**1. Introduction**

A great deal has been written by and about the Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen in the last two or three decades. In that time much has also been written about the capabilities approach in development studies, including Sen's version of it. Indeed, there is now an academic journal devoted to it, the *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities,* which commenced publishing in the year 2000, changing its name to the current title in 2009.

Similarly, a great deal has also been written in the same period about the concept of happiness and its relevance for students of economics. Not all of the contributors to this literature are enthusiasts for the value of happiness, or for a happiness approach to human well-being and development, although many of them are. Here it should be noted that there are, broadly speaking, two different versions of it, based on the notions of objective happiness and subjective happiness respectively. The difference between these is that for proponents of the former one can be mistaken about one's own happiness, whereas according to proponents of the latter one cannot be. On that view, individuals are the best judges of what their own happiness involves.

Again, this burgeoning literature on the economics and politics of happiness has led to the creation of a new academic journal, *The Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being*, which also commenced publication in the year 2000. As the wording of this title suggests, the editors of this journal lean in the direction of what I have called the subjective happiness approach. A good example of somebody who endorses this approach would be Richard Layard, who provides an accessible account of it in his *Happiness: Lessons From a New Science* (2005) [1].

Given the above, it is not too surprising that some scholars have attempted to bring these two different bodies of literature together. In the last 15 years or so, a number of conferences and workshops, and associated special issues of academic journals, have been devoted to this theme. These include symposia in the *Review of Social Economy* (2005); *Utilitas* (2006); *The Journal of Socio-Economics* (2010); and *The International Review of Economics* (2020). A significant event here was the publication of a volume edited by Luigino Bruni, Flavio Comim and Maurizio Pugno, entitled *Capabilities and Happiness* in 2008 [2]. I shall refer to this general effort as the capabilities versus happiness debate, which commenced in 2005 and continues to the present.

This chapter has five parts. In part one I offer an account of the subjective happiness approach to development studies. In part two I turn to consider Amartya Sen's version of the capabilities approach, which was initially put forward by him as a critique of the subjective happiness approach. In part three I consider what Sen has to say about the value of subjective happiness and his understanding of part which the concept has to play in the capabilities approach as he understands it. In part four I scrutinise the efforts which have been made by some scholars to synthesise the capabilities approach and the subjective happiness approach into a third approach, which is claimed to have the strengths of each and the weaknesses of neither. Finally, in part five, I consider some possible criticisms of Sen's own understanding of the concept of happiness and its significance, when assessed from the standpoint of Aristotle's ethical eudaimonism and its notion of objective happiness.

### **2. The happiness approach to human development and well-being**

The happiness approach comes in two significantly different forms, namely the subjective happiness and the objective happiness versions respectively. The contributors to the capabilities versus happiness debate usually (though not always) have in mind the notion of subjective rather than that of objective happiness. On that view, happiness is identical with subjective well-being. It is a matter of having pleasurable sensations or experiences, which might be characterised by the expression 'feeling good.' As such, it is something that is veridically self-reported. For those who think in this way about happiness, it is not possible for any individual agent to be mistaken about their own situation, so far as their happiness (or otherwise) is concerned. This way of thinking about happiness runs counter to a very old view, which can be traced back at least to the writings of Aristotle, if not before, according to which happiness (or eudaimonia) is at least in part an objective state of affairs. On that view, individual agents can indeed be mistaken as to what will make them really or truly happy. I shall say something about Sen, eudaimonism and the notion of objective happiness in part five.

I shall follow Amartya Sen and take Richard Layard and his *Happiness: Lessons From a New Science* as a representative for the happiness approach. This is subjected to criticism by Sen in *The Idea of Justice* [3]. Enthusiasts for the subjective happiness

### *Amartya Sen and the Capabilities versus Happiness Debate: An Aristotelian Perspective DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108512*

approach such as Layard make five core assumptions, some of which are indicated by the sub-title of *The Journal of Happiness Studies*, with its reference to the notion of subjective well-being. The first of these is a commitment to monism, or the view that there is only one value which really matters. The second is that this unitary value is happiness. Hence, in their opinion, happiness is all that matters. Given this assumption, there is evidently a close intellectual affinity between the happiness approach to human development and well-being and utilitarianism, more specifically, the classical version of that doctrine, in the writings of Jeremy Bentham.

The third assumption that is made by Layard is that happiness is entirely a subjective affair. Contrary to the view that is associated with ethical eudaimonism, Layard holds that there is for them no such thing as objective happiness. There is no more to happiness than a subjectively experienced 'feeling.' In Layard's words, 'happiness is feeling good and misery is feeling bad' [1]. On this view, if somebody 'feels' happy then they are happy. For there is no more to happiness than having a feeling of a certain kind, or being in a certain psychological state. On this view, as Shakespeare's Hamlet says, 'there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so.' Consequently, one cannot be mistaken about one's own happiness.

