**6. Findings: an emerging model of metacognitive imagination**

Having modelled the fundamental role of imagination in cognition, it is safe to assume that imagination also supports metacognition [19]. *Metacognition* requires the application of our cognition, within a focus on our cognition; therefore it involves imagination. Within a metacognitive process, the kinds of imagination identified in the cognitive model would be applied to the issue of our own thinking and learning.

Basically, to model imagination and metacognition we need to recall and objectify the cognitive model in order to gain a 'meta' view. While focussed on our thinking and learning, imagination within our metacognition is likely to perform in basically the same way as it does within our cognition, however, the relationship is more complex in requiring a more demanding role for self-awareness, which, as discussed above (and in [1]), is dependent on imagination. Imagine a child, metacognitively reflecting

on how they produced a story about travelling back in time. The categories of imagining are interacting within a self-transcendent lens, as the child reflects on how they incorporated experiences from a visit to their local museum to create their vision of the world of a child living 200 years ago. Using imaginative, self-awareness the child metacognises that drawing on personal, material, experience inspires their creativity. They decide that this is a helpful, future learning strategy, thereby developing their metacognitive skill. They have used their cognitive capacities in the context of their transcendental capacity for self-awareness. Both capacities were supported by imagination, within a metacognitive process.

**Table 2** attempts to summarise the role of each kind of imagination within metacognition. To provide some tangible insight into how the metacognitive model might apply to a piece of thinking, we will use the example of a child faced with a challenging exam including the topic of photosynthesis.

If we see self-awareness as the foundation of metacognitive knowledge, we might expect imagination to have an amplified role in metacognition. The deliberate application of our thought to our unique and individual thinking implies novelty and requires *Creative Imagination*. The role of imagination is increased if we cross, conceptually, from cognition to metacognition. *Creative Imagination is the key to unlocking metacognition*. *Imaging* and *Productive Imagination* are of course required but metacognition is grounded in cognitions previously acquired through socio-cultural experience and turned into images relating to thinking and learning. We accomplish this by using *Productive* and *Creative Imagination* at the cognitive level. These capacities are now material for 'meta' reflection. Simultaneously, they are tools for metacognitive manipulation—the same thought processes applied to our concepts of thinking and learning. 'Only when we have embarked on the creative task of developing metacognitive knowledge and skill do we continue to manipulate and combine imaging and products of imaging at this higher level, transcending and 'looking


### **Table 2.**

*Types of imagination in metacognition: Definitions and examples.*

### *Perspective Chapter: Is Metacognition 'Just' Imagination? Exploring the Relationship… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114167*

down' on our own learning, having accumulated a sufficiently sophisticated lexicon of symbolic language in order to achieve this' ([1], p. 12). In Vygotskian terms, at this point our thoughts have been crystallised into mental tools which allow us to open up and construct thinking within a metacognitive realm.

The example in **Table 2** is of course, simplified. The categories of imagination will interplay more, however; it provides a starting point for considering what are usually tacit processes. We can now speculatively 'map' imagination and its relationship with metacognition. Metacognitive knowledge and skill can be situated within a larger 'pool' of *Imaging* in relation to thinking and learning. From this pool, can bring to mind what is not present in relation to 'learning'. 'Ready-cohered within this pool of images is a range of cognitive tools which, when directed towards the concept of our own learning, enable us to manipulate and generate new thoughts which enhance metacognitive knowledge and skill' ([1], p. 12). Metacognitive knowledge and skill need and feed each other. Skill requires knowledge as a foundation from which to construct successful strategy. To obtain metacognitive knowledge we need to apply metacognitive skill. Metacognitive knowledge uses *Productive Imagination* to recall existing and integrate new images. *Creative Imagination* is needed in order to synthesise these thoughts by making and applying 'rules' to organise them coherently.

Moving on to consider metacognitive skill, due to its focus on self-regulation and strategy, this is largely supported by *Creative Imagination*, 'since these executive functions require the ability to reason and solve problems which are personal (therefore novel) to the learner' ([1], p. 13). While it is likely to draw directly on *Imaging* and *Productive Imagination*, in allowing connections to be forged and thoughts to flow, it also draws on *Productive Imagination* which has been previously crystallised into metacognitive knowledge as imagery related to thinking and learning. It requires the ability to speculate about and create strategies for application and adaptation in different contexts. This metacognitive capacity for 'adaptive intelligence' ([37], p. 1) is essential for responding effectively to turbulent, socio-cultural environments and for enabling us to better address the significant challenges we face during the current. 'convergence of crises' [38] we face. By increasing our metacognitive skill there is the potential to increase our confidence and perception of ourselves as capable, democratic agents.

