Challenges and Struggles

#### **Chapter 6**

## Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha, India

*Abhishek Bhowmick*

#### **Abstract**

Socioeconomic change in the era of globalization is omnipresent. The impact seems to be more in the case of indigenous people. The present article is an attempt to understand these changes from both the emic and etic perspective for the Particular Vulnerable tribal Paudi Bhuyan. As any indigenous people, the inherent capacity to protect the change in their cultural core is a challenge. With the effect of Globalization, there is a steady change in the culture, and the article tries to decipher these changes and the way forward. The changes that are being studied are related to social, which include life cycle rituals, religious practices, material culture, administration (politics), and economic pursuits. These changes will lead to adaptation of certain phenomena, which is either voluntarily adapted or due to incorporation to facilitate the ease in administrative functionality of the Union of India. Thus, social change is inevitable to any society and especially the indigenous population such as Paudi Bhuyans. The present article tries to find out the primitive cultural expression and the present form of socioeconomic changes that are relevant to the Paudi Bhuyans society. To carry out the study, the researcher carried out ethnographic study in three districts of Odisha where the concentration of Paudi Bhuyans is maximum. The findings can be summarized as though there are changes in socioeconomic condition from the past, but the cultural core related to life cycle rituals, administration, economy is still significantly present in the Paudi Bhuyans.

**Keywords:** Paudi Bhuyans, social change, cultural core, particular vulnerable tribal groups (PVTG), social structure, economic structure, globalization

#### **1. Introduction**

Change is omnipresent and comprehensive in itself. Change is considered to be an important factor behind variability. Both change and variability are interrelated factors that are prevalent in humanity. The variation can be considered as a basis of all anthropological studies. Though variation can be considered as a component of social change, conceptually they are widely different, and every variation we encounter in daily life cannot be considered as social change. Thus, physical growth in terms of age or change of seasons does not fall under the concept of social change. In social

anthropology and sociology, the concept of social change has been considered as alterations that occur in the social structure and social relationship. The International Encyclopedia of Social Science (IESS 1972) looks at change as the important alterations that occur in the social structure, or in the pattern of action and interaction in societies. Alterations may occur in norms, values, cultural products, and symbols in a society. It also includes alteration in the structure and function of a social system. Institutions, patterns of interaction, work, leisure activities, roles, norms, and other aspects of society can be altered over time as a result of the process of social change.

In other words, social change is a term used to describe variation in any respect of social process and social interactions. It can also be described as a mode that either modifies or replaces the "preexisting" in the life of a people and in the functioning of a society. Every society exists in a universe produced from the dynamic influences. It can be experienced in most of the society that changes in material equipment and expansion of technology resulted in reshaping of ideologies and values in the society [1–3]. This affects institutional structures as they take on new components, and later they are induced to alter their functioning. The common example of this form of impact of alteration can be evident in change of family structures. Joint family system has been a common pattern in India. The head of the family exercises absolute powers over its members and distributes work among them. It is now fast being replaced by the nuclear family wherein family ties and authority of the head are gradually weakening. The structural change also produces functional change. But considering the tribal or indigenous people, this change is very slow, or they are reluctant in the drastic changes as they held social bonding above all. To understand this, change the author took up and focused ethnographic study on Paudi Bhuyans to understand the changes that are slowly and steadily induced changes in them with respect to the historical account. The author has taken all the effort to include all the available literature including published and unpublished work, but as the work is empirical and firsthand study among the Paudi Bhuyans of Odisha's belonging to the three districts, namely Sundergarh, Angul, and Keonjhar, the author is unable to find very rich literature to work with. Hence, there is dearth in literature review, which can be considered as the limitation to the study.

#### **2. Paudi Bhuyans**

#### **2.1 The Paudi Bhuyans**

They are also found in large numbers in the adjoining states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Bengal, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, and some parts of Tamil Nadu. They are divided into two broad sections—Southern section with its center in Orissa comprising a backward section of the tribe and Northern section with its center at Chota-Nagpur containing the relatively advanced section of the tribe [4].

The Paudi Bhuyan is one of the major sections of Bhuyan tribe. They are mostly found in Bhuyan pir of Keonjhar, Banai mountainous areas, hill tracks of Sundergar and Angul districts [5]. The name "Bhuiya" might have derived from the Sanskrit word "Bhumi" meaning land or earth. This tribe is also known as Bhuiya, Bhuiyan, and Bhuinya [4].

According to S. C. Roy, the racial and cultural elements of the Paudi Bhuyans have a greater affinity to the Munda tribes [see 4]. Roy further described the physical features of men and women, which are in conformity with the study of the present

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

researcher. Paudi Bhuyans are well-proportioned, muscular, of medium height and light build. The hair is black and plentiful on the head, but generally not present on the rest of the body. The thick mustache and beard are occasionally found among them. The hair is wavy in the feature. The mouth and teeth are well formed, and the eyes are straight and of medium size. Their heads are dolichocephalic, and nose is broad and lips are thick. The skin of the Paudi Bhuyans is of a lighter brown tint than that of average Dravidian aborigines. Paudi Bhuyans speak their (Bhuyan) dialect as their mother-tongue, though they can speak Oriya.

The historical account of the Bhuyans can be traced from the Buddhist text Anguttara Nikaya, the two Bhuyan traders name Tapasu and Bhallika were inhabitants of Utkal (former name of Odisha). They met Lord Budha after his enlightenment and offered honey and rice cake to Lord Budha who had taken the food after 2 months of fast. They became disciples after listening to the sermon from Lord Budha [6].

Bhuyans are well documented in the Odhisan history for their participation in wars. And its reference can be traced from Madala Panji. The King Anangabhima Dev donated 25,0000 Madhas of gold (1 Madha = 5.8319 grams) for preparing Sri Jaganath's gold ornaments, and around double of this value (40 Lakh madhas) has been received from the Bhuyans as war indemnity. It can be inferred that the Bhuyans have a separate state and were quite rich and prosperous in the Ganga Age [7]. Some historians are also of the opinion that the famous Atavika kingdom that had even resisted king Ashok of Magadha dynasty from conquering their land were of Bhuyans along with other tribes such as Savars [7].

The second phase of the tribal uprising in the Odishan history consisted of accounts of struggle and movement in Keonjhar in 1890. Leadership was given by Dharanidhar Naik, a Bhuyan by birth. The struggle lasted for 5 years. The rising aimed at abolishing Bethi and other oppressive systems of extraction. The Bhuyans, the Juangs, and the Kolhas of Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj, and Pallahara joined into the movement. Interestingly, some of the non-tribals particularly some school teachers supported Dharanidhar Naik in this rising. It was, in fact, a unique event in the history of the freedom struggle in Orissa. Raja Dhanurjaya Bhanja of Keonjhar fled to Cuttack to seek the help of the Commissioner. Police forces were sent to suppress the rising. Dharanidhar was captured and was imprisoned for 7 years. Later on, he was released and led the life of a saint and began to preach his philosophy (see [6, 7]). This history is very much known to the present tribal people, and they usually talk that *Pitha* (a sweet dish made up of rice) was used as weapons for its hardness.

#### **2.2 Carrying out the research work**

Initially, the work carried out as part of research work for the PhD work on ethnoarchaeology but to trace variation among the Paudi Bhuyans, the researcher carried out the research work on six different villages spanning the three district of Odisha state, namely Sundergarh, Angul, and Keonjhar. The villages thus chosen are selected on two major criteria: the population of Paudi Bhuyans is above 80 percentage of the total population, and the second criterion is that the two villages should lie in different geographical setting with respect to accessibility of major communication system. Thus, one village among all the three districts is living near the major communication system such as interstate highway, and other lies at least 15–20 kilometers away from the major communication system, i.e., far away from the major road. This is being done to understand the impact of forces that impart changes in the socio economic aspects of Paudi Bhuyans.

#### **2.3 Population composition of Paudi Bhuyans of the studied villages**

Paudi Bhuyans settle themselves near the forest area in the hilly setup. Their subsistence pattern and lifestyle depend on the forest products. Their socioeconomic life is characterized by surrounding geophysical setting.

Society is composed of sum total of individuals. Individuals are the representative of group of population. Each individual of a group has certain norms and values influenced by the society's cumulative behavior. Classification of population begins with an individual as a member of the family, which is the smallest unit of a social system [8].

#### *2.3.1 Family*

Family plays an important role in economy, social organization, and ritual performance among the Paudi Bhuyan community. Member who shares a common hearth is considered as family. The members of the family are related either by consanguine or in affinal basis. Family size is calculated on the basis of the persons sharing a common hearth. The classification is as follows:


Frequency distribution shows that small-sized family (1–4 members) is predominant among the Paudi Bhuyan community. The Paudi Bhuyans live in nuclear families with married couple and their unmarried children. Sometimes unmarried brother and/or sister used to stay with them. Frequency of medium and large-sized families is 29.00% and 17.00%. Very large family is the lowest in frequency (**Figure 1**). Family size reflects the economic status of the community. Low frequency of large families indicates small productive unit. As they practice shifting agriculture, they have small plots of lands. The produces from these lands are unable to sustain the large and very large families [9].

#### **Figure 1.** *Frequency distribution of families on the basis of size of the studied population.*

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

#### *2.3.2 Age and sex*

Age-sex structure is important to understand the marital status, educational standard, and economic activities of the families. Age grouping is done at the interval of 5 years. The calculation is done up to 70 years. The first group is newborn baby to 5 years. Then the age groups are classified into 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, 60–64, 65–69, and 70+. The population of ages of 70 and above is grouped into the category 70+. The male-female ratio in each age group is more or less equal. So the population is a stable population. Age groups between 0 and 34 incorporate maximum number of individuals. So the population is growing in nature. The population pyramid shows the higher number of individuals in lower age groups, and with the increase of age, the population decreases gradually. Maximum number of children belong to the age groups 0–4 and 5–9. The frequency distribution of population indicates that it is a growing population. The sex ratio also indicates that it is a stable population (**Figure 2**).

#### *2.3.3 Marital status*

Civic condition of a population is reflected in the marital status of the population. Paudi Bhuyans are generally monogamous. Marriage within the community is permissible. They follow clan exogamy. Marriage within consanguinal relatives is extremely prohibited, whereas marriage within affinal relatives is permissible. Generally married women started to live with her husband in a newly built house with a new hearth setup. Paudi Bhuyans generally prefer to marry at an adult age. Child marriage is also in occurrence in case of females. The age of marriage of male is 18, and in case of female, 14. Widow and widower marriage is also permissible in the society (**Figures 3** and **4**). The frequency of married females is higher than males in case of age groups 15–19 and 20–24. Marriage follows clan exogamy and tribe endogamy. Mate is generally selected from the concentrating area of the Paudi Bhuyans, i.e., Banspal block in Keonjhar district of Odisha. Bride is also selected from the different families of the village. Marriage within a community is crucial to maintain their traditional rituals and associated norms and values.

**Figure 2.** *Population pyramid of the studied population.*

**Figure 3.** *Age- and sex-wise distribution of marital status of the studied population (male).*

#### **Figure 4.**

*Age- and sex-wise distribution of marital status of the studied population (female).*

#### *2.3.4 Education*

The village has educational facilities. There are Anganwadi, Primary, Secondary, and Higher Secondary schools within the village and nearby areas at walking distance. The graduate college is about 25–100 kilometers away from the villages. The level of literacy of Paudi Bhyans is significantly low. Illiteracy is also found among the younger generation. The frequency of illiteracy in case of males is 64.75% and in case of females, it is 74.30%. Frequency of can sign category is 10.31% in case of males and 10.15% in case of females. Primary educated male is 16.52% and female is 11.56%. The frequency of secondary education in case of male is 5.32% and 3.46% in females. The frequency of higher secondary education and above is very low in case of both males and females. The educational standard of the people shows that most of them belong to non-literate and can sign category. Due to low literacy level, the shifting from their traditional occupation is limited, which affects the organization of the society (**Figures 5** and **6**).

#### *2.3.5 Occupation*

The primary occupation of the community studied is cultivation (43.79%). Shifting cultivation is the primary occupation of Paudi Bhuyans. Male children from the age group 10–14 help in cultivation such as broadcasting of seeds and control their cattle. Males of age groups 60 and above also engage themselves in supervision of different stages of cultivation. Main labor force of cultivation comes from the age groups of

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

**Figure 5.** *Age- and sex-wise distribution of literacy status of the studied population (male).*

**Figure 6.** *Age- and sex-wise distribution of literacy status of the studied population (female).*

15–54. As their produces do not fulfill their economy, so they supplement their economy with daily wage labor (11.09%). Unemployment is significantly present among the male Paudi Bhuyans (26.83%). It is also important that unemployment is also present in the younger generations. Neither have they had opportunities to higher studies nor do they have interest in job. Service and business are rare in occurrence (**Figure 7**).

Females, both married and unmarried, are engaged in household work. Besides household work, both married and unmarried females of age group of 15–59 also help in cultivation in broadcasting of seeds and weeding. Females also engage in daily wage labor (**Figure 8**).

Per capita income of the families does not exceed rupees 5000/− per month. All of them are BPL (Below Poverty Level) card holders. It is also interesting that they also practice barter system of economy. They generally exchange their crops with basket, broom, mat, garments, and any other necessary items for their daily life.

**Figure 7.** *Age- and sex-wise distribution of literacy status of the studied population (male).*

**Figure 8.** *Age- and sex-wise distribution of literacy status of the studied population (female).*

#### **3. Economy**

The economic life of the Paudi Bhuyans mainly centers on shifting cultivation, which is the primary source of their livelihood [10]. Paudi Bhuyans also engage themselves in different works, such as collection of minor forest products, hunting, fishing, basket making, wage earning, and other economic pursuits to supplement the shifting cultivation [10].

The following paragraph provides a brief discussion on land utilization, agricultural practices, and related economic pursuits and their changing aspects with respect to the economic life of the Paudi Bhuyans.

#### **3.1 Cultivation**

The Paudi Bhuyans mostly settled between the block of plateau, hills, and forests intersected by rivers and ravines. In India, there is a strict rule related to habitation and settlement near the forest area. But, as autochthons, Paudi Bhuyans enjoy

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

immunity and can avert strict surveillance from the government. This immunity helps Paudi Bhuyans to cut and clear the patches of forest to practice their age-old practice of slash and burn cultivation. The land is communally owned by the villagers [10]. Each Paudi Bhuyan village has a definite demarcated area of the forest that was generally owned by them through feudatory chiefs of historical Kings. The villagers only have access to practice shifting cultivation, hunting, fishing, and gathering, within the pre-allocated area of that particular village. Generally, the Paudi Bhuyans prefer not to trespass the boundary of other villages [10].

The dispute among the villagers related to cultivable land is very few in number. They mutually respect the amount allotted to them in a specific year. If any dispute arises, village council and its members will assemble at a pre-decided place and the conflict over the dispute will be settled. The procedure to resolve the dispute is unique to them. In the pre-decided place, both the villagers who are interested to take part in the resolution will gather. Each village contributes a healthy chicken, an earthen pot, and some un-husked paddy. Both the chickens are then put inside the earthen pot with some un-husked paddy, which is sealed from outside with mud and is kept overnight. The next day both the fowls are checked. If any chicken died, then the corresponding village loses the right to the disputed land, and if both the chickens are alive, then the disputed land is equally divided [10].

#### **3.2 Types of land under cultivation**

Biringa: Biringa is a patch of land brought under cultivation for the first time. During the period of cultivation, a piece of land remains under the individual ownership, but after it is left fallow, it reverts back to the village. In Biringa, the *Biri dali* (black gram) is the principal crop that is grown, but a variety of other crops such as niger, *suturi, kolatha* (horse gram) mung, pumpkin, goard, etc., are grown.

**Kaman**: The patch of land that was cultivated earlier, and in this land principally paddy is planted along with the principal crops *gangai, ragi, maize,* and *ruma*. These are sown on all sites of a Kaman to mark the boundary lines.

**Guda**: The patch of land that was cultivated third and final time called Guda. After being cultivated for consecutive 2 years, a patch of Guda generally lacks much of fertility. Hence, such crops as paddy, niger are usually sown on such plots, after three successive years of cultivation. The land is left fallow for 5–6 years till the fertility of the soil is rejuvenated.

**Bila**: The patch of land where permanent paddy plots are present. These types of plots are close to the river or perennial stream body in the valley, so that the water of the river can be diverted to irrigate these lands. Such lands are individually owned on a permanent basis. Paddy is the only crop grown in these lands.

**Bakadi**: Bakadi is the land close to residential dwellings, preferably at the back side of the home stead. In some houses, even the three sides are found to be used for cultivation. Bakadi is owned permanently by individual families. To improve the fertility of the soil natural manures such as daily waste and cow dung are added regularly. These lands are generally used to cultivate mustard or maize in alternate year. In villages under study of Angul District, some vegetables and tobacco are also cultivated.

#### *3.2.1 Ownership of land*

Paudi Bhuyans inherit homestead land, which is generally assigned to them permanently. Apart from homestead land, all other land is owned by the village. The

#### **Figure 9.**

*The genealogical distribution of homestead.*

individual family enjoys the right of cultivable land and its produce with respect to specific time period. The period can last up to 2–3 years.

To understand the ownership of land, genealogical and case studies methods are undertaken (**Figure 9**).

In **Figure 5** (genealogical distribution of homestead), it becomes clear the homestead land is owned and inherited jointly by all the sons. Each of the sons has equal share, which again is transferred to the male children of the next generation.

#### *3.2.2 Distribution of land*

In every Paudi Bhuyan village, there is a pattern of distribution of land. Shows the trend of distribution of land among the Paudi Bhuyans of studied villages (**Figure 10**).

From the abovementioned pie chart, it is very clear that the cultivable land among the Paudi Bhuyans is very less [10]. The small land holding, which is less than 3 cottah {67m2 X3 = 201 m2 (approximately)}, is more in percent (70%). The 5 cottah or 335 m2 landholings on an average is quite low (20%). Large landholding is lowest (10%), which is similar to the earlier study done by me in Kuanar Village of Keonjhar District [10].

**Figure 10.** *Frequency distribution of distribution of land.*

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

Other than abovementioned occupation of cultivation, they have taken to petty trade and commerce and industrial employment also to supplement the income. Rope making and ordinary carpentry are known to all men, and mat making is the recreational activity of the Bhuyans women. Though, there is very feeble division of labor by sex for certain activities. Generally heavier works such as cutting trees, plowing, sowing, hunting, and fishing are generally carried out by men while lighter works such as cooking and other domestic works are mostly carried out by women. Thatching of houses and climbing trees are taboo for the women folk. Works such as forest clearing, weeding, transplanting harvesting, threshing, and collection of minor forest products are carried out by both men and women [10].

Cultivation is a family affair in which all able-bodied adult members of the family cooperate. If any extra labor is required, it is not done by exchange of money but exchange of similar kind of labor. Extra labor is generally required only for weeding and harvesting. A man having no draught animals may take the help of others having such animals. The Bhuyans domesticate various animals such as cow, bullock, goat, sheep, fowl, etc. The main purpose for keeping cattle is not for milk but for draft animal for cultivation and for breeding.

#### *3.2.3 The procedure of cultivation*

The Paudi Bhuyans practice shifting cultivation [11]. The use of bullock-driven plows for tilling all types of land is common in the village. Paudi Bhuyans generally coined it as *Podu chasa*. They generally cultivate a patch of forest land for three consecutive years after which it is left fallow. These patches are located on flat hill tops stretching up to foot hills. The hills in this area are generally flat-topped and without much stone boulders, and the gradients are gentle. After cultivating a patch of land for 3 years, they leave it fallow for a period of 5–6 years for rejuvenation. Previously the fallow period was 10–12 years. But the main cause for its reduction is the population pressure and shortage of land for *podu* cultivation. The land under shifting cultivation belongs to the village, and a patch is distributed by the village committee to the individual, and it remains in possession for cultivation to the man as long he cultivates it.

The first year shifting cultivation (*biringa*) involves several stages given below. It begins with selection of hill slopes mostly in the month of December–January by the village committee headed by Pradhan. Cutting of trees and bush clearing started from February to April. Piling of timbers and firing it (*anapuda*) in April–May. Bush clearing (*patikaa*) in May. Sowing (*Buna*) in July after Akhin Parab ritual. Plowing and hoeing (*bhuinyanga*) in July immediately after hoeing. Weeding and debushing (*Judabachha*) in – September–October after Ashiaripuja. Watching the crops in November–December onward. The crops grown during the first year are Kolatha (*Macrotyloma uniflorum*), Biri (*Vigna mungo*), Rasi (*Guizotia abyssinica*), and various types of vegetables and creeper plants. During the second year of shifting cultivation, the main crop grown is a short-duration paddy (aman) along with Gangei (Sorghum bicolor). The former is sown in the middle of the plot, and the latter on the borders of the plot. Besides, they grow Mandia (Eleusine coracana), Kangu (Setaria italica), Sarso (Sinapi sarvensis), and various types of vegetables in the second year. In the third year's shifting cultivation (*Guda*), only Rasi is grown. If a patch fetches good harvest in the second year, then it is cultivated for the third year. The same patch can be brought under fourth year's cultivation if there is a good harvest in the third year [10].

The Paudi Bhuyans use very simple implements in their agricultural operation. The most important implements used in shifting cultivation include plow, leveler yoke, crowbar, spade, sickle, knife, wooden pole, etc.

#### *3.2.4 Stages of shifting cultivation*

There are finite numbers of stages of the shifting cultivations and are somewhat similar in all the villages under study. These are i) *Preparation of Land* – in this stage, the patch of land that has thick vegetation is chosen. After clearing the patch, the big trees that are being cut are sold to timber markets. And all other residues of the plants are put together in stack and set into fire. The fire clears the land for cultivation and the residue acts as fertilizer. ii) *Plowing* – Ploughing is done as per the requirement of crops to be sown and the season of production. Locally made plow (hal) and leveler (kuruala) are used for plowing. Implements such as cylindrical iron rod (sabal) are also used for the removing stones. Plowing is done 2–3 times before the rainy season and sometimes in the rainy season also. Plowing is necessary for preparation of the land to conserve the soil moisture, to uproot the weeds, to make the soil arable, and also for the mixing of ashes that are produced from the burning of trees and shrubs. The method of plowing varies according to the type of soil and terrain. For example, the animal-drawn plowing is done where there is flat land, and handheld plowing is done on the steep slopes. There is difference in plowing in slopes where *podu* cultivation is practiced. The cultivators generally drove the plow in the lines perpendicular to the direction of the slopes. iii) *Selection of seeds and preservation* – The Paudi Bhuyans take very seriously the seed selection procedure and also its preservation. It is a complex process and is varied according to the villages. They practice various measures to select seeds, such as quality of shine, shape, undamaged, mostly collected from the best plants from the previous yield. They carefully select the patch of crop, which is suitable for seed preservation for next sowing. They process it and store it carefully. Preservation of seeds is also done in indigenous methods. The seeds are dried in sun for several days to make it hard and moisture-free. Most of the farmers put their seeds in their own houses for their personal use. More than 80% of the respondents informed that they kept the seeds in airtight baskets, which are locally made. This is a drum-like container made of thin bamboo strips. Both the inner and outer walls of the containers are plastered with mud and cow dung, and the seeds are mixed with dry neem (Azadirachta indica) leaf and ash. They keep it protected from moisture. Upon further investigation, another way of preservations of seeds is prevalent. A set of dry paddy straws are interwoven into thick rope form with a thickness of 10–12 cm. These are called *Benti*. The *Benti* is then coiled over making a basket-like shape in which the seeds are kept along with the dried Begunia leaves (Vitex nigunda L.). The seeds are occasionally exposed to sunlight. This practice is useful in maintaining the quality of seed and grains [10]. Iv) *Irrigation –* Paudi Bhuyans practiced particular systems to preserve water resources and control distribution of the water in the fields. All the villages under study, which are situated in the hilly trains, have perennial streams originated through capillary action of groundwater. These streams are trapped for irrigation through construction of smaller channels. They use bamboo and banana plants to make these temporary channels. Flow irrigation was not possible in an undulating topography; hence, the runoff water is stopped at different levels and allowed to soak deep into the soil. This resulted in availability of adequate moisture at root level, which helped for better crop production. V) *Weeding* – Generally in the studied villages, the weeding started in the month of September–October. The weeding is mostly done by

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

the women and is done by simply uprooting the weeds by hand. The weeds are collected on the earthen embankments of the fields. There may be more than one weeding cycle till the time of harvest. vi) *Harvesting* – Harvesting is done according to the year of cultivation and the type of crop cultivated. Paudi Bhuyans generally cultivate rasi (*sesame*) in the first year, and it is usually harvested in the month of November– December. In the second year, the harvesting can be extended up to Jannuary, and in the third year, it again is restricted to November–December. Vii) *Threshing* – It is the process of separating the edible part of grain from the stalk, the straw. Threshing may be done by beating the grain using a flail on a threshing floor or just thrashing the paddy stalk over a sloping platform, made of bamboo strips. Viii) *Winnowing* – Wind winnowing is an agricultural method developed by ancient cultures for separating grain from chaff. It is also used to remove weevils or other pests from stored grain. The Paudi Bhuyans practice it extensively in the paddy cultivation and other crops as and when required. ix) *Husking* – In all the villages under study, almost every 5–6 households, there is a husking lever. The husking lever can be utilized by more than one household on mutual understanding. Husking of the grains is done to separate the grain from its scales, inedible chaff that surrounds the grain.

#### *3.2.5 Pastoral activities*

Among the Paudi Bhuyans, the Pastoralism is not an important economic occupation [10]. Very few families are engaged full time in this occupation. The variety of cattle that are being reared is not miltch variety. They are only used for the agricultural purpose. The beef is a taboo for the Paudi Bhuyans. Apart from bovine, the most common animal that is found being reared is goat. Both she and he goats are reared and are primarily used to sell them in the weekly market in exchange for money or are consumed if not sold. The goat is also offered as a sacrifice to the gods and goddesses. The cattle and goats are grazed in their respective places as designated by the village council members.

#### *3.2.6 Poultry farming*

Most of the Paudi Bhuyans family maintains a considerable number of poultry, mostly hen. They are used as food or sold in the market. Eggs obtained from fowls are mostly consumed or exchange with rice in certain cases. Fowls are cooked on festive occasions and cherished as great food. Moreover, eggs and fowls are very important as religious offerings. Almost all their God and Goddesses and ancestors require fowls as offerings. They are also used in almost all ceremonies of life cycle.

#### *3.2.7 Fishing*

Fishing is limited to very few Paudi Bhuyans and is self-sustainable form. They consumed it themselves, and the catch is very limited in quantity. They catch fish in the springs and nearby river with indigenously built traps.

#### *3.2.8 Gathering of forest products*

One of the minor economic occupations of the Paudi Bhuyans is gathering of forest resources. They usually gather fruits from the nearby jungles. Mostly women are engaged in the collection of fruits, but men and children are also involved in this minor economic activity of collecting fruits. Mango and jack fruits are the most common fruits that are being collected in the forest. They even collect flowers of mahua plants that are used to prepare solution of country liquor. The important items of forest collection include Mohua flower (Madhuca indica seed), Mohua seed (M. indica seed), mango (Manifera Indica), jack fruit (Artocarpushetero phyllus), Tamarind (Tamarindus indica), Harida (Terminalia chebula), Bahada (Terminalia bellerica), Kochila seeds (Nux vomica), Phula Jhadu (Thysanoleana maxima), a kind of plant for making broom stick, Jhadu (Aristidas etacea), Gaba (Jetropha curcas), various types of green leaves, mushrooms, edible roots, and rubbers. They also collect fire wood, thatching grass, fibers for rope making, and different types of medicinal herbs and shrubs. The Bhuyans are in the habit of collecting minor forest product extensively for their own consumption, and at very few occasion they sell it for a secondary income [10].

In a particular village of Sundergarh district, Paudi Bhuyans women, especially the young girls and occasionally men, are engaged in collecting many forest products that are industrially needed. They collected it for specific contractors who allocated them a certain fund in exchange of the forest product. They do not disclose it properly about the particular items, but they inform the author about this activity. They are then paid according to the collection and the item ranges from Rs 30 to 100. They mostly collect resins, barks of certain plants, gum, etc., that have no direct resale value in the local market.

#### *3.2.9 Wage earning*

Paudi Bhuyans are nowadays engaged in 100 days work that is being provided to them by the Panchayat under the National Rural Employment Guarantee act, 2005. Wage earning is only occasional and even prevalent in the areas where the Paudi Bhuyans live in close contact with the other non-tribal peoples. Most of the wage earning that has been observed is engagement in governmental development work. Agricultural laborer is absent, and if engaged as agricultural labor, they are paid in terms of labor only.

#### **4. Market and price mechanism**

#### **4.1 Market**

The market is extremely vital to study from the perspective of material exchange [12]. The market not only provides the essential items required by the villagers, but also opens the avenue to access the goods, which are new and can really help them in the betterment of their daily life style. Thus, market study is done to analyze the items that are present in the market and mode of procurement of the goods those are present for exchange. The primary focus of the study is to access the villagers' response toward the particular items and the mode of payment that is prevalent in the market, i.e., price mechanism [10].

