Policy and Economics

#### **Chapter 1**

## Perspective Chapter: The Cost of Energy Independence

*Valerie Pelton*

#### **Abstract**

To reduce potential exposure to economic fluctuations and dependence on extra-territorial energy sources, some European Union (EU) member states are exploring energy diversification as a path to energy independence, economic vitality and national security. Nuclear power is a leading alternative energy source which may enable the EU to weather and potentially avert energy insecurity crises, including ones arising out of or related to political crises, collective action by oil-producing nations, global oil demand, and oil price fluctuations. Although nuclear power may be a longterm energy solution, the risks and cost trajectories deter many EU member states from nuclear power plant construction due to operation, maintenance and security costs. This chapter considers some key costs and potential options to reduce costs.

**Keywords:** cost, discount rate, price, supply, production, coal, gas, uranium, EU, OPEC, IMF, Euratom Treaty, Nord Stream, power plant, power generation, renewables, reactor

#### **1. Introduction**

Although global energy markets began tightening in 2021 as economies emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic unleashed pent-up demand in manufacturing, transportation, and travel and as consumers gradually resumed pre-pandemic activities, [1] the global energy market contraction accelerated in 2022 with the disruption of supply chains and the rise in energy prices caused by uncertainty over energy supplies [2] and weather-related factors [3].

Due in large part to the cuts in oil supplies by Russia [4] after its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, [5] and lowered production targets by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [6] (OPEC), this contraction in global energy supply fueled rising inflation rates worldwide. The emerging energy crisis deepened in September 2022 after Russia cut off oil supplies to Europe from the Nord Stream 1 pipeline [7]. In November 2022, OPEC further cut production in response to the weakening global economy, rising interest rates and growing fear of a potential global recession [8].

Against this backdrop, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cut projected global growth rate to 3.2% for 2022 and to 2.7% for 2023, a significant decrease from the 6% achieved in 2021 [9]. The IMF identified energy as a key driver of global inflation in **Figure 1** in its October 2022 *World Economic Outlook* report, as illustrated below ([9], at 4).

**Figure 1.**

*Inflation driven by food and fuel (Annualized percent). Sources: IMF, Consumer Price Index database; and IMF staff calculations. Note: Figure shows inflation contributions from broad categories. Contributions are computed first by country, annualized over available months in cases in which data are partial (for example, for 2022). The figure shows both the median contributions and aggregate inflation rate for each region.*

In response to unprecedented high fossil fuel costs which "account [ed] for 90% of the rise in the average costs of electricity generation worldwide (natural gas alone [accounted] for more than 50% [of the increase])", ([10], at 34) EU member states began making difficult energy-related economic decisions in 2022. Exacerbating the energy crisis, EU member states imposed sanctions on Russia, including cessation of coal imports ([10], at 33) As of August 2022, coal "deliveries from Europe's largest external supplier fell to zero" [10]. Prior to Nord Stream 1 pipeline supply cut-off, Russian energy deliveries to the EU were down by 80% by September 2022 ([10], at 33). As the war in Ukraine continues and constricted access to energy resources continues to drive inflationary costs and pricing, EU members states continue to grapple with measures to alleviate the economic impact of Russia's cutting gas deliveries and the EU's ban on Russian coal importation.

#### **2. Price vs. cost**

#### **2.1 Definitions**

As the price and cost of energy resources influence decisions about energy resources, it is important to understand the terms are not an interchangeable. For purposes of this chapter, the term "price" is defined as

*"a: the amount of money given or set as consideration for the sale of a specified thing*

*b: the quantity of one thing that is exchanged or demanded in barter or sale for another" [11].*

and the term "cost" is defined as

*"a: the amount or equivalent paid or charged for something*

*b: the outlay or expenditure (as of effort or sacrifice) made to achieve an object" [12].*

*Perspective Chapter: The Cost of Energy Independence DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110016*

#### **2.2 Price**

With respect to the price of uranium ore, the per pound price was \$48.15 on December 16, 2022 [13]. In comparison, the price of crude oil on December 17, 2022 ranged from \$74.29 (WTI crude) to \$80.47 (OPEC basket) [14]. While the price of uranium ore is relatively low compared to that of crude oil, the price of uranium's fuel form increases once processed and enriched due to the costs of processing and enrichment. In its 2021 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA) noted civilian nuclear power reactor owners and operators (collectively, COOs) purchased a total of 46.7 million pounds of uranium (equivalent) at a weighted-average price of \$33.91 per pound [15]. In comparison, as natural gas prices skyrocketed in 2021, the global demand for coal power generation increased 9% to "10,350 terawatt-hours (TWh)" ([16], pp. 8, 10). Although EU coal consumption was projected 45 metric tonnes (MT) in 2021, the price of coal quadrupled to \$170/MT in September 2021 [16] and soared to an "all-time high of around \$450 per tonne" while the price of uranium was \$48.10 [17].

#### **3. Cost**

#### **3.1 Processing and enrichment**

In addition, COOs purchased 14 million separative work units (SWU) under enrichment services contracts from 11 sellers at an average price of \$99.54 per SWU [18]. According to the WNA, the \$1663 front-end fuel cycle costs of 1 kg of uranium as of September 2021 were significantly higher than for raw uranium ore (\$842 for 8.9 kg U3O8×\$94.6/kg) due to the cost of conversion(\$120 for 7.5 kg U×\$16), enrichment (\$402 for 7.3 SWU×\$55) and fuel fabrication (\$300) ([18, 19], p. 62).

In 2011, the World Nuclear Association ("WNA") concluded "about half of the cost [of nuclear power] is due to enrichment and fabrication" [17]. Although those costs are significant, the WNA concluded nuclear power is "cost competitive with other forms of electricity generation, *except where there is direct access to low-cost fossil fuels*" [emphasis added] [19]. However, the WNA also acknowledged "nuclear technologies are capital intensive relative to natural gas or coal, [and] the cost of nuclear rises relatively quickly as the discount rate is raised", [18] seemingly undercutting its 2022 assertion of nuclear power's cost competitiveness. However, after applying a 7% discount rate, "the median value of nuclear is close to the median value for coal …, and at a 10% discount rate the median value for nuclear is higher than that of either CCGTs or coal" [18].

#### **3.2 Old vs. new nuclear plants**

While nuclear power generated by existing older plants may be competitive with fossil fueled plants, the unit cost of nuclear energy by new nuclear power plants which must amortize the costs of new construction are higher than for older nuclear and new fossil fuel power plants. In large part, the higher cost of power generated by new nuclear plants is due to finance costs and construction cost overruns [20]. Specifically, the high capital costs for plant construction, lengthy construction time, interest fees on capital used to finance construction and lengthy time period before

a power plant begins generating for new nuclear power plant construction [21]. In addition, the cost of nuclear accidents is also a factor. If such costs were "allocated to the aggregate output of nuclear power plants . . . [in 2011, they] would [have led] to a price increase of 2.3 euro cent per kWh" [22]. EDF Group, one of the world's largest power companies, estimated the minimum construction cost of a new nuclear power plant in France will be €950 million (approximately €5700 per kW) before 2030 [23]. Consequently, nuclear plant construction typically requires some form of government subsidization/support ([24], p. 17).

While the cost to bring a new nuclear power plant online (e.g., fuel, construction, safety, accident liability, environmental impact, etc.) may be daunting, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for "nuclear energy plants coming online in 2020 was \$95.2/megawatt hour (MWh), comparable to conventional coal (\$95.1/MWh), above conventional combined cycle natural gas-fired plants (\$75.2/MWh) but below conventional combustion turbine natural gasfired plants (\$141.5/MWh)" [24, 25]. In a 2020 joint study by the International Energy Agency (IEA), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), estimated the LCOE in U.S. dollars per MWh for nuclear plants built 2020–2025 based on specific discount rates and an assumed 85% capacity factor [26]. Depending on the discount rate applied and the country in which construction occurs, the projected LCOE per MWh of a new nuclear plant will vary. Accordingly, while the LCOE of new nuclear plant in France is estimated at \$45.3 (3% discount rate), \$71.1 (7% discount rate) and \$96.9 (10% discount rate), the LCOE of a similar new plant in Slovakia is estimated at \$57.6 (3% discount rate), \$101.8 (7% discount rate) and \$146.0 (10% discount rate) [27].

#### **3.3 Cost effectiveness**

Historically, the 1957 Treaty on the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), as amended, [27] was created in part to enable EU member states to develop civilian nuclear power as an inexpensive, plentiful source of power generation [28]. By 2019, the Euratom Treaty contributed to the EU receiving "25% of electricity … from nuclear, 46% … from fossil fuels and biomass, and 29% [from] renewables (including 11% from hydro)" [29]. As France is one of the EU's leading producers of nuclear energy, assuming its socio-economic approach of applying "standardized hypotheses (on GDP, demographics, public policies in other European countries, and electricity consumption)" is applicable to other EU member states, and assuming the majority of those states' respective "*existing nuclear units* were the most affordable ones" [emphasis added], nuclear power may be an economically tempting alternative to fossil fuels ([30], pp. 163–167).

In comparison to other renewable energy resources, the 2021 report commissioned by European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group and Renew Europe concluded "nuclear energy is more cost-effective than [other] renewables … and would remain the cheaper option in 2050" [30]. That conclusion may not hold true if uranium ore costs \$100/kg (or more) as the resulting fuel cost is €5.50/MWh [30]. For example, after uranium prices peaked at \$125–150/kg in 2008, they subsequently decreased to \$100/kg by 2019 [31]. As the lion's share of nuclear power costs occur early on, its cost advantage over other renewables decreases if the weighted average cost of capital [31] increases. Accordingly, unless the direct and indirect costs of new construction can be lowered and the lengthy timeline from construction to power generation can be offset, fossil fuels may remain an economically attractive option.

#### *Perspective Chapter: The Cost of Energy Independence DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110016*

As the EU's electricity generation is dependent on fossil fuel plants which rely heavily on fuel imports from Russia, ([32], pp. 206, 209) it makes economic sense for the EU to increase investment in alternative or supplementary energy sources and technologies such as nuclear power. Indeed, as early as 2018, the EU's use of renewable energy resources surpassed that of solid fossil fuels and accelerated in 2020 [33]. The EU's need to utilize renewables to provide a reliable and cost-effective supply of energy for civilian uses is underscored by its wide deployment and development in Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 2019, Russia and the PRC were at forefront of the "5.5 GW of new nuclear capacity" installed worldwide [34]. In the third quarter of 2022 EU energy product imports reached €70 billion, reflecting an 11.3% increase in petroleum imports and a 13.2% increase in natural gas imports from 2021 [35]. Although this increase may be attributed mainly to surging prices after Russia cutting off its exports of those commodities to the EU, the strain of filing the supply void of the 14.4% Russia supplied to the EU [36] until its late September 2022 cut-off underscores its sensitivity to global oil demand and oil price fluctuations – and the need for a stable, reliable and cost-effective energy supply within the EU.

#### **4. Cost-reduction options**

In November 2021, the French secretary of state for the digital sector, Cedric O, nuclear energy "is not an ideological question, it is a mathematical question" [37]. For EU member states to overcome cost hurdles posed by new construction and other related costs (e.g., regulatory oversight, waste water storage, spent fuel disposal, political opposition, public acceptance, insurance, environmental concerns, accident clean up, etc.), cost-reduction options are critical. As Europe imports 90% of its natural gas and 97% of its oil supplies, [38] technologies, techniques and design solutions may be the keys to efficient lower cost construction and decreased time to power generation in ways which do not compromise safety will be the drivers.

