Africa on the Move

#### **Chapter 5**

## Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia

*William Abur*

#### **Abstract**

Australia is a country that hosts millions of migrants from different countries and continents. This chapter presents the migration history of African Australians and the settlement challenges encountered by these families and individuals. In the last two decades, there has been a growing number of African communities in Australia. African people migrate to Australia for many reasons, including job-seeking and civil wars caused by race, religion, nationality, and membership in particular social or political groups. In the 2020 census, over 400,000 people living in Australia recorded they were of African origin. This represents 1.6% of the Australian population and 5.1% of Australia's overseas-born population. Most (58%) are white South Africans, but 42% are black Africans from sub-Saharan countries. Some people within these African populations did not settle well or adjust effectively to Australian society due to Australia's predominantly Anglo-Saxon culture. Therefore, this chapter discusses migration and settlement issues faced by African community groups in Australia.

**Keywords:** migration, settlement, African community, Australia, refugees

#### **1. Introduction**

African people began migrating to Australia from America before 1976 as former slaves, from Britain as convicts, and from Africa after the abolition of the White Australia Policy. However, the decision to migrate and resettle is something that can be exciting and daunting for families and individuals [1]. People choose to migrate to second or even third countries for many reasons including fleeing conflict, seeking jobs, reuniting with family members, and so on. Deciding to migrate often involves consideration of where to settle and how to seek connection with local community groups. In other words, "settlement" involves engagement or participation in local communities. It is also about seeking to belong within the local community. This chapter presents migration and settlement challenges faced by African people in Australia. Ultimately, the Australian Government has a responsibility to engage new migrants in the workforce as one of the pathways to help them settle more effectively and integrate into mainstream Australian society. Assisting migrants and refugees to participate in important social dimensions such as employment and sport has a substantial impact and positive outcome on settlement. Engagement in employment and sport brings benefits in well-being, health, social networks, and positive family

relationships/parenting which is good for society and people that are involved in such activities. On the opposite side, a lack of engagement for people from refugee backgrounds in positive activities can come with negative consequences such as mental health problems, domestic violence, and dysfunctional families. However, supporting people to obtain meaningful employment can improve their well-being and the wellbeing of their families as they become autonomous from welfare which gives them self-esteem and financial benefits [1, 2].

#### **2. The migration and settlement of African people in Australia**

African migrants first arrived in Australia as former slaves from America, as convicts from Britain, and more recently as refugees. This sets the scene for the current challenges African migrants face settling in Australia [2, 3]. However, before 1976, many of the migrants coming from Africa to Australia were white South Africans and White Zimbabweans. This was because of the White Australian Policy that allowed only white people to come to Australia during that time. The abandonment of the White Australian Policy allowed many African people to migrate to Australia through the humanitarian program because of civil war and ethnic cleansing in Africa to seek protection and a better place to live [1–3]. However, settlement was quite challenging for some individuals and families due to many reasons such as unemployment, racism and discrimination, language barriers, and lack of workforce skills required in Australia.

In recent years, young people from African community groups in Melbourne, for example, have not been settling well in schools due to bullying and discrimination. This raises the question of belonging and integration of people from African backgrounds. These concerns create anxiety among families and individuals as well as generate debates in the community about the future of migration for people from Africa, particularly those from refugee camps. This is because some politicians expressed their resentment toward African groups, calling them failed community groups that cannot integrate well into Australian society [2]. This kind of resentment was also labeled as racist and discriminatory by the African community leaders and community members, who argued many young people from different community groups and walks of life engage in anti-social behaviors and criminal activities [1].

Having worked with African-Australian community groups as a social worker, there have been many success stories and contributions made by African−Australians that were not captured by the media. For instance, African−Australians have made contributions in different fields such as sports, community services, law firms, academics, business, and many other fields. This is something that must be acknowledged and recognized as part of successful migration and settlement.

#### **3. Resettlement and protection of refugees**

The concept of refugee protection emerged during World War II, resulting in the Convention on Refugees and subsequently the establishment of the UNHCR [4–6]. Refugees are people who have fled their homeland, often due to political instability, repression, and violent conflict. They leave to escape oppressive discrimination or severe physical and mental harm [4]. Such sudden departures generally mean refugees do not have the opportunity to pack their belongings or say farewell to loved ones *Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107083*

[7–9]. It is fundamentally important to know that journey of refugees is always full of uncertain feelings and danger with unforeseen issues. It is a secret journey with fear of persecution, trauma, and hopelessness without knowing the future clearly and if they will return or not ever return to their homeland [8].

