**3.2 The assertive rise of China**

China has been known for the utmost consistency of purpose underpinning the nation's grand strategy, which has mainly been geared towards stability. The country's focus on stability is informed by its past characterised by extreme crises during periods of turbulence (e.g. the Great Chinese Famine 1959–1961, many armed conflicts including the Opium war 1839, Chinese Civil War 1927–1950, Korean 1950–1953, Sino-Indian 1962, Vietnam 1965–1969 and Sino-Vietnamese 1979, and occupation by Western colonial powers in the 'century of humiliation' 1839–1949). Dèng Xiǎopíng, known as the chief architect of modern China, introduced a far-reaching opening-up and reform course in 1978 allowing MNCs to invest and participate in the country's exceptional development. The acceptance to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 allowed the country to export on WTO terms, a step that turbocharged China's drive to become a global powerhouse. This journey was supported by a relentless push to progress in the value chain cultivating proprietary capabilities including innovative technology applications. Henceforth, China has gone from being unnoticed to competing with the world's largest economies. The upward trajectory attracted the attention of foreign investors which swarmed into the Chinese market to participate in the 'gold rush'. This has led to a situation where foreign companies in China employed a workforce of 16 million individuals [46] accounting for at least half of China's exports. Foreign firms also were helpful in disseminating Western best practices enhancing China's productive capabilities. However, the long chain of crises has been a key element of the PRC's founding narrative. It also has sustained the longstanding view harboured by the Chinese Government that foreign actors are sources less of potential than of peril, uncertainty and even humiliation [47]. It is important for MNCs to understand that such thinking has shaped the country's collective social psyche. It has also been instrumental in creating today's Sino-US antagonism and regional bipolarity. One of the major triggers for the 'dragon to awake' (referring to China's rising assertiveness on the global stage), was a series of recent events that has arguably disqualified the US-led system in the eyes of China, as well as other emerging economies, as it exposed brinkmanship (not statesmanship), both in politics and in economics. The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2010 can be seen as a crucial juncture at which China started to openly push its superpower ambitions and the narrative that US hegemony is in decline. Under the Xí Jìnpíng administration, China switched to a more assertive brand of grand strategy. In this context, China has led the initiative to redefine the BRICS as an intergovernmental organisation to establish a parallel system to the US Dollar, as well as the Bretton Woods system of monetary management and financial agencies including the World Bank and the IMF. By doing so, China aims to champion an alternative to the Western model offering a diplomatic

forum and financial system, shifting away from the US dollar as a default. The initiative is embedded in President Xí Jìnpíng's greater power diplomacy with the Chinese characteristics model. The model's manifesto is based on the four principles of (1) big powers are key, (2) neighbours [peripheral countries] are first, (3) developing nations are the base, and (4) multilateralism is the stage (dà guó shì guān jià; zhōu biān shì shŏu yào; fā zhǎn zhōng guó jiā shì jī chŭ; duō biān shì zhòng yào wŭ tái). This approach positions Chinese foreign policy in the developing world as a driver to move the global power balance. The rationale is to create 'strategic fulcrums' (zhàn luè zhī diǎn) for building Chinese influence and exporting the 'China Model' through policies. In fact, China's state media (CGTN, 2019) has positioned the BRICS as an 'antidote to the G7 and other U.S.-dominated institutions'. Alongside the BRICS, another multilateral platform has emerged in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which has been set up in 2001 by Russia and China. The ninemember group comprises the states of previous Soviet Central Asian as well as India, Pakistan and Iran. By courting other authoritarian regimes, China aims at countering Western control in Eurasia. Another key project along the same lines is the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), also described as 'New Silk Road'. For China, BRI represents a new gateway to Western Europe, the African continent and the Middle East through Central Asia [48]. It also solidifies the country's new-found friendship with Russia. It has emerged since 2013 as China's geo-industrial policy and global infrastructure development strategy disrupting the previous order of regional economic integration. It involves vast capital as well as terrestrial and maritime infrastructure investments in nearly 70 countries and international organisations that help to cement Chinese influence in the many nations along these economic corridors. BRI also undermines the previous East Asian development model known as the 'flying geese pattern' (yàn hán lĭ lùn). This model by Akamatsu [49] promulgates that East Asia's economic rise has been led by Japan, followed by the newly industrialising economies of Asia (NIEs or Asian Tigers) and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While being the dominant orthodoxy in the region since Japan's first modernisation drive from 1870 onwards, China has leapfrogged to a pole position bypassing the established V-shaped flight formation. By means of attracting the largest amount of FDI and know-how, China has gained competitiveness and increased the pressure on Asian neighbours to ensure that they remain competitive. The BRI has intensified these frictions as it allows China to trade overland depriving Asian neighbours along the major trade routes through the South China Sea of their share. All these forays into multilateralism—i.e. BRIC, SCO and BRI—have been designed to establishing China as a global power to challenge the US, which has not been involved in these initiatives. However, at the same time, China has become more isolated from countries and organisations in the West, as Anthony Saich [50] of Harvard Kennedy School has observed. Again, the transformation of China into a more complex and evolving country does not come as a surprise. It was predictable based on the country's sheer size, culture and work ethics as well as storied history. China works relentlessly towards becoming more confident and capable of making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality. Spearheaded by the so-called 'wolf warrior diplomacy', coined from a Chinese action movie, this approach is characterised by combative nationalism. China has moved from the more cerebral premise of 'hide and bide' (tāo guāng yǎng huì) under the leadership of Dèng Xiǎopíng to the blatant statement that the 'US is not qualified to speak from a position of strength when criticising China' [51]. The change in direction has not been an impulsive act. It is an integral part of a long-term plan, or '100-year marathon' [52]. In fact, the Chinese government is executing

against a vision to outstrip the US and other economies by 2049, the centennial anniversary of the CCP-led revolution. The party also seeks to complete the long-stated goal of 'national unification' with Taiwan by the same time.
