**1. Introduction**

This chapter is grounded in theoretical research [1, 2] which attempts to set aside 'magical' perceptions of imagination in education and understand it instead, as a fundamental aspect of cognitive and metacognitive capacity. In turn, it offers a perspective of metacognition from the view-point of imagination. A theoretical exploration of the relationship between imagination, cognition and metacognition is cohered and conceptualised within 'emergent models' of imagination, (drawn largely from [1]). Through this exploration, a question arises of whether a combined focus on imagination and metacognition could be potent in developing personal and social agency. If so, we may hypothesise that educational support for the inherent relationships between imagination, metacognition and individual agency creates capacity for democratic agency. The emergence [3–5] of the models demonstrates a fundamental relationship between cognition, metacognition and imagination, with these latter two capacities overlapping to the degree that we arrive at the question of whether metacognition is actually, just imagination. The chapter concludes with discussion of a recent application of these ideas within a research project with young people *Imagination Agents,* before making recommendations for research and practice.

Few would disagree that imagination is essential for originality and for enabling us to see beyond our current state. It is therefore crucial in addressing a 'posthuman convergence' ([6], p. 3) of structural injustice, environmental crisis and a shift in what it means to be human in light of rapid scientific and technological change. Complex personal, local and global challenges require us to re-imagine ourselves and to use imagination to develop autonomy, empathy and the capacity to solve problems. This suggests the importance of nurturing imagination, however; some argue that this is not recognised by or reflected in current education. At the more critical end of the scale, Giroux [7] states that schools have become 'disimagination machines' which leave us ill-equipped for necessary innovation in a challenging world. Biesta ([8], p. 55) describes how education is steered in the direction of 'the production of a small set of measurable learning outcomes' and neglects students' voice, creativity and unique identities.

Imagination is often regarded as a magical phenomenon, rather than as a cognitive or metacognitive capacity which can be educated. This is recognised from a psychological perspective by Ryle, who notes '…a quite general tendency among theorists and laymen alike to ascribe some sort of other-worldy reality to the imaginary.' ([9], p. 232). Within neoliberal contexts, imagination is frequently seen as an escape from reality, often colonised and epitomised by global, corporate bodies such as Disney, Dreamworks and so on. Over the course of my professional and academic career in education, numerous teachers have told me 'It's all about imagination'. They have expressed concern that many children do not have access to the experiences which nurture it and struggle to apply it when it is required, for instance, in literacy or problem-solving activities.

Like many others, I have a love of and belief in imagination which can seem to imply it has an almost magical power. I have no desire to extinguish ideas of magical imagination (after-all, that would be unimaginative!); however, a lack of definition could restrict the capacity to nurture imagination in our contemporary, educational environment, where accountability can dominate (e.g., [10]). As my research into imagination progressed, I became interested in the proximity and overlaps within its relationship to metacognition and in how, by association with metacognition, (perhaps a more frequently defined and implemented concept in education), it is possible to advocate for practices which nurture imagination and cognition/metacognition. Meta-evidence suggests that children can increase their chances of educational success if they are supported to develop metacognition [11]. A strong relationship between imagination and metacognition implies that developing imagination is likely to be beneficial for metacognition and therefore for learning more generally. If this relationship is strong and is understood, we might better develop metacognition by better developing imagination, thereby improving individual learning, in particular, the capacity for self-regulation. Conversely, we might support imagination by educating for metacognition, since this would automatically require us to exercise our

### *Perspective Chapter: Is Metacognition 'Just' Imagination? Exploring the Relationship… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114167*

imagination. Either way, by developing metacognitive understanding and strategies for self-regulation, these approaches could generate confidence and lead to increased autonomy (Bonnett in [12], p. 156). In turn, this could lead to increased potential for democratic capacity, as described by Dewey [13] and Greene [14].

