We are IntechOpen, the world's leading publisher of Open Access books Built by scientists, for scientists

4,200+

Open access books available

116,000+

International authors and editors

125M+

Downloads

151 Countries delivered to Our authors are among the

Top 1%

most cited scientists

12.2% Contributors from top 500 universities

Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)

### Interested in publishing with us? Contact book.department@intechopen.com

Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. For more information visit www.intechopen.com

## **Meet the editor**

Dr Rehab O. Abdel Rahman, PhD, is a nuclear engineering lecturer at Radioactive Waste Management Department, Hot Laboratory & Waste Management Center, Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt. Dr Abdel Rahman received her Ph.D. degree in Assessment of Unsaturated Zone as a Part of Waste Disposal Site from Nuclear Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria

University, Egypt. She has experience in developing safety, performance and risk assessment studies for waste management systems. She is noted for her work on the assessment and evaluation of different natural and synthetic materials for their potential application in waste management practice. Dr Abdel Rahman has lectured extensively and published more than 25 research and review papers in international journals and conferences. Her research interests include different aspects of radioactive waste management, including radioactive waste treatment, conditioning and disposal.

Contents

**Preface IX** 

Chapter 1 **Planning and Implementation** 

R. O. Abdel Rahman

Philippe Brunet

**Section 2 Pre-Disposal Activities 99** 

Timothy Miller

Chapter 3 **Problems of Uranium Waste and** 

Chapter 2 **A Controversial Management Process: From** 

Chapter 4 **Environmental Migration of Radionuclides** 

**Areas of the Southern Urals 65**  V. V. Kostyuchenko, A. V. Akleyev, L. M. Peremyslova, I. Ya. Popova, N. N. Kazachonok and V. S. Melnikov

Chapter 5 **Radioactive Waste Assay for Reclassification 101** 

Nandy Maitreyee and C. Sunil

D. Yu. Chuvilin, V. E. Khvostionov,

Chapter 6 **Estimation of Induced Activity in an ADSS Facility 117** 

Chapter 7 **Low-Waste and Proliferation-Free Production of Medical** 

D. V. Markovskij, V. A. Pavshouk and V. A. Zagryadsky

**Radioisotopes in Solution and Molten-Salt Reactors 139** 

**of Radioactive Waste Management System 3** 

**the Remnants of the Uranium Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 19** 

**Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 39** 

B. M. Djenbaev, B. K. Kaldybaev and B. T. Zholboldiev

**90Sr,137Cs, 239Pu) in Accidentally Contaminated** 

**Section 1 Introduction 1** 

**(**

### Contents


**Section 1 Introduction 1** 


#### Chapter 3 **Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 39**  B. M. Djenbaev, B. K. Kaldybaev and B. T. Zholboldiev

	- N. N. Kazachonok and V. S. Melnikov

X Contents


Contents VII

Chapter 17 **Statistical Analyses of Pore Pressure Signals**

Chapter 18 **Particulate Phases Possibly Conveyed** 

Chapter 19 **Modelling Groundwater Contamination** 

**in Salt, Granitoid and Clay 459**

Chapter 20 **An Assessment of the Impact of Advanced** 

Jan Marivoet and Eef Weetjens

Constantin Marin

Michal O. Schwartz

Christophe Nussbaum and David Bailly

**in Claystone During Excavation Works at** 

Rachid Ababou, Hassane Fatmi, Jean-Michel Matray,

**Above High-Level Nuclear-Waste Repositories**

**Nuclear Fuel Cycles on Geological Disposal 487**

**the Mont Terri Underground Research Laboratory 373** 

**from Nuclear Waste Repositories by Groundwater 431** 

Chapter 17 **Statistical Analyses of Pore Pressure Signals in Claystone During Excavation Works at the Mont Terri Underground Research Laboratory 373**  Rachid Ababou, Hassane Fatmi, Jean-Michel Matray, Christophe Nussbaum and David Bailly

VI Contents

Chapter 8 **Substantial Reduction of High Level Radioactive Waste by Effective Transmutation of Minor** 

Chapter 9 **Clean-Up and Decontamination of Hot-Cells** 

A. O. Pavelescu and M. Dragusin

Kwangheon Park, Jinhyun Sung,

Chapter 11 **Radionuclide and Contaminant Immobilization** 

**of Solidification Stress Theory 263** Charles Solbrig, Matthew Morrison

**in an Electrorefiner Tipping Accident 283** 

**Management of Fusion Power Plants 303**

Chapter 15 **Diffusion of Radionuclides in Concrete and Soil 331**  Shas V. Mattigod, Dawn M. Wellman, Chase C. Bovaird, Kent E. Parker, Kurtis P. Recknagle, Libby Clayton

Chapter 16 **Hydrogeologic Characterization of Fractured Rock** 

Donald M. Reeves, Rishi Parashar and Yong Zhang

**Masses Intended for Disposal of Radioactive Waste 351** 

and Toshikazu Takeda

Chapter 10 **Decontamination of Radioactive** 

Chapter 12 **Experimental Verification** 

Chapter 13 **Cadmium Personnel Doses** 

Chapter 14 **Radioactive Waste** 

and Charles Solbrig

and Kenneth Bateman

Clinton Wilson, Chad Pope

Luigi Di Pace, Laila El-Guebaly, Boris Kolbasov, Vincent Massaut

and Massimo Zucchetti

**Section 3 Disposal Activities 329**

and Marc I. Wood

Michio Yamawaki, Kenji Konashi, Koji Fujimura

**From the IFIN-HH VVR-S Research Reactor 197**

Moonsung Koh, Hongdu Kim and Hakwon Kim

**Actinides in Fast Reactors Using Innovative Targets 163** 

**Contaminants Using Liquid and Supercritical CO2 219** 

**in the Fluidized Bed Steam Reforming Waste Product 239**  James J. Neeway, Nikolla P. Qafoku, Joseph H. Westsik Jr., Christopher F. Brown, Carol M. Jantzen and Eric M. Pierce


Preface

The safe management of nuclear and radioactive wastes is a subject that has recently received considerable recognition from public and different governmental, regional and international bodies. This recognition has not only stem from the huge volume of cumulative wastes from previous practice in both peaceful and military fields, but also because the public relate their acceptance for new nuclear power programs to their confidence in the waste management practice. These points impose new burdens on the workers in the waste management field, since they have to understand and deal with technical difficulties beside their reactions to non-technical issues. This book aims to cover the practice and research efforts that are currently conducted to deal with the technical difficulties in different radioactive waste management activities and to introduce to the non-technical factors that can affect the management practice. International experts have cooperated to summarize their practical experience and present advances in managing different types of radioactive wastes and their longterm behavior. The book is targeting professional people in the radioactive waste management industry and reader with technical background such as graduate and postgraduate students undertaking courses in Environmental Science and

The book consists of 20 chapters, organized into three sections that cover important topics in the radioactive waste management field. The first four chapters are introductory, that introduces to the waste management system, explain the interference between technical and non-technical factors, and illustrate how old management practices and radioactive accident can affect the environment. The opening chapter By Dr. R. O. Abdel Rahman, introduces the radioactive waste management system and refer to the technical and non-technical aspects for planning and implementing this system. Dr. P. Brunet presents the historical interference between the technical, social and political factors and summarizes the controversial management process for uranium mine in France. Prof. Dejenbeav et al. present methods and results of the recent identification of uranium tailings in Kyrgyzstan. And finally, the long-term environmental migration from accidentally contaminated site in southern

urals in Russian federation was summarized by Prof. Kostyuchenko et al.

The second section is concerned with pre-disposal activities, it summarizes the knowledge gained from current radioactive waste management practice and results of

Environmental, Civil, Chemical and Nuclear Engineering.

### Preface

The safe management of nuclear and radioactive wastes is a subject that has recently received considerable recognition from public and different governmental, regional and international bodies. This recognition has not only stem from the huge volume of cumulative wastes from previous practice in both peaceful and military fields, but also because the public relate their acceptance for new nuclear power programs to their confidence in the waste management practice. These points impose new burdens on the workers in the waste management field, since they have to understand and deal with technical difficulties beside their reactions to non-technical issues. This book aims to cover the practice and research efforts that are currently conducted to deal with the technical difficulties in different radioactive waste management activities and to introduce to the non-technical factors that can affect the management practice. International experts have cooperated to summarize their practical experience and present advances in managing different types of radioactive wastes and their longterm behavior. The book is targeting professional people in the radioactive waste management industry and reader with technical background such as graduate and postgraduate students undertaking courses in Environmental Science and Environmental, Civil, Chemical and Nuclear Engineering.

The book consists of 20 chapters, organized into three sections that cover important topics in the radioactive waste management field. The first four chapters are introductory, that introduces to the waste management system, explain the interference between technical and non-technical factors, and illustrate how old management practices and radioactive accident can affect the environment. The opening chapter By Dr. R. O. Abdel Rahman, introduces the radioactive waste management system and refer to the technical and non-technical aspects for planning and implementing this system. Dr. P. Brunet presents the historical interference between the technical, social and political factors and summarizes the controversial management process for uranium mine in France. Prof. Dejenbeav et al. present methods and results of the recent identification of uranium tailings in Kyrgyzstan. And finally, the long-term environmental migration from accidentally contaminated site in southern urals in Russian federation was summarized by Prof. Kostyuchenko et al.

The second section is concerned with pre-disposal activities, it summarizes the knowledge gained from current radioactive waste management practice and results of

#### X Preface

research efforts for using some innovative technologies. The presented activities include reclassification, reduction of generated wastes, decontamination practice and advances, assessment of the performance of different solidified wastes and waste management facilities. The section is beginning with the presentation of a new analytical technique that is used in U.K. for the reclassification of the wastes at the Atomic Weapon Establishment (AWE) by Dr. Miller.

Preface XI

The third section provides the reader with an overview of the performance of the waste package, site characterization studies, and modelling ground water efforts. The first chapter by Dr. Mattigod et al., assess the performance of waste package under unsaturated conditions. The diffusivity measurements of Re, Tc and I in concrete containment and the surrounding vadose zone was presented. The effects of carbonation, presence of metallic iron, and fracturing of concrete and the varying

Within the site selection activity, the relative importance of the processes that occur within the site and can affect the disposal performance is evaluated and important parameters for assessing the system performance are collected and utilized to ensure that the host environment is having a good containment performance. One of the criteria that determine the suitability of a specific site to host high – level radioactive waste disposal is the radionuclides transport through the fracture of the host rock. The identification of the fracture network using a new approach was addressed by Dr. Reeves et al. The proposed approach is relaying on screening the candidate host rock according to relatively simple criteria obtained from fracture characterization. The characterization of elastic specific storativity and elastic effective porosity in claystone sites is an important topic to model the performance of the claystone as a host rock. Dr. Ababou et al summarizes the statistical methods utilized in quantifying the performance of the clay rock under barometric and earth tides fluctuations. Dr. Constantin summarized the effect of the presence of particulate phases on the radionuclides transport form disposal facilities. His review work is dedicated to provide an adequate definition of the particulate phases, and their effect on

Modeling groundwater contamination is an essential activity to ensure the long-term safety of the disposal facility, Dr. Michael is summarizing the modelling effort to predict the groundwater contamination above high-level waste disposal in three different host rocks. And finally the impact of using transmutation on the radioactive waste management the geological disposal was discussed by Dr. Marivot et al. The chapter is summarizing the results of important international projects that studied

**R. O. Abdel Rahman** 

Egypt

Hot Lab. Center, Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt

moisture contents in soil on the diffusivities of Tc and I were summarized.

radiocolloids development and distribution.

these topics.

The reduction of the amount of generated radioactive wastes is one of the most important topics in radioactive waste management. Three chapters are presenting this topic, the first deals with the reduction of radioactive wastes in the design phase of Accelerator Driven Subcritical System. This chapter, by Prof. Nandy et al., was directed to estimate the induced activity in the two windows types, which separate between the target and beam pipe in Accelerator Driven Subcritical System. A method for reducing the radioactive wastes associated by medical isotope production is presented by Dr. Yu et al. This new low waste technology for the production of medical isotopes (Mo99 and Sr89) using a homogenous liquid nuclear fuel that were conducted in Kurchatov Institute Russian Federation. Where the third chapter is related to the transmutation of minor actinides in fast reactors as a technique to reduce the half life of these actinides and consequently reduce the requirements for managing these wastes. Prof. Yamawaki Michio et al. are presenting in this chapter the results of actinide-hydride target transmutation research.

The decontamination of contaminated facilities is one of the phases that led to the generation of radioactive wastes, as secondary wastes, good planning and implementation of this phase can led to the minimization of the generated secondary radioactive wastes. Two chapters in this section deals with this topic, Dr. Pavelescu Alexandru Octavian et al. addressed the practice of the clean up and decontamination of hot cells in IFIN-HH VVR-S research reactor, Romania. The second chapter by Prof. Park Kwangheon et al. introduces innovative technique to reduce the amount of generated secondary wastes.

Producing a stable radioactive waste form is an important activity in the management practice, three chapters were devoted to present the recent research effort in this activity. The utilization of fluidized bed steam reforming process to immobilize radioactive wastes is discussed by Dr. Neeway et al. The aim of this chapter is to assess the performance of this technique in immobilizing the radioactive wastes. The second chapter was directed to study the solidification stress induced in ceramic waste form produced from the immobilization of actinides and fission products by Dr. Solbrig Charles et al. The third chapter, by Dr. Clinton Wilson et al, aimed to assess the impact of accidental release of cadmium from immobilization facility. That assessment was conducting by estimating the airborne cadmium concentration caused by facility design base earthquake which damages the electrorefiner vessel. The last chapter in this section is summarizing the waste management practice in fusion technology. By Dr. Luigi Di Pace et al.

The third section provides the reader with an overview of the performance of the waste package, site characterization studies, and modelling ground water efforts. The first chapter by Dr. Mattigod et al., assess the performance of waste package under unsaturated conditions. The diffusivity measurements of Re, Tc and I in concrete containment and the surrounding vadose zone was presented. The effects of carbonation, presence of metallic iron, and fracturing of concrete and the varying moisture contents in soil on the diffusivities of Tc and I were summarized.

X Preface

research efforts for using some innovative technologies. The presented activities include reclassification, reduction of generated wastes, decontamination practice and advances, assessment of the performance of different solidified wastes and waste management facilities. The section is beginning with the presentation of a new analytical technique that is used in U.K. for the reclassification of the wastes at the

The reduction of the amount of generated radioactive wastes is one of the most important topics in radioactive waste management. Three chapters are presenting this topic, the first deals with the reduction of radioactive wastes in the design phase of Accelerator Driven Subcritical System. This chapter, by Prof. Nandy et al., was directed to estimate the induced activity in the two windows types, which separate between the target and beam pipe in Accelerator Driven Subcritical System. A method for reducing the radioactive wastes associated by medical isotope production is presented by Dr. Yu et al. This new low waste technology for the production of medical isotopes (Mo99 and Sr89) using a homogenous liquid nuclear fuel that were conducted in Kurchatov Institute Russian Federation. Where the third chapter is related to the transmutation of minor actinides in fast reactors as a technique to reduce the half life of these actinides and consequently reduce the requirements for managing these wastes. Prof. Yamawaki Michio et al. are presenting in this chapter the results of

The decontamination of contaminated facilities is one of the phases that led to the generation of radioactive wastes, as secondary wastes, good planning and implementation of this phase can led to the minimization of the generated secondary radioactive wastes. Two chapters in this section deals with this topic, Dr. Pavelescu Alexandru Octavian et al. addressed the practice of the clean up and decontamination of hot cells in IFIN-HH VVR-S research reactor, Romania. The second chapter by Prof. Park Kwangheon et al. introduces innovative technique to reduce the amount of

Producing a stable radioactive waste form is an important activity in the management practice, three chapters were devoted to present the recent research effort in this activity. The utilization of fluidized bed steam reforming process to immobilize radioactive wastes is discussed by Dr. Neeway et al. The aim of this chapter is to assess the performance of this technique in immobilizing the radioactive wastes. The second chapter was directed to study the solidification stress induced in ceramic waste form produced from the immobilization of actinides and fission products by Dr. Solbrig Charles et al. The third chapter, by Dr. Clinton Wilson et al, aimed to assess the impact of accidental release of cadmium from immobilization facility. That assessment was conducting by estimating the airborne cadmium concentration caused by facility design base earthquake which damages the electrorefiner vessel. The last chapter in this section is summarizing the waste management practice in fusion technology. By

Atomic Weapon Establishment (AWE) by Dr. Miller.

actinide-hydride target transmutation research.

generated secondary wastes.

Dr. Luigi Di Pace et al.

Within the site selection activity, the relative importance of the processes that occur within the site and can affect the disposal performance is evaluated and important parameters for assessing the system performance are collected and utilized to ensure that the host environment is having a good containment performance. One of the criteria that determine the suitability of a specific site to host high – level radioactive waste disposal is the radionuclides transport through the fracture of the host rock. The identification of the fracture network using a new approach was addressed by Dr. Reeves et al. The proposed approach is relaying on screening the candidate host rock according to relatively simple criteria obtained from fracture characterization. The characterization of elastic specific storativity and elastic effective porosity in claystone sites is an important topic to model the performance of the claystone as a host rock. Dr. Ababou et al summarizes the statistical methods utilized in quantifying the performance of the clay rock under barometric and earth tides fluctuations. Dr. Constantin summarized the effect of the presence of particulate phases on the radionuclides transport form disposal facilities. His review work is dedicated to provide an adequate definition of the particulate phases, and their effect on radiocolloids development and distribution.

Modeling groundwater contamination is an essential activity to ensure the long-term safety of the disposal facility, Dr. Michael is summarizing the modelling effort to predict the groundwater contamination above high-level waste disposal in three different host rocks. And finally the impact of using transmutation on the radioactive waste management the geological disposal was discussed by Dr. Marivot et al. The chapter is summarizing the results of important international projects that studied these topics.

> **R. O. Abdel Rahman**  Hot Lab. Center, Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt Egypt

**Section 1** 

**Introduction** 

## **Section 1**

**Introduction** 

**1** 

 *Egypt* 

R. O. Abdel Rahman

**Planning and Implementation** 

*Hot Lab. Center, Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt,* 

**of Radioactive Waste Management System** 

The application of radioactive and nuclear materials in power generation, industries, and research can lead to radioactive pollution. The sources of this pollution might include the discharge of radionuclides to the environment by nuclear power facilities, military establishments, research organizations, hospitals and general industry. Also, historical tests of nuclear weapons, nuclear and radioactive accidents and the deliberate discharge of radioactive wastes are representing major sources for this pollution (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2012). Several international agreements and declarations were developed to control the radioactive pollution especially those related to the discharge of radionuclides to the environment. These agreements and declarations impose obligations on national policies to prevent the occurrence of radioactive pollution (IAEA 200a, 2010). On national scale, governments are responsible for protecting the public and environments; the manner at which this responsibility is

implemented varies from country to country by using different legislative measures.

radioactive waste management activities will be briefly introduced.

**2. Waste management policy and strategy development** 

The protection of the environment and human health from the detrimental effects of radioactive wastes could be achieved through the effective development and implementation of radioactive waste management system. Recently, some trends that influence the practice of radioactive waste management have emerged worldwide. These trends include planning and application of radioactive waste policy and strategy, issue of new legislation and regulations, new waste minimization strategies, strengthen the quality assurance procedures, increased use of safety and risk assessment, strengthened application of physical protection and safeguards measures in designing and operation of waste management facilities, and new technological options (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2011 a). In this chapter, the recent development in radioactive waste management planning and implementation will be overviewed, the prerequisites and elements for developing and implementing radioactive waste policy and strategy will be highlighted. The advances in the development and application of legal framework and different technical options for

Policy is defined as a plan or course of action, as of a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and determine decisions and actions (the three dictionary

**1. Introduction** 

### **Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System**

R. O. Abdel Rahman *Hot Lab. Center, Atomic Energy Authority of Egypt,* 

 *Egypt* 

#### **1. Introduction**

The application of radioactive and nuclear materials in power generation, industries, and research can lead to radioactive pollution. The sources of this pollution might include the discharge of radionuclides to the environment by nuclear power facilities, military establishments, research organizations, hospitals and general industry. Also, historical tests of nuclear weapons, nuclear and radioactive accidents and the deliberate discharge of radioactive wastes are representing major sources for this pollution (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2012). Several international agreements and declarations were developed to control the radioactive pollution especially those related to the discharge of radionuclides to the environment. These agreements and declarations impose obligations on national policies to prevent the occurrence of radioactive pollution (IAEA 200a, 2010). On national scale, governments are responsible for protecting the public and environments; the manner at which this responsibility is implemented varies from country to country by using different legislative measures.

The protection of the environment and human health from the detrimental effects of radioactive wastes could be achieved through the effective development and implementation of radioactive waste management system. Recently, some trends that influence the practice of radioactive waste management have emerged worldwide. These trends include planning and application of radioactive waste policy and strategy, issue of new legislation and regulations, new waste minimization strategies, strengthen the quality assurance procedures, increased use of safety and risk assessment, strengthened application of physical protection and safeguards measures in designing and operation of waste management facilities, and new technological options (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2011 a). In this chapter, the recent development in radioactive waste management planning and implementation will be overviewed, the prerequisites and elements for developing and implementing radioactive waste policy and strategy will be highlighted. The advances in the development and application of legal framework and different technical options for radioactive waste management activities will be briefly introduced.

#### **2. Waste management policy and strategy development**

Policy is defined as a plan or course of action, as of a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and determine decisions and actions (the three dictionary

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 5

management plans. It identifies the importance of using risk informed decision making process, minimization of waste generation, transparency and public involvement, and the consideration of potential effect of climatic changes. Finally it outlines waste import and

> Allocation of responsibilities between the government, regulatory body and

Identification of safety measure in addition to physical protection and security of

Mechanisms for providing and maintaining

the financial, technical and human

Address the need to minimize the generation of radioactive waste at the

Identify the export/import of option for

Identify the main sources of radioactive waste and the intended technical management arrangements.

Identify whether the nuclear regulations are applied to naturally occurring

radioactive material (NORM) or not based

on its radioactive properties.

Indicate the extent of public and stakeholder involvement

Decide whether the spent fuel is considered as resource or as waste, or returned to

operational organizations

facilities

resources

design.

supplier

Table 1. Prerequisites and element for the development of national radioactive waste policy

After developing the waste management policy principals there is a need to have practical mechanisms to implement these principals, those practical mechanisms are forming the strategy. The first step in developing the waste management strategy is to assign the strategy development responsibility, then assess the availability of information that will be used to develop the strategy. The IAEA has developed a list of important information that should be taken into account during the development of waste management strategy. Those

radioactive wastes.

export and the national organization involvement (Defra 2007).

Prerequisites Elements

Existence of institutional structure (regulatory body, operational

Existence of national legal structure and

Availability of resources to implement the

Applicable international conventions

Indicative national inventories (amounts and types) of existing and anticipated

The main parties concerned and involved with spent fuel and radioactive waste

The existing relevant national policies and its applicable strategies, if any, should be available in response to any policy

wastes should be identified

management in the country

development

organization)

policy

regulatory framework

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/policy). In the beginning of the nuclear era, the countries that first started to utilize nuclear and radioactive materials did not have any radioactive waste policy or strategy. To address the radioactive waste issue, some countries had developed and implemented permanent disposal repositories for radioactive wastes and other countries placed radioactive wastes into on-site or off-site storage facilities without the development of national policy for dealing with these wastes.

Preventing risks, to human and the environment, associated with exposure to radioactive wastes was the primary reason to motivate the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to formulate and publish the policy principals statement in 1995 that deals with the environmental and ethical issue related to managing and disposing these wastes. This statement indicated that "*Radioactive waste should be managed in such a way as to secure an acceptable level of protection for human health, provide an acceptable level of protection for the environment, assure that possible effects on human health and the environment beyond national borders will be taken into account, ensure that the predicted impacts on the health of future generations will not be greater than relevant levels of impact that are acceptable today, and that the management practice will not impose undue burdens on future generations. Also, radioactive waste should be managed within an appropriate national legal framework including clear allocation of responsibilities and provision for independent regulatory functions, the generation of radioactive waste shall be kept to the minimum practicable, interdependencies among all steps in radioactive waste generation and management should be taken into account and the safety of facilities for radioactive waste management shall be appropriately assured during their lifetime*" (IAEA 1995).

These policy principles can be applied to all types of radioactive wastes, regardless their physical and chemical characteristics or origin. In addition to these principles, each country have its own policy principles that define the aims and requirements for the regulatory and legislative framework and might includes administrative and operational measure (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al). These principals are reflecting the national priorities, circumstances, structures, and human and financial resources. In 2009, IAEA has identified the prerequisites and elements for the development of national radioactive waste management policy. These prerequisites and elements are summarized in Table 1 (IAEA 2009).

As indicated above, some countries started to build and operate radioactive waste disposal without the existence of national waste management policy. Nowadays, these countries started to develop national radioactive waste management policy principals. On the other hand, some existing national radioactive waste management policy principals may need to be updated to improve parts of the policy based on experience of its application and to reflect the changing circumstances in the country and in the world (IAEA 2009). Within this context, the South African policy and strategy document recently developed and was issued in 2005. It included beside the international principals proposed by the IAEA some national principals, that identify the financial and human resources, management transparency and public perception, nature of waste decision making process, international cooperation and national involvement (Department of minerals and energy 2005). In 2007, policy for the long-term management of the United Kingdom's solid low-level radioactive waste was developed following public consultation. That policy statement covers all management aspects for these wastes; it defines this waste category and the key requirements for the

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/policy). In the beginning of the nuclear era, the countries that first started to utilize nuclear and radioactive materials did not have any radioactive waste policy or strategy. To address the radioactive waste issue, some countries had developed and implemented permanent disposal repositories for radioactive wastes and other countries placed radioactive wastes into on-site or off-site storage facilities

Preventing risks, to human and the environment, associated with exposure to radioactive wastes was the primary reason to motivate the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to formulate and publish the policy principals statement in 1995 that deals with the environmental and ethical issue related to managing and disposing these wastes. This statement indicated that "*Radioactive waste should be managed in such a way as to secure an acceptable level of protection for human health, provide an acceptable level of protection for the environment, assure that possible effects on human health and the environment beyond national borders will be taken into account, ensure that the predicted impacts on the health of future generations will not be greater than relevant levels of impact that are acceptable today, and that the management practice will not impose undue burdens on future generations. Also, radioactive waste should be managed within an appropriate national legal framework including clear allocation of responsibilities and provision for independent regulatory functions, the generation of radioactive waste shall be kept to the minimum practicable, interdependencies among all steps in radioactive waste generation and management should be taken into account and the safety of facilities for radioactive waste management shall be appropriately assured during their lifetime*"

These policy principles can be applied to all types of radioactive wastes, regardless their physical and chemical characteristics or origin. In addition to these principles, each country have its own policy principles that define the aims and requirements for the regulatory and legislative framework and might includes administrative and operational measure (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al). These principals are reflecting the national priorities, circumstances, structures, and human and financial resources. In 2009, IAEA has identified the prerequisites and elements for the development of national radioactive waste management policy. These prerequisites and elements are summarized in Table 1

As indicated above, some countries started to build and operate radioactive waste disposal without the existence of national waste management policy. Nowadays, these countries started to develop national radioactive waste management policy principals. On the other hand, some existing national radioactive waste management policy principals may need to be updated to improve parts of the policy based on experience of its application and to reflect the changing circumstances in the country and in the world (IAEA 2009). Within this context, the South African policy and strategy document recently developed and was issued in 2005. It included beside the international principals proposed by the IAEA some national principals, that identify the financial and human resources, management transparency and public perception, nature of waste decision making process, international cooperation and national involvement (Department of minerals and energy 2005). In 2007, policy for the long-term management of the United Kingdom's solid low-level radioactive waste was developed following public consultation. That policy statement covers all management aspects for these wastes; it defines this waste category and the key requirements for the

without the development of national policy for dealing with these wastes.

(IAEA 1995).

(IAEA 2009).

management plans. It identifies the importance of using risk informed decision making process, minimization of waste generation, transparency and public involvement, and the consideration of potential effect of climatic changes. Finally it outlines waste import and export and the national organization involvement (Defra 2007).


Table 1. Prerequisites and element for the development of national radioactive waste policy

After developing the waste management policy principals there is a need to have practical mechanisms to implement these principals, those practical mechanisms are forming the strategy. The first step in developing the waste management strategy is to assign the strategy development responsibility, then assess the availability of information that will be used to develop the strategy. The IAEA has developed a list of important information that should be taken into account during the development of waste management strategy. Those

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 7

development as follow: the first and second level is the responsibility of the main national legislative body. The third level is the responsibility of the government departments or ministries whose portfolios cover one or more aspects affected or influenced by the management of radioactive waste. Exceptionally, the third level in the form of binding rules or codes as distinct from standards may be the responsibility of other bodies such as EPA and NRC in the United States or SSI and SKI in Sweden. There are two philosophies that could be adopted to develop the third and fourth levels, at the first there is a need to develop specifications standards and guides to direct the implementer on how to implement the first and second legislations. At this philosophy, the regulator has some responsibilities and the operator elaborate the detailed specifications then the reviewer and decision is made by the regulator. In the second philosophy, the regulation system is based only on the

After the establishment of the policy principles set, legal framework is created. To ensure the compliance with the legal framework, there is a need to acquire a formal legal instrument often described as license, permit or authorization. Depending on national legal framework, the licensing process may begin with some kind of decision on the site selection or site authorization or with the construction permit. Successful experiences in facility sitting have shown that active regulatory involvement is needed and is also possible without endangering the independence and integrity of the regulatory authorities (NEA

Radioactive waste management schemes differ from country to country, but the philosophical approach adopted generally is to dispose these wastes in environmentally acceptable ways (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2005 a). During the planning for such scheme, the collection and segregation of wastes, their volume reduction and appropriate conditioning into a form suitable for future handling, transportation, storage and disposal are considered. Pertinent activities in managing radioactive waste are schematically given in Fig. 1. This section is focused on introducing different waste management activities with special emphasizes on new waste minimization strategies, importance of quality assurance,

The objectives of waste minimization strategy are to limit the generation and spread of radioactive contamination and to reduce the volume of the managed wastes in the subsequent storage and disposal activities. The achievement of these objectives will limit the environmental impacts and total costs associated with contaminated material management. The main elements of this strategy can be grouped into four principals: source reduction, prevention of contamination spread, recycle and reuse, and waste management optimization (IAEA 2001 a, 2007). The reduction of the waste generation at the source begins during the planning for any facility that produces radioactive or nuclear wastes. This principal could be achieved by selecting appropriate processes and technologies, the selection of construction and operational material, and the implementation of appropriate procedures during the operational phase. Also, raising the awareness of the importance of

primary and secondary legislations (NEA 2005, Norrby & Wingefors 1995).

**4. Technical option for radioactive waste management** 

risk and performance assessment.

**4.1 Minimization of waste generation** 

2003).

include the estimation of existing and anticipated waste inventory and waste management facilities, the existence of acceptable waste classification system and regulation, the evaluation of waste characteristics and available resources, the knowledge of waste management strategies in other countries and the identification of concerned parties (IAEA 2009). The second step in the development of waste management strategy is the identification of possible end point and technical options. Finally the optimal strategy is determined and the implementation responsibility is assigned. It is worthy to mention that in strategy development, there are two alternatives. The first is a one level method called national plan, which is formulated from a national perspective and often specify one waste operator who is responsible for coordinating the development of such plans. While in the second method, there are two levels for formulating the strategy. At the first level the principal strategy elements are prescribed in general terms as a national strategy by government. At the second level, the detailed implementation of the principal strategy elements is delegated to particular waste owners (company strategies).