In the all the villages studied, there are average 50–60 stalls. And all of them are weekly market. That is, the market is assembled and open in specific day of week. There is no fixed day for all the villages under study. The market can be classified in two broad categories. The divisions can be made on the basis of the nature of construction, that is, semi-permanent structure and without any structure at all. The semi-permanent structure is built upon a fixed base that is made up of concrete, and

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

**Figure 11.** *Frequency distribution of major items sold in the market.*

the platform is raised above the surface to support the upper structure. Generally, the upper structure is constructed mostly by bamboo and occasionally with iron pipes. All shops used plastic sheets as roofing and covering of the structure.

Mostly the semi-permanent structures are raised by wealthy merchants whose articles are costlier and more prone to damage by sunlight and rain, such as clothing articles, grocery items, or ornaments. There are generally placed within the raised semi-permanent structure. For items such as vegetables, fish, and smaller commodity, shops are seldom seen with any kind of structure (**Figure 11**).

The above pie chart shows that the maximum items sold are clothes. Food items are next in order of sell. Utensils and kitchen implements are also found in appreciable quantity, and so are the ornaments.

#### **4.2 Price mechanism**

The Paudi Bhuyans' economy is definitely influenced from the general Odishan economy, and thus, the same monetary exchange mechanism is followed except for special cases, where the barter is more preferred over the monetary exchange system. Thus, Paudi Bhuyans' price mechanism can be termed as mixed system of exchange that has been guided with the general rule of feasibility [10]. The Paudi Bhuyans shift from one pricing system that is from monetary exchange (where the goods are exchanged for money) to barter system (where the goods are exchange for similar goods) according to their need and asset underlying. The guiding principal of exchange is solely as per need of Paudi Bhuyans. They are largely in need of rice, which is their staple food. More or less 80% of their daily food intake is rice and its byproducts. That means if we measure the amount of food consumed by Paudi Bhuyans any day, it will contain 80% of rice (*bhata*) or rice products and the remaining 20%

may be products such as pulses, vegetables, etc. Therefore, primary need of the Paudi Bhuyans is rice, and barter exchange is commonly utilized to trade rice in exchange of any other crop. In the month of sleek production, they even prefer to sell their goods in exchange of rice.

### **5. Daily life**

The daily life of Paudi Bhuyans is very much similar to rural life of any other community in India. Their daily routine is influenced by their economic life. In the morning, both men and women get up with the sunrise, mostly at the dawn with the first cocks crow. Nearly about 5 am in the summer months and rest of the year around 6 am. The man sits leisurely for a while in the verandah of his house and then most of the men will travel to the dormitory (manda ghar), to have a chit chat with fellow villagers. Women folk of the village start household work in the early morning. They sweep the courtyard and sprinkle water mixed with cow dung on it before doing any other work. Then she either visits the neighborhood where Dhenki (husking lever) is available or if present in her own home. They either husk paddy or jali (Ragi). After the grains for the day's meal are husked, she generally washes the utensils with water that is kept in store day before.


#### **Table 1.**

*Daily routine of the Paudi Bhuyans.*

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

After the men return from Manda ghar, either they first go for defecation while brushing teeth with datuns (either neem or sal twig) or take breakfast. They take stale rice with some onions and salt as breakfast. The children meanwhile wake up, and they also take the fermented rice or pan cake made of rice. The children either go to school, or they play with other children of the village. Women then go for fetching water from the stream or tube well. There they take bath and wash clothes of entire family. Then they return with pots filled with water. After returning home, they start preparing the midday meal. As the firewood is used as fuel, it takes considerable time to boil the rice and dal. Simultaneously, the women folk take care of their babies, prepare leaf cup or plaster of wall with mud and cow dung.

At noon, men come home from the work, wash themselves, and have their meal. Then both men and women spend some leisure time. Before sunset, they are engaged in gathering of wood for fuel. In the evening, they cook meal for dinner and members of the family sit around the hearth and gossip. After dinner, they go to sleep (**Table 1**).

#### **6. Social organization of Paudi Bhuyans**

#### **6.1 Family organization**

The smallest social unit of the Paudi Bhuyans is family consisting of parents and their children. The family is patriarchal and patrilineal, and father is the supreme authority in the family. The descent is traced through male line from father to son [13, 14]. Family plays an important role in Paudi Bhuyan society in rearing of children, socialization, enculturation, security of members, care of elderly people, decision-making, economic activities, and ritual performances.

"Khilli" is local descent group of Paudi Bhuyans [15]. A daughter belongs to her father's khilli before marriage. Married woman becomes the member of her husband's "Khilli." The adopted son also has a full property right. The family is mostly nuclear consisting of husband, wife, and their unmarried children. In some cases, unmarried brothers and sisters live with the brother's family.

#### **6.2 Position of women**

Females among the Paudi Bhuyans do not inherit property. After the death of a husband, the widow looks after his property. Jewelry is considered as women's personal property. Females do not inherit property. After marriage, woman lives in her husband's house. Marriage is ordinarily monogamous, though the husband of childless woman may take a second wife. Women can take decision about some family affairs such as shopping, marketing, and rearing of children [16].

#### **6.3 Village organization**

The village, "Grama," is a unit in the Paudi Bhuyans social structure. It consists of number of hamlets (Sahis). Hamlets constitute a number of families. The village acts as a unit for a number of activities of Paudi Bhuyans. Members of different families help each other in construction and repairing of houses and in economic activities. When there is any ceremonial feast, members of the whole village have to be invited. The village as a whole has certain common rights over the village pasture. Village also plays an important role in religious and social functions.

#### **6.4 Traditional and modern political organization**

Intra- and inter-village disputes are rare occurrence. However, the human nature in general as it is, the Paudi Bhuyan is not above jealousy, covetousness, and greed, which create occasionally quarrels and conflict. Bride capture is frequently in occurrence, which may lead to serious problems.

The conflicts that arise in the village are decided upon by the village head called Pradhan, while inter-village quarrels and conflicts are decided by the joint meeting of village head of the respective villages together with elders and the Dehuri (the village priest). Traditional norms and values are maintained by village priest and village head man [17].

Such leaders of Paudi Bhuyan society may be classified as traditional and hereditary. But in modern Panchayati Raj system, Sarpanch is also an elected head and has a considerable say in the matter of judicial decisions. Thus, members of gram panchayat and Sarpanch also hold a very special position as villagers understand that all the government benefits that are being processed are under the judiciary of Gram Panchayat.

#### **6.5 Village Head (Pradhan)**

The secular head of each Paudi Bhuyans village is called either Naek or Pradhan [4]. According to villagers, the post has been created by the ruling chief for administrative purposes. It was told that the Pradhan used to collect taxes, and judiciary functions on behalf of the ruling chief.

The post of Pradhan is hereditary. To understand it, a genealogy is prepared for understanding the pattern of inheritance (**Figure 12**).

From the above table, we can understand that the pattern of inheritance of the status of Pradhan of village is purely patriarchal in nature. In case of death of the elder brother and if the son is minor, the successive brother will become Pradhan. The post of Pradhan is again transferred to the eldest son of the family. In case the legal heir to the Pradhan is mental, physical or challenged in any other way, the title of Pradhan will go to the next male heir.

#### **6.6 Village priest (Dehuri)**

As a patriarchal rule, the eldest son of dehuri inherits the post of dehuri (**Figure 13**). From the above table, we can easily understand that the post of Dehuri is again purely patriarchal. The post of dehuri is transferred to the eldest son. And in case of death, or any other incapability to hold the post, it is transferred to the eldest son of the family.

#### **6.7 Pir council**

The Pir council has the greatest say if there is any kind of problems with inheritance. The Pradhan plays a very important role in judicial affairs of the village. He presides over the village meeting and decides cases relating interpersonal quarrels, breach of social customs, and disputes over possession of property among the claimants. In all such cases, he discusses the matter with all the elders of the village in the presence of Sarpanch also. The bride price or any other intermarital disputes arise between the bride's family and groom's family are also settled. On the first day of annual hunting festival "Pardih," a communal festival, such as Jatra and Bisri Usha, takes place and the Pradhan takes part in almost all the rituals.

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

**Figure 12.** *Genealogical distribution of Pradhan in the village studied villages.*

**Figure 13.** *Genealogical distribution of Dehuri in the studied villages.*

Pradhan along with some duties he also enjoys some privileges such as higher social respect, his farmland is being tiled by villagers. Almost all the rites de passages that are held, Pradhan always is in the chief guest. And he also gets free labor for any kind of household work.

Dehuri, the secular head, is the prime bridge between the villagers and the supernatural powers and ancestral world. Being the religious head and having hailed from the senior-most branch of the villagers, Dehuri is respected by every one of the villages and enjoys certain privileges, which are much similar to Pradhan. But there is the strict boundary between the Pradhan and Dehuri and demarcates their powers to execute.

Sarpanch is an elected member of gram panchayat. The posts of Pradhan and Sarpanch are functionally complementary to each other. The main difference between them is that the Pradhan is the traditional leader, who acts as a guardian of social control, values, norms, code of conduct, etc. Sarpanch, on the other hand, acts as a

government agent through which administrative works such as development of the village, rationing of foods, and any other benefits that are being administered by the government are provided.

Village elders, the oldest and renowned persons of the village apart from Pradhan and Dehuri play an equally important role in sociopolitical arenas of the village. The village elders take part actively in all discussions, which are taken up to the Sarpanch, Pradhan, or Dehuri. Their decisions are also equally important. Utmost care is given to include their decision.

#### **6.8 Village council**

The village council is composed of the leaders such as Pradhan, Dehuri, and the group of elders. The deliberation of the council is made at the place near the dormitory either in the early morning before anyone went for routine works such as working in the fields or in labor work, etc. This may be summoned in the evening after everyone returns home from the day's work. Every day, the darbar area is generally visited by the village council members and other villagers for discussing current affairs and informal discussions on the topic of general interest. But when summoned for arbitration of any important case, the council of village leaders and elders constitutes the jury and the council serves as a courthouse. The Paudi Bhuyans though have leaders and are quite influential, but the jury gives out decision by exchanging view of all the present members of Darbar and everyone has right to say something. The Pradhan generally summons the decision to the villagers at the end of arbitration.

The topics that come up to the village council for decision, include matters, such as quarrel between the co-villagers, a quarrel arising from the partition of property, breach of the code of conduct, negligence toward duties, or inter-village marital disputes, and forbidden sexual relationships. The concerned parties are summoned to the Darbar and the party that is found guilty is fined a few measures of husked rice, a goat or fowl, a few bottles of liquor, and some cash. In case of adultery, the woman may be handed over to the adulterer as his wife. In the case of love between the Bandhus and khillis, the marriage is generally accepted with some fines as mentioned earlier. To pin down the offenders in general, detection is made by oath and ordeals, and they are made to touch the earth, water, or any good omens, which in turn with give bad results if anyone lied upon. The fine collected from the offenders is spent in holding a feast and the liquor is sprinkled ceremonially to mitigate the conflict.

The case of land disputes between two villages, incestuous love affair, and premarital pregnancy involving two villages; witchcraft, of serious nature, homicide, divorce, and separation; which cannot be decided at the village level, are referred to inter-village council.

#### **6.9 Inter-Village (Pir) council**

The inter-village councils are looking into the matters of disputes over the boundary between the villages and cases of divorce, Especially verdict for which cannot be declared by village council and is of lesser importance to be brought into the notice of Pir Council. Disputes that arise between two villages go under the jurisdiction of Pir Council. The most common cases are land dispute and divorce issues. The land issues are generally mitigated with general understanding and mutually agreed on terms. The divorce issues are mitigated with the identification

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

of culprit. The guilty party is asked to give compensation to the aggrieved party. The groom may claim bride's price if found innocent, and the bride party may end up by getting compensation for the cost of living with her parents. The groom's party may claim compensation from the bride's new husband as the case may be. Though, the inter-village council takes utmost care to mitigate the matter of separation on the positive side by trying to reunite the separated pair. The wife may be told to go back to the husband's house.

For judicial purposes, the Paudi villages are grouped under a wide territorial organization called Pir council. The Pir council may consist of three or more villages. Kuanar Pir consists of seven villages. At Pir council, the sociopolitical affairs are discussed, which cannot be settled at the village level. Each Pir has his own titular deity, the Kuanar has Ma-Mangal Patha. Annual voyage of the deity Ma-Mangal Patha, which is locally known as Jatra, is celebrated.

As already stated, issues that are not mitigated with inter-village councils also are referred to it. The usage of the perennial water source, the ownership of land, crimes that are affecting the whole of Paudi Bhuyans, or any other such social, economic, or political offenses are discussed among the Pir council.

Each Pir council has functionaries who are appointed by the member of the Pir council to carry out certain functions as Pir Pradhan, His duty is to summon the Pir council and to announce the cumulative decision, which comes out after discussing the matter within the Pir council. He also carries out purification rites. Pir council consists of village elders of all the villages that constitute the Pir. Pir treasurer generally takes care of the whole finances of the Pir and puts in records all sort of procurement of finances that are levied on culprit or disbursement of finances for organizing an event on behalf of Pir. Pir barber comes in for punishment. Sometimes, the culprit may be punished by completely shaving his head. Earlier, the post was held by the Paudi Bhuyans themselves, but nowadays due to unavailability, a barber is borrowed from the barber caste. Pir Washer man generally washes clothes of the culprit, and the washed clothes are worn after purification. Pir Bramhana though previously was the oldest Dehuri among the villages in the Pir and was chosen for performance of socioreligious acts of purification of the culprits; but nowadays Hindu caste Brahmin is also taken from the Brahmin community from the nearby village for performances of purification ceremony. This is a case of "Sanskritization."

The different functionaries of the Pir are generally paid in kind for the services they render. There is no fixed remuneration for the functionaries, neither the posts are hereditary. All the post is honorary and can be changed according to the need of the Paudi Bhuyans. The money collected as fine is disbursed as remuneration, which is usually very negligible but, a feast is organized for the functionaries and for some dignitaries. All the fines collected as foodstuffs are cooked, and the feast is held by the Pir.

With the changing lifestyle and impact of global culture, the rigid code of conduct that is enforced by the Paudi Bhuyan councils relaxed to a great extent. The traditional political organization that is governed by the traditional norms and customs is nowadays not strictly adhered to. The cases such as same khilli marriage or intra-village marriages are common events now. The Pir council nowadays is rarely called upon for these kinds of crimes. The modern law enforcement such as Police and Judiciary take care of the cases of homicide or any such harsh crimes. Thus, the organization that held such a high position in the past is losing its identity and now mostly functions as a coordinator to celebrate Pirh's annual festival of the of Pir goddess.

### **7. Kinship among the Paudi Bhuyans**

The Paudi Bhuyans are divided into kin groups. The Paudi Bhuyans differentiate the marriage on the basis of Kutumb (agnatic) relation and Bandhu (non-agnatic) relation. Marriage between Kutumb relations is prohibited, whereas marriage with Bandhu (friend) relation is accepted. Similarly, marriage between same khili (extended lineage) is prohibited. Furthermore, though it is considered that Paudis have no clan organization (see [4, 15]), they identify their common ancestor in a particular way. As a common practice, people of common forefathers carry common surnames. The marriage of individuals with same surnames such as Swain to Swain, Pradhan to Pradhan, Dehuri to Dehuri is also prohibited.

Every society has its unique kinship terminology [18–20]. Though a detailed work on such terminology of kinship can be found in the work of S. C. Roy, there are some


#### **Table 2.**

*List of kinship terms among Paudi Bhuyans.*

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

anomalies also that the researcher has found. The researcher has come up with some very common relationship kinship terminology that is used in day-to-day activity in the present day (**Table 2**).

#### **8. Religious beliefs and practices**

The religious beliefs and practices of Paudi Bhuyans are studied with respect to beliefs concerning the soul, in the aspects of belief concerning the soul in all its proliferation and the supernatural beings, the experts of religion and the rituals or ceremonies in the forms of prayers, offerings, sacrifices, feasts, and other actions (Garson and Read, 1951). The Paudi Bhuyans believe in malevolent and benevolent spirits, supernatural beings and their role in the origin of the world.

#### **8.1 The concept of soul**

The term soul is known as "atma" by the Paudi Bhuyans. They know that if it leaves the body, the person is dead. The dream is regarded as the activity of the soul. They believe that everything living and non-living has soul. Good soul goes to heaven after death, and bad soul goes to hell. Soul is not destroyed, rather reappears in a new living body.

#### **8.2 Belief in supernatural power**

According to Roy [4], the Paudi Bhuyans relate any kind of misfortune like bad luck in the food quest, crop failure personal security, and adversity in physical well-being, to the supernatural powers. If these supernatural powers are pleased with them, they tend to get success in overcoming the dangers of uncertainty that is present in their lives in the sphere of birth, marriage, death, and economic activities.

The supreme god of Paudi Bhuyans is Dharma Devta, and the Goddess Basuki Mata is a supreme goddess. Both of the gods are formless and invisible. They can take any form as they desired. The goddess Thakurani is village deity, and the god Pats described as hill god. The Kuanar village has three shrines, one is for Thakurani, second is for Bisri Usha Thakurani mandap, and the third one is Gaisiri. All the abovementioned deities are benevolent in nature and can be appeased in their respective prescribed manner on different occasions. Apart from the indigenous deities, ancestral spirit, ghosts, and malevolent spirits are also appeased. Bisri Usha (serpent goddess) is worshiped with all sincerity and devotion and considered to be the protectess and can fulfill any desires of the Paudi Bhuyans.

#### **8.3 Experts in religious sphere**

The Dehuri is considered as the sacerdotal head, who performs all communitylevel religious rituals and acts as mediator with village deities, spirits, gods, and goddesses. The Paudi Bhuyans may change the village Dehuri if they are not satisfied with his performances. But such case happens rarely, it happened. The post is hereditary and is transferred to the eldest son.

The shaman, locally known as Rulia, plays some important role particularly in curing patients and appeasing malevolent deities. A Bejuni (Sorcerer) is famous for his black magic, and he is hard to be found as he generally spends days in the jungle. The Paudi Bhuyans are afraid of him and never dare to go against the wishes of the

Bejuni. Thus, all of the specialized persons in religious sphere play a significant role in retaining social health and happiness and well-being of the community.

#### **8.4 Rituals performed for getting relief from misfortune**

An individual may perform rituals for personal reasons. This may be after consulting Pradhan or Dehuri to find out the source as well as cure of ailments and misfortunes. It may be through the Rulia or Bejuni (they may offer sacrifice on behalf of the ailing persons or may invoke supernatural aid for curing of the illness). The prayers that are addressed to the concerned deity consist of a description of the events about offering are told. Apart from personal ailments and ill lucks, there are occasions such as epidemic or mass destruction of an agricultural field or communal problems, then the Dehuri prays for the well-being of general community.

Sacrifices and offerings are important parts of any ritual activities. Animals sacrificed consist of chicken and goats. Offerings include all the natural substances such as milk, curd, mustard oil, uncooked rice and paddy, rice beer, mahua liquor, etc. The animals sacrificed and the articles mentioned are offered to appease supernatural beings. Before any sacrifice is made, the chicken is first sprinkled with water, and then a few rice grains are offered to it. If it takes the rice, it is approved for sacrifice. The blood of sacrificed animal is mixed with rice and then cooked. This is taken as Prasad.

#### **9. Festivals**

The Paudi Bhuyans celebrate a number of feasts and festivals throughout the year. Each festival is associated with specific deities. There are Gods and Goddesses, ritualistic observances, special food items, agricultural cycle, activities relating to forest, shifting cultivation, hunting, fishing, food gathering, life cycle rituals, etc. Festivals play an important role in inter-village and intra-village solidarity. These festivals are as follows:

#### **9.1 Am-Nuakhai**

This festival is celebrated in the month of January–February when the mango blossoms come out. Offerings are made at the holy place (Gaisiri) and in the temple of Thakurani. Small green mangoes are offered to them and cutting of jungle for cultivation started.

#### **9.2 Nuakhai and Karam Jatra**

This festival is performed in the month of September –October at the time of harvesting of crops. On a festive day, the Dehuri goes to his own field and cuts some sheaves of paddy and offers them to the shrines along with some common offering, such as molasses, some flowers, mustard oil, milk, and sacrifice of a fowl. All the villagers are then told to bring the paddy from their respective fields and place them in their respective houses with offering of prayers to god and goddesses and their ancestral spirits.

#### **9.3 Magah Podol**

This festival is performed in the months of January and February. On this occasion, they mark the allotment of land for cultivation. Though it is not

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

mandatory to conduct this festival every year, it generally conducted when the fresh land has to be allotted.

#### **9.4 Kath Jatra**

In this ceremony, Dehuri and some villagers take part. It generally takes place in the month of January–February and is conducted to encourage the interested villagers for clearing of the jungle for their cultivation. The Dehuri ceremonially sets a log in fire and some offerings are made in the shrines.

#### **9.5 Akhin Pardih**

The ceremonial annual hunting festival is generally held in the month of March– April. The village priest selects any Thursday of the week day after Akshay Tritiya and asks the villagers to perform a small-scale offering in the shrines. In this ceremony, no fowl or animal is being sacrificed. This festival is related to ceremonial hunting. As soon as a game is hunted, the head of the game is given to that person whose arrow has pierced the game first. The person becomes the head for the next hunting. A big chunk of meat is being offered to Dehuri and Pradhan. Then the game meat is distributed among the hunters and their family.

#### **9.6 Thakurani Jatra**

This Jatra festival is the annual festival of the Pir Council. This festival is celebrated elaborately and in wider scale. People from seven villages participate in this festival. Most of the inhabitants from the nearby villages come gather at Kuanar for this annual festival. The festival spans for 7 days. On any Thursday after Makar Sankranti, the Maa mangal patha, which is represented by stone-carved emblem and its accessories were taken outside the shrine and was washed in turmeric water. Then it is taken to the Pradhan's House where some ceremony takes place secretly. After 7 days, it is placed back in the shrine and the ceremony starts again. In the morning of the auspicious day, along with the prayers, some rice is cooked. After an hour or two, Maa Mangal Patha is carried from shrine to the Ghumara nala at a point where it is deepest and widest. Most of the villagers join in the voyage with drums and other musical instruments. On reaching the predestined place, the articles associated with the Thakurani, such as daggers, swords, potsherds, and the stone emblems, were washed in the stream one by one and it is shown to the people. It is always regarded as sacred and kept away from the local people throughout the year. After washing the articles, they return to the temple and keep them separately. The whole voyage is called Jatra. People also make offerings to the Goddess. The villagers sacrifice animals to please the goddess Maa mangal patha.

Apart from the abovementioned traditional Paudi Bhuyan ceremonies and festivals, there are some Hindu festivals adopted by them. Some of these are given here. The festivals of Jhulan where the females and kids ceremonially swing in a special swing made of wood. The date essentially coincides with Akshay Tritiya, a Hindu festival. The second is the Bisri Usha, the serpent goddess. The ceremony is generally commenced after 2–3 weeks of Maa Mangal Patha Jatra festival. Generally, it takes place in the month of February–March. On an auspicious day, a potter is brought from the nearby village. The person is usually the traditional potter who prepares the idol for generations. He cleans and marks the ground where the idol is prepared. Then some alluvial

soil is carried by the potter himself. He mixes the mud with water and kneads it. After the soil is properly malleable, the potter makes some pots, in which two are smaller in size and one is larger in size. The larger pot acts as the body of the deity. Then the face is given proper shape. The potter lets the figure to dry in the sun. After few hours, the Pradhan visits the place and then puts some jewelry and clothes on the idol.

After the idol was completed, it is carried by a woman on her head to the temple. On the way, she passes various houses, where house owners give some offerings such as uncooked rice or fowl with prayers and chants. Then the idol is placed inside the temple.

At night, the folk singer (Gauni) along with villagers recites the story of the Goddess Bishri Usha. This will be repeated for 7 days until the final day of worshiping of Bishri Usha comes. On an auspicious day, the Gauni along with Dehuri and Pradhan utters chants for Usha Mata. The magnificent story of Lakhinder, the sea trader, and his favoritism toward lord Shiva and hatred toward Goddess Bisri Usha that started on the previous week and gradually progresses throughout these 7 days with the struggle of Behula to save his husband comes to an end on the final day. Thus, the festival is a combination of the folktale, the emergence of goddess Bisri Usha, and her magnificent power to curb the evil and provide overall happiness.

On the eighth day, celebration takes place. This is celebrated not only by the inhabitants of Kuanar, but the people of neighboring villages also visit Kuanar. The villagers offer various items, which include uncooked rice, molasses, domesticated fowls, goats, and as many objects that they afford to give. Young boys and girls actively participate in the festival. They dance with Oriya songs and Hindi songs while playing it on loud speakers that they leased from the Keonjhar. This is a new addition. Earlier, they danced by playing musical instruments, mainly drums.

#### **10. Life cycle rituals**

Each successive stage in the life of Paudi Bhuyans is celebrated with certain rites and rituals. These include birth, marriage, and death.

The females are shy about discussing on maternity. Though, the physiological origin of maternity that is sexual intercourse is not unknown to them. According to the traditional belief system that motherhood can only be achieved with the help of benevolent spirits and blessings of gods and goddesses.

To appease the god and benevolent spirits, the ceremony related to birth is celebrated by all the villagers. According to the S.C Roy [4], it's not only to appease but also to relieve the individual from harmful spiritual influence in particular, to assimilate the new state of life that a person is entering. Entry into the new state of life should be safe and prosperous.

#### **10.1 Name giving ceremony (Eikushia)**

On the 21st day of birth of a child, a socially accepted identity is given to a newborn baby in the form of name. A name is selected for the baby that will be his/her identity. This is done by some well-defined social customs that had been practiced among the Paudi Bhuyan society form the time immemorial. Most of the kin members and most of the villagers are invited to this ceremony especially at the time of the first child.

On the previous day, most of the relatives mostly the affinal and consanguine kins are invited. They are provided with the food and country liquor, handia. On the day of the occasion, all the relatives who arrived earlier get up early in the morning

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

except for the children. Most of them start cleaning the house. Both the floors and the walls are being cleaned splashing water mixed with cow dung. Generally, outer walls are splashed with the cow dung water. But it is splashed with the red soil mixed with water. After the house is cleaned and the inner part of the house is being decorated with designs made with rice paste.

After cleaning, men and women including the father and mother of the newborn take bath in the local stream. Though not mandatory, but running water is most favorable for performing the Eikushia.

After this, the father of the child arranges the feast that is the most important part of the occasion. And the Dehuri and Pradhan of the village are not only invited, but they perform rituals such as ancestral worship and worship of the god and goddess of Paudi Bhuyans. Various items such as uncooked rice, pulses, corn, etc., are cooked by the Dehuri and are offered to the ancestral spirits.

After ancestral worship, the Dehuri draws a circle on the ground with turmeric and a small pitcher (Lota) or measuring bowl (Mana) is placed in the center of the circle. Women sit around the Dehuri. Dehuri then puts some turmeric powder in the Lota or mana. The next procedure includes pouring of rice grain one by one and uttering of names one by one that are suggested by the parents of the child. When a rice grain floats, the name uttered while it was placed is selected. The ceremony ends with a feast given by the parents of the child to the villagers, kin members, and any distinguished guess who visited them on this occasion.

#### **10.2 Case Study I (birth)**

Respondent is a 21-year-old female belonging to the Paudi Bhuyans. She resides in the Purana Sahi of the Kuanar village. Earlier she was living at Puttu Sahi of Telkoi Block. She was married in the year 2015. She got married to a male aged 24 years. The baby boy is born to them. This is her first baby. She is very shy in giving out the information to the researcher. But after persuasion, she talked to the researcher.

Both the parents of the child believed that the baby was born with the blessings of their fore fathers and almighty. They are also familiar with the physical mating between an adult male and female, which is responsible for conception. Although they stressed upon that without the support of the almighty, the child cannot be in mother's womb.

The symptoms she experienced after conceiving are nausea, vomiting, uneasiness, and the sudden stoppage of menstrual cycles. Upon examined by her mother-inlaw, her grandmother-in-law and suruni (midwife) she was confirmed that she will become mother soon. She experienced changes in the size of belly.

She was restricted to her house and allowed to do only lighter household works. She was not allowed to do heavy tasks from the 8 months of pregnancy. Her diet was also taken care of by mother-in-law. She gave birth of a male child after 9 months and 20 days of pregnancy. The baby was delivered in home with the help of midwife. Very few relatives visit to see the newborn.

On the 21st day, the birth ceremony called ekushia took place, and the name was given to the child. A feast was given to the villages on this day.

#### **10.3 Marriage**

Marriage is always viewed to be an affair of the village, rather than an exclusive concern of the concerned family. The unmarried girls biologically belong to their parents, but sociologically all the unmarried girls are the children of the village. In a broader

sense, unmarried boys and girls are the members of the village and the village youth's dormitory associates more closely with the socio-religious life in the dormitory organization. In case of girl's marriage, the opinion of all the village elders is never overlooked. Likewise, the marriage of the village boys is the responsibility of all the villagers. The parents finance the marriage, but the villagers extend their support and cooperation to make the marriage ceremony a success. While ceremonially handing over the bride, the girl's villagers request the groom's villagers that they offer the girl not only go to groom but into the custody of his villagers. The village should take proper care of the bride.