Imagination as a concept 'has been relatively neglected in our current age' [15]. Little research has been carried out into the condition of imagination in education, perhaps because little has been done to find a way to conceptualise and assess it. The same cannot be said of metacognition, which continues to be well-researched and supported pedagogically through an array of programmes, strategies and curricula. It has been suggested [16] that metacognition may be considered to be a form of imagination, described in terms of Mead's 'generalised other' in which the individual internalises a 'general systematic pattern of social or group behaviour' and applies these 'towards himself, just as he takes the individual attitudes of others.' ([17], p. 158). Such an act is imaginative in requiring a leap of thought in order to consider how the 'generalised other' might respond in a given situation. For Kant, imagination is a means of connecting and synthesising sense perceptions with existing knowledge, making imagination the 'hidden condition of all knowledge' ([18], p. 167). One might also argue, based on Kant, that imagination is a kind of cognitive transcendence and is akin to metacognition. How far do these theories account for the characteristics of metacognition and how else might imagination influence the metacognitive process? By modelling this relationship we might better understand both imagination and metacognition and improve support for learners across both (or perhaps the same) kinds of thought.

To consider *meta*cognition (e.g.; [19–23]) in relation to imagination, it makes sense to explore it as specialised, self-awareness applied to personal thinking and learning and to acknowledge imagination as a critical factor in species-wide human development which enabled the emergence of consciousness of our own existence (e.g.; [24–26]). Literature which is concerned with the relationship between imagination and metacognition, (except through a focus on creativity, e.g., Runco [27], Kaufman and Beghetto [28]). Authors have discussed that there are multiple definitions of metacognition (e.g., [21]). Discussion in this chapter requires a pragmatic, essential yet comprehensive definition, to provide a foundation for relating it to imagination, hence it adopts Flavell's definition in which "Metacognition" refers to one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes and products or anything related to them.' ([29], p. 232). Flavell produced a framework including metacognitive knowledge, experiences, goals and actions ([19], p. 906).

### **2. Methods**

I undertook a theoretical journey towards emergent models of imagination within cognition and metacognition. This research was undertaken from a pragmatic stance (e.g., [30]). It aimed to address a problem which arose within my education practice as a museum and gallery educator: that an articulated understanding of 'imagination' is largely absent and its relationship to metacognition seems little considered.

An interdisciplinary approach to data collection was adopted in order to ensure that the new models are well-grounded, not limited by subject discipline and therefore; robust. The integration of theoretical data from multiple fields of knowledge was designed to enable a novel contribution to education practice due to its roots lying in perspectives emerging from beyond that practice. A method analogous to

'grounded theory' ([31], p. 491), was used inductively in the selection and analysis of literature, which constituted data within the study. Theory emerged from the identification and cohering of themes from the data, in conjunction with the interpretive capacity of the researcher, as an education practitioner. Exploring theories across disciplines unearthed ideas to use in *re-imagining* imagination. This enabled a conceptual escape from what can be a restrictive, educational perspective which can simply serve 'to facilitate a "ready-made" political or moral (normative) purpose' ([32], p. 2), as opposed to creating a means of supporting the productive transformation of our thinking and learning.

The resulting, cognitive and metacognitive models of imagination (see [1]) constituted the basis for the further research which is described in this chapter. This was an action research case study 'Imagination Agents'.

### **3. Findings: key themes emerging**

Two themes emerged strongly. The first, *transcendence*, is concerned with imagination and self-awareness, in a species-wide and individual sense. The second is *imagination as cognition*, which is concerned with imagination as being fundamental within all or almost all of our thought.

### **3.1 Transcendence**

First, the theme of transcendence is concerned with a species-wide, evolutionary perspective. What emerged within the theme is a proposal that by evolving a sufficiently sophisticated imagination, our capacity to develop and use a transcendental 'vision' developed. A significant evolution and enlargement of human brains (which evolutionary psychologists generally accept as taking place about 1 million years ago (e.g., [25], p. 48)) enabled us to develop theories of mind and to be able to consider our place within, whatever we then conceived as the universe. These transcendental theories led to our further evolutionary development, with *'*This perception of one's individual existence in space and time…[becoming] a driving force in the evolution of the human animal.' ([26], p. 8). In developing such an understanding of ourselves and of our situation, we could also develop empathy for other humans by imagining their thoughts, feelings and needs.

