**5. Conclusion**

From the empirical results, we concluded that the evaluation of the breach in BIG4 legitimacy as well as its impacts on the Islamic and conventional banks' FP should be performed by the most appropriate chartered accountants. The latter have the right to do so given their expertise in the domain of bank financial statements' certification, especially by CBs'stakeholders and, to a lower degree, by IBs' investors. Therefore, the lack of substantial impacts generated by the EAC quality on some CBs' FP measures means that the added value of BIG4 is low or nil. In other words, no difference is found between choosing a BIG4 or a non-BIG4. Consequently, the BIG4s lost the reason for their advantage within the CBs. This justifies two conclusions. First, most of the CBs' EAC are not efficient. Second, since they represent an external governance mechanism, the BIG4 fail to effectively fulfill their obligations according to the general norms. This is what explains and improves their inability to respect good audit

*How to Successfully Select the Best-Performing Bank Based on the Best Auditor's… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.113201*

standards and to support CBs' liquidity, efficiency, and even solvency. The main question at this level is whether to put at stake the validity of the reports surrounding the audit function, the CBs' transparency, and the credibility of the selected BIG4. But this does not prevent the fact that IBs' EAC weakness also deeply affects a part of their efficiency. Therefore, what is available is that the banking governance systems, specifically CBs, suffered mainly from systematic failures that focused for a long time on improving the perceived EAQ independently of the actual quality [129].

Indeed, because of the managers' preferences and the owners' expectations rather than the assessment of the discussed financial situation, which is especially determined by the FP measures, the EAC will be taken subjectively. In general, these shortcomings in the EA impact can be linked to the recording of accounting and financial data, the weaknesses of the banks' governance structure, the shortage of EA behavior recognition, and the lack of exhaustive knowledge of the BIG4 accountants. This finding is precisely due to the false BIG4 reputation.

Based on the above, the present paper represents a better understanding of the difference between the weight of the EAC within the CBs and the weight of the EAC within the IBs. We discovered that the EAC can lead not only to the EAQ which constitutes a tool for stimulating banks' FP, but can also be a filling factor for banks' FP. In a paradigm of contractual efficiency, this situation leads us to investigate the audit process at the heart of conflicts of interest and agency problems that characterize the banks' governance in general and the CBs' governance in particular and which come from the likelihood that the EAs have more or less recourse to external funding sources. Thus, a qualified EAC should logically meet a demand for handling agency conflicts intended to minimize contractual costs and maintain a balanced governance system. Consequently, our reflection will make it possible to be precisely located at the heart of the audit process to resolve the financial issues and rectify the internal and external weaknesses that may affect the EAC at the beginning and at the end of their regular control process.

EAC for IBs and specifically for CBs is not only a way to ensure management and accounting documents but also provides the usual EA tools to continuously improve collective FP, ameliorate security, and develop control efficiency [130, 131]. Moreover, the EAC for conventional or Islamic banks is not identical. In some countries, the banks applied international accounting and auditing standards; in another category of countries, they adopted local standards; and in some other countries, they implemented sector-specific standards. For these reasons, international banks should try to develop a contemporary system that helps them make a good EAC for banks and that eludes them from similar scenarios. There are many alternatives based on internal control and the auditor's reputation, but we aim to establish an original system based on EAC progress and FP planning. Implementing a new and original approach to EAC must be done by adopting a comprehensive, clear, and detailed evaluation vision of the conventional and Islamic banks' FP. Kuhn [132] stated that scientific revolutions are considered non-cumulative development episodes because an older and incompatible paradigm can be replaced as a whole or in part by a new paradigm. Our contribution in this area is the proposal of a new governance approach called "Dynamic EAC By Objective"; the objective, in our case, is the amelioration of conventional/Islamic banks' FP. This system can be defined as a series of dynamic audit procedures organized in a parallel structure to classical organizational bank control. However, the limitation of our study is that our results might be changed in future research if the latter uses other ratios or another couple of banks.
