**2. Organized recruitments in the USSR and nowadays**

The history of international experience in the organized recruitment of migrant workers shows that many European States (e.g. Germany, Denmark) have used this

#### *State Organized Recruitment for the Russian Enterprises: Is It a Pass to a Better Life or to Slavery? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110740*

policy extensively since the 1950s to develop certain types of economies with heavy physical labour, hazardous for health, and not attractive to the local population [8].

The emergence and functioning of an organized recruitment system in the USSR as a closed migration system was characterized by internal migrations. This method of state management of labour resources, their movement and redistribution in the conditions of a planned, tightly controlled economy was used to develop new industries or regions (Far North and Far East), large state projects (BAM, Kazakhstan Tselina, Nechernozemnaya Zone development, etc.). In the 1930s and 1960s, in the USSR, it was carried out mainly through the party and Komsomol district committees (on Komsomol assignment), and in some cases through mobilization*,* that is, by attracting the rural population to cities to work at enterprises. They were provided with tax benefits, lump sum cash payments, and material allowance [9].

In the absence of passports for the rural population and strict migration control until the 1960s, organizational recruitment in the USSR performed both economic (industrial) and social functions. It was, on the one hand, a way to satisfy the demand of employers for labour, and on the other hand, served as a means of ensuring certain personal interests of workers (change of employment, higher wages, etc.), from the 1930s until the collapse of the USSR. Specialists with higher education were usually sent to national republics for the development of the economy of the outskirts. During the organizational recruitment, many enterprises, especially the administration of new buildings, did not fulfill their obligations to the recruited collective farmers, did not dole out money, often did not provide them with medical care, did not pay them benefits during the next period, and did not accommodate them properly upon arrival at the place. The cost of recruiting escapees was high, especially from remote districts and regions [10].

The system of organized recruitment of workers was characterized by a high level of turnover of personnel and fraud of recruiters. The predominant number of people who resigned and left the enterprise arbitrarily during the first year was mostly employees recruited through the system of organizational recruitment from amongst the rural population. During the 1950s, 4.6 million workers were recruited through the organized recruitment system [11].

Despite this, the system of organized recruitment of workers contributed to solving the problem of lack of workers in the Soviet industry in the first post-war years. The change in the economic situation in the country in the 1950s led to a decrease in the need of the economy for unskilled labour and, therefore, to a decrease in the number of workers recruited through organized recruitment [12]. In many regions of Russia, demographic resources were either exhausted or close to exhaustion by 1960. Organized movements played an important role in this process [13].

Of particular note is the system and consequences of organized recruitment in Moscow. The demand for labour resources was so large that almost all sectors of the capital's economy felt a shortage of workers, and the authorities met this demand by hiring workers and employees who arrived under organized recruitment claims (socalled "limits") of ministries and departments on conditions of temporary registration in addition to invited specialists of high qualifications [14].

Unlike an indigenous Muscovite, the so-called "limiter" (temporary residence worker) lacked some of the rights accustomed to a Soviet citizen. The limiter with a temporary residence permit could not make purchases on credit, could not queue for housing, could not leave his enterprise, being unable to find a more suitable job. Employees attracted to Moscow under the limit were significantly underpaid. Life in the hostels was so unbearable that many limiters could not stand it and left the

capital. Limiters were given a hostel and, after 5 years of work, they were granted permanent Moscow registration and the right to receive a separate apartment in the capital. Enterprises built their dormitories and houses for limiters [14].

Limiters, having worked in Moscow for 5 years, often moved to more promising job positions in other industries, and at enterprises that were able to give them proper registration and housing. That led to a shortage of personnel, and it became necessary to hire more and more new workers. "About 50% of the total number of workers recruited for Moscow enterprises left the enterprises to which they were accepted." [15] Gradually, the process became unmanageable. In Moscow, during the 1970s and the 1980s, they recruited more than 50 thousand limiters per year [16].

This contributed to the fact that due to non-resident workers the population of the capital increased to 8 million people by 1979, which was the level planned to reach by the General Plan for the Development of Moscow only by 1990 [17]. In Moscow, the shortage of personnel was structural. This meant that the lack of labour resources was not overall, but there were not enough workers in particular professions, especially those engaged in heavy physical labour. Limiters made it possible for the administration of Moscow enterprises to do without rationalizing production, and without automating labour processes, which led to the uncontrolled growth of Moscow's population, increasing the social tension [12].