This capacity for self-awareness and empathy is surely a basic condition for personal agency and from this, social/democratic capacity. For example, self-awareness of how we learn, personally, might lead us to recognise that the holistic well-being of a social group depends on ensuring that others can also learn and need to be cared for in this respect through an empathetic approach to their learning needs and accompanying efforts to accommodate these. Thus, concepts of education for the social and democratic good might arise. Additionally, we see that from the outset of this argument, there is an implied closeness between imagination and metacognition if we consider metacognition to be a special kind of self-awareness, which, in its application to thinking and learning, is perhaps a particularly powerful kind of self-awareness in relation to species-wide development.

There is an interesting role for arts and culture within this evolutionary (as applied to the species) and developmental (as applied to the individual) theory, which has implications for the development of pedagogies to support imagination and metacognition. Montell argues ([26], p. 17) that the evolutionary adaptation

### *Perspective Chapter: Is Metacognition 'Just' Imagination? Exploring the Relationship… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114167*

of imagination was driven by awareness and fear of death. This had been provoked by the development of our sophisticated capacity for imagination. It may have been advantageous for us to externalise this fear in the form of artefacts ([25], pp. 49–50), with the proliferation of these leading to the development of culture and cultural practices which involved them. These cultural artefacts acted as cognitive anchors for concepts, set outside of ourselves, where they could be contemplated and shared and built upon. This externalisation of ideas as physical objects freed up '…cognitive 'space" [24], allowing us to over-ride existing mental categories and to develop our ways of thinking, socio-culturally (Ibid). A cycle emerges: evolved imagination leads to self-awareness, leading to socio-cultural dialogue, which further expands social and individual imagination. Considering this in a current, pedagogical context, we might come to understand the special, cognitive value of arts-based experiences and their potential in supporting social dialogues which can lead to individual and social agency. This idea is infused within the Imagination Agents project, described towards the end of this chapter. While the application of imagination need not only be concerned with supporting agency, it is fundamental to this task, since it is what enables us to consider ourselves reflectively, to consider the perspectives of others and what all of this means for successful co-existence.

Kant's philosophical theory of 'transcendental imagination' (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781) asserts that imagination is an innate human faculty which underpins and structures our thinking. Imagination enables us to group and synthesise new, sensory impressions with pre-integrated mental images. Transcendental imagination performs a basic, classifying function, without which we would be left to respond to experiences which would seem chaotic and meaningless. The idea of imagination as a kind of driving, cognitive force towards the progressive development of our understanding emerges, expanding the Aristotelian idea of imagination as the 'movement' of stored mental images, driven by 'desire' for meaning (De Anima, 3, 10, 433a).

Kant's use of the word 'transcendental' then, means that imagination 'comes first' and drives us to transcend what would otherwise be a mess of dis-ordered experiences. Without imagination, we could not synthesise our perceptions into concepts. If we experienced buildings, we could not conceptualise them as part of the environment or consider that, in greater number, they would constitute a city. We could not apply concepts of urban development or compare buildings to other buildings with different purposes. Each experience of a building would be unconnected with any idea which enabled a broader 'sense-making' about them and their place in the world. Likewise, without transcendental imagination about ourselves as humans, we could not understand the relationships between self, species and the universe. This transcendental deficit would negate possibilities for personal and/or social agency, since we could not understand self or social concepts and by extension, how to support self or society.

So far we have considered imagination in the context of cognition but this has strayed into ideas of self-awareness and theories of mind, which could be considered to be related to metacognition, albeit that these are broader concepts. Within metacognition, imagination enables a more focused transcendence, concentrated upon our thinking and learning.

To summarise what has emerged from this theme of 'transcendence' then, there are two key aspects, one evolutionary and the other, philosophical/psychological. First, imagination enabled our self-awareness at an evolutionary level. We then had to cope with the imaginings that this brought. The need to externalise our thinking prompted our cultural development and from that, our further, social development as a species. Considering transcendence at an individual level, it is the organising factor

within our thinking. Through this, we are able to synthesise and organise ideas about our own thinking and learning, which constitute metacognition. We can conclude that, based on these ideas, imagination is fundamental to cognition and metacognition, as well as to individual and social development.