#### **4.1 Cooperation**

One seemingly straight-forward option is to increase cooperation within the EU on energy construction projects. Although this option may seem simple, multistate coordination among numerous government agencies is a complex process. Updates to the Euratom Treaty such as Council Directive 2014/87 [39] and the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (effective on June 14, 2021, [40]), provide guidance and a framework for cooperation. Although the practical aspects of multistate cooperation such as equitable allocation of projects, fairness and open competition during the bid process, project management, regulatory oversight, national security, budgeting and cost management are harder nuts to crack, energy security is vital to EU economies and of paramount interest in light of the on-going hardships occasioned by the Nord Stream 1 pipeline cut-off, cessation of coal imports from Russia and production decrease by OPEC.

#### **4.2 Plant size and design**

In this winter of energy discontent, if the EU considers construction of new nuclear plants within its member states as a potential longer term solution to its energy woes, plant size and design must be factored in the planning and budgeting stages. Although smaller plants should require less materials and less time for construction than larger plants, small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs), "[d]ue to the loss of economies of scale, the decommissioning and waste management unit costs of SMR [is actually two to three times] higher than those of a large reactor" [41]. Such plants cost may cost over 30% "more than the traditional nuclear power plants by 2030s.. [as] each kWh of electricity would cost between 15 and 70% more … due to economies of scale" [42]. While larger scale plants are more cost-effective from a power generation standpoint as the reactor typically produces 1000 MW compared to the 300 MW typically produced by a smaller reactor, [42], the "capital start-up costs are much lower.. [with fewer construction] cost risks", place less of a load strain on electricity grids, "can be manufactured and assembled at a central factory and then sent to the site of installation", [42]… "greater simplicity of design, economy of series production …, short construction times, and reduced siting costs", potential for below ground level installation, "high level of passive or inherent safety in the event of malfunction" [43]. As there are multiple SMR manufacturers (e.g., GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, NuScale Power, China National Nuclear Corporation, CAREM, SMART, Holtec International, Rosatom, etc.), [43] the EU may be able to drive better bargains on construction costs if it hosts open bids.

#### **4.3 Management practices**

According to a 2018 study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), mismanagement (i.e., poor construction management practices) is behind the large cost of nuclear plant construction [44]. As in any industry, benchmarking and utilizing best practices are tools to increase efficiency. In the case of nuclear power, MIT concluded mismanagement is the real reason why "cost [in the East] is \$3000–\$4000 per kilowatt, whereas in the West the cost is north of \$8000 per kilowatt" when it benchmarked "failed projects and the successful projects" [45]. The study determined "indirect costs—those external to hardware—caused 72% of the cost increase … Examples include rising expenditures on engineering services, on-site job supervision, and temporary construction facilities." [46]. Based on its review, the MIT study made the following cost management recommendations:

*"Mak[e] sure that the design is complete, … that you have fabricators and constructors on your design team early so that you know that what you design can be built."*

*To minimize construction delays and cost over-runs, ensure "everyone has skin in the game, making sure the process can deal with and adapt quickly to change …"*

*To prevent supply chain gaps and/or delays, take steps to ensure the project has a "reliable supply of spare parts and trained workers" prior to starting construction." [47].*

*Reduce materials used and "automate some construction tasks" [48].*

#### **5. Conclusion**

To achieve an economically acceptable and feasible level of independence from economic fluctuations and dependence on extra-territorial energy sources, the EU will need make a long-term investment in nuclear power to mitigate economic and *Perspective Chapter: The Cost of Energy Independence DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110016*

national security risks of fossil fuel supply fluctuations. As the KWh cost of nuclear power is competitive with fossil fuel, safely reducing construction costs and the timeline to power generation are critical to widening development, deployment and utilization of nuclear power within the EU. By using benchmarking and best practices to drive efficiencies in indirect costs, the intensive capital costs of nuclear power construction may be reduced considerably and construction timelines decreased without adversely impacting safety.

#### **Conflict of interest**

The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes/thanks/other declarations**

The views expressed in this Article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the BIED Society, the BIED Global Leadership Academy or the United States.

#### **Author details**

Valerie Pelton BIED Society, USA

\*Address all correspondence to: vjpelton@yahoo.com

© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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*Perspective Chapter: The Cost of Energy Independence DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110016*

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### **Chapter 2**

## Perspective Chapter: Study of Indian and Japanese Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and Their Cooperation Policies with Selected Countries, Including IAEA

*Saurabh Sharma and Masako Ikegami*

#### **Abstract**

The authors have reviewed the bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation for Indian and Japanese cases. The objective of this research is to understand the civil nuclear agreements and analyze the nuclear policy for both Indian and Japanese cases, as well as to measure the impact of the India-Japan bilateral nuclear agreement through the comprehensive review study. Firstly, the Indian case covers India's civilian nuclear cooperation with France, IAEA, Russia, UK, and the USA. Secondly, the Japanese case explores Japan's civilian nuclear cooperation with IAEA, the USA, EURATOM, Russia, and the UK. Lastly, India-Japan civil nuclear cooperation is discussed.

**Keywords:** civilian nuclear cooperation, India-Japan, nuclear policy, IAEA, bilateral

#### **1. Introduction**

In this chapter, a review of the case analyses of Indian civilian nuclear policies and Japanese civilian nuclear policies is conducted based on their bilateral civil nuclear cooperation and agreements with other countries, including the India-Japan civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The objective of this research is to review various civil nuclear agreements to analyze the nuclear policy for both Indian and Japanese cases as well as to measure the impact of the India-Japan bilateral nuclear agreement. Thus, the Indian and Japanese Governments' agreement documents are reviewed and discussed in Sections 2 and 3 for India and Japan, respectively. Afterward, a detailed study of India-Japan bilateral cooperation and agreement is conducted in Section 4 emphasizing background, present status, and analysis. In Section 5, the summary and conclusion of this research have been described.

#### **2. Indian case analysis**

In this section, India's civilian nuclear policy is explained with respect to its civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with IAEA, USA, France, Russia, and UK.

#### **2.1 India-IAEA civil nuclear cooperation**

Agreement between the "Government of India and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguard to Civilian Nuclear Facilities" [1] was signed in Vienna on February, 2, 2009 [1]. This agreement has been reviewed in a detailed manner in the following parts:

Upon the mutual consensus, on one hand, India agreed not to use any item under the regulation of this agreement for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons or military purposes; similarly, on the other hand, IAEA would ensure the "safeguards" of items subject to this agreement [1]. The objective of these "safeguards" is to resist to withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time and their application would expedite the multilateral and bilateral engagements, which are in partnership with India [1].

Items to which these safeguards are applicable are nuclear and nonnuclear material, equipment, technology, and any facility identified by India producing, using, processing, or storing nuclear material in the territory of India [1]. In order to implement, India would notify IAEA as a sovereign and provide a written declaration to IAEA stating its decision to place its civilian nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA [1]. India in its declaration shall affirm that the above-mentioned nuclear material and other components would be used solely for peaceful purposes and there would not be the manufacturing of any nuclear explosive device [1]. The cessation of these safeguards would be subject to the provisions of GOV/1621 1973 [1]. Therefore, nuclear would be no longer safeguarded under this deal if they returned to the state which provided them to India. Also, if it is decided by IAEA that nuclear material is neither usable nor placed at notified compound subject to IAEA safeguards. Further, about the transfer of nuclear material, this agreement states that unsafeguarded material would be transferred outside the territory of India only when the material is returned to the supplier state in agreement with the Agency [1]. The notification to transfer unsafeguarded nuclear material from India to other countries should be made in advance to IAEA to enable it to take required actions and make necessary arrangements [1].

The part third of this agreement is broadly about safeguard procedures mentioned in the agreement. It would be the responsibility of IAEA to include "India Subsidiary Arrangements" [1] for safeguards implementation in the following manner [1]:


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submit it to IAEA. And, if IAEA requests clarification, then India must submit the required "Amplification of Reports" [1].


Discussing the Agency Inspectors, the next segment states that, as applicable to relevant provisions, Inspectors from the Agency would execute tasks pursuant to this agreement. Furthermore, as per IAEA recommendation document INFCIRC/225/ Rev.4 [1], India is obliged to undertake all appropriate essential measures for the "physical protection" [1] of nuclear material and facilities under its territorial jurisdiction subject to this agreement. For effective safeguards implementation, India must maintain a "system of accounting and control" to keep a check on all elements subject to these safeguards. Financing of all activities under this deal would be bear by parties equally, except in case of a special arrangement that will be reimbursed by IAEA to India [1]. If any defiance to the agreement by India, is observed by IAEA Board, it can summon India to resolve such matters and submit reports of its remedial measures and if India fails to undertake measures in a given time, then IAEA Board may take further actions under Article XII. C of the Statute [1]. Both parties must cooperate for the effective implementation of the agreement and resolve their dispute through mutual negotiations and consultations. Upon completion of constitutional and statutory requirements by India, it will provide written notification to IAEA to make the agreement's entry into force. Once entered into force, an agreement can be amended on the request of either of the party.

In the last section of this agreement, below mentioned are the definitions of important terms in the context of the legal agreement document to avoid any vagueness (**Figures 1** and **2**) [1].

**Figure 1.** *Definitions 1 [1].*

**Figure 2.** *Definitions 2 [1].*

#### **2.2 India-USA civil nuclear cooperation**

To fulfill the objectives under this agreement, Article 1 [2] provides definitions of important terms used in this agreement (**Figures 3** and **4**). Article 2 [2] discusses the scope of cooperation about the usage and transfer of nuclear material and other associated components as per the provisions of this agreement. Areas of cooperation include advanced research on nuclear science, nuclear safety, collaborative research through workshops, meetings, and research visits, the establishment of nuclear fuel reserve for an emergency, the supply of nuclear material and equipment, controlled thermonuclear fusion, including multilateral projects, and others. The implementation of projects in the territory of both countries would be carried through their individual laws, regulations, and treaties for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This article also upholds that, although both states are in agreement for peaceful usage of nuclear energy, it would not affect the "unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party" [2]. Therefore, under this Agreement, there will be no interference of both states in activities associated with military usage of nuclear technology.

**Figure 3.** *Article 1 Definitions 1 [2].*

#### **Figure 4.**

*Article 1 Definitions 2 [2].*

Articulating details about the transfer of nuclear energy *via* reports, computer programs, and data banks, Article 3 [2] covers the following areas about research and development of nuclear reactors, highly developed research in nuclear science and technology, nuclear safety and security, and environmental concerns, fuel cycle undertakings to meet civil nuclear energy requirements, consideration of nuclear power roles in national energy plans to use nuclear energy for healthcare, agriculture, and industry. There will be no transfer of "Restricted Data" [2], which is not under the provisions of this agreement.

Article 4 [2] enables nuclear trade between both states on subjects of their mutual interest and wherever applicable trade with a third party as well. Furthermore, for the uninterrupted functioning of nuclear facilities, the industry in both states must reassure reliable supplies to nuclear reactors. The authorization procedure for exportimport licenses for bilateral trade and nuclear material movement should be sound and efficient.

Concerning the transfer of nuclear and nonnuclear material, equipment, and technology, Article 5 [2] provides the following instructions:

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Under Article 6 [2] both countries can carry out the following "Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities":


Article 7 [2] states that all sensitive nuclear material transferred or produced under this deal shall always be stored at the facilities with the IAEA level of protection as explained in document INFCIRC 225/REV 4. Both states may contain details about the facilities of each other for further activities. This article also prohibits both states from transferring any of the sensitive nuclear material, equipment, or technology to any unauthorized person or party without mutual consent.

Physical protection of sensitive nuclear content shall be of utmost priority for both states. For this purpose, Article 8 [2] demand from both states to follow IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 as titled, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" [2]. It would be the responsibility of both states to keep each other updated through diplomatic sources ensuring the physical protection of nuclear material in their "territorial jurisdiction" [2]. Under the provision of this Article, there would not be any interference of India and the USA in each other's peaceful nuclear activities. Subsequently, Article 9 [2] stipulates that nuclear material used, transferred, or produced in accordance with this deal would not be used for any military purpose of making any nuclear explosive device.

