*2.2.1 Contribution to multilateral climate change funds*

The contribution to multilateral climate change funds constitutes 23% of the contributions under the multilateral channel, mainly provided in cross-cutting activities. As reported in **Figure 8**, a comparison between 2015–2016 and 2017–2018 shows an

*Kept Promises? The Evolution of the EU Financial Contribution to Climate Change DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.105541*

**Figure 7.**

*Climate finance of EUplus: multilateral contribution in BR3 vs. BR4. Source: elaboration on [18].*

#### **Figure 8.**

*Climate finance of EUplus: climate change funds by type of support. Source: elaboration on [18].*

increase in "cross-cutting" support, which has essentially replaced the "other" category, followed by an increase in both "mitigation" and "adaptation" support.

Looking at the evolution of contributions to climate change funds in the last two BR, **Figure 9**, there is a progressive growth of the Green Climate Fund, which absorbed 68% of resources in 2017–2018, mainly used in cross-cutting activities (77%) and mitigation (23%) (**Table 2**).

#### *2.2.2 Contribution to multilateral financial institutions*

The contribution to multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks, constitutes over 74% of the contributions under the multilateral channel,

**Figure 9.**

*Climate finance of EUplus: multilateral climate change funds (BR3 vs. BR4). Source: elaboration on [18].*


*Note: The breakdown for type of support is based on BR4 data, while the arrows show the trend respect to the BR3. Source: elaboration on [18].*

#### **Table 2.**

*Multilateral climate change fund: weight and contribution by type of support.*

even for the multilateral financial institutions the support is earmarked to "cross-cutting" activities (**Figure 10**).

Looking at the evolution of contributions to financial institutions in the last two BR, there is a progressive decrease of World Bank allocation whose amount passed from 43% to 11%, while the item "other" has increased by both the member fees paid for participation in certain institutions and the participation in projects promoted by regional development banks (e.g., EIB, Latin America Development Bank) or research institutions (e.g., IRENA, IEA, OECD) (**Table 3**).

*Kept Promises? The Evolution of the EU Financial Contribution to Climate Change DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.105541*

**Figure 10.**

*Climate finance of EUplus: multilateral financial institution (BR3 vs. BR4). Source: elaboration on [18].*


*Note: The breakdown for type of support is based on BR4 data, while the arrows show the trend respect to the BR3. Source: elaboration on [18].*

#### **Table 3.**

*Multilateral financial institutions: weight and contribution by type of support.*

#### *2.2.3 Contribution to specialized United Nations bodies*

Finally, in the third multilateral channel relates to the specialized United Nations bodies, the prevailing type of support is "cross-cutting," both because the contributions to the United Nations are collected on sustainability issues (e.g., UNICEF, FAO,


*Note: The breakdown for type of support is based on BR4 data, while the arrows show the trend respect to the BR3. Source: elaboration on [18].*

#### **Table 4.**

*Multilateral financial institutions: weight and contribution by type of support.*

IPCC, WMO), and because of the broad structure of the activities in which these bodies operate (**Table 4**).
