

<sup>15</sup> Jean-Paul Curnier, *L'Écologie politique au miroir : l'œuvre en surplomb*, Paris : Sens et Tonka, 2000.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, citations pp. 37-38.

In a similar way, Jean-Paul Curnier developed in *L'Écologie politique au miroir*15 the intuition according to which ecology would be the end of the political project. Human being has become the work of human being, and this means that the goal of politics has been reached. But this humanization does not have a humanist end; it is not a process of emancipation in which human being would be all together creation, creator and object of his work (in a Marxist view), but it serves a new form of reflexive control (human being facing his city, his nature, his world: producer, product and condition of his production; man in charge of his self-production)16. Thus, ecology brings the end of politics, because there isn't any collective choice anymore. What is left of political action is no more a production of the world, in reaction to possible conflicts, but a possibility to complain to a system that cannot be accused in itself, but only considered as an irreducible fact. Curnier claims that we are moving from a political consciousness to the complaining consciousness (one can observe this phenomenon in regard to the increase of the legal sphere). This position shares many aspects with Latour's diagnosis. For both authors, the submission of politics to nature causes the ruin of politics. In response to this diagnosis, Latour works on a

Latour's epistemological position has political implications: it leads to the deconstruction of the many biases resulting from the practices of purification. For instance, formal democracy can be criticized. Although it seems obvious that a truly equalitarian society must address issues concerning the situations that create inequalities, formal democracy does not take these situations into account. Furthermore, the true democratization of society requires a double rupture, both epistemological and institutional. Latour has made political propositions, redefining the ecological question in the following manner : how is it possible to find the right place for science in a democracy? His political propositions can be interpreted as an attempt to reach a compromise. He will not do without modern science, since it is quite relevant to qualify human and non human entities in some specific contexts, but he also refuses to give it as much political weight as the modern paradigm does when

In his book *Les politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en politique,* Latour addresses the issue of the Moderns' excessive, because unconscious, hybridization. The author suggests a reorganization of public debates and decision making processes built around two "moments", symbolized as two chambers, "moments" from which are constituted the participants to the common world. The first chamber's function is to identify the entities implied in a problematic situation. The second chamber classifies the different scenarios. In other words, the first chamber is built around the questions: "how many are we?" and "who are we?" and the second around the question "how can we live together?". Essentially, bicameralism does not properly break away from the fact-value distinction, but it organizes distinct procedures susceptible to guarantee its legitimacy. It aims at separating the actions leading to the production of the different facts and values. This theoretical

15 Jean-Paul Curnier, *L'Écologie politique au miroir : l'œuvre en surplomb*, Paris : Sens et Tonka, 2000.

practical research program aiming at opening up another perspective.

**7. For a control over the moderns' excessive hybridization** 

dealing with environmental issues.

16 Ibid, citations pp. 37-38.

proposition might seem strange coming from a man whose position was officially against practices of purifications and the dichotomy of nature and culture. In fact, Bruno Latour proposes a sorting device that allows to think and build new associations between humans and non humans. More precisely, he does not object to certain practices of purification given that they allow to think the hybridization of the world and follow it. Instead of putting trust in the difference between facts and values, Latour proposes to operate the distinction between facts and values17 on a temporal scale.

Latour uses the distinction between facts and values to build two tests necessary to Democracy, each one associated with a chamber. The first is the identification of the candidates to the collective; the second is an exploration of the possible assemblies. The existence of the first chamber shows how a certain practice of purification is necessary when a complex situation is being resolved, creating a climate of perplexity. The second chamber, for its part, puts into light the existence of propensities that condition each one's perception of the different assembling. This second chamber stands as a moment of classification, or consultation that makes it essential to the construction of Democracy. According to Latour, this model's main strength is to prevent the establishment from assembling on the basis of presuppositions. As a safeguard measure, the tests make sure a regime of equality is put into action in respect to all the candidates to the new assembling. This device also promotes a principle of precaution in regard to our typifications and presuppositions preceding the consultation of "human" and "non human" participants. In this manner, a dispute becomes an occasion to question the nature of our partners and, if necessary, to reconstruct alliances from "human" and "non human" entities. All conflicts are then potentially related to a question of legitimate recognition.

But practically, one might ask, how is it possible to organize a consultation about a collective composed of cars, humans (drivers or not) and frogs? Latour's answer is straightforward: the factoring of "non humans" is done with the help of consultation devices proper to them. It is no more extravagant than to think about democratic consultations for humans. The factoring of "non humans" must be done with devices that allow them to appear as reliable testifiers -that is- that allow them to express their preferences18. This position involves the possibility of a direct consultation and the creation of a device adapted to this task. According to Latour, it is worth attempting, as many experiences have shown. When frogs are confronted to a new adapted device, for example a new pond or a frog-adapted overpass, they are able to express a choice. This observation gives a new responsibility to science- and also to research, as it elevates this activity as the major resource for technical Democracy. When science is applied to equip "non humans" with proper devices for the expression of their preferences, it is then possible to talk about an alliance of science and

<sup>17</sup> What is really contested by Latour's reconstruction efforts is not the distinction between facts and values, but the establishment of two distinct classes, a practice that prevents from exploring many possible compositions from candidates to integration into collectives. This theoretical limit seems to be an obstacle to Democracy.

<sup>18</sup> In another context, Isabelle Stengers (1993, 1996, 1997) establishes a relation between consultation devices for non humans and laboratory experiments. She proposes to consider the extreme scarcity of successful consultations, from the point of view of the devices making them possible, in both human and non human history. Facing such a rare incident, we should celebrate the successful consultation.

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Democracy, and about technical Democracy (Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 2001). This experience shows how much a consultation can be achieved along with "non humans". It testifies that we can negociate with "non humans"19. It also testifies to the role of science in the processes of representation. Science is therefore political by extension.

From this point of view, political and scientific institutions have a common goal, to participate in the representation of collectives in the public space. Both these institutions explore different forms of representation. Hence, they are precious resources for the formation of collectives. Nevertheless, they are not organized around a separation of nature and culture, a structure that usually gives the final word of truth to science, but around the entities they represent. Their alliance can be qualified as equalitarian. This it justifies the new collaboration between science and politics for the construction of the new democratic state as proposed by Latour.