Article 10 [2] sets the provisions for safeguards of nuclear content to be maintained by both states. India in pursuant with its safeguards agreement with IAEA agreed to follow norms set up by IAEA at its territory to safeguard the nuclear material, equipment, and technology under this agreement. Similarly, the U.S. territory safeguards of nuclear content will be in accordance with the agreement signed between the USA and IAEA for the application of safeguards in the USA on November, 18, 1977 at Vienna. At the non-application of safeguards, and measures as decided by IAEA, it may check and confer both states for verification measures. As stated in Article 11 [2], both states must check the environmental impact of radioactive, chemical/thermal contamination and work together to minimize the impact of these activities on the environment and physical health.

To put this deal into effect, Article 12 [2] commands both states to conduct nuclear activities under their territorial jurisdiction on time with in-depth management practices. Both states should avoid interference in nuclear activities being held at the other's territory; also, they must not interfere in the nuclear policy of the other parties. As per Article 13 [2], both countries shall consult each other for the successful implementation and development of nuclear projects and their actions also shall be in congruence with the objectives of Article 2. A "Joint Technical Working Group" [2] would be set up to check the Administrative Arrangement.

About the termination and cessation of this deal, Article 14 [2] provides the right to both states to terminate this deal with a prior one-year written notice explaining the reason for termination. However, before terminating this agreement, both countries may consult each other to discuss the reasonability of termination as stated in Article 13 [2]. If a party that is seeking termination refers to a violation of the agreement as a reason for termination, it shall consider whether the action was caused unconsciously or purposely breaching the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If it cites a violation of IAEA safeguards as a reason for termination, then compliance with the IAEA board of directors would be a crucial factor to count on. If the agreement is terminated then both states must return acquired nuclear material, equipment, technology, and other components to each other. Article 15 [2] guides both states to resolve their disputes through negotiations and consultations.

Article 16 [2] holds that this agreement will be effective for 40 years and shall be extended for the next 10 years, except if there is a notice for agreement termination from either party. If the agreement is ceased to exist due to termination or expiration, Articles 5.6 (c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 would not be affected if nuclear components remain in "territorial jurisdiction" of the concerned parties. Lastly, Article 17 [2] asks to set up an "Administrative Agreement" [2] to facilitate the efficient implementation of this cooperation.

#### **2.3 India-France civil nuclear cooperation**

A cooperation agreement for the peaceful usage of nuclear energy was signed between the Government of India and the Government of France in 2008.

Article 1 [3] of this agreement asks both countries to use nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes, according to the obligation of international law and individual nuclear policy of each state. This article is divided into three subparts further discussing areas of cooperation, forms of cooperation, and nuclear safety.

To fulfill the obligations for cooperation, Article 1 [3], and Article 2 [3] discuss that the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed by the designated authorities must include detailed scientific and technical programs and planning about scientific and technical exchanges. Transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and setting up of nuclear facilities under this deal would be directly between the parties, and such a transaction to any third party must be in persuasion from applicable authority. Toward the implementation of the agreement and individual domestic laws, Article 3 [3] states that all provisions under this agreement must agree to their respective administrative, tax, and customs measures. Article 4 [3] talks about the

#### *Perspective Chapter: Study of Indian and Japanese Civilian Nuclear Cooperation... DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110537*

cooperation between both India and France in building, and commissioning of nuclear power plants under the regulatory framework. This Article also promotes cooperation among involved operators to develop equally suitable settings for mutual collaboration.

About the supply and accessibility of the nuclear power plant, Article 5 [3] holds that the country under whose jurisdiction the nuclear power plant is positioned would provide uninterrupted and reliable access to reactor systems, nuclear fuel supplies, and other mechanisms for the lifetime of the given nuclear power plant. In this regard, "supply of nuclear fuel for the lifetime of India's safeguarded reactors" [3] a longstanding deal according to Article 2 [3] would be established between entitled authorities from India and France. Therefore, to prevent the disorder of supply, it would be the responsibility of France to support India to acquire a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel *via* summoning friendly countries or joining a group that can arrange or restore fuel supply to India during the supply disruption. The recycling and modification of nuclear content transferred, used, and produced under this agreement would be conducted at the national nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards in the recipient country.

In the interest of the particular industries, utilities, and consumers, Article 6 [3] says that both India and France must recognize the reliability of nuclear supplies as a crucial need for both countries and it must be on time. There must be "progressive localization and indigenization" [3] for the effective operation of nuclear installations wherever applicable. Under Article 7 [3], there must be the protection of intellectual property rights by the responsible designated authorities in both countries. Both India and France must set up a required regulatory framework as referred to in MoU in Article 2 [3], for the protection of nuclear material and technology produced and transferred under this agreement.

The entitled authority from both countries would look after liability issues such as "Civil Nuclear Liability" under Article 8 [3]. According to the recognized international doctrines, both India and France must form a "Civil Nuclear Liability Regime" [3] to compensate for any damage instigated by nuclear material, technology, equipment, and facilities. For this purpose, Article 9 [3] holds that all nuclear components used, produced, and transferred under this agreement would be used only for nonexplosive and peaceful purposes.

Article 10 [3] under the provisions of Article 5 [3], guides both states to maintain IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials, technology, and equipment used or transferred under this agreement, in accordance with their individual safeguards' agreement with IAEA. The safeguards of the nuclear material transferred to the French Republic under this nuclear cooperation would be according to the agreement signed in 1978 and revised in 1998 between France, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and IAEA. Similarly, an agreement signed between the Government of India and IAEA would look after the safeguarding of nuclear material on Indian territory. Moreover, if in the future IAEA notes that IAEA safeguards are not being maintained, then it will require to consult with both parties for the verification.

As mentioned in Article 11 [3], the nuclear material obtained or recovered, technology, equipment, and facilities under this agreement would be "transferred or retransferred beyond the jurisdiction of recipient party" under Article 15 [3]. Also, the termination of safeguards, when nuclear material is fully consumed or no longer in use-would be decided by the pact between the Government of India and France, EURATOM, IAEA, and other involved agencies.

About the confidentiality and usage of the shared information, Article 12 [3] says that information and technical data used under the agreement would be considered sensitive and discretionary and must not be shared with any third party without each other's consent, also both countries must ensure security and safety of the shared information. Article 13 [3] asks both parties to make sure that all nuclear components, as mentioned in Article 11 [3] would be maintained exclusively by the designated authority of the person in charge.

To ensure the physical protection of the nuclear components Article 14 [3] emphasizes the effective implementation of national legislation and international conventions, such as IAEA's Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was signed in 1979, entered into force in 1987 and amended in 2005.

Article 15 [3] describes the condition that needs to be fulfilled by both countries if they wish to transfer nuclear components as discussed in Article 11 [3] to any third party. Such transfers and retransfers can be only conducted after obtaining written assurance from a third party under IAEA safeguards about the peaceful and nonexplosive usage of nuclear components. India and France first provide written consent to each other before transferring nuclear material to any third party except the member states of the European Union. Article 16 [3] holds that this agreement between India and France would not affect the other international obligations of each of them for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Promoting an equal partnership between both countries, Article 17 [3] articulates the relationship of both states to be reliable and stable to discuss the implementation of the agreement. A Joint Committee needs to be established and this committee must meet from time to time to discuss the further implementation of the agreement. Article 18 [3] prohibits amendments in the agreement throughout the period of the agreement. Both parties shall first provide mutual written consent for the proceeding of the amendment procedure. If any amendment is planned to be introduced in the agreement, it shall be first ratified and approved by both states under their individual statutory framework. Article 19 [3] forms Annexes of this agreement to be an essential part of this agreement.

Discussing the entry into force, duration, and termination of the agreement, Article 20 [3] says that after completing their internal process both states shall report each other, which will lead to the "entry into force" of the agreement. The duration of the agreement is 40 years and would be renewed automatically for another 20 years if not notified by each of the parties is to terminate the agreement. If either of the party demands termination of the agreement before the expiry of the agreement it shall provide 12 months prior notice with the reason for termination to the concerned party. If the agreement is not renewed the specific provisions under Article 2 [3] would persist to be applicable and if the agreement is terminated Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 [3] would continue to be applied wherever applicable.

#### **2.4 India-Russia civil nuclear cooperation**

Desiring to further promote the relationship of strategic partnership by developing cooperation between the two states, India and Russia agreed to sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement toward the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Following the principles of sovereignty, equality, and noninterference, Article 1 [4] addresses both states to develop bilateral cooperation for peaceful nuclear use under the regulatory framework of their individual legislations, international commitments, and national nuclear programs. This article further comprehends areas of cooperation between both states as follows [4]:

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Above mentioned area of cooperation must be carried out through—joint programs and working groups for the implementation of specific projects, conferences, workshops, and symposia for mutual consultations, training, and exchange of scientific personnel in addition to relevant information and equipment. The fourth section of this Article articulates the objective of this agreement as a step toward "peaceful nuclear cooperation" [4] and both states would not interfere in any of the nuclear activity of each other which does not come under the regulatory framework of this agreement.

Article 2 [4] explains the important terminology used in this agreement as follows (**Figures 5** and **6**):

#### **Figure 5.**

*Article 2 Definitions 1 [4].*

#### **Figure 6.**

*Article 2 Definitions 2 [4].*

Various sections of Article 3 [4] comprehend steps for the unhindered implementation of the agreement as follows:


• It will be the responsibility of both designated authorities to handle nuclear and nonnuclear material, equipment, information and technology, and facilities used and transferred under this agreement with safety and security.

Article 4 [4] demands from both states to consider information and documents exchanged and transferred under this agreement to be "confidential" [4] in accordance with individual legislation in both countries. In the case of Russia, it shall be adopted as an "official information of limited distribution" [4] and under regulations of the Indian government, it would be treated as "confidential" [4] with access only to regulated authorities and personnel. The right to intellectual property is discussed in Article 5 [4]. Only designated organizations under the jurisdiction of this agreement from both countries are allowed to transfer intellectual scientific information to each other. The rights of the jointly created or produced scientific information would belong solely to India and Russia and if either of them wishes to transfer this information to any third party, they must first acquire written consent from each other to do so.

About nuclear enrichment, Article 6 [4] states that this cooperation allows Uranium-235 enrichment up to the level of 20% [4]. The enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel should be performed under IAEA safeguards in concurrence with the "Agreement between the Government of India and the IAEA for the application of Safeguard to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, document-INFCIRC/754" [4] in the Indian case. Correspondingly, under Russian jurisdiction, "Agreement between the USSR and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), document-INFCIRC/327" [4]. This article also instructs both states to outline a separate agreement for, "transfer of technology and facilities for chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuel, isotopic uranium enrichment and heavy water production" [4].

The nuclear components received, transferred, and/or produced under this deal shall not be used for military or explosive purposes, as mentioned in Article 7 [4]. Both states must consult the IAEA document, "Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities document-INFCIRC/255/Rev 4" [4], for the protection measures. Both countries must use nuclear technology only for "declared purposes" and must not transfer any of the technology, material, or information to any third party.

As per Article 8 [4], any damage caused by a nuclear accident, and its liability, shall be concluded between India and Russia according to their international commitments and respective legislations. Under Article 9 [4], both countries shall establish a Joint Coordination Committee to facilitate faster and smoother implementation of this agreement. The committee would constitute "competent authorities" [4] from both states, which must consult each other over issues that may arise due to any dispute. Article 10 [4] holds that to amend this agreement, both parties must acquire written consent from each other. Article 11 [4] mentions the entry into force process of the agreement and the duration of the agreement, which is 40 years, and its further extension procedure for the next 10 years after the completion of 40 years of cooperation.

