**6. Corruption: the causes**

Causes of corruption are conditions outside of the moral feelings of the (potential) corruptor or corruptee, which are exploitable in the execution of the corrupt and selfish deed. They are exploitable in that they make the object of the intended corrupt activity

vulnerable; they facilitate concealment of the corrupt deed, or they naturally or artificially are used to degrade the seriousness of an act of corruption. Some of the causes or environmental factors that literature variably link to the prevalence of corruption are as follows:

**Governance issues:** Former colonies, size of government, structure of government, political Systems, press freedom, criminal justice system.

Corruption tends to be rife where governance systems are weak or non-existent. Systems create rules, content and processes of interdependence, working and relating which vary in their level of corruption proof. Thus, corruption is more a function of the nature of governance than any one of the factors: former colonies, size of government, structure of government, political systems, press freedom and criminal justice system operating singly.

The attribution of corruption to historical statehood as a colony has generally been with reference to Africa and the Latin American world. However, such a link becomes difficult to sustain in argument, taking into consideration that even some European states that were at some point colonised are not regarded as corrupt states, least as countries where corruption is visible even by the 'hidden cameras'. I do not dispute that most former colonies could still be experiencing corruption not necessarily because they were colonised but because individuals from the former colonial masters have maintained grip on systems, structures and resources in ways that help to keep them from exploiting the former colonies through corrupt channels. Much of this has been achieved and will be sustained through bribery and other forms of corruption, including the threats to withdraw aid and support.

Root [1] and Gerring and Thacker [2] argue that the bigger the state, the higher the levels of corruption. However, I argue that size alone cannot cause corruption. What we can suppose is that size and systems can be made to create resources, structures, processes and interface relationships that are exploited by the greedy and selfish for their personal aggrandisement.

To curb corruption through the Criminal Justice System (CJS), it matters to ensure deterrence at the policing level, the justice dispensation level and the prison/correctional services level. The effectiveness of the CJS depends indirectly on the stance-tocrime of the legislation, which sets the laws and monitors the CJS.

Kauffman and Krany [3] argue the presence of a correlational link between voice and accountability and control of corruption. They claim that the weaker the voice and accountability, the higher the level of corruption. The assumption here is that when voice and accountability are low, too will be their level of influence on conditions that can facilitate creation and strengthening of activism against corruption.

Treisman [4] and *Institute for Economics & Peace* [5] concur that democracy in itself does not put an end to corruption. What democracy does is reduce corruption by creating a system and environment where corrupt activities are not censored, are discussed and are exposed. It is this fear of being 'exposed, named, and shamed' that act as the deterrent against corruption. Brazil and Mexico have a public 'dirty list' that features all those convicted of corruption [6]. Democratic set-ups enhance the power of voice and the power of media channelled at challenging the multiplication and proliferation of supply chains of corruption. Where corruption manifests as a technical problem, it should be confronted by technical anti-corruption means, and where corruption manifests itself as a political phenomenon, it should be confronted by both technical and political devices.

• **Economic issues:** Extent of competition, Salary levels, Recruitment systems, Percentage of women in the labour force, Endowment of natural resources, economic environment.

#### *Corruption: Drivers, Modes and Consequences DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106826*

What is difficult to understand is relationship between relative presence of women in the labour force and levels of corruption. There are numerous cases where women have been at the centre of corruption in their femininity or operating alongside men. Women can also be party to corruption within labour as outside labour and business.

There are anecdotal claims that the higher the extent of competition the high the extent of corruption. But this relationship can be disrupted by other factors such as press freedom and the vigour of anti-corruption activism. Harsh economic environments can be causative of high corruption as is low endowment of natural resources. This relationship is in response to the natural instinct to survive in ambiances of scarcities. Low salaries create situations of scarcities. Extent of competition, salary levels, percentage of women in the labour force, endowment of natural resources, economic environment are factors that influence the scramble for jobs, thus the content and processes of recruitment systems and the prevalence of corruption in recruitment and selection channels.

• **Cultural issues:** Cultural determinants, political environment, professional ethics, morality, habits, customs, traditions, demography.

These factors, in one way or the other influence the prevalence of corruption. These too are the main explanation for the slipperiness of our conception of corruption. These factors can normalise and standardise particular actions to the extent that they become viewed as lesser or more corrupt. We cannot deny the fact that due to cultural hegemony perpetrated by the west and the USA on the other nations, the labelling of some cultural artefacts as corruption has been found offensive by people in other cultures. This is so, particularly, when these cultures take the issues in question as core to their way of living and socialising.

I would like to leave a note on the relation between corruption (C), economic rent (R) discretionary power (D) and accountability (A). If a society or system of governance confers too much space for decision makers to exercise their discretion they are increasing the chances for those decision-makers to act corruptly. Equally so, if a system allows for huge opportunities for creating economic rents, then it is allowing itself to suffer from rampant corruption. The stronger the accountability requirements in a system the lesser the chances for corrupt behaviours to occur. The equation below sums up the relationship among these variables.

> = + − orruption opportunities for economic amount of iscretionary power ccountability **C R***ent* **D A** (1)

$$\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{D} - \mathbf{A}$$

The equation sums up the discussion in that governance, economics and culture in some sophisticated manners do affect rent, discretion and accountability and consequently corruption.

### **7. Corruption: concealing strategies**

Corruption is almost always concealed because there is the risk of detection, arrest and prosecution. There is also interest in that the benefit from the corruption must be realised in full. Thirdly is the avoidance of exposure and blackmail. In fact, a corrupt activity must be concealed so that the corruption can be perpetuated. There are a number of ways corruption can be concealed.


*Corruption: Drivers, Modes and Consequences DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106826*

> The representative of the Project Owner will ensure that the project bill is exorbitantly high and that payments are quickened. Another scenario is where the partners in the JV will each work on a portion of the project. Now, the representative of the Project Owner ensures that the relative of the Project Owner in the JV gets a bigger portion of the payments, much more than should have legitimately been.


volumes of money can be transferred. The geolocation processes and the deanonymising processes need time, specialists and expensive technology. The financing of corruption has in the recent past gone public through various advertising channels. To avoid being traced out, those running the corrupt deeds migrate to new sites, new logos, and new names all too frequently. Trending too is the creation of corrupt and illegal markets alongside the legal markets and sites. The law enforcement agencies will as much as those victimised not be sure who they are actually dealing with. The corrupt owners of those markets and websites will always move between the two markets and sites as pleases their safety.

In summary, the motives to conceal a bribe or other forms of corruption include as follows: a bribe paid to win a contract must remain secret lest the contract award will be set aside; a bribe paid to have an inflated contract claim approved must remain secret otherwise the contract claim will be rejected; a bribe paid to secure planning permission must remain secret otherwise the planning approval will be set aside.
