**5. Conclusion**

From the results, we noticed that the combined impact of the BODs on the CBs' FP reduced their FP during and after the covid-19 crisis. Besides, the presence of a nonsignificant composite impact, particularly of the CBs' board meetings on the FP, provides the failure of this determinant to stage their role in a behavioral decision attitude. Independent of the bank type, the board is responsible for planning policies and making the best decisions. Jointly, line managers are required to improve the FP and maximize banks' profits; however, the lack of credibility and feasibility of the board's quality affected the CBs' FP. As a result, this finding leads to the conclusion that there are one or more substitutable determinants/mechanisms of the lost impact or that there is a complete failure of the governance system that requires revision.

In the context of participatory financial institutions, governance theories are not fully developed. The literature lacks integration of strategic considerations into the guidelines of the BOD. Moreover, empirically, although the sum of the cumulative impacts of the different BOD determinants on the PBs' FP is preferable to that relating to CBs, their impact on FP remains unclear during and after the covid-19 crisis. To overcome the problems related to the impact of the board's quality on the PBs' FP, we proposed the creation of a unified international academy of accounting, finance, and governance specialized in teaching the Islamic sciences of control, audit, and operating practices. The purpose of this body is to train scientifically, theoretically, and practically qualified executives not only to perform the traditional duties of a banker (accountant, financier, and auditor) and to comply with Islamic standards but also to introduce a radical change that aims to improve the products and services' quality in PBs and to continuously drive the creation and improvement of FP.

To avoid some negative impacts and the ambiguity of other impacts on FP, the BOD must first and foremost consider the processes' complexity with uncertainties, process discussions, techniques, and decision-making in its authority position to optimally monitor resources. For this gap, we proposed an innovative auditing system that is relevant not only for governing the board but is also very useful for other governance mechanisms: Dynamic governance by objective (DGBO). This is an intelligent information system that is formed by a large and detailed informational fiber. This system adapts simultaneously to all other systems of governance for all types of banks, while the traditional technical system is limited to the analysis and nervous interpretation of data. The set of two systems forms an instant mechanism for sending alerts once there are overruns. The introduction of a momentary double-checking system pushes the controlling actors to establish systemic coordination of the interdependent tasks to ensure the quality of the accounting documents and avoid errors. If fraud and falsification exist, they will be detected by the intelligent system. The new approach to governance is based on a decentralized vision and is too focused on control as its reason, which is data at a very advanced level. This model ensures the coordination of actions through the collective regulation of interorganizational dimensions and the

### **Figure 1.**

*Simplified organizational structure of an objective governance system.*

*Impacts of Board Quality on Financial Performance in Conventional… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.112089*

integration of interprofessional processes that cannot be established by summation or discrimination.

The constituent bodies of an objective regulatory system shall exchange their information, figures, documents, instruments, activities, records, and financial statements, usually in two reciprocal directions. As displayed in **Figure 1**, the new system is composed of an exchange network for incoming data and another network in the reverse direction. In these centers, all the data and information fibers collected by the specialists in the areas of internal control, management control, and auditing are collected and filtered to identify frauds, manipulations, misappropriations, conflicts of interest, and moral behaviors. After clustering, the center that detects the manipulation, fraud, challenge, or abnormal behavior, the fiber directs the data to the nearest referral center to make the necessary corrections and then reorients the new corrected data and related information into the correct meaning according to the objectives fixed in advance. All this program is prepared through an information system that is established according to the bank type and its particularities. Our alternative governance system is as follows:

Like all scientific research, our study is not exempt from limitations. First, the main limitation is using only four proxies to measure board quality because it ignores much of the board's impact on banks' FP in both bank types. The adopted board proxies in the present study could be augmented with the addition of other variables such as executive directors'specialization, executive directors' reputation, executive directors' tenure, executive directors'sex, and executive directors' expertise. Second, using a limited number of FP measures may not capture all the impacts issued by the boards. Therefore, despite the large sample sizes, we cannot draw thorough generalizations from our comparative results. Moreover, although the sample sizes are important, expanding the sample sizes and the countries' numbers tends to minimize the probability of errors, maximize the accuracy of the banks' estimates, and increase the generalizability of the comparative results.