#### **2.5 India-UK civil nuclear cooperation**

With the intention to strengthen bilateral strategic partnership through cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Government of India and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed an Agreement on 13 November 2015 in London, and on 16 December 2016, this agreement was entered into force [5].

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**Figure 7.**

*Article 1 Definitions [5].*

Article 1 [5] of this agreement defines important terminology as used in legal documents (**Figure 7**).

To foster peaceful usage of nuclear energy, Article 2 [5] elaborates following areas of cooperation between both states [5]:


This Article holds that provisions under this agreement would not affect other individual aspects associated with nuclear energy as well as individual international commitments and national policies and legislations.

Article 3 [5] suggests various forms of cooperation to fulfill objectives explained in Article 2 [5] through the supply of nuclear and nonnuclear material, equipment and technology, training and exchange of personnel, organization of workshop and seminars for participation by scientific and technical staff and others. Nuclear trade of nuclear material, technology, equipment, and other components can be carried out between both states and associated authorities as per Article 4 [5].

Transfer of all material whether between India and UK or any authorized third party would be conducted only when decided by both states in a written statement under Article 5 [5]. This article also states that there would not be any transfer of nuclear components outside the territorial jurisdiction of each party. To retransfer obtained nuclear material to any third party, firstly recipient party shall obtain written consent from the transferring party and a letter of commitment to use nuclear only for the peaceful purpose under the IAEA safeguards from a third party. However, these requirements would not be applicable to the Member States of the European Union (EU) under the EURATOM Treaty [5].

In pursuant to Article 6 [5], processing, reprocessing, and storage of nuclear material under this agreement should be carried out only at sites that have been reported by India to the IAEA as per document INFCIRC/754 [5]. Also, this article allows a maximum of 20% enrichment of U-235 [5], which will be assigned to India under agreement provisions of INFCIRC/754 [5]. Article 7 [5] commands both states to make sure that nuclear components and products would be used only for peaceful purposes and handled carefully under IAEA safeguards. Safeguards of nuclear material and other components transferred to the UK would be subject to regulations of Chapter 7 of EURATOM Treaty and IAEA document INFCIRC/263, including an Additional Protocol (AP) of IAEA, which was signed in 1998 and entered into force

in 2004 [5]. And, nuclear material transferred to India would be subject to IAEA safeguards under the guidance of IAEA document INFCRIC/754 along with an Additional Protocol, which was signed in 2009 and entered into force in 2014 [5]. Therefore, if IAEA agrees upon any possibility of non-application of its safeguards, then both parties need to discuss and adopt applicable verification measures in written format.

Article 8 [5] outlines the applicable scope of regulations of the agreement. All nuclear material, equipment, and technology transferred, used, or produced under this agreement would not be subject to the regulations of this agreement if both states decide through a written statement that they are not subject to obligations of the agreement or they have been assigned or reassigned above mentioned nuclear components to the third party beyond their jurisdiction. Article 9 [5] demands adequate actions from both parties to ensure the protection of nuclear material and technology, these protection measure obligations shall be carried out as per the recommendations of IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 [5] titled as, "Nuclear Security Recommendation on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" [5].

To protect intellectual property used, transferred, or produced under the provision of this deal. Article 10 [5] asks India and UK to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear material, technology, and information hereby, this article under this agreement forbids the transfer of intellectual property rights to any unauthorized agency or third. Article 11 [5] to expedite the effective implementation of this nuclear cooperation, ask to provide the administrative arrangement from appropriate government authorities to implement the required obligation. Similarly, under Article 12 [5] it would be the responsibility of both states to consult each other from time to time for the effective execution of projects under this agreement. If there arises any refute, both countries shall seek negotiations in accordance with the founding document of MoU to settle issues between them as per Article 13 [5].

Article 14 [5] allows both states to amend this agreement from time to time if necessary. About the entry and duration, Article 15 [5] notes that this agreement would be in force when both states notify each other about the fulfillment of required internal legalities in written. The duration of this agreement is 40 years, which is subject to extension for the next 20 years if neither of the countries shows intentions to terminate it at least 6 months prior to the agreement expiry. If notified to be terminated by either party, Article 16 [5] asks both parties to cooperate in the termination procedure. Both parties shall provide one-year prior notice with a reason for each other to terminate this agreement. If the agreement is terminated in any case than the obligations of Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of this agreement would not be affected and shall continue to be in force.

#### **3. Japanese case analysis**

In this section, authors have reviewed and analyzed the Japanese civil nuclear cooperation and agreements with IAEA, USA, EURATOM, Russia, and UK.

#### **3.1 Japan-IAEA civil nuclear cooperation**

An agreement between Japan and IAEA was signed in 1977 to fulfill the obligations of Articles III.1 and 4 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [6]. Therefore, in Article 1 government of Japan upholds support to Article III.1 of NPT and accepts IAEA safeguards on all special fissionable material from all sources use up only for peaceful

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nuclear activities under its jurisdiction inside and outside Japan. Article 2 [6] and 3 [6] covers the procedures to apply safeguards provided by IAEA in pursuant to the given agreement, hereby the Japanese government must maintain an accounting system (National Systems of Safeguards) to bring all nuclear and associated components in regulation. For the effective implementation of the safeguards, the IAEA taking into consideration the findings of the National System would conduct autonomous measurements and observations to check if nuclear material is not used for nuclear weapons and explosive devices. Article 4 [6] asks both parties to assist each other in the effective implementation of the agreement.

Articles 5 [6], 6 [6] and 7 [6] provide a framework to implement safeguards in a manner that they must not intervene and impede the nuclear and technological developments of Japan. Both parties must safeguard confidential and sensitive data subject to the provision of this agreement and must not share such information with any third party except with the Board of Governors of the Agency. Article 8 [6] sets the provisions for Japan to share information regarding nuclear material and related activities subject to safeguard with IAEA. In accordance with Article 9 [6], IAEA must appoint an Inspector to carry out activities efficiently under the given agreement in consensus with the Japanese government. This Agency Inspector would check if the confidentiality of sensitive data is being maintained by both parties, and inspection of nuclear activities in Japan's territory is not hampering its nuclear activities. Relevant privileges and immunities must be provided by the government of Japan to the IAEA Inspector and other officials as per Article 10 [6]. Article 11 [6] holds that IAEA safeguards are subject to termination if IAEA decides that nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity. As per Article 12 [6], if the Japanese government requires transferring its nuclear material to any other country, then it must notify the Agency about the nuclear transfer and its safeguards, and Agency must maintain documentation of each transfer and retransfer of nuclear material. Article 13 [6] mentions that both parties must agree to use nuclear material for nonnuclear activities before its termination from the agreement due to dilution.

In accordance with Article 14 [6], if the government of Japan decides not to apply the given safeguards to maintain its discretion, it must inform the IAEA board and shall affirm that nuclear material would be used only for peaceful nuclear activities and during the period of "non-application of safeguards" [6] nuclear material very strictly would not be producing explosive devices and nuclear weapons. Article 15 [6] explains about the finance and Article 16 [6] mentions the liability of the third-party in the case of nuclear damage. Any dispute between both parties regarding the agreement implementation must be resolved in concordance with international law as per Article 17 [6]. Articles 18 [6] and 19 [6] provide "measures in relation to verification of non-diversion" of nuclear activities. Article 20 [6], 21 [6] and 22 [6] discusses the interpretation of the Agreement and that both parties must consult each other for the interpretation and implementation of the agreement as well as hold negotiations to resolve any dispute. Safeguards enforced by IAEA upon Japan under other agreements would be suspended on the entry of this agreement according to Article 23 [6]. As per the provisions of Article 24 [6], there will be the same conditions like "entry into force" [6] to amend this agreement for which both parties must consult each other. About the duration and "entry into force," Article 25 [6] says that when the Japanese government would notify IAEA Director-General about the completion of its constitutional and statutory requirements the agreement would "enter into force" and would be in force till Japan is a participant in NPT. Article 26 [6] forms the attached protocols as an integral part of this agreement.

Objectives for safeguards are highlighted from Article 27 [6] to 30 [6], the foremost aim would be to keep a check on the usage of nuclear material and ensure that they must not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and devices. For this purpose, "material accountancy" has been suggested as a significant safeguard measure that would help to contain the illicit usage of nuclear material. Therefore, Article 31 [6] and 32 [6] emphasize the role of the National System of Safeguards as an authority in Japan that may facilitate verification activities for nuclear maintenance and inspection in accordance with Article 3 [6]. Articles 33 [6] and 34 [6] set up areas for safeguards application as well as restricting their application to material in mining ore or ore processing activities. Article 35 [6], pursuant to Article 13 [6] states that on mutual consensus between Japan and IAEA, IAEA safeguards would be terminated given the nuclear material is extremely exploited and irrecoverable. Articles 36 [6] and 37 [6] provide an exemption to special fissionable material, plutonium-238 (exceeding 80%), and nuclear material (used in nonnuclear activity as per Article 13) from safeguards application at the request of the Japanese government. However, Article 38 [6] states that if exempted nuclear material is processed or stored with nuclear material under safeguards, then safeguard provision must be reapply on such material. Article 39 [6] and 40 [6] commands both parties to make the required "Subsidiary Arrangement" to fulfill duties effectively under the given agreement and must be enforced within 90 days from the date of entry into force. After the release of the first report, it will be the responsibility of the IAEA to create an inventory of all nuclear material in Japan liable to the given agreement as per Article 41 [6].

Provisions and information regarding the design of nuclear facilities are articulated in Article 42 [6] to 45 [6]. The "design information" regarding all nuclear facilities subject to this agreement must include information, such as—facility identification, description of general arrangement at the facility, layout of equipment used, report of prevailing and propositioned processes regarding nuclear material accounting and surveillance, measurement of flow, and inventory undertakings. Article 46 [6] enlist the objectives to regulate material balance, get detailed nuclear material verification, to create record and reports of evolution procedure, and others regarding the above-mentioned "design information". Articles 47 [6] and 48 [6] set forth a clause of reexamination in case of changes in nuclear operations and verification by the Agency Inspector regarding the design information as provided in Articles 42 [6] to 45 [6]. Articles 49 [6] and 50 [6] command Japan to provide information to IAEA with respect to nuclear material when used outside authorized facilities. Provisions for the record system are set out from Articles 51 [6] to 58 [6]. Designated under "Subsidiary Arrangements" the Japanese government must maintain a record system of all nuclear material equipment, operating facilities, and associated components to be retained at least every 5 years.

Articles 59 [6] to 61 [6] articulate general provisions to prepare reports based on records as mentioned in Articles 51 [6] to 58 [6]. Articles 59 [6] to 61 [6] explain the general provisions of the reports system. An "Accounting Report" and "Special Report" must be prepared in English, Russian, French, or Spanish but otherwise as specified in the "Subsidiary Arrangement" with respect to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards. A detailed description of the "Accounting Report" is mentioned in Articles 62 [6] to 67 [6]. First of all, an initial report of all nuclear material must be released by the Japanese government to IAEA within a month of "entry into force." Each material balance area report must cover inventory changes and a material balance statement centered on the physical inventory of nuclear material located in the material balance area. Twice a year, IAEA shall provide a statement book consisting of inventory change entries of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards of this

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agreement. A "Special Report" pursuant to Article 68 [6] must be prepared by the government of Japan in case of any unusual contamination and loss of nuclear material exceeding the specified limit. The government of Japan must provide an explanation and clarification of any report if requested by IAEA as per Article 69 [6].

