**4.2 The "geography of corruption" of criminal organizations in Italian regions: the result of a research on the analysis of judicial records of the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor's office (DNA)**

In contrast to what has been stated in recent years with respect to the data reporting almost total impunity for real corruption, a study was conducted and reported in the recent *Report on Criminality and security in Naples* [15], dedicated in its third and fourth parts to the issue of corruption, demonstrating that corruption cases are

<sup>8</sup> This effect is the so-called phenomenon of the Botswana syndrome, that is, the tendency to compare Italy to states that are quite different from Italy in terms of well-being and wealth.

*Corruption and Policy-Making: How Corruption Models Favor Mafias – The Case Study of Italy DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107835*

#### **Figure 3.**

*Geographical distribution of the events analyzed. Percentage values. Years 2013–2020. Source: DNA data processing of the research group "Crime and security in Naples", Third report.*

not only identified but also punished. Starting from the analysis of judicial cases,9 it has been concluded that the use of corruption by mafia organizations is massive and spread throughout the country. Regarding the so-called "Geography of corruption", the highest concentration of events is recorded only in some of the regions traditionally associated with the presence of mafia-type organizations, especially Campania and Calabria, with 39.9% and 29.1% of cases respectively, while the weight of Sicily and Puglia is marginal, as these two regions taken together barely reach 6% of the total. As regards those territories where mafia infiltration is more recent, the data show a significant presence in Lazio with 19.0% of cases, mainly for events related to the so-called "Mafia Capitale". The other regions of the center-north have a negligible weight, with percentages of less than 5% (**Figure 3**).

In 44.3% of cases, it is corruption for acts contrary to official duties and in 8.3% corruption due to the exercise of the function, while the induction to corruption has reached values of less than 5%. The presence of a mafia-type network directly coincides with those crimes that presuppose the identification of an opportunity that the associates manage directly, or as guarantors of agreements, or as middlemen enabling the hidden exchange to always produce a positive result for all stakeholders. The breakdown of events by mafia-type organization provides some clear information: a comparison between regional area and type of criminal organization tells us that the difference between the Camorra and the 'Ndrangheta is equal to 8.3%, a lower figure than that found between Campania and Calabria, equal to 10.3% (**Figure 4**). This data suggests, based on the documents acquired, that the territorial extension of the Camorra and the 'Ndrangheta does not end in the territories of origin but, as many investigations have already shown, according to the so-called phenomenon of "mafias on the move", the penetration of the 'ndrine in central-northern territories has been growing for years—through their use of corruption to make the process of expansion towards new areas latent and invisible—and, for many aspects, more effective, since they gather around themselves local administrators and politicians, entrepreneurs,

<sup>9</sup> The study was conducted by analyzing: (a) the rulings of the Court of Cassation; (b) those relating to six districts of the Court of Appeal; (c) the judicial material of the SIDNA database; (d) the judicial acts of the DNA; (e) the rulings of the Court of Auditors.

#### **Figure 4.**

*Percentage of incidents by criminal organization. Years 2013–2020. Source: DNA data processing of the research group "Crime and security in Naples", Third report.*

public officials, professionals, intermediaries, precisely by corrupting other subjects engaged in illegality [17].10

As regards the relationship between the territory and corruption events, this is even more interesting if the data on the distribution of corruption events in the sectors of activity is crossed with that of specific mafia-type criminal organizations. Given the confirmation of the hypothesis that the southern regions where mafia organizations are traditionally rooted are those with a dense corrupt activity, the expansion of mafia organizations towards newly settled areas is worrying. In fact, many investigations have revealed a strong presence of Camorra, 'ndrangheta and Sicilian mafia groups in Central and Northern areas, whose expansion has often been determined either by criminal migration chains or by the phenomenon of forced displacement. These two factors explain the establishment of mafia networks and illegitimate powers in territorial realities other than the Mezzogiorno. From expansion, we are now faced with a genuinely new territorial entrenchment where tacit agreements are generated between mafia structures favored by recourse to corrupt activity rather than the use of violence [18]. The results that emerge depict a reality where the high rate of corruption affecting political life, society, the economy and culture, combined with the total or partial absence of transparency and integrity of the institutions and the strong relocation of the mafias, leads to a worsening of the general system. In light of this, in a country like Italy, where mafia criminal organizations are strongly rooted in local areas, it can be said that corruption has an endemic character as it is now an operational tool preferred by the mafias. Yet it should be noted that not all corruption is attributable to the presence of the mafias. Nevertheless, since not all corruption is of mafia origin, the dynamics of intersection between the various economic sectors and the public administration (not to mention corruption between private individuals), requires that anti-corruption reforms are geared towards two types of contrast: (a) at a macrosystemic level, i.e., of a general and all-encompassing nature, coinciding with effectiveness of the sentence, the reduction of subcontracting, greater simplification of competitive administrative procedures, rationalization of the existing regulatory system, etc.; (b) at the microsystem level, coinciding with the

<sup>10</sup> This strategy enhances and consolidates the different types of social capital that are endowed to and produced by mafia organizations.

