**1. Introduction**

210 Telecommunications Networks – Current Status and Future Trends

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> Today there is virtually no area where information technology (ІТ) is not used in some way. Computers support banking systems, control the work of nuclear power plants, and control aircraft, satellites and spacecraft. The high level of automation therefore depends on the security level of IT.

> The main features of information security are confidentiality, integrity and availability. Only providing these all gives availability for development secure telecommunication systems. *Confidentiality* is the basic feature of information security, which ensures that information is accessible only to authorized users who have an access. *Integrity* is the basic feature of information security indicating its property to resist unauthorized modification. *Availability*  is the basic feature of information security that indicates accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity.

> One of the most effective ways to ensure confidentiality and data integrity during transmission is cryptographic systems. The purpose of such systems is to provide key distribution, authentication, legitimate users authorisation, and encryption. *Key distribution is one of the most important problems of cryptography.* This problem can be solved with the help of (SECOQC White Paper on Quantum Key Distribution and Cryptography, 2007; Korchenko et al., 2010a):


Quantum Secure Telecommunication Systems 213

other protocols (Bradler, 2005; Lütkenhaus & Shields, 2009; Navascués & Acín, 2005;

The main task of QKD protocols is encryption key generation and distribution between two users connecting via quantum and classical channels (Gisin et al., 2002). In 1984 Ch. Bennett from IBM and G. Brassard from Montreal University introduced the first QKD protocol (Bennett & Brassard, 1984), which has become an alternative solution for the problem of key distribution. This protocol is called *BB84* (Bouwmeester et al., 2000) and it refers to QKD protocols using single qubits. The states of these qubits are the polarisation states of single photons. The BB84 protocol uses four polarisation states of photons (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°). These states refer to two mutually unbiased bases. Error searching and correcting is performed using classical public channel, which need not be confidential but only authenticated. For the detection of intruder actions in the BB84 protocol, an error control procedure is used, and for providing unconditionally security a privacy amplification procedure is used (Bennett et al., 1995). The efficiency of the BB84 protocol equals 50%. Efficiency means the ratio of the photons number which are used for key generation to the general number of

*Six-state protocol* requires the usage of four states, which are the same as in the BB84 protocol, and two additional directions of polarization: right circular and left circular (Bruss, 1998). Such changes decrease the amount of information, which can be intercepted. But on

Next, the *4+2 protocol* is intermediate between the BB84 and B92 protocol (Huttner et al., 1995). There are four different states used in this protocol for encryption: "0" and "1" in two bases. States in each base are selected non-orthogonal. Moreover, states in different bases must also be pairwise non-orthogonal. This protocol has a higher information security level than the BB84 protocol, when weak coherent pulses, but not a single photon source, are used by sender (Huttner et al., 1995). But the efficiency of the 4+2 protocol is lower than efficiency

In the *Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol* (Goldenberg & Vaidman, 1995), encryption of "0" and "1" is performed using two orthogonal states. Each of these two states is the superposition of two localised normalised wave packets. For protection against intercept-resend attack,

A modified type of Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol is called the *Koashi-Imoto protocol* (Koashi & Imoto, 1997). This protocol does not use a random time for sending packets, but it uses an interferometer's non-symmetrisation (the light is broken in equal proportions between both

The measure of QKD protocol security is Shannon's mutual information between legitimate users (Alice and Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve): *I D AE* ( ) and *I D BE* ( ) , where *D* is error level which is created by eavesdropping. For most attacks on QKD protocols, *I DID AE BE* () () = , we will therefore use *I D AE* ( ) . The lower *I D AE* ( ) in the extended range of

Six-state protocol and BB84 protocol were generalised in case of using *d*-level quantum systems — qudits instead qubits (Cerf et al., 2002). This allows increasing the information

the other hand, the efficiency of the protocol decreases to 33%.

Pirandola et al., 2008).

transmitted photons.

of BB84 protocol.

packets are sent at random times.

long and short interferometer arms).

*D* is, the more secure the protocol is.


In recent years, quantum cryptography (QC) has attracted considerable interest. Quantum key distribution (QKD) (Bennett, 1992; Bennett et al., 1992; Bennett et al., 1995; Bennett & Brassard, 1984; Bouwmeester et al., 2000; Gisin et al., 2002; Lütkenhaus & Shields, 2009; Scarani et al., 2009; Vasiliu & Vorobiyenko 2006; Williams, 2011) plays a dominant role in QC. The overwhelming majority of theoretic and practical research projects in QC are related to the development of QKD protocols. The number of different quantum technologies is increasing, but there is no comprehensive information about classification of these technologies in scientific literature (there are only a few works concerning different classifications of QKD protocols, for example (Gisin et al., 2002; Scarani, et al., 2009)). This makes it difficult to estimate the level of the latest achievements and does not allow using quantum technologies with full efficiency. The main purpose of this chapter is the systematisation and classification of up-to-date effective quantum technologies of data (transmitted via telecommunication channels) security, analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, prospects and difficulties of implementation in telecommunication systems.

The first of all *quantum technologies of information security* consist of (Korchenko et al., 2010b):


The theoretical basis of quantum cryptography is stated in set of books and review papers (see e.g. Bouwmeester et al., 2000; Gisin et al., 2002; Hayashi, 2006; Imre & Balazs, 2005; Kollmitzer & Pivk, 2010; Lomonaco, 1998; Nielsen & Chuang, 2000; Schumacher & Westmoreland, 2010; Vedral, 2006; Williams, 2011).