Obligations with respect to inspection by Agency are provided in Articles 70 [6] to 73 [6]. The purpose of such inspection would be to authenticate initial report information and identify changes as well as check the composition and quantity of nuclear material at the time of its transfer in and out of Japan later Articles 74 [6] and 75 [6] discusses the scope of the inspection to be conducted in accordance with Articles 51 [6] to 58 [6]. Entry to Agency Inspector shall be provided for inspection of all locations mentioned in the initial report with respect to nuclear material, as per Articles 76 and 77 [6]. Articles 78 [6] to 82 [6] provide guidelines about the frequency and intensity of inspection and hence states that IAEA must conduct a yearly inspection of authorizing nuclear facilities, material balance areas, and other components in consultation with the Japanese government. It will be the responsibility of the IAEA to provide the Japanese Government prior to notice concerning the visit of the Agency Inspector to their nuclear facilities pursuant to Articles 83 [6] and 84 [6]. As mentioned in Articles 85 [6] and 86 [6], officials nominated by the IAEA and accepted by the government of Japan shall be appointed by the Director General of Agency within a month of the agreement's "entry into force." Articles 87 [6], 88 [6] and 89 [6] emphasize the conduct of the Agency Inspector during the visit to carry out activities carefully without hampering the construction of facilities and nuclear operation activities. Article 90 [6] commands IAEA to release statements mentioning the result of verification activities conducted during the inspection.

To fulfill the objectives of this agreement, pursuant to Article 91 [6] Japan must ensure the safeguard of nuclear material to be transferred in an out of Japan. For this purpose, Articles 92 [6] to 96 [6] provide guidelines for the export and import of nuclear material in Japan. To export nuclear material out of Japan, the Japanese government must notify the IAEA board about the quantity of nuclear material, safeguard measures, state to which it would be transferred, and date of nuclear material dispatch and arrival, also both parties must agree upon the implemented procedures. A similar process will be applicable there will be a transfer of nuclear material into Japan. Pursuant to Article 68 [6], Article 97 [6] commands the Japanese government to prepare a Special Report in case of any delay or loss of nuclear material during international transfer.

Article 98 [6] provides definitions of the important terminology for the effective interpretation and implementation of this agreement (**Figures 8** and **9**).

**Figure 8.** *Article 98 Definitions 1 [6].*

**Figure 9.** *Article 98 Definitions 2 [6].*

#### **3.2 Japan-USA civil nuclear cooperation**

Japan and the US have been the longest-standing partners promoting the peaceful use of Civil Nuclear Energy, their first nuclear agreement was signed in 1955 and then in 1968. In 1987, Japanese government and the US government revised their "previous agreement" [7] and signed a new agreement reasserting their commitment to ensuring the research and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and support objectives of IAEA toward the international observance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The articles of this agreement are discussed in detail as follows:

For the purpose of this agreement, definitions of the below-mentioned terminologies are explained in Article 1 (**Figure 10**) [7]. Article 2 [7] provides the following guidelines for both states to cooperate for the effective implementation of the agreement:


All nuclear material, technology, equipment, and associated components used and shared between both states would be subject to the provisions of this agreement. Above mentioned nuclear components would cease to be part of the agreement if they are transferred beyond the dominion of the receiving party or the nuclear material is consumed or diluted to the extent that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity.

About the storage of sensitive nuclear material, such as Uranium-233, Plutonium, and high enriched uranium. Article 3 [7] commands both countries on mutual consensus to store such material at the facilities upholding IAEA safeguards. Article 4 [7] asks to transfer sensitive nuclear components and special fissionable material only to a person authorized by the receiving party. If agreed mutually both parties can

**Figure 10.** *Article 1 Definitions [7].*

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reprocess and alter the form of nuclear material transferred, used, or produced under this agreement as per Article 5 [7]. Article 6 [7] limits the enrichment of the U-235 to 20%. Article 7 [7] demands suitable physical protection of all the nuclear components subject to the provision of this agreement. Therefore, this agreement prohibits both states from using nuclear components for any military purposes or developing nuclear explosive devices as per Article 8 [7].

Article 9 [7] is about the safeguard of nuclear components in accordance with IAEA safeguards. Nuclear material and associated components transferred, used, and produced under this agreement in the territory Japan and the US would be safeguarded in pursuant to their respective safeguard agreement with IAEA. With respect to nuclear material, technology, equipment, and components used under this agreement, Article 10 [7] set forth rights equivalent to Articles 3 [7], 4 [7], 5 [7], 6 [7], and 12 [7] of this agreement to other third parties or state, which is in agreement with either of both parties. With respect to their national security, Article 11 [7] obliges both countries to make consistent efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and make special arrangements to facilitate Articles 3 [7], 4 [7], and 5 [7] of this agreement to foster peaceful use of nuclear energy. About the termination of this agreement, Article 12 holds that if either Japan or the US fails to comply with the provisions of Articles 3 [7], 4 [7], 5 [7], 6 [7], 7 [7], 8 [7], 9 [7], and 11 [7] of this agreement, defies IAEA provided safeguards or does not follow the decision of arbitral tribunal both states have right to terminate this agreement at any given time and demand the return of any material, nuclear material, and equipment transferred under this agreement.

On the date of the entry into force of this agreement, Article 13 [7] would terminate the previous agreement. However, projects initiated under the previous agreement would be resumed under the provisions of this agreement. To promote bilateral cooperation pursuant to this agreement, Article 14 [7] asks both states to consult with each other through diplomatic channels and other forums to resolve the issues regarding the interpretation and implementation of this agreement. However, if any such issue is not resolved through consultation, mediation, or negotiations both parties on mutual consensus must submit issues to an arbitral tribunal and the decision of the tribunal would be obligatory for both countries. Article 15 [7] forms Annexes of this agreement as to its integral part, which can be modified on mutual consensus without any amendment. Article 16 [7] holds that upon completion of their respective legal provision, both states must notify each other, and hence agreement must enter into force within a month from the notification. The duration of this agreement is 30 years, which may be continued thereafter until either of both parties seeks termination. Nevertheless, before the completion of 30 years, either party may seek termination by providing 6 months prior to the other party. Articles 1 [7] to 9 [7], 11 [7], 12 [7], and 14 [7] of this agreement would continue to be in effect on the applicable matters even after the agreement is terminated. Lastly, on the mutual consensus, both countries may amend or change this agreement with a new agreement.

#### **3.3 Japan-EURATOM civil nuclear cooperation**

Article 1 [8] defines terminologies from the legal document for effective interpretation of agreement as follows (**Figure 11**). To promote peaceful nuclear trade and research activities between Japan and the European Union "Scope of Cooperation" through the establishment of a research and development institute, the nuclear fuel cycle industry is discussed in Article 2 [8]. This Article further elaborates on forms through which this cooperation can be fostered between both parties in the following manner:

**Figure 11.** *Article 1 Definitions [8].*


Article 3 [8] is about the nuclear and associated materials under the territorial jurisdiction of Japan, it holds that all nuclear and nonnuclear material and equipment, whether shared between Japan and Agency or transferred from any other third party to Japan would be subject to the provisions of this agreement. However, above mentioned nuclear material and equipment would not be subject to this agreement if they would be transferred beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the recipient party or if they are no longer usable for any nuclear activity and mutually decided by both parties that they are no longer subject to this agreement. Article 4 [8] further elaborates on the cooperation as discussed in Article 2 [8] on nuclear research and development. For this purpose, both Japan and the EU shall encourage the involvement of researchers and organizations from universities, laboratories, and private sectors.

To facilitate the effective implementation of the agreement, Article 5 [8] asks both parties to implement provisions of the agreement in good faith to be coherent with "prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of their nuclear activities" [8]. The provision of this agreement must not be used for interference in the nuclear policy of either party as well as not for any industrial or commercial advantages. Regarding the mixing procedure of nuclear material, it should be handled on the "principle of fungibility and proportionality" during the process of enrichment, fuel fabrication, and conversion. In pursuant to international rules and regulations, Article 6 [8] asks both parties to safeguard the protection of intellectual property transferred used and produced under this agreement. Hereby, Article 7 [8] commands both parties to use nuclear material and equipment subject to this agreement only for peaceful purposes.

Article 8 [8] requires the application of safeguards pursuant to the EURATOM Treaty and IAEA agreement from Japan and the EU community. Article 9 [8] prohibits both parties from retransferring nuclear beyond their jurisdiction to any third party to do so they must obtain a prior consent letter from each other and an

#### *Perspective Chapter: Study of Indian and Japanese Civilian Nuclear Cooperation... DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110537*

assurance letter of not using nuclear material for any military purpose from the country to which nuclear material would be retransferred. There shall be transparency between both parties with respect to the management of nuclear and nonnuclear material, equipment, and technology in accordance with Article 10 [8] of the given agreement. Article 11 [8] commands both states to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material and associated components transferred, used, or produced during this agreement. During the International transfer of nuclear material in confirmation with Japan and European members of the Community, they must follow the provision of the "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material."

Pursuant to Article 12 [8], provisions of the given agreement shall be observed corresponding to the "Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" and the "Agreement between Government of Japan and Government of French Republic." The obligations of the above-mentioned bilateral agreement beyond this agreement must continue to be in effect. Article 13 [8] articulates suspension and termination clauses of the present agreement and states that, if the Japanese government or any Member state of the Community violates the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal or provisions of Articles 7 [8], 8 [8], 9 [8], and 11 [8] of this agreement both parties have right to terminate cooperation under the given agreement may demand the return of the nuclear material transferred pursuant to this agreement. Article 14 [8] asks both parties to designate applicable authorities for the effective implementation of "operational procedures."

Both parties must consult each other in case of any difference regarding agreement implementation and must opt for negotiations and conciliation; however, if the dispute is still not resolved they shall submit the dispute to Arbitral Tribunal under Article 15 [8]. The decision undertaken by the Arbitral Tribunal would be obligatory for both parties. Article 16 [8] creates Annexes as an integral part of this agreement. Article 17 [8] fixes the duration of this agreement for 30 years from the date of "entry into force" with 55 years of automatic extension if either of both parties does not seek termination of the agreement before its expiry. Articles 7 [8], 8 [8], 9 [8], and 11 [8] of the given agreement would remain effective upon the agreement termination.

#### **3.4 Japan-Russia civil nuclear cooperation**

Japan and Russia signed a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on May, 12, 2009 in Tokyo. To fulfill the objectives of this agreement Article 1 [9] provides a definition of the following mentioned terminologies (**Figure 12**).

Under the regulatory framework of this agreement and their respective legislations, Article 2 [9] provides guidelines for Japan and Russia to cooperate with each other in the following ways:

**Figure 12.** *Article 1 Definitions [9].*


Both countries must assist each other to construct and operate light water reactors, for the application of radio-isotopes and radiation, exploration and utilization of Uranium, processing of radioactive waste, and most importantly nuclear safety from radiation. However, this Article also clarifies that technology and nuclear material that is not covered in this agreement would not be shared by either country.

Article 3 [9] states that to fulfill the above-mentioned cooperation, both states need to apply safeguards as directed by IAEA. If nuclear material is transferred to Japan, then it shall apply safeguards as per "the Safeguard Agreement" [9] signed between the Government of Japan and IAEA to implement the "Non-Proliferation Treaty" in 1977. And if the nuclear material recipient in Russia, it must oblige "the Safeguard Agreement for Russian Federation" signed with IAEA in 1985. Article 4 [9] obligates both states to use nuclear material, equipment, and technology used, transferred, and produced under this agreement only for peaceful purposes for the welfare of society. Therefore, to fulfill above mention obligations, Article 5 [9] binds all sensitive nuclear material and technology subject to provisions of the "Safeguards Agreement" of Japan and Russia and must be placed at facilities as selected by IAEA. Similarly, Article 6 [9] asks both states to observe provisions of "Convention on Early Notification 1986" [9], "Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 1986" [9], "Convention on Nuclear Safety 1994" [9], and the "Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel & Radioactive Waste Management 1997" [9] for the effective implementation of projects under this agreement.

