**6. Concluding remarks**

We presented an experiment with application on the role of transparency in currency crisis models. The originality of our contribution stems from the fact that such an exercise has never been implemented (to our knowledge) as a usual

laboratory economic game with a pedagogical objective afterwards: (see Holt and Tanga [16], Alba-Frenandez et al. [22]). We find that public information plays somewhat a role in subjects' choices, but could not be considered obviously as a focal point in determining their decisions. Overall, transparency as measured by the precision of public information gives the central bank more control over traders' beliefs. However, the ability of the central bank to predict an attack is reduced as the traders get private information (uncontrolled by the central bank) from other sources. We further note that this experiment is a "première" in Tunisia. All published or unpublished (few) papers in the literature are about experiments conducted after ours. This adds value to our contribution and encourages us to carry out further economic experiments in our country about other scientific research objectives.