Marriage is the proper situation to study the roles played by different age and sex groups. The elderly men and women and unmarried boys and girls play specific roles in marriage. Marriage is monogamous among the Paudi Bhuyans. Widower can marry. In case the first wife proves to be barren, one has the liberty to take a second wife. Cross cousin marriages are not common. No cases found in the village.

Of all forms of marriages, Dharipala and Ghicha marriages are the most common forms. Love marriages with arrangement (Phulkusi) are very few in number among the Paudi Bhuyans. In the past 2 years, in the studied village only a single case of such marriage is found. Mangi Bibha is recently introduced in the village. The material culture and rituals tend to be way similar to the form of marriage, which has been adopted from the other Hindu caste people. Very recently, in certain cases of Mangi form of marriage, a Vaishnab or Brahmin is invited to act as a priest. This is also commonly known as Mukut Baha since the bridal pair wears crown (Mukut). Earlier it was made of real flower, but nowadays it is generally made of plastic flowers, similar to caste people during the marriage ceremony. This is a case of sanskritization.

During the field work, 34 couples were interviewed whose marriages were took place during the years 2013–2015.

From the **Table 3** and **Figure 14**, we can interpret that Dharipala bibaha is the most prevalent form of the marriage with nearly 38%. The second form of the marriage, which is preferred, is Mangi Bibaha and is about 32%. The Ghicha Bibaha is less prevalent than the above two forms of marriage. Phulkusi and Rundi Bibaha are rare in occurrence as compared with the Dharipala and Mangi Bibaha.

#### **10.4 Dharipala**

This is a form of love marriage. When a boy likes a girl of certain village and falls in love with her and vice versa and agrees to marry. Then they come to the boy's village. The girl is left in the outskirts of the village and the boy goes and informs his family preferably brother's wife or grandmother first. And it is the responsibility of them to communicate


#### **Table 3.**

*Different forms of marriages among the Paudi Bhuyans (see [4, 21]).*

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

#### **Figure 14.**

*Frequency distribution of types of marriages.*

to other family members. If the bride is accepted, the girl is made to wash her feet in water containing turmeric. Tilak of turmeric paste is applied on the forehead of both the boy and the girl and accepted as bride and groom before entering into the house.

After entering the boy's house, the bride was given fresh clothes to wear and the next day the bride's parents were informed. After the information, if the bride's family accepted the groom as their son-in-law, then father and maternal uncle along with some villagers visit the groom's house. Upon visiting the groom's house, they were welcomed with tobacco and country liquor (Handia/Mahua). According to the financial condition of the Groom's family, the feast is arranged for the bride's family members. And next day both the families along with the bride and groom visited the Thakurani temple. The Dehuri (village priest) in the presence of Pradhan sang some chants and the groom put vermilion on the forehead of the bride. Then the procedure of marriage is over, but the marriage is not accepted socially until a feast is organized by the groom's family, in which both bride's villagers and groom's villagers are invited.

#### **10.5 Ghicha**

This is a form of marriage by capture. The boy and his friends hide in the forest to capture the girl. Then the guardians of the girl are informed secretly so that they send the girl to the desired place. The girl is then asked to visit the place either alone or companied by friends. There the chosen girl is captured and taken to the boy's village. The friends inform the guardians of the girl.

On the next day of capture, the girl's family members including her parents visit the boy's house. The boy's family arranges a feast for them. If a girl is captured on her visit to some village or from the market or fair, two kin members of groom go to the girl's village with a stick. Reaching there they first go to the Pradhan's house (village headmen) and inform. The Pradhan consults with the villagers about her identity.

Next day the boy's party visits to the girl's house and settles the marriage. Their feet are washed in turmeric water. Tobacco and country liquor (Rice brew) are offered to them. After a short discussion with the girl's father, all come to the Darbar to settle the marriage.

Next day the girl's party goes to the boy's house. They are welcomed with tobacco and country liquor (Rice brew). And the next day both the families along with the bride and groom visited the Thakurani temple. The Dehuri in the presence of Pradhan chants hymns and the groom puts vermilion on the forehead of the bride. The procedure of

marriage is over. The marriage is not accepted socially until a feast is organized by the groom's family. In this type of marriage, bride price is given after 2 or 3 years.

#### **10.6 Phul Khusi**

This is also a marriage by love. During the festival of Bisri Usha, a boy puts flower on the bun of the girl he likes. If the girl accepts the flower, the marriage is settled among them, and if not, she is captured and the earlier procedures of Ghicha marriage are followed.

#### **10.7 Am Lessare**

This is also a form of love marriage. In this marriage, a boy and a girl generally like each other. The boy splashes mango juice at the girl in the forest and in return the girl shows her acceptance by giving an ornament of her. If the girl accepts, the marriage is settled among them and if not, she is captured and the earlier procedures of Ghicha marriage are followed.

#### **10.8 Kada lesare**

In this type of marriage, the boy splashes mud at the girl whom he likes. This generally happens during any marriage ceremony. If the girl in return throws mud at the boy, the marriage is settled among them and if not, she is captured and the earlier procedures of Ghicha marriage are followed.

#### **10.9 Mangi Bibaha**

This is a type of marriage by negotiation. In this type of marriage, the parents of a marriageable boy go to other villages to search for a suitable girl. At first, they inform the Sarpanch about their requirements. Then the Sarpanch calls an assembly and conveys the requirements to the villagers. When anybody agrees, then both the parties discuss with each other to settle down the marriage.

#### **11. Stages of marriage by negotiation (Mangi Bibaha)**

After discussion between girl's and boy's party, the date of marriage is fixed.

#### **11.1 Haldi**

It is a ceremony of applying haldi (turmeric) mixed in sarso (mustard) oil on the body of the bridegroom and sanghi, younger brother of the groom by seven married women generally known as Mahatrais. Apart from them, most of the elderly women of the village apply the paste on the bridegroom's body.

#### **11.2 Tel Handi**

The day before marriage, the would-be bride holds seven straws on her forehead and the Mahataris pour oil seven times on the straws with uttering of chants. The haldi (turmeric) mixed in sarso (mustard) oil is applied on the body of the bride and on her sanghi, the younger sister.

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

#### **11.3 Phul Handi**

The day before the marriage, in the evening, ceremonial gift known as Phul Handi is sent to the bride's family from the groom's end. A big earthen handi painted with rice paste is used in this ritual. Different food items such as paddy, rice, gur, rice cake, and necessary items for bride, such as sari, petticoat, bangles, comb, mirror, and flower are kept in the handi and sent.

#### **11.4 Dia Mangala**

On the day of marriage, in the morning, a group of seven married women (Mahatrais) go to the four directions in the village with the bride and offer homage to Dharma Devta, Basukimata, and Gaisiri for a successful marriage. The Dehuri of the groom's village also performs the same procedure.

#### **11.5 Haldi**

On the marriage day, the haldi ceremony is repeated in both the cases, that is, the bride and groom, as described earlier.

#### **11.6 Ghuru Pani**

The bride and the groom are given ceremonial baths by the women of their respective villages with the holy water of Baitarani River on the day before marriage and on the day of marriage also.

#### **11.7 Baha jatra**

On the marriage day, the groom along with the relatives, friends, and villagers who reside in the neighborhood starts journey toward the bride's village. They either accompany modern music system or traditional drums. The groom's party dances and sings throughout the journey.

#### **11.8 Baha**

After arrival of the groom's party to the bride's house, the mother of the bride welcomes the bridegroom by washing his feet with turmeric water and by offering Jau (puffed rice). The Dehuri prepares the place of marriage with rice paste and color. The area is bordered with bamboo poles. The bride and groom are made to sit in the place. The priest utters chants while the hands of bride and groom are held together. The maternal uncle of both bride and groom puts new clothes over them. The uncle of bride ties the garments of bride and groom in a knot. Then they move around the mandap seven times. The vermilion and turmeric are applied on the forehead of the bride by groom with the help of a coin. Then both of them throw puffed rice on the fire.

#### **11.9 Kanyasamarpana**

On the next day of marriage, the villagers of bride hand her over to the villagers of the groom. They utter "Oh respected Bandhus, now you get your daughter in law. When she was young she was with her parents, but after her puberty, she belonged

to the village. Now we are giving her to you. She may be ugly or beautiful, blind, or only one-eyed, deaf or dumb or lame, she might be a witch or sorceress, she may not know how to cook, how to talk, and how to respect you. Anyway, she becomes your Bahu now if she does anything harmful to you, or she is not liked by you, don't let her wander from the shed to shed (begging food) but bring her back to the same tree (to her parents) where from you have taken her."

The groom's villagers reply "oh bandhus, she may have anything which goes against her, but she is our Bahu now, she is not only your daughter. Unless she does serious offence why should we bring her to you?"

#### **11.10 Gundi chaul and mandcheeli**

The bride's villagers give five pai of rice called Gundi chaul and one goat (Mandcheeli) to the groom's villagers. The villagers of groom arrange feast with these.

#### **11.11 Salabidha**

In a formal ceremony, relatives and villagers of bride give gifts and money to the bridal pair and to the sanghis (accompanied persons of groom and bride). The bride's younger brother pats on the back of the groom. The groom gives a piece of cloth to the bride's younger brother. He carries the groom on his back, and the groom's younger brother carries the bride on his back. Both dance for a few minutes.

#### **11.12 Kada lata**

After the marriage is over, the women relatives present gifts to the bridal pair on the marriage altar, then they throw mud, cow dung water, ashes, and black dyes at them. Jokes are exchanged between them and they make a lot of fun.

#### **11.13 Ceremonial Bath and Breaking the Bow**

The women and the girls of the bride's village take the bride and the groom to the stream for a bath. There the bride hides a steel pitcher (lota) under water and the groom finds it out. The groom also hides it and the bride finds it out. This is called "dub duba." The bride carries a pot full of water on her head on the way back. The boys of the bride's village make a strong bow with sal tree branch and put a string on it. The groom shoots at the water earthen pitcher carried by the bride. The groom breaks the bow and throws it away. He should break it in one stretch, otherwise, he is not considered strong enough to bear a child.

#### **11.14 Handi sira**

After returning from the stream, the bride and her women relatives husk about three to four pai paddy in husking lever (Dhenki). She cooks jau out of this rice and offers it to the family ancestors. The groom also offers it to their ancestor. All the participants of the marriage take a little of this jau.

After the feast, the newly married couple starts journey to the groom's village at afternoon.

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

#### **11.15 Baha jatra**

The groom along with the relatives, friends, and villagers who reside in the neighborhood starts on journey toward the groom's village. They are either accompanied by modern music system or with traditional drums. Along the way they dance and sing.

#### **11.16 Griha Prabesho**

After reaching to the groom's house, the feet of the couple is washed with turmeric water and Red dye (Alta). In front of the house, a square shape is marked out with 4 sal branches placed at the four corners. The place is decorated inside. This is similar to the mandap. The couple moves around the Mandapa seven times. Then they are taken into the house and take rest.

#### **11.17 Bhuri bhoj**

Next day of coming in groom's house, the bride cooks a little "jau" in a new earthen pot and offers to the ancestors. At night, sister-in-law or grandmother of the groom brings the groom and the bride to the house and declare them as a couple. Then the newly married couple starts to live together.

#### **11.18 Bada Khana**

After 2 days of marriage, the bridegroom arranges a feast for the villagers and bride's party. Gundi chaul is mixed with rice and along with the Mandcheeli, many goats are slaughtered, and the villagers of both the sides are given a hearty meal.

Feast is mandatory in a Paudi Bhuyan's marriage, which incurs huge expense. Thus, Paudi Bhuyans are very flexible in this regard they allow both the groom and bride families up to 2 years of time to arrange the feast to the villagers.

#### **11.19 Marriage expenditure**

Marriage puts great economic strain on Paudi Bhuyans. Contribution from the relatives is negligible. The parents start hoarding crops and cash for 5 years or more till they are able to amass considerable amount for financing the marriage. In spite of the efforts, they run into indebtedness and incur heavy loans to meet the marriage expenses. A considerable amount is spent for feasts. Other heads of expenditure include bridewealth (Mula) paid to the bride's relatives, clothes for the bridegroom and other relatives, and other miscellaneous expenses.

The items and amount of bridewealth are same for all types of marriages, which are paid within a year or two after the marriage except in Dharipala (marriage by elopement) in which it may be paid after 5–10 years when the marrying partners accumulate enough amount for the purpose. Extremely poor persons are sometimes exempted from paying the full amount of bride wealth. The following gives item-wise detailed list of the standard bride wealth paid in Bhuyans marriages.

#### **11.20 Case Study II (marriage by capture)**

Respondent was 21-year-old male belonging to the Paudi Bhuyans. He resides in the Purana Sahi of the Kuanar village. On the occasion of Bisri Usha of neighboring village Nipa around 9 km away, he found a very attractive girl and fell in love with her. He then enquired about the girl from the villagers that she also visited her uncle's village Nipa for the Bisri Usha festival. She resides in Pannanasha village under the Kuanar Panchayat. So the respondent tried to talk with the girl he had fallen in love with, but she was too shy to talk to him. The respondent then started some advancement like holding her hand and forcefully talks to her. He actually proposes to her for marriage. The girl was not clear with "yes" or "no" toward the advancement of the respondent. So the respondent talked to the girl's immediate guardians. The girl's guardians are informed secretly that they are going to capture her, which is acceptable in the Paudi Bhuyans. After the guardian expressed their willingness, the girl was captured by the respondent and his friends from the Mandap area. And the respondent took blessings of the guardians and told them that she was taken to his house.

On arrival in the village, though the girl was not talking to anybody but was eagerly welcomed by the boy's family. Her feet were washed with water mixed with turmeric. Turmeric powder was applied on her forehead. She was given a separate room to stay and relax.

The next day the respondent's two uncles visited the native village of the girl and told about the capture to the girl's family. The uncles are treated well by the girl's family and are offered Hadia, Rice, and Dal food. Next day along with the uncles, the girl's family members and some villagers along with weapons start the journey toward the respondent's village.

Upon arrival, the girl's family and the accompanying villagers are given a feast. After discussion with family members and the Pradhan of Kuanar village along with the Sarpanch, they disagreed with the offer of marriage. They took the girl back with them and respondent felt very sad. He said that the main reason of the dissolution of the marriage was that the girl did not like him and thus the marriage did not take place. The girl along with the family members got back to her native place. The respondent felt very sad with the rejection but he accepts it and said "I will find another girl who is made for him."

#### **11.21 Case study III (marriage by negotiation)**

Respondent was 21-year-old male belonging to the Paudi Bhuyans. He resides in the Sonajhuri Sahi of the Kuanar village. The marriage ceremony started 1 day before the marriage with the haldi ceremony. On that day, the respondent and his unmarried younger brother were made to sit with bare upper body, only lower portion was covered upto knees. Only the female relatives and neighbors are taking part in the haldi ceremony. They made turmeric paste and mixed it with mustard oil. That was smeared upon the bridegroom and the sanghi with chanting of some blessings.

After smearing them with the turmeric and mustard oil paste, they were taken outside the house and were made to stand where the mother of bridegroom poured holy water on them. The holy water was prepared from the water that was brought from the Baitarani River the previous day. After the holy water, some more water was poured on them, then they took bath in the nearby stream.

After bathing, both the respondent and sanghi wore new upper undergarment and dhoti. After this they took lunch. In the afternoon, after the Haldi ceremony, the

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

family members started to prepare the nua handia, which was going to be sent to the girl's family in the evening.

On the marriage day, the bridegroom does not take food in the morning. On the marriage day again, haldi ceremony was held. In the afternoon after the haldi ceremony, the bridegroom was carried by his sister in the neighborhood for collecting rations as a token of love and affection. Then he was subjected to ritualistic bathing with the holy water and in the stream. On arrival at the stream, the participants consisting of children, teenagers, adult women started ritualistic play in which the bridegroom was continuously smeared with mud. The participants were divided into two groups in which one continuously tried to help them in bathing and the other group tried to put mud. In this process, the two groups started throwing mud at each other. If a girl and boy in this process continuously put mud on each other and develop affection for each other, they are supposed to be the next couple. So this ritual was also very important for showing affection toward the opposite sex. After an hour of enjoyment, the whole game came to an end and the bridegroom was allowed to take bath and wear the new clothes as mentioned above.

In the evening, the bridegroom was decorated with the alta (red dye) in the feet and the chandan (sandal wood paste) dots on the fore head.

In the evening, the near and dear ones who have been invited in the marriage started the journey toward the bride's village, Nipa, on foot. While walking at many places they stopped and danced. The music was played on the speaker that was carried with them.

After reaching the village, the bride's mother washed the feet of groom with turmeric water and all the members accompanying the groom were given sweet and water. Bride's sisters and friends started teasing the groom by forcefully putting sweets in his mouth. It was a fun-filled moment and enjoyed by everyone.

Dehuri of bride's village started preparing the Mandapa by smearing color, placing essential items such as both boiled and raw rice, four terracotta lamps, one brass lamp, insane sticks, holy water, ghee, some vegetables, small wooden sticks, and many such smaller things that are used by Dehuri to perform the marriage ceremony.

The marriage started with the groom first visiting the Mandapa. The Dehuri chants sacred mantras, which could hardly be heard and the groom does not repeat any chants with dehuri. The chants are mostly to please the forefathers and gods and goddesses and for their blessings.

Then the groom left and bride entered the Mandapa, here the same procedure was followed. Then both the bride and groom entered the Mandapa. The bride's face was now covered with her sari and the bride's maternal uncle was given responsibility for giving away the bride to the groom. The ritual was known to them as "Kanyadano."

Then the bride and groom just completed seven rounds across the Mandapa. Then next important ritual was Khoidaho in which the puffed rice was thrown in fire to appease the fire god. After this the groom puts vermilion on the forehead of the bride with the help of small bamboo stick. The marriage was over. There was an arrangement of feast.

The bride and groom were put in separate rooms to rest. In the morning the bride and groom were given food, and the journey started toward the groom's village on foot. Upon arrival the bride and groom's feet where washed by the sister of groom. And the groom generally spent the evening with friends enjoying country liquor and roasted chicken. The next day a grand feast was organized by the groom and his relatives. Most of the villagers are invited in the feast. From this day onward, the newlywed couple stated living together.

#### **11.22 Death among the Paudi Bhuyans**

The death is inevitable. It will come on a certain day, maybe tomorrow or day after tomorrow. Bhuyans conceptualized the death as a supernatural incidence. It is always related to the activities of a person, which he carried out in his life that results in the death, as a consequence of punishment. Fear of supernatural is the basis of the perception of all the major life crisis, and death is the ultimate crisis that is conceptualized in the sphere of fear for supernatural.

This may be considered as the reason that Bhuyans are quite conscious to avoid all kinds of culturally prohibited activities and carrying out all the rituals as per their cultural norms to ultimately please the supernatural power to gain its favor [22]. Thus, the influence of supernatural power in all kinds of deaths can easily be established.

Though the Bhuyans are quite aware of the scientific explanation of causes of death such as deadly diseases, snake bite, etc. But they also believe that the cause of such crisis is also influenced by some external agencies such as witches, sorcerers, and the evil eye. The accidental deaths are also influenced by the life activities (Karma).

The existence of the soul and the position of the soul, after separation from the body (it is life activity driven), the concept of rebirth, and finally the treatment of physical body after death are all considered important life activities and are socially bounded.

Types of Death prevail in the Paudi Bhuyans community [23].


Death due to old age: The death for the old age is common to all the living organisms of the world. Due to the natural process of wear and tear and attaining a certain age, the organism has to die. It is considered as natural death. And this is considered as universal truth. Paudi Bhuyans are also not an exception, and they accept the fact very gracefully.

Death due to the accident: This kind of death is considered as ill fate for the dead one. Death is generally associated with his life's activity. Paudi Bhuyans believe that if the person leading a socially accepted good life is generally immune to the accidental death. But they also believe there are exceptions, where the accident occurs to socially accepted good persons also.

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

Death due to witchcraft: Deaths that are considered by the Paudi Bhuyans are sudden and generally unexplained causes without prior indications of ill health or any such symptoms and the corpse is being examined by raulia (witch doctor). If after examination rulia confirms that the cause is witchcraft, then after doing prescribed rites for the normal death. The raulia also confirms with his rites that other person of the family may not suffer similar death.

Death due to God's desire: If any death occurs without any witchcraft symptoms or with prolonged sufferings with uncurable disease. Then that death is ascribed by the Bhuyans as God's desire.

Death due to Diseases: If any death occurs due to any disease all the prescribed rights that are performed as normal death but with most of his belongings are destroyed either in the pyre or buried with him. In case of children, his toys are also put on the funeral pyre or buried along with him.

Death due to snake bite: The rites associated with the death caused by the snake bite are also being dealt as the death due to old age. But the exception is that his family members have to generally offer goat or big hen in the worship of Bisri-Usha. Otherwise, the other family members may the same fate.

Death due to murder: Paudi Bhuyans nowadays have to consult police and after the autopsy, the body is handed over to the family members for the last rites, which are again similar to the old age death.

Childhood death: When small infants or children die, they are mostly buried. The burial ground may differ though. In some cases, the infants are buried in the vicinity of the dwelling house or in some cases in the community burial ground.

Some omens related to death that are common among the Paudi Bhuyans are as follows:

The howling of dog, which is commonly designated as weeping of dogs.

The unusual cry of the bird, Koyel (Eudynamys schlopaceus).

The fearful dreams of demons and devils are very common before a few days of death.

In the event of death, the prime responsibility is to inform the affine, consanguineal kins, and other known persons of the deceased's family. Usually on such occasions, no kutumb is expected to carry the message to other people or other villages. It is believed as well as recognized culturally that the kutumbs are usually in grief and remain busy for the treatment of the corpse. The people who are the primary or secondary kins of the deceased and therefore they vary in utter grief. This may be the only reason for refraining the Kutumbs to carry the message of the death to people in other villages. On the other hand, the Bandhus (affine) or the members beyond the lineage who are not primarily or secondarily related to the deceased are sent as messengers on such an occasion.

The economic transaction on such occasions is very negligible and confined only to the payment for rice toward the food on the way. Similarly, the person or relative who received the information also pays the same amount of rice to the messengers for the same purpose. As already mentioned, for a common Bhuyan, the food cost for the messenger is to be borne by the family members of the deceased, whereas, if the deceased is a rank holder of the village, the payment of rice toward food cost is borne by the villagers.

In the house of the deceased, soon after the death, the family members inform all their lineage members first. With the crying of the family members, the message of death reaches all the villagers beyond the lineage immediately. People rush into the house of the deceased. It is the fine and foremost responsibility of the villagers (who are usually the clan lineage member of the deceased) to come forward on such an occasion to prepare the stretcher (Kathagudi) first. Usually, the villagers search for the slender poles either of Sal or Jammu tree and few more branches in the nearby forest to prepare the stretcher. On such occasion, sometimes the villagers donate the wooden poles if they have. Sometimes, the family members also collect the wooden poles for the stretchers. The social responsibility of preparing the stretcher is, therefore, a humanitarian question for all the villages in Paudi Bhuyans society helping in such occasion irrespective of the kinship relation is not based on any other motive than just to help each other.

With the above-stated responsibility of stretcher making cash transaction is not at all given importance. If somebody has the requisite wooden poles, he donates them without any objection and never demands any cash payment. Usually, people help each other in this respect mutually and reciprocally and never demand cash or kind for the material or service. In case, people do not have required wooden poles, some of the villagers or volunteers go to the nearby forest for immediate collection. Mainly because of deceased, on the occasion of grief, no body demands food from the deceased family. Bhuyans are usually buying ropes from the local markets. For the purpose of stretcher making and the expenditure for ropes were born by the family of deceased.

#### **11.23 Rituals observed during Cremation**

Carrying the corpse to the funeral site is one of the major activities of the mortuary practice. In this activity, either the lineage numbers or anybody from the village may join. The family members of the deceased may join the group if found capable of carrying the bier. However, it is the responsibility of the villagers either of the same clan or different. The Bandhus or affine may also carry but usually, Paudi Bhuyans prefer to carry the corpse to the cremation ground as fast as possible, which may be within 3–4 hours of death, mainly because the Bandhus or affine live far away and they have to return home. In most of the occasion, they could not come before cremation. Usually, four male members carry the corpse on the stretcher to the funeral site. Women are not allowed to accompany the corpse to the funeral site.

The economic transaction in this activity is quite significant. As the Paudi Bhuyans are living with their family and lineage members, all such activities are performed on the basis of mutual or reciprocal help and people looking at the grief of the deceased's family members never expect any cash or kind from the deceased's family. Moreover, all the Paudi Bhuyans are in favor of disposing the corpse at the earliest possible, because of the fact that lineage members cannot take food until the corpse is cremated. Thus, this phase of social responsibility has absolutely no economic transaction.

After reaching the site for cremation, the first responsibility is the cremation. The corpse carriers together with other accompanying villagers to collect firewood either of Sal (Shorea robusta) or Jammun (Syzygium cumini) variety. It is just considered a humanitarian help, which all the villagers render. Most of the elderly people remain at the site till the burial or cremation activities are over.

In preparation of funeral pyre and placing the corpse on the pyre, the responsibility is taken by the same villagers as well as the host family. Paudi Bhuyans ignite the pyre or put the soil on the corpse inside the pit. The eldest son will ignite the pyre, husband in case of wife's death, or nephew in case the deceased had no son or husband. If no such relative is found, only then any male member who shares the same surname can ignite the pyre.

Soon after the cremation is over, the accompanying villagers go to the pond or river for a ritual bath. After which they come back to the deceased house and stand *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

in front of his house where the water mixed with cow dung and with a copper coin dipped in it is sprinkled over them. Usually, a bunch of sacred grass Durba is kept inside the water for sprinkling. Every person has to sprinkle of water over their own body with the help of grass bunch.

After this, all the accompanying persons go to their own house. This is a social responsibility among the Paudi Bhuyans; on the other hand, the responsibility is bestowed upon the concerned individuals accompanying the corpse to the cremation site. Directly from the cremation site, people come to a pond or streamside where all of them take a clean bath and their clothes are washed by the washerman. Though the Paudi Bhuyans have employed the washerman like the caste people, it was not a practice in the olden days nobody is also able to tell about the exact time of the first introduction of washerman in the Paudi Bhuyans society.

Soon after the cremation activities are over, on the very day to the 10th day there is no significant social or ritual activity in the family of the deceased except to offer food and drink twice a day to the spirit. During daytime, usually boiled rice is offered. The food is generally carried by the lady who usually cooked the food but can be carried by the men also. The place of offering is usually at one end of the village in the direction of the cremation site. It is mandatory that the lady will proceed alone without any accompanying her for such offering. This activity continues up to 11th day.

On the 10th day among the Paudi Bhuyans, the purification rites are usually observed taking into account all the Kutumbs or the consanguines in the village. Usually, the lineage members are to join and participate in the ceremony.

On 11th day morning, ladies wash the wall and floor with cow dung water and clean the kitchen, throw away earthenwares, and get all the clothes washed by the washerman. Just before the bath time, all the lineage members, especially males of primary kins go for tonsuring the head. The females only pare the nails by the barber. At the end, all the members apply turmeric paste on the body and take a ritual bath for purification. Soon after the purificatory bath, the mortuary rituals carried out. Soon after the purificatory bath, the mortuary ritual is over for the people and they come back to their respective houses and take food after cooking.

Usually, on the 10thday, the Bandhus along with the distant Kutumbs reach by the afternoon and the household head has to make all arrangements for their food and accommodation.

Early in the morning when the women remain busy in cleaning the house, all the Kutumb members go to the bank of the river Baitarani and throw the ashes and the earthen pot in the river. Dehuri undertook some rituals in the honor of the spirit. On this occasion the village priest and other leaders have no social responsibility. Only senior Kutumb members perform all the rituals. Social responsibilities of all the male members are outside and females confined to the indoor cleaning.

On 11th day feast is organized for the Bandhus and distant Kutumbs usually carry no rice or goat as gift or help. They simply participate in the feast and disperse.

#### **11.24 Rituals of Burial**

Rituals related to burial have some similarities with the rituals related to cremation. The difference is noticed in the burial of the dead body. Dead body is buried in the North-South direction along with the articles, which are used by the deceased. These articles include bedding (mat and pillow), clothing, steel plate, small pitcher (lota), and coins. In case of women, ornaments are buried with the dead body. The

burial place is surrounded by stone blocks. Purification is done in 11th day from the date of death. A feast is arranged on the same day.