To ensure the physical protection of transferred nuclear material, equipment, and technology Article 7 [9] asks both parties to adopt provisions of the "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980" and "International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005." As per Article 8 [9] any of the associated nuclear components must not be transferred or retransferred to any unauthorized third party without the prior written consent of each other. Article 9 [9] limits the enrichment of nuclear material, such as U-235, to 20%. All nuclear material and associated components shared between Japan and Russia would automatically fall under the provisions of this agreement once it is entered into force pursuant to Article 10 [9]. Article 11 [9] sets provision for both states to not use this agreement as a base for interfering in each other's industrial or commercial interest or for any other purpose, which may hinder the peaceful usage of nuclear energy. This article also states that nuclear items when used for enrichment, mixed processing, fuel fabrication, conversion, and reprocessing must be operated under the "principle of fungibility and proportionality" [9].

If nuclear material is transported to a state beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party Article 12 [9] holds that in such a situation it will no longer be answerable to the provision of this agreement. Also, if both states mutually decide from the perspectives of "nuclear safeguards" about particular nuclear material that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity it would not be subject to provisions of this agreement. Article 13

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[9] holds that secret and classified information of both states must not be exchanged in the name of this agreement.

Article 14 [9] asks both states to consult each other in case of any disagreement and conduct negotiations, conciliation, and mediation to resolve the dispute. However, if the dispute is still not resolved either of both states may appeal Arbitral Tribunal to settle the matter. Following all legal arbitral procedures, the decision of the tribunal would be fixed and obligatory in both states. Article 15 [9] provides cases that may lead to the suspension or termination of this agreement as follows:


If either of the party decides to terminate this agreement, they may first consult to take corrective measures. This article will be applicable only in case when either of the party fails to adopt corrective measures in a given time frame.

In accordance with applicable international commitments, safeguards, and respective legislation, Article 16 [9] asks both states to ensure the protection of intellectual property created, used, and/or transferred under this agreement. Article 17 [9] observes Annexes of this agreement as an integral part of this agreement, it also states that this agreement can be amended through mutual understanding of both states provided through a written contract. In the last, Article 18 [9] fixes the duration of this agreement to 25 years, which may be further extended thereafter until terminated. To seek termination, either of both parties must provide 6 months prior notice to each other before the expiry of the agreement. However, agreement termination would not affect Articles 1 [9], 4 [9], 5 [9], 6 [9], 7 [9], 8 [9], 9 [9], 12 [9], 14 [9], and 15 [9] as these Articles would continue to be in effect even after termination.

#### **3.5 Japan-UK civil nuclear cooperation**

To foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Article 1 [10] commands both parties (Japan and UK) to cooperate with each other in the following ways:


Under Article 2 [10] cooperation between both states shall be in accordance with each other's law and regulations, regarding the safeguard of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. In the case of Japan, regulations would be subject to "Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Agency in Implementation of Article III. 1 and 4 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" [10], done on March 1977. Similarly, "Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, EURATOM and the Agency in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, done in September 1976" [10] must be contemplated for the application of safeguards provided by IAEA. Therefore, nuclear material, equipment, technology, and other components transferred, used, or produced under this agreement would be used only for peaceful purposes under Article 3 [10].

To fulfill the above-mentioned obligations, Article 4 [10] says that the safety of nuclear material in Japan's territory would be pursuant to the Japan-IAEA agreement, while on the territory of the United Kingdom along with its agreement with IAEA, safeguards applied by EURATOM as per the 1957 Treaty will also be applicable. And if any of the clauses of the EURATOM treaty is not applicable to the provisions of this agreement, both parties must consult to adopt rectifying measures corresponding to agreement commitments. Article 5 [10] demands adequate "physical protection" of the nuclear material used, transferred, or produced during the application of the agreement.

Nuclear material and other components subject to the obligations of this agreement would not be transferred to any unauthorized party under Article 6 [10]. However, if there arise any condition to transfer nuclear components, then both states must obtain prior written consent from each other, also a written commitment from the third party to use nuclear components for peaceful purpose only. Additionally, products such as equipment for reprocessing and enrichment, 20% or more enriched U-233, U-235, or plutonium would not be reassigned by the recipient country to any third party.

Article 7 [10] would bring nuclear material and related components of both parties under the regulatory framework of the agreement except in the following situations:


Discussing termination of the previous agreement between both countries. Article 8 [10] holds that, once this agreement would be in force it shall terminate the previous agreement. Also all nuclear material and related components would fall under the obligations of this agreement. There shall not be any prejudice based on obligations imposed on either party at the signing of the agreement as per Article 9 [10].

Article 10 [10] requires both parties to consult each other if there arises any issue regarding the implementation of the agreement. If any dispute or issue cannot be resolved through consultation or negotiation, therefore at the appeal of either Contracting Party or issue must be submitted to Arbitral Tribunal. If within 30 days of the appeal of the Arbitration Tribunal, either Contracting Party has not nominated *Perspective Chapter: Study of Indian and Japanese Civilian Nuclear Cooperation... DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110537*

an arbitrator then either Party may request the International Court of Justice to employ an arbitrator, and a decision made by Tribunal would be obligatory on the Contracting Party. As per Article 11 [10] if either of both parties does not comply with the provisions of the agreement, then they have the right to ask the defiance party to adopt cooperative measures and if these corrective measures are not adopted by the party which is not complying with provisions of the Agreement, then other party has right to terminate or suspend this agreement.

Article 12 [10] provides a description of the mentioned terms for the purpose of this agreement (**Figure 13**). The Annexes provided with this agreement are an essential part of this agreement and can be revised on the mutual consensus of both countries as mentioned in Article 13 [10]. Article 14 [10] provides guidelines about entry, duration, and termination procedure of this agreement. The agreement would be enforced for the next 25 years and thereafter, upon getting written notification from both states about the completion of their respective legislative procedures. To terminate the given agreement both parties shall provide 6 months prior notice to each other either on the completion of the initial 25 years or any time later on. Articles 3 [10], 4 [10], 5 [10], 6 [10], 7 [10], 10 [10], and 12 [10] of this agreement would not be affected by the agreement termination and must continue to be in effect. Therefore, on February, 251,998, Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed this agreement to form strategic cooperation toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy [10].

**Figure 13.** *Article 12 Definitions [10].*

#### **4. India-Japan civil nuclear cooperation agreement**

This section explains the background of the India-Japan civil nuclear cooperation, present status, and further detailed analysis of the India-Japan bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation.

#### **4.1 Background and present status**

The background and present status of India-Japan bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation is described in **Figure 14**. As shown in **Figure 14**, in 2010, India and Japan

**Figure 14.**

*Timeline of India-Japan civil nuclear cooperation [11–16].*

started negotiations for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation. After 6 years-long negotiations, in 2016, the agreement was signed in Tokyo. The agreement was entered into force in 2017. In the direction of working group meetings, two meetings were held in Mumbai, India, in 2018, and in 2020, the third meeting was held in Tokyo, Japan.

#### **4.2 Analysis**

To fulfill the commitments of this agreement, Article 1 [12] defines the meaning of important terms in the context of a legal agreement document between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of Japan in order to avoid vagueness and facilitate effective interpretation of the agreement (**Figure 15**). Fostering bilateral cooperation between India and Japan for peaceful and nonexplosive usage of nuclear energy. Article 2 [12] emphasizes that both parties shall implement international laws and applicable nuclear treaties in furthering this deal. This Article further provides ways through which cooperation can be nurtured between both parties as follows:


Article 3 [12] binds both parties to use nuclear material, technology, equipment, and by-products transferred, used, or produced under this agreement only for peaceful and nonexplosive purposes. Article 4 [12] instructs both India and Japan to apply protective safeguards measures pursuant to the IAEA safeguard agreement with India and Japan, respectively. Also, appropriate verification measures are required from both parties if the Agency determines that the safeguards application is unachievable. Next Article 5 [12] is asking both countries to keep an account of all nuclear material transferred, produced as well as recovered pursuant to this deal. Also, there will be

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an exchange of nuclear information and technology between both parties under the provision of this agreement. Both India and Japan are required to reiterate their commitment toward International Conventions concerning nuclear security and safety to which parties and members as per Article 6 [12].

To maintain the physical protection of all nuclear material and associated components Article 7 [12] commands both parties to adopt adequate protection measures in accordance with the regulations of applicable international conventions such as "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material & Nuclear Facilities." It will be the individual responsibility of both states to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material under their territorial jurisdiction as guided by the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4. In pursuant to international agreements consulting intellectual property rights, Article 8 [12] asks both parties to protect the intellectual property, information, and technology acquired during this agreement from any unauthorized use and prohibits any disclosure of such information to any third party. Article 9 [12] encourages nuclear trade between the designated authority or person from both countries, however, the provisions of the agreement must not be misused for obtaining commercial gains. Article 10 [12] strictly prohibits the transfer or retransfer of nuclear material to any third party beyond the jurisdiction and to do so written consent must be obtained from the supplying party.

About nuclear enrichment, Article 11 [12] restricts the enrichment of uranium-235 isotope to less than 20% transferred and used in accordance with this agreement. It also states that nuclear material recovered as a by-product will be reprocessed under the jurisdiction of the Republic of India complying with the Agreement signed in 2009 between India and IAEA for the "Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities." Article 12 [12] covers the subject matter related to the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technology between both states. Both parties must sign the Memoranda of Understanding to exchange scientific and technical information regarding the above-mentioned components between designated persons from both parties. Once the nuclear material and associated components are shared between both states, thereby upon entering into their respective territory, they will fall under the respective regulatory framework of both states. It is further stated that if nuclear material is transferred beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state of the receiving party or is exploited in a manner that no longer usable for any nuclear activity, it shall no longer be subject to the given agreement. To cultivate proper handling of nuclear material, "principles of fungibility, proportionality, and equivalence" to nuclear material transferred, used, and produced under this agreement.

To promote the effective implementation of the agreement, Article 13 [12] asks both states to establish Joint Committee and Technical Working Group to view matters regarding the implementation of projects under this agreement. If in case there is any dispute or disagreement regarding the implementation of the agreement between both states, they must opt for negotiations and consultations to resolve their dispute. If either of both parties violates agreement provisions, Article 14 [12] provides the right to both countries to terminate the agreement before its expiry by providing 1-year prior notice to each other. If the agreement is terminated both states also have the right to demand the return of nuclear material and equipment transferred under this agreement from each other as applicable under law.

As per the provisions of Article 15 [12], this agreement would not influence the individual rights and international commitments of both parties with respect to nuclear and nonnuclear material, technology, and equipment not subject to the given agreement. Article 16 [12] is about the amendment procedure and Annexes of this agreement; it holds that a given agreement can be amended at any given time if provided with written agreement from both parties; it also binds Annexes as an integral part of the agreement which can be modified without amendment. Article 17 [12] fixes the duration of the given agreement to 40 years from the date of entry. The agreement can be extended for the next 10 years automatically if either of the parties does not submit a written document of termination of the agreement no later than 6 months before its expiration. Upon the termination of agreement provisions of Articles 1 [12], 3 [12], to 7 [12], 10 [12], 11 [12], 12 (paragraph 3) [12], 13 [12], and 14 [12] would not be affected and would continue to be in effect.