We know that the term "refugee resettlement" is a positive concept to remove people from difficult situations to a better place. It is a term commonly used to explain the relocation of refugees from second country of asylum to a third country with the idea that third country is for permanent resettlement and integration in host community. The aim is that third country is responsible for providing settlement support services for refugees and helping them to integrate with society and system of the host society as a way of their needs. Refugee resettlement and integration is a very complex process. However, it is generally considered a durable solution to refugee problems [see [10–12]]. Refugees are assessed and accepted for resettlement when they meet the criteria set out by the UN Convention [1, 3, 5]. The challenges that refugee people experience are significant and multi-faceted [7, 13]. Large numbers of refugees who are waiting to be assessed and resettled currently live in refugee and displacement camps worldwide, such as the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, where many African-Australians have lived before migrating to Australia. Some also come from other refugee camps in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt. These camps are characterized by shortages of food, inadequate medical services, and lack of sanitation [14–16].

Furthermore, these refugees encountered some additional issues such as hardships and physical deprivations, some of the vulnerable refugees experienced a high level of traumatic events before their arrival in the refugee camps. Some had witnessed execution, death of loved ones, and busses such as rape, torture, psychological deprivation, looting, and destruction. These challenges and lived experiences can have overwhelming psychological and emotional impacts on individuals and families. Some researchers have already recognized these difficulties and suffering of refugees from divergent degrees of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) [4, 12, 15, 16]. The complexity of refugees' pre-settlement experiences and the impact of these experiences on individuals and families place pressure on countries to ensure that they can adequately support arriving refugees at both a policy and service level [9, 15]. Host countries are providing resettlement and settlement programs as part of their contributions and global commitment to humanity by taking a share in protection of refugees. They provided resettlement and settlement support services voluntarily. Protection and resettlement of refugees is a responsible idea to do in face of humanity and it is a durable solution for refugees who cannot return to their countries of origin [6]. The role of host countries included, but was not limited to providing access to resources, facilitation of integration, and provision of support services [1, 2, 6, 17]. These issues critical for the South Sudanese community in Australia and in the context of this study. Families and individuals are struggling with resettlement and may need support services to overcome settlement issues.

#### **4. Policy and practice: refugee settlement in Australia**

Australia has a history of resettling refugees and migrants via humanitarian programs. Australia is a signatory to the United Nations 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and to the subsequent 1967 Protocol [18, 19]. This means that Australia agrees to protect refugees and is one of the countries that accepts refugees for resettlement. The 1951 Convention clearly defined a refugee as a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" [6]. The Humanitarian Resettlement Program in Australia began in 1947, with the resettlement of European Displaced Persons (DPs) who were displaced by World War II (31) and resettled to Australia under the auspices and accommodation of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the immediate precursor of the UNHCR. Australia started resettling refugees in 1947 and more than 800,000 refugees from different countries and nationalities have been resettled. They rebuilt their lives in Australia and called Australia home [4, 11, 20, 21]. Between 1933 and 1939, for example, more than 7000 Jews fleeing Nazi Germany were settled [22]. In 1937, the Australian Jewish Welfare Society pioneered the first refugee settlement support services, with financial assistance from the Australian government [23]. However, Australia also has a history of discriminating against certain ethnicities. The Restriction Act 1901, which became known as the White Australia Policy, limited immigration to Australia on the basis of ethnicity [11, 20]. When this White Australia Policy ended in 1975, the Racial Discrimination Act was introduced. The agenda of multicultural debate started to grow strongly politically. However, it took time for the federal government to put this multicultural agenda into the National Policy for Multicultural Australia. The aim of multicultural policy is to achieve a harmonious and friendly society based on Australian values by recognizing diversity as a positive contribution to the workforce within Australian culture [23, 24]. This was the time when first Vietnamese refugees came in 1975 by boat. As a result, many refugees started arriving from Asia, Middle East, and Africa. In the recent decade, many refugees have come to countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Bhutan, Somalia, Burma, Iraq, Sudan, Burundi, Congo, and other countries [1, 2, 4, 11, 20].