To assist the member countries in the nuclear energy agency (NEA), in developing safe sustainable and broadly acceptable strategies for the long-term management of all types of radioactive wastes. NEA has published recently the strategic plan that identity the role of the radioactive waste management committee (RWMC) with respect to the challenges that face the member countries and describe the area of interest for the future work. The identified strategic areas of interest included the following (NEA 2011):


#### **3. Developments and implementation of legal framework**

To ensure a safe practice for radioactive waste management, there is a need to develop and implement legal framework successfully (IAEA 2000 b). This framework is a part of the national legal system and usually has a hierarchy structure. IAEA has identified a four-level legal framework. The first level in this hierarchy is at the constitutional level, where the basic institutional and legal structure governing all relationships in the country is established. Below this level, there is the statutory level, at which specific laws are enacted by a parliament in order to establish necessary bodies and to adopt measures relating to the broad range of activities affecting national interests. At this level the independency of the regulatory body should be established and maintained. The third level comprises regulations for authorization, regulatory review and assessment, inspection and enforcement. And the final level consists of non-mandatory guidance instruments, which contain recommendations designed to assist persons and organizations in meeting the legal requirements (Stoiber et. al. 2003). In 2005, NEA identified the responsibility of each level

include the estimation of existing and anticipated waste inventory and waste management facilities, the existence of acceptable waste classification system and regulation, the evaluation of waste characteristics and available resources, the knowledge of waste management strategies in other countries and the identification of concerned parties (IAEA 2009). The second step in the development of waste management strategy is the identification of possible end point and technical options. Finally the optimal strategy is determined and the implementation responsibility is assigned. It is worthy to mention that in strategy development, there are two alternatives. The first is a one level method called national plan, which is formulated from a national perspective and often specify one waste operator who is responsible for coordinating the development of such plans. While in the second method, there are two levels for formulating the strategy. At the first level the principal strategy elements are prescribed in general terms as a national strategy by government. At the second level, the detailed implementation of the principal strategy

To assist the member countries in the nuclear energy agency (NEA), in developing safe sustainable and broadly acceptable strategies for the long-term management of all types of radioactive wastes. NEA has published recently the strategic plan that identity the role of the radioactive waste management committee (RWMC) with respect to the challenges that face the member countries and describe the area of interest for the future work. The

1. Organization of a comprehensive waste management system, including its financing 2. Development of robust and optimized roadmaps for spent fuel and radioactive waste

3. Licensing the first geological repositories for high level wastes and /or spent fuel and

7. Knowledge management and long-term preservation of records, knowledge and

To ensure a safe practice for radioactive waste management, there is a need to develop and implement legal framework successfully (IAEA 2000 b). This framework is a part of the national legal system and usually has a hierarchy structure. IAEA has identified a four-level legal framework. The first level in this hierarchy is at the constitutional level, where the basic institutional and legal structure governing all relationships in the country is established. Below this level, there is the statutory level, at which specific laws are enacted by a parliament in order to establish necessary bodies and to adopt measures relating to the broad range of activities affecting national interests. At this level the independency of the regulatory body should be established and maintained. The third level comprises regulations for authorization, regulatory review and assessment, inspection and enforcement. And the final level consists of non-mandatory guidance instruments, which contain recommendations designed to assist persons and organizations in meeting the legal requirements (Stoiber et. al. 2003). In 2005, NEA identified the responsibility of each level

elements is delegated to particular waste owners (company strategies).

identified strategic areas of interest included the following (NEA 2011):

6. Management of low level wastes and special types of radioactive waste

management towards disposal, including transportation

**3. Developments and implementation of legal framework** 

4. Industrial implementation of deep geological disposal

for other long-lived wastes

5. Effective decommissioning

memory

development as follow: the first and second level is the responsibility of the main national legislative body. The third level is the responsibility of the government departments or ministries whose portfolios cover one or more aspects affected or influenced by the management of radioactive waste. Exceptionally, the third level in the form of binding rules or codes as distinct from standards may be the responsibility of other bodies such as EPA and NRC in the United States or SSI and SKI in Sweden. There are two philosophies that could be adopted to develop the third and fourth levels, at the first there is a need to develop specifications standards and guides to direct the implementer on how to implement the first and second legislations. At this philosophy, the regulator has some responsibilities and the operator elaborate the detailed specifications then the reviewer and decision is made by the regulator. In the second philosophy, the regulation system is based only on the primary and secondary legislations (NEA 2005, Norrby & Wingefors 1995).

After the establishment of the policy principles set, legal framework is created. To ensure the compliance with the legal framework, there is a need to acquire a formal legal instrument often described as license, permit or authorization. Depending on national legal framework, the licensing process may begin with some kind of decision on the site selection or site authorization or with the construction permit. Successful experiences in facility sitting have shown that active regulatory involvement is needed and is also possible without endangering the independence and integrity of the regulatory authorities (NEA 2003).

#### **4. Technical option for radioactive waste management**

Radioactive waste management schemes differ from country to country, but the philosophical approach adopted generally is to dispose these wastes in environmentally acceptable ways (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2005 a). During the planning for such scheme, the collection and segregation of wastes, their volume reduction and appropriate conditioning into a form suitable for future handling, transportation, storage and disposal are considered. Pertinent activities in managing radioactive waste are schematically given in Fig. 1. This section is focused on introducing different waste management activities with special emphasizes on new waste minimization strategies, importance of quality assurance, risk and performance assessment.

#### **4.1 Minimization of waste generation**

The objectives of waste minimization strategy are to limit the generation and spread of radioactive contamination and to reduce the volume of the managed wastes in the subsequent storage and disposal activities. The achievement of these objectives will limit the environmental impacts and total costs associated with contaminated material management. The main elements of this strategy can be grouped into four principals: source reduction, prevention of contamination spread, recycle and reuse, and waste management optimization (IAEA 2001 a, 2007). The reduction of the waste generation at the source begins during the planning for any facility that produces radioactive or nuclear wastes. This principal could be achieved by selecting appropriate processes and technologies, the selection of construction and operational material, and the implementation of appropriate procedures during the operational phase. Also, raising the awareness of the importance of

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 9

The last element in the waste minimization strategies is the optimization of radioactive waste management program that can reduce the volume of the secondary waste. Proper characterization of the generated wastes helps in sorting and segregation of the wastes according to its physical, chemical and radiological characteristics and facilitates the

Treatment is defined as operations intended to benefit safety and/or economy by changing the characteristics of the waste. The basic treatment objectives are volume reduction, removal of radionuclides from the waste and changing the composition of the waste (IAEA 2003 a). There are various commercial volume reduction technologies; the selection of any of these technologies is largely depending on the waste type. To facilitate the selection of the treatment options, the wastes are classified according to their activity limit (e.g. exempt waste, very low level waste, low level waste, intermediate level waste, and high level waste), chemical properties (e.g. aqueous/organic waste, acidity/alkalinity, chemical stability, redox potential, toxicity), physical characteristics (liquid/solid/gas, density, morphology, compactability and level of segregation) and biological properties. Table 2 lists the commercial technical treatment options for managing different waste classes (IAEA

Liquid aqueous waste Liquid organic waste Solid wastes Gaseous

Ion exchange Emulsification Compaction Sorption, Evaporation Absorption Melting, Scrubbing

The conditioning activity includes the operations that produce a waste package suitable for handling, transport, storage and/or disposal. Conditioning may include the conversion of the waste to a solid waste form (immobilization), enclosure of the waste in containers, and, if necessary, providing an over-pack (IAEA 2003 a). The produced waste form must be structurally stable to ensure that the waste does not degrade and/or promote slumping, collapse or other failure. Chemical and physical immobilizations provide the required structural stability and minimize the contaminant migration. Immobilization techniques

(e.g. distillation) Fragmentation

Storage for decay (for very low level

Filtration

wastes)

Incineration

Membrane processes Wet oxidation Incineration Evaporation Alkaline hydrolysis Encapsulation,

Table 2. Available technical treatment options for different waste categories

optimization of the treatment option.

**4.2 Treatment technical options** 

1999, 1994 a ,2009, Ojovan, 2011 ).

Reverse osmosis Phase separation

Chemical precipitation (Coagulation/flocculation

/separation)

Electrochemical Solvent extraction

**4.3 Conditioning technical options** 

waste minimization through training the employees, and the development and application of contamination and quality control procedures represent important tools to implement the waste minimization strategy.

Fig. 1. Radioactive Waste System

Spread of radioactive contamination can lead to creation of secondary wastes, so preventing contamination is consider one of the waste minimization principals. Proper zoning of the facility at the design phase, administrative controls, management initiatives, and selection of decontamination processes are mean keys in reducing the probability of contamination. Finally, the selection of the treatment processes and the utilized chemicals may help in avoiding the production of chemically toxic radioactive wastes.

The recycle and reuse is an attractive method to minimize the generated wastes during the refurbishment and decommissioning of radioactive and nuclear facilities. The decision of selecting this method is dependent on the availability of regulations and criteria, suitable measurement methodology and instrumentation and public acceptance.

The last element in the waste minimization strategies is the optimization of radioactive waste management program that can reduce the volume of the secondary waste. Proper characterization of the generated wastes helps in sorting and segregation of the wastes according to its physical, chemical and radiological characteristics and facilitates the optimization of the treatment option.

#### **4.2 Treatment technical options**

8 Radioactive Waste

waste minimization through training the employees, and the development and application of contamination and quality control procedures represent important tools to implement the

Spread of radioactive contamination can lead to creation of secondary wastes, so preventing contamination is consider one of the waste minimization principals. Proper zoning of the facility at the design phase, administrative controls, management initiatives, and selection of decontamination processes are mean keys in reducing the probability of contamination. Finally, the selection of the treatment processes and the utilized chemicals may help in

**WAC** 

The recycle and reuse is an attractive method to minimize the generated wastes during the refurbishment and decommissioning of radioactive and nuclear facilities. The decision of selecting this method is dependent on the availability of regulations and criteria, suitable

avoiding the production of chemically toxic radioactive wastes.

measurement methodology and instrumentation and public acceptance.

waste minimization strategy.

Fig. 1. Radioactive Waste System

**Conditioning** 

**Treatment** 

**Transportation** 

**Storage / Disposal** 

**Characterization** 

**Transportation** 

**Generation** 

Treatment is defined as operations intended to benefit safety and/or economy by changing the characteristics of the waste. The basic treatment objectives are volume reduction, removal of radionuclides from the waste and changing the composition of the waste (IAEA 2003 a). There are various commercial volume reduction technologies; the selection of any of these technologies is largely depending on the waste type. To facilitate the selection of the treatment options, the wastes are classified according to their activity limit (e.g. exempt waste, very low level waste, low level waste, intermediate level waste, and high level waste), chemical properties (e.g. aqueous/organic waste, acidity/alkalinity, chemical stability, redox potential, toxicity), physical characteristics (liquid/solid/gas, density, morphology, compactability and level of segregation) and biological properties. Table 2 lists the commercial technical treatment options for managing different waste classes (IAEA 1999, 1994 a ,2009, Ojovan, 2011 ).


Table 2. Available technical treatment options for different waste categories

#### **4.3 Conditioning technical options**

The conditioning activity includes the operations that produce a waste package suitable for handling, transport, storage and/or disposal. Conditioning may include the conversion of the waste to a solid waste form (immobilization), enclosure of the waste in containers, and, if necessary, providing an over-pack (IAEA 2003 a). The produced waste form must be structurally stable to ensure that the waste does not degrade and/or promote slumping, collapse or other failure. Chemical and physical immobilizations provide the required structural stability and minimize the contaminant migration. Immobilization techniques

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 11

materials. Transport regulations include requirements on the waste package that ensure its survival under accident conditions. Depending on importance of the shipped wastes from security, safeguards, and safety point of views, the risk assessment of the transport process

Long-term management of spent fuel is becoming of increasing concern, since few decisions are now available with regard to the implementation of their final disposal. This might be attributed to the public perception towards the final disposal of spent fuel and/or the need to gain better insights into the long-term performance of spent fuel and materials. This class of radioactive wastes is currently stored in different storage types. These include, nuclear power plant pools, wet and dry storage facilities. Figure 2 illustrates the capacity and

Fig. 2. Comparison of capacities and inventories of different types of spent fuel storage

Interim storage of radioactive waste packages is not only required if the disposal facility is not available but also for wastes those include very short lived radionuclides. The design and operation of storage facilities must comply with the basic safety principles set up on both the national and international scale. To assess the compliance of the storage facility, a licensing process including safety and environmental impact assessments must be part of the waste management system. The main functions of a storage facility for conditioned

might include the following (IAEA 2003 b):

4. Exposure parameters for the transport workers, 5. Routing data and population characteristics,

2. Radiological, physical, an chemical characteristics of the waste, 3. Physical characteristics of the package and conveyance,

6. Frequency and severity of accident for a given transport mode, and

inventories of different types of spent fuel storage (IAEA 2002).

1. Shipment information,

7. Estimation of doses to public

**4.5 Storage technical options** 

(IAEA 2002)

consist of entrapping the contaminant within a solid matrix i.e. cement, cement-based material, bitumen, glass, or ceramic (R.O. Abdel Rahman et al. 2007 a).

Cementation of radioactive waste has been practiced for many years basically for immobilization of low and intermediate level radioactive waste. The majority of cementation techniques rely on using Portland Cement as the primary binder. Other binders might be used to improve either the mechanical performance of the final waste matrix or to improve the retention of radionuclides in that matrix, these include fly ash, blast furnace slag, bentonite, zeolite and other materials (R.O. Abdel Rahman & A.A. Zaki 2009 a). The implementation of this technique worldwide is supported by its compatibility with aqueous waste streams, capability of activated several chemical and physical immobilization mechanisms for a wide range of inorganic waste species. Also, cement immobilization possesses good mechanical characteristics, radiation and thermal stability, simple operational conditions, availability, and low cost (R.O. Abdel Rahman et al. 2007 a).

Bituminisation is applied to immobilize the secondary wastes resulting from the treatment of low and intermediate level liquid effluents of very low heat generation (< 40 TBq/m3). The bituminized product has a very low permeability and solubility in water and is compatible with most environmental conditions (IAEA 1998). This kind of immobilization media is restricted for wastes that contain strongly oxidizing components, e.g. nitrates, biodegradable materials and soluble salts. A special care should be given to this waste form during its storage owing to its flammability.

Vitrification is one of the important immobilization techniques which relays on the utilization of glass as immobilizing media, because of the small volume of the resulting waste-form, its high durability and stability in corrosive environments. To ensure the high durability of the produced matrix, the vitrification process should be conducted under very high processing temperatures (>1500 °C), which impose limitations on the immobilized radionuclides and increase the amount of generated secondary wastes. As a result, the most common glasses used in vitrification of nuclear waste are borosilicates and phosphates which use lower processing temperatures (≈1000 °C) while still forming a durable product (M.I. Ojovan & W.E.Lee 2005).

The above-mentioned immobilization technologies are available commercially and have been demonstrated to be viable. The highest degree of volume reduction and safety is achieved through vitrification although this is the most complex and expensive method requiring a relatively high initial capital investment. The potential of using new immobilization matrices were emerged to deal with difficult legacy waste streams. These matrices include crystalline (mineral-like) and composite radionuclide immobilization matrices as well as using thermochemical and in situ immobilization techniques (M.I. Ojovan & W.E.Lee 2005).

#### **4.4 Transport of radioactive wastes**

The transport of radioactive wastes includes three stage namely; preparation, transfer and emplacement (IAEA 1994 b). The safety of the transport processes could be provided through meeting the provisions of transport regulations, which aim to protect persons, property and the environment from the effects of radiation during the transport of these materials. Transport regulations include requirements on the waste package that ensure its survival under accident conditions. Depending on importance of the shipped wastes from security, safeguards, and safety point of views, the risk assessment of the transport process might include the following (IAEA 2003 b):

1. Shipment information,

10 Radioactive Waste

consist of entrapping the contaminant within a solid matrix i.e. cement, cement-based

Cementation of radioactive waste has been practiced for many years basically for immobilization of low and intermediate level radioactive waste. The majority of cementation techniques rely on using Portland Cement as the primary binder. Other binders might be used to improve either the mechanical performance of the final waste matrix or to improve the retention of radionuclides in that matrix, these include fly ash, blast furnace slag, bentonite, zeolite and other materials (R.O. Abdel Rahman & A.A. Zaki 2009 a). The implementation of this technique worldwide is supported by its compatibility with aqueous waste streams, capability of activated several chemical and physical immobilization mechanisms for a wide range of inorganic waste species. Also, cement immobilization possesses good mechanical characteristics, radiation and thermal stability, simple

operational conditions, availability, and low cost (R.O. Abdel Rahman et al. 2007 a).

during its storage owing to its flammability.

(M.I. Ojovan & W.E.Lee 2005).

Ojovan & W.E.Lee 2005).

**4.4 Transport of radioactive wastes** 

Bituminisation is applied to immobilize the secondary wastes resulting from the treatment of low and intermediate level liquid effluents of very low heat generation (< 40 TBq/m3). The bituminized product has a very low permeability and solubility in water and is compatible with most environmental conditions (IAEA 1998). This kind of immobilization media is restricted for wastes that contain strongly oxidizing components, e.g. nitrates, biodegradable materials and soluble salts. A special care should be given to this waste form

Vitrification is one of the important immobilization techniques which relays on the utilization of glass as immobilizing media, because of the small volume of the resulting waste-form, its high durability and stability in corrosive environments. To ensure the high durability of the produced matrix, the vitrification process should be conducted under very high processing temperatures (>1500 °C), which impose limitations on the immobilized radionuclides and increase the amount of generated secondary wastes. As a result, the most common glasses used in vitrification of nuclear waste are borosilicates and phosphates which use lower processing temperatures (≈1000 °C) while still forming a durable product

The above-mentioned immobilization technologies are available commercially and have been demonstrated to be viable. The highest degree of volume reduction and safety is achieved through vitrification although this is the most complex and expensive method requiring a relatively high initial capital investment. The potential of using new immobilization matrices were emerged to deal with difficult legacy waste streams. These matrices include crystalline (mineral-like) and composite radionuclide immobilization matrices as well as using thermochemical and in situ immobilization techniques (M.I.

The transport of radioactive wastes includes three stage namely; preparation, transfer and emplacement (IAEA 1994 b). The safety of the transport processes could be provided through meeting the provisions of transport regulations, which aim to protect persons, property and the environment from the effects of radiation during the transport of these

material, bitumen, glass, or ceramic (R.O. Abdel Rahman et al. 2007 a).


#### **4.5 Storage technical options**

Long-term management of spent fuel is becoming of increasing concern, since few decisions are now available with regard to the implementation of their final disposal. This might be attributed to the public perception towards the final disposal of spent fuel and/or the need to gain better insights into the long-term performance of spent fuel and materials. This class of radioactive wastes is currently stored in different storage types. These include, nuclear power plant pools, wet and dry storage facilities. Figure 2 illustrates the capacity and inventories of different types of spent fuel storage (IAEA 2002).

Fig. 2. Comparison of capacities and inventories of different types of spent fuel storage (IAEA 2002)

Interim storage of radioactive waste packages is not only required if the disposal facility is not available but also for wastes those include very short lived radionuclides. The design and operation of storage facilities must comply with the basic safety principles set up on both the national and international scale. To assess the compliance of the storage facility, a licensing process including safety and environmental impact assessments must be part of the waste management system. The main functions of a storage facility for conditioned

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 13

Container Mechanical strength, Limit water ingress, Retain radionuclides Waste form Mechanical strength, Limit water ingress, Retain radionuclides Backfill Void filling, Limit water infiltration, Radionuclide sorption

Cover Limit water infiltration, Control of gas release, Erosion barrier

**Place Depth (m) Type of reservoir** 

Hostim 30 Limestone mine

Bratrstvi -- Uranium mine

Asse 725-750 Salt mine

Loviisa 70-100 --------

Table 4. Summary of some underground disposal

utilized and illustrated (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2011 c).

**4.7 Safety of radioactive waste management.** 

Richard 70-80 Limestone mine waste

Morsleben 400-600 Potash and salt mine **Swedish** Final Repository 50 below Baltic Sea Metamorphic bedrock

Olkiluoto 60-100 Crystalline bedrock

**USA** WIPP 655 Rock salt formation

The optimization of the disposal is done by conducting safety assessment studies. These studies are complex due to the dynamic nature of the hydrological and biological subsystems in the host environment that affects the degradation scenarios of the disposal facility. So treating the disposal as one system is not possible, instead these subsystems are decoupled and divided into modules for which the evolution of the disposal is distinguished into step changes rather than continuous time change [NCRP 2005]. Generally, safety assessment relays on specifying assessment context, describing the disposal system, developing and justifying evolution scenarios, formulating and implementing of models; and finally analyzing the assessment results for each module. During the development of safety assessment, all confidence building tools should be

IAEA recommended that assessment studies have to be developed and well adapted to situations of concern to ensure the protection of human health and the environment (IAEA 1993 b). To apply this recommendation, an initial assessment of the planned waste

Gas control Structural materials Physical stability containment barrier

Intrusion barrier

**Barrier Function** 

Table 3. Function of each engineered barrier.

**Czechoslovakia** 

**Germany,**

**Finland**

radioactive waste are to provide safe custody of the waste packages and to protect both operators and the general public from any radiological hazards associated with radioactive wastes. The design of storage facilities should be capable of (IAEA 1998)


The storage facility may be associated with an area for inspection (including sorting and/or non-destructive examination), certification and labeling of waste packages. The storage facility is usually divided into areas where low contact dose rate packages are stored, areas where packages not meeting waste acceptance criteria (WAC) are stored, and a shielded area where high contact dose rate packages are kept secure (IAEA 1998). The design of the facility usually permits package stacking, sorting and visual inspection. Provision for maintaining a database keeping chain-of-custody for each waste package in storage must be included in the design. Key information about the waste package should include the total radionuclide content, the waste matrix used for immobilization, the treatment and/or conditioning method (as applicable), and the unique package designator. A hard copy file should follow the waste package from conditioning to its final disposal (IAEA 2001 b).

#### **4.6 Disposal technical options**

Disposal is the last step in the integrated radioactive waste management, it relay on the passive safety concept. The disposal facility includes waste emplacement area, buildings and services for waste receipt. Its design aims to provide isolation of the disposed waste for appropriate period of time taking into account the waste and site characteristics and the safety requirements (Bozkurt 2001, R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2005 a, b). To achieve this aim, the multi-barrier concept that relays on using engineered barriers to augment natural barriers has been developed. The use of engineered barriers helps in ensuring that increasingly stringent design aims are satisfied to an appropriate level (IAEA 1997). This concept helps in avoiding over-reliance on the natural barriers to provide the necessary safety (IAEA 1992 a, 1993 a).

Engineered barriers may consist of a number of separate components, including structural walls, buffer or backfill materials, chemical additives, liners, covers, leachate collection and drainage systems, cut-off walls, gas vents and monitoring wells (IAEA 1992 b). The design criteria for each barrier will differ according to the waste class and disposal type, IAEA have define the main function for the engineering barriers in a near surface disposal type. Those functions are listed in Table 3 (IAEA 2001 c).

Disposal facilities could be place in geological formation or near surface. Near-surface disposal includes two main types of disposal systems: shallow facilities located either above or below the ground surface; and underground facilities, usually in rock cavities. Geological disposal refers to disposal at greater depths, typically several hundreds of meters below ground (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2012). Table 4 lists a summary for underground disposal practices.


Table 3. Function of each engineered barrier.

12 Radioactive Waste

radioactive waste are to provide safe custody of the waste packages and to protect both operators and the general public from any radiological hazards associated with radioactive

3. Keep the external dose rate and contamination limits for waste packages to be accepted

The storage facility may be associated with an area for inspection (including sorting and/or non-destructive examination), certification and labeling of waste packages. The storage facility is usually divided into areas where low contact dose rate packages are stored, areas where packages not meeting waste acceptance criteria (WAC) are stored, and a shielded area where high contact dose rate packages are kept secure (IAEA 1998). The design of the facility usually permits package stacking, sorting and visual inspection. Provision for maintaining a database keeping chain-of-custody for each waste package in storage must be included in the design. Key information about the waste package should include the total radionuclide content, the waste matrix used for immobilization, the treatment and/or conditioning method (as applicable), and the unique package designator. A hard copy file should follow the waste package from conditioning to its final disposal (IAEA 2001 b).

Disposal is the last step in the integrated radioactive waste management, it relay on the passive safety concept. The disposal facility includes waste emplacement area, buildings and services for waste receipt. Its design aims to provide isolation of the disposed waste for appropriate period of time taking into account the waste and site characteristics and the safety requirements (Bozkurt 2001, R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2005 a, b). To achieve this aim, the multi-barrier concept that relays on using engineered barriers to augment natural barriers has been developed. The use of engineered barriers helps in ensuring that increasingly stringent design aims are satisfied to an appropriate level (IAEA 1997). This concept helps in avoiding over-reliance on the natural barriers to provide the necessary

Engineered barriers may consist of a number of separate components, including structural walls, buffer or backfill materials, chemical additives, liners, covers, leachate collection and drainage systems, cut-off walls, gas vents and monitoring wells (IAEA 1992 b). The design criteria for each barrier will differ according to the waste class and disposal type, IAEA have define the main function for the engineering barriers in a near surface disposal type. Those

Disposal facilities could be place in geological formation or near surface. Near-surface disposal includes two main types of disposal systems: shallow facilities located either above or below the ground surface; and underground facilities, usually in rock cavities. Geological disposal refers to disposal at greater depths, typically several hundreds of meters below ground (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2012). Table 4 lists a summary for underground disposal

wastes. The design of storage facilities should be capable of (IAEA 1998)

2. Protect the waste from environmental conditions that could degrade it,

5. Allow control of any contamination from gaseous or liquid releases.

1. Maintain the "as-received" integrity of the waste package,

4. Minimize the radiation exposure to on-site personnel,

by the facility,

**4.6 Disposal technical options** 

safety (IAEA 1992 a, 1993 a).

practices.

functions are listed in Table 3 (IAEA 2001 c).


Table 4. Summary of some underground disposal

The optimization of the disposal is done by conducting safety assessment studies. These studies are complex due to the dynamic nature of the hydrological and biological subsystems in the host environment that affects the degradation scenarios of the disposal facility. So treating the disposal as one system is not possible, instead these subsystems are decoupled and divided into modules for which the evolution of the disposal is distinguished into step changes rather than continuous time change [NCRP 2005]. Generally, safety assessment relays on specifying assessment context, describing the disposal system, developing and justifying evolution scenarios, formulating and implementing of models; and finally analyzing the assessment results for each module. During the development of safety assessment, all confidence building tools should be utilized and illustrated (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2011 c).

#### **4.7 Safety of radioactive waste management.**

IAEA recommended that assessment studies have to be developed and well adapted to situations of concern to ensure the protection of human health and the environment (IAEA 1993 b). To apply this recommendation, an initial assessment of the planned waste

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 15

and approved to assure that the impact of a change is carefully assessed before updating the

The waste acceptance is defined as "Quantitative or qualitative criteria specified by the regulatory body or by waste operator and approved by the regulatory body, for radioactive waste to be accepted in a waste management facility "(IAEA 2003). The development of the waste acceptance criteria is carried out in parallel with the development of the waste management facility and is derived from both safety and operational requirements. The compliance with these criteria includes two stages; the first is the definition of the waste characteristics and identification of quality related parameters. This stage is developed by using the results of the safety assessment studies and the operational experience. The second stage is the confirmation of the conformance of the individual waste packages to the WAC, this stage could be checked directly or indirectly by using data sheets that includes information about the preceding waste producer, the waste type, activity, source, description, and radiological characteristics and package identifier number and type if any. The dose and heat rate, surface contamination and the weight are also important parameters that are widely used to confirm conformance with WAC (IAEA 1996). Assurance that a waste package can meet WAC could be provided if the development and design of the

management process is carried out under a Quality Assurance Program (QAP).

corrective actions, records, management review and audit.

**5. Acknowledgment** 

**6. References** 

Inadequate procedure specification and verification of required actions in the selection, design, construction, and operation of individual facilities and processes through the waste management system may lead to a failure in the achievement of waste management goals**.**  The application of a Quality Assurance Program (QAP) to all waste management activities including treatment, conditioning, storage, transport, and disposal is intended to ensure the achievement of the waste management objectives. Within the QAP, there is a need to establish a quality control program that intended to ensure the compliance of the products from the waste management facility with the WAC at the preceding waste management facility and/or meet the regulatory requirements for discharge, transport, condition, store, and or dispose this waste product (R.O. Abdel Rahman 2009 c, 2007 b). The elements of this program are similar to any other program in non-radioactive industry. It includes: organization and responsibilities planning and implementation, personnel training and qualification, existence of procedures and instructions, document control, research and development, procurement, process control, inspection and testing, non-conformance and

The author would like to acknowledge her appreciation to Dr M.I. Ojovan, professor at

Abdel Rahman R.O., A.M. El Kamash, A.A. Zaki, M.R..El Sourougy, (2005 a) "Disposal: A

Last Step Towards an Integrated Waste Management System in Egypt",

Imperial Colege London, for the time and effort that he spent to review this chapter.

**4.8 Waste acceptance criteria and quality assurance programs** 

baseline (USDOE 2003).

management practice needs to be performed that identifies the radiological sources, foresees potential exposures, estimates relevant doses and probabilities, and identifies the required radiological protection measures. Various methodologies with varying complexity have been and are being developed to assist in the evaluation of radiological impact of nuclear and radioactive facilities. Despite there are differences in the details of these methodologies to correspond to each facility, the general objective of any radiological assessment is to determine the impact of radioactive material on individuals and their environment (R.O. Abdel Rahman 2010). In 2002, IAEA published procedure for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities (IAEA 2002 b). This procedure is consist six interlinked steps, which include


The identification of the source and exposure is done through the consideration of sourcepathway- receptor analysis at which different aspects are identified i.e. how radiocontaminants released from the studied facility, the pathways along which they can migrate, and their impacts on human. In developing such analysis, it is important to understand that radio-contaminants are transported by air, soil or water through advective or diffusive processes and that the principal means of human exposure is by direct radiation exposure, inhalation of gases or particulates, and ingestion of contaminated food or water (R.O. Abdel Rahman 2010).

To quantify the sequence of the release there is a need to model the release scenario, this could be performed through the development of conceptual model, mathematical model selection, and development or selection of numerical tools. Generally, a conceptual model describes with words and diagrams the key processes that occur within the studied system (or have a reasonable likelihood of occurring). These models can be formulated at varying levels of complexity and realism to abstract the reality (Environment Agency 1999). The developed conceptual model forms the basis for the selection of mathematical models, which in turn govern the selection and creation of numerical models and computer codes (R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2009b).