It is true that Layard thinks that mental experiences or of this kind, or psychological states of mind, can be connected to the physiological activity of the human brain, and that this is something which increasingly we are able to objectively measure [1]. Once that is done, we can go on to explain a person's underlying level of happiness,' the 'quality of his life as he experiences it' [1]. Nevertheless, according to Layard and other advocates of this view, this should not be thought to imply that the concept of happiness is objective in any other sense of the term, especially not the sense according to which individual agents might possibly be mistaken when making a judgement about their own happiness. For those who subscribe to a subjective or subjectivist understanding of the notion of happiness, to talk in that way would involve a contradiction in terms.

Layard's fourth assumption is that there is, therefore, no significant difference between 'happiness' and 'well-being.' These two terms are synonyms. They are simply two different ways of talking about or referring to the same thing. His fifth assumption is that, just like happiness, so also well-being is entirely a subjective affair. This implies that those like Layard who make this assumption should not really talk about 'subjective well-being' at all, and would not do so if their thinking was entirely consistent. This is so because for them, given their understanding of the concept of well-being, the term is a pleonasm. It really only makes sense to speak in that way if one also accepts that there is such a thing as objective well-being as well as subjective well-being. However, this is something which Layard denies.

### **3. Sen's version of the capabilities approach**

Sen is a critic of what I have called the happiness approach to human development and well-being, especially Layard's subjectivist version of it. He rejects most of its assumptions, though not all of them. With one important exception, his version of the capabilities approach is based on a very different set of beliefs. First of all Sen rejects Layard's monism, or the view that there is only one thing which really matters, or only one core value in ethics and politics, either for private individuals or for policy makers. Sen rejects Layard's utilitarianism, 'on the grounds that well-being,' whether understood by Layard or in some other way, 'is not the only thing that is valuable' [4].

There is disagreement over the issue of what Sen's proposed alternative to monism is, specifically whether he is a pluralist who maintains that there are many values, which are of equal importance to one another or, alternatively, a dualist who maintains that there are in fact two core values rather than just one. For present purposes, I shall present Sen as a dualist. His version of the capabilities approach attaches importance to just two core values, not one or more. These two core values are well-being and freedom. Unlike Layard, far from being *the* one and only value in ethics, happiness is not even one of the core values in Sen's version of the capability approach. I shall consider what Sen has to say about the value of happiness in part four.

There is evidential support for a dualist reading of Sen's views. For example, in *On Ethics and Economics*, he states that 'there is an essential and irreducible "duality" in the conception of a person in ethical calculation' [4]. This is so, he continues, because 'we can see the person, in terms of agency [freedom – TB], recognizing and respecting his or her ability to form goals, commitments, values, etc., and we can also see the person in terms of well-being' [4]. Sen makes the same point in his Dewey lectures of 1984. There he observes that 'in these lectures I have tried to explore some of the implications of seeing persons from two different perspectives, viz., well-being and agency, neither of which can subsume the other' [5]. He goes on to say that these 'two basic aspects of persons, viz., well-being and agency' might be associated with the 'dual base' of his capability approach to questions of ethics and politics [5]. His conclusion in *On Ethics and Economics* is that there is 'no possibility of relying on utility-based calculation' in order to catch 'the dual basis of well-being and agency in substantive ethics.' This 'duality between achievement and freedom,' he argues, is simply 'not capturable within the "monist" framework of utility-based calculus' [4]. Sen argues that, because of its dualism, his version of the capabilities approach provides 'a different—and in many ways a richer—perspective on the evaluation of individual well-being and freedom' than is offered by utilitarianism. Consequently, it provides a more 'plausible informational basis for a large part of social evaluation' [6].

This conceptual dualism between the value of freedom and that of well-being runs throughout Sen's work. It is expressed in different ways at different times. Sometimes Sen distinguishes between thinking about individual human beings as either 'agents' or as 'patients.' Elsewhere, when talking about the actions of individual agents, he differentiates between 'processes' or the process side of things, on the one hand, and 'achievements' or 'outcomes' on the other. The same dualism is also implicit in his distinction, which is central to his version of the capabilities approach, between 'capabilities' and 'functionings.' When Sen talks about capabilities he has in mind realistic opportunities for the successful achievement of certain outcomes which are preferred and freely chosen by individual agents. The concept of 'functionings,' on the other hand, has to do with whether or not the intended outcomes, or the associated 'beings and doings,' are in fact successfully achieved.

Sen holds that there is no guarantee that an increase in freedom, understood by reference to the notion of capabilities, will lead to an increase in well-being. This is so for a variety of reasons. For example, this may not be what the agent chooses. Alternatively, the agent may choose to promote her own well-being and yet, for some reason, decide not to not act on that choice. Also, Sen suggests at times that the well-being of the agent might actually be reduced for some reason. This might be either intentional or unintentional. In the first case, as with Mohandas Gandhi, this would happen if through an act of commitment the agent freely chose to act in a way which they know will lead to a diminution of their own well-being. Alternatively, they might choose to pursue their own well-being and act accordingly, but unsuccessfully.

### *Amartya Sen and the Capabilities versus Happiness Debate: An Aristotelian Perspective DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108512*

An unintended outcome of their action might be that their well-being actually falls, despite their efforts to increase it.