#### *Corruption and Policy-Making: How Corruption Models Favor Mafias – The Case Study of Italy DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107835*

strengthening of the *Stand Still* clause,11 the implementation of gradual interventions aimed at restoring the legality of entrepreneurs' action, more effective protection nets for *whistleblowers*. This two-pronged approach is decisive because corruption intrinsically has a double meaning: it is a modality that allows the exercise of power and at the same time it benefits the corrupt materially and immaterially.

Confirming the strong micro and macro character of the corruptive dimension present in the country, based on judicial materials and documents pertaining to the database of the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor (DNA), the Court of Auditors and a limited number of documents coming from three Courts of Appeal (Lombardia, Lazio, and Campania), the research cited quantified the amount of diverted public resources representing the "loot" of the various corruption pacts. Overall, from the examination of 536 judicial documents, 673 corruption events were found, totaling almost €260 million stolen from the community over the period 2005-2017 [15].12

The situation that emerges offers an account of the action of the mafias and of entrepreneurs, politicians, administrators and *civil servants* who, in cohesive units, individually, or in specific relationships with some of the agents, plunder public resources by diverting significant shares that could, conversely, benefit the community because deviating from government practices is the exercise of power and not necessarily the result of administrative dysfunctions [19].

The criminal tools used by the mafias must be fought with *ad hoc* regulatory instruments, with a special repression reserved for these forms of crime. Although Italy is preparing all possible tools to make the fight against corruption effective from the innovations introduced by law 3/2019 to the strengthening of the sphere of intervention of ANAC in favor of promoting a culture of prevention of corruption, while maintaining its function of supervision and regulation of public contracts there are still several obstacles to overcome. For instance, the failure to adopt a general law on *lobbying* and the rules on conflict of interest has been repeatedly highlighted as fundamental elements in the fight against corruption by *Transparency International Italy*. Furthermore, repressive measures tend to be hampered by the excessive length of criminal proceedings.

#### **4.3 How to interpret micro and macro corruption**

That multidimensional character of corruption recalled precisely because it is the object of analysis by various sciences, undergoes interpretations that emphasize one

<sup>11</sup> With this instrument, governed by Article 32 of Legislative Decree 50/2016, a temporary impediment to the conclusion of the contract is determined after the definitive award. In this way, minimum standards of substantive and procedural protection are guaranteed to the economic operators involved in the procurement process, to prevent their reasons from being frustrated by the signing of a contract resulting from an allegedly flawed award.

<sup>12</sup> As can be understood, the sources of the survey were different and each made it possible, based on the total of the rulings examined, to extract the number of events characterized by exchange of money. The other utilities have not been examined for the purposes of the total calculation. The SIDNA database (of the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor's Office) showed for the years 2013-2020 a total of 102 judicial acts including 253 events of mafia corruption. From the examination of the acts of the Courts of Appeal (217 rulings) for the period 2002-2019, 348 events of corruption can be found and finally, from the database of the Court of Auditors for the period 2015–2018, out of 217 second instance rulings, there were 72 cases of corruption where the exchange is characterized exclusively by money. Besides these, 96 other cases must be added (whose usefulness was material but not in money) and 49 whose usefulness was found to be immaterial.

aspect or another. Quite a few authors point out that the most appropriate explanation is linked to profound subjective immorality, while others consider the malpractice of corruption originating from administrative inefficiencies and deficits of public organizations (of which crimes against the public administration are an indicator), or coinciding with the capacity of particular circuits of actors (political, economic, administrative, criminal) who, using "illegal skills" and sophisticated regulatory mechanisms, intercept shares of public resources to exclusively pursue private interests [12]. In addition, others see in corruption a degree of circulation of resources functional to oiling the procedures of the public system and necessary to balance differences in status and reputational imbalances due to the different roles of *civil servants*.

Indeed, the corruption market is considered as such by virtue of the perverse effect, especially in Italy, that slow justice produces in rendering criminal proceedings ineffective, without final convictions or with weak criminal effects. This reinforces the sense of impunity and encourages the entry of entrepreneurs, politicians and bureaucrats into the networks of corruption [20]. Although the central aspect, from a criminal law standpoint, is the deviation from official duties that the public role entrusts to the person, whether elected or appointed, it is the pursuit of the private interest (even if it extends to family, kinship or subjects with which you have specific relationships) or of some form of utility, that represents the trait characterizing it subjectively. This angle, however, fades or becomes integrated if we observe corruption as a violation of a collective interest versus the private one, where the public interest becomes connotative of the phenomenon.