The idea of multiculturalism embraced diversity and differences as a public policy designed by the government in response to the expectation of society with nationalities with different cultural practices. There are three main dimensions of multicultural policy identified by the government. First dimension is a cultural identity as a right of all Australians to express their cultural heritage including language and celebration of religion. The second dimension is social justice as a right of all Australians to equal treatment, opportunity, and the elimination of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender, or place of birth. The third dimension is economic efficiency, the need to maintain, develop, and effectively utilize the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background [1, 2, 25].

With this multicultural society in mind, refugee community groups are considered disadvantaged and thus deserving of special consideration under social inclusion services [24]. Social inclusion has become an important policy initiative for state governments, and it often generates debate about which groups are socially excluded and why [23, 24]. Social exclusion is viewed as a significant social cost, since it pushes new arrivals to the edge of society and prevents them from participating fully in society due to their poverty, lack of basic competencies, limited lifelong learning opportunities, and ongoing discrimination [1, 2, 4]. People from refugee backgrounds often experienced poverty in displaced camps, refugee camps, their home countries, and in their interim countries before their resettlement. The poverty experienced is additional to war, conflict, disruption of life, and basic

#### *Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107083*

activities such as education, farming, and business. This is one of the reasons why formal education is absent from some refugees. However, some refugees are welleducated or literate in their own language and English. These are people who have attended formal education in their countries before the war displaced them. Some also attended education in refugee camps [1, 2]. Many refugees in Australia do face problems in workforce due to lack of experience in workforce and institutional discrimination. Australian workforce can be more complex compared to their previous work experiences in their countries. Also, life in refugee camps denied them to get work experience in big institutions such as banks, hospitals, schools, and hotels prior to their arrival in Australia [7]. The combination of unfamiliarity with systems and lack of confidence and ability to communicate effectively in English created a struggle to access meaningful employment opportunities. Lack of participation or limited participation in society denied refugees the power and make relevant decisions for their lives. They often feel powerless, confused, and unable to control their lives, their families, and their children [1, 2, 4, 26]. On the other hand, young people from African community want to be free citizens like other young people in Australian mainstream community groups. They want to be viewed as young people that want to participate in a multicultural society without many expectations of them. They see the idea of inclusive society as something that not working sometimes for them when they are extremely judgmental by the media and politicians who want to promote their politics in a negative way. Some of these politicians that are promoting negative debates about minority community groups in Australia as "African Gang" are clearly violating the multicultural and social inclusion policy. One of the principles of social inclusion policy is a promotion of harmony that allows all Australians to feel valued and welcome to participate freely without discrimination and exclusion. Social policy promotes the idea of diversity and celebration of diversity regardless of status and cultural background. It is also about celebrating the benefits of diversity in a multicultural society with the commitment to social cohesion [4, 25].

The Australian Government's concept of social policy and the principles of multiculturalism are particularly relevant to the African community groups that are faced some barriers to participation in employment and sport as well as many other areas. Benefits of participation are very clear and highly needed by the vulnerable community groups and families that are struggling with isolation. This study demonstrates general experiences of African community groups in Australia and these experiences are contradicting the social inclusion policy and the principles of multiculturalism in areas of employment, participation in sports, and other important decisions or powers. People from African community groups are more likely to experience some subtle and explicit forms of racism and discrimination in different fields including workplace and sports [1, 2, 4].

#### **5. Settlement of refugees: a challenging process**

Settlement support services are provided by the Australia humanitarian program. This program manages and provides settlement support services to newly arrived families and individuals. However, these support services are delivered by nongovernmental originations that are funded to provide settlement support services.

While general resettlement issues for refugees have been discussed above, this section discusses settlement issues that are of particular significance to the South

Sudanese community in Australia. "Refugee settlement" is a term used when refugees arrive in Australia and require a range of support services to establish themselves and become independent in a new cultural and social context [see [4, 27]]. Settlement is a complex process that requires support from the host community, government, and non-government agencies to address different challenges [4, 7, 28].