The planning, development and application of quality assurance program for the safety assessment of the radioactive waste management facilities begin with the identification of quality policy then it associates each step in the assessment. Different quality assurance activities should be performed that include sample control, quality assurance for the documentation. In the scenario modeling step, the range, accuracy and precision of equipment used for input data collection must be verified. The personnel should be suitably trained and qualified to perform the data collection step in accordance with standards. Also the utilized computer software must be verified, validated and documented. Computer software must be placed under configuration control as each baseline element is approved and released. Changes to computer software must be systematically evaluated, co-ordinated

management practice needs to be performed that identifies the radiological sources, foresees potential exposures, estimates relevant doses and probabilities, and identifies the required radiological protection measures. Various methodologies with varying complexity have been and are being developed to assist in the evaluation of radiological impact of nuclear and radioactive facilities. Despite there are differences in the details of these methodologies to correspond to each facility, the general objective of any radiological assessment is to determine the impact of radioactive material on individuals and their environment (R.O. Abdel Rahman 2010). In 2002, IAEA published procedure for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities (IAEA 2002 b). This procedure is consist

2. Identification of source of radioactive releases, exposure and accident initiator,

The identification of the source and exposure is done through the consideration of sourcepathway- receptor analysis at which different aspects are identified i.e. how radiocontaminants released from the studied facility, the pathways along which they can migrate, and their impacts on human. In developing such analysis, it is important to understand that radio-contaminants are transported by air, soil or water through advective or diffusive processes and that the principal means of human exposure is by direct radiation exposure, inhalation of gases or particulates, and ingestion of contaminated food or water (R.O. Abdel

To quantify the sequence of the release there is a need to model the release scenario, this could be performed through the development of conceptual model, mathematical model selection, and development or selection of numerical tools. Generally, a conceptual model describes with words and diagrams the key processes that occur within the studied system (or have a reasonable likelihood of occurring). These models can be formulated at varying levels of complexity and realism to abstract the reality (Environment Agency 1999). The developed conceptual model forms the basis for the selection of mathematical models, which in turn govern the selection and creation of numerical models and computer codes

The planning, development and application of quality assurance program for the safety assessment of the radioactive waste management facilities begin with the identification of quality policy then it associates each step in the assessment. Different quality assurance activities should be performed that include sample control, quality assurance for the documentation. In the scenario modeling step, the range, accuracy and precision of equipment used for input data collection must be verified. The personnel should be suitably trained and qualified to perform the data collection step in accordance with standards. Also the utilized computer software must be verified, validated and documented. Computer software must be placed under configuration control as each baseline element is approved and released. Changes to computer software must be systematically evaluated, co-ordinated

5. Documentation of the analysis and interpretation of the results, and

six interlinked steps, which include 1. Management and organization,

3. Scenario modeling, 4. Sequence quantification,

6. Quality assurance.

Rahman 2010).

(R.O. Abdel Rahman et. al 2009b).

and approved to assure that the impact of a change is carefully assessed before updating the baseline (USDOE 2003).

#### **4.8 Waste acceptance criteria and quality assurance programs**

The waste acceptance is defined as "Quantitative or qualitative criteria specified by the regulatory body or by waste operator and approved by the regulatory body, for radioactive waste to be accepted in a waste management facility "(IAEA 2003). The development of the waste acceptance criteria is carried out in parallel with the development of the waste management facility and is derived from both safety and operational requirements. The compliance with these criteria includes two stages; the first is the definition of the waste characteristics and identification of quality related parameters. This stage is developed by using the results of the safety assessment studies and the operational experience. The second stage is the confirmation of the conformance of the individual waste packages to the WAC, this stage could be checked directly or indirectly by using data sheets that includes information about the preceding waste producer, the waste type, activity, source, description, and radiological characteristics and package identifier number and type if any. The dose and heat rate, surface contamination and the weight are also important parameters that are widely used to confirm conformance with WAC (IAEA 1996). Assurance that a waste package can meet WAC could be provided if the development and design of the management process is carried out under a Quality Assurance Program (QAP).

Inadequate procedure specification and verification of required actions in the selection, design, construction, and operation of individual facilities and processes through the waste management system may lead to a failure in the achievement of waste management goals**.**  The application of a Quality Assurance Program (QAP) to all waste management activities including treatment, conditioning, storage, transport, and disposal is intended to ensure the achievement of the waste management objectives. Within the QAP, there is a need to establish a quality control program that intended to ensure the compliance of the products from the waste management facility with the WAC at the preceding waste management facility and/or meet the regulatory requirements for discharge, transport, condition, store, and or dispose this waste product (R.O. Abdel Rahman 2009 c, 2007 b). The elements of this program are similar to any other program in non-radioactive industry. It includes: organization and responsibilities planning and implementation, personnel training and qualification, existence of procedures and instructions, document control, research and development, procurement, process control, inspection and testing, non-conformance and corrective actions, records, management review and audit.

#### **5. Acknowledgment**

The author would like to acknowledge her appreciation to Dr M.I. Ojovan, professor at Imperial Colege London, for the time and effort that he spent to review this chapter.

#### **6. References**

Abdel Rahman R.O., A.M. El Kamash, A.A. Zaki, M.R..El Sourougy, (2005 a) "Disposal: A Last Step Towards an Integrated Waste Management System in Egypt",

Planning and Implementation of Radioactive Waste Management System 17

IAEA, (1992 a), Review of available options for Low level radioactive waste disposal, iaea-

IAEA, (1992 b), Performance of engineered Barriers in deep geological repositories, Technical Reports Series no. 342, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. IAEA, (1993), Report on radioactive waste Disposal, Technical Reports Series no. 349,

IAEA, (1993), Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Installations with Large

IAEA, (1994 a), Advances in Technologies for the Treatment of Low and Intermediate Level

IAEA, (1994 b), Interfaces between transport and geological disposal systems for high level

IAEA, (1995), The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management. Safety Series No. 111-F,

IAEA, (1996), Requirements and methods for low and intermediate level waste package acceptability, TecDoc-8 64 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. IAEA, (1997), Planning and operation of low level waste disposal facilities (proc. Symp.

IAEA, (1998), Interim Storage of Radioactive Waste Packages, Technical Reports Series No.

IAEA, (1999), Review of the factors affecting the selection and implementation of waste

IAEA, (2000 a), Regulatory control of radioactive discharges to the environment, IAEA Safety Series Guide No. WS-G-2.3, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna IAEA, (2000 b), Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive

IAEA, (2001 a), Methods for the minimization of radioactive waste from decontamination

IAEA, (2001 b), Waste inventory record keeping systems (WIRKS) for the management and

IAEA, (2001 c), Performance of engineered barrier materials in near surface disposal

IAEA, (2002 a), Long term storage of spent nuclear fuel —Survey and recommendations

IAEA, (2002 b), Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment TecDoc-1267 ,

management technologies, TecDoc-1096, International Atomic Energy Agency,

Waste and Transport Safety Requirements, Safety standard series, No. GS-R-1,

and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, TRS 401, International Atomic Energy

disposal of radioactive waste, TecDoc-1222 International Atomic Energy Agency,

facilities for radioactive waste, TecDoc-1255, International Atomic Energy Agency,

Final report of a co-ordinated research project 1994–1997, TecDoc-1293,

Vienna, 1996), International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

Inventory of Radioactive Material, TecDoc-711, International Atomic Energy

Radioactive Liquid Wastes, Technical Reports Series No. 370, International Atomic

radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel TecDoc-764, International Atomic Energy

tecdoc-661, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

390, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

Agency, Vienna.

Agency, Vienna

Vienna.

Agency, Vienna.

Vienna.

Vienna.

Energy Agency, Vienna.

International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal, Tokyo, Japan,, IAEA-CN-135/81, p.p. 317-324


Abdel Rahman, R.O., El-Kamash, A.M, Zaki, A.A., & Abdel-Raouf, M.W. (2005 b). Planning

Abdel Rahman R. O., A. A. Zaki, A. M. El-Kamash, (2007 a), Modeling the long-term

Abdel Rahman R. O., A. M. El-Kamash, F. A. Shehata, M. R. El-Sourougy, (2007 b) Planning

Abdel Rahman R.O., A. A. Zaki, (2009 a), Assessment of the leaching characteristics of incineration ashes in cement matrix, Chem. Eng. J. ,155, p.p. 698-708 Abdel Rahman R. O., (2009 c), Design a quality control system for radioactive aqueous waste

Abdel Rahman R. O., A.M. El Kamash, H. F. Ali, Yung-Tse Hung, (2011 b) Overview on

Sorption/Ion Exchange Technique, *Int. J. Environ. Eng. Sci.*, 2 (1), PP. 1-16 Abdel Rahman R. O., H. A. Ibrahium, Yung-Tse Hung, (2011 a), Liquid radioactive wastes

Abdel Rahman R.O., (2010), Preliminary assessment of continuous atmospheric discharge from the low active waste incinerator, *Int. J. Environ. Sci*, 1, No 2, p.p.111-122. Abdel Rahman R.O., A.A. Zaki (2011 c), Comparative study of leaching conceptual models:

Abdel Rahman R.O., H. A. Ibrahim, N. M. Abdel Monem, (2009 b), Long-term performance

Abdel Rahman R.O., M. W. Kozak, Yung-Tse Hung, (2012), Radioactive pollution and

Bozkurt, S., Sifvert, M., Moreno, L., & Neretnieks, I. (2001). The long-term evolution of and

Defra, DTI and the Devolved Administrations, (2007), Policy for the long term management

Department of minerals and energy, (2005), Radioactive waste management policy and strategy for the republic of South Africa, Department of minerals and energy. Environment Agency, (1999), Guide to Practice for the Development of Conceptual Models

Japan,, IAEA-CN-135/81, p.p. 317-324

317–324), Tokyo, Japan, IAEA-CN- 135/81

11(1) p.p. 53-59

p.p. 722– 736.

Eng. J*.* , 149, 143-152

Scientific Publishing Co, Singapore.

the Total Environment, 271, 145–168.

environment food and rural affairs.

Center Report NC/99/38/2, 1999

clay matrices, *J. Hazard Mater*., 145(3) p.p.372-380

treatment facility, *Qual. Assur J*; 12(1)p.p. 31-39

treatment: A Review , *Water*, 3, P.P.551-565

International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal, Tokyo,

closure safety assessment for the egyptian near surface disposal facility, Presented at the International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal (pp.

leaching behavior of (137)Cs, (60)Co, and (152,154) Eu radionuclides from cement-

for a solid waste management quality assurance program in Egypt, *Qual. Assur J.*

Recent Trends and Developments in Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Part 1:

Cs leaching from different ILW cement based matrices, Chem. Eng. J*.*, 173 (2011)

of zeolite Na A-X blend as backfill material in near surface disposal vault. Chem.

control, in accepted for publication Handbook of Environmental and Waste Management, Vol 2, Land and Groundwater Pollution Control, chapter 16 World

transport processes in a self-sustained final cover on waste deposits, The Science of

of solid low level radioactive waste in the United Kingdom, Department for

and Selection and Application of Mathematical Models of Contaminant Transport Processes in the Subsurface, National Groundwater and Contaminated Land


**2** 

Philippe Brunet *Université d'Evry, Evry Centre Pierre Naville* 

*France* 

**A Controversial Management Process:** 

**Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France** 

The analysis of environmental issues inevitably requires the contribution of an array of scientific disciplines. The experimental sciences, whose goal is the knowledge of natural phenomena, cannot aspire, alone, to resolve the problems raised by interactions between human societies and nature. Nor can the social sciences claim any monopoly thereto. This is particularly true of our industrial societies, which ceaselessly produce what Ulrich Beck calls "latent induced effects" (1986) which engender long term environmental and health hazards. Their understanding is always belated. It is very often achieved by expertise in experimental sciences, intersecting with the wisdom of common sense, social mobilisations, and the weight of prevailing social norms (Wynne, 1997). Their extent and lastingness accordingly result from the combination of two factors, one being determined by the other. One factor include the limits, at any time, to the knowledge and predictions that they make possible, in terms of the future trend of a given industrial process ; other factor, the social relationships of production and reproduction whereby this industrial process is

implemented by relying on the prior art, but also on prevalent beliefs and ideologies.

These social relationships also produce social values and norms. Under the impact of the rapport between capital and labour, they sustain the subdivisions inherent in any process of industrial production and in its organisation between experts and laymen, producers and consumers, particularly via legitimating arguments (Braverman, 1975). The sociological analysis of environmental issues requires an understanding of the dynamic of these social relationships through the examination of their tensions and conflicts which, very often, are crystallised in these dialectical forms. It must be considered as complementary to the analysis of the nature sciences, without one ever substituting for the other. It is in this perspective that we propose to analyse the production process of the uranium industry, a vital link in the production of nuclear energy. We shall focus particularly on its remnants. We shall show that the qualification of radioactive waste which henceforth attaches to them results from practices of the players within changing configurations, to varying degrees conflictual. The challenge concerns the hegemony of legitimacy to *say* and to *do* with regard

**1. Introduction** 

**From the Remnants of the Uranium** 


### **A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France**

Philippe Brunet *Université d'Evry, Evry Centre Pierre Naville France* 

#### **1. Introduction**

18 Radioactive Waste

IAEA, (2003 a), Radioactive waste management glossary, 2003 edition, International Atomic

IAEA, (2003 b) Input data for quantifying risks associated with the transport of radioactive

IAEA, (2007), Considerations for waste minimization at the design stage of nuclear facilities,

IAEA, (2009), Policies and strategies for radioactive waste management, Nuclear energy

IAEA, (2010) Setting authorized limits for radioactive discharge: practical issues to consider,

NCRP, (2005), Performance assessment of near-surface facilities for disposal of low level

NEA, (2003), The regulator's evolving role and image in radioactive waste management

NEA, (2005), The regulatory functions and radioactive waste management international

NEA, (2011), Strategic plan 2011-2016 for the radioactive waste management committee ,

Norrby S., S. Wingefors, 1995, formulation of regulatory and licensing requirements, IAEA-

Stoiber C, Baer A., Pelzer N., Tonhauser W., (2003), Handbook on nuclear law, International

M.I. Ojovan (Editor) (2011). Handbook of advanced radioactive waste conditioning

USDOE, (2003), Carlsbad field office quality assurance program document, DOE/CBFO-94-

Ojovan M.I., W.E. Lee, (2005), Introduction to nuclear waste immobilization, Elsevier

Oxford, 512 p. http://www.woodheadpublishing.com/6269

1012 revision 5 2003, United State Department of Energy.

radioactive waste, NCRP Report No. 152, National Council on Radiation Protection

lessons learnt within the NEA forum on stakeholder confidence, NEA ISBN 92-64-

TecDoc-853 requirements for the safe management of radioactive waste, p.p.281-

technologies. ISBN 1 84569 626 3. Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy No. 12,

material Final report of a co-ordinated research project 1996–2000, TecDoc-1346,

Energy Agency, Vienna.

and Measurements.

NEA/RWM(2011)12

Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

02142-6

286

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

overview, NEA No.6041 , ISBN 92-64-01075-0

The three dictionary http://www.thefreedictionary.com/policy

TRS, No 460, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

TecDoc-1638, International Atomic Energy Agency ,Vienna

series NW-G-1.1 International Atomic Energy Agency ,Vienna,

The analysis of environmental issues inevitably requires the contribution of an array of scientific disciplines. The experimental sciences, whose goal is the knowledge of natural phenomena, cannot aspire, alone, to resolve the problems raised by interactions between human societies and nature. Nor can the social sciences claim any monopoly thereto. This is particularly true of our industrial societies, which ceaselessly produce what Ulrich Beck calls "latent induced effects" (1986) which engender long term environmental and health hazards. Their understanding is always belated. It is very often achieved by expertise in experimental sciences, intersecting with the wisdom of common sense, social mobilisations, and the weight of prevailing social norms (Wynne, 1997). Their extent and lastingness accordingly result from the combination of two factors, one being determined by the other. One factor include the limits, at any time, to the knowledge and predictions that they make possible, in terms of the future trend of a given industrial process ; other factor, the social relationships of production and reproduction whereby this industrial process is implemented by relying on the prior art, but also on prevalent beliefs and ideologies.

These social relationships also produce social values and norms. Under the impact of the rapport between capital and labour, they sustain the subdivisions inherent in any process of industrial production and in its organisation between experts and laymen, producers and consumers, particularly via legitimating arguments (Braverman, 1975). The sociological analysis of environmental issues requires an understanding of the dynamic of these social relationships through the examination of their tensions and conflicts which, very often, are crystallised in these dialectical forms. It must be considered as complementary to the analysis of the nature sciences, without one ever substituting for the other. It is in this perspective that we propose to analyse the production process of the uranium industry, a vital link in the production of nuclear energy. We shall focus particularly on its remnants. We shall show that the qualification of radioactive waste which henceforth attaches to them results from practices of the players within changing configurations, to varying degrees conflictual. The challenge concerns the hegemony of legitimacy to *say* and to *do* with regard

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

industrial applications.

industry, born in the USA in 1943.

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 21

that these countries had tried or were trying to possess a military nuclear industry (IAEA, 2006). It also fostered a policy of secrecy which was gradually relaxed to facilitate civilian

This unprecedented situation betokened a new relationship between science, industry and politics, with an implication of international controls. The sharing of the world in fact established new geostrategic relations between East and West. Its equilibrium depended on the resources available to each camp to develop the industrial process. Before the war, the Belgian mines of Upper Katanga enjoyed a monopoly of radium production. The importance gained by uranium as a fuel then encouraged the USA to control its production. Despite the discoveries in Canada and Czechoslovakia, uranium was held to be a rare ore (Ducrocq, 1948). Thus, wishing to maintain a lead, which it wrongly believed to be significant in terms of the technology and the uranium raw material, the USA tried to impose its point of view, which only Great Britain and Canada accepted. Faced with the refusal of the USSR, which controlled Czech uranium, the USA decided to maintain its lead by practising a policy of secrecy (Goldschmidt, 1962). Indeed, in late July 1946, a law was passed organising and governing atomic energy in the USA (the *MacMahon Bill*). All the problems of atomic energy, from ore to nuclear fuel, plants included, fell under its authority. Secrecy was maintained, and its violation decreed a capital crime. Finally, the new Bill enshrined isolationism: collaboration with other countries was subject to Congressional approval. This is why from 1946 to July 1954, when the law was first relaxed, even collaboration with English speaking countries was suspended (Goldschmidt, 1962). This policy of secrecy became the international norm. In September 1949, the Russians showed the American that they no longer held exclusive sway. The battle for power and technological sophistication was then joined on a new project based on the thermonuclear reaction, leading to the hydrogen bomb, a thousand times more powerful than the A bomb. At the same time, in 1952, Great Britain broke into the closed club of the atomic countries, followed by France in 1960. This policy of secrecy contained its contradictions. Thus, from the 1950s, the US proposed the Baruch plan to the United Nations (Goldschmidt, 1987). It offered to relinquish atomic secrecy provided that an international agency took charge of the ownership of the uranium mines, atomic materials, and the running of fuel production plants and power reactors. The USSR was opposed and demanded that the USA destroy its arsenal and terminate the arms race. The American proposal was doomed to failure. Certainly, it foreshadowed the various UN regulatory agencies that were progressively set up in the atomic field. This necessity stemmed from the ambivalence of its industry. In terms of destruction, the UN Security Council contained the five foremost historic atomic powers as permanent members1. They therefore "monitored" the balance of global forces under the sign of secrecy and mutual mistrust. In terms of production, civilian industrial development could not durably be a subject issue. This conflict was partly resolved at the first international conference in Geneva in 1955, *Atoms for Peace*. The disparateness of its participants and the scheduling of its deliberations (first, states and after Scientists) were symptomatic of its social intricacy and hierarchy, which promoted the existence of the

1 The list of five permanent members was approved in 1946, long before they became atomic powers.

However, the correlation is striking, and the sign of a suite in the state power ranking.

to their management. This perspective accordingly implies carrying out a long range analysis to grasp their evolution.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first describes the emergence of the problematics, in which science, technology, politics and standards are combined in a scheme of specific production relationships. It dwells on the early decades of the atomic complex, to grasp its various structural components and, ultimately, to understand the function of the radioactive waste qualification process. The second part expands the analysis of this mechanism over the long term, based on the case of France. The focus is then directed at the least known productive segment of the nuclear complex, the uranium mining industry, and on its repercussions in terms of waste.

#### **2. Science, politics and standards concerned with radioactive waste: A new horizon**

By virtue of its history, and its underlying scientific knowledge and techniques, the atomic industry, later called the nuclear industry, is linked with the state of war. This is why no doubt more than any other, this industry has been ambivalent since its inception. It is oriented towards destruction as well as production (Naville, 1977). This attribute is especially pronounced as the structure becomes recursive. Indeed, the earliest large atomic facilities that went on stream in the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and France, were plants simultaneously generating plutonium and electricity for military and civilian uses (Barillot and Davis, 1994). Similarly, the environmental and health hazards associated with the concept of energy generation were precisely the "arguments", amply demonstrated in practice, of its capacity to destroy at a hitherto unsuspected scale. This finding became the background for the many descriptions, popularisations and justifications of the new industry (Ducrocq, 1948; Martin, 1956; Goldschmidt, 1962), giving rise to many consequences that we shall examine in turn, and globally. First, the control of this industry was directly assumed by the States and associations thereof, in peacetime and wartime alike. Second, its technological and strategic sophistication generated an intensive and tight interpenetration of different professional worlds: scientific, military, industrial and political. This tense closed world reflected the elitist, in other words, non-democratic, relationship that became established for decisions pertaining to this industry. And finally, its ambivalence marked an associated process: the qualification of "radioactive waste". The narrow perimeter in which it was long contained caused the slowness of its development, and also, in exchange, the deep democratic penetration that it received.

#### **2.1 The atomic and nuclear industry: A matter for States at the planetary scale**

After the Second World War, the atomic industry developed essentially in obedience to geostrategic and military objectives. A differentiation set in between States according to whether or not they possessed the atomic weapon and its uranium fuel. This cleavage was not exclusively of a technical or economic nature. It was also political, and had two outcomes. States owning atomic weapons sought to hamper the access of other candidate states to the possession of the industrial process. It hence ordered and crystallised the global ranking of the military powers. This situation still prevails today. For example, the sanctions imposed against Iran since 2006 by the UN Security Council, claimed justification in the fact

to their management. This perspective accordingly implies carrying out a long range

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first describes the emergence of the problematics, in which science, technology, politics and standards are combined in a scheme of specific production relationships. It dwells on the early decades of the atomic complex, to grasp its various structural components and, ultimately, to understand the function of the radioactive waste qualification process. The second part expands the analysis of this mechanism over the long term, based on the case of France. The focus is then directed at the least known productive segment of the nuclear complex, the uranium mining industry, and on its

**2. Science, politics and standards concerned with radioactive waste:** 

and also, in exchange, the deep democratic penetration that it received.

**2.1 The atomic and nuclear industry: A matter for States at the planetary scale** 

After the Second World War, the atomic industry developed essentially in obedience to geostrategic and military objectives. A differentiation set in between States according to whether or not they possessed the atomic weapon and its uranium fuel. This cleavage was not exclusively of a technical or economic nature. It was also political, and had two outcomes. States owning atomic weapons sought to hamper the access of other candidate states to the possession of the industrial process. It hence ordered and crystallised the global ranking of the military powers. This situation still prevails today. For example, the sanctions imposed against Iran since 2006 by the UN Security Council, claimed justification in the fact

By virtue of its history, and its underlying scientific knowledge and techniques, the atomic industry, later called the nuclear industry, is linked with the state of war. This is why no doubt more than any other, this industry has been ambivalent since its inception. It is oriented towards destruction as well as production (Naville, 1977). This attribute is especially pronounced as the structure becomes recursive. Indeed, the earliest large atomic facilities that went on stream in the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and France, were plants simultaneously generating plutonium and electricity for military and civilian uses (Barillot and Davis, 1994). Similarly, the environmental and health hazards associated with the concept of energy generation were precisely the "arguments", amply demonstrated in practice, of its capacity to destroy at a hitherto unsuspected scale. This finding became the background for the many descriptions, popularisations and justifications of the new industry (Ducrocq, 1948; Martin, 1956; Goldschmidt, 1962), giving rise to many consequences that we shall examine in turn, and globally. First, the control of this industry was directly assumed by the States and associations thereof, in peacetime and wartime alike. Second, its technological and strategic sophistication generated an intensive and tight interpenetration of different professional worlds: scientific, military, industrial and political. This tense closed world reflected the elitist, in other words, non-democratic, relationship that became established for decisions pertaining to this industry. And finally, its ambivalence marked an associated process: the qualification of "radioactive waste". The narrow perimeter in which it was long contained caused the slowness of its development,

analysis to grasp their evolution.

repercussions in terms of waste.

**A new horizon** 

that these countries had tried or were trying to possess a military nuclear industry (IAEA, 2006). It also fostered a policy of secrecy which was gradually relaxed to facilitate civilian industrial applications.

This unprecedented situation betokened a new relationship between science, industry and politics, with an implication of international controls. The sharing of the world in fact established new geostrategic relations between East and West. Its equilibrium depended on the resources available to each camp to develop the industrial process. Before the war, the Belgian mines of Upper Katanga enjoyed a monopoly of radium production. The importance gained by uranium as a fuel then encouraged the USA to control its production. Despite the discoveries in Canada and Czechoslovakia, uranium was held to be a rare ore (Ducrocq, 1948). Thus, wishing to maintain a lead, which it wrongly believed to be significant in terms of the technology and the uranium raw material, the USA tried to impose its point of view, which only Great Britain and Canada accepted. Faced with the refusal of the USSR, which controlled Czech uranium, the USA decided to maintain its lead by practising a policy of secrecy (Goldschmidt, 1962). Indeed, in late July 1946, a law was passed organising and governing atomic energy in the USA (the *MacMahon Bill*). All the problems of atomic energy, from ore to nuclear fuel, plants included, fell under its authority. Secrecy was maintained, and its violation decreed a capital crime. Finally, the new Bill enshrined isolationism: collaboration with other countries was subject to Congressional approval. This is why from 1946 to July 1954, when the law was first relaxed, even collaboration with English speaking countries was suspended (Goldschmidt, 1962). This policy of secrecy became the international norm. In September 1949, the Russians showed the American that they no longer held exclusive sway. The battle for power and technological sophistication was then joined on a new project based on the thermonuclear reaction, leading to the hydrogen bomb, a thousand times more powerful than the A bomb. At the same time, in 1952, Great Britain broke into the closed club of the atomic countries, followed by France in 1960. This policy of secrecy contained its contradictions. Thus, from the 1950s, the US proposed the Baruch plan to the United Nations (Goldschmidt, 1987). It offered to relinquish atomic secrecy provided that an international agency took charge of the ownership of the uranium mines, atomic materials, and the running of fuel production plants and power reactors. The USSR was opposed and demanded that the USA destroy its arsenal and terminate the arms race. The American proposal was doomed to failure. Certainly, it foreshadowed the various UN regulatory agencies that were progressively set up in the atomic field. This necessity stemmed from the ambivalence of its industry. In terms of destruction, the UN Security Council contained the five foremost historic atomic powers as permanent members1. They therefore "monitored" the balance of global forces under the sign of secrecy and mutual mistrust. In terms of production, civilian industrial development could not durably be a subject issue. This conflict was partly resolved at the first international conference in Geneva in 1955, *Atoms for Peace*. The disparateness of its participants and the scheduling of its deliberations (first, states and after Scientists) were symptomatic of its social intricacy and hierarchy, which promoted the existence of the industry, born in the USA in 1943.

<sup>1</sup> The list of five permanent members was approved in 1946, long before they became atomic powers. However, the correlation is striking, and the sign of a suite in the state power ranking.

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

embargo. France accordingly launched a prospecting programme:

international "radiance" (Hecht, 1997).

to the Pyrenees! Not a single clue of uranium could elude me!"

**2.3 The atomic and nuclear industry: Qualifying waste and measuring risks** 

The concerns that initiated the "radioactive waste" qualification process were present from the outset of the atomic complex, in forms both extensive and unstable. However, they fit into a matrix in which the development of atomic weapons and the corresponding secrecy policies predominated3. They were directed towards radioactive materials in use as well as those already used and non-reusable, insofar as they all incurred health hazards. The scientists, engineers and experts, associated with nuclear facilities, investigated and controlled this qualification process. They set up a system of standards and practices to which the governments adhered. Over the long term, this framework stiffened in a context of pressures. This was because a shift in the reference threshold of health and environmental hazards was observed, correlated with a deep public sensitivity, organised or not. In this

2 He was Nobel co-laureate in 1935 with his wife, Irène, for the discovery of artificial radioactivity. During the German Occupation, F. Joliot-Curie secretly joined the Communist party. 3 An example, among many others, is the circulation of books aimed at the public for protection against

the atomic radiation from a bomb. They were generally written by the military. (Gibrin, 1953)

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 23

created under the unchallenged authority of Frédéric Joliot-Curie2. Its programme was that of atomic science and its civilian applications. The problem of fuel remained to be solved. The CEA had a limited stock of heavy water and uranium in a context of a uranium

"Dig everywhere without second thoughts. Have no qualms about your prospecting methods. Besides, if I could, I would send out 2000 prospectors throughout France! They would systematically scour the soil with a Geiger counter, from the Pas-de-Calais

This was Joliot-Curie's exhortation to the first class of uranium prospectors trained from December 1945 (Paucard, 1994). Until 1950, when Joliot-Curie was dismissed for political and geostrategic reasons, and even beyond, scientists resisted government pressures concerning the assigned objectives. The challenge was the atom bomb and the military presence in the CEA. But, progressively, through the Fifties, the CEA industrialised, militarised and finally escaped the control of the scientists, now more relevant to the initial model promoted by the U.S. So, By government decree in 1951, the CEA was led by a director and no longer by a scientist. In 1955, the government created the consultative commission for the Production of Energy of Nuclear Origin (PEON commission). It is reporting to the government and tasked with supplying justified opinions on decisions to be taken. Also, the government named a military man to direct the CEA's general design office: in 1958 this office became the CEA's Directorate of Military Applications (DAM), charged with setting up France's nuclear weapons programme. After much procrastination, the French government decided to build the atom bomb. The return of General De Gaulle to power in 1958 accelerated the process. Symptomatically, the CEA's director general, P. Guillaumat, was appointed minister of the Armed Forces by de Gaulle in his new Government. Two years later, in 1960, France exploded a bomb in the Algerian Sahara for the first time. In doing so, it joined the club of the four world nuclear powers. It thus marked a crucial step of its scientific, technological and geostrategic history in its quest for

#### **2.2 The atomic and nuclear industry, a heterogeneous and closed visage**

Its starting point was the *Manhattan Project*. This project was its parent-formula. It associated four different types of social actors, not without some tension: State (for political decisions), Industry (the *Du Pont* company engineers for the practical organisation of the industrial process at Oak Ridge, Tennessee), Scientists (for their investigations), and the Military (for their responsibility in management and control) (N'diaye, 1998). Subsequent industrial developments, each inserted into their specific national frameworks, were differentiated from this initial wartime model. But, with it, they shared the principle of ambivalence between destruction and production, of the disparateness of the social actors, and finally, the closure of this new productive world sustained by the policy of secrecy. The French model was no exception.

Certainly, for no science other than nuclear physics, was the era of its fundamental and theoretical questions and that of its practical applications so intermingled, jump-starting the production of destructive bombs. This unprecedented situation was marked by contradictions and internal tensions, particularly the ambiguous attitudes of the scientists (Martin, 1956). In August 1939, Einstein sent a letter, co-signed by other physicists, to US President Roosevelt, to alert him to the risk of some day finding Nazi Germany in possession of the atom bomb. He decided to move swiftly. This act triggered a process of decisions culminating in the *Manhattan Project* in 1942, in other words, the production of the bomb. It is estimated that 75 000 to 150 000 people were mobilised, particularly in the Oak Ridge plant, until the explosion of the first bomb in New Mexico (Goldschmidt, 1962; N'Diaye, 1998). The scientists, with the army and the industry, were joined under the aegis of the political authority. This created some ambiguity in the attitudes of the scientists in three respects. On the one hand, while nothing in the atomic field could be done without them, its future was beyond their control. On the other, the practical and ideological underpinnings of their professional integrity were denied. This applied to unrestricted access to information and its exchange in the name of priority over the policy of secrecy, and disinterestedness in the name of limited commitment. They tried morally to resolve this contradictory positioning in many ways: through justification, through guilt, or even by engaging in peace movements like *Pugwash* and the *Stockholm Appeal* (Oppenheimer, 1955; Joliot-Curie, 1963; Einstein, 1979).