#### **5. Summary and conclusion**

This chapter provides an overview of Indian and Japanese civilian nuclear cooperation with other countries as well as India-Japan mutual cooperation on the basis of Government documents for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To summarize and conclude the chapter, the authors highlight the importance of international civil nuclear cooperation [17] toward the smooth implementation of bilateral as well as multilateral civilian nuclear deals. The Government' documents guide both agreed parties and make sure the timely implementation of the signed agreements with accuracy and assurance. Importantly, due to the complexity of nuclear power in terms of safety, security, and safeguards regimes, authors recommend establishing an efficient operation of bilateral and multilateral civilian nuclear cooperation to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as minimize the nuclear proliferation risk. To enhance the transparency in peaceful nuclear development in countries or regions, mutual cooperation through civilian nuclear agreements between or among the Governments plays a vital role. In brief, this chapter facilitates to understand Indian and Japanese nuclear relations through the lens of various described civilian nuclear agreements.

#### **Author details**

Saurabh Sharma\* and Masako Ikegami Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

\*Address all correspondence to: sharma.s.ab@m.titech.ac.jp

© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*Perspective Chapter: Study of Indian and Japanese Civilian Nuclear Cooperation... DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110537*

#### **References**

[1] IAEA. Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/754. 2009

[2] DAE, Government of India. Important Agreements-Agreement between the Government of India and the USA on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 10 October 2008. 2008

[3] DAE, Government of India. Important Agreements-Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of France on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 30 September 2008. 2008

[4] DAE, Government of India. Important Agreements-Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, 12 March 2010. 2010

[5] DAE, Government of India. Important Agreements-Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 13 November 2015. 2015

[6] IAEA. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/255, March 1978. 1978

[7] U.S. Government Printing Office Washington. Proposed Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In: 100th Congress, 1st Session, House Document 100-128, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 09 November 1987. 1987

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 2006. 2006

[9] MOFA. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 2009. 2009

[10] Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Japan for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Treaty Series No. 36. 1999 [Previously Published as Japan No. 1 (1998) Cm 3948]

[11] Sharma S, Ikegami M. Research review on India-Japan civil nuclear cooperation agreement towards the progress of peaceful uses of the nuclear energy–原子力平和利用進展 にむけた日印原子力協定のレビュ–. In: Abstract Proceedings and Poster Short Presentation at the 39th Annual Meeting of Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM). Japan: The University of Tokyo; 2018

[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 2016. Available from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/000202920.pdf

[13] Library of Congress. Japan/India: Diet Approves Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. 2017. Available from: http://

www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/ japanindia-diet-approves-civil-nuclearcooperation-agreement/

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Meetings on Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation. 2018. Available from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/ press4e\_001973.html

[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Meetings on Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation. 2018. Available from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/ press1e\_000089.html

[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Meetings on Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation. 2020. Available from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/ press4e\_002521.html

[17] Singh A, Sharma S, Kalra MS. Levelised cost of electricity for nuclear power using light water reactor technology in India, Economic & Political Weekly. 2018;**2018**:10

Section 2 Fundamentals

### **Chapter 3**

## Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy, and Charge of Fragments from Actinide Fission

*Modesto Montoya*

#### **Abstract**

In nuclear fission of actinides samples, the fragments emit prompt neutrons before they reach the detectors. This chapter shows the effects of that emission on the final distribution of mass, charge, kinetic energy, and prompt neutron multiplicity of fragments. Those effects depend on the experimental technique. This chapter shows the curve of the maximal value of total kinetic energy as a function of primary fragment mass for the reactions 233U(nth, f), 235U(nth, f), and 239Pu(nth, f) which reflect the deformation properties of fragments in their ground states and the Coulomb effect on their scission configurations. The odd–even effects on the cold fission region will be also presented.

**Keywords:** thermal neutron fission, mass yield, kinetic energy, charge, prompt neutron multiplicity

#### **1. Introduction**

In 1939, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman discovered the fission of the uranium nucleus induced by neutrons [1], which was experimentally corroborated by Meitner and Frisch [2]. In 1939, von Halban et al. [3] discovered that fission fragments emit neutrons. To interpret the experimental results, Bohr and Wheeler [4] proposed a model in which the potential surface of the fissile nucleus is a function of several variables that represent the deformation of the nucleus, which starts from a well of stability to rise through the potential surface and reach the saddle point. From the saddle point, the system descends through a fission valley (where the attractive nuclear interaction and the repulsive Coulomb interaction compete) to the scission point where finally two separate complementary fragments are formed. The interpretation of the fission process may be based on the potential surface of the fissile system [5].

From the scission point, the two independent fragments are repelled by electrostatic interaction until they reach their final kinetic energy. On the way, the fragments decay mainly by gamma and neutron emission.

In that scheme, to investigate the nature of fission, it results necessary to know at least the characteristics of the final state of the fission process, i.e., the scission configuration. For this reason, the goal of most fission experiments is to see how the process might manifest itself in the distribution of primary fragment mass and kinetic energy distribution.

In this chapter, the effects of the emission of prompt neutrons on the distribution of mass, charge, and kinetic energy of the fragments, compared to the primary quantities will be reported. We will see how the experimental technique affects the results of their measurements.

#### **2. Kinetic energy distribution as a function fragment mass**

Let us list some definitions and relations to be used to show the effects of neutron emission on the distribution of mass, charge, kinetic energy, and average prompt neutron multiplicity of the fission fragments.

The fissile nucleus is characterized by its charge and mass *Z*<sup>0</sup> and *A*0, respectively. The primary complementary fragments are characterized by their masses (*A*, *A*<sup>0</sup> ), charges (*Z*, *Z*<sup>0</sup> ), and kinetic energies (*E*, *E*<sup>0</sup> ), respectively.

The conservation laws of mass and linear momentum are expressed in the relations.

$$A\_0 = A + A',\tag{1}$$

and

$$AE = A'E',\tag{2}$$

respectively. The total kinetic energy is.

$$T\text{KE} = E + E',\tag{3}$$

The final complementary fragments masses.

$$m = A - n\tag{4}$$

and

$$m' = A' - n',\tag{5}$$

where *n* and *n*<sup>0</sup> are their corresponding number of emitted prompt neutrons.

For each isobaric fragmentation, the values of *n* and *n*<sup>0</sup> are given approximately by the relations.

$$n = \overline{\nu} \left( 1 - \frac{\text{TKE} - \overline{\text{TKE}}}{a} + r \right) \tag{6}$$

*Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

and

$$n' = \overline{\nu}' \left( 1 - \frac{\text{TKE} - \overline{\text{TKE}}}{a} - r \right), \tag{7}$$

where *TKE* is the average total kinetic energy, *ν* and *ν*<sup>0</sup> are the average prompt neutron multiplicities, respectively, *α* is a parameter taken from experimental data, and *r* is a correlation term.

Due to the emission of neutrons, the values of the final kinetic energy of the fragments will be, approximately,

$$e = E\left(1 - \frac{n}{A}\right),\tag{8}$$

and

$$e' = E'\left(1 - \frac{n'}{A'}\right) \tag{9}$$

These relations are formulated considering no recoil effect by neutron emission. If one simulates an isotropic prompt neutron emission relative to each fragment center of masses, the result is a kinetic distribution characterized by an average obeying approximately the same relations with standard deviations depending on the emitted neutron kinetic energy. The result is equivalent to a lower resolution in kinetic energy measuring.

The total kinetic energy of the final fragments is defined as

$$
\hbar t \mathbf{k} \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{e}' \tag{10}
$$

Experimentally one has access to the values of final fragment mass and kinetic energy. The fragment masses measured by the double energy method (2*E*), defined as provisional masses of the complementary fragments, *μ* and *μ*<sup>0</sup> , are calculated using the conservations relations.

$$A\_0 = \mu + \mu',\tag{11}$$

and

$$
\mu e = \mu' e'.\tag{12}
$$

From the Eqs. (8), (9), (11), and (12), one obtains.

$$
\mu = A\_0 \frac{e'}{e'+e} = A\_0 \frac{E'}{E'+E \times F} = A\_0 \frac{A}{A+A' \times F},\tag{13}
$$

where

$$F = \frac{1 - n/A}{1 - n'/A'}.\tag{14}$$

The provisional mass *μ* may be lower or higher than *A*, depending on *F*. For the reactions 233U(nth, f), 235U(nth, f), and 239Pu(nth, f), there is a fragment mass region where *ν* ≫ *ν*<sup>0</sup> . In this case *μ*> *A*. Obviously, *m* will be equal or lower than *A*.

#### **2.1 Kinetic energy distribution as a function of the final fragment mass**

In 1978, using the Monte Carlo method, the experiment to measure the distribution of *e* as a function of *m* of fragments from the fission induced by thermal neutrons of 235U was simulated. The simulation was carried out before the corresponding experiment. The simulated standard deviation of the final light fragment kinetic energy *σ<sup>e</sup>* showed a peak of 9 MeV for *m* ¼ 109 in a mass region where the primary standard deviation is approximately 5 MeV. This peak was the result of the neutron emission combined with the effects of the slopes of the mass yield and the average kinetic energy of the fragments. Experimental results, obtained on the LOHENGRIN mass spectrometer, confirmed that prediction [6]. See **Figure 1**.

In 1983, Behafaf et al. repeated that experiment extending the domain of measured masses to the heavy region, finding a peak in the standard deviation for *m* ¼ 125, which was not reproduced by their Monte Carlo simulation [7]. See **Figure 2**. In 2007, through another Monte Carlo simulation, Montoya et al. reproduced the mentioned peak [8]. See **Figure 3**. The origin of the discrepancy between those results is the discontinuity between *m* ¼ 124 and *m* ¼ 125 on the curve of *e* that Montoya et al. used as input for the simulation while probably was not used in the Belhafaf et al. simulation.

#### **2.2 Kinetic energy distribution as a function of provisional fragment mass**

In 1978, using the 2*E* technique, Asghar et al. measured the quantities *e*, *σe*, *tke*, and *σtke* as a function of provisional mass *μ* of fragments from the reactions 235U(nth, f) and

#### **Figure 1.**

*Standard deviation of the final kinetic energy distribution as a function of the final mass (m) of fragments from fission of 235U induced by thermal neutrons. The output of the Monte Carlo simulation (squares) is to be compared with the experimental result (triangles) [6].*

*Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

#### **Figure 2.**

*Standard deviation of the final kinetic energy distribution as a function of the final mass (m) of fragments from fission of 235U induced by thermal neutrons. The output of Monte Carlo simulation (squares) does not reproduce the experimental peak (triangles) at m =125 obtained by Belhafaf et al. [7].*

#### **Figure 3.**

*Standard deviation of the final fragment kinetic energy distribution as a function of the final mass (m) of fragments from fission of 235U induced by thermal neutrons. The output of Monte Carlo simulation (squares) [8] and experimental result (triangles) reproduce the experimental peaks obtained by Belhafaf et al. [7].*

239Pu(nth, f), respectively [9]. For each of both reactions, those authors obtained a peak near the symmetric mass region in the corresponding *σtke* curves. For the reaction 235U(nth, f), the peak on *<sup>σ</sup><sup>e</sup>* around *<sup>μ</sup>* <sup>¼</sup> 109 reaches the value of approximately 6 MeV. This value must be compared to the 9 MeV found by Brissot et al. for *σ<sup>e</sup>* around ¼ 109. These authors used the LOHENGRIN mass spectrometer.

**Figure 4.**

*Standard deviation of the total kinetic energy distribution as a function of the primary fragment mass (diamonds) and the corresponding to the provisional mass (squares), which are the input and output data, respectively, in a Monte Carlo simulation [10], to be compared with experimental data (triangles) obtained by Asghar et al. [9].*

In 2020, simulating a primary distribution with any peak on the *σTKE* curve for fragments from the reaction 239Pu(nth, f), Montoya reproduced the values of *σtke* as a function of *μ* [10], found by Asghar et al. [9]. See **Figure 4**.