Refugees have sometimes been perceived as a burden on receiving countries. This notion of burden has been central to both policy and research debates about displacement and protection [29]. Such political and community concerns are indicative of the global challenge of refugee resettlement amidst decreasing numbers of refugees being able to return voluntarily to their countries [30]. The difficulty of settlement is exaggerated by their connection to place and creation of a sense of belonging in local place. Having a sense of belonging can assist in feeling safe and connected to local community activities. This increases interest in participation in upcoming community activities or events with confidence [2, 31]. Host community can assist in navigating connections and access to community activities if refugees are not received as troublesome to host community groups. According to the 1951 Convention, protection of refugees was a responsible action for countries to protect and resettle refugees in nondiscriminatory way. Countries are also responsible for ensuring that participation of refugees in host society is fully participated by the government of the country hosting refugees [1, 2, 4, 6]. Settlement of refugees in host communities is a two-way process in relation in term of cultural understanding and expectations of integration. There is a great need for partnership between organizations that are supporting refugees and the host community. Settlement of refugees can be made better by the host community by welcoming and engaging refugees in meaningful programs or activities that make them feel welcome with the spirit of hospitality and not an environment where they are viewed as "other" or people with problems [1, 2].

As already discussed above, refugee settlement is a final phase, and are meant to be integrated into their host communities. It is time when individuals and families required some support to be connected in community groups and activities to participate in meaningful activities such as sports for young people. They also required some support and connection to develop and build their social and economic independence [1, 2, 32, 33]. However, we know that from the research, settlement is an ongoing process for people from refugee backgrounds. It is not something that can be achieved overnight as it is a process that involved many challenges such as adapting to a new place and a new community with a new language cannot be an easy task to overcome in short period of time [1, 2, 28]. Settlement challenges include lack of social capital and language acquisition to assist in navigating systems and integration processes. This can be daunting task for individuals and families if they are not well supported regardless of the level of education they obtained in their previous countries. These challenges can overshadow some benefits for refugees during the settlement period [1, 2, 4, 7]. The impact of integrating into a new society can cause high levels of stress and anxiety [11, 21]. Refugees often experience intense homesickness and isolation which are aggravated by culture shock that further hinders their ability to begin a new life in Australia [4]. To reduce these challenges, there is a need to promote optimal well-being strategies to help people to manage stress and adjustments to settlement issues. Settlement programs should be funded to support emotional and personal well-being of people from refugee backgrounds. It is important to assist people with prevention of mental health issues are they are more likely to be developed by individuals and families. Refugee people need support to rebuild their lives from what they lost or missed in their lives. This should be

#### *Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107083*

seen as part of the settlement package for refugees [1, 2, 34]. The studies in this area of refugee settlement have generated enough evidence globally. Some of the critical themes are discussed in the context of this chapter in terms of understanding forced migration, displacement, and settlement of migrants in Australia. Prominent themes of relevance include drivers of displacement and forced migration, legal and moral frameworks, and experiences in refugee camps and countries of resettlement [see, for example [3–5]]. Some positive factors identified in this research that are useful in helping refugee people overcome settlement issues and contribute better include feeling safe from discrimination and racism, getting secure and well-paid employment, participation in local community meetings without encountering prejudices or negative judgments, feeling supported at school and in community, buying home raise family and many others [1, 2, 4, 11, 14]. These studies have discussed general challenges faced by refugees in Australia but have not critiqued policies and ways forward to address issues on a broader level as African people are still experiencing unemployment issues and discrimination in Australia. In some cases, the treatment of refugees and their access to meaningful resources is something that is influenced by the politics in Australia. When some politicians choose to use negative language calling young people from Africa as "African gang" level of racism and discrimination increases in community against people of African heritage [1, 2, 35]. This was because of some politicians and media promoting fearmongering and exposing African Australians as a desirable group in Australia. Levels of abuse and racial attacks were noticed in community and at schools by children. In Australia, there is interesting culture and attitude toward newly arrived groups. Newly arrived groups often generated debates in public about who is responsible when there is something wrong. There is often a blame game about why they are in first place or why they are not deported back to where they came from. This was a case with African community or "African gang" debates with some blaming that they are not able to integrate in Australia according to the Australian values. This happened with the group that came by boat to asylum in Australia. They were managed by the federal government in detention centers, but public debate increased with some calling for deportation [1, 2, 4, 36, 37]. Many of these recent debates in the media have attempted to distinguish between "good" and "bad" refugees. "Bad" refugees are those who "jump the queue", meaning they arrive by boat and not through the formal UNHCR channels [4, 37]. The majority of African people in Australia who arrived via UNHCR work in refugee camps. Despite this, they are often still labeled as "undesirable" refugees in political and media discourse because of their settlement-related challenges in Australia, which have been both exaggerated and widely misreported by the mainstream media [4, 36, 37]. Therefore, understanding this history and these challenges facing people from refugee and migrant backgrounds in Australia, including people from African community groups, is vital in policy and practice contexts.