Similarly, the first international conference in Geneva in 1955, *Atoms for Peace*, which brought together seventy-two countries, tried to resolve the internal contradiction of the atomic complex internationally. It partly relaxed the policy of secrecy and thereby met the desires of the scientists. It made possible the recursiveness of destruction towards production. It timidly addressed the latent induced effects of radioactivity on human health. Its deliberations nevertheless reflected the ambivalence of the atomic complex and the ranking of its players. First, the governments of the atomic countries (USA, Great Britain, USSR and France) held a week-long meeting in July; followed by the scientists and industrialists for twelve days on the civilian applications of the atom. No other social or associative force was invited to the discussion table, confining the issues exclusively in the hands of the experts and political decision makers.

These ingredients of the atomic complex could be found in the French formula, delayed and with specific characteristics. In October 1945, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) was

Its starting point was the *Manhattan Project*. This project was its parent-formula. It associated four different types of social actors, not without some tension: State (for political decisions), Industry (the *Du Pont* company engineers for the practical organisation of the industrial process at Oak Ridge, Tennessee), Scientists (for their investigations), and the Military (for their responsibility in management and control) (N'diaye, 1998). Subsequent industrial developments, each inserted into their specific national frameworks, were differentiated from this initial wartime model. But, with it, they shared the principle of ambivalence between destruction and production, of the disparateness of the social actors, and finally, the closure of this new productive world sustained by the policy of secrecy. The French

Certainly, for no science other than nuclear physics, was the era of its fundamental and theoretical questions and that of its practical applications so intermingled, jump-starting the production of destructive bombs. This unprecedented situation was marked by contradictions and internal tensions, particularly the ambiguous attitudes of the scientists (Martin, 1956). In August 1939, Einstein sent a letter, co-signed by other physicists, to US President Roosevelt, to alert him to the risk of some day finding Nazi Germany in possession of the atom bomb. He decided to move swiftly. This act triggered a process of decisions culminating in the *Manhattan Project* in 1942, in other words, the production of the bomb. It is estimated that 75 000 to 150 000 people were mobilised, particularly in the Oak Ridge plant, until the explosion of the first bomb in New Mexico (Goldschmidt, 1962; N'Diaye, 1998). The scientists, with the army and the industry, were joined under the aegis of the political authority. This created some ambiguity in the attitudes of the scientists in three respects. On the one hand, while nothing in the atomic field could be done without them, its future was beyond their control. On the other, the practical and ideological underpinnings of their professional integrity were denied. This applied to unrestricted access to information and its exchange in the name of priority over the policy of secrecy, and disinterestedness in the name of limited commitment. They tried morally to resolve this contradictory positioning in many ways: through justification, through guilt, or even by engaging in peace movements like *Pugwash* and the *Stockholm Appeal* (Oppenheimer, 1955;

Similarly, the first international conference in Geneva in 1955, *Atoms for Peace*, which brought together seventy-two countries, tried to resolve the internal contradiction of the atomic complex internationally. It partly relaxed the policy of secrecy and thereby met the desires of the scientists. It made possible the recursiveness of destruction towards production. It timidly addressed the latent induced effects of radioactivity on human health. Its deliberations nevertheless reflected the ambivalence of the atomic complex and the ranking of its players. First, the governments of the atomic countries (USA, Great Britain, USSR and France) held a week-long meeting in July; followed by the scientists and industrialists for twelve days on the civilian applications of the atom. No other social or associative force was invited to the discussion table, confining the issues exclusively in the

These ingredients of the atomic complex could be found in the French formula, delayed and with specific characteristics. In October 1945, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) was

**2.2 The atomic and nuclear industry, a heterogeneous and closed visage** 

model was no exception.

Joliot-Curie, 1963; Einstein, 1979).

hands of the experts and political decision makers.

created under the unchallenged authority of Frédéric Joliot-Curie2. Its programme was that of atomic science and its civilian applications. The problem of fuel remained to be solved. The CEA had a limited stock of heavy water and uranium in a context of a uranium embargo. France accordingly launched a prospecting programme:

"Dig everywhere without second thoughts. Have no qualms about your prospecting methods. Besides, if I could, I would send out 2000 prospectors throughout France! They would systematically scour the soil with a Geiger counter, from the Pas-de-Calais to the Pyrenees! Not a single clue of uranium could elude me!"

This was Joliot-Curie's exhortation to the first class of uranium prospectors trained from December 1945 (Paucard, 1994). Until 1950, when Joliot-Curie was dismissed for political and geostrategic reasons, and even beyond, scientists resisted government pressures concerning the assigned objectives. The challenge was the atom bomb and the military presence in the CEA. But, progressively, through the Fifties, the CEA industrialised, militarised and finally escaped the control of the scientists, now more relevant to the initial model promoted by the U.S. So, By government decree in 1951, the CEA was led by a director and no longer by a scientist. In 1955, the government created the consultative commission for the Production of Energy of Nuclear Origin (PEON commission). It is reporting to the government and tasked with supplying justified opinions on decisions to be taken. Also, the government named a military man to direct the CEA's general design office: in 1958 this office became the CEA's Directorate of Military Applications (DAM), charged with setting up France's nuclear weapons programme. After much procrastination, the French government decided to build the atom bomb. The return of General De Gaulle to power in 1958 accelerated the process. Symptomatically, the CEA's director general, P. Guillaumat, was appointed minister of the Armed Forces by de Gaulle in his new Government. Two years later, in 1960, France exploded a bomb in the Algerian Sahara for the first time. In doing so, it joined the club of the four world nuclear powers. It thus marked a crucial step of its scientific, technological and geostrategic history in its quest for international "radiance" (Hecht, 1997).

#### **2.3 The atomic and nuclear industry: Qualifying waste and measuring risks**

The concerns that initiated the "radioactive waste" qualification process were present from the outset of the atomic complex, in forms both extensive and unstable. However, they fit into a matrix in which the development of atomic weapons and the corresponding secrecy policies predominated3. They were directed towards radioactive materials in use as well as those already used and non-reusable, insofar as they all incurred health hazards. The scientists, engineers and experts, associated with nuclear facilities, investigated and controlled this qualification process. They set up a system of standards and practices to which the governments adhered. Over the long term, this framework stiffened in a context of pressures. This was because a shift in the reference threshold of health and environmental hazards was observed, correlated with a deep public sensitivity, organised or not. In this

<sup>2</sup> He was Nobel co-laureate in 1935 with his wife, Irène, for the discovery of artificial radioactivity.

During the German Occupation, F. Joliot-Curie secretly joined the Communist party. 3 An example, among many others, is the circulation of books aimed at the public for protection against the atomic radiation from a bomb. They were generally written by the military. (Gibrin, 1953)

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

November 1960, p. 1435].

the justifications of this industry.

5 According to testimony obtained by letter dated 25 July 1999.

1993).

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 25

Finally, a challenge emerged in France, concerning the health detriment of the radioactivity used in medicine. A teacher, J. Pignero, took the initiative. In 1962 he created the Association against Radiological Hazard (ACDR) to react against the compulsory radiological examinations for schoolchildren. Previously, in 1957, the reading of a popular science magazine alerted him to the risks incurred by the children5. The association published a bulletin, *Le danger radiologique* (Radiological hazard) and acted to defend the few teachers who refused the imposition of these examinations on the children. In 1966, the ACDR was converted to the APRI (Association for the Protection of Ionising Radiation) in order to extend the associative battle to the civilian and military industry branches. This appears to have been the first organised opposition to the nuclear industry in France (Prendiville,

These various forms of public engagement implied an extension and a dissemination of the critical questionings on the subject of the risks of radioactivity, more or less independently of the institutional experts. This extension revealed the instability in identifying the threshold between the benefits and detriments, because science alone could not tell all (Beck, 1986). Thus, a normally positive health use of radioactivity (X-ray examinations) could be challenged for its danger. Moreover, since the diversity of the uses was condensed into a risk bearing aggregate, stretching from the military industry to medical practices, it was not so much the problematics of waste that prevailed in these first challenges, as that of the potential hazard of any radioactive material. It took root in particular in the detachment of some of the scientists from the reassuring and faultless discourse of the atomic institution. Yet its public range remained limited by the small audience of the associative movements that relayed it on, apart from the more political movements focused on the rejection of the bomb. This is why these criticisms did not truly destabilise or delegitimise the power to say and to do of the players of the atomic complex, who generated most of the knowledge and

When the French government decided in 1975 to build a large nuclear power capability to contend with the oil energy crisis, this situation had barely changed. The social criticism of the atomic industry remained very discreet. It is true that the spectre of atomic war had receded and that a political consensus had emerged in France in favour of possession of nuclear weapons. As an emblem of this process, the French communist left, which long argued against nuclear weapons, finally came round to the idea that its possession by France was a guarantee of its independence. This caused a significant weakening of social mobilisation. And it is without any real debate in the parliament that the decision of this

"We must therefore calm the fears of French opinion by making it understand that, in a century of progress, its vague terrors are no more reasonable than those of our ancestors upon the advent of the railway, of electricity, and of cars. It is a national duty, because it conditions the development of atomic energy in France […]. We, who are most familiar with the details of the problem, who bear the responsibility, not only to weigh the risks, for ourselves and for our children, with objectivity, but also to inform, have this honour or liberating the men and women of France from their vague and senseless fears, and of restoring their trust" [*Official Bulletin*, Senate, session of 3

respect, the radioactive waste qualification process was characterised by a democratic penetration that affected the entire nuclear complex.

Without any doubt, the starting point of this process was located in a twofold prolongation. One was the international meetings between experts of the new industry, which became institutionalised, either under the UN or in the form of inter-State treaties in the Fifties (Goldschmidt, 1987)4. The aim was to standardize practices to conform to the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It was also a symptom of the public response. In fact, the weight of the military industry and its meshing with the civilian industry limited the quality of available knowledge, the social relationship to this knowledge, and the transparency of the information (Barillot and Davis, 1994). Let us examine these various aspects through three examples in France.

The multiplication of thermonuclear bomb tests came under strong criticism from some of the atomic scientists, who mobilised internationally. Soil contamination by radioactive fallout was condemned with the health hazards associated with the food chain. For example, Linus Pauling, Nobel laureate, in an international conference of conscientious objectors in Germany in June 1959, declared:

"The government leader who issues the order to explode an experimental atom bomb must realise that it simultaneously condemns 15 000 children yet unborn to suffer serious physical or spiritual handicaps and to have a painful and miserable existence" [press article in *Echo du Centre*, 2 July 1959].

This topic was a pressing concern in the Fifties in France. It was expressed in the political and peaceful battles against atomic weapons. It also raised public awareness about the problems raised by radioactivity. A split accordingly occurred between the good and bad users of the atom, depending on whether they derived respectively from civilian or military applications (Joliot-Curie, 1963). Public attention to the health risks engendered by radioactivity was therefore structured differentially. Notwithstanding this, it forced the CEA to install devices to record the radioactivity produced by this fallout across the country.

Another pressing topic was the dumping at sea of radioactive waste. This method, common to the atomic countries, applied the principle of dilution (Quéneudec, 1965). It was part of an initial presumption of the growth of industrial capitalism. Nature's power of absorption is infinite (Beck, 1986). In October 1960, French press reports that the CEA is planning, in its own words, an experiment to submerge 6 500 drums of low level radioactive waste in the Mediterranean Sea [*Echo du Centre*, October 12, 1960]. In actual fact, from the onset of the Fifties and in secret, the CEA was already implementing the dilution principle by dumping waste into the rivers. The publicity shed on this project sparked a strong reaction from the population concerned: elected officials as well as scientists, biologists and oceanographers in particular, demanded that the Government shelve the experiment. The Minister for Atomic Energy had to explain matters before the Parliament:

<sup>4</sup> Without claiming to be complete, examples include UNSCEAR created in 1955 by the UN. Its role was to assess the levels and the effects of exposure to radioactivity. The IAEA, created in 1957 by the UN also, promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. EURATOM, created in 1957 by Europe, was a body that coordinated research programmes on nuclear energy and accompanied the growth of the civilian nuclear industry.

respect, the radioactive waste qualification process was characterised by a democratic

Without any doubt, the starting point of this process was located in a twofold prolongation. One was the international meetings between experts of the new industry, which became institutionalised, either under the UN or in the form of inter-State treaties in the Fifties (Goldschmidt, 1987)4. The aim was to standardize practices to conform to the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It was also a symptom of the public response. In fact, the weight of the military industry and its meshing with the civilian industry limited the quality of available knowledge, the social relationship to this knowledge, and the transparency of the information (Barillot and Davis, 1994). Let us examine these various

The multiplication of thermonuclear bomb tests came under strong criticism from some of the atomic scientists, who mobilised internationally. Soil contamination by radioactive fallout was condemned with the health hazards associated with the food chain. For example, Linus Pauling, Nobel laureate, in an international conference of conscientious

"The government leader who issues the order to explode an experimental atom bomb must realise that it simultaneously condemns 15 000 children yet unborn to suffer serious physical or spiritual handicaps and to have a painful and miserable existence"

This topic was a pressing concern in the Fifties in France. It was expressed in the political and peaceful battles against atomic weapons. It also raised public awareness about the problems raised by radioactivity. A split accordingly occurred between the good and bad users of the atom, depending on whether they derived respectively from civilian or military applications (Joliot-Curie, 1963). Public attention to the health risks engendered by radioactivity was therefore structured differentially. Notwithstanding this, it forced the CEA to install devices to record the radioactivity produced by this fallout across the country.

Another pressing topic was the dumping at sea of radioactive waste. This method, common to the atomic countries, applied the principle of dilution (Quéneudec, 1965). It was part of an initial presumption of the growth of industrial capitalism. Nature's power of absorption is infinite (Beck, 1986). In October 1960, French press reports that the CEA is planning, in its own words, an experiment to submerge 6 500 drums of low level radioactive waste in the Mediterranean Sea [*Echo du Centre*, October 12, 1960]. In actual fact, from the onset of the Fifties and in secret, the CEA was already implementing the dilution principle by dumping waste into the rivers. The publicity shed on this project sparked a strong reaction from the population concerned: elected officials as well as scientists, biologists and oceanographers in particular, demanded that the Government shelve the experiment. The Minister for Atomic

4 Without claiming to be complete, examples include UNSCEAR created in 1955 by the UN. Its role was to assess the levels and the effects of exposure to radioactivity. The IAEA, created in 1957 by the UN also, promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. EURATOM, created in 1957 by Europe, was a body that coordinated research programmes on nuclear energy and accompanied the growth of the civilian

penetration that affected the entire nuclear complex.

aspects through three examples in France.

objectors in Germany in June 1959, declared:

[press article in *Echo du Centre*, 2 July 1959].

Energy had to explain matters before the Parliament:

nuclear industry.

"We must therefore calm the fears of French opinion by making it understand that, in a century of progress, its vague terrors are no more reasonable than those of our ancestors upon the advent of the railway, of electricity, and of cars. It is a national duty, because it conditions the development of atomic energy in France […]. We, who are most familiar with the details of the problem, who bear the responsibility, not only to weigh the risks, for ourselves and for our children, with objectivity, but also to inform, have this honour or liberating the men and women of France from their vague and senseless fears, and of restoring their trust" [*Official Bulletin*, Senate, session of 3 November 1960, p. 1435].

Finally, a challenge emerged in France, concerning the health detriment of the radioactivity used in medicine. A teacher, J. Pignero, took the initiative. In 1962 he created the Association against Radiological Hazard (ACDR) to react against the compulsory radiological examinations for schoolchildren. Previously, in 1957, the reading of a popular science magazine alerted him to the risks incurred by the children5. The association published a bulletin, *Le danger radiologique* (Radiological hazard) and acted to defend the few teachers who refused the imposition of these examinations on the children. In 1966, the ACDR was converted to the APRI (Association for the Protection of Ionising Radiation) in order to extend the associative battle to the civilian and military industry branches. This appears to have been the first organised opposition to the nuclear industry in France (Prendiville, 1993).

These various forms of public engagement implied an extension and a dissemination of the critical questionings on the subject of the risks of radioactivity, more or less independently of the institutional experts. This extension revealed the instability in identifying the threshold between the benefits and detriments, because science alone could not tell all (Beck, 1986). Thus, a normally positive health use of radioactivity (X-ray examinations) could be challenged for its danger. Moreover, since the diversity of the uses was condensed into a risk bearing aggregate, stretching from the military industry to medical practices, it was not so much the problematics of waste that prevailed in these first challenges, as that of the potential hazard of any radioactive material. It took root in particular in the detachment of some of the scientists from the reassuring and faultless discourse of the atomic institution. Yet its public range remained limited by the small audience of the associative movements that relayed it on, apart from the more political movements focused on the rejection of the bomb. This is why these criticisms did not truly destabilise or delegitimise the power to say and to do of the players of the atomic complex, who generated most of the knowledge and the justifications of this industry.

When the French government decided in 1975 to build a large nuclear power capability to contend with the oil energy crisis, this situation had barely changed. The social criticism of the atomic industry remained very discreet. It is true that the spectre of atomic war had receded and that a political consensus had emerged in France in favour of possession of nuclear weapons. As an emblem of this process, the French communist left, which long argued against nuclear weapons, finally came round to the idea that its possession by France was a guarantee of its independence. This caused a significant weakening of social mobilisation. And it is without any real debate in the parliament that the decision of this

<sup>5</sup> According to testimony obtained by letter dated 25 July 1999.

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 27

from Brittany to the Morvan and passing through the Massif Central. Others, like the Limousin, were prospected for the first time. In this region, some twenty kilometres north of the city of Limoges, the richest uranium shows in France and the most promising in terms of quantity were discovered in late 1948 (Paucard, 1992). They allowed the industrial mining of uranium ore and, from the late Fifties, chemical treatment to produce *yellow cake*. The outcome was an industrial configuration which lasted half a century and caused an upheaval in this small rural region, formerly dedicated to agriculture. Like any mining industry, the production of uranium led to the buildup of overburden and tailings. Three successive periods can be distinguished to understand how these tailings were transformed into radioactive waste. They corresponded to different social configurations in which the legitimacy of statement and action tended towards their qualification. Whereas the tailings were treated routinely in the early period, and only raised questions in the second, the analysis of the third period reveals a conflictual context, with growing, permanent, expert

and multifaceted vigilance with regard to their management as radioactive waste.

intrinsic to mining activity. Only the environment is risk-free.

**remnants** 

supply.

**3.1 The good old days of uranium: The era of arrangements and convertible industrial** 

The first configuration, the *good old days of uranium*, lasted about twenty-five years, from 1949 to 1973. It reflected an industrial mining scheme in which the tailings were treated as harmless. As for any mining practice at the time, they were either returned to the environment, or were used for other purposes. The monopoly of knowledge and power over them belonged to the CEA. It alone analysed, guided decisions and set the standards. The knowledge of these tailings was therefore severely restricted by such practices, especially since the mining industry was dissociated from the nuclear industry. Ultimately, risk is

Because of its duration, this industrial configuration was a structuring factor. It displayed many features. First, it was localised, limited to a few communes of the Monts d'Ambazac. Second, it was closed in on itself. The few kilometres distance from the city of Limoges were a virtual barrier separating the rural and urban worlds. Their links were limited to traditional trading between countryside and city. Besides, this small rural region was the water reservoir of the city of Limoges7. This configuration was also dominated by the CEA's mining division, made up of mining engineers and geologists. So, the job organisation of mining production is doubly structured by a geological department, in charge of prospecting, of measuring ore assays, and a mining department which extracts the ore. The Mining Division corresponds to the company which, in addition to these two major technical departments, contains an equipment maintenance and management department and an administrative department. And a significant number of the mine workers were former farmers or their offspring. Moreover, after the discoveries of large uranium deposits, the CEA supplemented the ore mining process with on-site treatment in a plant built in 1957 in the commune of Bessines. For economic reasons relating to the low concentration of the ore, the CEA quickly decided to concentrate the uranium ore chemically on-site. The product obtained was a paste called yellow cake, which had a uranium content of about

7 Since the 19th Century, the City of Limoges has installed reservoirs in the form of ponds, for its water

new nuclear energy plan was taken, because in this case also, the political consensus existed to legitimise the energy independence of France. And yet, it is at the meeting point of the various criticisms that an anti-nuclear movement was taking structural shape in France, with varying strength according to location. This movement was not only heterogeneous in its composition, but also in its arguments and its highly diversified methods of combat. Thus we find three types of critical (Brunet, 2004a; 2006b). First, critics levelled by scientists who organise and popularise for the public the problems raised by the deployment of this energy industry in France. This is the case of Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy (GSIEN). This group was founded by scientists, particularly nuclear physicists, after the "appeal of the 400" published by the daily *Le Monde* in February 1975. A total of 400 scientists of the CNRS, the College du France and the universities were concerned about the risks incurred by the French nuclear power programme and asked the population to reject the installation of power plants as long as any doubts subsisted. They criticised the secrecy surrounding the nuclear industry. GSIEN published a journal *La Gazette du Nucléaire* which played a considerable role in checks and balances and hence in the democratic penetration of the nuclear industry. This journal was circulated to a nascent antinuclear movement. In this sense, GSIEN was the first independent associative expert. In second, the critics in which the nuclear power programme is assimilated with the installation of a police state ordering an overwhelming consumption disrespectful of nature. This type of critical, more political, was essentially levelled by libertarian and ecological movements as an extension of the criticism of capitalist production and consumption in 1968. Finally, we find the critical type "nimby"6. It is truly from this period that the problematics of radioactive waste began to take shape. The inquiry by a journalist among members of the PEON commission in this period was symptomatic of this slow movement. To the question of "waste?" he received the answer: "It is not a current problem. The storage of these wastes today raises no difficulties; they only occupy a few square metres. It will become a substantial problem in the year 2000". (Simonnot, 1978). This issue was essentially centred on the production of industrial facilities qualified as nuclear, in other words, their fuels and wastes and releases. The uranium ore industry remained on the sidelines of this nascent problematics. Accordingly, its associated remnants are difficult to "recognise" as radioactive waste. This is precisely what we shall examine in the second part, covering the long term.

#### **3. From the remnants of the uranium mining industry to the qualification of radioactive waste**

We have seen that for geostrategic reasons, the context of national reticence and secrecy surrounding the development of the atomic industry internationally after the Second World War compelled France to take steps to assert its independence. Evidence of this is the creation of The CEA in 1945. And in setting up this new industry, uranium procurement became the CEA's top priority. The first class of prospectors was operational in late 1945. From the outset, an ever growing series of survey missions crisscrossed France, focusing on granitic formations. Some were already known from radium mining. This is the case of small deposits known before the war and located on the eastern margin of the Massif Central. As to the remainder, prospecting missions were spread over a vast area forming a V

<sup>6</sup> Nimby: the acronym means "not in my backyard". It is intended to reflect a refusal by future residents, not of this industry as a whole, but of observing the installation of a risky industrial facility nearby.

new nuclear energy plan was taken, because in this case also, the political consensus existed to legitimise the energy independence of France. And yet, it is at the meeting point of the various criticisms that an anti-nuclear movement was taking structural shape in France, with varying strength according to location. This movement was not only heterogeneous in its composition, but also in its arguments and its highly diversified methods of combat. Thus we find three types of critical (Brunet, 2004a; 2006b). First, critics levelled by scientists who organise and popularise for the public the problems raised by the deployment of this energy industry in France. This is the case of Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy (GSIEN). This group was founded by scientists, particularly nuclear physicists, after the "appeal of the 400" published by the daily *Le Monde* in February 1975. A total of 400 scientists of the CNRS, the College du France and the universities were concerned about the risks incurred by the French nuclear power programme and asked the population to reject the installation of power plants as long as any doubts subsisted. They criticised the secrecy surrounding the nuclear industry. GSIEN published a journal *La Gazette du Nucléaire* which played a considerable role in checks and balances and hence in the democratic penetration of the nuclear industry. This journal was circulated to a nascent antinuclear movement. In this sense, GSIEN was the first independent associative expert. In second, the critics in which the nuclear power programme is assimilated with the installation of a police state ordering an overwhelming consumption disrespectful of nature. This type of critical, more political, was essentially levelled by libertarian and ecological movements as an extension of the criticism of capitalist production and consumption in 1968. Finally, we find the critical type "nimby"6. It is truly from this period that the problematics of radioactive waste began to take shape. The inquiry by a journalist among members of the PEON commission in this period was symptomatic of this slow movement. To the question of "waste?" he received the answer: "It is not a current problem. The storage of these wastes today raises no difficulties; they only occupy a few square metres. It will become a substantial problem in the year 2000". (Simonnot, 1978). This issue was essentially centred on the production of industrial facilities qualified as nuclear, in other words, their fuels and wastes and releases. The uranium ore industry remained on the sidelines of this nascent problematics. Accordingly, its associated remnants are difficult to "recognise" as radioactive waste. This is

precisely what we shall examine in the second part, covering the long term.

**radioactive waste** 

**3. From the remnants of the uranium mining industry to the qualification of** 

We have seen that for geostrategic reasons, the context of national reticence and secrecy surrounding the development of the atomic industry internationally after the Second World War compelled France to take steps to assert its independence. Evidence of this is the creation of The CEA in 1945. And in setting up this new industry, uranium procurement became the CEA's top priority. The first class of prospectors was operational in late 1945. From the outset, an ever growing series of survey missions crisscrossed France, focusing on granitic formations. Some were already known from radium mining. This is the case of small deposits known before the war and located on the eastern margin of the Massif Central. As to the remainder, prospecting missions were spread over a vast area forming a V

6 Nimby: the acronym means "not in my backyard". It is intended to reflect a refusal by future residents, not of this industry as a whole, but of observing the installation of a risky industrial facility nearby.

from Brittany to the Morvan and passing through the Massif Central. Others, like the Limousin, were prospected for the first time. In this region, some twenty kilometres north of the city of Limoges, the richest uranium shows in France and the most promising in terms of quantity were discovered in late 1948 (Paucard, 1992). They allowed the industrial mining of uranium ore and, from the late Fifties, chemical treatment to produce *yellow cake*. The outcome was an industrial configuration which lasted half a century and caused an upheaval in this small rural region, formerly dedicated to agriculture. Like any mining industry, the production of uranium led to the buildup of overburden and tailings. Three successive periods can be distinguished to understand how these tailings were transformed into radioactive waste. They corresponded to different social configurations in which the legitimacy of statement and action tended towards their qualification. Whereas the tailings were treated routinely in the early period, and only raised questions in the second, the analysis of the third period reveals a conflictual context, with growing, permanent, expert and multifaceted vigilance with regard to their management as radioactive waste.

#### **3.1 The good old days of uranium: The era of arrangements and convertible industrial remnants**

The first configuration, the *good old days of uranium*, lasted about twenty-five years, from 1949 to 1973. It reflected an industrial mining scheme in which the tailings were treated as harmless. As for any mining practice at the time, they were either returned to the environment, or were used for other purposes. The monopoly of knowledge and power over them belonged to the CEA. It alone analysed, guided decisions and set the standards. The knowledge of these tailings was therefore severely restricted by such practices, especially since the mining industry was dissociated from the nuclear industry. Ultimately, risk is intrinsic to mining activity. Only the environment is risk-free.

Because of its duration, this industrial configuration was a structuring factor. It displayed many features. First, it was localised, limited to a few communes of the Monts d'Ambazac. Second, it was closed in on itself. The few kilometres distance from the city of Limoges were a virtual barrier separating the rural and urban worlds. Their links were limited to traditional trading between countryside and city. Besides, this small rural region was the water reservoir of the city of Limoges7. This configuration was also dominated by the CEA's mining division, made up of mining engineers and geologists. So, the job organisation of mining production is doubly structured by a geological department, in charge of prospecting, of measuring ore assays, and a mining department which extracts the ore. The Mining Division corresponds to the company which, in addition to these two major technical departments, contains an equipment maintenance and management department and an administrative department. And a significant number of the mine workers were former farmers or their offspring. Moreover, after the discoveries of large uranium deposits, the CEA supplemented the ore mining process with on-site treatment in a plant built in 1957 in the commune of Bessines. For economic reasons relating to the low concentration of the ore, the CEA quickly decided to concentrate the uranium ore chemically on-site. The product obtained was a paste called yellow cake, which had a uranium content of about

 7 Since the 19th Century, the City of Limoges has installed reservoirs in the form of ponds, for its water supply.

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

methodology and a metrology were then set up (Bernhard & al*,* 1992).

positive asset. And tentatively, the issue of waste materialised.

**3.2 Nuclear discord: The mining industry, a link of the nuclear industry** 

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 29

with the installation of mine aeration systems and radioactivity measurements, both collective and individual. The chief hazard identified was radon. It was discharged to the exterior by the ventilation systems. A dosimetric measurement system was set up at the same time. In 1951, the CEA formed an inspection body, the Radiation Protection Department (SPR) reporting directly to the High-Commissioner for the mining sector. A

The second period, the era of *nuclear discord*, began in the mid-Seventies and ended twenty years later when Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires (COGEMA) announced the indefinite suspension of uranium mining in the Limousin. This period reflected a new industrial configuration, more open and intense than the previous one, with sharp tensions. The construction of a major nuclear power capability in France demanded much higher uranium output than in the past. At the same time, criticism of the government decision roiled across France. It impacted uranium mining, henceforth considered an inseparable component of the nuclear industry. Uranium was no longer acknowledged to be the only

The government decision in 1974 to schedule the construction of nuclear power plants had two major consequences for the CEA's mining sector. One concerned its organisation. To streamline the new energy sector founded on the nuclear industry, the government decided to split off all operations associated with the nuclear fuel cycle from the CEA, ranging from mining to waste reprocessing. It created a subsidiary in 1976 for the purpose, named COGEMA. The second consequence was the transformation of the local industrial configuration in the Limousin. Annual uranium production had to be doubled. This goal implied fresh prospecting and new mine sites. The mining division therefore expanded its operating perimeter and went on a hiring spree. A number of comparative figures can provide an idea of the transformation of the mining division in a few short years. In 1973, it produced 590 tonnes of uranium; in 1980, 1002 tonnes of uranium for 620,300 tonnes of ore extracted. At the same time, its area of occupancy rose from 350 to 1300 hectares, divided into 3300 registered plots. Its workforce also grew from 650 in 1975 to 1000 in 1980. The new mine workers were outsiders. The industrial configuration which, until then, was closed in upon itself, opened up. But the extension of its activities henceforth became a problem for a large segment of the population, farmers and others, who discovered and attempted to legitimise environmental issues with local officials and administrative authorities. The words "pollution", "nature protection", "environmental problems" became current, in opposition to the earlier popularisation. These words come from the new environmentalist vocabulary used by the national associations of conservation and environmental scientists. They are then taken over by the State when it created, in 1973, the first environment ministry in France. (Charvolin, 1997). Local officials passed the word on to COGEMA's mining division and the State authorities. The texture of the individual arrangements which hitherto cemented this configuration disintegrated. Conflicts broke out, essentially collective. Some inhabitants of the mining zone set up owners' and environmental conservation associations. Antinuclear groups were also formed, especially in Limoges. They decried the risks of radioactive pollution of the water catchment basins of their city by mining operations. These conflicts were emblematic of the way in which environmental

90%. This cake was then sent to plants in southern France to undergo final treatment to fabricate nuclear fuel by purification and enrichment. Before the Bessines factory went on stream, the CEA transported and processed the ore from Limoges in the Paris area, to the Bouchet factory.