#### **11.25 Case Study V (death)**

Respondent was 34 years old living in the Purna sahi of the village Kuanar. He belongs to Paudi Bhuyans community. His father died 2 months ago on 24-01-2015. He was the eldest son with four siblings. He was the most educated youth in the village, completed higher secondary with distinction, and worked in mines in Suakati area of Keonjhar. His family was among the most affluent families of the village Kuanar. He was not in his home and went for the work when the news arrived of his father's death. According to him, his father was suffering from heart ailments and had many heart attacks in the past. He took his father to Bhubaneswar for the bypass surgery. But his father's health did not improve as such. His father was under strict diet and medicines.

He told me that it was a sudden death of his father who was 62 years old due to cardiac arrest. On hearing the news over the telephone from his paternal uncle, he rushed to the home from his office. Upon arrival he saw that many of his relatives had

already arrived and his married sisters along with brother in law also present. After 7–8 hours of death, the local physician from Kanjipani town arrived and the death certificate was issued. After that the dead body was bathed and new clothes were put on. Then the Hindu Brahman from the nearby village was called, and he performed the rituals. The respondent could hardly remember any such rituals.

The male relatives mainly men accompanied the dead to the cremation ground in a small matador vehicle. Most of the personal belongings of his father were taken to cremation ground. His bedsheets, mattress, lota, favorite garments, etc., were taken. They are also disposed of in the cremation ground. They went to the bank of Baitarani River and the Brahman again carried out rituals there. The pyre of wood has been prepared and the dead body was placed over it. He then put fire on the pyre. After the cremation was over, the dom brought some remains of the dead body and put it into a terracotta pot and that pot was then put into the water of Baitarani river. Thus, the ritual was over. All the male kin members shaved their head to show the reverence and affection toward the dead person.

On 11th day to end the pollution period, a feast was organized by the respondent and his relatives. The entire village was invited in the feast.

#### **12. Summary of the chapter**

The focus of the chapter is on the economy and social aspects of the Paudi Bhuyans. The economy of Paudi Bhuyans centers on shifting cultivation and gathering of natural resources from the nearby forest. The different lands that are utilized by the Paudi Bhuyans are discussed. Daily life of the Paudi Bhuyans is being discussed with a table showing the daily routine, which shows that they live very simple life. The social organization of Paudi Bhuyans is discussed under the subtopics of family organization that shows the different types of families, village organization, traditional and modern political organization of the Paudi Bhuyans. The kinship organization and the kinship terms are being discussed. That shows a considerable difference from what Roy [4] has observed. It can be said that the influence of Oriya language may have influenced the kinship terms. All the major rituals that are practiced by the Paudi Bhuyans of the village Kuanar are described. These show the prevalence of animism

#### *Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

and a partial influence of Hindu rituals and festivals. The life cycle rituals are then discussed in the form of name giving ceremony, marriage, and death. The rituals performed in these ceremonies are discussed in detail. The economic and social organization of Paudi Bhuyans shows that traditional structure of the society is in action in every sphere of village life as well as family and individual level. Most of the rituals performed in different festivals and ceremonies are functioned as group cohesiveness, identity, and to strong bonding of relations between people of the village as well as the other Paudi Bhuyans villagers. The traditional social structure and rituals of Paudi Bhuyans show that they belong to pre-modern societies.

#### **Author details**

Abhishek Bhowmick Guest Faculty Central University of Odisha, Koraput, Odisha, India

\*Address all correspondence to: anth.abhi@gmail.com

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **References**

[1] Borah G. Understanding the challenges of globalization on indigenous societies of Assam. Think India Journal. 2019;**22**(14):685-692

[2] Semwal R, Nautiyal S, Sen KK, Rana U, Maikhuri RK, Rao KS, et al. Patterns and ecological implications of agricultural land-use changes: A case study from central Himalaya, India. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment. 2004;**102**(1):81-92

[3] von Fürer-Haimendorf C, von Fürer-Haimendorf E. The Gonds of Andhra Pradesh: Tradition and Change in an Indian Tribe. London: Routledge; 2021

[4] Roy SC. The Hill Bhuiyans of Orissa. Ranchi: Man in India Office; 1935

[5] Tripathi V. Legacy of Iron Technology in India: A case study. In: Sengupta G et al., editors. Past and Present Ethnoarchaeology in India. New Delhi: Pragati Prakashan; 2006. pp. 367-382

[6] Behera B. Odiya Upanayasare Bhuyan sampradaya or Rajparibara. Bhubneswar: Grace Offset Printers; 2003

[7] Mishra PK. Comprehensive History and Culture of Orissa. New Delhi: Kaveri Books; 1997

[8] Wiercinski M. Some problems in the demography of the tribal populations in India. Mankind Quarterly. 1996;**36**(3):261

[9] Shah AM. The Household Dimension of the Family in India: A Field Study in a Gujarat Village and a Review of Other Studies. New Delhi: Orient Longman, and Berkeley: University of California Press; 1973

[10] Bhowmick A, Sutapa M. Change and continuity the economic life

of Paudi Bhuyans in the era of globalization. Journal of Asiatic Society. 2018;**LX**(2):107-124

[11] Dash B. Shifting cultivation among the tribes of Orissa. Orissa Review. 2006:76-84

[12] Bhowmick A, Sutapa M. Indigenous knowledge system of Agricultural Management: A case study among the Paudi Bhuyan of Keonjhar District of Odisha. Journal of the Department of Anthropology. 2018;**16**(17):1-12

[13] Radcliffe-Brown AR. The study of kinship systems. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 1941;**71**(1/2):1-8

[14] Kjosavik DJ, Shanmugaratnam N. Property rights dynamics and indigenous communities in highland Kerala, South India: An institutional-historical perspective. Modern Asian Studies. 2007;**41**(6):1183-1260

[15] Rout SP. Pauri Bhuyan marriage. Adibasi. 1969;**11**:49-60

[16] Behera JK. Tribal religion, transformation and women participation: An analytical study. Research Journal Social Sciences. 2019;**27**(3):92

[17] Jha S. Tribal leadership in Bihar. Economic and Political Weekly. 1968;**13**:603-608

[18] Fox R, Robin F. Kinship and Marriage: An Anthropological Perspective. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press; 1983

[19] Holy L. Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship. London: Pluto Press; 1996

[20] Radcliffe-Brown AR, Forde D. African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. London: Routledge; 2015

*Changing Socioeconomic Structure of Paudi Bhuyans, a Particular Vulnerable Tribe of Odisha… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107295*

[21] Christie K, editor. Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: A Global Perspective. Curzon Press. Surrey. 1998

[22] Kushwah VS, Sisodia R, Bhatnagar C. Magico-religious and social belief of tribals of district Udaipur. Rajasthan. Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine. 2017;**13**(1):1-7

[23] Nayak S. Mortuary Practices of the Paudi Bhuiyans and the Juangs of Orissa an Anthropological Study. Bhubneshwar, Orissa: Utkal University; 2007

#### **Chapter 7**

## Ethnic Self-Categorization of the Russian-Speaking Population in Latvia

*Vladislav Volkov*

#### **Abstract**

The paper discusses the peculiarities of self-categorisation of Russian-speaking population as an ethnic minority in Latvia. The author considers categorisation as a cognitive process for classification of objects and phenomena into separate groups (categories). The article shows the institutional factors of reproduction of categorization and self-categorization of the Russian population of Latvia as a subordinate ethnic minority. At the same time, the issue of Russians as one indigenous people of Latvia is being discussed. The article examines the question of the extent to which the self-categorisation of Russians as an ethnic minority is reproduced in the younger generation of this ethnic group. In 2000 and in 2019, the author of the article conducted a survey of students studying in Russian in three private universities in Riga, to find out the evolution of this self-categorisation. The data of the study show that in the perception of young Russian respondents, Latvian society is stratified into Latvians and ethnic minorities, whose identities have different social weight in the country. The data of the study show that the narrative form of respondents is most often associated with identification with these groups, but not with Latvian citizens or residents.

**Keywords:** self-categorization, ethnic minority, system of the ethnosocial stratification, indigenous people, Russian-speaking population

#### **1. Introduction**

Latvia is a country where the ethno-cultural diversity of the population is a long-term historical and even political phenomenon. Since the 18th century, with the inclusion of the Latvian lands into the Russian Empire, and especially in the 20th century, during the period when Latvia was part of the Soviet Union, the share of the Russian population in the multi-ethnic diversity has increased significantly. And in modern independent Latvia, the share of Russians is about a quarter of the country's population. In addition, Latvia is characterized by a high percentage of representatives of other ethnic groups (Belarusians, Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, etc.), for whom Russian is also their native language. This fact significantly increases the proportion of the Russian-speaking population in the ethnic palette of Latvia. At the same time,

according to the Constitution and other legislative acts, the dominant socio-political discourse, Latvia is a Latvian national state, which, at the same time, proclaims the right to preserve ethnic and cultural identity to ethnic minorities. True, the scope of the Russian language in the social life of Latvia is sharply narrowed. According to the Constitution, national identity in Latvia can be built only on the basis of the Latvian language and culture, only Latvian is the state language, into which the education system of ethnic minorities is also fully translated. At the same time, the extremely insignificant representation of the Russian population in the socially prestigious spheres of public life, politics, business, culture, science, and art is also visible. This is accompanied by an extremely low interest on the part of the political elite and the media to discuss problems that concern the Russian population and ethnic minorities in general. In such a situation, which can be characterized as the subordination of the Russian population in relation to ethnic Latvians, it is important for researchers and public figures to understand the peculiarities of the ethnic self-categorization of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia. The author adheres to the notion that in the conditions of a clearly manifested ethno-social stratification for Russians as an ethnic minority in Latvia, ethno-cultural markers of self-categorization (Russian language, culture, features of historical experience, memory, etc.) are very closely intertwined with markers that characterize the social positions of Russians as a subordinated minority, which is characterized by perceptions of underestimated life chances in comparison with the life chances of Latvians. To confirm this hypothesis, the author conducted sociological studies of the narrative practices of Russian students in Riga in 2000 and 2019, the materials of which confirmed this interpretation of the ethnic self-categorization of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia. Moreover, in 2019, the self-categorization of Russian young people as a subordinate ethnic minority only intensified compared to 2000. The data of these studies confirmed the fact of increasing skepticism in the Russian environment regarding their official categorization as an ethnic minority, since the existing norms and practices of not protecting the interests of ethnic minorities do not imply full inclusion in social, political and economic life in Latvia. Therefore, it is no coincidence that among the representatives of the Russian public there is an interest in self-categorization as "one of the indigenous peoples" of Latvia. However, such ideas do not find support in the Latvian environment.

#### **2. Self-categorization of an ethnic minority in the context of ethno-social stratification and the space of life chances**

Social self-categorization is the process of attributing oneself to one or another social, including ethnic, group [1, 2]. The most important condition for ethnic selfcategorization is the ethnic differentiation of society, which permeates all its spheres and directly affects the nature of the distribution of social capital between different ethnic groups. P. Berger and T. Luckmann see in the established social institutions of society the most important resource for constructing social categorization and social identity [3]. The source of ethnic categorization and self-categorization is the features of the mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion in large social and civil communities [4]. Mechanisms of social exclusion in relation to ethnic minorities, realizing the dichotomy "we/they", prevent their access to membership in prestigious social roles and statuses, increasing the marginalization of these groups in society and, according to I. M. Young, their social and political impotence [5].

#### *Ethnic Self-Categorization of the Russian-Speaking Population in Latvia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106688*

The relevance of understanding the processes of ethnic categorization increases in multi-ethnic societies, where at the official, including the legislative level, as well as in the public consciousness, there is a long-term and stable consolidation of the division of society into a national majority and ethnic minorities. Thus, for ethnic self-categorization, both markers of ethnic identity (common historical origin, culture, language, religious beliefs shared by members of an ethnic group) turn out to be relevant [6]), and markers of ethno-stratification identity that characterize the most common social positions occupied by representatives of ethnic groups in the system of power in society [7]*.* As the practice of multi-ethnic states shows, where differences in the functional roles of the identities of the ethno-national majority and ethnic minorities are constantly accentuated in socio-political life, ethno-cultural and ethno-stratification markers can smoothly flow into each other [8].

For ethnic minorities, self-categorization is particularly sensitive to markers characterizing the position of these groups in the system of ethno-social stratification and life chances [9]. This correlation is especially relevant for those ethnic minorities that are poorly represented in the structures of state power, in socially prestigious activities and professions, and in relation to whose ethnocultural identity the dominant ethnopolitical discourse implements exclusion practices. In such a situation, representatives of ethnic minorities significantly actualize the dichotomy "we - they" in their ethnic self-categorization [10].

#### **3. Social and political factors stimulating self-categorization of the Russian population as an ethnic minority in Latvia**

The geographical proximity of Latvia to Russia and mainly its entry into the Russian Empire from the beginning of the 18th century, and then the USSR, contributed to the emergence on its territory of a large group of the Russian population and representatives of other ethno-cultural groups for whom the Russian language was or became native. The materials of the first All-Russian population census (1897) indicate that 231.2 thousand Russians, or 12% of its population, lived in the current territory of Latvia, and more than 300 thousand before the First World War. Moreover, the Russian population of Riga, the largest city in the Baltics, in this period was approximately 100 thousand people, or 20% of all citizens [11]. During the years of independent Latvia (1918–1940), although the number of the Russian population decreased to 206.5 thousand (1935), it was the largest ethnic minority in the country (10.6%) [12]. The largest number of the Russian population falls on the last years of the existence of Latvia in the USSR (1940–1991), which was mainly caused by migration from its regions. In 1989, 905.5 thousand Russians lived in Latvia, or 34.0% of its population [13].

During the independence of Latvia (since 1991), the number of its Russian population has decreased by about two due to emigration, as well as negative demographic growth. At the beginning of 2022, 454.4 thousand Russians lived in Latvia, which accounted for 24.2% of the total population of the country, and their share in the population of the five largest cities is: in Riga 35.7%, in Daugavpils - 47.8%, in Liepaja - 27.2%, in Jelgava – 24.9%, in Jurmala – 32.6% [13]. The high proportion of the Russian population in the largest cities of Latvia, as well as in Latgale, where Russian Old Believers settled already in the 17th century, as well as priority identification based on the Russian language and Russian culture, also led to the reproduction of the most important structural elements of their collective ethno-cultural identity [14, 15].

Among all the largest ethnic groups in Latvia - Latvians, Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Poles, constituting 94.9% of the total population only for Latvians and Russians is the native language of their ethnic group. For Latvian Latvians, the mother tongue is Latvian in 95.7% of cases, for Russians, Russian - 94.5% of cases, for Ukrainians, Ukrainian - in 27.2%, for Poles, Polish - in 19.4%, for Belarusians, Belarusian - in 18.8%. Only Latvians and Russians, compared to other large ethnic groups in Latvia (with the exception of the Roma), are characterized by marriages mainly with partners of their own nationality [16].

The categorization of Russians as a ethnic minority is very clearly manifested in the peculiarities of their political consciousness and behavior. This is due to the extremely low representation of Russians among the Latvian political elite, the highest state bureaucracy, the scientific and expert community, which can be qualified as the operation of ethnic exclusion mechanisms. Since 1991, only one person of Russian origin, Maria Golubeva, has been Minister of the Interior for less than one year as a representative of the Development/For! party [17]. Nil Ushakov in the period 2009–2019 was the mayor of Riga. But among the advisers to the Prime Minister [18], among the nineteen heads of departments and departments of government departments, there is no one with a Russian name and surname [19]. There is not a single Russian among the rectors of all sixteen state universities, academies and higher schools. The proportional participation of ethnic minorities in Latvia is realized mainly in the leadership of private universities, where five out of eleven rectors are only representatives of these ethnic groups [20]. There are practically no Russians in the leadership of big business in Latvia either. Among the top 20 taxpaying businesses in 2019, ethnic minorities were CEOs of only one company, which ranked last on the list, and among the top 60 companies, only six (BERLAT GRUPA, SIA; GREIS, SIA; GREIS loģistika, SIA; Accenture Latvijas filiāle; LIVIKO, SIA; BITE Latvija, SIA) [21].

Given the enormous attention of the international community to the problems of preserving the identity of indigenous peoples, in terms of the collective consciousness of the Russian population of Latvia, self-categorization as one of the indigenous peoples of Latvia also resonates. In Latvian science, including in works written by Russian scientists themselves, the term national (or ethnic) minority is mainly used in relation to Russians in Latvia [3, 22–25]. The categorization of the Russian population of Latvia as an ethnic minority is extremely important for the legitimation of the collective identity of this ethnic group in the conditions of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society in Latvia. The Constitution defines Latvia as a "nation state" with "ethnic (national) minorities" [26]. Recognition of the Latvian language as the only state language at the same time coexists with the right of ethnic minorities to use their native languages and develop their culture in private and public life. Within the framework of legal guarantees for ethnic minorities, Latvian Russians since 1991 have been able to create a system of non-governmental organizations, political parties, educational institutions, including higher education, the development of scientific, publishing, journalistic activities, etc. These forms of institutionalization of the collective identity of the Russian ethnic minority are an important channel integration into the Latvian society without threatening the interests of the Latvian language and culture [27].

However, it cannot be said that the categorization of Russians in Latvia as an ethnic minority is shared by the entire scientific community and experts. Particularly great disagreements on this issue are found in the political consciousness, which offers alternative forms of ethnic categorization. The main objections to the

legitimacy of categorizing the Russian population of Latvia as an ethnic minority can be summarized as follows:


#### **4. The concepts of "indigenous peoples" and "ethnic minorities" in international law and the experience of the Republic of Latvia (1991: 2022)**

The adopted United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) contains a description of a whole system of individual and collective rights of people belonging to indigenous peoples [28]. However, there is no definition of "indigenous peoples" in this document. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues reveals the modern understanding of the term "indigenous peoples", which includes a sign of individual self-identification and its recognition as a community, a special language, culture, religion, historical connection with the pre-colonial period, non-dominant status in society, etc. [29]. The World Bank also provides a detailed enumeration of the characteristics of indigenous peoples, which indicate the difference between their collective identity and the majority of the country's population, commitment to their native languages, traditions, leaders, and connection to their land. At the same time, such peoples are characterized by a sense of danger associated with a reduction in their life opportunities, including the lack of their official recognition by the state [30].

The term "indigenous peoples" is quite actively used in the scientific and sociopolitical discourse in Latvia. In scientific articles, this term has been assigned to Livs, representatives of the Finno-Ugric language family, now numbering 170 people [31–33]. In the Constitution, it is the Livs, along with the Latvians, that are recognized as an ethnic group that forms the identity of Latvia [26]. Some representatives of the Latgalian community, as well as Russian publicists in Latvia, also consider Latgalians as an indigenous ("independent") people of Eastern Latvia [34, 35]. There were even attempts by the opposition party "Consent Center" to induce the Latvian Parliament to recognize the Latgalians, along with the Livs, as the indigenous people of Latvia [36]. Such perceptions are supported by research data in Latgale, which

show a very high proportion of people who indicated their Latgalian identity (27.0%) and belonging to the Latgalian language (21.1%) [37].

Many features that characterize indigenous peoples (originality of language, culture, traditions, areas of traditional residence), as well as their rights to protect and reproduce their individual and collective identity, inadmissibility of discrimination against them by the state and society, largely coincide with the features national minorities contained in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) of the Council of Europe [38].

If the categorization "indigenous people" in relation to the Russian population is not officially accepted in Latvia, then the categorization "national (ethnic) minority" is usually applied. However, the application of this categorization in relation to the entire non-Latvian population is connected with the directions of nation-building in Latvia, which is not completed. In Latvia, at the state level, as a "normative" model of nation-building, the achievement of the goal is recognized, when "the Latvian language and cultural space form the basis of national identity, which strengthens belonging to the nation and the Latvian state. Therefore, maintaining and strengthening the position of the Latvian language and cultural space is a priority for the long-term development of Latvia" [39]. As the political history of Latvia since 1991 shows, this stated goal has not yet been achieved, and its implementation is expected by 2030.

The preamble to the Constitution of Latvia (2014) guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities to preserve their identity. At the same time, it is said that there are "Latvian nation" and ethnic minorities in the country, which, along with the Latvians, constitute the "people of Latvia" [26]. Thus, the categorization of "ethnic minorities" is excluded from the national identity, and the identities of ethnic minorities are subordinated to the identity of the Latvians. Other important ethno-political documents also emphasize the idea of differences in the socio-political value of the identity of Latvians and representatives of ethnic minorities. In the "Citizenship Law" (1994), only Latvians are automatically recognized as citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, as representatives of the "state nation" (valstsnācija) and autochthonous Livs [40]. The "Declaration on the Occupation of Latvia" (1996) speaks of "the need to eliminate the consequences of the occupation", which included "hundreds of thousands of migrants", with the help of which "the leadership of the USSR ... sought to destroy the identity of the people of Latvia" [41]. The "Law on the State Language" (1992, 1999) fixes the varying degree of responsibility of the state in relation to the Latvian language ("preservation, protection and development") and ethnic minority languages ("the right to use the mother tongue") and "expanding the influence of the Latvian language ..., to stimulate the fastest integration of society" [42]. The "Education Law" (1998) defines Latvian as the language of education in state, municipal and private educational institutions, while retaining the right to use ethnic minority languages in pre-school and primary schools that implement ministry-approved "ethnic minority education programs" [43].

In various social integration programs (2000, 2011) adopted by the government of Latvia since the early 2000s, ethnic minorities, primarily the Russian population, regardless of legal status (citizens of the Republic of Latvia or its permanent residents) are considered as only an object of the state integration policy. According to these documents, in the field of their education, it is necessary to achieve the existence of a "stable environment of the Latvian language", and the goal of the integration policy is to preserve the "Latvian language, cultural and national identity, European democratic values, a unique cultural space" without mentioning the

interests of ethnic minorities in the development of their ethno-cultural identity [44, 45]. In fact, the principle of asymmetry is being implemented in the sociopolitical value of the Latvian identity and the identity of ethnic minorities.

#### **5. Programs of Latvia's political parties on the place of ethnic minorities in nation-building**

In 2004, the Latvian Saeima (parliament) ratified the General Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities, which laid important legal grounds for recognizing the identities of these population groups as one of the legitimate forms of Latvian national identity. This created the prerequisites for taking into account the interests of ethnic minorities in the democratized process of nation-building. However, neither before the ratification of this Convention and Latvia's accession to the European Union in 2004, nor after any of the political parties expressing the interests of ethnic minorities to one degree or another, was invited to the ruling coalition. And this despite the fact that from 2011 to this day, the faction of the Social Democratic Party "Consent", which is supported mainly by Russianspeaking citizens, is the largest in the Saeima.

The programs of some political parties of the ruling coalition ("New Unity" and "Who Owns the State") do not even mention the existence of ethnic minorities in Latvia [46, 47]. At the same time, in the program of the radical "National Association", which is part of the government coalition, the native language of the Russian population of Latvia is mentioned in a negative connotation [48]. The election program of the Union of Greens and Peasants, which is in opposition, for which the Latvian voter votes, has recently begun to include a provision on the need to respect the right of ethnic minorities to preserve their language and culture [49]. In the party programs of the government's New Conservative Party and the Development/For! states the need for the state to create conditions for "the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the Latvian language, culture, worldview while preserving their language and culture." But in general, ethnic minorities are seen as social groups that need to be actively included in the space of the "Latvian language, culture and worldview" [50]. Or, in some variation, it is proposed "to provide all children with education in the Latvian language and the opportunity to master part of the educational material bilingually in the languages of ethnic minorities and EU languages" [51]. The presence in the program documents of the two government parties of some provisions on the preservation of the identity of ethnic minorities can be seen as a step forward compared to the situation before the elections of the current 13th Seimas (2018), in which all government parties did not mention in their programs the presence of ethnic minorities in the country. But in general, it is fair to say that the leading political parties proceed from the idea of nation-building in Latvia as an unfinished process that needs to achieve the linguistic homogeneity of the public space.

The Social Democratic Party "Consent" proceeds from the idea of the need to ensure a more worthy place for ethnic minorities in nation-building than is happening now. This party in its program emphasizes the group ethno-cultural values of this part of the population (the need for "teaching the languages of traditional ethnic minorities in Latvia within the framework of the education system", "the use of ethnic minority languages in communication with state and local government institutions in places where minorities live traditionally or in a significant amount, for the application of the norms of the General Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

in full and the withdrawal of reservations (declarations) made during the ratification of the convention." the presence of ethnic minorities in the country [52] was mentioned. Only a serious loss of support for the Russian-speaking voter in the Seimas elections in 2018 at the level of political declarations increased the emphasis on the interests of the Russian-speaking population. In particular, "Consent" advocated the introduction of "optional programs in the native language in metropolitan schools of ethnic minorities" [53]. In addition to "Consent" the party "Russian Union of Latvia" also focuses on the interests of ethnic minorities. The program of this party proclaims the achievement of an official status for the Russian language, state guarantees for Russian schools and schools of ethnic minorities in general [54]. But the Russian Union has not been represented in the Seimas since 2010.

A significant place among the agents of nation-building is occupied not only by nationalist and radical parties, but also by public organizations, the media, whose representatives consider any independence of the Russian-speaking parties and the orientation of the political views of the Russian population that do not fit into the nationalist canon as "national betrayal" [55, 56]. Some politicians propose to liquidate the largest party of the parliament "Consent", which is voted mainly by Russianspeaking citizens [57]. Information stuffing of extremely Russophobic content is regularly made [58, 59]. Moreover, xenophobia began to spread to the ethnonym "Russians" itself. In 2020, a discussion revived in the Latvian segment of the Internet whether this concept should be considered a curse [60]. Within the framework of this interpretation, the widespread interpretation of the "loyalty" of ethnic minorities to the state also fits in, in the content of which nationalist politicians "forget" to include a mention of the constitution, which contains articles on the guarantee of the Latvian state to respect human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities [61]. The impossibility of combining Latvian patriotism and adherence to Soviet values is emphasized. One of the driving factors for the growth of the Russian population's skepticism towards their official categorization as an ethnic minority is associated with the rejection of the categorization of Russians as "foreigners" (cittautieši), which is widespread in a significant segment of the Latvian socio-political consciousness, including some scientific publications [62].

#### **6. Materials of sociological research**

The author of the article in 2000 and 2019 conducted a survey of students studying in Russian in three private higher education institutions in Riga. Taking into account the significant time gap in the study, the tasks were also set to determine to what extent the needs of self-categorization of Russian-speaking youth as an ethnic minority are reproduced in discursive practices for a sufficiently long period of time, as well as the extent to which continuity in such self-categorization is characteristic of the respondents of 2000, who lived about half of their lives in conditions of the USSR and among respondents in 2019 who were born in independent Latvia. In 2000, 68 respondents were interviewed, in 2019–2075. The gender characteristics of the respondents, citizenship, self-assessment of the level of knowledge of the Latvian language, as well as their attitude towards the prospects of linking their future life with Latvia are presented in **Table 1**.

The students were asked to answer one question in free written form "How do you imagine the future of ethnicminorities and languages in Latvia?". The very wording of the question for the respondents did not at all imply the need to directly categorize


#### **Table 1.**

*Some objective and subjective characteristics of the respondents.*

themselves as representatives of various national-political or ethnic communities, for example, with "citizens of Latvia", "permanent residents of Latvia", "Latvians", with representatives of ethnic minorities. However, through the content of the individual discourses of the respondents, one can determine how much the most frequently occurring (normative) descriptions and assessments of the ethno-political and ethnosocial reality in Latvia and the place of ethnic minorities in it, which are specific to the consciousness of the Russian and Russian-speaking population of Latvia, turn out to be in demand in them. Given the large volume and diversity of opinions expressed, their content was grouped on a scale of assessments in the range "the future of ethnic minorities and their languages depends mainly on their own individual efforts" to "state ethnic policy and existing political institutions do not imply the full preservation of national minorities and their languages ". In general, the distribution of representations of respondents in 2000 and 2019 is presented in **Table 2**.

The overwhelming majority of descriptions speak of a close connection between the future of ethnic minorities and the current direction of state ethnic policy (primarily policies in the field of citizenship, education, language), as well as with a large proportion of these ethnic groups in the population of Latvia (51 such descriptions in 2000 and 58 - in 2019). The consciousness of the respondents is extremely concentrated on the external, both institutional and demographic circumstances of their self-categorization as ethnic minorities. While the individual and collective capabilities of the ethnic minorities themselves are not considered as the main guarantee to preserve their language and identity, and therefore to preserve themselves as full-fledged ethno-cultural groups in Latvia (16 descriptions in 2000 and 13 in 2019). Respondents are more inclined to consider their reference ethnic


#### **Table 2.**

*Assessment of the future of ethnic minorities and their languages in Latvia.*

groups as a subordinate element of the system of ethno-social stratification and the institutionalized system of power. Moreover, in 2019, compared to 2000, the proportion of respondents who were critical of state ethnic policy even increased (48 and 34 descriptions, respectively). In 2000, respondents gave more detailed answers to the proposed question than in 2019. So, the average number of words of the five most voluminous narratives in 2000 was 451 words, while in 2019 it was only 94 words. More detailed essays in 2000 contained a multifaceted description of the conditions for the existence of the Russian population of Latvia, as well as their identity as a multi-layered phenomenon, where ethnic elements are intertwined with general civil ones. In 2019, there is practically no trace of this extended discourse. The main focus is on emphasizing one's identity: "we are national minorities." This is the reserve of group, cultural markers that should determine adaptive strategies for respondents and the construction of civic identity, based on the priority of preserving their ethnic core.