#### **6. Conclusion**

This chapter discussed migration and settlement challenges faced by families and individuals from African backgrounds during migration and settlement. The majority of African migrants in Australia came because of war and other challenges including political prosecution. However, people from minority community groups appear to find settlement challenging due to a lack of support services available to community groups or families/individuals. Families and young people from African community

groups often find themselves in trouble with many settlement issues in Australia. The settlement of African community groups has been negatively publicized in the media and African community groups are thus often viewed negatively.

### **Acknowledgements**

The author would like to acknowledge that this chapter was written as part of a PhD research project conducted between 2014 and 2018 at Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia.

### **Author details**

William Abur Department of Social Work – Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

\*Address all correspondence to: william.abur@unimelb.edu.au

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107083*

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#### **Chapter 6**

## Sub-Saharan Migrations to Europe during the Three Last Decades

*Jacques Barou*

#### **Abstract**

Migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe are recent. Slave trade organized by Europeans to the America created some possibilities of settlement in Europe between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries for Black African persons, but the phenomenon was marginal. Migratory flow really begins in the twentieth century. Colonial troops arrived in France to take part in the battles of the First World War. After this first experience, voluntary migrations were organized by some communities of West Africa to some harbors in France. In the sixties, the phenomenon increased but concerned only men whose purpose was to come back rapidly at home with their savings. Little by little, different European countries were concerned by the immigration of women and families coming from all parts of Africa. This article aims to describe and analyze the transformations of the migratory flows and the ways of integration in the receiving societies with cases concerning mainly France and the UK.

**Keywords:** Sub-Saharan Africa, unforced migrations, France, UK, social changing

#### **1. Introduction**

In this text, we will examine the global processes of African migration during the three last decades (from 1990 to 2020). We will start with a historical background concerning migrations in the south of the Sahara. The internal migrations in this region have always been very important and today almost 70% of the estimated 40,000,000 Sub-Saharan migrants are living in a foreign country of this area [1]. Only 15% of them are settled in Europe and the others are in North America and in the countries of the Persian Gulf. However, the fluxes of migrants toward Europe have strongly increased during the three last decades. After a presentation of the migrations in the Sub-Saharan area, we describe the different routes to Europe by land and sea, and the risks encountered by the migrants.

Then we analyze the particularities of migration in France, the European country the most concerned by this migration. We will also examine the demographics of African migration, including migration pathways, work, education, living conditions, familial, gender, faith, and settlement patterns. These trends in African migration will be analyzed alongside broader global trends within African diasporas. In this chapter, we use a methodology based on comparisons between quantitative data collected in

different periods. This let appears the main changes in the fluxes of migrants and their profiles. The most relevant sources of data at a global level are produced by the IOM (International Organization of Migrations), depending on the UNO. Concerning France, the INED (National Institute for Demographic studies) realizes regularly important surveys about the different aspects of migratory fluxes and processes of integration. We complete this approach with references to qualitative research.

After his analysis of the evolution of the Sub-Saharan migrations in Europe, we will explore their future. Some arguments let think they will grow irresistibly. The reproduction rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is very high, while in Europe it is lower. Does it mean we will see in the next decades a rush of young African migrants toward old Europe? Will the people originated from Sub-Saharan represent 25% of the French population in 2050, as some statistic projections let foresee it [2]. However, if we consider different historical cases, we can conclude the growth of the population of a country did not provoke systematically a growth of the migrations outside. Europe remains far from Sub-Saharan Africa and difficult to reach because of the cost and the danger of the travel, and the administrative closing of the countries of the U.E. Besides, African continent gives large possibilities to migrate from a poor country to a more developed one. So, we will first analyze the evolution of internal migrations in the south of the Sahara.

