**5. Sen, Aristotle, Eudaimonism and objective happiness**

Sen's name is usually mentioned together with that of Martha Nussbaum, who is generally considered to be a Neo-Aristotelian thinker. Sen himself refers to the connection which exists between the philosophy of Aristotle and his own version of the capabilities approach on several occasions. It is true that he does not make a great deal out of this. Rather, he leaves the development of this side of things to Martha Nussbaum. Nevertheless, he does at times maintain that the ultimate origins of his own approach can be found in the writings of Aristotle [4, 6, 19, 24–26].

For example, in *On Ethics and Economics,* Sen states that 'the approach of functionings and capabilities developed in these works can be seen as having something in common with Aristotle's analysis of functions (see *Politics*, Book III)' [4]. Similarly, in his contribution to the *Capabilities and Happiness* volume, he says that 'one route that some of us have tried to explore relates to Aristotle's pointer, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, to the achievement of valuable functionings and to the ability to generate and enjoy such functionings' [6]. He also refers there to the 'ability to achieve combinations of functionings, which is often called "capability".' However, going further than Aristotle, Sen also claims that this 'is really an expression of freedom, and can be interpreted as the freedom to attain different kinds of alternative lives (between which a person can choose)' [6]. Similarly, in *Development as Freedom*, he argues that 'there have indeed been broader voices, including that of Aristotle**,** whose ideas are of course among the sources on which the present analysis draws' [24]. As Robert Sugden has pointed out, Sen 'repeatedly refers to the Aristotelian concept of "human flourishing" as the philosophical starting point for his own approach' [27].

This association of Sen and his ideas with the philosophy of Aristotle is significant because, as is well known, Aristotle's ethical and political thought attaches fundamental importance to the notion of 'eudaimonia*,*' a Greek term which has often been translated by the English word 'happiness.' Given this, one might expect Sen to follow Aristotle and also attach importance to the value of happiness, albeit objectively rather than subjectively understood. It is not too surprising, therefore, to find that a number of commentators have interpreted Sen views on happiness along these lines. They have drawn attention to the similarities which exist between Sen's version of the capabilities approach and Aristotle's ethical eudaimonism. For example, Luigino Bruni has argued that, despite Sen's criticisms of the hedonic version of the happiness approach, the capabilities approach, as he understands it, 'is in fact close to the Aristotelian' notion of eudaimonia [28].

Benedetta Giovanola also explicitly associates Sen with ethical eudaimonism, and therefore with the notion of objective happiness [29]. According to Giovanola, Sen's version of the capabilities approach presents a 'critique of happiness as subjective well-being' and is to be associated with 'the idea of "flourishing" which ultimately

### *Amartya Sen and the Capabilities versus Happiness Debate: An Aristotelian Perspective DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108512*

refers to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia' [29]. Giovanola points out that many economists 'understand happiness mainly as subjective well-being,' and 'often related to other notions like pleasure or desire fulfilment, or, more broadly, utility.' She claims that Sen criticises this understanding of what happiness involves, and argues that 'one of Sen's critiques of the notion of happiness addresses precisely this problem' [29].

According to Giovanola, Sen maintains that in the happiness literature the notion of happiness 'is interpreted too subjectively' [29]. Giovanola notes that Sen is a critic of utilitarianism, at least in its classical Benthamite form, for a number of reasons. He rejects 'the interpretation of happiness in utilitarian terms, i.e., as welfare, satisfaction, and maximization of utility function.' However, she argues, his criticisms of utilitarianism 'seems aimed more' at its assumed 'equivalence between welfare, happiness and utility,' than 'at the notion of happiness itself' [29].

The point of Giovanola's claiming that Sen rejects one way of thinking about happiness, but not the other, is to suggest that, like Aristotle and J. S. Mill, Sen is an ethical eudaimonist who endorses the notion of objective happiness. According to Giovanola, this can 'be proven by the fact that Sen does speak about happiness, but very differently than utilitarian thinkers.' Indeed, she maintains, 'he wants to restore happiness to its traditionally essential and broader meaning, linked to the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, which is commonly translated as happiness, but which instead is closer to "flourishing"' [29, 30].

A similar view is also taken by Carl-Henric Grenholm. According to him, 'in Aristotelian philosophy happiness is taken to be much more than pleasure. It is related to flourishing and integral human fulfilment, which means the realization of the potentials we have as humans' [31]. Grenholm maintains that the 'neo-Aristotelian position' that is set out by both Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum shares with Aristotle's eudaimonism the view that 'happiness may be understood in terms of human self-actualization.' It is for this reason, Grenholm argues, that they 'reject the utilitarian theory' that well-being or 'welfare' has to do only with pleasure or preference satisfaction' [31]. Grenholm claims that 'one argument in favour of the capabilities approach,' as he thinks Sen understands it, 'is that it entails a reasonable understanding of what happiness means' [31]. By this Grenholm has in mind the idea that, unlike Richard Layard, Sen subscribes to an objective or objectivist understanding of the concept of happiness.