#### **7. Categorization of Russians as the "indigenous people" of Latvia**

The marginalization of the collective interests and collective ethno-cultural identity of the Russian population in the dominant socio-political discourse and political practices stimulates the growth of skepticism among a part of this ethnic group to look for alternatives to the categorization of the non-Latvian population as ethnic minorities stated in the legislation. Categorization as one of the indigenous peoples of Latvia is seen by some representatives of the Russian public as such an alternative, especially in a situation where international law contains more guarantees for the preservation of ethno-cultural identity than is provided for in international law relating to the interests of ethnic minorities.

It cannot be said that self-categorization of the Russian population of Latvia is recognized as an official term in the programs of political parties focused on protecting the interests of this ethnic group. However, in the program of the "Russian

#### *Ethnic Self-Categorization of the Russian-Speaking Population in Latvia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106688*

Union of Latvia" party, one can find a number of terms for categorizing the Russian population, which go beyond the officially accepted concept of "ethnic minority" in relation to the non-Latvian population. This party has a positive attitude towards the categorization of Russians as an ethnic minority of the country, but at the same time stands for "recognition of the existence of two main linguistic communities in the country - Latvian and Russian", for "the establishment of Russian cultural autonomy in Latvia" [63].

The categorization of Russians as the "indigenous people" of Latvia can be found in the statements of some representatives of Russian public organizations in Latvia, publicists and journalists. A detailed motivation for the legitimacy of using such a categorization of the Russian population was proposed in 2017 by the chairman of the public organization "Union of Citizens and Non-Citizens" Vladimir Sokolov. In his opinion, the use of such a term is possible, since Russians lived on the territory of Latvia even before the formation of Latvian statehood in 1918. And the need to categorize Russians in Latvia as one of its indigenous peoples is dictated by the lack of full-fledged guarantees from the state to preserve the Russian language, whose status in Latvia, according to Sokolov, is "politically repressed" [64].

The idea of Russians as one of the indigenous peoples of Latvia is promoted on the current website of the "Association of the Indigenous Russian-Speaking People of Latvia" [65]. At the same time, the most important sign of the categorization of Russians as an indigenous people is seen in the presence in this group of a large number of citizens of Latvia who received such a status not as a result of naturalization, but by their origin, as descendants of citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in 1918–1940 [66].

Representatives of the Association of Indigenous Russian-Speaking People of Latvia (as an organization of indigenous people) regularly participate in significant UN events - the annual sessions of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the annual sessions of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Latvian publicist and public figure Vlad Bogov, speaking at the 7th session of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Geneva, 2014), linked the need to consider the Russian population of Latvia as its indigenous people due to the fact that the Russian language is recognized in Latvia only like a foreign one. Bogov's speech stated that "the leadership of Latvia, formed mainly from representatives of the Latvian-speaking people and defending only their interests, is consistently implementing plans to build a single nation in Latvia based on a single Latvian language and culture. To this end, a policy of forced assimilation and integration is being pursued" [67]. V. Bogov also made a report at the meeting of the 14th session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues at the United Nations Headquarters (2015). In his opinion, the approximate number of indigenous Russian-speaking people is at least 140,000 people - 8% of the total population of Latvia and 50% of the number of Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia who have the right to vote. In this case, the representatives of this people include those Russian-speaking people who received citizenship of Latvia without naturalization, "by blood" ("by inheritance"), which is in fact the recognition by the state (Latvia) of the existence of the indigenous Russian-speaking people inhabiting the territory of this country [68].

Representatives of the Russian public also resort to the self-categorization of "indigenous people" in polemics with representatives of political power. For example, this happened at a rally of many thousands near the Presidential Palace of parents, public activists, teachers, journalists who gathered in response to the approval by

the President of Latvia Raimonds Vejonis (2018) of amendments to the Law on Education, according to which education in public and private schools of national minorities will soon be be held only in Latvian, and Russian-speaking students will be allowed to study in their native language only Russian language and literature. At this rally, the mother of one boy compared education in Latvia to a blow to the head with an ax - tough, rude and the strongest survive: "I have nowhere to go, my ancestors have lived on this land for centuries. I do not believe that we can be crushed here. We are a third of the population of Latvia, it is unacceptable to put up with the humiliation and infringement of our rights! If the store refuses to speak Russian with me, I turn around and go to another place. We must force them to reckon with us, we are the same indigenous people of Latvia as the Latvians!" [69]. At the Youth Country Conference of Russian Compatriots in Latvia (2019), Margarita Dragile, representing the international youth organization "Prospects for Russian Youth", said: "We are Russian citizens of Latvia, the same indigenous people as the titular population. My great-grandfather, for example, was the governor-general of the city of Riga! Why should I leave here or have a limited list of rights? But now November 2019 is on the calendar, and there is no more Russian education in our country" [70].

As can be seen from the speeches of some representatives of Russian public organizations, the results of the 2012 referendum on amendments to the Constitution, making Russian the second state language are the immediate stimulus for turning to the categorization "Russian indigenous people of Latvia". The results of the referendum showed that the majority of Latvian citizens - 74.8% were against granting Russian the status of a second state language, only 24.9% of those who participated in the vote supported this initiative [71]. Thus, the referendum demonstrated the split of society along ethno-linguistic lines, because the proportion of people who supported the initiative to grant the Russian language the status of the second state language in Latvia roughly corresponds to the proportion of Russian-speaking citizens in Latvian society.

If we turn to the content of social networks in the Russian-speaking segment of Latvia, we can find the following arguments in favor of self-categorization by Russians as one of the indigenous peoples of Latvia:


Here is a characteristic statement of one of the initiators of the discussion on social networks about the value of categorizing Russians as one of the indigenous peoples of Latvia: "Well, how long can you mock us, call us some kind of "ethnic minority"? We are not a ethnic minority, but the indigenous inhabitants of Latvia, we have exactly the same rights to this land as the Latvians. Today's Saeima and the government of Latvia have committed a form of genocide against us, forbid us to speak our native language, humiliate and insult us in every possible way, take away our Motherland. And we follow their lead, silently put up with the situation of second-class people. Latvians are not masters in Latvia, they are just one of the peoples living in this territory. We are not an "ethnic minority", but "the indigenous people of Latvia of non-Latvian nationality" [72].

*Ethnic Self-Categorization of the Russian-Speaking Population in Latvia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.106688*

#### **8. Conclusion**

The Russian population of Latvia is characterized by self-categorization as an ethnic minority of this country. However, as the analysis of the dominant socio-political discourse shows, the formed political practices, such categorization is associated not so much with additional opportunities for the preservation and development of their collective ethno-cultural identity, which is provided for by international law, but with the subordinated status of the Russian population in comparison with the status of ethnic Latvians. It is no coincidence, therefore, that in terms of the consciousness of the Russian population of Latvia, skepis is spreading in relation to the positive possibilities of the status of an ethnic minority within the framework of the people of Latvia. Such skepticism leads a part of the Russian population to turn to the possibilities of categorization as one of the indigenous peoples of Latvia, given that international law attaches great importance to respecting the rights of these groups of society. However, in the scientific community, such attempts to selfcategorize the Russian population of Latvia as its indigenous people do not meet with understanding.

#### **Author details**

Vladislav Volkov1,2

1 The Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia

2 Baltic International Academy, Riga, Latvia

\*Address all correspondence to: vladislavs.volkovs@inbox.lv

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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#### **Chapter 8**

## The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel

*Yusri Khaizran*

#### **Abstract**

Until recent years, the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel was completely absent from the concerns of their surroundings in the Arab world, despite the fact that the Arab surroundings have maintained a strong presence in forming the political consciousness and intellectual and ideological tendencies in Israeli Arab society for the past 70 years. It can be accurately said that Arab society in Israel considered itself a part of the Arab surroundings in every sense of the word, and it still sees its existence as a social, existential, and cultural extension of these Arab surroundings. This communicative situation, at the level of consciousness and sentiments, has cast a shadow on the relationships and positions of Arab citizens in the state, and there have always been views towards the Arab surroundings as a source of moral strength and intellectual inspiration. All of the intellectual and ideological transformations that the Arab world has experienced have reflected on the conditions of Arabs in Israel, starting with pan-Arabism, following through to the reframing of national identities, and ending with the extension of Islamism and resorting to pre-state frameworks against the backdrop of the logic of fragmentation that was brought about by the Arab Spring.

**Keywords:** Palestinian in Israel, Israel, Arab milieu, ethnic minorities, Middle East

#### **1. Introduction**

The conflict between the Palestinian national movement and the settlement enterprise that is represented by the Zionist movement led to the Nakba of the Palestinian people, who have been transformed, due to the war, from a majority into a national minority, after approximately 800,000 Palestinians were expelled, forced out, or displaced, turning them into refugees outside of their country of origin. During this war, 531 villages and population centers were destroyed, and their people displaced, in addition to the emptying of 11 cities and towns during the Nakba, which led to an end to Palestinian cities and destruction of urban society that had been characterized by elites and cultural and economic movements.

In addition, the Nakba of the Palestinian people led to the isolation of the Palestinians who remained in their country, from their Arab surroundings and cultural environment. Israel considered communication between Palestinians in the country and the Arab surroundings an imminent risk that could threaten Israel's existence. It is important to mention that, because of the Nakba, the Arab minority in the country was left without political, intellectual, cultural, and economic elites, and only with a rural minority living in village population centers in the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev. The situation of the Palestinians who became citizens of the state of Israel has been described as being a "body without a head", as a result of the break-off in development and modernization, the destruction of civic centers, and the displacement of the political leaders and the cultural elite. The Nakba did not stop there, and it has even limited the possibility of getting a higher education in Arab capitals, which was commonplace before the Nakba, and this is due to the conflict between Arab states and the Palestinian national movement on the one hand and with Israel on the other. The number of Palestinian students in universities outside the country has decreased from approximately 1000 students to a few in individuals.

The fact that Palestinians remained in Israel was not accepted by a number of leading forces in the Israeli political community, starting with the founder of the state and its first prime minister, David Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion wanted, it seems, to displace the remaining Palestinians and maintain an exclusively Jewish state, "pure" of non-Jews. On this basis, Ben Gurion considered the Arabs to be a fifth column and dealt with them from a security perspective by imposing military rule on Arab population centers [1].

After the Nakba, Palestinians lived in a state of great contradictions that formulated their consciousness and impacted their political and social behavior. The sense of alienation and besiegement was prominent in their isolation from the surrounding Arab world and they are being cut off from their civilizational and cultural heritage on the one hand and by the policies of military rule on the other. These policies worked in a systematic manner to isolate them in their villages, limiting their movement and trying to paralyze their political and protest movements by persecuting and banning political organizations (like the Ard Movement in 1964 and the Socialist List in 1965).

During that period, contradictory motivations appeared for the political behavior of the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel, and they became more prominent with the rise of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the pan-Arab national movement and the Arab unity movement. Palestinians lived in a state of anticipation, in addition to the sense of defeat that had taken control of their political behavior. It had become commonplace for them to gather and eagerly listen to the speeches of Abdel Nasser, who breathed hope into them once again, while, on the other hand, they capitulated to the military rule and went out in droves to vote for Zionist parties and the lists of the ruling party, the Mapai Party.

The Arab population who remained within the borders of the State of Israel after the 1948 war went through abnormal developments because they were still a part of the Arab world and the Palestinian people nationally, culturally, and religiously. But at the same time, they were a part of the citizenry of the State of Israel, which was built upon the ruins of the Palestinian people and was still in engaged in a bloody conflict with the Palestinian national movement and Arab states. This can be seen in the crises, the obstacles, and the difficulties facing Arab Palestinians in adapting and integrating inside the state of Israel, which defines itself as being a Jewish state. The political reality derived from the Zionist and Jewish nature of the state is prominent in the lack of equality between Jews and Arabs on all levels of their lives because of distribution mechanisms that are in the interests of the Jewish majority and discriminate against the Arab citizens. As a result, the exclusion and marginalization of Arab citizens continue, and they continue their lives on the margins of Israeli society, unable to achieve full citizenship because of the exclusivity of the state. At the same time, the state has

#### *The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107520*

reinforced policies of removing Arabization and eliminating the Palestinian character, which impacts the status of Arab population and their national and cultural identities [1]. This dilemma has led to an acute crisis among Palestinian citizens of Israel, and this had been reflected at three levels. The first level is the internal level, which assumes that there is no consensus among the Arab population on a national agenda and political demands as a national minority inside Israel, a country that defines itself as a state for the Jewish people. The second level is the Israeli level, which assumes that the definition of the state of Israel as a Jewish state gives priority to Jews, and this definition has paved the way for increased marginalization, exclusion, and discrimination against Arab citizens in the distribution of financial and in-kind resources. The third is the Palestinian level, which assumes that the Arab minority has remained on the margins of the Palestinian national movement and has been excluded from its agenda, not receiving enough attention from the Palestinian leadership, some of whom believed that Arabs were an internal Israeli matter. The aggravated development has led the civil identity (Israeli) and the national identity (Arab Palestinian) of the Arabs to be partial and created a hybrid of a national minority belonging to the Arab world and the Palestinian people while, at the same time, being a part of Israeli society because of its Israeli citizenship [2, 3].

In Majid Al Haj's analysis of the reality of identity and its transformation in Arab society in Israel, Al Haj believes that the identity of Arabs in Israel is dynamic and changing and that it is in a constant process of evolution and development. Based on this approach, the changes in the identity of Arab citizens in Israel are influenced by four main spheres. The first is the local sphere, and it is linked to the internal structure and benefits of the Arab population, as well as the changes that have occurred over time in the value systems and ways of life. The second sphere is related to the national dimension of the condition of Arabs in the Jewish state and its policies towards them, in addition to their relationship with the Jewish majority. The third sphere is the topic of this study, which has not been given enough attention in past studies, and it is linked to the regional dimension and political developments in the Arab region. Finally, the fourth sphere is linked to the religious dimension referring to the ethnic and religious identity of Muslims, Christians, and Druze [2]. Another theory believes that the identity of Arabs in Israel is affected by changes in and interaction with the three main spheres. In this theory, the spheres are the internal sphere, or the changes inside Palestinian society in Israel itself and the political consensus that has been formulated, the Israeli sphere, confirms the system of relationships that provides preferential treatment to the Jewish majority over the Arab Palestinian minority, and the general Palestinian and Arab sphere, which reiterates the political development in the Palestinian field, in addition to changes and transformations in the Arab world, especially Israel's neighboring countries. It should be noted that this theory has ignored the international sphere, which has impacted the formation of a civil society that focuses on the rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples.1

The analytical framework that this study is based on confirms that the identity, consciousness, and political behavior of Palestinian citizens of Israel carry different forms of content. Their identity has been affected for years by the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, and it has been fed by it. It has not been insulated from being affected by

<sup>1</sup> In 1992, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the "Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities", see: United Nations General Assembly [4].

various changes and events in the Arab world, and it is still subjected to the influence of various changes and fluctuations in the Arab world, despite the fact that the level of this influence has changed from one time to another, as we can see in this section. The political reality of the Arab minority in Israel is described as being a reflection of a "dual consciousness". The Arab minority is developing a national and emotional link with the Palestinian people and the Arab surroundings, but, at the same time, it is practically and rationally linked with the Israeli reality [5]. This assertion by Amal Jamal is supported by the main hypothesis of this study, which is summarized that the Arab minority in Israel is greatly aligned with the Arab world, despite its rational link with the Israeli sphere. In addition, the Strategic Report that was recently published by the I̕lam Center, which was drafted by a number of Arab researchers and academics, confirms the organic link between Arab society in Israel and the regional surroundings, even considering it a national and rational phenomenon. It also considers this link vital to Arab society, as the sense of belonging in their surroundings is part and parcel of the Arab minority's political, cultural, and social identity. In addition, there is a rational explanation for adherence to affiliation with the Arab surroundings, and this is the relentless pursuit by the Arab minority to be rid of the shackles of structural weakness that are created by its status as only a national minority in a Jewish national state. In this definition, the report states: "The Arab Palestinians in Israel have a political, cultural, and civilization link with the Arab and Islamic surroundings of Israel, which, at times, removes the label of minority from them and includes them with the majority within the Middle East in general and the cultures, history, and affiliations in it" ([6], p. 19). Identifying with the surroundings, that is, the Arab world, or reiterating affiliation to them, is an attempt to break the shackles and the feelings of inferiority resulting from discriminatory politics and exclusion created by the state of Israel against the Arab minority. This model will be a starting point to attempt, in this regard, to study the impact of the "Arab Spring" on the Arab society in Israel.

The socio-political history of Arab society shows consistent progress, and there is historical continuity for the harmony of Arab society with its surroundings, not only in everything relating to forms of political behavior and identity politics but also at the level of political rhetoric and intellectual and ideological discourse. In all of these aspects, Arab society in Israel responds and is impacted by its Arab surroundings and practically embodies the fact that it considers itself a part of these surroundings. The political world of the Arab citizens is not limited to the towns that they live in or the borders of the state, and they are affected by developments taking place in the Arab world, which is considered a part of the "broader selfidentity" that they have. This is contrary to what some research in this field have argued, which is that the nature of the state as a factor forms the political reality of Arab citizens in Israel, while they ignore the impact of the Arab surroundings on their forms of political behavior.<sup>2</sup>

The Arab minority, as is the case with many minorities around the world, is also impacted by neighboring countries and regional conflicts, even international ones, in addition to internal factors, with regards to political leadership, the relationships between majorities and minorities, the authority of the state, and social and demographic benefits for the minority group.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, the academic writings of As̕ad Ghanem.

#### **2. The political space**

#### **2.1 Under Nasserism**

The 1948 war left its mark on Palestinians in Israel and created feelings of fear, isolation, defeat, and humiliation among them. The Palestinians, who had become a minority as a result of the war, found themselves in a new political framework that not only did not recognize them as a group, with their own national rights but also was hostile towards them and tried to dismantle them. In addition, for two decades, they were limited to specific spaces that were mentioned by a strict system. The shock of defeat was a decisive factor in the formation of the political behavior of Arab citizens during the first decades. At the same time, the ruling elites in Israel were successful in implanting a state of existential fear among the Jewish majority for the purpose of external propaganda and internal recruitment and mobilization.

The feeling of fear and defeat among the Palestinians in Israel led to the adoption of reconciliatory politics with regard to the state of Israel and finding a balance between their political, social, and economic survival in the Jewish state and the attempt to maintain the features and characteristics of their collective identity. As an expression of the balance between their integration in the new political framework and preserving their individual identity, they participated in the Knesset elections of 1949 and voted for Zionist parties and parties affiliated with them, which were extensions of the Mapai Party (during that period, the ruling and dominant party) and were following its orders. At the same time, they maintained an emotional and rational relationship with the Arab space, not withdrawing from it, despite the formation of a new reality that was hostile to this space. The Arab public lived with the feeling of being in a temporary situation that could change at any moment, as it hoped that the Arab armies would mobilize in a new campaign that would curb the new political system. The pan-Arab ideology of the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was dominant in the Middle East, and its impact did not exclude The Arab citizens of Israel. At the time, Palestinians would gather around radios, in their homes, and in cafes, always listening to Radio Cairo, which would broadcast speeches by Nasser, who was a popular and well-loved leader among many in the Palestinian public in Israel [7]. Therefore, on the eve of the elections to the Fourth Knesset in 1959, the Arab media encouraged Arab citizens to boycott them and not grant legitimacy to the ruling system in Israel.

As part of the desire to survive and avoid the fate of Palestinian refugees, the Arab public created a "strategy of resilience" (resilience in the homeland). At the core of this strategy, the Arab residents maintained an emotional and symbolic relationship with Arab nationalism, while they strived, at the individual level, to maintain their personal interests and daily needs. Over the years, the Arab minority in Israel embarked on a struggle to survive and exist, and it struggled gradually to integrate into the state on equal footing [8].

The defeat in the 1948 War had a considerable impact on the political behavior of Arab citizens during the first decade of the state's existence, as this decade was characterized by very limited political protest as a direct result of the 1948 defeat and the fear of Palestinians who remained in Israel from having a fate similar to that of the towns that were destroyed and whose residents were evacuated. In 1956, the relationship between the political developments in the Arab world and political developments among Arabs in Israel was strengthened. The modest protest movement that followed the Kafr Qasim massacre might be the best illustration of the feeling of defeat and fear that dominated the political consciousness of Arab citizens in Israel. Here, it should be noted that the massacre took place after a curfew was imposed on the residents of Kafr Qasim, and the town was declared a closed area, while some of the residents were still working outside of the village. Upon their return from work, security forces opened fire, killing 49 of them.

As is the case in other parts of the Arab world, the Arab minority in Israel did not remain indifferent to the Arab nationalist ideology that was launched by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. As noted above, Abdel Nasser's speeches were received with great emotion among the Palestinian citizens in Israel. His words also aroused national pride among them, and they were a counterbalance to the political and military defeat that the Arab armies had sustained during the 1948 War. There is a lot of evidence that Abdel Nasser's speeches gained special popularity and attention, and that he was considered an undisputed leader who would be able to curb divisions among the Arabs and achieve the dream of pan-Arab unity, helping Arabs overcome the crisis-filled reality that they had experienced since the establishment of the Jewish state [9].

At the end of the 1950s, it became clear that pan-Arab ideology had become dominant in the Arab Middle East. The Arab unity project was achieved for the first time at the beginning of February 1958, when Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President, and Shukri al-Quwatli, the President of the Syrian Republic, announced the establishment of the United Arab Republic. The unification of Egypt and Syria, as a reflection of Arab nationalism and a revival of Arab nationalism and unity, affected the identity, consciousness, and political behavior of the Palestinian minority in the state of Israel. The establishment of the Popular Front in 1958, and the Al Ard Movement a year later, was, to a large extent, a direct reflection of the intensified resolve of revolutionary pan-Arabism in the region. One way or another, the Israeli establishment compared the "Al Ard Family" with the expansion of revolutionary pan-Arabism and it was thus proclaimed an illegal movement, and at the end of 1964, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol, signed an official decree banning its activities [10].

The establishment of the "Al Ard Family" movement in 1959 had come as a clear response to the expanding pan-Arab revolutionary movement after the rise of Nasserism following the Suez War in 1956. Among the effects of this transformation was the emergence of the national hero, Abdel Nasser, who was able to challenge the will of the traditional-colonial powers and their aggression and realized the latent potential of pan-Arab emotions, seen during the aggression by the overwhelming protest of all over the Arab world in solidarity with Egypt. Despite the state of isolation and separation that had been imposed by realities and reinforced by the Hebrew state, Arab society did not remain indifferent to the transformations happening around it during the 1950s, characterized by the Suez War, the rise of Nasserism, and the first attempt at unification in modern Arab society when Syria joined the unification project with Egypt under the leadership of Abdel Nasser. This was also the period of the first Lebanese civil war and the fall of the Hashemite monarchy (in Iraq) which had been allied with the West and had been a founding member of the Baghdad Pact. The establishment of the Al Ard Movement cannot be viewed separately from the revolutionary spirit in the Arab Mashreq region at the time [11]. What also confirms this is the resolute and non-lenient response by the Israeli authorities, as Israel considered, at the time, that the rise of this entity was a threat to national security and dealt with it on this basis. As mentioned, the government did not hesitate to declare it an illegal organization and prohibit its activities as it was considered an extension of

Nasserism, which Israel considered an existential threat that had to be dealt with in any way possible.

The influence of the Arab space on the Arab public in Israel became prominent during the Six-Day War in 1967 as well, the war that ended with Israel's victory and the defeat of the Arab armies. That defeat led to Israel occupying what remained of Mandatory Palestine, in addition to territories of other Arab countries, like the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. As a result, communication between Palestinians in the occupied territories and Palestinian citizens in Israel resumed after two decades of disconnection.

#### **2.2 The renewed start of the Palestinian national movement and its internal implications**

The resumption of meetings between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had important effects on the Arab Palestinian public in the state of Israel. The meetings between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank took place at the same time as the rise in the profile of the Palestinian resistance and the strengthening position of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which led to momentum in expressing the latent Palestinian identity among the Palestinians in Israel. This also took place at the time of the decline of pan-Arab expansion in the Arab context, and renewed legitimacy for the existence of a national state. As a response to the political developments in the Arab sphere, Palestinians in Israel developed, during those years, "resistance poetry", whose pioneers were members of the Communist Party in Israel. The most prominent of these were Mahmoud Darwish, Tawfiq Ziad, and Samih al-Qasim. The poetry reiterates the resilience of the Arabs in their homeland and that they are a part of the Palestinian people and the Arab world. The resistance poetry reflected the culture of the Arab and Palestinian struggle, and, through it, these poets resisted the domination and high-handed actions of the Jewish majority [12]. In addition, the October (Yom Kippur) War, in 1973, came to somewhat change the feeling of defeat and humiliation that the Arab armies had suffered during the Six-Day War. These changes, from defeat to destroying the myth of the invincible army, breathed renewed hope among the Arab citizens in the state of Israel and rehabilitated their self-image. It also quickened the process of creating their Arab and Palestinian sense of belonging, which had been decreasing after the 1948 War.

The sequence of events and trends from 1948 shows a clear harmony between political developments and transformations in the Arab space and political developments among the Palestinian citizens in the state of Israel. It is no exaggerating to say that the rising status of the Palestinian resistance after the 1967 War, and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, formed a background for the changes that characterized national politics of Arab society at the beginning of the 1970s, especially the establishment of the national organizations in 1974 and 1975. We can clearly see the process of resurrection of Palestinian nationalism, which also led to the establishment of national institutions for the Arabs in the state of Israel. For example, in 1974, a national committee was established for Arab local authorities. In 1975, communist student councils were formed in secondary schools, Arab student committees in Israeli universities, and the Land Defense Committee, led the protests of Palestinian citizens of Israel against government policies [13].

During the period between the establishment of the National Committee for Arab Local Authorities in 1974 and the events of Land Day in 1976, there was a significant increase in the importance and status of the national committee,

despite the political coup that took place in Nazareth in 1975. The Communist Party was able, in that same year, to create real change in Arab politics in general, and the politics related to the local authorities specifically. This was done through the establishment of the Democratic Front in Nazareth, a local coalition with the Communist Party at its core, in addition to other local national forces. The Front achieved a landslide victory against the nominee of the "ruling party" and other traditional forces in Nazareth. During these elections, more than 75% of electors in Nazareth voted for the Communist Party, which captured 11 of 17 possible seats, in addition to winning the leadership of the municipality. The victory of the Front in Nazareth in 1975 was considered a transformation in local and national politics, and this victory was a representation of the renewed national uprising and the collapse of the old traditional leadership, with new national leaders appearing. The victory of the Front was also affected by the transformations and changes that were having an impact on both the Palestinian and Arab spheres. The fall of the traditional leadership, which was considered linked to the authorities, and the victory of national political leadership, was seen as a real change in the work of the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities. It went from an entity that exclusively dealt with local issues into a representative organization involved in national issues towards Land Day and the establishment of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel [14].

The events of March 30, 1976, which was known as Land Day, had a clear effect on strengthening national sentiments among Arab citizens in the state of Israel. The impact of both the rise of the National Palestinian Movement, which was positioned outside the Arab sphere and the crisis in Israeli self-confidence after the Yum Kippur War, enabled the Arab citizens to face the Jewish majority on the issue of land. The main cause of the events of Land Day was a state plan to confiscate around 21,000 dunams of land in the area of Al-Batuf, considering it part and parcel of the policy of Judaization which had targeted the Galilee after the establishment of two Jewish cities, Nazareth Illit and Karmiel. The involved confiscation of the lands of Arab citizens in these areas. The purpose of the plan to confiscate Galilee lands was to change the demographic makeup by increasing the Jewish population in the area, and at the same time, putting a Jewish wedge into the heart of the geographic expanse of Arab towns in Galilee [15]. In response to the government action and thanks to the increased influence of the Communist Party and its political leadership and the reinforcement of Arab nationalist and Palestinian elements in the identity of Palestinian citizens in Israel, a general strike was announced on March 30, 1976, to protest the land confiscation policy. At the same time, the government tried to break the Arab protest by recruiting local authority heads to defeat the general strike and pressure other heads of local authorities to isolate the Israeli Communist Party and its local authority allies. When this step failed, security agencies moved in to break up the strike by force, with units of the police, the border police, and the army being stationed in the middle of the Arab towns. As a result, six Palestinian civilians were killed, around 50 were injured, while 300 were detained [16]. This event was a point of transformation in the image of Arabs in the eyes of the state and the Jewish majority, as, for the first time, the Arab public had clashed with Israeli security agencies without fear or regret. This was the first time in history that Arabs in Israel had influenced the general Palestinian sphere and "exported" it as an ideology of resistance. This shows that the events on Land Day changed the self-image of the Arab public in Israel, from a small and weak minority that had lost the ability to do anything, to the self-image of a strong public with influence. Therefore, Land Day became a national holiday in different countries,

#### *The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107520*

including many Arab states, among the Palestinians in occupied areas, and in the Palestinian refugee camps [15].