Between this industry and the population, a shared positive vision emerged of its production within a set of arrangements. Uranium ore, an element of an acted nature, became the new wealth of this area and the symbol of its revival. It became a positive heritage. This situation did not discount the "drawbacks" engendered by the proximity of the mine to the villages: collapses of cultivated land, wastewater dumping into the fields, deafening noises and dust clouds from the mine sites. Yet formulated as such, they did not bring into question the mining industry and its vocation for the inhabitants: as the driver of local economic development. Depending on their characteristics, these drawbacks were dealt with under individualised arrangements on an individual case basis, or collectively. Thus, for example, the collective problem of access to water could be solved by its handling by the mining division. Indeed, when the mining division was installed in the Fifties, a collective water supply did not exist, and water was drawn from individual wells. Very often, mining operations intersected the springs and dried up the wells. The mining division then took charge of the collective water supply. In exchange, these arrangements served to reinforce its domination over the area. Thus when the mediation of the mayors was required to address collective drawbacks, the negotiations always took place in the office of the director of the mining division, a venue that was deeply symbolic of the exercise of this unchallenged domination.

As for the treatment of the remains from the industrial process, it was completely unmarked. Two types of waste coexisted: overburden from ore extraction, and mill tailings from chemical treatment. The first were the rock containing the ore, whose economic value was below the assay. Considered as routine and harmless, they were used as backfill for road building projects, or to plug a mine. Part of it was also used in individual arrangements. The latter were present as soon as the Bessines factory became operational. In the form of reddish wet sand, they represented an approximately equivalent mass to the crushed ore. Indeed, in terms of mass, given the very low uranium concentration in the rock, yellow cake represents an infinitesimal part of the total mass of ore treated, about 2 to 5 ppm depending on each case. They were handled in two ways. The first was burial in the excavations of the open pit mines. Thus like the overburden, they were "returned to nature" without any further action. A second, in very small quantities and less frequent was disseminated across the region for masonry. So, examples are not rare of individuals residing on the mining zone who used these residues, some to make a floor slab for a home, build a workshop, obviously unaware of the radioactive hazard associated with the very high radon emanations released by the radioactivity remaining in these residues. This raised no problem: the radioactive composition was considered close to zero because the chemical treatment was supposed to extract all the uranium.

In actual fact, the only recognised risks were contained within the strict limits of the production process. Exposure to these risks concerned the miners, especially the workers. Some of these risks fell into the very broad class of mining operations: cave-ins, silica inhalation. Others were classed as radioactive risks. From the mid-Fifties, a more sophisticated vigilance, taken over by the CEA, was exercised over the work of the miners,

90%. This cake was then sent to plants in southern France to undergo final treatment to fabricate nuclear fuel by purification and enrichment. Before the Bessines factory went on stream, the CEA transported and processed the ore from Limoges in the Paris area, to the

Between this industry and the population, a shared positive vision emerged of its production within a set of arrangements. Uranium ore, an element of an acted nature, became the new wealth of this area and the symbol of its revival. It became a positive heritage. This situation did not discount the "drawbacks" engendered by the proximity of the mine to the villages: collapses of cultivated land, wastewater dumping into the fields, deafening noises and dust clouds from the mine sites. Yet formulated as such, they did not bring into question the mining industry and its vocation for the inhabitants: as the driver of local economic development. Depending on their characteristics, these drawbacks were dealt with under individualised arrangements on an individual case basis, or collectively. Thus, for example, the collective problem of access to water could be solved by its handling by the mining division. Indeed, when the mining division was installed in the Fifties, a collective water supply did not exist, and water was drawn from individual wells. Very often, mining operations intersected the springs and dried up the wells. The mining division then took charge of the collective water supply. In exchange, these arrangements served to reinforce its domination over the area. Thus when the mediation of the mayors was required to address collective drawbacks, the negotiations always took place in the office of the director of the mining division, a venue that was deeply symbolic of the exercise of this

As for the treatment of the remains from the industrial process, it was completely unmarked. Two types of waste coexisted: overburden from ore extraction, and mill tailings from chemical treatment. The first were the rock containing the ore, whose economic value was below the assay. Considered as routine and harmless, they were used as backfill for road building projects, or to plug a mine. Part of it was also used in individual arrangements. The latter were present as soon as the Bessines factory became operational. In the form of reddish wet sand, they represented an approximately equivalent mass to the crushed ore. Indeed, in terms of mass, given the very low uranium concentration in the rock, yellow cake represents an infinitesimal part of the total mass of ore treated, about 2 to 5 ppm depending on each case. They were handled in two ways. The first was burial in the excavations of the open pit mines. Thus like the overburden, they were "returned to nature" without any further action. A second, in very small quantities and less frequent was disseminated across the region for masonry. So, examples are not rare of individuals residing on the mining zone who used these residues, some to make a floor slab for a home, build a workshop, obviously unaware of the radioactive hazard associated with the very high radon emanations released by the radioactivity remaining in these residues. This raised no problem: the radioactive composition was considered close to zero because the chemical

In actual fact, the only recognised risks were contained within the strict limits of the production process. Exposure to these risks concerned the miners, especially the workers. Some of these risks fell into the very broad class of mining operations: cave-ins, silica inhalation. Others were classed as radioactive risks. From the mid-Fifties, a more sophisticated vigilance, taken over by the CEA, was exercised over the work of the miners,

Bouchet factory.

unchallenged domination.

treatment was supposed to extract all the uranium.

with the installation of mine aeration systems and radioactivity measurements, both collective and individual. The chief hazard identified was radon. It was discharged to the exterior by the ventilation systems. A dosimetric measurement system was set up at the same time. In 1951, the CEA formed an inspection body, the Radiation Protection Department (SPR) reporting directly to the High-Commissioner for the mining sector. A methodology and a metrology were then set up (Bernhard & al*,* 1992).

#### **3.2 Nuclear discord: The mining industry, a link of the nuclear industry**

The second period, the era of *nuclear discord*, began in the mid-Seventies and ended twenty years later when Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires (COGEMA) announced the indefinite suspension of uranium mining in the Limousin. This period reflected a new industrial configuration, more open and intense than the previous one, with sharp tensions. The construction of a major nuclear power capability in France demanded much higher uranium output than in the past. At the same time, criticism of the government decision roiled across France. It impacted uranium mining, henceforth considered an inseparable component of the nuclear industry. Uranium was no longer acknowledged to be the only positive asset. And tentatively, the issue of waste materialised.

The government decision in 1974 to schedule the construction of nuclear power plants had two major consequences for the CEA's mining sector. One concerned its organisation. To streamline the new energy sector founded on the nuclear industry, the government decided to split off all operations associated with the nuclear fuel cycle from the CEA, ranging from mining to waste reprocessing. It created a subsidiary in 1976 for the purpose, named COGEMA. The second consequence was the transformation of the local industrial configuration in the Limousin. Annual uranium production had to be doubled. This goal implied fresh prospecting and new mine sites. The mining division therefore expanded its operating perimeter and went on a hiring spree. A number of comparative figures can provide an idea of the transformation of the mining division in a few short years. In 1973, it produced 590 tonnes of uranium; in 1980, 1002 tonnes of uranium for 620,300 tonnes of ore extracted. At the same time, its area of occupancy rose from 350 to 1300 hectares, divided into 3300 registered plots. Its workforce also grew from 650 in 1975 to 1000 in 1980. The new mine workers were outsiders. The industrial configuration which, until then, was closed in upon itself, opened up. But the extension of its activities henceforth became a problem for a large segment of the population, farmers and others, who discovered and attempted to legitimise environmental issues with local officials and administrative authorities. The words "pollution", "nature protection", "environmental problems" became current, in opposition to the earlier popularisation. These words come from the new environmentalist vocabulary used by the national associations of conservation and environmental scientists. They are then taken over by the State when it created, in 1973, the first environment ministry in France. (Charvolin, 1997). Local officials passed the word on to COGEMA's mining division and the State authorities. The texture of the individual arrangements which hitherto cemented this configuration disintegrated. Conflicts broke out, essentially collective. Some inhabitants of the mining zone set up owners' and environmental conservation associations. Antinuclear groups were also formed, especially in Limoges. They decried the risks of radioactive pollution of the water catchment basins of their city by mining operations. These conflicts were emblematic of the way in which environmental

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

back home." [press article in *Le Populaire*, 15 février 1979]

**3.3 Nuclear uncertainty: Managing and qualifying the remnants** 

direction.

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 31

The semantics were ingenuous: to qualify mine tailings as "overburden" meant to treat them as any routine form of residue. Their "problem" was nonexistent, and their sole admissible identity was the one attributed by COGEMA. This identity implied an ignorance of the radioactive composition of these residues, and denied the existence of any risk. The associations lacked the means to counter these assertions. Their criticism was limited to inflating the challenge to this industry by arguments targeting waste, which contributed to its disqualification. It sustained a powerful tension between the positive and negative aspects of the industry. Yet too many economic and social challenges precluded its full and unchallenged legitimacy. This is why the issue of radioactive waste from the mining industry was not identified during this period, although emerging details tended in that

The third and final period, of *nuclear uncertainty*, began in 1988 with the announcement of the speedy termination of industrial activity. The social configuration, hitherto centred on industrial operations, and the problems raised by uranium production, were progressively transformed into a solidly environmental configuration that would never end. From uranium as *acted nature*, its remnants were considered *acting nature*. Indeed the radioactive waste qualification process applied to the residues now entailed permanent vigilance and accompaniment. A priori, it's almost impossible to fix the term because the respective time scales for men and radioactivity emitted by these wastes are immeasurable. This situation resulted from the nuclear establishment's progressive loss of hegemony of statement and action with regard to these remnants (Brunet, 2004b). Its weakness had three causes. First, it originates the strengthening of the expertise of the antinuclear movement in France with the emergence of the associative expert, who scientifically challenged the arguments of the nuclear establishment. Second, the local public authorities, no longer anticipating any positive spinoffs from the industry, were vulnerable to the arguments of the associations. Finally, thirdly, the nationwide nuclear establishment was forced into reform, given its relative failure to propose an operationalisation of the comprehensive management of all radioactive waste, high and low level alike. A correlation therefore existed between this weakness, the obvious shift in acceptable standards on radioactive waste management, and the stigmatising image projected by the recognition of the remnants as radioactive waste. Nevertheless, the environmental configuration remained subject to regulatory practice.

With the onset of the Nineties, the mining industry declined and collapsed in late 1995. COGEMA's decision in 1988 to stop any further mining in France had its economic underpinnings: to mine only profitable orebodies. The low price of uranium on the world market made Limousin ore expensive compared to those of Canada and Africa. Despite the very intense but dispersed labour unrest, the mine workers and their unions had to give in, and they quickly disappeared from the social landscape. While the local political officials favoured the resumption of mining, others, urban political officials, promoted the idea of a

"[…] At that time, there was no treatment plant on the spot and the ore was sent by lorry to the Paris area, to the Bouchet factory installed by the CEA. The treatment of the ore led to the production of a few thousand tonnes of sterile, just like the sterile at the Bessines factory: these harmless materials are now returning. It is almost like going

problems generated by the uranium industry and the solutions made thereto were posed from then on. They also helped to grasp the conditions of the emerging issue of radioactive waste.

A conflict about the definition of the situation broke out on two levels with the mining division. Faced with the industrial breakthrough, these new associative players, pursuing their favourite themes, became spokesmen of a nature and of a living framework that deserved protection, and/or radical critics of a risky energy policy generating very long term waste. In the former case, the associative arguments drew on sensitive past experience: the noise generated by mining, the drying up of the springs, the degradation of the landscape, were criticised. Water and landscaps were defended as common heritage of an abused nature (Dorst, 1965) and as a positive asset whose use was jeopardised by pollution and other industrial detriments. In the latter case, the scientific and critical arguments of the GSIEN (Gsien, 1977) concerning the nuclear industry were mobilised. Appropriated by the antinuclear associations, they were disseminated among the population of Limoges, so that the conflict around the risk of radioactive pollution of drinking water that crystallised in autumn 1979 was acknowledged to be a problem by the municipality and the Prefect, the representative of the State. The confrontation found legitimacy in areas which were no longer those of the mining division but those of the State. In the negotiations initiated in the presence of local officials, while the State obliged COGEMA to protect the water resources of the city from industrial releases, the director of the mining division nevertheless continued to deny the problem. At a joint meeting chaired by the Prefect and attended by the Mayor of Limoges and the director of the mining division, the latter offered an answer:

"Yes, Prefect, we agree in principle, but provided that it is the prefectural authority that issues the demand, and that it is perfectly clear that it is not a problem of pollution that needs settling, but a problem of psychological damage. In other words, the crowd psychology needs to be corrected." [Prefecture of the Haute-Vienne, "Radioactivity of waters supplying the city of Limoges." - Proceedings of the briefing of 08/10/79. Mimeographed].

At the same time, the State and the nuclear establishment were denounced for their habit of withholding information about radioactivity monitoring measurements. Short of a suspension of the nuclear power programme, which remained its ultimate target – this locally implied suspending the inauguration of new mine operations and the shutdown or slowdown of those incurring a risk for the environment or for the population – the local antinuclear movement defends two others claims. The first is more intensive monitoring of the radioactivity of drinking water and publication of the data. The second is the creation of an enquiry commission to conduct an epidemiological survey by independent bodies.

It is in the tumult of this conflict that the nature protection and antinuclear associations also alerted the public to practices they considered dubious. These included waste dumping at night in an open pit mine by COGEMA. The CEA, which closed its uranium concentration plant in the Paris area to the Bouchet factory, decided to transfer the tailings to the Limousin. The arguments volunteered to justify this practice was their harmlessness and the fact that having originated in the Limousin, they were merely going back to where they came from. The answer offered by the Prefect of the Haute-Vienne in 1979 to a worried local official:

problems generated by the uranium industry and the solutions made thereto were posed from then on. They also helped to grasp the conditions of the emerging issue of radioactive

A conflict about the definition of the situation broke out on two levels with the mining division. Faced with the industrial breakthrough, these new associative players, pursuing their favourite themes, became spokesmen of a nature and of a living framework that deserved protection, and/or radical critics of a risky energy policy generating very long term waste. In the former case, the associative arguments drew on sensitive past experience: the noise generated by mining, the drying up of the springs, the degradation of the landscape, were criticised. Water and landscaps were defended as common heritage of an abused nature (Dorst, 1965) and as a positive asset whose use was jeopardised by pollution and other industrial detriments. In the latter case, the scientific and critical arguments of the GSIEN (Gsien, 1977) concerning the nuclear industry were mobilised. Appropriated by the antinuclear associations, they were disseminated among the population of Limoges, so that the conflict around the risk of radioactive pollution of drinking water that crystallised in autumn 1979 was acknowledged to be a problem by the municipality and the Prefect, the representative of the State. The confrontation found legitimacy in areas which were no longer those of the mining division but those of the State. In the negotiations initiated in the presence of local officials, while the State obliged COGEMA to protect the water resources of the city from industrial releases, the director of the mining division nevertheless continued to deny the problem. At a joint meeting chaired by the Prefect and attended by the Mayor of Limoges and the director of the mining division, the latter offered an answer:

"Yes, Prefect, we agree in principle, but provided that it is the prefectural authority that issues the demand, and that it is perfectly clear that it is not a problem of pollution that needs settling, but a problem of psychological damage. In other words, the crowd psychology needs to be corrected." [Prefecture of the Haute-Vienne, "Radioactivity of waters supplying the city of Limoges." - Proceedings of the briefing of 08/10/79.

At the same time, the State and the nuclear establishment were denounced for their habit of withholding information about radioactivity monitoring measurements. Short of a suspension of the nuclear power programme, which remained its ultimate target – this locally implied suspending the inauguration of new mine operations and the shutdown or slowdown of those incurring a risk for the environment or for the population – the local antinuclear movement defends two others claims. The first is more intensive monitoring of the radioactivity of drinking water and publication of the data. The second is the creation of an enquiry commission to conduct an epidemiological survey by independent bodies.

It is in the tumult of this conflict that the nature protection and antinuclear associations also alerted the public to practices they considered dubious. These included waste dumping at night in an open pit mine by COGEMA. The CEA, which closed its uranium concentration plant in the Paris area to the Bouchet factory, decided to transfer the tailings to the Limousin. The arguments volunteered to justify this practice was their harmlessness and the fact that having originated in the Limousin, they were merely going back to where they came from. The answer offered by the Prefect of the Haute-Vienne in 1979 to a worried local

waste.

Mimeographed].

official:

"[…] At that time, there was no treatment plant on the spot and the ore was sent by lorry to the Paris area, to the Bouchet factory installed by the CEA. The treatment of the ore led to the production of a few thousand tonnes of sterile, just like the sterile at the Bessines factory: these harmless materials are now returning. It is almost like going back home." [press article in *Le Populaire*, 15 février 1979]

The semantics were ingenuous: to qualify mine tailings as "overburden" meant to treat them as any routine form of residue. Their "problem" was nonexistent, and their sole admissible identity was the one attributed by COGEMA. This identity implied an ignorance of the radioactive composition of these residues, and denied the existence of any risk. The associations lacked the means to counter these assertions. Their criticism was limited to inflating the challenge to this industry by arguments targeting waste, which contributed to its disqualification. It sustained a powerful tension between the positive and negative aspects of the industry. Yet too many economic and social challenges precluded its full and unchallenged legitimacy. This is why the issue of radioactive waste from the mining industry was not identified during this period, although emerging details tended in that direction.

#### **3.3 Nuclear uncertainty: Managing and qualifying the remnants**

The third and final period, of *nuclear uncertainty*, began in 1988 with the announcement of the speedy termination of industrial activity. The social configuration, hitherto centred on industrial operations, and the problems raised by uranium production, were progressively transformed into a solidly environmental configuration that would never end. From uranium as *acted nature*, its remnants were considered *acting nature*. Indeed the radioactive waste qualification process applied to the residues now entailed permanent vigilance and accompaniment. A priori, it's almost impossible to fix the term because the respective time scales for men and radioactivity emitted by these wastes are immeasurable. This situation resulted from the nuclear establishment's progressive loss of hegemony of statement and action with regard to these remnants (Brunet, 2004b). Its weakness had three causes. First, it originates the strengthening of the expertise of the antinuclear movement in France with the emergence of the associative expert, who scientifically challenged the arguments of the nuclear establishment. Second, the local public authorities, no longer anticipating any positive spinoffs from the industry, were vulnerable to the arguments of the associations. Finally, thirdly, the nationwide nuclear establishment was forced into reform, given its relative failure to propose an operationalisation of the comprehensive management of all radioactive waste, high and low level alike. A correlation therefore existed between this weakness, the obvious shift in acceptable standards on radioactive waste management, and the stigmatising image projected by the recognition of the remnants as radioactive waste. Nevertheless, the environmental configuration remained subject to regulatory practice.

With the onset of the Nineties, the mining industry declined and collapsed in late 1995. COGEMA's decision in 1988 to stop any further mining in France had its economic underpinnings: to mine only profitable orebodies. The low price of uranium on the world market made Limousin ore expensive compared to those of Canada and Africa. Despite the very intense but dispersed labour unrest, the mine workers and their unions had to give in, and they quickly disappeared from the social landscape. While the local political officials favoured the resumption of mining, others, urban political officials, promoted the idea of a

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

disappeared.

waste.

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 33

antinuclear groups. From this point of view, the antinuclear groups did not conceal their strategy. One of the routes for securing the shutdown of the nuclear industry in France was to demonstrate the "intestinal blockage" of the system. This strategy consisted in focusing public attention on the waste. Insofar as no transfer solution was accepted by the potential host population (deep burial, underground storage with possible rehandling), the wastes remained where they were generated and ultimately cluttered the area. Added to the establishment expert, arguing by differentiation, were the university laboratories which assumed a role in offering expertise, in which the monopoly of the nuclear establishment

During the same period, and at the same time, the associative players transformed themselves into the typical ideal figure of the *associative expert*, with features specific to the Limousin. This figure assumed two forms. On the one hand, it inspired the local environmental defence associations and antinuclear groups, who together created the Limousin anti-waste coordination (CLADE) in 1992. This flexible federative organisation focused exclusively on the "remnants" of the mining industry. Its essential demand was the conduct of a radiological investigation which, independently of the nuclear establishment, could assess the environmental and health hazards incurred by these harmful remnants. The prize was the definitive qualification of these remnants as radioactive wastes. It adjusted its practices to this outcome. Thus, without awaiting the independent investigation that it demanded from the authorities, it concentrated on the burden of proof that bedevilled it and forced it to mobilise science to prove the existence of dangers to health. On the other hand, this associative expert figure also engaged the Commission for Independent Research and Information on Radioactivity (CRII-RAD), an associative radioactivity measurement laboratory. CRII-RAD is a non-profit association created in 1986 to counter the statements of the authorities and experts of the nuclear establishment, who, after Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant explosion, argued that the radioactive cloud had "stopped" at the French border, and that there had been no significant radioactive fallout on the national territory. This association enjoys the original privilege of having founded a laboratory for measuring the radioactivity that is independent of the state and nuclear authorities, with a nationwide audience. It is therefore at the junction of the activities of the local association, which relentlessly denounced the potentially polluted locations, took samples in suspect places of the old mining zone by observing the procedures recommended by the CRII-RAD and those of the associative laboratory which analysed and interpreted the results, that this associative expert unveiled its reality as a player and, progressively, imposed a new and critical viewpoint on the remnants (Brunet, 2006c). There is therefore an important qualitative change in the practice of associative expertise. Without the GSIEN having disappeared from the associative landscape, the investigation of the antinuclear movement no longer relied exclusively on a critique of the documents produced by the nuclear establishment, but on independent evidence produced in the laboratory. This is one of the reasons why COGEMA, the experts of the nuclear establishment and the authorities were compelled to re-examine the knowledge and management of these "remnants" and to recognise them as radioactive

Firstly, the associative expert forced COGEMA, via the State, to take more restrictive protective measures in its winding-up operations. But above all, with the support of the local authorities, it succeeded in imposing the satisfaction of its central claim: the setting up

"green" Limousin for the mining area, oriented towards housing and tourism. The construction of expressways between Limoges and Monts d'Ambazac shortened the distances and many citydwellers came to live there. At the same time, in the late Nineties, the inauguration of a leisure facility on St Pardoux Lake made it a relaxation centre for the population of Limoges and for the tourists. That is why these urban political officials formulated a twofold demand, non-negotiable for them: that COGEMA should finance a conversion plan for the mining territory, and that it clean up the traces left by fifty years of uranium mining.

Yet when mining operations ended, more than twenty million tonnes of residues generated by the industrial process remained on the old mining territory, stored in open pit mines. Added to this mass were wastes of all types, already present or anticipated. The industrial logic of burial for many long years had been fully implemented. Thus, empty drums that previously contained radioactive substances and originated directly from COGEMA and CEA industrial facilities, were regularly dumped in thousands in the mine pits. And in the guise of a conversion project, COGEMA planned to set up an interim storage facility for 200 000 tonnes of depleted uranium produced by the fuel enrichment cycle. All these factors tended to project a negative and stigmatising image on the region, one of a "nuclear dustbin". The unfair tradeoff that triggered it contributed to a dual upheaval symbolic and political. Symbolic, when the uranium converted to residues was no longer considered a positive asset, but became a negative legacy. Political, when the radioactive, economic, environmental and health hazards harboured by this negative legacy, whether real or imaginary, soon spread and tended to convert the officials to the position defended by the environmentalist associations. The industrial configuration blurred and vanished, leaving in its place an environmental configuration in which COGEMA, the elected officials, State representatives, associations and experts were the players. The experts then played a central role in the dynamic of this configuration. They compiled and assessed the controversial knowledge about the remnants, given the turmoil that governed the way in which the questions were asked and answered. This knowledge, no doubt unstable, was nevertheless sufficient to qualify and to manage the remnants.

Two types of expert faced off within this environmental configuration: the establishment expert and the establishing expert (Bonnet, 2006a): the first largely came from the nuclear establishment itself. This period of the late Nineties witnessed the generalised treatment as a problematic issue of all radioactive waste and, as a corollary, a transformation of the institutions which possessed and produced the expertise of the State in this field. We cannot expand further on this issue in this chapter. However, it is clear that the progressive inclusion of the remnants of the uranium industry in the issue of all radioactive waste facilitated the process of its qualification. This transformation stemmed from processes of differentiation and independence. For example, the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA) was created from a CEA Department. In 1981, with the passage of the first French bill on the nuclear industry specifically and exclusively addressing radioactive waste management, ANDRA became independent of the CEA. This transformation impacted the radioactive waste management policy, the nuclear facility safety policy, and the health and environmental safety policy of the population. The French State did not succeed in resolving the management of high and medium level nuclear waste. Underground storage alternatives were vigorously challenged by the public and the

"green" Limousin for the mining area, oriented towards housing and tourism. The construction of expressways between Limoges and Monts d'Ambazac shortened the distances and many citydwellers came to live there. At the same time, in the late Nineties, the inauguration of a leisure facility on St Pardoux Lake made it a relaxation centre for the population of Limoges and for the tourists. That is why these urban political officials formulated a twofold demand, non-negotiable for them: that COGEMA should finance a conversion plan for the mining territory, and that it clean up the traces left by fifty years of

Yet when mining operations ended, more than twenty million tonnes of residues generated by the industrial process remained on the old mining territory, stored in open pit mines. Added to this mass were wastes of all types, already present or anticipated. The industrial logic of burial for many long years had been fully implemented. Thus, empty drums that previously contained radioactive substances and originated directly from COGEMA and CEA industrial facilities, were regularly dumped in thousands in the mine pits. And in the guise of a conversion project, COGEMA planned to set up an interim storage facility for 200 000 tonnes of depleted uranium produced by the fuel enrichment cycle. All these factors tended to project a negative and stigmatising image on the region, one of a "nuclear dustbin". The unfair tradeoff that triggered it contributed to a dual upheaval symbolic and political. Symbolic, when the uranium converted to residues was no longer considered a positive asset, but became a negative legacy. Political, when the radioactive, economic, environmental and health hazards harboured by this negative legacy, whether real or imaginary, soon spread and tended to convert the officials to the position defended by the environmentalist associations. The industrial configuration blurred and vanished, leaving in its place an environmental configuration in which COGEMA, the elected officials, State representatives, associations and experts were the players. The experts then played a central role in the dynamic of this configuration. They compiled and assessed the controversial knowledge about the remnants, given the turmoil that governed the way in which the questions were asked and answered. This knowledge, no doubt unstable, was nevertheless

Two types of expert faced off within this environmental configuration: the establishment expert and the establishing expert (Bonnet, 2006a): the first largely came from the nuclear establishment itself. This period of the late Nineties witnessed the generalised treatment as a problematic issue of all radioactive waste and, as a corollary, a transformation of the institutions which possessed and produced the expertise of the State in this field. We cannot expand further on this issue in this chapter. However, it is clear that the progressive inclusion of the remnants of the uranium industry in the issue of all radioactive waste facilitated the process of its qualification. This transformation stemmed from processes of differentiation and independence. For example, the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA) was created from a CEA Department. In 1981, with the passage of the first French bill on the nuclear industry specifically and exclusively addressing radioactive waste management, ANDRA became independent of the CEA. This transformation impacted the radioactive waste management policy, the nuclear facility safety policy, and the health and environmental safety policy of the population. The French State did not succeed in resolving the management of high and medium level nuclear waste. Underground storage alternatives were vigorously challenged by the public and the

uranium mining.

sufficient to qualify and to manage the remnants.

antinuclear groups. From this point of view, the antinuclear groups did not conceal their strategy. One of the routes for securing the shutdown of the nuclear industry in France was to demonstrate the "intestinal blockage" of the system. This strategy consisted in focusing public attention on the waste. Insofar as no transfer solution was accepted by the potential host population (deep burial, underground storage with possible rehandling), the wastes remained where they were generated and ultimately cluttered the area. Added to the establishment expert, arguing by differentiation, were the university laboratories which assumed a role in offering expertise, in which the monopoly of the nuclear establishment disappeared.

During the same period, and at the same time, the associative players transformed themselves into the typical ideal figure of the *associative expert*, with features specific to the Limousin. This figure assumed two forms. On the one hand, it inspired the local environmental defence associations and antinuclear groups, who together created the Limousin anti-waste coordination (CLADE) in 1992. This flexible federative organisation focused exclusively on the "remnants" of the mining industry. Its essential demand was the conduct of a radiological investigation which, independently of the nuclear establishment, could assess the environmental and health hazards incurred by these harmful remnants. The prize was the definitive qualification of these remnants as radioactive wastes. It adjusted its practices to this outcome. Thus, without awaiting the independent investigation that it demanded from the authorities, it concentrated on the burden of proof that bedevilled it and forced it to mobilise science to prove the existence of dangers to health. On the other hand, this associative expert figure also engaged the Commission for Independent Research and Information on Radioactivity (CRII-RAD), an associative radioactivity measurement laboratory. CRII-RAD is a non-profit association created in 1986 to counter the statements of the authorities and experts of the nuclear establishment, who, after Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant explosion, argued that the radioactive cloud had "stopped" at the French border, and that there had been no significant radioactive fallout on the national territory. This association enjoys the original privilege of having founded a laboratory for measuring the radioactivity that is independent of the state and nuclear authorities, with a nationwide audience. It is therefore at the junction of the activities of the local association, which relentlessly denounced the potentially polluted locations, took samples in suspect places of the old mining zone by observing the procedures recommended by the CRII-RAD and those of the associative laboratory which analysed and interpreted the results, that this associative expert unveiled its reality as a player and, progressively, imposed a new and critical viewpoint on the remnants (Brunet, 2006c). There is therefore an important qualitative change in the practice of associative expertise. Without the GSIEN having disappeared from the associative landscape, the investigation of the antinuclear movement no longer relied exclusively on a critique of the documents produced by the nuclear establishment, but on independent evidence produced in the laboratory. This is one of the reasons why COGEMA, the experts of the nuclear establishment and the authorities were compelled to re-examine the knowledge and management of these "remnants" and to recognise them as radioactive waste.

Firstly, the associative expert forced COGEMA, via the State, to take more restrictive protective measures in its winding-up operations. But above all, with the support of the local authorities, it succeeded in imposing the satisfaction of its central claim: the setting up

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

and scale.

future of our industrial societies.