Nevertheless, moving on to interpreting the reaction of the public opinion, the corruptive fact is condemned to the extent that the affair arises public indignation; although there is a risk that corruption ends up being associated with acts that have nothing to do with it (i.e., clientelism, favoritism, forms of *ex post* authorization, familisms, particularisms, etc.). Therefore, considering corruption—even if it runs through the history of many countries—as a constitutive phenomenon of the political class and a propensity for entrepreneurial action characterized by a weak or absent sense of the state and *civicness* raises the problem of how these ethical principles are produced and preserved and who is the actor from which they originate.

Interpretations that move along the more culturalist or institutional axis [21] explain some correlations and consequences (in this case the civic deficit) that stem from the spread of corruption, but they tell us nothing about their genesis. The *path-dependent* explanation of the inherited culture (i.e., the historical rooting of a cultural connotation) is itself the harbinger of an explanatory circularity that ends up ignoring where it originated [22]. Given the whole debate on the measurement of interinstitutional trust and the construction of social trust, the culturalist and institutional interpretation promotes the rank of widespread experience that instead belongs to restricted circles or elites that mutually reinforce each other. This approach does not depart from the idea already expressed by Sutherland and from the concept of "differential association", indicating a set of agents who give themselves their own rules and sanctions while sharing a symbolic repertoire strengthened by the "closed" structure, characterized by a veil of silence, as well as by the various utilities distributed, which holds this submerged world together [23, 24]. Indeed, recent integrative criminological theories [25, 26] have repeatedly stressed that socialization with illegitimate opportunities generates a subcultural climate of sharing dishonesty, fraudulent behavior and self-absolution that especially if exempt from social reprobation and stigmatization, which is connected to the perception of social shame, feeds the subjective willingness to use illegitimate means to achieve one's ends and build a

#### *Corruption and Policy-Making: How Corruption Models Favor Mafias – The Case Study of Italy DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107835*

social position while generating a conformity to transgressive action by increasing deviant behavior, especially if the groups or social circles of reference tend to separate the negativity of the act from the personality of the criminal.

Since corruption has historically always been present everywhere in the world, the question is whether it has really increased over time and why. In fact, corruption has been a regulatory tool of the ruling classes precisely because it has allowed either their consolidation or access to power. The contemporary process of globalization, which increased inequality, has in fact reduced the initial capital of resources (monetary, intellectual, technical) with which those belonging to the lower and middle classes begin their careers. The social elevator has stopped, the expectations of improvement and social ascent have been betrayed and the gaze toward the use of illegal opportunities has become broader and more concrete. Moral barriers to corruption have disintegrated. The constant internal crises of economic cycles (three recessions in the last decade) have made it more difficult to support growth, full employment and the production of a sense of social identity in people revolving around a common regulatory structure. The financialization of global markets and the "absolute power" they exert through returns and the introduction of new mechanisms that increase global inequalities of income, opportunity and wealth [27, 28], are putting meritocracy values under pressure, alongside individualism and even cynicism, to the point of producing ideological barriers against the principles of justice on which modern democratic societies are founded.

Economic action from within the capitalist market vision has been annihilated by the financialization of the economy. Entrepreneurs bypass the inefficiencies of the state bureaucracy and the inability to find the right balance in company management between the pursuit of short and long-term objectives and give excessive attention to maximizing their own objective functions exclusively in the short-term [29–31]. This short-term pressure pushes shareholders to make immediate rather than deferred gains, influencing the strategic action of management and thus supporting the entrepreneurial culture and business performance on *short-term* results. This pressure, search for absolute and immediate profit, and sovereignty of the venture market have eradicated the interest of entrepreneurial action in pursuing self-esteem by acting within a territory and perceiving one's role as highly responsible for growth and diffusion of economic development. As a result, the corruptive exchange is consolidated and recognized as the most advantageous and immediate way to profitability, entrusting to it, and to rent-seeking actions, the results and the success of economic activity, thus feeding a vicious circle. Political action geared towards short-term results - in a vicious circle fueled by government instability, the reduction in the growth rate, the high level of public debt and inflationary dynamics - tends to maximize earnings. Crony capitalism has expanded because the condition of weak growth and political fibrillation makes political-administrative positions and statuses precarious. This condition is associated with the global networks of parasitic finance not at all interested in extracting value from the real economy but seeking to transfer wealth from low and middle classes to high-income individuals. A short circuit has occurred and in this perverse vicious circle a willingness to corrupt negotiation agreements matures that is transversal to class segments, professional middle class, economic agents and entrepreneurs, social groups, white-collar workers and individuals for whom the secret corruption pact and hidden exchange configures that utility or advantage whose benefit transforms a condition, allowing the achievement of an objective that would otherwise not be possible, or which would require high subjective costs and a long-term vision.