In summary of what is described above and more fully in Burns [1] as an emergent model of metacognitive imagination: metacognitive knowledge and skill dynamically interact with each other. They are dependent on and consist largely of imagination. Reaching a metacognitive state requires us to transcend into self-awareness (individually and historically, as a species), using Imaging and the other kinds of imagination described. Imagination enables us to construct knowledge. We can then apply creative imagination to cohere our unique, concept of self. With this in place, we are able to 'step outside' of our thinking, as if it were an artefact. We can then reflect and build on it, metacognitively, with imagination continuing to support those metacognitive processes.

### **7. Discussion**

### **7.1 Just imagination?**

Having explored and modelled imagination and metacognition let us return to the question which partially forms the title of this chapter 'Is metacognition just imagination?'. First, it is important to address the fact that the word 'just' can imply lesser value for imagination. This author hopes that, in having made a case for and modelled imagination in such a way as to demonstrate its fundamental and pervasive presence within our thinking, we do not see it as a lesser faculty. We can also reflect that, while metacognition is necessarily concerned only with our own thinking and learning, imagination is a far broader concept in terms of its potential application to any given aspect of our world/universe. While this applicability is broad, it does not necessarily follow that it penetrates every aspect of our thinking or of our metacognition.

Next then, perhaps we can ask, what is left of metacognition without imagination? What seems to remain within metacognitive processes beyond imagination are any operations which do not require mental images (for instance, isolated verbal coding and perhaps, structures for thinking through, *if* it is possible for these not to depend on imagery). If this is the case, then imagination and metacognition are very, very close and we might argue that the terms are interchangeable.

What if, rather than using the word 'metacognition' in education, we had used 'imagination'? As well as enabling us to work with metacognition, as a specific aspect of imagination, this would allow us to understand and would emphasise the need to nurture imagination more generally or to recognise it clearly as the foundation for metacognition, in addition to its further benefits for learning, beyond imagining concerned with the self. This might elevate imagination in education from being seen as a 'fluffy', magical and non-educable force into a cognitive/metacognitive capacity which it is vital to teach for. Given the accountability agenda which prevails in many of our current, global education systems and the impact this has on what and how children learn (for instance, the emphasis on STEM subjects and on measurable outcomes) we might concur with Giroux, that in neoliberal societies schools act as 'disimagination machines' and insist that we need to generate a healthier attitude to and provision for imaginative learning experiences. Ascribing the same importance to imagination as we do to metacognition might help to remedy this, with many educators understanding that the global and social issues we face can only be solved by imaginative individuals, communities and societies. This could be understood as an act of embracing multiplicity in order to address:

*'the posthuman convergence…[as] a multi-directional opening that allows for multiple possibilities and calls for experimental forms of mobilization, discussion and at times even resistance' ([38], p. 9).*

To some extent I am 'resisting' and playing devil's advocate here, out of anger and despair at what I see as a lack of imagination in education (both in what learners experience and in how teachers perform or are allowed to perform), as well as for the purpose of emphasising the essential role of imagination for metacognition and more generally, for living a good life. Perhaps it is useful or necessary to retain 'metacognition' as a more specific concept, rather than to lose it to 'imagination'. Ideally, we should have the language, conceptual understanding and indeed, the imagination to embrace both ideas and their relevance to each other, for application within our learning, for the development of personal and social agency and ultimately, for social justice and the good of our planet.

### **7.2 Applying the findings**

Recently, the author applied the models, along with a model of individual 'agency' [39] in research with young people in a Scottish, inner-city secondary school. The project was called Imagination Agents and was funded through a Royal Society of Arts Catalyst

### *Perspective Chapter: Is Metacognition 'Just' Imagination? Exploring the Relationship… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114167*

Grant. At the time of writing, data collection has only just been completed, so while it is not yet possible to report with rigour on the findings, it is useful to describe the application of the models (above) here, with some minor speculation as to the results. Led by an artist, Imagination Agents aimed to support young people to develop personal agency through an experiential process designed to nurture metacognition of their imagination and through this, their sense of personal agency. The hypothesis we worked with was that imagination enables the originality for creativity, which enables us to create unique, personal understandings of and strategies for metacognition, with metacognition enabling confidence for taking action, or, in other words, personal agency.