**4. Conclusion** 

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 35

the action model promoted by the associative expert. Moreover the action model was completed by a legal expertise of the associative movement. All the actions of COGEMA and of the State on radioactive waste management are the subject of closely attentive legal monitoring by the local associative movement. In other words, the recognised legitimacy of the environmental issue by expert knowledge, failed in setting up truly permanent systems for consultation and negotiation, that is to say political. Only *acting nature*, via the spokesmen experts, who claimed to be its interpreters, conditioned its frequency, intensity

It follows that AREVA Company, formerly COGEMA9, like any mine producer, wanted to leave Limousin for good after the industrial sites had been redeveloped, and not rehabilitated as this company suggests (Bavoux & Guiollard, 1998). It was forced to remain on the spot. In recent years, the State should take its place for a strictly indeterminate period. Its task was precisely to "contain" this set of remnants now qualified as "radioactive waste" and to meet the standards whose level of acceptability ceaselessly became more restrictive. In other words, while the nuclear establishment was planning to "return these wastes to nature", according to its own terminology, to forget about them, they now became, probably for an unlimited period, the subject of increasingly intensive monitoring, which forced it to remain nearby. This obligation of surveillance and retention was not simply that. AREVA NC and the State are resistant to this because it represents a cost to both economic and symbolic. More the cost of monitoring work grows, less the industry shows that it was profitable. Similarly, more problems appear, less engineering, over the long term, shows its ability to solve them. It's in fact ceaselessly updated by the vigilance of the associative movement. This monitoring is therefore fragile. Indeed, it is largely contingent on the capacity of the movements coming from society to exercise this control which, necessarily, remains discontinuous. The militant capacities of the associative movement are very fragile (Brunet, 2004c; 2006b). More generally, above and beyond the issues of radioactive waste, this situation raises the question of the role of public, the associative movements and experts in a renewed technical democracy. In this context, certainly, the State should reconsider the submission of general interest for the sole benefit of short-term economic, which denies the existence of waste and problems. It needs also to recognize and take account of public engagement in its attention to the commons with their coloration positive or negative, as are the radioactive waste. In the same times, the public must recognize all the commons that are part of the same story. This is certainly one of the most important political challenges of the

The socio-historical analysis of an industry helps to understand the place that gradually take its waste. In France, in its productive phase, the uranium industry lasted about fifty years. In fact it has no end. Three periods were able to be identified. Each has a very different relationship to his remains. Their succession shows a progressive visibility and legitimacy of his remains to the characterization of radioactive waste. The first period, which lasts nearly twenty five years, shows that the remains do not exist. Either they are "returned to nature," either they are used for other purposes. Uranium is considered by all actors as a common

9 COGEMA changed its name in 2001 and is now called AREVA NC.

of an independent investigation of all the mine sites. The Prefect decided in fact to set up a Local Information Commission (CLI). This commission aims to provide information "on the risks incurred by ionising radiation pertaining to the activity of the uranium site"8. The composition of the CLI serves to gather together in a single place all the players in this environmental issue: the services of the State, the operator, the eco-environmental and antinuclear associations, local authorities and the experts. This decision is also the translation of many reports produced or under preparation of the State Services and also of the Parliamentary Office for Assessing Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) on the mining residues that have supported this qualification (Ministère de l'Environnement, 1991, 1993 ; OPECST, 1992). Thus, mining residues were definitively classed in the category of radioactive waste, which implied a need for management and the establishment of new standards. It is in this new setting of institutionalised consultation that a radiological investigation of the mine zone was decreed.

To allay suspicion, the investigation was funded by the local authorities and took the form of a joint investigation between the CRII-RAD and COGEMA laboratories. The definition of the measurement plan and its implementation lay at the heart of the conflict on the most appropriate definition of the situation. It is therefore not surprising that it was the subject of lengthy and difficult negotiations between the players of the CLI. And when in 1994, the results had to be interpreted by comparing the measurements of the two laboratories, the players of the environmental configuration were unable to agree, leading to the breakup of the CLI. The investigation, all the way to the assessment, clashed on two conflicts of interpretation which prevented settling the argument between the associative movement and COGEMA. First, in this mining area, how the part of the so-called natural radioactivity and that provided by industrial activities? This question evidenced an attempt to establish COGEMA's liability. And besides, is the risk assessed at the source, within the boundaries of the mining sites, or is it, according to the regulations in force, assessed in the environment, outside these boundaries? In the former case, waste monitoring was a public matter; and the second, it remained a private affair, the domain of COGEMA, because access to the source remained prohibited. Thus, while everybody agreed that the results of the two laboratories were identical. But for the associative movement, they offered evidence of the existence of risks which must be neutralised at the source, whereas for COGEMA, they confirmed the absence of any danger to human health and justified his self-inspection.

#### **3.4 Continuing tensions between expertise, democracy and social norms**

The democratic trial seemed powerless to withstand the ordeal of scientific controversy. Precisely because the scientific controversy extends continuously beyond the narrow issues of Science. These were constantly articulated in terms of social norms: an environmental hazard or a health risk always includes more than just scientific data (Beck, 1986). Both reflect essentially normative points of view drawing not only on scientific reasoning but also on social reasoning. Since it is around this model, initiated by the incomplete experiment of the CLI, that two-track *ad hoc* procedures for consultation and negotiation punctuated every new problem posed by *acting nature*. It brings together the elected officials, State Administration, COGEMA and the experts, which reached the public domain in line with

<sup>8</sup> Prefectoral decision of 7 January 1992.

the action model promoted by the associative expert. Moreover the action model was completed by a legal expertise of the associative movement. All the actions of COGEMA and of the State on radioactive waste management are the subject of closely attentive legal monitoring by the local associative movement. In other words, the recognised legitimacy of the environmental issue by expert knowledge, failed in setting up truly permanent systems for consultation and negotiation, that is to say political. Only *acting nature*, via the spokesmen experts, who claimed to be its interpreters, conditioned its frequency, intensity and scale.

It follows that AREVA Company, formerly COGEMA9, like any mine producer, wanted to leave Limousin for good after the industrial sites had been redeveloped, and not rehabilitated as this company suggests (Bavoux & Guiollard, 1998). It was forced to remain on the spot. In recent years, the State should take its place for a strictly indeterminate period. Its task was precisely to "contain" this set of remnants now qualified as "radioactive waste" and to meet the standards whose level of acceptability ceaselessly became more restrictive. In other words, while the nuclear establishment was planning to "return these wastes to nature", according to its own terminology, to forget about them, they now became, probably for an unlimited period, the subject of increasingly intensive monitoring, which forced it to remain nearby. This obligation of surveillance and retention was not simply that. AREVA NC and the State are resistant to this because it represents a cost to both economic and symbolic. More the cost of monitoring work grows, less the industry shows that it was profitable. Similarly, more problems appear, less engineering, over the long term, shows its ability to solve them. It's in fact ceaselessly updated by the vigilance of the associative movement. This monitoring is therefore fragile. Indeed, it is largely contingent on the capacity of the movements coming from society to exercise this control which, necessarily, remains discontinuous. The militant capacities of the associative movement are very fragile (Brunet, 2004c; 2006b). More generally, above and beyond the issues of radioactive waste, this situation raises the question of the role of public, the associative movements and experts in a renewed technical democracy. In this context, certainly, the State should reconsider the submission of general interest for the sole benefit of short-term economic, which denies the existence of waste and problems. It needs also to recognize and take account of public engagement in its attention to the commons with their coloration positive or negative, as are the radioactive waste. In the same times, the public must recognize all the commons that are part of the same story. This is certainly one of the most important political challenges of the future of our industrial societies.

#### **4. Conclusion**

34 Radioactive Waste

of an independent investigation of all the mine sites. The Prefect decided in fact to set up a Local Information Commission (CLI). This commission aims to provide information "on the risks incurred by ionising radiation pertaining to the activity of the uranium site"8. The composition of the CLI serves to gather together in a single place all the players in this environmental issue: the services of the State, the operator, the eco-environmental and antinuclear associations, local authorities and the experts. This decision is also the translation of many reports produced or under preparation of the State Services and also of the Parliamentary Office for Assessing Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) on the mining residues that have supported this qualification (Ministère de l'Environnement, 1991, 1993 ; OPECST, 1992). Thus, mining residues were definitively classed in the category of radioactive waste, which implied a need for management and the establishment of new standards. It is in this new setting of institutionalised consultation that a radiological

To allay suspicion, the investigation was funded by the local authorities and took the form of a joint investigation between the CRII-RAD and COGEMA laboratories. The definition of the measurement plan and its implementation lay at the heart of the conflict on the most appropriate definition of the situation. It is therefore not surprising that it was the subject of lengthy and difficult negotiations between the players of the CLI. And when in 1994, the results had to be interpreted by comparing the measurements of the two laboratories, the players of the environmental configuration were unable to agree, leading to the breakup of the CLI. The investigation, all the way to the assessment, clashed on two conflicts of interpretation which prevented settling the argument between the associative movement and COGEMA. First, in this mining area, how the part of the so-called natural radioactivity and that provided by industrial activities? This question evidenced an attempt to establish COGEMA's liability. And besides, is the risk assessed at the source, within the boundaries of the mining sites, or is it, according to the regulations in force, assessed in the environment, outside these boundaries? In the former case, waste monitoring was a public matter; and the second, it remained a private affair, the domain of COGEMA, because access to the source remained prohibited. Thus, while everybody agreed that the results of the two laboratories were identical. But for the associative movement, they offered evidence of the existence of risks which must be neutralised at the source, whereas for COGEMA, they confirmed the absence of any danger to human health and justified his self-inspection.

**3.4 Continuing tensions between expertise, democracy and social norms** 

The democratic trial seemed powerless to withstand the ordeal of scientific controversy. Precisely because the scientific controversy extends continuously beyond the narrow issues of Science. These were constantly articulated in terms of social norms: an environmental hazard or a health risk always includes more than just scientific data (Beck, 1986). Both reflect essentially normative points of view drawing not only on scientific reasoning but also on social reasoning. Since it is around this model, initiated by the incomplete experiment of the CLI, that two-track *ad hoc* procedures for consultation and negotiation punctuated every new problem posed by *acting nature*. It brings together the elected officials, State Administration, COGEMA and the experts, which reached the public domain in line with

investigation of the mine zone was decreed.

8 Prefectoral decision of 7 January 1992.

The socio-historical analysis of an industry helps to understand the place that gradually take its waste. In France, in its productive phase, the uranium industry lasted about fifty years. In fact it has no end. Three periods were able to be identified. Each has a very different relationship to his remains. Their succession shows a progressive visibility and legitimacy of his remains to the characterization of radioactive waste. The first period, which lasts nearly twenty five years, shows that the remains do not exist. Either they are "returned to nature," either they are used for other purposes. Uranium is considered by all actors as a common

 9 COGEMA changed its name in 2001 and is now called AREVA NC.

A Controversial Management Process: From the Remnants of the Uranium

Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 2006c, pp. 163-173

Ducrocq, A., *Les horizons de l'énergie atomique*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1948

France », *STRATES* n°9, pp. 184-196, 1997 Dorst, J, *La nature dénaturée*, Paris, Delachaux et Niestlé, 1965

Einstein, A., *Comment je vois le monde*, Paris, Flammarion, 1979

Goldschmidt, B., *L'aventure atomique*, Paris, Fayard, 1962 Goldschmidt, B, *Le complexe atomique*, Paris Fayard, 1980 Goldschmidt, B., *Pionniers de l'atome*, Paris, Stock, 1987

*nucléaire: danger,* Paris, Seuil, 1977.

Massachussets, USA, 1998

87.

Cogema, 1992.

Cogema, 1994.

*1973),* Cogema, 1996

GOV/2006/14, February, 2006

Joliot-Curie, F., *Textes choisis*, Paris, Editions sociales, 1963 Martin, C.-N., *L'atome maître du monde*, Paris, Le Centurion, 1956

dépôts de Matières radioactives, juillet 1991.

Général des Ponts et Chaussées, 14 mai 1993. Naville, P., *La guerre de tous contre tous*, Paris, Galilée, 1977, 220 p.

Oppenheimer, J.R., *La science et le bon sens*, Paris, Gallimard, 1955.

Prendiville B., *L'écologie la politique autrement ?,* Paris, L'Harmattan, 1993.

*international*, volume 11, 1965. pp. 750-782.

Simonnot, P., *Les nucléocrates*, Grenoble, P.U.G., 1978

Mining Industry to Their Qualification as Radioactive Waste – The Case of France 37

Brunet, P., « La CRII-RAD, un laboratoire « passe-muraille » entre militantisme et

Brunet, P., « De l'usage raisonné de la notion de « concernement » : mobilisations locales à propos de l'industrie nucléaire » *Nature, Sciences et Société*, n°4, décembre, 2008 Charvolin F., « L'invention du domaine de l'environnement au tournant de l'année 1970 en

Gibrin, C., *Atomique secours – Etude des effets de l'engin atomique et de la protection familiale et collective contre le danger aérien*, Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie, 1953, 179 p.

G.S.I.E.N. (Groupement de Scientifique pour l'Information sur l'Energie Nucléaire), *Electro-*

Hecht G., *The radiance of France : Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*, M.I.T.

IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards. Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran",

Ministère de l'Environnement, Desgraupes, P., Rapport de la Commission d'Examen des

Ministère de l'Environnement, Barthélémy, F., Rapport à Monsieur de Ministre de

N'diaye, P., « Les ingénieurs oubliés de la bombe A », *La Recherche*, n°306, février 1998, p.82-

OPECST, Le Déaut, J-Y, Rapport « La gestion des déchets très faiblement radioactifs »,

Paucard, A., *La mine et les mineurs de l'uranium français, I les temps légendaires (1946-1950),*

Paucard, A., *La mine et les mineurs de l'uranium français, II le temps des conquêtes (1951-1958),*

Paucard, A., *La mine et les mineurs de l'uranium français, III le temps des grandes aventures (1959-*

Quéneudec, J.-P., « Le rejet à la mer de déchets radioactifs », *Annuaire français de droit* 

Assemblée Nationale n°2624, Sénat n°309, Tome II, avril 1992

l'Environnement relatif aux déchets faiblement radioactifs, affaire n°92-282, Conseil

professionnalisme », in *Reconversions militantes*, textes réunis par Tissot S., Limoges,

unchallenged. Account only the nature acted. The second period corresponds to a strong growth of the mining industry. This one is disputed because it disrupts the natural environment. Two commons are then in opposition. Water and uranium, respectively, correspond to urban and rural social worlds different. In addition, by the action of antinuclear groups, the uranium industry becomes an integral part of the nuclear industry. Their challenge is only to delegitimize the reassuring speech experts from the State and the operator (CEA and COGEMA) about the environmental and health risks associated with radioactivity, affecting the water. However, this challenge is limited because it based solely on the data produced by the nuclear institution itself. Also, in this context of strong activity, industrial remains are hardly questioned. The third period, which has no end, starts when the industrial decline and the operator informs of the imminent closure of the mines. From that moment, the remains are real issues and the problem of radioactive waste emerges. It develops in a context of strong challenges that mobilize elected urban and antinuclear groups against the state and the operator. Uranium as common fades along with its industry. Only exist remnants that become problematic. It then becomes necessary to identify, qualify as radioactive waste, measure and evaluate them in terms of environmental and health risks. Antinuclear associations have acquired a capacity to produce data themselves through the figure of the associative expert. But conflicts over these activities can not diminish for two reasons. The democratic machinery around these radioactive wastes is limited and fragile. And also the actors for the most part unaware of the history of the industrial process in its entirety, including the production of its common, positive and negative. Despite appearances, our society built on the basis of science and technology, is fundamentally a political society.

#### **5. References**

Bavoux, B., Guiollard, P.-C., *L'Uranium de la Crouzille*, Fichous, Ed. P.-C. Guiollard, 1998 Barillot, B., Davis M., *Les déchets nucléaires militaires français*, Lyon, CDRPC, 1994.

Beck, U., *Risikogesellschaft*, Francfort, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986.


unchallenged. Account only the nature acted. The second period corresponds to a strong growth of the mining industry. This one is disputed because it disrupts the natural environment. Two commons are then in opposition. Water and uranium, respectively, correspond to urban and rural social worlds different. In addition, by the action of antinuclear groups, the uranium industry becomes an integral part of the nuclear industry. Their challenge is only to delegitimize the reassuring speech experts from the State and the operator (CEA and COGEMA) about the environmental and health risks associated with radioactivity, affecting the water. However, this challenge is limited because it based solely on the data produced by the nuclear institution itself. Also, in this context of strong activity, industrial remains are hardly questioned. The third period, which has no end, starts when the industrial decline and the operator informs of the imminent closure of the mines. From that moment, the remains are real issues and the problem of radioactive waste emerges. It develops in a context of strong challenges that mobilize elected urban and antinuclear groups against the state and the operator. Uranium as common fades along with its industry. Only exist remnants that become problematic. It then becomes necessary to identify, qualify as radioactive waste, measure and evaluate them in terms of environmental and health risks. Antinuclear associations have acquired a capacity to produce data themselves through the figure of the associative expert. But conflicts over these activities can not diminish for two reasons. The democratic machinery around these radioactive wastes is limited and fragile. And also the actors for the most part unaware of the history of the industrial process in its entirety, including the production of its common, positive and negative. Despite appearances, our society built on the basis of science and technology, is

Bavoux, B., Guiollard, P.-C., *L'Uranium de la Crouzille*, Fichous, Ed. P.-C. Guiollard, 1998 Barillot, B., Davis M., *Les déchets nucléaires militaires français*, Lyon, CDRPC, 1994.

Braverman H., *Travail et capitalisme monopoliste*, Paris, Maspero, 1976, 361 pages.

Limoges, Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 2004a, 353 pages.

Universitaires de Saint-Etienne, 2006b, pp. 189-202

Bernhard, S., Pradel, J., Tirmarche, M., Zettwoog P., « Bilan et enseignement de la

Brunet, P., *La nature dans tous ses états : Uranium, nucléaire et radioactivité en Limousin,*

Brunet, P., « L'environnement concerté et négocié : un demi-siècle d'exploitation industrielle de l'uranium en Limousin », *Ecologie et Politique*, n°28, 2004b, pp.121-140. Brunet, P., « L'impossible gouvernance à l'épreuve de la nature agissante » in Scarwell, H.-J.,

Brunet, P., « L'expert en technosciences : figure « critique » ou « gestionnaire » de la

Brunet, P., « Flux et reflux de l'engagement antinucléaire. Entre vigilance et dénonciation »,

radioprotection dans les mines d'uranium depuis 45 ans (1948-1992), *Revue Générale* 

Franchomme, M., (Dir.), *Contraintes environnementales et gouvernance des territoires*,

civilisation industrielle contemporaine ? » in Guespin, J., Jacq, A., (Coord.), Le vivant, entre science et marché : une démocratie à inventer, Ed. Syllepse, 2006a, pp.

in Roux J. (Coord.), *Etre vigilant – L'opérativité discrète de la société du risque*, Presses

Beck, U., *Risikogesellschaft*, Francfort, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986.

fundamentally a political society.

*Nucléaire*, n°6, 1992.

L'Aube, 2004c, pp.147-154

99-125.

**5. References** 


**3** 

*Kirghiz Republic* 

**Problems of Uranium** 

**Waste and Radioecology in** 

**Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions** 

B. M. Djenbaev, B. K. Kaldybaev and B. T. Zholboldiev *Institute of Biology and National Academy of Sciences KR, Bishkek* 

It is known that uranium industry in the former Soviet Union was a centralized state management. Information flows related to the issues of uranium mining was strictly controlled and is in a vertical subordination of the structures of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR. After the USSR collapse, the information about uranium mining and processing were not available in Kyrgyzstan, and all the data related to past uranium production, were in the Russian Federation in the archives of the successor of the

The activity of the regulatory body in the field of radiation safety have been independent of the former USSR. The agency also was part of the "Minsredmash", which was responsible for the nuclear industry. Application of regulatory safety standards ("standards") with respect to exposure and control of emissions of radioactivity in the field of mining and processing was similar in all organizations of the uranium industry, making it easier for

 The requirements of radiation safety often disappeared or were not fulfilled, because the task performance of production had priority at the expense of safety. The neglected environmental protection requirements and protection of human health in the process of extraction often the same reason and processing of uranium ores, and recycling. Environmental protection has not been determined as a priority, and have not been identified the relevant criteria of safe operations. While establishing the new mining and uranium ore processing units, the issues of the protection of the environment has been neglected, and the data collection which should become the basis for further evaluation and possible remediation of contaminated areas that make up the heritage of the industry, was

Uranium mining in the country was launched in 1943 year. After Kyrgyzstan gained independence, the uranium tailings are preserved, but without the engineering and technical support outside of Russia and cooperation with other independent countries in the region. Since the early 90's uranium industry of Kyrgyzstan in the region was unexpectedly opened to the world market. A large number of mines in the region during the low

**1. Introduction** 

former "Minsredmash".

their administrative use.

not done.

Wynne, B., « Le nucléaire au Royaume-Uni » in GODARD, O., (dir.), *Le principe de précaution dans la conduite des affaires humaines*, Paris, Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, INRA Editions, 1997

### **Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions**

B. M. Djenbaev, B. K. Kaldybaev and B. T. Zholboldiev *Institute of Biology and National Academy of Sciences KR, Bishkek Kirghiz Republic* 

#### **1. Introduction**

38 Radioactive Waste

Wynne, B., « Le nucléaire au Royaume-Uni » in GODARD, O., (dir.), *Le principe de précaution* 

l'homme, INRA Editions, 1997

*dans la conduite des affaires humaines*, Paris, Editions de la Maison des sciences de

It is known that uranium industry in the former Soviet Union was a centralized state management. Information flows related to the issues of uranium mining was strictly controlled and is in a vertical subordination of the structures of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR. After the USSR collapse, the information about uranium mining and processing were not available in Kyrgyzstan, and all the data related to past uranium production, were in the Russian Federation in the archives of the successor of the former "Minsredmash".

The activity of the regulatory body in the field of radiation safety have been independent of the former USSR. The agency also was part of the "Minsredmash", which was responsible for the nuclear industry. Application of regulatory safety standards ("standards") with respect to exposure and control of emissions of radioactivity in the field of mining and processing was similar in all organizations of the uranium industry, making it easier for their administrative use.

 The requirements of radiation safety often disappeared or were not fulfilled, because the task performance of production had priority at the expense of safety. The neglected environmental protection requirements and protection of human health in the process of extraction often the same reason and processing of uranium ores, and recycling. Environmental protection has not been determined as a priority, and have not been identified the relevant criteria of safe operations. While establishing the new mining and uranium ore processing units, the issues of the protection of the environment has been neglected, and the data collection which should become the basis for further evaluation and possible remediation of contaminated areas that make up the heritage of the industry, was not done.

Uranium mining in the country was launched in 1943 year. After Kyrgyzstan gained independence, the uranium tailings are preserved, but without the engineering and technical support outside of Russia and cooperation with other independent countries in the region. Since the early 90's uranium industry of Kyrgyzstan in the region was unexpectedly opened to the world market. A large number of mines in the region during the low

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 41

Since 2005 integrated studies for evaluation of radio-ecological features and radio biogeochemical features in uranium tailings and dumps are carried out by us. The survey was carried out according to the modern techniques and methodologies at the territories of radiological, and eco-radio biogeochemical study of the various types of the biosphere(4, 8,

The equipment used in research, consists of a set - Dosimeter-radiometer DKS-96, Radiometer PPA-01M-01 with the sampling device POU-4, Photo-electro-colorimeter (SPECOL), liquid scintillation spectrometer, λ - spectrometer (CAMBERRA), radiometer UMF-2000, etc., a satellite instrument to determine the coordinates and a personal computer with data entry module. Distribution and data processing were performed on a personal computer using a special software package. Gamma-ray surveying carried out in accordance with the "Instruction on the ground survey of the radiation situation in the contaminated area" at a height of 0.1 and 1 meter above the ground. According to the technical manuals of dosimeters,

Measurements of gross alpha and beta - activity in the mass were performed in the laboratory. For measuring gross alpha and beta - activity in the mass was performed prior to digestion. For that, each sample weighing was carried out separately, and determined their actual weight. They then converted into porcelain crucibles and placed in a cold muffle furnace. Digestion was performed for one hour at 4500C, and then the temperature was raised to 5500C and after three hours muffle furnace turned off. The resulting ash was weighed and ground in a porcelain mortar and homogenized to the state from counting samples were collected weight 0.4 grams for the measurement of alpha and beta - irradiation on radiometer UMF-2000. Volumetric total alpha activity in the sample (Bq/kg) was

A = (Aα / M) × (M1 / m)

M 1 and m - mass of the ash samples and aliquots of cell mass (mass of sample countable) (g),

*Determination of the isotopic forms of radionuclide* samples of soil and plants were dried after harvest, soil samples were ground further in a mortar and pestle and sieved through a 2.0 mm diameter, 1.0 mm, 0.25 mm., Plant samples were cut with scissors and prepared at the machine for grinding plant samples. Further sample tests of soil and plants were burnt in a muffle furnace at 400°C, after burning 90Sr stood by oxalate and antimony-137Cs iodine on relevant techniques. Shortchanging the final draft of 90Sr was carried out on the radiometer UMF-2000, by 90Sr by instrumental gamma-ray spectrometry. As a model of a radioactive source used a set of solid sources, 90Sr + It90 activity of 50 Bq in the angle 4π and 26 Bq in the angle 2π, with an area of active spot 4 cm2. Cut-off screen for 90Sr was an aluminum filter with a surface density of 150 mg/cm2, such a filter reduces the effects of 90Sr in 128 times,

at one point was carried out at least three measurements, the log recorded average

**2. Materials and methods** 

calculated using the formula:

the counting sample (Bq)

respectively.

M - mass of the original sample (kg)

and activity It90 two times (2, 4).

where Aα - gross alpha-activity of radionuclide in

The total volume of beta activity calculated similarly.

9,11, 13).

profitability of such production has stopped in the 70s of last century. Nowadays, some companies continue to pollute the surrounding areas polluted by dust from uncontrolled waste disposal sites of uranium production, although to a lesser extent than during the current production. The deterioration of the environment as a fact of many experts' associates with a significant economic slowdown in countries faced with serious social problems of local people. This particularly applies to facilities located in Kyrgyzstan, whose economy has suffered more than others in the region. The environmental situation in Kyrgyzstan is exacerbated economic problems, provoking people to predatory use of natural resources (deforestation, poaching, extensive use of arable land, neglect melioration and other measures), which leads, on the basis of the feedback to further environmental degradation.

Thus, the post-war (1941-1945) development of Kyrgyzstan has been closely linked with economic and military policies of the Soviet Union and known that Kyrgyzstan was the largest producer of uranium from 1946 to 1968 for the former Soviet Union. Huge amount of raw materials as a due to inefficient production and wasteful processing of minerals have in the territory of the Republic (747 220 000 m3) with high content of potentially dangerous chemicals stored in waste dumps and tailing. For storage of uranium waste additional waste were also imported from other friendly countries such as Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, China and Tajikistan. The status of these dumps and storage facilities so bad, that radioactive waste, heavy metals and toxic chemicals pollute the environment (soil, air, water) and living organisms. They are involved in biogeochemical cycles in the formation of new biogeochemical provinces (5,6, 14).

In general, the territory of Kyrgyzstan is a large number of radioactive sources (1200). The radioactive sources are stored in premises built storages of primitive methods (overlap of the mountain gorge.) Many of the tailings were formed within settlements (Maili-Suu, Min-Kush, Kaji-Say, Ak-Tuz, Kahn and others) in the mountain valleys and along the river.

Interest in the use of a nuclear facility for peaceful purposes again increased in the early twenty-first century at the decision of the new strategic challenges in the world. For example, at this time (2011) in the country four companies have influenced right to operate at a uranium deposit and 12 companies have licensed right to search for uranium ore. However, it should be noted, after the case in the Japan with nuclear stations (2011), security, use of nuclear energy, require special importance and improvement processes for peaceful purposes.

Thus, in the republic issue of Radioecology and radio biogeochemistry took priority of rare and rare earth elements of the former uranium production (tailing and dumps). The most urgent is to find features radiobiogeochemical enriched uranium and other trace elements and evaluation of reaction areas of organisms in ecosystems of the high content of radionuclide and base metals.

During a long time of economic activities in the Kyrgyz Republic has accumulated a huge amount of industrial and municipal solid wastes containing radionuclide's, heavy metals and toxic substances (cyanide, acids, silicates, nitrates, sulfates, etc.), negatively affecting on the environment and human health. In this regard, the problem of waste management is becoming increasingly important, and some waste has a frontier character.

#### **2. Materials and methods**

40 Radioactive Waste

profitability of such production has stopped in the 70s of last century. Nowadays, some companies continue to pollute the surrounding areas polluted by dust from uncontrolled waste disposal sites of uranium production, although to a lesser extent than during the current production. The deterioration of the environment as a fact of many experts' associates with a significant economic slowdown in countries faced with serious social problems of local people. This particularly applies to facilities located in Kyrgyzstan, whose economy has suffered more than others in the region. The environmental situation in Kyrgyzstan is exacerbated economic problems, provoking people to predatory use of natural resources (deforestation, poaching, extensive use of arable land, neglect melioration and other measures), which leads, on the basis of the feedback to further environmental

Thus, the post-war (1941-1945) development of Kyrgyzstan has been closely linked with economic and military policies of the Soviet Union and known that Kyrgyzstan was the largest producer of uranium from 1946 to 1968 for the former Soviet Union. Huge amount of raw materials as a due to inefficient production and wasteful processing of minerals have in the territory of the Republic (747 220 000 m3) with high content of potentially dangerous chemicals stored in waste dumps and tailing. For storage of uranium waste additional waste were also imported from other friendly countries such as Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, China and Tajikistan. The status of these dumps and storage facilities so bad, that radioactive waste, heavy metals and toxic chemicals pollute the environment (soil, air, water) and living organisms. They are involved in biogeochemical cycles in the

In general, the territory of Kyrgyzstan is a large number of radioactive sources (1200). The radioactive sources are stored in premises built storages of primitive methods (overlap of the mountain gorge.) Many of the tailings were formed within settlements (Maili-Suu, Min-Kush, Kaji-Say, Ak-Tuz, Kahn and others) in the mountain valleys and along the

Interest in the use of a nuclear facility for peaceful purposes again increased in the early twenty-first century at the decision of the new strategic challenges in the world. For example, at this time (2011) in the country four companies have influenced right to operate at a uranium deposit and 12 companies have licensed right to search for uranium ore. However, it should be noted, after the case in the Japan with nuclear stations (2011), security, use of nuclear energy, require special importance and improvement processes for

Thus, in the republic issue of Radioecology and radio biogeochemistry took priority of rare and rare earth elements of the former uranium production (tailing and dumps). The most urgent is to find features radiobiogeochemical enriched uranium and other trace elements and evaluation of reaction areas of organisms in ecosystems of the high content of

During a long time of economic activities in the Kyrgyz Republic has accumulated a huge amount of industrial and municipal solid wastes containing radionuclide's, heavy metals and toxic substances (cyanide, acids, silicates, nitrates, sulfates, etc.), negatively affecting on the environment and human health. In this regard, the problem of waste management is

becoming increasingly important, and some waste has a frontier character.

formation of new biogeochemical provinces (5,6, 14).

degradation.

river.

peaceful purposes.

radionuclide and base metals.

Since 2005 integrated studies for evaluation of radio-ecological features and radio biogeochemical features in uranium tailings and dumps are carried out by us. The survey was carried out according to the modern techniques and methodologies at the territories of radiological, and eco-radio biogeochemical study of the various types of the biosphere(4, 8, 9,11, 13).

The equipment used in research, consists of a set - Dosimeter-radiometer DKS-96, Radiometer PPA-01M-01 with the sampling device POU-4, Photo-electro-colorimeter (SPECOL), liquid scintillation spectrometer, λ - spectrometer (CAMBERRA), radiometer UMF-2000, etc., a satellite instrument to determine the coordinates and a personal computer with data entry module. Distribution and data processing were performed on a personal computer using a special software package. Gamma-ray surveying carried out in accordance with the "Instruction on the ground survey of the radiation situation in the contaminated area" at a height of 0.1 and 1 meter above the ground. According to the technical manuals of dosimeters, at one point was carried out at least three measurements, the log recorded average

Measurements of gross alpha and beta - activity in the mass were performed in the laboratory. For measuring gross alpha and beta - activity in the mass was performed prior to digestion. For that, each sample weighing was carried out separately, and determined their actual weight. They then converted into porcelain crucibles and placed in a cold muffle furnace. Digestion was performed for one hour at 4500C, and then the temperature was raised to 5500C and after three hours muffle furnace turned off. The resulting ash was weighed and ground in a porcelain mortar and homogenized to the state from counting samples were collected weight 0.4 grams for the measurement of alpha and beta - irradiation on radiometer UMF-2000. Volumetric total alpha activity in the sample (Bq/kg) was calculated using the formula:

$$\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{a} \;/\; \mathbf{M}) \times (\mathbf{M}1 \;/\; \mathbf{m})$$

where Aα - gross alpha-activity of radionuclide in

the counting sample (Bq)

M - mass of the original sample (kg)

M 1 and m - mass of the ash samples and aliquots of cell mass (mass of sample countable) (g), respectively.