The complicated thread of corruption seen in hidden exchanges, i.e., in large and small corruption, the solution undertaken by an increasingly large number of people and groups who grab public resources, acquire different advantages or utilities to reach or safeguard private interests, defend themselves from processes that appear ineluctable, or maintain social positions, acting with drug addiction rhythms and consolidating the *pitfall of corruption*.

#### **4.4 Corruption and Covid-19**

It is now known that the mafias are increasingly making use of corruption to penetrate the legal market and that, among other things, it is the emergency conditions following disasters that revive that "disaster capitalism" recently coinciding with Covid-19 [32].

Based on the premise that the *modus agendi* of criminal organizations adapts to the historical moment in which they find themselves operating and to the economicsocial context of reference, starting from the lockdown and throughout the subsequent period of emergency, the activities of the mafias also changed. They continued to act under the radar, abandoning the so-called first-level criminal activities (drug trafficking, extortion, receiving stolen goods, robberies), and promoting money laundering and corruption.13 The large availability of money, from the European financial instruments launched to face the crisis and aimed at reinvestment in legitimate activities, becomes a tool for laundering and re-using illicit capital. For decades now the mafia has been increasingly morphing into a business, showing a fervent ability to operate in an entrepreneurial manner in the medium-long term, without sector or geographical boundaries, especially in relations with Public Administrations. The *permanent monitoring and analysis body on the risk of infiltration into the economy by mafia-type organized crime,*14 when examining the phenomenon of mafia contamination in the economic and social system, outlined the existence of "potential risks, identifying the economic sectors that have always been of interest to the mafias and the new areas connected to the production chains or services linked to the pandemic", the so-called *Covid economy* [33].

The trend of the corruption phenomenon is constantly on the rise, with criminal organizations increasingly resorting to corrupt systems to achieve their goals and taking advantage of emergency situations to a great extent. It is no coincidence that the devastating effects of the recent economic crisis and of the pandemic on the economic system and on healthy businesses, have mobilized the mafias in the support of families and businesses through the offer of money at low interest rates, competitive to the banking system, or with an offer of illicit credit made exclusively to launder and make profits from emergency situations that represent an extraordinary opportunity.

<sup>13</sup> The 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International highlights how corruption affects the ability of states to effectively deal with emergencies. In a context such as that caused by the SARS-COV-2 pandemic, which brought about a double crisis, health and economic, corruption has diverted funds from essential services leaving countries unprepared to respond promptly to the public health crisis. Furthermore, it has generated a distorted allocation of resources which has led to a general violation of the minimum standards of protection of human rights in the management of the pandemic.

<sup>14</sup> Established in April 2020, set up at the Central Directorate of the Criminal Police, of a joint nature, composed of representatives of the State Police, the Carabinieri, the Finance Police, the Penitentiary Police, the DIA, the Central Directorate for the anti-drug services and the Postal Police Service.

#### *Corruption and Policy-Making: How Corruption Models Favor Mafias – The Case Study of Italy DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107835*

The issue is even more topical as the most suitable tool to overcome the Covidrelated crisis was found in the massive operation of public investments aimed at public works, infrastructures, and digital modernization through what has been called an "infrastructural shock", that envisages fast times to face the post-pandemic economic slowdown. To carry out work quickly, the "Decreto Semplicifazioni" n. 76/2020 was issued and then converted into law 120/2020, which provides for a series of "Simplifications in the field of public contracts" of a two-faced nature: extraordinary and transitory. The problem lies in failing to consider the corruptive matrix that has affected and still affects our country, which could draw new life from such a system.

At the international level, too, the problem of the diversion of public funds is a cause for concern. In a speech to the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said that "*we will ensure that money from our budget and NextGenerationEU is protected against any kind of fraud, corruption and conflict of interest*". Again, Europol raises the alarm on the risk of infiltration by syndicates: "*The mafias are aiming for the money from the Recovery Fund, we need to watch out for the funds arriving*". Finally, the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has published guidelines aimed at its 50 member states for preventing corruption in the context of the health emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. "*As countries face undeniable emergencies, the concentration of power, the waiver of rights and freedoms, and as large amounts of money are infused into the economy to alleviate the crisis, the risks of corruption should not be underestimated*" said the president of the GRECO [34].