Finally, Tadashi Hirai, Flavio Comin and Yukio Ikemoto have also argued that it is possible to find in Sen's writings an alternative, though 'complementary' view, according to which 'happiness is not simply a hedonic feeling,' but rather a 'manifestation of the things that' objectively speaking 'we have reason to value'. It is for this reason, they argue, that for Sen 'happiness,' objectively understood, 'can provide an informational space that can be part of an overall assessment of our quality of life' [10].

This reading of Sen's views on happiness, with its attribution to him of the notion of objective happiness, as we find it in the writings of Aristotle and other eudaimonist thinkers, seems to me to be not well founded. In fact, as we have seen, Sen endorses Richard Layard's view that happiness is a matter of subjective well-being. This is his main reason for insisting that there is much more to the quality of life than happiness. This reading of Sen's views overlooks the significance which Sen attaches to the distinction between happiness and well-being. For Sen it is not so much the notion of happiness that is to be associated with that of human self-actualization or flourishing, but rather that of well-being. For Sen happiness just is an hedonic feeling and nothing more. It is well-being that Sen thinks has an objective component, not happiness. This is not to say, however, that Sen regards well-being as an entirely objective affair.

We saw earlier that Sen does acknowledge the importance of subjectively perceived happiness as an essential component of well-being.

Sen appreciates that the capabilities approach as he understands it has a close connection to the Aristotelian notion of the good life, or human flourishing. However, he is reluctant to characterise such a life as a happy life, or to associate it too closely with the value of happiness. He prefers, rather, to talk about the concept of wellbeing. There is a similarity between Aristotle's ethical eudaimonism and Sen's version of the capabilities approach. However, this has nothing to do with their respective understandings of the notion of happiness. Rather, it has again to do with their conceptualisation of the notion of well-being. As we have seen, Amartya Sen endorses the hedonic or subjectivist way of thinking about happiness that is dominant within the happiness literature today. He is very close to Aristotle on other issues, especially his understanding of the notion of well-being, and the related but not identical notion of the quality of life, but not so far as his understanding of the concept of happiness itself is concerned.

Grenholm may well be correct when he states that there are 'good philosophical' reasons 'to maintain' that happiness is 'not limited to pleasure and feeling good.' Rather, as in the case of 'an Aristotelian perspective on happiness,' which might be 'expressed in terms of functionings and capabilities,' happiness can and should 'be understood in terms of human fulfilment and human flourishing' [31]. Such a doctrine is often rightly associated with Aristotle. However, it would be wrong to attribute this Aristotelian notion of happiness to Amartya Sen. Sen explicitly dissociates himself from any such understanding of his own views. In his opinion it is not happiness, but rather well-being, or possibly the quality of life, which is to be understood in this way. Sen does not consider himself to be an ethical eudaimonist, or a follower of Aristotle in this particular sense, despite the affinities which exist between his ideas and those of Aristotle with respect to other issues. A fuller treatment of this subject would require a consideration of Sen's understanding of the notion of the quality of life, and how this relates to the idea of well-being. I set discussion of this issue aside for the present.

Sen criticises the views of ethical eudaimonists, from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill, whose understanding of what real or true happiness involves is either entirely objectivist, or has a significant objective component. For example, in *The Standard of Living*, he argues that 'it is, of course, possible to pack more into the notion of happiness than common usage will allow, and to see some objective achievements as part of being "really happy"' [32]. He also acknowledges there that 'the Greek concept of *eudaimonia* may suggest similarly broad interpretations of happiness' [32]. Nevertheless, he insists, 'in the present context there is not much point in going in that direction, since other notions of value and valuation,' for example well-being and freedom, 'can be entertained in their own right without their having to be inducted into serious consideration through riding on the back of pleasure or happiness' [32].

Perhaps with John Stuart Mill in mind, Sen also maintains in *The Standard of Living* that if one is a monist thinker, for example a 'self-declared utilitarian who has signed away his freedom to use other concepts,' and who is in consequence 'stuck with having to make do with the notion of happiness,' and who must 'base all evaluation on happiness alone,' then ethical eudaimonism, with its notion of objective happiness, might perhaps, in such circumstances, 'form a sensible exercise' [32]. However, Sen himself rejects any such theoretical monism and refuses to limit his own thinking in that way. Sen has a great deal of sympathy for Mill and his ideas generally, as well as

*Amartya Sen and the Capabilities versus Happiness Debate: An Aristotelian Perspective DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108512*

for those of Aristotle, but he does not endorse their objectivist understanding of the notion of happiness.

It is clear from the above that Sen thinks that it is misleading, to translate Aristotle's Greek term 'eudaimonia' into English as 'happiness.' He is of the opinion that what Aristotle has in mind when he talks about eudaimonia is not the same thing as is implied by the use of the word 'happiness' today. These are two very different concepts. Nor is Sen alone in this. For example, Luigino Bruni, in his contribution to the *Capabilities and Happiness* volume, also suggests that 'the Aristotelian meaning of eudaimonia is semantically impoverished when translated into the English word happiness,' because the Greek expression means 'the highest end that a human person can realize' [28], whereas the word 'happiness' does not mean this at all. Bruni argues that 'neo-Aristotelian philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world' are right to prefer 'to translate eudaimonia with "human flourishing" rather than happiness,' because 'in common language today' the word 'happiness' is commonly thought to refer to 'momentary euphoria, 'or to the presence of 'pleasurable sensation' [28].