The total volume of beta activity calculated similarly.

*Determination of the isotopic forms of radionuclide* samples of soil and plants were dried after harvest, soil samples were ground further in a mortar and pestle and sieved through a 2.0 mm diameter, 1.0 mm, 0.25 mm., Plant samples were cut with scissors and prepared at the machine for grinding plant samples. Further sample tests of soil and plants were burnt in a muffle furnace at 400°C, after burning 90Sr stood by oxalate and antimony-137Cs iodine on relevant techniques. Shortchanging the final draft of 90Sr was carried out on the radiometer UMF-2000, by 90Sr by instrumental gamma-ray spectrometry. As a model of a radioactive source used a set of solid sources, 90Sr + It90 activity of 50 Bq in the angle 4π and 26 Bq in the angle 2π, with an area of active spot 4 cm2. Cut-off screen for 90Sr was an aluminum filter with a surface density of 150 mg/cm2, such a filter reduces the effects of 90Sr in 128 times, and activity It90 two times (2, 4).

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 43

Toxic chemicals and radionuclide (As, S, Pb, Hg, Sb, U, etc.) in the waste dumps and tailings are found in both soluble and insoluble forms. The most dangerous of them are mobile forms compounds that are primarily involved in the chain: soil, water, vegetation, animals, people. Special problem of waste accumulation (more than 15 million m3) of overburden dumps, tailings and ore-balance, holding large areas near the settlements in the mountains, drainage basin, etc. The greatest threat of contamination remains uranium waste in crossborder areas on the slopes of the Fergana mountain frame and Chui valleys (near Maili-Suu

After independence (1991), Kyrgyzstan began to collaborate with many international organizations on this issue, such as the UN, the IAEA, EU, UNESCO, UNDP, IMF and others. The following areas have been designated as priorities for Kyrgyzstan in conclusion

Kyrgyzstan is facing serious environmental problems associated with uranium mining and processing activities in country. Due to natural disasters such as earthquake, landslide, mudflow and erosion processes increases the threat of further contamination by radioactive substances. As a result of natural processes a number of uranium tailings had been damaged. Most of the tailings storage facilities are in disrepair and poorly

• to develop and confirm the national program of radiating monitoring (at present is not

• to develop correspond uniform regulating infrastructure on the radiating and nuclear safety, capable to operate a situation for the long-term period (till now there is no

The use of methods based on radiation for the prevention, early detection and treatment of

It is known that the use of obsolete equipment in radiotherapy for cancer treatment greatly reduces the chances of survival, and jeopardizes the health of staff. Moreover, the operating

Therefore, the planned improvement of radiotherapy services was an important component

• the urgent need to upgrade radiotherapy equipment at the National Center of

• modernization of nuclear medicine and diagnostic services through appropriate

**3.1 Rehabilitation of the effects of uranium mining and processing activities** 

city, settlements Shekaftar, Ak-Tuz and others).

*The following actions require immediate attention:* 

uniform regulating state structure).

of the IAEA TC for the country over the medium term:

• modernization of tomography and diagnostic equipment;

Oncology, KR;

programs;

controlled.

with experts of the TC IAEA for the intermediate term period.

present national the program on radiation monitoring); • to give radio ecological and radio biogeochemical estimation; • to estimate and begin rehabilitation works by a priorities;

**3.2 Health: Improved diagnostics and nuclear services radiotherapy** 

cancer is one of the main priorities of the government in the health sector.

costs of equipment, lack of parts and skilled technicians make things worse.

Satellite device (GPS) with regular frequency automatically recorded the longitude and latitude location, and stores this data in its memory. All coordinate data, indicators of levels of radioactivity, the date, time of measurement later transferred to a computer's memory with the help of the writer. In carrying out studies have been conducted random measure radiation levels in different parts of the tailings piles and indoor as well as selected samples of soil and plants for laboratory analysis.

#### **3. Discussion of research results**

In connection with the collapse of the USSR on the territory of Kyrgyzstan in derelict condition were 55 of tailings, the total area of 770 hectares, of which more than 132 000 000 m3 of tailings dumps stored, and 85 gained more than 700 m3 of waste, cover an area of over 1,500 hectares. There are 31 tailing dumps and 25 contain the wastes of uranium production volume - 51.830 000 m3, the total radioactivity of more than 90 000 Ci (as of 2010) (1, 6). Since the mid 50s of last century to the present time in the country closed or mothballed 18 mining companies, including 4 for the extraction of uranium (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Layout of the main places of accumulated waste of the former uranium production in Kyrgyzstan

According to the latest data from the National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic (2010) Most of the toxic waste in the territory of Issyk-Kul (61.4%) and Batken (25.8%) regions. In Issyk-Kul region, the amount of waste has risen sharply since 1997 in connection with the commissioning of the gold processing plant "Kumtor", and in the Batken region of their main sources of formation are Khaidarkan (Hg) and Kadamzhai (Sb) plants.

Toxic chemicals and radionuclide (As, S, Pb, Hg, Sb, U, etc.) in the waste dumps and tailings are found in both soluble and insoluble forms. The most dangerous of them are mobile forms compounds that are primarily involved in the chain: soil, water, vegetation, animals, people. Special problem of waste accumulation (more than 15 million m3) of overburden dumps, tailings and ore-balance, holding large areas near the settlements in the mountains, drainage basin, etc. The greatest threat of contamination remains uranium waste in crossborder areas on the slopes of the Fergana mountain frame and Chui valleys (near Maili-Suu city, settlements Shekaftar, Ak-Tuz and others).

After independence (1991), Kyrgyzstan began to collaborate with many international organizations on this issue, such as the UN, the IAEA, EU, UNESCO, UNDP, IMF and others. The following areas have been designated as priorities for Kyrgyzstan in conclusion with experts of the TC IAEA for the intermediate term period.

#### **3.1 Rehabilitation of the effects of uranium mining and processing activities**

Kyrgyzstan is facing serious environmental problems associated with uranium mining and processing activities in country. Due to natural disasters such as earthquake, landslide, mudflow and erosion processes increases the threat of further contamination by radioactive substances. As a result of natural processes a number of uranium tailings had been damaged. Most of the tailings storage facilities are in disrepair and poorly controlled.

*The following actions require immediate attention:* 

42 Radioactive Waste

Satellite device (GPS) with regular frequency automatically recorded the longitude and latitude location, and stores this data in its memory. All coordinate data, indicators of levels of radioactivity, the date, time of measurement later transferred to a computer's memory with the help of the writer. In carrying out studies have been conducted random measure radiation levels in different parts of the tailings piles and indoor as well as selected samples

In connection with the collapse of the USSR on the territory of Kyrgyzstan in derelict condition were 55 of tailings, the total area of 770 hectares, of which more than 132 000 000 m3 of tailings dumps stored, and 85 gained more than 700 m3 of waste, cover an area of over 1,500 hectares. There are 31 tailing dumps and 25 contain the wastes of uranium production volume - 51.830 000 m3, the total radioactivity of more than 90 000 Ci (as of 2010) (1, 6). Since the mid 50s of last century to the present time in the country closed or mothballed 18 mining

Fig. 1. Layout of the main places of accumulated waste of the former uranium production in

According to the latest data from the National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic (2010) Most of the toxic waste in the territory of Issyk-Kul (61.4%) and Batken (25.8%) regions. In Issyk-Kul region, the amount of waste has risen sharply since 1997 in connection with the commissioning of the gold processing plant "Kumtor", and in the Batken region of their main sources of formation are Khaidarkan (Hg) and Kadamzhai

of soil and plants for laboratory analysis.

**3. Discussion of research results** 

Kyrgyzstan

(Sb) plants.

companies, including 4 for the extraction of uranium (Fig. 1).


#### **3.2 Health: Improved diagnostics and nuclear services radiotherapy**

The use of methods based on radiation for the prevention, early detection and treatment of cancer is one of the main priorities of the government in the health sector.

It is known that the use of obsolete equipment in radiotherapy for cancer treatment greatly reduces the chances of survival, and jeopardizes the health of staff. Moreover, the operating costs of equipment, lack of parts and skilled technicians make things worse.

Therefore, the planned improvement of radiotherapy services was an important component of the IAEA TC for the country over the medium term:


Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 45

Till present time establishes the recommendations for remediation of former uranium companies "Sanitary rules of liquidation, and conversion mining of conservation and processing of radioactive ores" (SLCP - 91). "The existing law "On the tailings and dumps" (2001) is a specific document relating to governance and uranium tailings and rock dumps. Earlier as a noted, some of these documents were developed during the former USSR and some are adapted to the Russian Federation, but they must be revised and adapted. These activities are carried out by the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Agency for

It should also be noted that the IAEA report ("Radiation and Waste Safety Infrastructure Profile (RWSIP) Kyrgyzstan Part A, 2005), most legal documents in the Kyrgyz Republic of

Uranium deposit district in Maili-Suu practiced from 1946 to 1967. Currently, the former enterprise, including in the urban areas are 23 tailings and 13 mining dumps. The total amount of uranium waste, pending in the tailings is approximately 199 000 000 m3 and occupies an area of 432 000 m2. The tailings were conserved in the 1966-1973 years, according to existing regulations. Heaps with a volume of 939 300 m3 and occupied area

For a long time working on repair and maintenance of tailings were sporadic and insufficient. At the present time, the average exposure dose of gamma radiation (gammabackground) on the surface of the tailings is 30-60 mR/h, at some local anomalous areas

However the science analysts' estimate that extraction from the original rock has been reach up to 90-95% of the uranium, and in the tails is only 5 to 10% or so in today's tails makes great background progeny of the uranium series. In table 1 the structure of original ore and a tail material of the Maili-Suu field are resulted. Elevated levels of Mn and Ca in the tails, as compared with the ore is associated with the use of compounds as a reagent and auxiliary substances in the ore processing and extraction of uranium, and high levels of lead, usually

**Components% Original ore Tailings**  Ca 10-20 30 Si 20 6-10 Fe 2-3 0,4-1,0 Pb 1,5-2,0 2,0-3,2 Cr 4,5-6,0 2-3 Mn - 50-200 V 1,0 0,4-0,6 Ni 3-5 2 Table 1. The average maintenance of separate components in ores and tailings of Maili-Suu

related issues justify rehabilitation, are not available and require development yet.

**4. Brief description of the major uranium tailings and dumps** 

Environmental Protection and Forestry of the Kyrgyz Republic.

**4.1 Maili-Suu technogenic uranium province** 

about 114 700 m2 were not re-cultured (Fig. 2), (1, 3, 5).

associated with the addition of radiogenic lead, is in the ore.

have greater than 1000 mR/h.

• The need to focus efforts on training of medical staff, as well as the introduction of modern diagnostic techniques.

#### **3.3 Knowledge management and rational use of nuclear technology**

In 2005, Kyrgyz Republic became a member of the International Nuclear Information System IAEA (INIS). How to create a network of analytical and calibration laboratories.

Kyrgyzstan has received significant assistance through projects of various international organizations such as the World Bank, IAEA, UNDP, IMF, EU and bilateral assistance provided by the governments of Austria, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA.

By the IAEA in the country, a modern radiology laboratory at the Institute of Biology and Pedology National Academy of Sciences, industry laboratories under the Department of State Sanitary and Epidemiology, Health Ministry of KR and Kara-Balta Environmental Laboratory.

In the framework of national and regional projects of IAEA - agency offers: the expertise, scientific visits, seminars and training courses on various aspects of radiation safety. Kyrgyzstan also has acquired the necessary modern dosimeter and analytical equipment for monitoring and analysis.

#### **Legal and regulatory framework**

The main basic Law of the KR, which regulates the handling of sources of radiation, is the "Law on Radiation Safety KR" as amended on February 28, 2003 # 48 and August 1, 2003 # 168. This law defines the legal relationship in the field of radiation safety and protection of the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The law defines the main concepts, in particular, the term - "contamination" as the presence of radionuclide of technogenic origin in the environment, which may lead to additional exposure in an individual dose of more than 10 µSv year. Additional exposure below this level is negligible and should not be taken into account.

In accordance with the Act in 2005 Kyrgyz Republic, a special representative governing body for radiation protection, regulatory activities with radiation hazardous technologies and sources of radiation under the Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations. Since 2006, this Ministry was reorganized into two - "The Ministry for the Protection of natural and forest resources" and "The Ministry of Emergencies." The regulatory role belongs to the Ministry of Health, in particular the Office of the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance.

The main regulations in the Kyrgyz Republic have been adapted previously developed in the Russian Federation NRB-99 and Sanitary Regulation of Radioactive Waste Management (SRRM-2002). In particular, as the principal dose limit for the staff of the existing enterprises whose activities are related to the practice of radioactive waste management is set at 20 µSv per year, while the limit dose for the population in areas where uranium companies is set at 1 µSv per year. A clear recommendation for establishing intervention levels and regulatory criteria for the study of remediation activities at the former uranium companies has not been established yet.

Till present time establishes the recommendations for remediation of former uranium companies "Sanitary rules of liquidation, and conversion mining of conservation and processing of radioactive ores" (SLCP - 91). "The existing law "On the tailings and dumps" (2001) is a specific document relating to governance and uranium tailings and rock dumps. Earlier as a noted, some of these documents were developed during the former USSR and some are adapted to the Russian Federation, but they must be revised and adapted. These activities are carried out by the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry of the Kyrgyz Republic.

It should also be noted that the IAEA report ("Radiation and Waste Safety Infrastructure Profile (RWSIP) Kyrgyzstan Part A, 2005), most legal documents in the Kyrgyz Republic of related issues justify rehabilitation, are not available and require development yet.

### **4. Brief description of the major uranium tailings and dumps**

#### **4.1 Maili-Suu technogenic uranium province**

44 Radioactive Waste

• The need to focus efforts on training of medical staff, as well as the introduction of

In 2005, Kyrgyz Republic became a member of the International Nuclear Information System IAEA (INIS). How to create a network of analytical and calibration laboratories.

Kyrgyzstan has received significant assistance through projects of various international organizations such as the World Bank, IAEA, UNDP, IMF, EU and bilateral assistance provided by the governments of Austria, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the

By the IAEA in the country, a modern radiology laboratory at the Institute of Biology and Pedology National Academy of Sciences, industry laboratories under the Department of State Sanitary and Epidemiology, Health Ministry of KR and Kara-Balta Environmental

In the framework of national and regional projects of IAEA - agency offers: the expertise, scientific visits, seminars and training courses on various aspects of radiation safety. Kyrgyzstan also has acquired the necessary modern dosimeter and analytical equipment for

The main basic Law of the KR, which regulates the handling of sources of radiation, is the "Law on Radiation Safety KR" as amended on February 28, 2003 # 48 and August 1, 2003 # 168. This law defines the legal relationship in the field of radiation safety and protection of the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The law defines the main concepts, in particular, the term - "contamination" as the presence of radionuclide of technogenic origin in the environment, which may lead to additional exposure in an individual dose of more than 10 µSv year. Additional exposure below this level is negligible

In accordance with the Act in 2005 Kyrgyz Republic, a special representative governing body for radiation protection, regulatory activities with radiation hazardous technologies and sources of radiation under the Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations. Since 2006, this Ministry was reorganized into two - "The Ministry for the Protection of natural and forest resources" and "The Ministry of Emergencies." The regulatory role belongs to the Ministry of Health, in particular the Office of the State Sanitary and Epidemiological

The main regulations in the Kyrgyz Republic have been adapted previously developed in the Russian Federation NRB-99 and Sanitary Regulation of Radioactive Waste Management (SRRM-2002). In particular, as the principal dose limit for the staff of the existing enterprises whose activities are related to the practice of radioactive waste management is set at 20 µSv per year, while the limit dose for the population in areas where uranium companies is set at 1 µSv per year. A clear recommendation for establishing intervention levels and regulatory criteria for the study of remediation activities at the former uranium companies has not been

**3.3 Knowledge management and rational use of nuclear technology** 

modern diagnostic techniques.

USA.

Laboratory.

Surveillance.

established yet.

monitoring and analysis.

**Legal and regulatory framework** 

and should not be taken into account.

Uranium deposit district in Maili-Suu practiced from 1946 to 1967. Currently, the former enterprise, including in the urban areas are 23 tailings and 13 mining dumps. The total amount of uranium waste, pending in the tailings is approximately 199 000 000 m3 and occupies an area of 432 000 m2. The tailings were conserved in the 1966-1973 years, according to existing regulations. Heaps with a volume of 939 300 m3 and occupied area about 114 700 m2 were not re-cultured (Fig. 2), (1, 3, 5).

For a long time working on repair and maintenance of tailings were sporadic and insufficient. At the present time, the average exposure dose of gamma radiation (gammabackground) on the surface of the tailings is 30-60 mR/h, at some local anomalous areas have greater than 1000 mR/h.

However the science analysts' estimate that extraction from the original rock has been reach up to 90-95% of the uranium, and in the tails is only 5 to 10% or so in today's tails makes great background progeny of the uranium series. In table 1 the structure of original ore and a tail material of the Maili-Suu field are resulted. Elevated levels of Mn and Ca in the tails, as compared with the ore is associated with the use of compounds as a reagent and auxiliary substances in the ore processing and extraction of uranium, and high levels of lead, usually associated with the addition of radiogenic lead, is in the ore.


Table 1. The average maintenance of separate components in ores and tailings of Maili-Suu

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 47

and chemical properties of soil cover, the Maili-Suu (except for the area of man-made sites), according to Sanitary and Epidemiology norm (SanEpidN) are in conformity or below the MPC (Maximum Permitted Concentration). More detailed study showed that not all the

Studies suggest a relatively low level of contamination of the soil cover micronutrients in relation to the background and the MPC. Found a slight increase in the concentration: Al, Mn, Se and U (2 - 3 times) in the autumn and spring, and Zn up to 6 times, the background

indicators correspond to the standard level, especially the level of trace elements.

Fig. 3. Location uranium production Maili-Suu

Fig. 4. The current state of tailings (# 8,9)

of U in sub-region in more than 10 times than MPC.

Fig. 2. The scheme of arrangement of tailings and waste dumps in anthropogenic provinces Maili-Suu.

From 1997 to 2003 special rehabilitation work in the country have been done, if they were sporadic. Starting from 2003 to 2007 in the country sharply intensified geomorphologic processes (landslides and floods), and therefore became acutely the question of preservation and rehabilitation of tailings and dumps (Fig.3-4). Upsurge in landslides, mudflows, erosion phenomena on the slopes adjacent to the tailings, the lack of funds for maintenance and repair and maintenance work has created a situation in some of the tailings in which may cause an ecological catastrophe. It should be noted that the destruction of tailings lead to removal of the tail material, not only in to the Maili-Suu river valley, but also into the densely populated Ferghana valley, and further to the basin of Syrdaria river. Fig. 5-6 shows the effect of surface re-vegetation of tailings in the period 1997-2003 compared to 1961. It clear from this scheme that the final completion of the re-cultivation work has far prospective.

The soil cover in the basin area downstream of the river - a typical gray soil, in the middle course - a dark gray soil, and then start mining-brown soil. General characteristics of the soil is as follows: pH 8.2 - 8.8, nitrate - 13.2 - 25 mg/kg of dry matter, chlorides - 25 - 47 mg/kg sulfate - 240 -895 mg/kg and petroleum products - 18 - 128 mg/kg of dry matter. Physical

Fig. 3. Location uranium production Maili-Suu

Fig. 2. The scheme of arrangement of tailings and waste dumps in anthropogenic provinces

From 1997 to 2003 special rehabilitation work in the country have been done, if they were sporadic. Starting from 2003 to 2007 in the country sharply intensified geomorphologic processes (landslides and floods), and therefore became acutely the question of preservation and rehabilitation of tailings and dumps (Fig.3-4). Upsurge in landslides, mudflows, erosion phenomena on the slopes adjacent to the tailings, the lack of funds for maintenance and repair and maintenance work has created a situation in some of the tailings in which may cause an ecological catastrophe. It should be noted that the destruction of tailings lead to removal of the tail material, not only in to the Maili-Suu river valley, but also into the densely populated Ferghana valley, and further to the basin of Syrdaria river. Fig. 5-6 shows the effect of surface re-vegetation of tailings in the period 1997-2003 compared to 1961. It clear from this scheme that the final completion of the re-cultivation work has far

The soil cover in the basin area downstream of the river - a typical gray soil, in the middle course - a dark gray soil, and then start mining-brown soil. General characteristics of the soil is as follows: pH 8.2 - 8.8, nitrate - 13.2 - 25 mg/kg of dry matter, chlorides - 25 - 47 mg/kg sulfate - 240 -895 mg/kg and petroleum products - 18 - 128 mg/kg of dry matter. Physical

Maili-Suu.

prospective.

Fig. 4. The current state of tailings (# 8,9)

and chemical properties of soil cover, the Maili-Suu (except for the area of man-made sites), according to Sanitary and Epidemiology norm (SanEpidN) are in conformity or below the MPC (Maximum Permitted Concentration). More detailed study showed that not all the indicators correspond to the standard level, especially the level of trace elements.

Studies suggest a relatively low level of contamination of the soil cover micronutrients in relation to the background and the MPC. Found a slight increase in the concentration: Al, Mn, Se and U (2 - 3 times) in the autumn and spring, and Zn up to 6 times, the background of U in sub-region in more than 10 times than MPC.

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 49

0,94±0,031 0,024±0,003 0,005±0,001 0,005±0,001 0,34±0,025 0,01±0,002 0,081±0,012 0,010±0,002 0,025±0,003 0,02±0,003 0,023±0,02 0,006±0,001 0,003±0,001 0,19±0,021 0,002±0,001

Table 2. Trace element composition of water in the r. Maili-Suu (average annual mg/kg)

Kyrgyzstan, home to 26 000 people, and Uzbekistan - to 2 400 000, Tajikistan - about 700 000, Kazakhstan - about 900 000 long-term contamination of radionuclides will be subjected to extensive areas Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, most of which are in the area of irrigated agriculture. Exposed to infection by rivers and streams, including such major rivers as the Kara-Darya, Syr-Darya. Water supply of drinking water is from rivers and canals, taking them from the beginning. Even if the water supply from groundwater wells

It should be noted that the collapse of tailings lead to removal of the tail material, not only in the valley of the Maili-Suu river, but in the densely populated in Fergana Valley, then - in the basin of Syr Darya river. In the zone of tailings influence in Maili-Suu the former enterprise in Kyrgyzstan, lives about 26 thousand people, Uzbekistan - to 2.4 million, Tajikistan - around 0.7 million, Kazakhstan - about 0.9 million. Extensive areas in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, most of which are in the area of irrigated agriculture, are exposed to long-term contamination with radionuclides. The major sources for public exposure are the rivers and streams, including such major rivers as the Kara-Darya and Syr Darya. Water supply of drinking water is from rivers and canals, taking them from the beginning. Even if the water supply from groundwater wells may be contaminated

As a whole the soil-vegetative cover near the rivers Majli-Suu according to obtained data is satisfactory. There are no changes revealed of level of the studied elements in a soilvegetative cover for several years. Naturally, the land covers in the tailings is not suitable

Currently, the safe storage of uranium waste in the town of Maili-Suu, has the following problems: disposal facilities are located less than 200 meters from residential city limits, the waste stockpiled near the river bed Maili-Suu. In order to reduce radon load to an acceptable level of sanitary protection zone in the city should be more than 3 km. Tailings dams require constancy of preventive measures in case of catastrophic floods and mud

for agricultural purposes and require special guidelines for local residents.

1 2 3 4 5

1,026±0,13 0,088±0,012 0,006±0,001 0,008±0,002 2,54±0,42 0,01±0,002 0,181±0,032 0,003±0,001 0,028±0,004 0,02±0,003 0,02±0,004 0,008±0,001 0,142±0,023 0,04±0,005 0,002±0,000 1,086±0,13 0,102±0,012 0,005±0,001 0,008±0,001 3,209±0,54 0,01±0,002 0,192±0,016 0,010±0,002 0,025±0,004 0,02±0,003 0,023±0,005 0,006±0,001 0,077±0,011 0,04±0,005 0,002±0,000 0,935±0,22 0,074±0,068 0,005±0,001 0,006±0,001 2,601±1,01 0,01±0,001 0,101±0,03 0,006±0,004 0,22±0,14 0,023±0,002 0,021±0,001 0,007±0,001 0,047±0,023 0,04±0,01 0,002±0,0002

Elements MPC Sampling point (the river) and the mean values

1,076±0,15 0,009±0,001 0,0073±0,001 0,007±0,002 0,46±0,062 0,01±0,001 0,225±0,013 0,004±0,001 0,032±0,001 0,035±0,001 0,02±0,003 0,011±0,002 0,011±0,002 0,04±0,002 0,002±0,000

1. Al 2. Ba 3. Co 4. Cu 5. Fe 6. Hg 7. Mn 8. Сo 9. Ni 10. Pb 11. Se 12. V 13. Zn 14. U 15. Cd 0,5 4,0 1,0 1,0 0,5 0,005 0,1 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,001 0,1 1,0 0,037 0,001 0,55±0,09 0,068±0,01 0,005±0,002 0,004±0,001 0,248±0,025 0,01±0,003 0,07±0,012 0,005±0,001 0,026±0,006 0,02±0,001 0,023±0,005 0,007±0,001 0,005±0,001 0,004±0,001 0,002±0,001

may be contaminated with radioactive elements.

with radioactive elements.

streams.

\* Red indicates the areas exceeded MPC (100 mR/h-1), green area marked with MPC, complying with local natural background

Fig. 5. and Fig. 6. The effect of surface re-vegetation of tailings in the period 1997-2003.

The vegetation (collection) in the basin Maili-Suu content of most trace elements studied at the level of control areas or slightly higher. Compared with the background sites, content: Al, Ba, Be, Fe, Mn, and Zn 2-times higher; As, Hg, Ni, Pb, Se and U - to 5 times; Mo, Co, Cd - 10-15 times. Increasing concentrations of trace elements observed in the middle and lower reaches of rivers. At some level of background regions is different from the minerals MPC. For example: U, Fe and Co more than a factor of 2, Hg - 10 times higher.

In an average sample of plants in the upper section (conditionally pure), the level of key micronutrients studied is relatively low, except for certain items, such as - Al in the Fergana wormwood (Artemisia ferganensis) - 2.5 times; Cu, Se and V in the astragalus (Astragalus lasiosemius) - 2 - 2.5 times; Ni in astragalus (Astragalus lasiosemius) and Artemisia Fergana (Artemisia ferganensis) - 10 times more compared to the background of other areas of the country.

According to our research water of Maili-Suu r. is not suitable for drinking. In some parts of the river water are found the highest concentrations - Se, exceeding the MPC in 23 times. Fe - concentration exceeds the MPC by 6 times or more, especially in the 2 and 5 points. The content - Cd, Al, Hg, Mn and Pb higher than normal in 2 times. The data obtained by: Ba, Fe, Co, Ni and Zn were not statistically significant (Table 2).

It should be noted that the destruction of tailings lead to removal of the tail material, not only in the valley r.Maili-Suu, but in the densely populated Ferghana valley, then - in the basin r.Syrdaria. In the zone of influence of the tailings of the former enterprise Maili-Suu in

1961 year 2003 year

local natural background

country.

\* Red indicates the areas exceeded MPC (100 mR/h-1), green area marked with MPC, complying with

The vegetation (collection) in the basin Maili-Suu content of most trace elements studied at the level of control areas or slightly higher. Compared with the background sites, content: Al, Ba, Be, Fe, Mn, and Zn 2-times higher; As, Hg, Ni, Pb, Se and U - to 5 times; Mo, Co, Cd - 10-15 times. Increasing concentrations of trace elements observed in the middle and lower reaches of rivers. At some level of background regions is different from the minerals

In an average sample of plants in the upper section (conditionally pure), the level of key micronutrients studied is relatively low, except for certain items, such as - Al in the Fergana wormwood (Artemisia ferganensis) - 2.5 times; Cu, Se and V in the astragalus (Astragalus lasiosemius) - 2 - 2.5 times; Ni in astragalus (Astragalus lasiosemius) and Artemisia Fergana (Artemisia ferganensis) - 10 times more compared to the background of other areas of the

According to our research water of Maili-Suu r. is not suitable for drinking. In some parts of the river water are found the highest concentrations - Se, exceeding the MPC in 23 times. Fe - concentration exceeds the MPC by 6 times or more, especially in the 2 and 5 points. The content - Cd, Al, Hg, Mn and Pb higher than normal in 2 times. The data obtained by: Ba, Fe,

It should be noted that the destruction of tailings lead to removal of the tail material, not only in the valley r.Maili-Suu, but in the densely populated Ferghana valley, then - in the basin r.Syrdaria. In the zone of influence of the tailings of the former enterprise Maili-Suu in

Fig. 5. and Fig. 6. The effect of surface re-vegetation of tailings in the period 1997-2003.

MPC. For example: U, Fe and Co more than a factor of 2, Hg - 10 times higher.

Co, Ni and Zn were not statistically significant (Table 2).



Kyrgyzstan, home to 26 000 people, and Uzbekistan - to 2 400 000, Tajikistan - about 700 000, Kazakhstan - about 900 000 long-term contamination of radionuclides will be subjected to extensive areas Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, most of which are in the area of irrigated agriculture. Exposed to infection by rivers and streams, including such major rivers as the Kara-Darya, Syr-Darya. Water supply of drinking water is from rivers and canals, taking them from the beginning. Even if the water supply from groundwater wells may be contaminated with radioactive elements.

It should be noted that the collapse of tailings lead to removal of the tail material, not only in the valley of the Maili-Suu river, but in the densely populated in Fergana Valley, then - in the basin of Syr Darya river. In the zone of tailings influence in Maili-Suu the former enterprise in Kyrgyzstan, lives about 26 thousand people, Uzbekistan - to 2.4 million, Tajikistan - around 0.7 million, Kazakhstan - about 0.9 million. Extensive areas in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, most of which are in the area of irrigated agriculture, are exposed to long-term contamination with radionuclides. The major sources for public exposure are the rivers and streams, including such major rivers as the Kara-Darya and Syr Darya. Water supply of drinking water is from rivers and canals, taking them from the beginning. Even if the water supply from groundwater wells may be contaminated with radioactive elements.

As a whole the soil-vegetative cover near the rivers Majli-Suu according to obtained data is satisfactory. There are no changes revealed of level of the studied elements in a soilvegetative cover for several years. Naturally, the land covers in the tailings is not suitable for agricultural purposes and require special guidelines for local residents.

Currently, the safe storage of uranium waste in the town of Maili-Suu, has the following problems: disposal facilities are located less than 200 meters from residential city limits, the waste stockpiled near the river bed Maili-Suu. In order to reduce radon load to an acceptable level of sanitary protection zone in the city should be more than 3 km. Tailings dams require constancy of preventive measures in case of catastrophic floods and mud streams.

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 51

contain 10, in some cases - 100 times more uranium than water areas and non-black earth black earth zone of Russia. Table 3 shows the results of our analysis of natural radionuclides in the water of rivers and tributaries of the lake Issyk-Kul, and the ratio of 234U/238U. According to scientific estimates of researchers in the lake holds about 100 tons of uranium.