To date, it is undisputed that if on the one hand the emergency required the need to identify tools for accelerating and simplifying procedures, on the other the legislator is obliged to provide for measures that strengthen legality.

Based on the premise that the corruption phenomenon is assuming an increasingly expansive trend, it is necessary to act on a double front, in the common perspective of transparency: on the one hand, it is necessary to strengthen transparency in procedures and simplify them, by accurately tracing the responsibility of acts, the digital sequence of the process and the decision-making locations in organizational procedures; on the other hand, we need transparency in the field of corruption prevention strategies. This means *accountability* and participation of the various *stakeholders* must be integrated and pursued in all anti-Covid-19 plans and *policies.*15 The pandemic has shown, once again, how important the prevention of corruption is even before the fight against it, and that the instrument of derogation from the regulations set up precisely to contrast and significantly reduce the risk of corruption, would generate a laceration in and of the law with a very strong risk of infiltration by criminal organizations.

#### **5. Conclusion**

This contribution invariably emphasizes the serial character assumed by corruption which has infected a large part of the public sphere and private companies and

<sup>15</sup> According to GRECO, transparency, control and responsibility must be better implemented, given the delicacy of a situation in which large sums of money are quickly made available to the sectors most in trouble, such as the health sector, where there are critical issues related to large-scale public procurement, an insufficient number of vaccines and a vaccination passport, see Council of Europe, GRECO, Corruption Risks and Useful Legal References in the context of COVID-19, Strasburg, 15 April 2020, available at: www. coe.int/greco.

anesthetized the collective conscience, generating a general addiction and a sense of resignation towards the phenomenon. This resignation is a symptom of a profound crisis affecting the field of legal certainty that characterizes our age and the life of every citizen.

This crisis derives from the problem that has been affecting our legal system for a long time, namely that of the legislative nomorrhea: in fact, our regulatory system is characterized by an over-production of easily circumventable norms, by legislation rich in precepts where it is difficult to describe into more and more specific rules certain nuances that a multifaceted and chameleonic phenomenon like corruption can take on, therefore unable in reality to really tackle the problem. Moreover, it has now become common practice for jurisprudence to fill the legislative gaps. As a matter of fact, the actors of corruption exploit to their advantage this gap between the incompleteness of the laws and the interpretation of jurisprudence. This generates constant "updating" of the criminal rules hand in hand with the strategies prepared to counter the corruption phenomenon, relying above all on the silence of the actors who participate in the *pactum sceleris*, on the silence of the socio-cultural context in which they operate and exploiting the greater impunity guaranteed by invisibility in the eyes of society.

The sense of distrust engendered by this mechanism in the population leads to a victory for corruption over legality. Therefore, the new challenges that international and national organizations are facing must be fought by using not only the weapon of criminal sanctions but also of administrative tools which, used in a coordinated and synergistic way, can give an effective response to the fight against corruption by attacking the system upstream through preventive action and downstream through prosecution when prevention was not effective.

It is now a widespread mentality to answer the question about the reasons for getting involved in certain corrupt mechanisms with the phrase "because everyone does it". This statement is only partially true, as it is not fair to say "everyone does it" but "many do it". However, until those "many corrupt" do not become "all corrupt" it means that there is still a part of public officials, entrepreneurs or private citizens who are fighting this silent war against corruption and suitable tools must be guaranteed so that, in the opposite sense, "many not corrupt" become "all not corrupt".

It should be emphasized that anti-mafia measures need to be implemented. It would be appropriate, like we do when referring to mafias in the plural, to speak of "anti-mafias" [35]. Therefore, in order to fight this system and break the link between the mafias and the economy, it is advisable to know more about the different organizational dynamics, to use existing tools while avoiding burdening a system that already possesses a gargantuan normative production, and to use differentiated instruments of action of a repressive, preventive and "curative" type for the social fabric, so that this does not act as a breeding ground for the proliferation of such practices harmful to the national economy, thus decreasing the real risk of corruption and infiltration of criminal organizations, especially in *subiecta materia* [36].

We hope that, both in terms of *de iure condito*, and *de iure condendo,* a reform is carried out to reconcile the tools provided by the current regulatory system with a legal system that quickly restores dignity and trust in justice. Corruption damages the community but those who pay the highest price are always the most disadvantaged groups who use services that become increasingly poor. The effect is the exclusion and nonrecognition of rights, as well as the mortification of the dignity of those who cannot afford to resort to private services delivered by private professionals.

*Corruption and Policy-Making: How Corruption Models Favor Mafias – The Case Study of Italy DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107835*