In addition, the victory of the Democratic Front of Nazareth in the local elections in 1975 had implications for other political arenas. The Communist Party adopted the local model in Nazareth, establishing the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) as a national political movement in order to expand its support base, and it included new activists in its ranks. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality became the most prominent party among the Arab public in national and local elections in the 1970s and 1980s, as it succeeded, in 1977, in winning the support of 51% of Arab voters in the Knesset elections. Furthermore, the local elections that were conducted in 1978 witnessed a noticeable change in local politics in Arab communities after the success of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality in establishing local coalitions and winning the leadership of some local authorities in Arab population centers in the state of Israel. Moreover, there was, at the same time, a great change in the discussions of the local councils, which went from relating to local issues of service provision by local authorities and the basic needs of the population, to discussions that were clearly political and national in nature. At the same time as the national revival among local authorities in Israel, the elections in 1976 in the West Bank brought to power a large number of municipality heads affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization and supporters of the Palestinian struggle, over candidates affiliated with Israel. After their victory, they started to strengthen the relationship with the national Arab leadership in Israel, especially the leadership of the Communist Party [2].

Alongside the national uprising in Palestinian lands, which led to reinforcing the national identity among the Arab population, and which reached its peak from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, there was also a steady increase in the importance of the religious dimension in the self-identity. Studies that tried to follow the renewed rise and institutionalization of the Islamic identity confirm that the meeting between Palestinian citizens in Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories in 1967 was an important factor in strengthening the Islamic orientation among the Arab citizens in Israel. This is partially attributed to young Arab men going to study in religious institutes in the West Bank and Hebron, where they received a religious and political education. Upon their return to their local communities at the beginning of the 1970s, they moved on to religious activities (dawah). The rise of political Islam as an ideological alternative to revolutionary pan-Arabism started to find a foothold among the Arab and the Muslim public in the 1970s [17], that is if we look into the Palestinian aspect. However, the rise of the local Islamist movements came in the context of the rise of the Islamist movement in the Arab world as a whole. Therefore, reaction to the Arab surrounding states has also been reflected in the rise of the Islamist movements and the Islamic expansion in the Arab world since the beginning of the 1970s. The establishment of the "Family of Jihad" at the beginning of the 1970s was a preliminary indicator of the effect on local Arab society that the transformation taking place in the Arab surroundings was having and the shift from revolutionary pan-Arabism to Islamist protest, which considered itself an alternative for all that came before it. It based its legitimacy on what was considered the failure of all the ideologies and political behaviors that had preceded it in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s.

In 1972, Sheikh Abdullah Nimar Darwish took action by establishing the first form of the Islamic Movement in Israel. Under the leadership of Sheikh Darwish, the "Family of Jihad" worked in secret to gather weapons and military equipment and became a secret religious organization whose immediate objective was to strike at

Israeli targets, while its overarching aim was a struggle that would culminate in the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine. Sheikh Darwish was detained, along with a number of youths, in 1981, and they were convicted. After their release from prison, they underwent a paradigm shift that made them more pragmatic, and they started their religious activities. They expanded their fields of activities, especially at the local and municipal levels.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the movement established a number of branches in Arab towns, especially in the Triangle. The transformation from religious and social preaching to political activities was a response to the loss of hope by the Arab citizens in the Arab nationalist movement, and reservations about its ultimate ability to lead real change in the fates of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Adding to that, the Camp David Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel, which was signed in 1978, had taken Egypt out of the circle of the Arab-Israeli conflict and only reinforced the feeling of Arab society moving farther away from secular pan-Arabism. The increasing Islamization in Arab society in Israel was an extension of the spread of political Islamization in the wider Arab surroundings, which was represented by the transformation from religious peaching to political and social activities. It gained clear momentum after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which reiterated Islamic identity as a motivator and creator of the revolution in Iran and was a source of inspiration to many Islamic movements. In addition to the impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it should be mentioned that the Hajj (pilgrimage) agreement in 1978 enabled Arab citizens, for the first time, to carry out the requirement of Hajj and Umrah to Mecca based on Islamic laws [18].

The first Intifada, which broke out in 1987, was further proof of the relationship between political events and developments in the Arab world in general, and the Palestinian space specifically, and as affecting the political behavior of Palestinian citizens of Israel. The outbreak of the First Intifada in occupied lands led to increased protest activities among the Arabs in Israel through peaceful demonstrations in which they expressed their deep solidarity with the Palestinian people, and also collected donations and basic needs for the Palestinian people. At the same time, the escalation in the occupied lands led MK Abdulwahab Darawshe to resign from the Labor Party, which had, along with the Likud Party, formed a national unity government during the period from 1984 to 1988. Darawshe formed his own party, called the Arab Democratic Party, through which he entered elections and was elected as political representative in 1999. Moreover, during the elections to the 12th Knesset, the political parties that represented the Arab public, including the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, reiterated their solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people, and they accused the activists of Zionist parties of cooperating, being lackeys of the authorities, and believing in fantasies that only served their own personal interests.

At the height of the First Intifada, which deepened the renewed revival of the national Palestinian identity among Palestinian citizens of Israel, the regional and international communities witnessed two main events that had important implications for the Arab society in Israel. The first was the Second Gulf War, which transformed the confrontation between the Arab world and Israel into an internal conflict between the Arab states and showed the limitations and weaknesses of pan-Arab ideologies. The second was the collapse in the balance of world powers. These two events had a decisive impact on Arab citizens in Israel and created a sense of frustration among them. Therefore, it can be said that the events had a destructive impact on Arab society in Israel, and even increased the fragmentation and internal conflicts

#### *The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107520*

in society, by renouncing the national direction that had characterized the previous two decades and weakening its political activity. We can see an embodiment of this in the Knesset elections in 1992, which reflected the political changes in the world and the region on Palestinian citizens in Israel through the clear decrease in voter turnout, in addition to the noticeable decrease in voter turnout for non-Zionist parties and an increase in voting for Jewish and Zionist parties. There is no need to mention that regional developments deepened the crisis among Arab citizens and clearly showed their state of "compounded marginalization" as expressed by Majid Al Haj.

The Oslo Agreements ignored the Palestinian citizens of Israel and reinforced their place on the margins of the Palestinian national movement agenda and the Palestinian and Israeli leadership. Practically, the Oslo Accords increased the exclusion, isolation, and alienation of the Arab citizens in light of their elimination from the Israeli agenda and the agenda of the Palestinian national movement at the same time. The Islamic Movement went through a political crisis and was divided into two parts: one part in the north and one in the south. It is true that, before the division of the Islamic Movement in the middle of 1990s, there had been disputes over a number of issues and topics, but it was clear that the main and core conflict was around the peace process between the PLO and Israel. At the time when the leadership of the southern branch, led by Sheikh Abdullah Nimar Darwish, had supported the Oslo process, the leadership of the northern branch had rejected the principle of settlement, and had considered the agreement to be a "betrayal". Practically, the issue of participating in the Knesset elections in 1996 led to a clear division within the movement, leaving it in two parts. The Islamic Movement moved towards Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who was considered one of the most important scholars on Islam in the second half of the twentieth century and was a jurisprudential reference for many Islamic movements as well as tens, or maybe hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world. Al Qaradawi issued a fatwa that stated that, according to Islamic sharia, it was prohibited for Muslims to participate in Knesset elections because voting, or being nominated, meant recognizing Israel's right to exist or remain on invaded lands. Sheikh Darwish refused to accept the fatwa, but the two leaders of the radical branch, Sheikh Raed Salah, and Sheikh Kamal Al-Khatib, vehemently opposed participation in the Knesset elections based on this fatwa. They claimed that the mere participation was a recognition of the legitimacy of Zionism [19].

The impact of the surrounding Arab countries was clear in the case of the Islamic Movement, as its political ideology is based on belonging to Islam, as a cultural, religious, and political space, and the Islamic Movement, in both of its branches, could be considered an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, just like many other Islamic movements in the Arab world. The division that the local movement experienced was, at its core, related to a purely regional issue involving the political process and the resolution of the Palestinian problem. However, the division itself was based on the background of the intervention of the Arab world into the conflicts within the movement, with the fatwa by Sheikh Al Qaradawi being the decisive factor in this division.

The presence of the wider Arab surroundings was also clear in the behavior of the Islamic Movement following the Arab Spring and the political developments in its wake, as it led to the victory of Islamists in elections in Tunisia and Egypt, which aroused motivation for the movement at the local level. In the same context, the military coup that led to the fall of the elected president of Egypt and brought Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power sparked a campaign of solidarity with the deposed president, Mohamed Morsi. It is clear that the solidarity campaign with deposed President

Morsi was a clear indicator of the harmony between the local Arab minority and its wider Arab surroundings because the Islamic Movement in Israel (especially the Northern Branch, which is more ideological) considered the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt a factor that would strengthen its position in Arab society, even at the rational level. By the same measure, the deposition of Morsi and the fall of Muslim Brotherhood rule led to a wave of solidarity and sympathy, especially in the Northern Branch [20].

#### **3. What exceeds the purely national space**

#### **3.1 Settlement and exception projections**

The political and intellectual elites of Arab society in Israel considered the process in Oslo, and the historic decision of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to accept the principle of dividing Palestine, as excluding the Arab minority in Israel from the framework of a future solution. In this regard, the establishment of the National Democratic Alliance, and the appearance of a discourse of civil and political nationhood that was drafted by Azmi Bishara, along with the later documents of the Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, were a sort of response to the increasing feelings of besiegement among the Arab minority in Israel and its growing sense that the future settlement of the Palestinian problem would not include them. In other words, the response of the Arab minority to Oslo was to develop a political discourse that challenged the domination of Zionist ideas in Israel and that looked for intellectual and ideological alternatives that would break down Zionist rhetoric and challenge its moral and political legitimacy. The Arabs had reached the conclusion that they must focus on improving their civil status in the state of Israel and managing their struggle in Israeli society within the framework of the law and the Israeli political realities. Any consideration of the surrounding Arab countries as factors that could be relied on to change the political situation of Arabs in Israel had ended. This had become prominent as Arab countries had signed peace agreements with Israel, at the same time as negotiations were being conducted, directly or indirectly, by other Arab countries with Israel. These events showed the severity of the Arab crisis and sped up the process of focusing on the local aspect among Arabs in Israel [9]. In this regard, it should be noted that channels of communication were created by some Arab members of the Knesset after the signing of the Oslo Accords with a number of Arab countries, especially Jordan, Syria, and some of the Gulf countries. These relationships, despite being modest and of limited impact, have brought about mobilization in these countries to support local projects, like the building of the Doha Stadium in Sakhnin, for example, or the establishment of scholarships for Arab students. In addition, some Arab capitals have become destinations for visits by some of the Arab members of the Knesset. In 2010, Libya was visited by a large delegation that included dozens of political, social, and academic figures, where they met with Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. Likewise, a former member of parliament, Azmi Bishara, was successful in building stable channels for communication with the ruling regime in Syria, and was received by the heads of the regime, Hafez and Bashar Al Assad. Recently, current MK Ahmad Tibi and former MK Jamal Zahalka carried out a historic visit to the Arab League to present a vision of the position of Arabs in Israel regarding the Jewish nation-state law recently adopted by the Israeli Knesset (Statement by the Knesset member Jamal Zahalka, September 11, 2018: http://www.alarab.com/Article/871212).

All of these and others represent continued attempts by the political elites to achieve a breakthrough in their isolation in a clear attempt to use Arab diplomacy to pressure Israel. It seems as though the Arab political leadership in Israel has started to realize that even though some Arab countries are becoming more open to Israel, this is not necessarily completely in the interests of Israel, and it could be used to achieve some gains, even if partial ones.

#### **3.2 Cultural and social communication in light of forced isolation**

If the Oslo Accords were seen as being an abandonment of the Arab minority in Israel by the Palestinian national movement, leaving this minority alone to face its fate against Israel, the peace agreements that were signed with Egypt and Jordan specifically had, without a doubt, a positive impact on Arab society, and provided a small possibility to vent that cannot be taken lightly in the cultural, economic, and tourism contexts. Among the clearest examples of the positive effects might be the steady increase in the number of college students who study in Jordanian universities, especially in fields and majors that they cannot, or find it difficult to, study in Israeli universities, especially in the field of medicine [21]. In addition, peace with Jordan provided Arab citizens in Israel with an opportunity to take tourist trips to Jordanian hotels at prices that are affordable for them. The same applies to the situation in Egypt, and it is enough to go to travel and tourism offices during holidays and vacations to see the amount of Arab tourism from Israel to Egyptian resorts in Sharm El Sheikh and Taba, or to Jordanian resorts in Aqaba and the Dead Sea.

There is a clear cultural dimension to the interaction of the Arab citizens with the openness to the Arab world through Jordan and Egypt, and it is represented by the hunger of Arab citizens in Israel to communicate directly with the art scene in the Arab world. Moreover, there has been a recent rise in the phenomenon of organizing musical concerts for famous artists, that are primarily directed toward Arab citizens in Israel. There is also the matter of the social communication that is taking place through Jordan, between those inside Israel and those in the Palestinian diaspora, and Jordan has become something of a meeting point for relatives and families that were separated in the aftermath of the 1948 War. It is implicitly understood that the geographical proximity of Jordan is an important factor in this rush toward the surrounding Arab world, as the Arab citizens in Israel see Jordan as a place to vent and escape their state of isolation, suffocation, discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion that follow Arabs inside the Hebrew state [22]. Cultural communication with Arab states in the Persian Gulf is another benefit stemming from the Oslo Accords and the partial normalization of ties between Israel and a number of monarchies in the Gulf, especially Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

As mentioned above, relationships between Palestinians in Israel and the Arab world can be seen, in recent years, in the cultural and artistic milieu. Beirut has become a destination for youth, artists, intellectuals, and academics who travel to the city to attend conferences, programs, and various cultural events. Arab society in Israel does not hesitate to use the means available to them to break through the siege and isolation that they were thrown into in 1948. Arab citizens in Israel are trying to breach the cultural barrier in an attempt to enter an alternative cultural space that expresses their identity and internal and cultural worlds, considering their exclusion from the Israeli agenda. They are doing this through the development of cultural, technical, and media relations. Many Arab academics are fellows in various research centers in the Arab world, and many journalists regularly write columns in important and prestigious newspapers that are published in the Arab world. In the past 2 years, a number of young men have participated in television programs that are broadcast from Beirut. The attempts by Arab intellectuals and artists inside Israel to communicate with the Arab world are further evidence of the engagement between local Arab society and its Arab surroundings, and it is also evidence of the Arab society's diligent attempts to break through the wall of isolation and alienation and become engaged with the larger Arab world.

The political and cultural changes in the Arab region have affected, and are still affecting, the mood, attitudes, perceptions, awareness, and political behavior of Arab citizens in Israel, as they are influenced by and responding to changes and transformations in the Arab space and translating them into political activity. It has also been possible to use the Arab surroundings to create changes in the realities of Arabs inside Israel, as has been the case with the Arab Druze.

The social communications project was launched by the intellectual, Dr. Azmi Bishara, at the beginning of the 2000s, and it made a unique effort to break through the political isolation that had been imposed by Israel on the Druze over previous decades since the link between Druze and other Druze in Syria and Lebanon had been cut off since the Nakba in 1948. Even though some links had developed after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, these had been limited to the social, familial, and religious aspects, with the exclusion (to the point of prohibiting) of discussion of political issues. The official religious leadership of the Druze in Israel had politicized religion to adapt the members of the Druze community to Israeli politics, and in the name of religion, they prohibited any discussion of politics. What was new in the social communications project was that it was a creative effort to dismantle the walls of isolation by creating a state of social and political communications with Druze in Syria and Lebanon, who were always known for their nationalistic and pan-Arab tendencies. What was more important than this, however, was that, for the first time, a large number of Druze religious men were involved in the social communications project under the umbrella of resisting forced conscription and returning the Druze to their Arab affiliations, an affiliation that Israel has always tried to discourage with the compliance of Druze leaders, military conscription, and finally, with the education program of Druzification that inspired animosity towards the surrounding area. The tangible presence of religious men in the social communications project caused a breakthrough in the monopoly of official religious leaders, who were always in line with the politics of the authorities as they had always expressed their loyalty as a way to avoid participating in politics, service to the group's civic interests, and an embodiment of the position of the religious community. The social communications project proved that there was no consensus among religious leaders and scholars about taking a position of blind loyalty and that there was a sizeable component who was ready to take up positions that were different from those taken by the authorities. Additionally, there was the fear by the official religious leadership, it seems, of the appearance of alternative leadership under the umbrella of a national project, especially since the communications committee did not conceal its resentment of the fact that the Druze had remained "a tribe at the disposal of the tribal leader." (Statement issued by the Druze Communication Committee, October 2005. Contained in the author's archives).

The warm relations that were widespread during this stage, between the Lebanese Druze leader, Waleed Jumblatt, and the Baathist regime in Syria, contributed to support for the communications project. In 2001, in Amman, Jordan, a conference was held and Druze figures and groups from Lebanon that were affiliated with the

#### *The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107520*

pan-Arab line also attended. This conference was sponsored by Jumblatt, and there were also Druze delegations from Galilee and Carmel, and the conference resulted in national-minded decisions being made that were not limited to just a rejection of mandatory army service imposed on the Druze. The conference also denounced the phenomenon of non-Druze Arabs volunteering in the Israeli Army (Al Wasat, 514th Edition, December 3, 2001, pg. 26).

The social communications project created a new dynamic for the organization of a protest movement among the Druze, and its most prominent features were the appearance of protest organizations that reiterated the national and Arab identities of the Druze and tried to uncover the injustices that were affecting the Druze despite their service in the military and security agencies. The first of these organizations was the Mithaq al-Marufiyen al-Ahrar (The Charter of the Free Druze). Which as organically linked with the National Democratic Alliance (the Balad Party) and the communications project.

#### **3.3 The "Arab Spring"**

The "Arab Spring" revived the debate on the impact of the surrounding Arab states, and this became clear with the appearance of political and intellectual divisions in local Arab society at the level of intellectuals, the political parties, and the public. Specifically, this division has referred to the ongoing war in Syria. Despite the fact that this rhetoric has not had an impact on what was happening in the Arab region, its existence represents the ultimate harmony between the two sides. What is more important is that it shows the significant internalization among the Arab minority of being part and parcel of the Arab surroundings [20].

The "Arab Spring", at its start and during its first stages, created unrivaled enthusiasm in Arab society in Israel, and this was despite the absence of the Palestinian issue and the conflict against Israel on its agenda. This enthusiasm led to the hopes that it would be the beginning of democracy and liberalism in the Arab world, and what this would mean as a way of taking the air out of democratic-elitist Israeli rhetoric and challenging Zionist rhetoric which compares the conditions of Arabs in Israel and the miserable conditions of Arabs in the surrounding Arab world.

With the expanding revolutionary environment in the Arab world, first moving to Libya and then to Yemen and Syria, hopes were undermined by foreign intervention and the militarization of peaceful protests, turning some into civil wars that are still going on today. Still, Amal Jamal believes that the revolutionary environment in the Arab world inspired the Arab Palestinian minority and affected its positions, and political behavior [20].

It is clear that there are differences in the positions of political parties and different views on the revolutionary situation in the Arab world. At a time when the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) took a position aligned with the Baath regime in Syria, the Islamic Movement and the National Democratic Alliance (Balad) took a stance supporting the revolution. The differing positions towards the "Arab Spring" could be seen clearly among Arab Palestinian intellectuals in Palestine with discussions, and intellectual and political debates in order to understand the political and intellectual dimensions accompanying developments in the Arab world. In addition, the attempt to explore the themes that came up with the "Arab Spring" at the level of political behavior uncovers forms of political activities and behaviors at both the local and national levels and confirms the civil discourse has overcome nationalistic discourse, in a clear return to the fragmentation and collapse that was

widespread in the Arab surroundings. This was a clear expression of the feeling of despair and frustration with these surroundings, meaning that the decrease in nationalistic discourse in the Arab surroundings and the increasing civic discourse had an impact on Arab conditions in Israel. In light of the fragmentation and despair at the "cultural and historical depths" represented by the Arab surroundings, it appeared that the best way to move forward for Arab citizens was to resort to civil discourse and try to oppose the Jewishness of the state through full and equal citizenship. It remains that the state of emphasizing the civil dimension of the public discourse among the Arab public and limiting it to local contexts is a live and constant example of the extent of the effect that the Arab surroundings have on the Arab society in Israel. This surrounding has been always seen by Arab society in Israel as deeper cultural and existential anchor. When this surrounding area relapsed, the response of the Arab society in Israel was identical to its surroundings in its discourse and behavior towards the state.

#### **4. The institutionalization of the clans in the wake of the "Arab Spring"**

Arab local elections have always carried more importance than national elections in Israel. Local government is not only regarded as a primary economic resource and source of income and employment but also constitutes a pillar of social and political prestige in the local political tradition in light of the exclusion of the political parties from majority Jewish politics.

2013 witnessed the first elections for local authorities, after the eruption of the "Arab Spring". This may be called the clan-dominated period. Herein, clanism not only held ground but also unapologetically inserted itself into the political arena. The 2013 Arab local authority elections were also marked by great competition, with 610 lists contesting 620 mandates (one list to every mandate) and 228 candidates (four in every community on average). A conspicuous feature of the municipal elections was the strengthening of the coalition and clan frameworks and the waning of the ideological frameworks. The latter was exemplified in the Islamic movement's participation in the elections in Um Al-Fahm, its traditional stronghold, and the southern faction's decision to stand on a small scale. Although Balad proposed candidates for the local elections, it allowed them to stand independently; (Haneen Zoabi stood in Nazareth on a local list, former MK and Balad chairperson Wasel Taha adopting the same approach, and several other members of the political bureau and Balad's central committee standing independently). Despite the decline in voting percentages in comparison with earlier local elections, the average general voting rate stood at 85%. The clan lists won 85% of the seats—also greater than in previous elections. 82% of all the local authority heads elected that year, however, were party affiliated. Hadash—traditionally the dominant party—lost some of the central communities it had controlled for a long period, Nazareth (the largest city in Israel and Hadash's stronghold) standing out in particular, together with other important places, such as Arraba, Deir Hanna. The results of the 2013 elections thus indicate a continuation of the trend towards the strengthening of the clan system and weakening of the power of the party lists and candidates.

The 2013 municipal elections were the first sign of what was happening in the Arab space, the internal arena not witnessing any changes, developments, or constitutive events capable of explaining the abrupt decline in the political parties' status in the local arena. While the Hadash candidates were defeated in its important

#### *The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107520*

strongholds in the al-Batuf region—Deir Hanna, Araba, Sakhnin, Shefar'am, al-Rina, and the principal municipal stronghold of Nazareth—the Islamic movement barely participated, withdrawing from its traditional bastion of Umm al-Fahm, Kfar Qassem, Kfar Bara, etc. The candidates that stood on behalf of Balad, such as Wasil Taha, could not defeat their rivals in the party and clan stronghold [23]. This trend, of the strengthening of clan and independent at the expense of the party candidates, accords with voting trends. According to a survey conducted by the Mada al-Carmel Center, 68.4% of Arab citizens vote for family relatives in mayoral elections, 72.8% in council elections. This support for clan frameworks and preference of clan and family over all other frameworks corresponds to some extent with the prevailing trend in the Arab Middle East in favor of sub-state over state frameworks.

Despite the decline of the Islamic movement, Hadash was the primary loser in the 2013 elections. Ayman Odeh, Hadash's secretary, openly acknowledged that the party had suffered a serious setback at the expense of what he identified as the Establishment, clanism, and sectarianism. Unsurprisingly, in his opinion this was due to the State and security forces, which he maintains have devoted themselves since the establishment of the State to deepening internal Arab divisions [24]. Odeh regards the downturn in the parties' status as the root of the global political collapse of ideology and weakening of the party framework—a phenomenon Israeli society in general and Arab society in Israel, in particular, have not escaped.

Although Arab scholars in Israel point to a weakening of the parties in favor of clan frameworks, especially over the past two decades, neither academics nor politicians adduce any direct or indirect connection between clan dominance over the internal arena and events in the Arab world ([25], p. 104). The failure of revolutionary ideologies on the one hand and the modern state's inability to solve the chronic Arab civil issues on the other has turned clanism, communality, and ethnicity into realistic alternatives to revolutionary ideologies, institutional politics, political parties, and national discourse.

The clanization characteristic of the 2018 municipal elections assumed four prominent forms:


d.The primaries within the family or clan.

The novel feature of the 2018 elections lies in the fact that the candidates saw no need for a modern political or partisan framework, clanization no longer being perceived as an unsustainable political process in and of itself. On the contrary: since the outbreak of the "Arab Spring," clanism has established itself as a viable political structure ([26], pp. 21–23). In this spirit, Said Zeedani published an article entitled "And the Voice of the Tribe remains that of the Hegmon." In the most recent election, while businessmen and the educated replaced the traditional respected local leaders, this process was primarily channeled through the hamula, which served as both a political framework and a means of political mobilization ([27], p. 25). The establishment of the hamula as an independent political framework reflected a trend that has become increasingly prominent since the outbreak of the "Arab Spring" uprisings. Although the primaries are held before the election, they have become an integral part of local elections in Arab society. While the clans were present and powerful even before the "Arab Spring," the political parties created mechanisms to come to terms with them, the "Arab Spring"— which *inter alia* prompted the collapse of the ideological party system and the national discourse—highlighted sub-state frameworks as identity foci and a sense of belonging and solidarity for individuals helpless in the face of the State. Against this background, and as part of engagement with the space, clanization intensified in Arab society, channeled by the educated, middle class, and businessmen as an authentic, uncomplicated, accessible phenomenon free of any political discourse. Hereby, the maximalization of the local and accessible became more effective than imported ideologies imposed from above.

There is a consensus among observers and political factors that the 2018 elections knew two greatest trends, which complement each other. The first is the significant retreat of the political and principled-ideological discourse from the internal political arena of Arab society, while the second trend, which complements its predecessor, is the tribalization of the lists running in the elections. According to Adv. Awad Abd al-Fatah, previous secretary general of Balad, the disappearance of the ideological parties from the local arena only feeds the social, tribal, and even ethnic polarization. Morsi Abu Mokh, on the other hand, claims that there are new variations of tribalization, such as two candidates running from the same family. This phenomenon is repeated in a number of locations. Different candidates from the same family are not a development that will weaken the centrality of the extended family, on the contrary, running within the family only further establishes it as a political-normative framework for all intents and purposes. The withdrawal of the ideological parties is not a consequence of the "Arab Spring", nor is the tribalization of intra-Arab politics in Israel. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" undermined the right of all the institutional and normative frameworks in the Arab space to exist, which had parallel echoes in Arab society itself [28].

Despite the modernization of Arab society in Israel, clanism never disappeared from Arab society in Israel—certainly not from the social landscape. Rather than leading to the formation of sub-State frameworks, the "Arab Spring" and its crumbling effect have reinforced the former as sub-States structure in light of the State's failure to fulfill its central function. It has also signaled the failure of all the collective ideologies and ruling elites. The emergence of these sub-State frameworks has further been regarded as an alternative to official, institutional, and collective State bodies. Its greatest impact has been in the demonstrativeness and independent stance of a political clanism that feels no need to justify itself or accommodate itself to broader, more modern frameworks such as partyism or nationalism. In the wake of the "Arab Spring," political clanism has begun presenting itself unapologetically on the basis of two moral and public patterns: the failure of the collective frameworks as a whole and in the name of authenticity and connection with social reality. The "Arab Spring" therefore neither gave rise to nor begot clanism. Its biggest impact has rather been clan demonstrativeness and the jettison of any need for accommodation, adaptation, or justification. As the last two elections have demonstrated, the growth in the clans' power is a consequence of failure and alternativism rather than their inherent inner strength.

#### **5. Conclusion**

Until recent years, the Arab minority in Israel was completely absent from the concerns of their surroundings in the Arab world, despite the fact that the Arab surroundings have maintained a strong presence in forming the political consciousness and intellectual and ideological tendencies in Israeli Arab society for the past 70 years. During the period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, until the 1980s, Arab states did not try to use the Arab minority in their interest, nor did they consider this minority a trump card in the conflict. Despite this, it can be accurately said that Arab society in Israel considered itself a part of the Arab surroundings in every sense of the word, and it still sees its existence as a social, existential, and cultural extension of these Arab surroundings. This communicative situation, at the level of consciousness and sentiments, has cast a shadow on the relationships and positions of Arab citizens in the state, and there have always been views towards the Arab surroundings as a source of moral strength and intellectual inspiration. All of the intellectual and ideological transformations that the Arab world has experienced have reflected on the conditions of Arabs in Israel, starting with pan-Arabism, following through to the reframing of national identities, and ending with the extension of Islamism and restoring pre-state frameworks against the backdrop of the logic of fragmentation that was brought about by the "Arab Spring". While certain political elites believed, the Oslo process and the continuing conditions of normalization were a blockade against them, local Arab society, through its political elites, and cultural, artistic, and media activities, has viewed normalization as a way for them to vent and an opportunity for them to break through the isolation of Arab society.