The Monte Carlo simulations of fission experiments show that the structures on the standard deviation of the fragment kinetic energy distribution, as a function of mass, are the result of prompt neutron emission and the combined effects of mass yield and average kinetic energy curves. The shape of those effects depends on the measurement technique.

A representative case is the region of light fragment near the symmetry of fission. In this region for both cases *E A*ð Þ,*Y A*ð Þ are decreasing functions, and the final mass, due to neutron emission, is lower than the primary mass, i.e., *m* < *A*. As a consequence from that, for a given *m*, the final kinetic energy distribution is wider than the corresponding to the primary mass *A* ¼ *m:*

In the same mass region, *n* >*n*<sup>0</sup> . Then, from the conservation relations, one can easily show that *μ*> *A*. As a result of that, the distribution of *e* values for a given *μ* is different compared to the corresponding to the final mass *m* [11].

#### **3. Average prompt neutron multiplicity**

One of the quantities related to the distribution of fragment excitation energy in fission is the average prompt neutron multiplicity *ν*ð Þ *A* as a function of the mass. In *Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

#### **Figure 5.**

*Experimental average prompt neutron multiplicity as a function of mass (triangles) of fragments from the spontaneous fission of 252Cf obtained by A. Göök et al. using the* 2*E method [12], its sawtooth approach of primary distribution (diamonds), and the corresponding to the calculated by a Monte Carlo simulation (circles) [11].*

2014, using the 2*E* method, Göök *et al.* measured the average prompt neutron multiplicity as a function of the mass of fragments from the spontaneous fission of 252Cf [12]. They found the well-known sawtooth approach, with a noticeable enhancement for *μ* ¼ 121. In 2019, applying a Monte Carlo simulation with input data representing a pre-neutron sawtooth approach (*νs*) without any enhancement for the average prompt neutron multiplicity, Montoya and Romero reproduced [11], as post-neutron, the Göök et al. result [12]. See **Figure 5**.

Those authors explain that the notorious peak in *ν μ*ð Þ at *μ* ¼ 121 is an effect of the yield, the kinetic energy distribution, and the prompt neutron multiplicity as a function of primary fragment mass. In 2019, Montoya applied the Monte Carlo Method to reproduce the results of similar experiments for the 233U(nth, f) and 235U(nth, f) reactions [13].

Those studies show that to calculate the quantities distribution associated with the primary fragments it is necessary to apply the Monte Carlo technique to simulate the experiment and reproduce its results.

#### **4. Yield of charge as a function of fragment kinetic energy**

Several authors have measured the yield of charge as a function of the kinetic energy of the final light fragments from isobaric fragmentations. Quade et al. studied the reaction 233U(nth, f). The results show that the yield of the lower charge of light fragment mass increases as a function of the final kinetic energy [14].

Using the Monte Carlo method, Montoya and Rivera simulated a constant charge distribution as a function of the light fragment kinetic energy, the prompt neutron emission depending on the kinetic energy, and the yield of mass of primary fragments. Their results show that the increase in charge asymmetry with final kinetic energy is due to the decreasing neutron multiplicity as a function of the primary fragment kinetic energy [15]. See **Figure 6**.

Lang et al. obtained similar results for the reaction 235U(nth, f) [16] which were interpreted by Montoya and Rivera with similar arguments [17]. See **Figure 7**. The fragments with low kinetic energy have high excitation energy so they emit a high number of prompt neutrons. Thus, for a given final mass *m*, the corresponding primary mass and charge would be high. This reasoning is valid in a region where the yield is an increasing function of mass.

#### **Figure 6.**

*Reaction 233U (nth, f). (a) The yield of charge as a function of final fragment kinetic energy for final mass 82 measured by Quade et al. [14]. (b) Results from Monte Carlo simulation of the experiment. Yields of charge lower than 0.1% are neglected [15].*

*Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

#### **Figure 7.**

*Reaction 235U(nth, f). The yield of charge as a function of kinetic energy for mass number 85 of final fragments (after neutron emission). (a) Results measured by Lang et al. [16]; (b) results from Monte Carlo simulation of the experiment [17].*

#### **5. Cold fission**

#### **5.1 Maximum values of the kinetic energy of the fragments**

Due to the emission of neutrons, the fragments reach the detectors with final values of mass and kinetic energy lower than the primary values. In 1981, Signarbieux *et al.*, discovered the phenomenon of cold fission in the reactions 233U(nth, f), 235U (nth, f), and 239Pu(nth, f) [18]. They detected fragments with high values of kinetic energy and, therefore, with low values of excitation energy, too low to emit neutrons. Using the time-of-flight difference technique, these authors separated neighboring masses, which permitted them to measure the maximal total kinetic energy curves as a function of the primary fragment mass (*TKE*maxð Þ *A* ) [19]. See **Figures 8**–**10**, respectively.

In 1986, Trochon et al., using twin ionization chambers, obtained experimental values of *TKE*maxð Þ *<sup>A</sup>* for the reaction 235U(nth, f) [20]. See **Figure 11**. The trends of

#### **Figure 8.**

*Fragment mass and total kinetic energy distribution in cold fission region from 233U(nth, f). The thick dashed line is the maximal value of the available energy (Q), as a function of light fragment mass and its corresponding charge. The thin dashed line is the total kinetic energy as a function of fragment mas, for the light fragment kinetic energy E* ¼ 112 *MeV. The thin full lines are equal probability lines: The numbers of detected fission events per a.m.u., whose corresponding total kinetic energy values between two consecutive lines, are indicated in the amplified circle. Those numbers (10 in this case) are chosen such that the separation between consecutive lines is of the order of 1 MeV. Figure is taken from [19].*

*Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

**Figure 9.** *Similar to Figure 6 for the reaction 235U(nth, f). Figure from [19].*

*TKE*maxð Þ *A* are similar to the *tke*ð Þ *μ* curve, but approximately 20 MeV higher than those values [21–23]. The *TKE*maxð Þ *A* curves show oscillations that were interpreted as effects of the change of fragment charges that reach these total kinetic energy values.

**Figure 10.** *Similar to Figure 7 for the reaction 239Pu(nth, f). Figure from [19].*

These so-called Coulomb effects produce ledges in the increasing part of *TKE*maxð Þ *A* curve, corresponding to the change of charges that maximize the total kinetic energy [22].

The Coulomb effect is defined as the preference for a more asymmetric charge isobaric fragmentations corresponding to similar *Q*-values at the highest values of *Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

**Figure 11.**

*Maximal value of total kinetic energy as a function of mass and its corresponding charge of fragments from thermal neutron-induced fission of 235U. Figure taken from [20].*

total kinetic energy [22]. Lang et al. [16] measured the charge and the mass distribution for *E* ¼ 108 MeV. This energy window corresponds to the *TKE*-line 10 MeV lower than the average than the maximal Q-line. For the mass fragmentation 91/135, the charges *Z* ¼ 36 and 37 correspond to the same *Q*-value (187.5 MeV), but the charge *Z* ¼ 36 has a yield (75.9 � 3.3%) higher than the corresponding to *Z* ¼37 (19.7 � 3.1%). For the same mass fragmentation, Trochon et al. [20] have deduced that the surviving charge at very high TKE-values is *Z* ¼ 36. The same holds for the

even-even fragmentations (*Z=Z*<sup>0</sup> , *N=N*<sup>0</sup> Þ ¼ ð Þ 36*=*56, 56*=*88 and (38*=*54, 54*=*90Þ, whose *Q* values are 189.8 and 189.3, respectively.

#### **5.2 Spherical-prolate configurations**

The highest values of *TKE*maxð Þ *A* are reached for the configurations corresponding to the double magic spherical heavy fragments *Z* ¼ 50 and *N* ¼ 82 and the prolate and soft transitional light nuclei *Z* ¼ 40 � 42 and *N* ¼ 60 � 64 . These conditions allow that

$$\text{TKE}\_{\text{max}}(\mathcal{A}) \cong \text{CE} \cong \mathcal{Q},\tag{15}$$

Where *CE* is the Coulomb energy at the scission point, and *Q* is the energy available from the corresponding fragmentation.

Because in the symmetric mass region *CE* ≫ *Q*, in the scission point, the fragments must be highly deformed to constitute a probable configuration. That implies a high deformation energy and therefore a low kinetic energy. This hypothesis is verified in the curve *TKE*maxð Þ *A* : There is a steep drop in *TKE*maxð Þ *A* in symmetric fission [22].

#### **5.3 Even-odd effects in cold fission**

The curve of *TKE*maxð Þ *A* does not present clear even**-**odd effects as a function of the mass, contrary to what might have been expected in the case of a superfluid fission process [23]. This is not contradictory to the existence of even**-**odd effects in the number of protons *δZ* and *δN*. If there is no more than one pair of nucleons (protons or neutrons), the relationship between the three even**-**odd effects is [24, 25]:

$$\mathbf{1} + \delta \mathbf{A} = \delta \mathbf{Z} + \delta \mathbf{N}.\tag{16}$$

In 1991 Gönnenwein and Börsig [26] found a negative odd–even effect on the minimum excitation energy (*TXE*min) as a function of *Z*. In 1993, Hambsch et al. [27] questions the positive odd even effect on that quantity. In 2013, Gönnenwein confirms the negative odd**-**even effect [28]. In 2016, Mirea proposes a microscopic model to explain the negative odd**-**even effects on excitation energy in cold fission [29]. In 2017, Montoya and Collin show that there is no contradiction between the positive odd**-**even effect on *TKE*max and negative odd**-**even effect on *TXE*min as a function of *Z* [30].

#### **6. Conclusion**

The emission of prompt neutrons from fragments from actinides fission does not permit to obtain the pre-neutron mass (*A*) and kinetic energy (*E*) distribution. It is only possible to measure the post-neutron mass (*m*) and kinetic energy (*e*). The difference between the post-neutron and pre-neutron distributions depends on the prompt neutron multiplicity (*ν*) associated with each complementary fragment. Using a Monte Carlo simulation of neutron emission and the experimental technique, several surprising unexpected results of the fission experiment are explained.

The curve of the standard deviation of the kinetic energy as a function of the final mass*σe*ð Þ *<sup>m</sup>* of fragments from the reaction 235U(nth, f) shows a peak around *<sup>m</sup>* <sup>¼</sup> 109.

*Influence of Prompt Neutron Emission on the Final Distribution of Mass, Kinetic Energy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110048*

The curve of the average prompt neutron multiplicity as a function of the provisional mass of fragments, *ν μ*ð Þ, from the spontaneous fission of 252Cf, presents a peak around *μ* ¼ 122. The results of Monte Carlo simulations show that both cases may be explained by the interplay of the prompt neutron emission and the rapid decreasing of *Y A*ð Þ and *E A*ð Þ in their respective mass region.

For isobaric fragmentation in the asymmetric region, the preference for the lower charge of the light fragment increases with the final kinetic energy. This result is explained by the fact that fragments with higher kinetic energy have emitted a lower number of neutrons, which correspond to a lower charge nuclei.

In the cold fission region, the fragment excitation energy is so low that there is no emission of neutron emission. Thus, by a mass spectrometer, one can separate neighboring masses. So, we can obtain the curve of the maximal value of the primary total kinetic energy (*TKE*max) as a function of the fragment mass (*A*). The curve of the *TKE*maxð Þ *A* shows odd**-**even, shell, and Coulomb effects.

As a conclusion one may say that, in order to relate primary and final fragment distributions, it is necessary to simulate the primary fragment distribution, the emission of neutrons, and the experimental technique. Two different experimental techniques may produce contradictory results.

#### **Author details**

Modesto Montoya1,2

1 National University of Engineering, Lima, Perú

2 Ricardo Palma University, Lima, Perú

\*Address all correspondence to: mmontoya@uni.edu.pe

© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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