Bruni agrees with Amartya Sen that a subjectivist understanding of the notion of happiness is necessarily built in to the use of the word 'happiness,' which cannot therefore, in his opinion, any other meaning [28]. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have taken issue with this view. In their opinion, the notion of objective happiness, which they attribute to Aristotle, makes perfectly good sense, even today. Bruni acknowledges that at least 'some scholars' continue to 'maintain that "happiness," if qualified, renders the original meaning of *eudaimonia* more appropriately' than any other alternative expression [28]. The view, held by Bruni and others [33], that Aristotle's 'eudaimonia' should not be translated into English as 'happiness' has been challenged, notably by Richard Kraut, in his 'Two Concepts of Happiness [34], by Julia Annas, in *The Morality of Happiness* [35], and by Merrill Ring, in 'Aristotle and the Concept of Happiness' [36].

Kraut acknowledges that although 'it is sometimes correct to call a person happy merely because he feels that way about his life,' Aristotle 'never uses *eudaimonia* in this way,' and in this respect 'his term differs markedly from our (sic) own' [34]. However, Kraut's point here is not so much that it is wrong to translate the Greek word 'eudaimonia' into English as 'happiness.' Rather it is that, given that for Aristotle eudaimonia and happiness are the same thing, it follows that the Greek term can legitimately be translated in that way, provided that care is taken to avoid any misunderstanding of its meaning.

When discussing the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists regarding the nature of happiness, Kraut asks whether this disagreement is 'merely verbal?' Does the objectivist simply differ from the subjectivist because she assigns 'a different meaning to the word "happiness?"' Should we say that she would make her point 'more clearly and effectively' by using 'a different word instead of "happiness?",' for example the word 'flourishing,' so that it might be said that 'one can be happy,' subjectively speaking, and yet 'not flourish,' and vice versa. Given his subjectivist understanding of what happiness involves, it seems clear that Amartya Sen would have some sympathy with that view. However, Kraut maintains that 'the objectivist has good reason to reject this proposal' [34]. For words do matter. In his opinion, 'happiness is what people want for themselves.' Moreover, people 'are unlikely to change' their lives drastically 'for their own sake unless they believe that they are not presently leading happy lives.' Consequently, 'if we take the word "happiness" away from the objectivist,' then 'we take away a strategic tool, which she rightly insists on

using' when engaging in debate with subjectivists [34]. Kraut insists, then, that 'the objectivist is not simply adopting an arbitrary and misleading way of talking' [34]. On the contrary, she 'thinks that the way we talk about happiness' today, which is the way in which Amartya Sen also talks about it, 'deceives people into leading what is, from their own point of view, the wrong kind of life' [34]. In his opinion, therefore, there is a substantive issue involved here and not merely a verbal one. Kraut argues that 'we would be missing' her point 'if we were to look upon' her 'way of judging people happy to be nothing but a misuse of the word' [34].

Julia Annas has also defended this position, in her *The Morality of Happiness.* There Annas endorses Kraut's views regarding happiness in general, as well as his reading of Aristotle's opinions on the subject. As she puts it, Kraut 'claims, convincingly, that we (sic) also have an "objective" notion of happiness.' That is to say, 'when we hope that somebody will be happy, we are not hoping that they will feel happy even if they are grossly mistaken, but rather hoping that they will have good reason to feel happy' [35]. Annas insists that it is entirely appropriate to translate the Greek word 'eudaimonia' into English as 'happiness.' This is so because for Aristotle 'eudaimonia *is* happiness [my emphasis]' [35]. In her opinion, 'ancient theories, like that of Aristotle, 'are theories about happiness' itself. They are not about something else other than happiness. This is the case even though they contain 'a reflective account' of what happiness, properly understood, involves, one which requires an understanding that true happiness 'requires having the virtues,' and also 'giving proper weight to the interests of others' [35].

Annas acknowledges that the word 'happiness,' as it is often used today, including by Amartya Sen, 'covers some areas that are not covered by eudaimonia' [35]. However, in her opinion, this is not a sufficient reason to translate the Greek word in some other way, for example by the term 'flourishing.' Rather, all that is necessary, is that 'we remember that,' for Aristotle and indeed for ourselves, happiness properly understood has to do, no so much with a momentary sensation of pleasure, but rather with 'a whole life,' or with an individual agent 'in respect of her whole life,' and that 'it implies that she has a positive attitude to her whole life' [35]. Unlike Amartya Sen, Richard Kraut and Julia Annas both endorse the eudaimonistic notion of objective happiness. In their view, even if happiness properly so-called is not entirely an objective matter, nevertheless it does at least possess an objective component. This is something which Sen denies.
