**4.2 Corporate executives exploit/disregard regulatory controls (Opportunities)**

An intense emphasis on monetary success leads to a pronounced strain toward anomie, that is, a tendency for corporate executives to exploit/disregard regulatory controls for monetary gains. The American Dream embodies the basic value of materialism that has been described as "fetishism of money" (Taylor et al. 1973, p.94). We realize that Americans are not uniquely materialistic, for a strong interest in material well-being can be found in most societies. Rather, the distinctive feature of American culture is the preeminent role of money as the "metric" of success. Orru succinctly expresses the idea in the following terms: "Money is literally, in this context, a currency for measuring achievement" (1990, p.235). This monetary value orientation contributes to the anomic character of the American Dream:

<sup>1</sup> We should clarify that anomie is not only engendered by 'limited access' of social actors (i.e., CEOs) to legititmate means of achieving goals. Rather, deviance becomes a tempting and a viable option given the 'limited availability' of legitimate means, which is probably the critical reason why social actors resort to different means not only with the end of achieving the goals, but to "lighten the pressure" of attaining socially sanctioned goals (e.g., money, success, material opulence). 2 Keane (1993) found some evidence of a latent relationship between corporate pressure to maximize

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its strong emphasis on the importance of accumulating monetary rewards with its relatively weak emphasis on the importance of following legitimate rules and regulations to do so. In other words, corporate executives seek opportunities to exploit/disregard normative rules and regulations when these rules and regulation threaten to interfere with the realization of their monetary success.