The second assumption which Sen makes follows on immediately from the first. It is that, *pace* Layard and classical utilitarianism, happiness is not the only value which matters. In his contribution to the *Capabilities and Happiness* volume, Sen argues that 'it is one thing to see utility or happiness as important, but it is quite another to insist that nothing else matters' [6]. Here he emphasises the importance of two other values, namely that of freedom and justice. He says that note should 'be taken of considerations of freedom in assessing social arrangements' [6]. He also draws attention to the value of justice, understood by reference, not only to 'the rights' which people enjoy, but also to their 'actual opportunities in society' [6], or what Max Weber would refer to as their 'life chances' [7]. When it comes to social evaluation, Sen argues, 'there are grounds for being concerned about the interpersonal distribution of these freedoms, rights, and opportunities' [6]. In other words, unlike classical utilitarianism, which is entirely quantitative or summative and has no interest at all in the issue of distribution or redistribution, Sen thinks that we should be concerned about the issue of social equality or justice. This involves redistribution of economic resources. At the same time, however, Sen assumes that the promotion of social justice, understood in this way, is significant because it is a necessary precondition for the existence of freedom as he understands the concept.

Sen's view that happiness is not the only important value is clear from the emphasis which he places on the value of freedom. However, it is also clear from the fact that the value which he contrasts with that of freedom is in fact well-being and not happiness. According to Sen, there is a significant difference between 'happiness' and 'well-being' [5, 8, 9]. In *On Ethics and Economics* (1987), Sen refers to 'the insufficient depth of the criterion of happiness or desire-fulfilment in judging a person's wellbeing' [4]. He also maintains that **'**happiness' and the 'fulfilment of desire' with which Layard associates it, 'cannot, on their own or even together – adequately reflect the value of well-being' [4]. In his view, then, utilitarianism, by which he has in mind the classical utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and latterly of Richard Layard, 'provides a defective view of well-being' [4]. The problem with utilitarianism, he says, is that 'the claim of utility to be the only source of value' rests on wrongly 'identifying utility with well-being' [4]. Sen maintains that this view is open to criticism. In his opinion, utility or happiness 'does not adequately represent well-being' [4]. The conceptual distinction between happiness and well-being is central to Sen's ethical and political thought, and to his critique of the subjective happiness approach that is defended by Layard*.*

A third assumption that is made by Sen is one which he shares with Layard and with classical utilitarianism. This is the assumption that happiness is entirely a subjective affair. In other words, Sen rejects outright the notion of objective happiness, which is one of the core assumptions of ethical eudaimonism from the time of Aristotle to that of John Stuart Mill. So far as he is concerned, happiness in the strict sense of the term is necessarily or inherently subjective. For Sen also, therefore, the expression 'subjective happiness' is a pleonasm. Given his understanding of what the concept of happiness involves, for Sen to characterise happiness as 'subjective' is unnecessary. I consider Sen's capabilities approach from the standpoint of ethical eudaimonism and its notion of objective happiness in part four.

A fourth assumption of Sen's version of the capabilities approach is that well-being is at least in part an objective affair. Sen insists, therefore, that although one cannot be mistaken about one's own happiness, nevertheless one can be mistaken about one's

own well-being. According to one commonly held reading of his views, Sen holds that far from being a pleonasm, as Layard argues, on the contrary the notion of 'subjective well-being' is in fact an oxymoron. If he is read in this way, Sen rejects Layard's view that happiness subjectively understood is a sufficient condition for well-being. At the same time, however, he does not think that it is a necessary condition either. I shall discuss an alternative reading of his views on this subject in part four.

What Sen says about the phenomenon of adaptation is relevant here. This has to do with the case of how extremely deprived individuals adapt to their situation. In his contribution to the *Capabilities and Happiness* volume, as elsewhere, Sen draws attention to the significance of the phenomenon of adaptation for an assessment of the adequacy of utilitarianism as an approach to the understanding of well-being. He repeats his oft cited claim that 'the utilitarian calculus based on, say, happiness can be deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived, such as the traditional underdogs in stratified societies' [6]. These 'hopelessly deprived people,' he says, 'often tend to adjust their desires and expectations to what little they see as feasible,' thereby 'making deprived lives bearable' [6]. Sen argues there that if we focus entirely on 'the metric of pleasure or desire fulfilment,' then 'the disadvantages of the hopeless underdog may seem much smaller than would emerge from a more objective analysis of the extent of their deprivation and unfreedom' [6]. It is important to note, however, that Sen refrains from arguing that these deprived individuals are not really happy at all, and that they just (mistakenly) think that they are. On the contrary, he accepts that they *are* happy. This is one of Sen's reasons for not attaching too much importance to the value of happiness.

Sen insists that what matters most is not happiness but, rather, well-being. This raises two interesting and related questions. The first is whether Sen considers wellbeing to be *entirely* an objective affair. The second is whether or not Sen attaches any value at all to subjective happiness. With respect to these two questions, Sen has been interpreted in different ways. According to one reading, he holds that well-being is indeed entirely an objective matter. Consequently, he attaches no importance at all to the value of happiness. According to another, he maintains merely that there is an objective component to well-being. Hence he does attach at least some importance to the value of happiness, subjectively understood. I shall say something about these two alternative readings of Sen's views regarding the value of subjective happiness in part four.