There is no doubt that the "Arab Spring" revolutions had negative impacts on morale in the public sphere in Arab society in Israel, but at the same time, they strengthened this society's belief in the importance of developing a new political discourse that did not ignore pan-Arab affiliation and one that actually keeps collective civil rights at its core. Finally, I would like to point out that the relationship between Arab society and the state, and this society's readings into the status of this relationship, have always been connected with the general situation in the Arab surroundings, and this is something that cannot be ignored, as it has become an influencing factor in the behaviors of local Arab society in recent years.

The United Arab List's political campaign and joining of the government coalition undoubtedly signify a watershed in Arab politics in Israel and Arab society's attitude towards the State alike. Giving local interests prominence, the campaign also stressed the need for political realism in regard to the State while putting the national discourse and the Palestinian cause on a back burner. The very fact that an Arab party joined a government coalition set a historical precedent, an Arab party formally becoming an important part of an Israeli government for the first time in Israeli politics. Mansour Abbas' speeches favoring the civil over the national discourse and deliberate downplaying of the Palestinian issue and National Law that led to this circumstance signal a new trend in Arab politics, evincing the entrenchment of the civil school within Arab society in Israel. This is consistent with the public discourse in Arab society in Israel, public opinion polls, the steep rise in the numbers volunteering for national and civic service, recruitment to the police, and government investment in Arab society, etc. In a certain sense, the United Arab List's political direction is far more significant than has been recognized, the very willingness of an Islamic movement in Israel to take such a pioneering step demonstrates the power the civil discourse has gained in Arab society in Israel. Representing the first cracks in the

hegemony of the national protest discourse, this orientation, without doubt, reflects the influence of the "Arab Spring" and its prioritization of civil over ideological issues.

In recent decades, Arab society in Israel has experienced far-reaching contradictory changes. Along with developments in the field of education and the modernization of traditional Arab society, both clanism and crime have burgeoned, making social characterization difficult. The influence of the "Arab Spring" on Arab society in Israel reinforces these conflicting trends: while the Arab public is growing increasingly alienated under the influence of the Jewish nation-state law, the "Arab Spring" has deepened frustration with the Arab space and heightened the sense of loneliness and need to focus on localism. These circumstances call for an integrative theory to describe and explain the political and social existence of Arab society in Israel against the backdrop of the "Arab Spring."

#### **Author details**

Yusri Khaizran Al-Qasemi Academic College of Education, Israel

\*Address all correspondence to: yusri.khaizran@mail.huji.ac.il

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107520*

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### **Chapter 9**

## Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Determination in International Forest Financing Strategy: A Case Study from the Indigenous Bribri People of Costa Rica

*Britney Villhauer*

#### **Abstract**

The efforts to protect the global environment, in principle, reflect Indigenous priorities through an appropriate cosmological perspective. However, international forest financing strategies through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are solely negotiated and agreed upon through state powers and governments, with nothing more than a symbolic gesture toward the essentiality of the Traditional Ecological Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples. The autonomy of Indigenous Peoples to negotiate their own financing models and forest conservation strategies are neglected in these international conventions, and are consequently relegated to the impulse of national governments. Despite Costa Rica's adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the ratification of the International Labor Organization's Convention 169, and the passing of the 1977 Indigenous Law legally demarcating Indigenous territories in Costa Rica, the failure to recognize Indigenous autonomy and self-determination is a blight on Costa Rica's record. My research in one of the Indigenous Bribri territories in Costa Rica demonstrates that while international forest financing strategies are a contemporary hot topic and pertinent issue of international diplomacy, it is essential that Costa Rica and other nations codify Indigenous autonomy and self-determination within these strategy developments for climate change mitigation.

**Keywords:** the right to self-determination, indigenous autonomy, international Forest financing strategy, consultation, UNFCCC, Costa Rica, REDD+

#### **1. Introduction**

Costa Rica has been lauded globally as an example in environmental sustainability and regionally as a leader in the recognition of the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

However, a fragile legal framework around the rights of Indigenous Peoples has led to neocolonial manipulation and government impunity in several essential areas, including the rights to autonomy and self-determination.

While autonomy is not specifically defined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), self-determination is specifically outlined in Article 3, stating that "By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" [1]. However, the UNDRIP is not a legally binding convention that holds Costa Rica accountable to these rights. Subsequently, as Costa Rica negotiates international forest financing strategy, it is defaulting to lower standards of consultation and consent, which Costa Rica is legally required to uphold through the International Labor Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 [2]. Conversely, Indigenous People throughout the Americas are demanding higher standards of full autonomy for their Peoples.

My research for my 2020 dissertation took place in close collaboration with an Indigenous Bribri community with whom I have sustained a very close relationship of trust for more than a decade. Developing mutuality, reciprocity, and connecting to place are essential in Indigenous research methodologies and were the foundations for my research [3, 4]. Throughout my writing, I will refer to Juanita Sánchez, an Indigenous elder and my main Indigenous research collaborator, but more importantly, someone with whom I have developed a familial relationship of trust. All interviews in the communities were done in collaboration with Juanita to maintain the essential foundation of relationships of trust in Indigenous research methodology.

Combining Indigenous research methodology with scientific method in environmental conservation and international climate change mitigation policies is difficult work, because non-scientific knowledge is often not recognized as robust data and is therefore marginalized or excluded. One of my objectives in my research was to standardize the recognition of alternative Indigenous epistemological approaches in order to decolonize the sphere of international environmental policies. This in itself is an exercise of recognizing Indigenous autonomy within environmental negotiations.

#### **2. Case study context**

The United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, but specific rights of Indigenous Peoples were not discussed until the 1970s and the UNDRIP was not adopted by the United Nations assembly until 2007. However, despite the progress achieved with the UNDRIP to facilitate Costa Rican recognition of Indigenous rights, the impact of the declaration is still undermined by colonial powers as "the declaration recognises Indigenous Peoples' inherent sovereign rights to their lands but such rights cannot be exercised if they infringe on the rights of the nation state" [5]. In other words, the manifestation of true Indigenous selfdetermination is undermined in a thinly disguised colonial rule. And the UNDRIP does not serve as a legally binding document, so accountability to its articles holds no legal consequences for the government of Costa Rica. Costa Rica did, however, ratify the International Labor Organization's Convention 169, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, in 1993 [2], which is a legally binding agreement. This provides some legal accountability to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples in Article 16 [2], but not to full autonomy.

#### *Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Determination in International Forest Financing Strategy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108166*

The Indigenous territories of Costa Rica were legally established by the Indigenous Law in 1977 [6]. The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity outlines 3344 square kilometers, made up of 24 Indigenous territories (5.9% of the country), with 8 different Indigenous groups present [7]. The largest of these are the Bribri and Cabécar groups [8]. It is of note, however, that in the 2000 census, only 1 out of every 10 hectares in Indigenous territories was in conformity with the law, with Costa Rica's Office of the Ombudsman noting 5 years later that no steps had been taken to recover Indigenous lands. The Ombudsman stated once again in June 2015 that the government had still not recovered any of the land in the 24 Indigenous territories [9]. Indigenous People have not historically been respected by or represented by the Costa Rican government. The Indigenous People did not even gain the right to vote in Costa Rica until 1994, after they received their national IDs in 1992 [10]. Additionally, the government-instituted Integral Development Associations (ADIs) that are the officially recognized authorities of each territory are also perceived by many as being neocolonial impositions that are not appropriate in the Indigenous communities [9].

It is often the state powers charged with legally guaranteeing Indigenous rights that systematically violate the same rights. The largest and most significant Indigenous contribution to the construction of Indigenous rights in Costa Rica has been the proposition of the Bill for Autonomous Development of Indigenous Peoples [11]. It is very telling, however, that even 20 years after the Bill was originally introduced in Congress, there has been no movement towards constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights [9]. Despite Costa Rica's theoretical commitment to the rights of Indigenous People, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon met with 36 Indigenous leaders in Costa Rica to discuss the state's failure to enforce laws to protect them and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) had to intervene in Costa Rica in 2015 due to violence against the territories [12, 13].

The National Institute of Statistics and Censuses 2011 census estimates an Indigenous population of 48,500 in Costa Rica. There are 8 Indigenous groups in Costa Rica, including the Bribri People, and 24 Indigenous territories, including 4 Bribri territories [14]. Although territories are legally outlined by the Indigenous Law of 1977 [6], an alarming 43% of the territorial lands are in the hands of non-Indigenous People [15]. My research was done in one of the four Bribri territories, the KéköLdi Territory, where non-Indigenous People make up 70.3% of the population of the KéköLdi territory [16]. This is the highest rate of land usurpation of any Indigenous territory in Costa Rica. This governmental impunity and disorder plague the territory in several ways, including in cultural identity, self-determination, and autonomy.

#### **3. REDD+**

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is an international forest financing strategy currently in development in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) through the yearly Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings. In REDD+, countries and private companies pay to conserve forest in their name, as a type of payment for environmental services approach. This method was first proposed by Costa Rica in the COP-11 meeting in 2005 and with the creation of UNDRIP in 2007, discussions of protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples in this strategy were first considered in the COP-13 in 2007 [17].

The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility was created in 2008 to help develop policies to implement REDD+, including a grant for the Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) to show that a country is ready to implement REDD+, with the consent and participation of all stakeholders, including Indigenous People.

Concerns of abuses of the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as aspirations to codify Indigenous Rights in legally binding contracts through REDD+, have been under constant negotiation since then, both on the national and international levels. Social safeguards and guidelines were created in 2010, swiftly followed by the denunciation of REDD+ as "the biggest land grab of all time" in 2011 [18]. The Indigenous advocacy group, Guardians of the Forest, helped to achieve the creation of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples platform in 2017 to advocate for Indigenous rights in the UNFCCC. The regional program of REDD/CCAD/GIZ was created to help improve the participation of Indigenous stakeholders by facilitating intersectional dialog [19]. The Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD) and the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ in its German acronym) helped to link important actors in developing the National Strategy for REDD+ in Costa Rica. The Indigenous Peoples' demands for "legal recognition of their property rights over the land, the recognition of the rights to self-determination and autonomy, and the right to FPIC" are highlighted as concerns [19].

In Costa Rica, specifically, several institutions joined together to create the consultation mechanism with Indigenous cultural mediators [20, 21] to satisfy the R-PP [22]. The protection of Indigenous stakeholders in REDD+ through the safeguards of transparency, respect to traditional Indigenous knowledges, and participation was highlighted as a success by the 2015 report by the Costa Rican National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) and Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) [23]. This, however, is contested with the declaration by the Bribri people banning REDD+ from their territories and will be discussed in the next section.

The final stages of negotiating the National REDD+ Strategy continued in July 2017, with Edgar Gutiérrez of MINAE celebrating the success of the design and endorsement by Indigenous leaders. The Indigenous Chapter of the National Strategy addresses five Special Indigenous Themes [24], however the application of Indigenous Traditional Ecological Knowledge towards decolonization of REDD+ is still greatly lacking. While the government celebrates a successful REDD+ negotiation process respecting the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, many Indigenous People decry the neocolonial manipulation in settling on consultation, rather than true autonomy and self-determination [25]. Dine'/Dakota Indigenous leader Tom Goldtooth says that this same logic dominates the notion of carbon trading and REDD+ to justify this "new wave of colonialization and privatization of nature" [26].

#### **4. Indigenous consultation mechanism**

The "Consulta Indígena" is a consultation mechanism developed in Costa Rica to fulfill the requirement of FPIC, as outlined in Article 10 of the UNDRIP [1] and Article 6 Convention 169 [2]. Through a series of local, regional, and national meetings, the official Indigenous Consultation Mechanism was created and eventually signed in March, 2018 [27]. This is a legal framework for officially seeking consent for any public or private projects that would affect Indigenous territories.

My personal observations of the Indigenous Consultation Mechanism in Costa Rica illustrate an inefficient satisfaction of the right to FPIC. While participating

#### *Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Determination in International Forest Financing Strategy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108166*

in the consultation mechanism, I have observed clear power differences among the Costa Rican State and Indigenous People. In September, 2017, I had the opportunity to participate in and observe the Consulta Indígena in the KéköLdi territory. The 45 attendees (out of the approximately 300 residents of the territory) were unexpectedly summoned to make a vote for the delegates that would represent the territory at the national meeting in the month to follow. Once the meeting had ended and we had returned to the house, Juanita and I critically discussed the nature of the Consulta Indígena as a mechanism creating the façade of order and due process where in actuality the execution is much more haphazard and destructive.

However, with these consultation workshop meetings instigated in the communities throughout the process of codifying the Executive Order N° 40,932-MP-MJP in 2018 [27], Indigenous Peoples in the territories began to engage the legal system in ways they had never before. To take control and practice their right to self-determination within the sphere of environmental policies, Indigenous Peoples from multiple territories came together to develop their own Indigenous forest financing proposal. Through the over 150 workshops put on by FONAFIFO and MINAE, better organizational understanding was made between the participating groups and many ideas and proposals were shared [28]. This workshop mechanism utilized with FONAFIFO similarly functions as a sort of precursor for the cultural mediators program to be utilized with the REDD+ negotiations (discussed in the next section). This is also a demonstration of an attempt to achieve FPIC through a method of consultation, which also serves as a precursor to the Indigenous Consultation Mechanism, discussed in the next section.

#### **5. Cultural mediators program**

Despite significant progress in Costa Rica with developing a national Indigenous Consultation Mechanism, the global concerns over violations of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in the implementation of the REDD+ strategy (outlined in Section 3) led the National REDD+ Strategy in Costa Rica to partner with FONAFIFO to develop its own, more robust, consultation strategy for REDD+ implementation, utilizing a cultural mediators approach [20]. The Cultural Mediators Program (CMP) was developed and piloted by the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center and the Bribri-Cabécar Indigenous Network in the Talamanca region in 2012 and later scaled-up to function on a national level [20]. The standards set in the CMP exceed the eventual Executive Order passed in 2018 [27], with Indigenous leaders in each territory familiar with cultural values, cosmovision, and language as well as scientific understanding of the forest financing strategy in climate change mitigation [29]. These cultural mediators helped members of the communities engage in the policy negotiations in several workshops. In my research, I was able to sit in on these workshops and observe the process of translating not only the language of the REDD+ strategy to Indigenous languages but also applying the Indigenous cosmovision to conceptualize the efforts of this strategy. Participants in the workshops gave feedback and contributed to the development of an entirely separate chapter within the National REDD+ Strategy specifically for Indigenous Peoples.

Through the CMP, Costa Rica eventually arrived at a final draft of an Indigenous Chapter for the National REDD+ Strategy. This chapter highlights the important Special Indigenous Themes of 1. land tenure/healing, 2. Indigenous payments f or environmental services, 3. protected areas/Indigenous territories, 4. integration of Indigenous cosmovision, and 5. participatory monitoring [24]. The Costa Rican

government has repeatedly hailed the CMP as a resounding success in The Framework for Environmental and Social Management [30], on a global stage at the Pre-COP side event on October 9, 2019, and finally the presentation of the report Results of the Consultation Process: Systematization of Completion of FPIC [31]. The principal achievements of the CMP being celebrated include the observance of the principles of free, prior and informed consent and self-determination [31].

The CMP was created to comply with the ILO Convention 169 by "respecting the special importance that the culture and spiritual values of the Indigenous People have in relation to their land and territories" and "respecting Indigenous cosmovision" [30]. However, mention of culture and spiritual values and Indigenous cosmovision are notably absent in the above successes of the CMP listed in the Framework for Environmental and Social Management [30] and the Results of the Consultation Process: Systematization of Completion of FPIC [31]. In fact, many Bribri People are still very alarmed at the potential implementation of REDD+ in the territories, despite the public narrative of informed consent through the cultural mediators process.

On July 1st, 2016, the Bribri Indigenous People submitted to their local government a declaration with more than 300 signatures of Bribri people in 15 communities rejecting REDD+ [25]. This is a clear contradiction to the consent that the government claims to be receiving from the Indigenous People, further emphasizing the need to distinguish between consent, consultation, and autonomy. The issues raised in the declaration is that the Bribri People had not been consulted appropriately and that the restrictions placed on forest use through REDD+ would prohibit traditional customary usage of the forest for food, medicine, and other resources. Declaring that the Indigenous Peoples had not been consulted anytime within the 8 years since the beginning of the REDD+ proposal is very problematic if the government touts the success of their innovative consultation mechanism exercised for REDD+ in 2014. It is clear that the Cultural Mediators Program implemented in Costa Rica to develop the Indigenous chapter of the National REDD+ Strategy is not fully successful in achieving consent, much less recognition of Indigenous autonomy and self-determination.

#### **6. Indigenous autonomy and self-determination**

I have outlined Cost Rica's relatively robust legal framework in regards to the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the Executive Order for an Indigenous Consultation Mechanism and the Cultural Mediators Program for the development of the REDD+ forest financing strategy. However, failure to uphold these legal standards and rampant government impunity are great cause for concern, causing the IACHR to denounce the situation in Costa Rica in 2015. The Costa Rican government holds longstanding debts to the eight Indigenous People groups of Costa Rica. Having passed the Indigenous law of 1977, signed the rights frameworks of the UNDRIP [1], ratified the Convention 169 [2], and passed an official consultation mechanism to respect the Indigenous right of free, prior, and informed consent in 2018 [27], Costa Rica appears to set an exceptional example of respecting Indigenous rights and identity. However, the lived experience of the Indigenous People, as told to me by Bribri research participants, shines a light on the vast impunity and incompletion of the aforementioned policies.

Even the consultation mechanisms designed to protect Indigenous rights have been critiqued as mechanisms of manipulation masquerading as Indigenous consent [20]. My conversations in the territory, and with other Indigenous People outside of the territory, held countless denunciations of the Costa Rican institutions to fulfill

#### *Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Determination in International Forest Financing Strategy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108166*

their promises. Even institutions created specifically to protect or advocate for the Indigenous People appear to be ineffective in my observations, including the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), the Public Prosecutor for Indigenous Issues, the Rural Development Institute, and in some cases the local ADIs under the National Directorate of Community Development [32, 33]. These legal apparatuses to achieve FPIC from the Indigenous territories to engage in international REDD+ negotiations have been denounced by Indigenous leaders as facades of consultation, rather than true Indigenous autonomy and self-determination.

The systemic lack of accountability of the institutions mentioned above towards the Indigenous populations in Costa Rica represent egregious injustices in their own right, but it is even more concerning for conservationists when we consider the impact these impunities have on the forests that become unprotected when the law is not applied. It has been shown that land tenure rights for Indigenous People support conservation, prevent deforestation, and protect biodiversity [34, 35]. If the goal of REDD+ is to reduce emissions from deforestation, it would appear that Indigenous land tenure rights should be a top priority within the policy. However, REDD+ does not demonstrate any increased institutional accountability to fulfill governmental responsibilities towards Indigenous territories. In fact, the income gained through REDD+ payments are intended to replace the governments' accountability to indemnify land occupied by non-Indigenous People, as the minister of the Environmental Carlos Manuel Rodrigues told me at the Pre-COP 25 [36].

Scholars who seek to contribute to the decolonization of environmental policies typically work through this Western rights framework, and lack a decolonization of their own rights conceptualizations. Many marginalized groups come to the UNFCCC in search of greater equality and representation of their rights in development and selfdetermination, however, as many scholars note, these rights are often unrecognized [15, 37]. The necessity to decolonize rights conversations as a prerequisite to decolonization of environmental policy becomes evident. Furthermore, it is essential that Costa Rica and other nations respect Indigenous autonomy and self-determination in the development of climate change-mitigation strategies such as REDD+.

#### **7. Conclusions**

Without a legally binding commitment to autonomy and self-determination, as with the Bill for Autonomous Development of Indigenous Peoples [11], other consultation mechanisms serve as tokenism or a façade of autonomy while working within a neocolonial framework. Diversity of opinions on whether the government should intervene more on behalf of the well-being of the community or withhold intervention in recognition of Indigenous autonomy is up to the Indigenous Peoples themselves to determine, precisely in recognition of their own self-determination. International forest financing strategies such as REDD+ have the potential to contribute to the legal codification of Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Determination, but as it stands currently in Costa Rica, the REDD+ strategy fails to do so.

#### **Acknowledgements**

This research would not have been possible without the collaboration of my Bribri Indigenous family. All information and application of research findings belong to

the determination of the KéköLdi territory and the Bribri People. I would have never gotten to where I am if it were not for Juanita, Gloria, Duaro, and Keysuar.

#### **Conflict of interests**

There were no financial or non-financial interests directly or indirectly related to this research.

#### **Statements/declarations**

I upheld the ethics standards of the University for Peace, National Costa Rican protocols, the Indigenous Ethics Review Board of the KéköLdi territory (ADI), and the traditional customs of Indigenous participants. If and when discrepancies arose, I defaulted to the guidance of my Indigenous family as to what is truly appropriate in protecting the well-being of the Indigenous Peoples. I maintained ongoing informed consent with all research participants and collaborators.

#### **Author details**

Britney Villhauer University for Peace, San José, Costa Rica

\*Address all correspondence to: bvillhauer@doctorate.upeace.org

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Determination in International Forest Financing Strategy… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108166*

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## Munduruku Cosmopolitics and the Struggle for Life

*Bárbara do Nascimento Dias*

#### **Abstract**

The mythical narratives of the Munduruku people in the Tapajós region are permeated by metamorphic transformations from humans to nonhuman beings into vegetables, animals, or spirits. Today, while these beings live as other forms in the world they still have an agency in the lives of humans and can intervene directly in the social life of the villages. The Munduruku strategies used to negotiate with these beings undergo ritualized actions that are also part of everyday life. Most of these actions are intended to bring joy to the spirits, who in return provide them with an abundance of food from the fields, hunt, and fish. This cosmopolitical relationship with these beings, however, is today threatened in the face of logging and mining operations that are advancing on indigenous lands. The pursuit of the defense and demarcation of the territory, in this sense, is intrinsically linked to the sacred places and to nonhuman beings that help to direct the strategies of struggle and political resistance. Thus, the war that the Munduruku people face is to protect the multiple worlds or existing plans, the multiple histories and scenarios where they live.

**Keywords:** mundurku, cosmopolitics resistances, territory, construction of the world, struggle for life

#### **1. Introduction**

For the Munduruku people, as for many Amerindian peoples, the world—or the worlds—is inhabited by various human and nonhuman beings. To relate to the forest, to the rivers, and to the territory also implies relating to these beings, for they are subjects whose agency influences the world of the living. In this same sense, actions carried out in the world of "humans" also have the capacity to interfere in the lives of these other beings, because those are worlds that coexist and intertwine.

Thus, for the Munduruku to be able to relate without noise with the spirits of the ancients, with the mothers of the forest, of the game, and of the fish, they must negotiate conviviality by means of respectful exchanges, based on generosity, with all these beings of distinct forms of existence. It is important to emphasize that the conviviality to which I refer does not mean harmonious coexistence, without conflicts or the possibility of predation. So that the relationship and connection between these diverse worlds, with different materialities and temporalities, do not become chaotic and predatory, the Munduruku trigger ways of doing cosmopolitics through the ability to "articulate the multiple existing worlds" ([1], pp. 446–447).

The Munduruku inhabit the Tapajós river basin, which comprises part of the states of Mato Grosso and western Pará, Brazil, and is the largest tributary of the Amazon river. Known since the eighteenth century as Mundurukânia, the region of the middle and upper Tapajós course is inhabited by at least 14,000 Munduruku and a great diversity of traditional peoples and communities living along its banks and those of its main tributaries, the Jamanxim, Juruena, and Teles Pires rivers.

The Munduruku people live on the banks of the Tapajós and Amazon river basins, between the states of Pará, Mato Grosso, and Amazonas, and are historically known for their warrior character ([2], p. 81). They call themselves *Wuy juju,* whose meaning is "true people," and are known and feared for their trophy-head hunting expeditions, which lasted until the nineteenth century ([3], p. 48). The name Munduruku was given to them by their former war enemies who lived in the same region, and means "red ant" ([4], p. 368). This paper will limit itself only to those Munduruku on the banks of the Tapajós River, with emphasis on those who inhabit the middle part of the river course between the municipal areas of Itaituba and Trairão, both in Pará.

#### **2. Munduruku cosmopolitics and the struggle for life**

Isabelle Stengers' cosmopolitical proposition recognizes these other ways of existing in the world, and among the Munduruku the relations between humans and nonhumans are almost always ambivalent: sometimes of estrangement and avoidance, and other times of rapprochement. The strategies with which the Munduruku manage these worlds, however, are confronted by logging and mining invasions in their territories, which often affect places that are sacred to them. The respect for these places, as well as the protection of the dwellings of the mothers of the fish, hunting or mountains where the spirits of the ancients' dwell, for example, are fundamental so that the connection between the multiverse [5] does not become dangerous. Not to protect these places is to provoke the anger of these other beings, who may respond with violence in the form of accidents or illnesses upon the Munduruku.

Beatriz Perone-Moisés is right when she says that we must take indigenous people seriously, which "means, in this case, to stop treating as metaphor or figure of speech that which appears so to us" ([6], p. 18). One must recognize the specificity in the construction of historical processes and narratives present in Munduruku historicity, for every historicity has a specific temporality ([7], p. 109) and this often differs from the linear and "progressive" temporality of Western society. Given that sacred places are inseparable from the Munduruku way of handling the world, we can see how mythic narratives also direct political and social decisions in the present, for these places fall within what Cayon [8] understands as "shamanic geography."

*geografía chamánica debe entenderse como un aspecto fundamental que estructura la realidad al vincular metonímicamente a las personas con el espacio en el que viven, reafirmando sus conexiones históricas y con sus ancestros, y relacionándolos con los otros seres que pueblan el mundo ([8], p. 149).*

Thus, the landscapes of the Tapajós region are intrinsically linked to the people's mythical narratives and their ways of managing the world, that is, the procedures that

#### *Munduruku Cosmopolitics and the Struggle for Life DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109926*

ensure the order of their world and allow "the vital processes of the various beings and the succession of the seasons to take place without inconvenience" ([8], p. 17).

The chief of the Sawre Muybu village, Juarez Saw, always travels through the territory with the warriors to find out what has been happening inside the indigenous land. I have sometimes accompanied this type of action, in which the warriors and young people of the Munduruku audiovisual collective1 would register the presence of mining rafts and tracks opened by loggers. In one of these situations, we passed one of the rafts that, according to the cacique, belonged to the largest illegal mining operation inside the indigenous land, the Chapéu de Sol, whose damage is easily seen by satellite images.

With an ever-watchful eye, cacique Juarez spots the red macaws flying above the forest from afar. It is from the feathers of these macaws that the Munduruku headpieces are made, and it is these feathers that show their social organization, which is divided into two clans, the white (adorned with yellow and blue feathers) and the red (adorned with red feathers). On our way, we pass near a large raft that has been trying for many years to mine for diamonds out of that place. The cacique points to a mountain in the middle of the vegetation, where there is a large crevice, and says that that is the passage of the pigs, where "they narrowed the river to try to get the son of Karosakaybu," and went on to tell us that many workers have already died trying to get the diamond out of there. He explains that "they will never succeed because this is a sacred place, there will always be consequences."

Although there are specific places in the territory to which they refer as sacred sites, usually places where the "mothers" of the animals are, or where there is a concentration of spirits of Munduruku dead or of former Munduruku living on another plane, the territory as a whole and everything that was left out in the administrative demarcation process, although part of their territoriality, is permeated with stories about the people, about the ancestors.

Thus, as the Munduruku themselves point out, the whole territory needs to be protected because there is a multitude of sacred places in it, where their ancestors are. If any destruction happens in these places, the angry spirits may take revenge:

*We hear the sound of reeds, the sound of flutes, these are people that we cannot see because they are on the other side of the world, on the other side of life, but they try to communicate to say that they are alive. These are what we call sacred places. We want to get in touch with them, and they with us, but they are in another world (Chief Jairo Saw, interview held in 2017).*

The sacred places, so important for the Munduruku people, hold ancestral memories of the people, but they are also channels of communication "between worlds," for "sacred places are inscribed within people, while they connect them with their ancestors and with other dimensions of the world" ([8], p. 218). In this sense, a place that was once occupied by Munduruku will always be a Munduruku's place, in which one of the marks is the black land, *Katomp,* in the Munduruku language, it even is responsible for legitimizing reoccupations in the forms of new villages.

<sup>1</sup> The Munduruku audiovisual collective is formed by young women, who accompany the actions of resistance inside and outside the territory. See more at: <https://www.facebook.com/audiovisualmunduruku/> [Accessed: March 25, 2021].