### **4. Imagination as cognition**

In *De Anima*, Aristotle provides foundational ideas of cognitive imagination. For him, imagination mediates our sensory perceptions and our judgement. Without imagination, our sensory perceptions would be unavailable to our thought processes and therefore, we could not think properly or function as conscious individuals.

For Aristotle, imagination is 'movement' (De Anima, 3, 3, 428b), concerned with transporting sensory perceptions into the cognitive realm, where they are stored for further use. This 'image store' support us to deliberate and self-regulate by recalling 'images' (while this implies visuality it includes all kinds of sensory perceptions, smell, touch taste etc.) to enable us to reason and self-regulate. According to Aristotle, we are driven by a 'desire' *(De Anima, 3, 7, 431b)* to understand or make meaning. Within this driven process of cognition, imagination connects sensory perception with our existing thought, enables us to make choices and to think backwards and forwards in time (ibid). applying Aristotle's ideas to metacognition: driven by the desire to learn, we make choices and self-regulate our thinking and learning by manipulating stored mental imagery which relates to this. The mental image can be considered as a 'building block' of the imagination which is critical within our thinking.

Jumping forward in time, Hume and Kant developed understanding of imagination as cognition which seems to have laid foundations for more recent, psychological approaches. Hume's [33] philosophy of imagination as a kind of existential keystone, holding together a coherent understanding of the world by filling in gaps in our understanding is resonant with Piaget's, psychological understanding of the role of imagination for young children. For Piaget, imagination compensates for a deficit in material experiences [34]. Kant's 'transcendental imagination' has resonance with Piaget's theory of schema and the accommodation and assimilation of experiences into these (1952).

Vygotsky concurs with Piaget that our thinking is based on storing, manipulating and applying sensory images, conceptualising this not as 'gap filling' within the act of discovering pre-existent truths (in a positivist sense) but as a creative, constructive activity [34]. This implies an agental role for the learner as a constructor of meaning and therefore as a potential change-maker. This function can be applied to the development of metacognition and our capacity to make sense of and strategise our thinking and learning. Furthermore, the implication is that we can create *new* knowledge, which can provoke thinking about new possibilities in relation to the complex challenges which we face individually and socially.

### **5. Findings: an emerging model of cognitive imagination**

Having described what emerged from the research process as significant themes in relation to the study, I will now go on to summarise the models of imagination and cognition and metacognition which were major findings. These were initially described in detail in [1] and are briefly re-presented here, illuminated by new examples of how they might manifest in experience.


### **Table 1.**

*Types of imagination: Definitions and examples.*

The premise of the model of imagination in cognition is that imagination consists of various manipulations of mental images, which we recall from a kind of 'store' or an 'allusionary base' ([35], p. 18), in order to cohere ideas. This premise can be traced back to Aristotle, who described this concept of storage and recall, driven by 'desire', in 'De Anima'. To consider how the model might manifest in our thinking, I will relate the types of imagination to a concept and apply them in the context of a child learning. With reference to Jerome Bruner's chapter 'Possible Castles' [36], I will use the concept of 'a castle' (**Table 1**).

Note that fantastical imagination is 'fantastical' because the child imagined something materially impossible, yet not original. *Fantastical Imagination* may or may not be creative. For instance, it could be said that bringing to mind a dragon requires fantastical imagination since a dragon is not 'real' in a material sense (as far as we know!). This is not necessarily *Creative Imagination* because dragons will usually not be a relatively original imagining. On the other hand, *Fantastical Imagination* could include *Creative Imagination* if the impossible scenario being imagined is original to the person imagining it. *Fantastical Imagination*, while it may or may not involve *Creative Imagination*, like *Creative Imagination*, will also rely on *Imaging* and *Productive Imagination.*