The project took a 'grass-roots' approach, identifying pertinent issues within the local environment of the school and encouraging the young people to respond to these artistically. This artistic challenge acted as a 'vehicle' for them to develop their sense of agency. In having no 'right answers', the subjectivity of art as a discipline allowed the young people to make their own decisions within an imaginative and creative process. The artistic outcomes of this included the production of sculptures, cast in plaster from discarded packaging and situated within the local environment and alternative signage, which the young people took out into their local streets and park.

Data collection tools were embedded within the pedagogic approach. They were 'catalytic' [40] in providing research data whilst simultaneously enabling the young people participating to reflect on and develop a metacognitive perspective of their imagination and agency. These tools (see **Figure 1**) took the form of handbooks, which included axial tools related to the models of imagination (above) and a model of 'ecological agency' [39]. Within the art-based context, these self-evaluation tools were designed to be as visual as possible and to minimise the need for writing, in order to engage young people who had chosen to join the project because of its artistic focus. The handbook also included opportunities to visually represent imagination and agency at the start and at the end of the project by drawing metaphors for each of these. Additionally, there were sketchbook-style, blank pages and further activities

**Figure 1.** *Tool for self- evaluating imagination.*

relating to the project focus on local sustainability, so that the handbooks might work both as data collection tools and in supporting the pedagogy. They were designed in collaboration with the artists who worked on the project to ensure that they served these combined purposes.

While the handbooks worked well, despite our best efforts, they still seemed to be and 'add on' to the main project activity. The young people completed them but really, they would have preferred to stay with their personal, art making and told the researchers so. They also said that they did not want to write at all, even though this was a minimal requirement, within the context of an art project. We did explain that this was necessary since the handbooks would also constitute data which we wanted to interpret correctly, in accordance with participant intentions. In this communication, the young people were of course, exhibiting agency. The axial tools were quick to complete and as such, yielded participation and useful data. Importantly, the young people (aged 12–13) were easily able to comprehend the models of imagination and agency presented to them, which is an encouraging finding in relation to the practicality of the models presented within this paper.

As mentioned above, data has not yet been fully analysed but what can be said is that in yielding hand-made signs on a walk around the local area, the young people certainly exhibited confidence and agency, as they selected appropriate settings in which to photograph them and were happy to be photographed with them. The nature of these signs and the slogans the young people created on them was usually humorous and friendly, playing with ideas of dictatorial instructions in relation to the environment, such as 'LOOK at the nice ducks!' (**Figure 2**). While, superficially, this can be interpreted as light-hearted fun, it can also be seen as an attempt at social influence by democratic means. By reminding people to focus on the positive, the young artist hoped to stimulate appreciation of and empathy for the environment. As discussed above, this capacity for empathy is based on the capacity to imagine the perspective of others, in this case, the ducks and the people who have the opportunity to experience them. From a posthuman perspective (e.g.; [6, 38]), this can be seen as an important philosophical step towards de-centralising our position as human beings

**Figure 2.** *Image of young person's artwork.*

within environments, re-imagining the place of fellow species, their connection with us and the environments we make and share. Such an approach chimes with concepts of 'The Imaginary Institution of Society' [41] in which, 'What we call 'reality' and 'rationality" (p. 3) are works of imagination and as such, can be changed.

### **8. Conclusion**

The emergent models imply that imagination is fundamental to cognition, metacognition and is at the root of our potential for agency. Imagination must be recognised as a critical means of supporting personal and democratic agency. This implies that imagination, along with metacognition, should be considered as an educational priority which need to be effectively supported by curricula, teachers and pedagogy.

Imagination is not a magical addition to our thought. Rather, it is intrinsic throughout. The necessity for imagination in metacognition is particularly important, given that metacognition supports achievement and attainment. In its close association with metacognition, imagination could share some of the credit for enabling our learning which is usually associated with the former capacity. Through this association it might be possible to raise the status of educational provision for imagination and increase opportunities for simultaneous, imaginative and metacognitive development.