Basically, organized recruitment in the USSR was carried out on the territory of Russia and inside Russia. The population of the national republics practically were not able to move anywhere else due to registration control. And qualified Russian specialists were sent there for the development of the economy of the republics. The modern situation somewhat resembles the situation in the USSR, with the difference that now the incoming workers are foreigners, not "insiders," and no one promises them the prospects of social elevators except better wages. Until recently, the perspective to gain Russian citizenship has been considered an attractive factor in migration.

## **3. Labour migration from Uzbekistan during the period of independence**

After the collapse of the USSR, forced migrations of the 1990s to Russia and abroad were replaced by labour ones. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was designed in 1991 to preserve, in one form or another, the system of economic, cultural, and historical ties within the former Soviet space and member states like Uzbekistan enjoyed a visa-free regime. Demographic projections for Russia and the countries of its southern underbelly differ widely. Whereas Russia's labour force is expected to shrink by 1 million people per year from 2025 onwards [18], the forecast for Central Asia is very optimistic through 2050. Labour migration from Uzbekistan is projected to rise by 6.4 million. This is a good source of replacement labour for Russia [5].

Uzbekistan's economic development is much lower than in Russia, which is expressed in GDP per capita by the ratio of Russia—\$12,172.8 GDP per capita in 2021, whilst in Uzbekistan only \$1983.1GDP per capita. This makes Russia very attractive to migrant labourers from Uzbekistan. Citizens of Uzbekistan began to actively participate in labour seasonal migration at the beginning of the 2010s and their number increased to 1.8 million people by 2016 [19].

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), as close cooperation for the free movement of goods, capital, technologies, and labour within the five-member bloc, came

### *State Organized Recruitment for the Russian Enterprises: Is It a Pass to a Better Life or to Slavery? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.110740*

into effect on 1 January 2015. Uzbekistan is not a member. This situation did complicate the migration of labourers since 1 January 2015 and create greater vulnerability to exploitation of migrant labourers in the Russian labour market [20]. According to the "stairs of inequality" on levels of payment that is based on racial characteristics of ethnicity, Uzbek workers are at the lowest position together with Tajikistan migrants. The hardest and lowest-paying jobs are in construction, where many Uzbekistan migrants are employed, often in slave-like conditions [21]. According to one survey, 55% of migrants cited informal connections—relatives and friends—as their main channel for finding work [22]. Most Central Asian migrants stayed in Russia in time of COVID-19: only 73,000 migrants out of more than 1 million working in Russia returned to Uzbekistan [23].

During the COVID-19 pandemic, to comply with sanitary and epidemiological standards, those wishing to come to Russia underwent a medical examination, PCR testing, and vaccination, and the patent was not tied to a specific employer. But the quota for workers from Uzbekistan was 10 thousand only in 2021. All construction companies need builders. The construction companies PIK-Industry and TechStroy planned to recruit about 4 thousand people to work in Moscow and Moscow region. In total, the region needs about 14 thousand Russian-speaking men from 21 to 50 years old with work experience of at least 2 years for a salary of 60–100 thousand. Dormitory, working clothes, and meals in the first month are provided by the employer [24]. The Russian government has already approved programs for the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects. Millions of Uzbeks will be able not only to get a job there, but also to master new experience, according to the leadership of AELM. Reliance on organized recruitment 2022 [25].

In October 2021, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation announced the start of testing a new mechanism for the admission of foreign labour to the country. The Ministry of Labour of the Russian Federation proposed to remove the limit on the number of migrants of 10 thousand people from Uzbekistan and expand the range of participants from companies in the construction sector and agro-industrial complex to other industries [26]. It is proposed to link a foreign citizen to a specific employer who issues a work permit to the arriving employee, which, as we will see later, often turns into a violation by employers of criminal law on combating human trafficking and slavery. This happens as many migrants, when finding themselves in terrible living and working conditions, run away from their employers. Chairman of the interregional trade union "Novoprof" Ivan Milykh believes that the targeted recruitment of foreign migrant labourers carries certain risks. Workers may find themselves in a situation where all current expenses of the employer will be deducted from the promised salary, which is why migrants are actually tied to their working places [27].

In 2021, 108.5 thousand people went to work abroad as part of an organized recruitment from Uzbekistan. Of these, 100.1 thousand went to Russia (out of more than a million participating in migration to Russia), 6.9 thousand to Kazakhstan, 1.5 thousand to South Korea [28]. In addition, new destinations for official labour migration became Serbia—for 410 people, as well as Germany—for 31 people. The Institute of Forecasting and Macroeconomic Research presented an assessment of new directions for labour migrants from Uzbekistan. They called Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic attractive directions for the development of migration from Uzbekistan [29].