Issyk-Kul lake , Kara Oi v. 1,79±0,18 1,13±0,05 1,80 0,013 r. Bulan-Sogotu 0,09±0,01 - 0,10 0,002 r. Kichi Ak-Su 0,17±0,02 - 0,20 0,009 r. Tuip 0,23±0,02 - 0,23 0,016 r. Kara-Kol 0,21±0,02 - 0,25 0,005 Issyk-Kul lake , Ak-Terek v. 0,56±0,06 - 0,60 0,02

before the rain 4,21±0,42 1,49±0,05 4,5 0,007

before the rain 10,2±1,02 1,30±0,05 10,0 0,005

mouth 1,69±0,17 1,52±0,05 1,67 0,015

content of uranium, this has the same level with slight variations.

Table 3. Natural radionuclides in the water of rivers and tributaries of the lake Issyk-Kul

As Table 4 shows, for comparison, the ratio 234U/238U at different times and the average

**1966-1990 (1-6)** 

r. Toruaygyr - 1,49±0,01 11,0-19,0 r.Chon-Aksu 1,39±0,01 1,42±0,01 6,7-10,7 r. Tup 1,43±0,01 1,34±0,08 2,6-8,7 r. Jergalan 1,23±0,01 1,20±0,02 4,7-13,0 r.Chon-Kyzylsuu 1,23±0,01 1,20±0,02 4,3-11,2 r. Barskaun 1,14±0,01 1,08±0,07 7,2-2,7 r. Ak-Terek 1,23±0,01 1,24±0,02 0,42-47,0 r. Tamga 1,22±0,01 1,22±0,06 15,1-21,6

Borehole 3 v. Dzhergalan 1,20±0,02 1,32±0,06 0,6-15,6

Table 4. Comparison of uranium-isotope data from the test 1966-1970 and 2003-2004 (12)

**(total) Bq1-1 234U/238U Gross alpha**

**Bq1-1** 

**γ = 234U/238U Contents** 

**2003-2004 (12)** 

1,51±0,02 1,62±0,02 2,6

**Uranium 10-6 g/l (9)** 

**226Ra Bq1-1** 

**Location of sampling Uranium** 

Kadji-Say v. a stream number 1

Kadji-Say v. a stream number 2

**Location of testing** 

Spring in the alluvial fan of r.Orukty

Issyk-Kul, v. Kadji-Sai river

In the geotechnical investigations and tailings design was not taken into account susceptibility to landslides in the region involving the violation of rock massifs in the development of oil fields. In recent years, large-scale response of the slopes on the mountain of work is expressed in the mass development of landslides in the entire field. They provoke the probability of failure of some tailings. With landslides in the valley may be formed landslide lakes and catastrophic floods. In the flood zone may be tailing located along the river Maili-Suu river, as well as homes and other facilities of the city.

Lack of waterproofing the bottom of the tailings may lead to contamination of groundwater with radionuclide. Studies on the content of radionuclide in ground water and other contaminants have been conducted, as disposal facilities were not equipped with monitoring wells. The situation is complicated by the fact that after the cessation of uranium mining and the collapse of the Soviet Union and tailings dumps were abandoned for a long time in the state. Until 1998, there were only occasional maintenance and repair work. Environmental emergency calls for speedy implementation of measures for rehabilitation of tailings and dumps, to ensure long-term stability and prevent the threat of ecological catastrophe, the consequences of which could cause political complications and also in Central Asia.

Since 2007, the province implemented the project "Prevention of emergency situations", funded by the World Bank, worth 10 950 000 US dollars. The project provides for the identification and prevention of the most significant risks of radioactive tailings in the town of Maili-Suu, hazards of natural origin (landslides) and the improvement of emergency management. Work carried out by VISUTEK (Germany). Earlier, district repeatedly visited various expert missions to the IAEA, the World Bank, ADB, and the Russian Federation and other international organizations. As indicated from the conducted studies, tailing number 3 can impose high risk, so this tailing has been transferred to tailing number 16.

#### **4.2 Issyk-Kul province of natural uranium (uranium-technogenic Kadji-Say)**

Issyk-Kul province of natural uranium is located on the south shore of the lake Issyk-Kul, in Ton district, at an altitude of 1980 m above sea level. Mining Enterprise of the Ministry of Average Machine Building of USSR for processing uranium ore there was in operation from 1948 to 1969, and was subsequently converted into the electrical engineering plant. The uranium oxide at this site is generated from the ashes of brown coals uraniferous sogutin filed as a by product for the electricity production from coal (5, 15)

Waste and industrial equipment have been buried, forming a tailings pond, with a total volume of uranium waste 400 000 m3, an area of 10 800 m2. Tailings from uranium waste is located 2.5 km east of the residential village, but due to natural factors (rain, groundwater, landslides and mudflows) is an environmental threat to lake Issyk-Kul (1.5 km from the lake) and the nearest towns located on slopes up to 30-45° between the mountains. For 50 years there has been intense uplifting coastal area near the industrial site. A small part of the radioactive ash reached the lake Issyk-Kul.

According to Kovalsky V.V., Vorotnitskaya I.E. and Lekareva V.S. (10), the amount of uranium in the waters of rivers - Ton, Ak- Suu, Issyk-Kul is 5,6 • 10-6 g\l. According to Kovalsky V.V element content in the river Jergalan varies, depending on season and room selection, from 2,8 • 10-6 to 1 •10-5 g\l. Key water wells and rivers of the Issyk-Kul basin

In the geotechnical investigations and tailings design was not taken into account susceptibility to landslides in the region involving the violation of rock massifs in the development of oil fields. In recent years, large-scale response of the slopes on the mountain of work is expressed in the mass development of landslides in the entire field. They provoke the probability of failure of some tailings. With landslides in the valley may be formed landslide lakes and catastrophic floods. In the flood zone may be tailing located along the

Lack of waterproofing the bottom of the tailings may lead to contamination of groundwater with radionuclide. Studies on the content of radionuclide in ground water and other contaminants have been conducted, as disposal facilities were not equipped with monitoring wells. The situation is complicated by the fact that after the cessation of uranium mining and the collapse of the Soviet Union and tailings dumps were abandoned for a long time in the state. Until 1998, there were only occasional maintenance and repair work. Environmental emergency calls for speedy implementation of measures for rehabilitation of tailings and dumps, to ensure long-term stability and prevent the threat of ecological catastrophe, the consequences of which could cause political complications and also in

Since 2007, the province implemented the project "Prevention of emergency situations", funded by the World Bank, worth 10 950 000 US dollars. The project provides for the identification and prevention of the most significant risks of radioactive tailings in the town of Maili-Suu, hazards of natural origin (landslides) and the improvement of emergency management. Work carried out by VISUTEK (Germany). Earlier, district repeatedly visited various expert missions to the IAEA, the World Bank, ADB, and the Russian Federation and other international organizations. As indicated from the conducted studies, tailing number 3

Issyk-Kul province of natural uranium is located on the south shore of the lake Issyk-Kul, in Ton district, at an altitude of 1980 m above sea level. Mining Enterprise of the Ministry of Average Machine Building of USSR for processing uranium ore there was in operation from 1948 to 1969, and was subsequently converted into the electrical engineering plant. The uranium oxide at this site is generated from the ashes of brown coals uraniferous sogutin

Waste and industrial equipment have been buried, forming a tailings pond, with a total volume of uranium waste 400 000 m3, an area of 10 800 m2. Tailings from uranium waste is located 2.5 km east of the residential village, but due to natural factors (rain, groundwater, landslides and mudflows) is an environmental threat to lake Issyk-Kul (1.5 km from the lake) and the nearest towns located on slopes up to 30-45° between the mountains. For 50 years there has been intense uplifting coastal area near the industrial site. A small part of the

According to Kovalsky V.V., Vorotnitskaya I.E. and Lekareva V.S. (10), the amount of uranium in the waters of rivers - Ton, Ak- Suu, Issyk-Kul is 5,6 • 10-6 g\l. According to Kovalsky V.V element content in the river Jergalan varies, depending on season and room selection, from 2,8 • 10-6 to 1 •10-5 g\l. Key water wells and rivers of the Issyk-Kul basin

can impose high risk, so this tailing has been transferred to tailing number 16.

filed as a by product for the electricity production from coal (5, 15)

radioactive ash reached the lake Issyk-Kul.

**4.2 Issyk-Kul province of natural uranium (uranium-technogenic Kadji-Say)** 

river Maili-Suu river, as well as homes and other facilities of the city.

Central Asia.

contain 10, in some cases - 100 times more uranium than water areas and non-black earth black earth zone of Russia. Table 3 shows the results of our analysis of natural radionuclides in the water of rivers and tributaries of the lake Issyk-Kul, and the ratio of 234U/238U. According to scientific estimates of researchers in the lake holds about 100 tons of uranium.


Table 3. Natural radionuclides in the water of rivers and tributaries of the lake Issyk-Kul

As Table 4 shows, for comparison, the ratio 234U/238U at different times and the average content of uranium, this has the same level with slight variations.


Table 4. Comparison of uranium-isotope data from the test 1966-1970 and 2003-2004 (12)

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 53

**Activity of soils by isotope, Bq / kg U-238 Ra-226 Pb-210 Th-228 Ra-228** 

**Kara-Oi** 0-5 71,8 12,7 35,1 3,9 147,4 13,0 39,5 2,2 35,2 8,8

Table 6. Background values for alpha-active isotopes in soils around Lake. Issyk-Kul and

Soil and ground tailings - in the upper layer of soil bulk (0-20 cm) of uranium from 1.1 to 2,6 • 10-6 g/g, with the depth of the element increases - up to 3,0 • 10-6 g/g. Most of the uranium concentration was noted in the central zone of tailings: in the upper layer of soil - 4,2 • 10-6 g/g in the bottom (at depths of 40-60 cm) - 35,0 • 10-6 g/g, which is 8.3 times

**The vegetation** is characterized by the province following associations: xerophytic shrub-, sagebrush-efimerovymi deserts, thorny (Akantalimon alatavsky, bindweed tragacanth). The vegetation cover is sparse, the project covering ranges from 5 to 10% and only in some areas

 5-10 50,8 7,3 37,7 3,4 64,6 11,4 49,0 1,9 60,1 7,5 10-15 44,0 1,7 35,1 3,2 50,1 7,2 45,6 1,8 52,3 3,5 15-20 51,7 7,4 46,1 3,5 50,2 7,7 49,9 1,9 53,6 7,7

0-6 71,5 14,3 51,0 3,4 88,5 18,4 69,1 3,6 72,4 7,2 6-11 52,1 6,5 43,2 3,1 71,7 10,2 43,2 3,3 59,2 19,7 11-20 54,9 7,3 45,4 3,5 68,6 7,6 64,3 3,8 64,1 7,5

0-5 260,0 30,0 103,0 8,0 169,0 30,0 915,0 57 846,0 70,0

**+/- +/- +/- +/- +/-** 

Fig. 8. The tailings from the bottom

**Layer cm** 

**Sampling location** 

**Kichi-Aksuu** 

**Ak-Terek sand** 

thorium sands

more than in the upper horizons.

From radiometric survey we found that radiation levels in the Issyk-Kul basin, and the village itself Kadji-Say and the adjacent territory is relatively low. However, this basin is the natural uranium province, in some areas there is increased radiation background. We found that the beach areas near the southern coast of v. Dzhenish and v. Ak-Terek (placer - Thorium sands) the exposure dose is 30 to 60 mR/h, at least at some points reaches up to 420 mR/h (Table 5, Fig. 7-8).

Background areas were studied by measuring alpha-active isotopes in soils around Lake Issyk-Kul. The level of background radiation on the surface of the industrial zone and the tail short, in a residential area above the 2 time compared with the norms.

On isotopic composition of the soil (Bq/kg), extremely high levels of activity were detected. In the area of the settlement v. Kara-Oy, the content of U238 and Pb210 were found to be 2 – 2.5 times higher in the upper (0-5 cm) soil layers. In the area of the settlements Ak-Terek and Jenish, it was found that for all the thorium (Th) isotopes the level of radiation are higher than any other studied locations by 2 to 10 order of magnitude (Table 6; Fig.9-10).


Table 5. The level of exposure dose in the Issyk-Kul basin

Fig. 7. Tailing after the rain

Fig. 8. The tailings from the bottom

From radiometric survey we found that radiation levels in the Issyk-Kul basin, and the village itself Kadji-Say and the adjacent territory is relatively low. However, this basin is the natural uranium province, in some areas there is increased radiation background. We found that the beach areas near the southern coast of v. Dzhenish and v. Ak-Terek (placer - Thorium sands) the exposure dose is 30 to 60 mR/h, at least at some points reaches up to

Background areas were studied by measuring alpha-active isotopes in soils around Lake Issyk-Kul. The level of background radiation on the surface of the industrial zone and the

On isotopic composition of the soil (Bq/kg), extremely high levels of activity were detected. In the area of the settlement v. Kara-Oy, the content of U238 and Pb210 were found to be 2 – 2.5 times higher in the upper (0-5 cm) soil layers. In the area of the settlements Ak-Terek and Jenish, it was found that for all the thorium (Th) isotopes the level of radiation are higher

**on the soil surface at a height of 1 m** 

tail short, in a residential area above the 2 time compared with the norms.

**Sampling location То of water pH Gamma background** 

Table 5. The level of exposure dose in the Issyk-Kul basin

than any other studied locations by 2 to 10 order of magnitude (Table 6; Fig.9-10).

Kara-Oi v. 18,5 оС 8,5 150-200 mSv / h 100 mSv / h Cholpon-Ata t. 18,8 оС 8,6 200 mSv / h 150 - 220 mSv / h Bulan-Sogotu v. 17,5 оС 8,15 150 mSv / h 100 mSv / h Kichi Ak-Suu r. 13,2 оС 7,94 160 mSv / h 150-170 mSv / h Tuip r. 18,8 оС 8,12 170 mSv / h 140 mSv / h Kara-kol r. 15,8 оС 8,05 180 mSv / h 150-210 mSv / h Ak-Terek v. 17,5 оС 8,24 470 mSv / h 420 mSv / h

420 mR/h (Table 5, Fig. 7-8).

Fig. 7. Tailing after the rain


Table 6. Background values for alpha-active isotopes in soils around Lake. Issyk-Kul and thorium sands

Soil and ground tailings - in the upper layer of soil bulk (0-20 cm) of uranium from 1.1 to 2,6 • 10-6 g/g, with the depth of the element increases - up to 3,0 • 10-6 g/g. Most of the uranium concentration was noted in the central zone of tailings: in the upper layer of soil - 4,2 • 10-6 g/g in the bottom (at depths of 40-60 cm) - 35,0 • 10-6 g/g, which is 8.3 times more than in the upper horizons.

**The vegetation** is characterized by the province following associations: xerophytic shrub-, sagebrush-efimerovymi deserts, thorny (Akantalimon alatavsky, bindweed tragacanth). The vegetation cover is sparse, the project covering ranges from 5 to 10% and only in some areas

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 55

Consequently there is reason to say that most of the plants Kaji-Says region have high uranium content in comparison with other territories in the region. Growth of plants in an environment with high concentrations of uranium is not only accompanied by changes in their biological productivity, but also causes morphological variability in particular: the splitting of Astragalus leaf blade, Peganum garmaly instead of the usual five petals it was noted 6-7 and part of their split, and the black grate observed significant morphological changes - low-growing form with

Fig. 12. Color mosaic of plant leaves Iris family (Iridaceae) species-Iris songarica Schrenk

branched inflorescences instead of straight single arrows (5, 10, 13) (Fig.11-12).

Fig. 11. Straight from the top of the tailings

#### Fig. 9. Dosimeter research.

Fig. 10. Local cattle pastured

up to 50%. The uranium content in different types of wormwood (Artemisia) in the tailings relatively high in relation to the region as a whole - 0,03-0,04 • 10-6g/g. Representatives of the legume (Salicaceae) - Astragalus (Astragalus) and sweet clover (Melilotus) contain up to 0,09 • 10-6g/g, while the grass (Poaceae) - a fire roofing (Bromus tectorum) uranium contained in twice to 0,17 • 10-6g/g. According Bykovchenko J.G. (3) these types of plants can serve as a land-improving plant for reobiletation tailings. According to the results of our studies the percentage of uranium in the province of plants Kaji-Sai is from 0,17 to 4.0 • 10-4%. Consequently there is reason to say that most of the plants Kaji-Says region have high uranium content in comparison with other territories in the region. Growth of plants in an environment with high concentrations of uranium is not only accompanied by changes in their biological productivity, but also causes morphological variability in particular: the splitting of Astragalus leaf blade, Peganum garmaly instead of the usual five petals it was noted 6-7 and part of their split, and the black grate observed significant morphological changes - low-growing form with branched inflorescences instead of straight single arrows (5, 10, 13) (Fig.11-12).

Fig. 11. Straight from the top of the tailings

54 Radioactive Waste

up to 50%. The uranium content in different types of wormwood (Artemisia) in the tailings relatively high in relation to the region as a whole - 0,03-0,04 • 10-6g/g. Representatives of the legume (Salicaceae) - Astragalus (Astragalus) and sweet clover (Melilotus) contain up to 0,09 • 10-6g/g, while the grass (Poaceae) - a fire roofing (Bromus tectorum) uranium contained in twice to 0,17 • 10-6g/g. According Bykovchenko J.G. (3) these types of plants can serve as a land-improving plant for reobiletation tailings. According to the results of our studies the percentage of uranium in the province of plants Kaji-Sai is from 0,17 to 4.0 • 10-4%.

Fig. 9. Dosimeter research.

Fig. 10. Local cattle pastured

Fig. 12. Color mosaic of plant leaves Iris family (Iridaceae) species-Iris songarica Schrenk

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 57

Fig. 13. Arrangement of uranium tailings storage Tuyuk-Suu in the village of Min-Kush

The soil cover neighborhoods Min-Kush presented, as indicated above, sub-alpine soils of steppe and meadows. The uranium content here, in the middle of the profile ranges - from 3,3 to 17,5 • 10-6 g/g is relatively high. Moderate pollution (great danger) in the area located above the processing plant where the uranium content in the soil reaches the surface - 30-35

In all soil profiles high concentration of uranium observed in the horizon of 20-40 cm (15- 20,0 • 10-6 g/g). In the adjacent - Kochkor valley where the soils are mountain-valley light brown the uranium content in the range 3,0-5,0 • 10-6 g/g. Humus to a certain extent helps to perpetuate the uranium in the soil apparently is in the process of sorption of uranium by

Fig. 14. A landslide in the lower portions of tailing

• 10-6 g / g, indicating that the local pollution of this area.

organic matter of soil and the formation of uranyl humates.

Currently, surface water eroded slopes adjacent to the tailing of relief, ground ash dump, the protective coating surface of the tailings piles and rocks. Diversion of surface water systems tailings are partially destroyed preserved, due to changes in drainage conditions due to existing buildings and structures do not provide normal drainage of surface water. Fences tailings destroyed, the network of groundwater monitoring is absent.

#### **4.3 Uranium deposits of settlement**

**Min-Kush** (Tura-Kavak) are at an altitude of about 2000 m in the basin of the r. Min-Kush. The population of urban settlement. Min-Kush at present is 4760 persons. In this region there are 4 tailing of radioactive materials - the volume of 1.15 thousand m3, an area of 196.5 thousand m2, and 4 mountain damps (substandard ore, there is no data on the volume) and the whole tail is a flat, land located on slopes up to 25-40° between the mountains. Ore complex operated from 1963 to 1969. After closing all the tailings of the uranium production was inhibited.

Currently, because of the timing of repairs and maintenance, there is a destruction of individual defenses and surface areas. The most dangerous are tailing "Tuyuc-Suu" and "Taldy-Bulak." Tailings "Tuyuc-Suu" is located in line with the same river. The total volume of reclaimed tailings - 450 000 m3, their area - 3,2 hectares. According to the results of radiometric survey the exposure dose at the surface of the tailings - 25-35 mR/h, locally - 150 mR/h. The total radio activity of nuclides in the disposal of the tail material - 1555 Ci.

To skip the reinforced concrete built river bypass channel is now part of ferro-concrete bypass channel structures destroyed, there was differential settlement surface tailings, formed locally closed injury, do not provide a flow of surface waters: a protective coating in some places broken excavation, fences and signs forbidding destroyed. The tailings are located in an area prone to mudslides. Possible violation of the water drainage and destruction of the tailings with the removal of the tail of material in the river Kokomeren and Naryn, then - in Toktogul and the Fergana valley. There has been a movement of an ancient landslide threat of overlap Tuyuk-Suu river and the destruction of the road to tailing (Fig. 13-14).

The radiometric survey of the exposure dose of gamma radiation at various sites of uranium tailings Min-Kush, showed from 27 to 60 mR/h, but at some points is high. For example the tailing Taldy-Bulak - 554 - 662 mR/h (Table 7). In general, the soils of Min-Kush geochemical province largely enriched by uranium, as far as concentration of uranium in them is 5-6 times higher than in other soils of Kyrgyzstan.


Table 7. The level of background radiation in a uranium province of Min-Kush

Currently, surface water eroded slopes adjacent to the tailing of relief, ground ash dump, the protective coating surface of the tailings piles and rocks. Diversion of surface water systems tailings are partially destroyed preserved, due to changes in drainage conditions due to existing buildings and structures do not provide normal drainage of surface water.

**Min-Kush** (Tura-Kavak) are at an altitude of about 2000 m in the basin of the r. Min-Kush. The population of urban settlement. Min-Kush at present is 4760 persons. In this region there are 4 tailing of radioactive materials - the volume of 1.15 thousand m3, an area of 196.5 thousand m2, and 4 mountain damps (substandard ore, there is no data on the volume) and the whole tail is a flat, land located on slopes up to 25-40° between the mountains. Ore complex operated from

Currently, because of the timing of repairs and maintenance, there is a destruction of individual defenses and surface areas. The most dangerous are tailing "Tuyuc-Suu" and "Taldy-Bulak." Tailings "Tuyuc-Suu" is located in line with the same river. The total volume of reclaimed tailings - 450 000 m3, their area - 3,2 hectares. According to the results of radiometric survey the exposure dose at the surface of the tailings - 25-35 mR/h, locally - 150 mR/h. The total radio activity of nuclides in the disposal of the tail material - 1555 Ci. To skip the reinforced concrete built river bypass channel is now part of ferro-concrete bypass channel structures destroyed, there was differential settlement surface tailings, formed locally closed injury, do not provide a flow of surface waters: a protective coating in some places broken excavation, fences and signs forbidding destroyed. The tailings are located in an area prone to mudslides. Possible violation of the water drainage and destruction of the tailings with the removal of the tail of material in the river Kokomeren and Naryn, then - in Toktogul and the Fergana valley. There has been a movement of an ancient landslide threat of overlap

The radiometric survey of the exposure dose of gamma radiation at various sites of uranium tailings Min-Kush, showed from 27 to 60 mR/h, but at some points is high. For example the tailing Taldy-Bulak - 554 - 662 mR/h (Table 7). In general, the soils of Min-Kush geochemical province largely enriched by uranium, as far as concentration of uranium in

Name of areas Radiation background in mR/h

60,0-61,0

Fences tailings destroyed, the network of groundwater monitoring is absent.

1963 to 1969. After closing all the tailings of the uranium production was inhibited.

Tuyuk-Suu river and the destruction of the road to tailing (Fig. 13-14).

Min-Kush village 27,0-28,0 Tailings Tuyuk-Suu gate 27,5-28,0

The site- 21(where miners lived) 32,0-32,5 Tailings Taldy-Bulak 554 - 662 Water from the tunnels 61,0-61,5 Hotel Rudnik 60,0-61,0

Table 7. The level of background radiation in a uranium province of Min-Kush

them is 5-6 times higher than in other soils of Kyrgyzstan.

**4.3 Uranium deposits of settlement** 

Fig. 13. Arrangement of uranium tailings storage Tuyuk-Suu in the village of Min-Kush

Fig. 14. A landslide in the lower portions of tailing

The soil cover neighborhoods Min-Kush presented, as indicated above, sub-alpine soils of steppe and meadows. The uranium content here, in the middle of the profile ranges - from 3,3 to 17,5 • 10-6 g/g is relatively high. Moderate pollution (great danger) in the area located above the processing plant where the uranium content in the soil reaches the surface - 30-35 • 10-6 g / g, indicating that the local pollution of this area.

In all soil profiles high concentration of uranium observed in the horizon of 20-40 cm (15- 20,0 • 10-6 g/g). In the adjacent - Kochkor valley where the soils are mountain-valley light brown the uranium content in the range 3,0-5,0 • 10-6 g/g. Humus to a certain extent helps to perpetuate the uranium in the soil apparently is in the process of sorption of uranium by organic matter of soil and the formation of uranyl humates.

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 59

Fig. 15. The not re-cultured dumps in the region of Shakaftar

**4.5 Ak-Tuz technogenic provinces of rare and radioactive metals** 

complex, mountainous. Absolute altitude exceeds 2000 m above sea level.

industrial concentrations established the presence of: Pd, Zn, Sn, Mn, Cu.

• strengthening the river banks Sumsar;

• re-culturing of land dumps; • restoration of fences,

to 1000 mR/h (Fig.16-17).

destruction of the surrounding areas.

• the installation of warning signs.

Bringing the dumps in a safe condition requires the following emergency operations:

Ak-Tuz technogenic provinces of rare and radioactive metals are located in the Chui region of KR in the upper part valley river Kichi-Kemin and river basin Chu. The terrain - a

The ore field of the region is characterized by an extremely complex structure, and covers about 30 occurrences of lead and rare metals. It is widely developed within a multiplicative and disjunctive offenses manifested repeatedly throughout geological history, ranging from the Precambrian. Within the deposit an oxidized sulfide ores of metals were developed. In

In the region of the Ak-Tuz are 4 tailings. Stored 3900 000 m3 of waste ores, which occupy 117 000 m2, the average gamma-ray background is 60-100 mR/h in the abnormal areas of up

From 1995 to 1999. work to maintain the waterworks were not conducted. In 2000 activities were conducted waterworks tailings number 1 and 3. There is intense erosion of the protective layer tail number 1 and wind erosion surface tailings number 3 with the

We have also studied the radiation background in some village homes'. V. Min-Kush (Table 8) and measurement results showed that in homes, compared to the MPC, the background radiation slightly increased (2 times) and therefore requires specific measures to reduce. The main reasons for the slight increase in background radiation provided cases of using waste ashes from the local coal for the construction needs.


Table 8. The level of radiation background in the residential of v. Min-Kush (17 Square, st. Zhusup, Building 10, Apt. 6)

Considered several options for security of stored waste:


#### **4.4 Uranium-technogenic provinces Shekaftar**

The mine operated from 1946 to 1957 year at this area and also 8 dumps located here. In the dumps warehousing about 700 000 m3 of low-level radioactive rocks and ores substandard.

In the immediate vicinity are houses with gardens. The main pollutants are elements of the uranium series. The average gamma-ray background is 60-100 mR/h on the anomalous areas - up to 300 mR/h. All damps are not re-cultured (Fig. 15).

The material of which is used by local people for household needs. Damp number 5 located on the bank of river Sumsar intense urged by its waters. The lack of vegetation on the surface contributes to the development of wind erosion and surface runoff material stockpiles and distribute them not only to the territory Shekaftar item, but also in adjacent territories of Fergana valley.

A more extensive destruction of stockpiles fall down cross-border contamination of the territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Fig. 15. The not re-cultured dumps in the region of Shakaftar

Bringing the dumps in a safe condition requires the following emergency operations:


58 Radioactive Waste

We have also studied the radiation background in some village homes'. V. Min-Kush (Table 8) and measurement results showed that in homes, compared to the MPC, the background radiation slightly increased (2 times) and therefore requires specific measures to reduce. The main reasons for the slight increase in background radiation provided cases of using waste

**Gamma-ray background: in the attic** 

Inside appartment 6, in the hall **Bedroom - - the floor Kitchen floor** 

**Bedroom - the ceiling Kitchen ceiling** 

Table 8. The level of radiation background in the residential of v. Min-Kush (17 Square, st.

• Repair of hydraulic structures and constant maintenance of their working condition

• Conducting sanitation radioecological studies and measures to reduce the exposure

The mine operated from 1946 to 1957 year at this area and also 8 dumps located here. In the dumps warehousing about 700 000 m3 of low-level radioactive rocks and ores substandard. In the immediate vicinity are houses with gardens. The main pollutants are elements of the uranium series. The average gamma-ray background is 60-100 mR/h on the anomalous

The material of which is used by local people for household needs. Damp number 5 located on the bank of river Sumsar intense urged by its waters. The lack of vegetation on the surface contributes to the development of wind erosion and surface runoff material stockpiles and distribute them not only to the territory Shekaftar item, but also in adjacent

A more extensive destruction of stockpiles fall down cross-border contamination of the

0,78 mcZv/h ± 20% 0,73 mcZv/h ± 20%

0,63 mcZv/h ± 20% 0,69 mcZv/h ± 20%0, 69 mcZv/h ± 20%

0,57 mcZv/h ± 10% 0,80 mcZv/h ± 10% 0,71 mcZv/h ± 10%

ashes from the local coal for the construction needs.

0,97mcZv/h ± 22% 0,88 mcZv/h ± 20%

0,76 mcZv/h ± 20% 0,65 mcZv/h ± 20% 0,75 mcZv/h ± 20%

0,72 м mcZv/h ± 20 0,66 mcZv/h ± 22% 0,79 mcZv/h ± 22%

Considered several options for security of stored waste:

over a long period of use (thousands of years);

**4.4 Uranium-technogenic provinces Shekaftar** 

• Dismantling and transport the tailings to a safer place;

areas - up to 300 mR/h. All damps are not re-cultured (Fig. 15).

Zhusup, Building 10, Apt. 6)

dose in dwellings.

territories of Fergana valley.

territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

• the installation of warning signs.

#### **4.5 Ak-Tuz technogenic provinces of rare and radioactive metals**

Ak-Tuz technogenic provinces of rare and radioactive metals are located in the Chui region of KR in the upper part valley river Kichi-Kemin and river basin Chu. The terrain - a complex, mountainous. Absolute altitude exceeds 2000 m above sea level.

The ore field of the region is characterized by an extremely complex structure, and covers about 30 occurrences of lead and rare metals. It is widely developed within a multiplicative and disjunctive offenses manifested repeatedly throughout geological history, ranging from the Precambrian. Within the deposit an oxidized sulfide ores of metals were developed. In industrial concentrations established the presence of: Pd, Zn, Sn, Mn, Cu.

In the region of the Ak-Tuz are 4 tailings. Stored 3900 000 m3 of waste ores, which occupy 117 000 m2, the average gamma-ray background is 60-100 mR/h in the abnormal areas of up to 1000 mR/h (Fig.16-17).

From 1995 to 1999. work to maintain the waterworks were not conducted. In 2000 activities were conducted waterworks tailings number 1 and 3. There is intense erosion of the protective layer tail number 1 and wind erosion surface tailings number 3 with the destruction of the surrounding areas.

Problems of Uranium Waste and Radioecology in Mountainous Kyrgyzstan Conditions 61

above and below the sump level is the same. Eh - in the region settling tank is moderately

Results of the analysis of the upper soil layer (up to 0 - 20 cm) are presented in Table 9. The table shows that the maximum concentration of lead found in the area of 500 m below the lagoon (3108,4 ± 415 mg/kg), followed by factories in the area of 1 km (2686,1 ± 287,7 mg/kg) and 4 tailing (1937,0 ± 325,4 mg/kg), which is increased to 10 times compared to

Zinc concentration increased to 10 times compared to other sites, as compared with up to 15 times MPC. For example, in the factory up to 1 km (720,62 ± 59 mg/kg), the tail region of 3

621,14±17,82 104,83±17,82

1937,0±325,4 756,20±57

(818,90 ± 26 mg/kg), 4 tail (756,20 ± 57 mg/kg) and 2 tail (652 70 ± 87,1 mg/kg).