The emergent models are offered firstly; as a basis for dialogue across the field of education. This may lead to their rejection, adaptation or even their replacement, as a means of progressing this area of education. I make no claim that they are comprehensive, complete or in any way 'ultimate'. They simply offer a means of discussing what has often been considered to be largely inaccessible and indescribable, while also constituting a valuable part of our learning. Secondly; the models are offered to practitioners and researchers who are interested in exploring their potential within their areas of interest. The accumulation of findings from such explorations can help to establish how useful the models are and suggest pathways for their transformation.

The models can help us to establish the current state of practitioner understanding of imagination and the in/adequacy of support offered for this. They also offer a framework to support pedagogic design. They could be used to form criteria for the exploration of imagination in and across contexts, in relation to multiple factors and impacts (not to suggest a solely deductive approach; the models might complement inductive methods). A priority is to expand understanding of the imaginative meta/ cognitive processes which support capacity for personal and democratic agency.

If we have tools available to us which can even evidence the development of imagination and through this; metacognition and if we are able to engage in dialogue about how best to support these capacities through the presence of a practical language and framework, it may be more likely that we can encourage serious, focussed approaches to imagination in education. If we can accomplish this, not only will we support metacognition and learning; we might help to secure a better future for our planet by equipping learners to confidently address the complex, global and local problems which we face.

### **9. Recommendations**

Since the initial conclusion of the research described above, further ideas and philosophies of imagination have come to the authors attention as being relevant within a consideration of imagination in education, particularly in terms of its co-relation

with agency. Costariadis's ([41], p. 146) ideas of the radical imaginary, in particular, have resonance here, in positing imagination as the basis of social-historical concepts. This suggests that those concepts can be re-imagined, within a 'universe of significations' which are constituted by imagination. This reimagining and subsequent action relating to it might be considered to constitute social agency. Relating this to an individual, metacognitive perspective and focussing specifically on learning, by this argument there is continual potential to re-imagine ourselves as learners. We might otherwise refer to this as creative, metacognitive strategy. While Costariadis's theories were largely related to possibilities for societal change, they also seem to offer relevant insights in relation to imagination, metacognition and agency within the individual. The author recommends the pursuit of and will pursue these and other theories within attempts to ensure the continued emergence of understanding in these areas.

If we consider the example of the 'nice ducks' (above)art seems to be a good vehicle for reimagining, applied to any given focus. It may not seem surprising that art supports imaginative capacities; however, based on the arguments presented above, imagination is critical to rational thought, so, if art supports imagination better than some other subjects, it is worrying that it is so neglected in many curricula (see, for example NSEAD 2015), usually in favour of STEM subjects. We can also assume that, due to imagination's close relationship with metacognition, the deficit in art provision might also impact negatively on opportunities to develop metacognition. After all, what is a work of art if not a 'meta' representation of or reflection on a chosen idea or set of ideas. As such, a recommendation arising from this work is to advocate STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Art, Mathematics) rather than STEM.

A further recommendation is simply to continue with the process of finding ways to evaluate and self-evaluate imagination, perhaps in conjunction with the evaluation of metacognition. This could include the quantitative analysis and reporting of qualitative data, with this perhaps more likely to convince those who retain the idea that imagination is 'magical', unteachable, or too abstract to be evidenced. The ability to evidence imagination statistically could play into prevailing concerns with accountability, enabling recognition of its importance and thereby, its existence in education systems. This said, this author would hope that in evidencing its cognitive and metacognitive value, there might also be the possibility to illuminate the limitations of such instrumental regimes within education, which can act to negate important areas of learning (see [42]). Embracing imagination as cognition and metacognition enables creative possibilities beyond meeting pre-imposed learning outcomes and increases our chances of finding new solutions to complex problems in individual as well as social life. It allows individuals to be re-creators, rather than spectators (after [43], p. 56). This could include the reimagining and re-creation of our education.

All in all, the recommendations above cohere to suggest a much more substantial focus on imagination within education. Along with this we need to recognise and understand imagination's close relationship with metacognition, with this relationship offering a route to personal and social agency.

*Perspective Chapter: Is Metacognition 'Just' Imagination? Exploring the Relationship… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114167*