#### **3. The Munduruku people and the construction of the world scenario**

In the history of the Munduruku people, the Tapajós River, or *Idixidi* in their language, was created by a very powerful warrior of ancient times from the juice of three tucumã seeds. During the paths taken by Karosakuybu, the great demiurge, several places important to the Munduruku cosmology and cosmography appeared, many of which are still considered sacred. With superhuman powers, the great warrior also brought the Munduruku themselves into the world, who in turn "helped to build the scenario of the world, had this participation because the Munduruku were transformed into trees, fish, animals, so for us, they are also beings like us" (cacique Jairo Saw, 2017).2

Thus, the landscapes of the Tapajós region are intrinsically linked to their mythical narratives and their ways of managing the world. For the Munduruku people exist specific places in the territory to which they refer as sacred sites, which are usually places where the "mothers" of the animals are, where there is a concentration of spirits of the dead Munduruku and of the "old ones" living in another world. But the territory as a whole, and also everything that was left out in the administrative demarcation process is permeated with stories about the people, about the ancestors, and contains some degree of "sacredness."

According to Munduruku narratives, the spirits of the ancients are those who, during the time when the Munduruku had the power to metamorphose, became animals, vegetables, turned into streams, or simply chose to live in another world. The elders say that at that time their bodies were made of tapir lard, which is why they had such transformative powers. As for the spirits of the dead, they are all those who "lost their human life" and their spirits went to the forest, because, as the Munduruku teacher Hiléia Poxo told me: "when we die our spirits go to the animals, they go walking with the spirits of the ancestors" (Hiléia Poxo, Poxo Muybu Village, interview held in 2020).

Sacred places not only nurture a relationship of identification with the Munduruku, but also relationships of reciprocity, through the exchange of gifts with the various beings that exist in the territory. In line with Cayon and Chacon [9]: "los lugares no están són conectados con las narrativas míticas sino con otros elementos como las curaciones chamánicas, los cantos, la música y los objetos, donde todos sirven como vehículos o manifestaciones de conocimiento" (2014, p. 216).

In the myth about Karosakaybu, the great warrior metamorphoses some Munduruku into pigs as punishment for having denied his son food, even coming across the abundance of a great hunt. By turning those who did not share the food into pigs, Karosakaybu established a way of acting, a parameter for what is or is not a "social being." Thus, not sharing the game is considered an act that breaks Munduruku rules of sociability and can even interfere with the availability and diversity of such game, which is released by the mother of these groups of animals. The spirits of these animals can come through dreams to rebuke those who are stingy and, in addition, the act of eating game can also be considered a ritual. The sharing of the game is still reflected today in the way the Munduruku deal with this type of food. Even though being composed of small animals, the game must be shared among all the inhabitants of the village.

The Munduruku who were turned into pigs were confined in a kind of enclosure inside the village. The armadillo Daydu, another mythical character, went to

<sup>2</sup> Chief of Sawre Aboy village, interview conducted in 2017.

#### *Munduruku Cosmopolitics and the Struggle for Life DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109926*

Karosakuybu's son to urge him to leave the hammock his father had ordered him to stay in while he went hunting, and persuaded him to open the enclosure where the pigs were and feed them tucumã. When the pigs realized who had opened the enclosure, they wanted to take revenge on Karosakaybu and set out in pursuit of his son. To try to reach him, the pigs, who also had superhuman powers, narrowed the banks of the Tapajós, but according to some narratives, never managed to catch the descendant of the great warrior. <sup>3</sup>

They left marks on the mountain the trail they had passed through, as well as Karosakuybu's footprint on the stones by the river. For the Munduruku, this place, called *Daje Kapap Eipi* (sacred passage of the pigs), which today gives its name to the territory, cannot be disturbed, otherwise, they may suffer from various types of "accidents" and diseases that the angry spirits may cause, such as scorpion and snake bites. The constant invasions of miners in the area, however, negatively interfere with the dialog that maintains the coexistence between various worlds. The chief of Sawre Aboy village, Jairo Saw, told me this story:

*karosakaybu said that he was going to turn some of his relatives into food because if they are being denied food, then they will serve as food for future generations. So he turned these Munduruku into pigs when the karosakaybu's son was deceived by the boy Daydo. The pigs recognized the karosakaybu's son and then said, "it was his father who turned us this way, so we will also punish his son! "Then he was chased, but they could never find him because he turned into everything: fruit, scorpion, snake, bee, all sorts, but the others could still identify him, smell him. They never caught him […] In our Sawre Muybu territory there is the sacred place where the son of karosakaybu was persecuted. It also has the path of karosakaybu that is under the earth that is called the path of the worm, which is like a tunnel, a secret passage under the earth. So they had the mastery of space and could shorten the path to be there anywhere. We call it noma, (underground paths) (Jairo Saw, Itaituba, 2017).*

Jairo tells another part of the myth: After losing his first son, who had never been seen again, Karosakaybu carved a wooden doll and, in one breath, gave him life. When his son grew up, the women began to have sex with him, until one day the men of the village found out about it. They then went to talk to Karosakaybu, who decided to transform his son into a tapir, which did not stop the women from continuing their relations with him. In retaliation, the husbands gathered to kill him, and, after it was done, cooked him for the whole village to eat. When the women found out what they had done, they decided to take revenge: "so, they told the men, 'tomorrow everyone goes hunting!' When they went, the women lined up, performed a ritual, and, singing, fell into the water to turn into fish" (Jairo Saw, personal communication).

Today, in order for them to score the big catch with timbó4 they have to do the Tinguejada ritual to ask permission from the mother of fish, "which is Xiquiridá, Karosakaybu's wife—I will talk about this ritual in more detail later. She is the one who pulled the woman to transform into fish, this ritual is to make her happy. If she is happy, we can make the big catch" (Jairo Saw, personal communication). Taking care

<sup>3</sup> In another version of this story, Karosakaybu managed to trap the pigs between some mountains, but his son ended up staying with them and no longer seen by the demiurge.

<sup>4</sup> The timbó is part of a group of plants in the leguminous and sapindaceous families, and is used by the Munduruku, as for several other indigenous peoples, to stun fish, making them float and facilitating fishing.

of the mother of the forest, the fish, and the game, as well as protecting the sacred places and objects, are all part of a cosmopolitical relationship, for they are agencies that operate and articulate themselves both in the earthly world of the living and in the worlds of other beings.

The Tinguejada ritual takes place between the two moieties of the social organization.5 During the ritual, the women and men from opposite moieties try to pass sorva on each other. This ritual aims to bring joy to Xiquiridá, the mother of the fish. When approaching the dono-maestria-maternity theme, Carlos Fausto [10] understands that this relationship is constitutive of sociality and""characterizes interaction between humans and nonhumans" ([10], p. 16). About Tinguejada, the mother tongue teacher, Hiléia Poxo, clarifies:

*The fish were also transformed by human beings, that's why when we have a tinguejada it's like a party for them. That is why when we go to a tinguejada and start to play, and do the game very well, then those pretty fish die. When we do not do it right, the pretty fish do not die, only some, because the game wasn't done right, the prettier fish hide, that's why they do not die. When we do it right, respecting them, they die happy, because it is like a party for them. (Teacher Hiléia Poxo, Poxo Muybu village, 2020).*

On the day of the Tinguejada, women may not be menstruating and no one should have sexual intercourse the day before, otherwise, the fish that we cannot see in this dimension will climb trees and throw dry leaves in their place, thus preventing them from being caught. Trophy headhunts, performed by the Munduruku until the eighteenth century, also fulfilled functions similar to the ritual performed to make the mother of the fish happy. Comprising three parts, the ritual lasted from one and a half up to two years, and the warrior involved had to comply with a series of interdictions. The first part of the ritual was the *Inyenborotaptan,* (ear adornment), where the ears of such heads were adorned according to the clan of the warrior who conquered it (white or red clan). The second part of the ritual, the *yashegon*, as described by Murphy [11], consisted of shaving the head, and the third and last part was pulling the teeth out of the head and hanging them on belts or necklaces. Once a Munduruku told me that during the process in which the teeth were being pulled, it was necessary to put them inside the mouth of the one doing it, so that they would not be stolen by the spirits.

Headhunting was a way to please the mother of the peccaries, *daje ixe yu*, so that she could maintain the reproductive power and abundance of the peccaries. In addition, the heads also aided in the people's own physical reproduction, as well as the "renewal of the warrior movement, since it was assumed that the belt of teeth increased the bearer's chances of getting new victims" ([10], p. 459). In this sense, the heads of war enemies went through what Fausto (2014) calls familiarizing predation, since, from the beginning of the ritual, these heads were introduced "into a segment of that society" ([10], p. 458) by being adorned with the same colors as the clan of its hunter, transforming an enemy, whose spirit might come to take revenge, into something allied, or belonging to the hunter's group.

About Munduruku headhunts, the chief of Sawre Mubyu village, Juarez Saw, told me that there were two types of headhunts: those of other Munduruku, from other

<sup>5</sup> The Munduruku organize themselves into two exogamous halves: white and red. On the social and kinship relationship, return to the introduction.

#### *Munduruku Cosmopolitics and the Struggle for Life DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109926*

villages, whose heads had great power of attracting the hunted, and were also very desired by the spirits because they also wanted this hunting facility; and the other is the hunting of heads of other ethnicities, which gave the warrior value and status.

Maintaining the tranquility of multiple worlds, with sacred places protected, while the hunts continue to be released to feed the villages, is part of a set of agencies that are being negotiated all the time in order to maintain conviviality among the Munduruku multiverse, controlling alterities in a "constant lucha contra el carácter disruptivo del caos" ([12], p. 53) so that, in this way, it can also maintain social reproduction. This kind of negotiation that "articulates multiple worlds" is, in Stengers' terms ([1], pp. 446–447):

*The cosmos, here, must therefore be distinguished from every particular cosmos, or every particular world, as a particular tradition may think of it. And it does not designate a project that would aim to encompass them all, because it is always a bad idea to designate an encompassing for those who refuse to be encompassed by anything else. The cosmos, as it appears in this term, cosmopolitical, designates the unknown that constitutes these multiple, divergent worlds, articulations of which they could become capable, against the temptation of a peace that would claim to be final, ecumenical, in the sense that a transcendence would have the power to require of that which is divergent that it recognize itself as only a particular expression of that which constitutes the point of convergence of all.*

Myths end up giving guidelines on ways of acting that guarantee people's sociability. Santos-Graneiro [13] emphasizes the importance of thinking of myths as "sacred truths," literal and conscious manifestations that are present in all spheres of life and "provide guidelines for social action" ([12], p. 18). Thus, the Munduruku participation in the construction of this landscape of the world described by the cacique Jairo Saw must be taken seriously, because not only are they producing the history of these landscapes, they are also "producing knowledge and reality, confronting the reality created by Western science" ([14], p. 599). They thus tension the production of the Western "single world" that has the extinguishing of multiple words as its *modus operandi*.

The pursuit for the defense and demarcation of the territory is intrinsically linked to sacred places and nonhuman beings that help directing strategies of struggle and political resistance, as contemporary works on the people have been demonstrating. In her work with the Munduruku resistance movement *Ipereg Ayu*, for example, Rosamaria Loures [15] highlighted the presence and importance of shamans in Munduruku movements and occupations against hydroelectric dams and in other resistance actions. The shamans are subjects who possess "two visions" ([15], p. 206), that of the world of the living and that of the spirits, and it is through them that the guidelines and strategies of struggle are revealed, so their presence, in these moments, is indispensable. The shamans, however, are responsible for both the good things that happen in the village and the bad things that also might happen. There is an ambivalence that marks the life of these pajés, as well as the Tapirapé pajés:

*They are essential for social reproduction and, at the same time, they are feared and dangerous, that is, they seem to have a threatening power for society. In the figure of the shaman there is a combination of the figure of the enemy and that of the whole person. The tapirapé imagine that every death is caused by the witchcraft of one of them. Thus, the shamans must live in strong family groups that are able to protect them ([14], p. 38).*

Even with their ambivalent power, the shamans access the multiple worlds and mediate relations with them. They are important figures in the struggle for land the Munduruku people face. This struggle is for the existent different worlds or planes, for the multiple histories and scenarios they inhabit. When analyzing the paths and territories trodden and lived by the Mbyá indigenous people, Guimarães [14] analyzes how indigenous peoples understand that territories are made of human and nonhuman beings as subjects identified in narratives, situated in histories, and with whom they establish social relationships. He goes on to argue that territories are space-time of social interactions, where there are beings with whom they weave social relations of both peaceful and bellicose reciprocity. In these interactions, several plans are made and the Munduruku need to deal with them. They make themselves Munduruku and make their world through this careful interaction.

In all elaborations of resistance that I followed from the Munduruku, where chiefs, leaders, shamans, and warriors were present, the songs were always present, sung before or during the occupations and demonstrations held by them. These songs evoke the presence and wisdom of the ancients, telling their trajectories and strategies of fighting in the wars they took part in. According to Hiléia Poxo (2020): "whenever a person goes to the movement, the spirits of the old people who died are always close by, that is why they sing so that they can hear our songs and let them know that we have our living culture. The living culture, as described by the teacher, can be interpreted as what the Munduruku recurrently refer to, not without a certain pride, about the 'warrior spirit,' reaffirmed by the odysseys played by the ancients, the head cutters of the Brazilian Amazon."

The Munduruku war against invaders and development projects that presuppose the destruction of these sacred places has the "purpose" to maintain the life of different beings that inhabit the multiverse, keeping them within a relationship of coexistence, not one of chaos. They think, feel, and live this multiverse differently from the State's war, and its territorial occupation, which is against all forms of multiplicity. The relationship between the Munduruku and these beings can be read from the concept of gift in Marcel Mauss [16], as conviviality and predation are not always opposed. In the Munduruku case, they go together, and are not rarely are mediated by gift exchanges. To understand how conviviality, predation, and gift are connected, we will see how the gift is defined by anthropology.

#### **4. Giving, receiving, and giving back: the spirit of giving**

Starting from the assumption that gift exchanges can exist universally, Marcel Mauss [16] makes a series of comparisons between the various regions and continents where the exchange of gifts are present. According to the author, they generate alliances and sociability and can occur through matrimonial, political, economic, legal, etc. Exchanges materialize in different ways, whether through parties, gifts, visits, or the circulation of goods and people. In many societies, gift exchanges are present throughout daily life, as well as in cosmopolitical relations, that is, between humans and nonhuman beings.

In said gift exchanges, unlike mercantile exchanges, whose relationship is between subject and object, the exchange of "objects" is constituted as a relationship between subjects [17]. When one exchanges something, one also exchanges part of oneself, for that which goes, is embedded with spirituality, soul. That which is given must be received and reciprocated, but this obligation is, at the same time, "performed"

as spontaneous. The gift differs from other types of exchange because its exchange, in most cases, is not immediate, and can even occur between generations, between peoples, and between beings of different forms of existence. Its specificity, however, is in what "transcends" what is exchanged, because it is not a relationship between subject and "object"—in the Western way of understanding the latter—it is a relationship between subjects. It is a long-term relationship, not one an immediate exchange such as defined by the edges of capitalism. To give, receive, and reciprocate is a continuum that is constituted and constitutes social life, and it is also the triad that makes up the gift.

The refusal to give or receive something can mean war or the path of enmity, as described by Davi Kopenawa about the ethics of exchange among the Yanomami. By bartering, on the other hand, collectives are linked, and alliances are consolidated:

*When the road that leads to another house is not for us a path of goods, we say that it has the value of enmity. In that case, we can wage war against the people to whom it leads, […] on the contrary, when we first come into contact with the inhabitants of an unknown house to make friends, we exchange with them everything we have. ([18], p. 414).*

In the Munduruku myth of Karosakuybu turning his relatives into pigs for having denied food to his son, we can see that by denying something to someone one also denies what guarantees the sociability of the group. In the case of the myth, by denying hunting, a behavior that is considered unsocial, one loses the status of "humanity," culminating in the transformation of people into game animals. In the Munduruku villages, games or fish must be shared, as mentioned before, even if they are only available in small quantities. If this food is not distributed among the families in the village, the mother of the fish and game may appear in dreams to "scold" the Munduruku or even limit and exhaust the possibilities of being able to access said food.

Also, according to Mauss, in the exchange of gifts "souls are mixed into things, things are mixed into souls. Lives are mixed, and thus the mixed persons leave each one of their own spheres and mix together: which is precisely the contract and the exchange" ([16], p. 213). If by exchanging something the receiver feels morally obliged to reciprocate, Mauss questions, it is because there is something more to this relationship than goods going, coming, or being passed on. For the author, "if things are given and reciprocated, it is because 'respects' are given and reciprocated—we can also say 'courtesies.' But it is also because people give themselves by giving, and, if people give themselves, it is because they 'owe' themselves—themselves and their goods—to others" ([16], p. 263).

To reflect on Munduruku sociability, like Yanomami sociability, would require thinking about the exchanges established in interethnic contact between indigenous and white people, but also about the exchanges within the group itself and with other nonhuman beings. Among the Munduruku, contact with non-Indians peoples occurred most intensively through the SPI (Serviço de Proteção ao Índio—Indian Protection Service) and later through the regatões6 , for while the Munduruku worked in latex harvesting and made rubber for exchange, the regatiros took drugs from the sertão, "luring" them to the riverbanks. According to Dias-Scopel, "to some extent,

<sup>6</sup> The regatões traveled the rivers of the Amazon in small boats to exchange products from the city for products from the forest.

the rubber enterprise eventually placed the Munduruku in a circuit of the local and global economy, in which they inserted themselves as part of an extensive network of production and circulation of commodities." Chief Juarez Saw, who also worked in latex and sorghum milk collection as a young man, SPI agents also took goods to trade with rubber,

*"They started to buy rubber first. It was the SPI people, there were two guys [SPI agents] who took the goods directly to the Munduruku post to exchange them for rubber. Then, after them, the regatons came in. Then a bunch of regatão went up by boat to take goods" (Juarez Saw, 2020).*

Exchanges with nonindigenous peoples, however, had been taking place since the nineteenth century, when travelers, mainly foreigners, traded Western items for trophy heads that were no longer useful to the Munduruku. Soon after, the gatekeepers, as the buyers of animal skins are called, such as maracajá cats, bush cats, and jaguars, also began to trade with the indigenous people.

Although these are the most obvious forms of exchange, and which undoubtedly generated significant changes in Munduruku ways of life and sociability, this is not the only exchange relationship between them. Between the spirits of the ancients, with the mothers of the forest, the pigs, or the fish, gift exchanges mediate the good (or bad) communication between them. That can also occur between hunters and hunted, between shamans and spirits, and between humans and nonhuman beings.

An example of this is the relationship between hunter and hunted among the Munduruku and Yanomami. In Yanomami cosmology, the hunted give themselves to the hunter, attracted by objects given by the shamans to be used in the hunt. The hunted give themselves, and the hunters receive and take them back to the village. This hunter, however, cannot consume the game he has taken, he has to make it go further. It is the logic of the gift that is at work: giving, receiving, and giving back. Thus, other hunters will have to do the same and this hunter will feed on the game of another, creating a relationship of interdependence among the group. If this triad is broken and the hunter consumes his own game, the animals of the forest will respond by no longer giving themselves to him, and this hunter will become panema.7 Without being able to bring food to the village, social relations between him and the group may be damaged.

In the Munduruku case, the hunter and hunted relationship are also complex. In one of the many dialogs, I had with a great sage and leader of Sawre Muybu, the chief Juarez Saw, one of them seemed especially interesting. Instigated by the fact that many Munduruku had been transformed into animals, as the myths tell, I asked him about his relationship with the animals they hunted. The chief told me that when the Munduruku found a group of peccaries or other animals, it was because the mother of those animals—who for some peoples are called chiefs of the hunt, as occurs in the Runa ([19], p. 106)—set them free to be hunted by them. The animals, Juarez Saw told me, "walk all around here, they know where we are, they know who we are, if we can hunt them, it is because they gave us permission. They are the ones who find us."

According to him, the game, in their worlds, think that Munduruku humans are shamans. "When, in their world, these animals get sick, they go to meet the 'shamans' to be cured" (Juarez Saw, 2020), and the number of sick ones in the animal world is

<sup>7</sup> Panema is a term used for hunters who can no longer catch game or fish. Either because a spell has been cast on them, because he has transgressed some interdiction, or because he has disrespected the hunts.

#### *Munduruku Cosmopolitics and the Struggle for Life DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109926*

exactly the same amount that goes in flocks to meet the Munduruku in their human form. This encounter is the hunt, which functions as the beginning of a healing ritual whose last act is the meal. According to the chief Juarez Saw:

*We dream about these people when they give themselves up. And when they are in the bush, it's not just any game that they will offer to the village. Because, for example, it will be night, right, and then we will dream about them, but they have also joined together in the bush, for example the pig, and then he says: "How many sick people are there in our midst? "Who wants to consult with the Pajé?" And we are Pajé to them. This is how they give themselves to us. Then they will indicate themselves: "Me! "I am also going! Then it will be a woman, "I am also going", I am sick. If it's two, it's two, if it's four, it doesn't go beyond their indication. You only see the one who is going to die, you don't see the others. Then you shoot him, "pow", then he comes back here, when we finish eating his meat he goes back to the bush. (Juarez Saw, Sawre Muybu village, 2020).*

After the game is eaten, the skulls of the hunted are placed under trees near the houses. Their spirits return to other animal bodies, now in good health. Murphy [11], during his work with the Munduruku of the upper Tapajós in the 1950s, had already described rituals for pacifying the mothers of the hunted using animal skulls.

*Before the skulls were placed in order, they were washed with a fragrant solution made from the envira cherosa and then with miirt, a sweet manioc gruel. Miri is thought to be especially pleasing to the spirit mothers, and a bowl was kept near the skulls so that the spirits could eat after answering the summons. ([11], p. 60).*

In the middle Tapajós, it is still possible today to perceive this ritual operating in the daily life of the village, where around the houses these skulls are, to unsuspecting eyes, "thrown" randomly. Although the ritual does not happen the way it was described by Murphy in "Mundurucu religion" (1958), one can see how it still occurs, with few modifications. Children are even told from a very young age not to play with those skulls, because the spirits may cause them harm. According to Professor Deusiano Saw

*There are some rules that we have to tell our children, so that they do not play with that, because we might suffer something. When you separate a jabuti's shell you should not play with it, too, so it's everything… there are rules too, with the mother in the river too, it's the same way, when I catch animals, you should not play with their spines, I may have an accident and have serious consequences too, because they penalize us too, right, so we catch them and should not play with them (Deusiano Saw, interview conducted in Sawre Muybu village, 2020).*

Viveiros de Castro, in *Os deuses canibais: a morte e o destino da alma entre os Arawete (1982)*, brings a perspective on the understanding of sacrifice between humans and nonhumans that can corroborate the analysis of the Munduruku's relation to hunting. According to him, in the Awaweté cosmology, humans, when dying, will meet the *Mai,* who will go through a ritual of cannibalism that will transform these dead into gods. When eating the hunted, the Munduruku also perform a kind of ritual sacrifice. The body is eaten so that the spirit can be healed and return to the forest, thus obtaining new ways of existence.

Among the Munduruku, it is recurrent to hear that the older men, for example, have more experience with otherness, because they have already gotten lost in the forest during days of hunting, and have seen and gone through things that the younger ones are yet to go through. Getting lost in the forest is not something casual or an accident, because according to what they told me when this is not the result of some *cauxi* (spell) that was cast on the hunter, it is because the spirits of the forest did this to teach the hunter to respect the game animals, not to be playing around and making jokes during meals because those hunts have spirits, they are his relatives from the time of the ancients. The forest is a place to be taken seriously.

After the Munduruku goes through such situations several times, which can also be of sickness, they become "intimate" and "friends" with these spirits, after which they are allowed to play around during meals or afterward, when the skulls of the hunts are still around the houses ([11], pp. 59–60). Juarez Saw clarifies how this approach to the spirits happens:

*She shows up to fight with us, because we say a lot of things. He is not a person to play with, we can, but we have to go through a lot of process. For example, if I play with a pig's head, then I can get injured. Then I spend a week sick, really sick, I'm no longer in this world here, I'm already in their world. Why do I go there? because it's for me to know what they do. they take me there, with my spirit, just for me to know. Just for them to say: look, we are no joke. Then I walk with them, and then they send my spirit back, then I get better. From there you already bring back a lot of stories from this trip that you went with them. Then again, about five times, then you can be their friend, then you can do whatever you want with your head, with your meat, with everything. Then we play with them and they smile too, but not yet. (Juarez Saw, Sawre Muybu village, 2020).*

For the Munduruku, most illnesses are occasioned by *cauxi* or because the mothers of the hunts and spirits of the forest want to teach them something. On certain occasions, as cacique Juarez Saw reported to me, if the spirits of the animals take someone to teach them a lesson, their spirit will walk with their spirits in the forest, as their body in the world of the "living" gets sick, suggesting that consciousness and spirit are not umbilically linked. Sometimes the spirits of these animals are very pleased with this person and do not want to return his spirit anymore, and it is up to the shaman to do the negotiation to recover the subject's spirit.

*When the person's spirit goes to the forest, then the people from the community ask the shaman to consult that person that has been sick for more than a month, then he goes there and says: no, this person already has no spirit, he is already going to the forest to stay with the spirit of the animals, of the pig, of all the animals… he goes… first he goes to an animal, then he gets sick because of how much he stayed with this animal, then some time goes by and he goes to another animal. Then he spends some time with them, then he gets sick, then he goes to another animal and keeps going. Then the one… said that he will leave when he leaves when he walks with all the spirits of all the game of all the animals of the forest, then he passes to the spirit of the monkey. Then it becomes more difficult to bring. And so they do. Then they call the community to make a porridge to call the spirits of all the animals of the forest, then they call three Pajé or four Pajé, but good ones. Then they make it for almost a week, and then they stay inside the village and start to sing near the patient, the Pajé. There, each one has his or her own chant, every animal. Then the pajés sing, not only the pajé, but the* 

*singers themselves, who are specific just to call the spirit that knows the dance of all the animals, then they start with one, and if there is not one, they say: "it's not with us, no", but the pajé keeps an eye on it, and then moves on to another one, for almost a day singing only one animal's song. And the mingauzão is going on. Every day that goes by, spirits are arriving there, and they go looking for them in every corner, until sometimes they find the spirits of the deer, of the pig. With this ceremony there comes both good and evil spirits, and the shaman is for this, so that the evil spirit does not touch them. When they manage to do so, they put the head of the dried tapir, like we find pigs' heads, and they keep it, and when it is during these ceremonies they take it and put it inside the house, around the corners. Then when the spirits of the forest come, with the spirit of that person comes a lot, then it enters in the place of the tapir's brain. Do not you have that hole that stays just inside? Then they go in all the way. He says that when they arrive there is a lot of noise, a lot of people come. Then the shamans stay outside the house too, to keep the evil people out. They are like their guardians, and there are others inside the house and some at the door. Back in the Sai cinza we participated a lot in this kind of ceremony, now it is difficult, it is very difficult for us to see. (Juarez Saw, Sawre Muybu village, 2020).*

Death in this sense is not the definitive rupture of life. It is related to the change of corporality, which, as said by Aparecida Vilaça about the Wari in *Eating like people* [20], is connected with the change of relatives, because when the doubles of these subjects are taken by the doubles of the animals, he continues to perceive himself as human in the forest, but inserted into other sociocosmic networks [10] in view of the fact that his former relatives will no longer see him as human but as a game. Death for the Munduruku as much as for the Wari is a relational rupture [21]. The moment when the spirit of the sick person will walk with the forest animals, and the shaman tries to return him to his human relatives, is a liminal space/time/condition [22] in which changes and transformations can happen or simply return to what was before. That is, either that sick person will change his corporality, relatives, and dimension, or he will return to his relatives and "human" corporality.

#### **5. Concluding remarks**

For the Munduruku, the territory is not only where their ancestors lived and where they continue their occupation process. The dead are not framed in a picture depicting the past, are not static in a time gone by, or are alive only in the memory of the people. These dead, their ancestors, are also in the present, they have agency, personality, and rationality in the same way as the spirits, the peccaries, the açaí trees, and the mothers of the animals. The way reality and time are constituted for the Munduruku people confronts our own perceptions of time and of what we so pretentiously call reality.

Nevertheless, the indigenous people lead us to conclude that our conception of politics is not sufficient to understand the complex relationships in which these people are inserted. As well put by Cadena [23] and Stengers [1], we need to "pluralize" politics: not limit the concept to power disputes between opposing forces, but rather make it pluriversal, involving all human and nonhuman beings who seek conviviality.

The Munduruku are fighting for territory, but this territory cannot be read as a space without any kind of agency. The Western way of understanding the world often establishes dualisms and dichotomies to explain the social, such as subject/object, nature/culture, male/female, and the idea that one must dominate the other. But these dualisms do not make sense to these people, being that too many Amerindian peoples here the idea of a continuum makes sense, which sometimes brings subjects together and sometimes distances them depending on the relational play.

### **Author details**

Bárbara do Nascimento Dias Social Anthropology at the National Museum, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil

\*Address all correspondence to: barbaradiasuft@gmail.com

© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*Munduruku Cosmopolitics and the Struggle for Life DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109926*

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Section 3