#### **2. Migrations in the south of Sahara**

The history of African people living in the south of the Sahara is above all a history of migrations**.** A process of desertification in the Sahara began around 2000 years B.C.E and provoked the departure of black peasants living there for numerous centuries toward the grand rivers of Western Africa: Senegal, Niger, Volta…. At the same time, wandering groups of cows or camel breeders began to run over this immense desert and its surrounding regions.

From the Benoué tableland, in the border region of Cameroon and Nigeria, the ancestors of the Bantu rushed across the equatorial forest and arrived in the Australia savannah at a period corresponding to the European middle age. In Eastern Africa, we can also observe different flows of populations toward the high tablelands of Rwanda and Burundi and the regions of the grand lakes. Bantu agriculturists settled there around the eleventh century A.D.E and Ethiopian shepherds followed them some decades later.

These migrations populating little by little the different spaces of the continent continued until the twentieth century. Many ethnic groups of Sub-Saharan Africa have myths or legends telling precisely their arrival in their actual territory, underlining their relatively recent presence there. Different reasons explain the importance of migrations in Africa up to the contemporary era: the existence of vast under-inhabited places, the climate hazards, and the lack of agricultural techniques as fallow, allowing the regeneration of the fields, which let people leave lands quickly run dry and look for new soils to plow. The slave trade has also influenced the moving of the populations. The trade practiced by the Arabic countries and their African suppliers, such as the Kabaka and the King of Uganda, captured and sold around 17 million people in North Africa and in the Arabic peninsula from the middle age to the beginning of the twentieth century. During two centuries, the European traders transferred around 12 million Sub-Saharan persons to the America. In order to escape capture, many people might abandon their village and looked for refuge in mountains or in

#### *Sub-Saharan Migrations to Europe during the Three Last Decades DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107522*

forests and other places difficult to reach. These forced migrations stopped in the first part of the twentieth century [3].

During the colonial period, migrations increased because of different reasons. Military troops were recruited among local populations and were moved from one country to another, in order to conquer new lands or to maintain the authority of colonial power. Economic migrations were organized by the administration from poor and overcrowded regions to plantations and mines, as in the case of the migration of Mossi people from poor Burkina to the rich plantations of Ivory Coast or from the villages of the former Northern Rhodesia to the mining towns of the "copper belt" [4].

During the years following the independence of African countries from the early to mid-1960s, the migrations became more controlled because of policies aiming to protect the national workers against the rivalry of foreigners. The rare countries, which had chosen a liberal way of development, continued to receive numerous migrants coming from the neighboring countries. It was particularly the case of South Africa in the period of apartheid which encouraged the arrival of foreign workers in order to develop mining and industrial activities and the case of the Ivory Coast which continued to receive workers coming from its poor surrounding countries, such as Mali and Burkina. But the majority of the governments preferred to close the frontiers and expel sometimes violently foreign residents who settled there during the colonial period.

During the 1960s, Marshall Mobutu evicted from Zaire thousands of Malian and Senegalese who were settled there in the time of Belgian Congo. Instead of going back to their countries of origin, these people preferred to join some of their fellow citizens working in France and this event amplified the flow toward this country [5].

In the 1980s, we can observe a general rerun of internal migrations and growing flows toward other continents. During this decade most African countries had a negative rate of economic growth. The Gross National Product remained low, while the global population increased by 3% in a year and the working population by 2,7% in a year. The individual middle income decreased by 25%. The economists used to name this period "the lost decade." During the following decade, economic growth came back in certain regions. However, the global situation was still difficult. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, many African governments reduced strongly the number of public jobs. Many young graduates had no hope of finding employment. This fact influenced the behavior of younger pupils who abandoned studying and tried to work in order to survive. Their quest for jobs led them to move from their villages to the nearest towns, from little towns to important urban areas, from their home country to a less poor one, and from Africa to the outside.

#### **3. The real beginning of migrations out of Africa**

In the 1990s, political problems added to economic difficulties, provoking insecurity. Violent conflicts bursting in some countries caused a chain of dramatic consequences in the whole surrounding zone. From 1960 to 1990 Africa has already known 17 civil wars among the 43 registered in the world. In and after the 1990s, internal conflicts have been on the increase. In total, 27 countries among the 53 existing in the continent have known political violence between 1993 and 2002. The civil wars in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone added to those already existing for a long time in Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan.

The surrounding countries must receive populations running away from the struggles and the frontier zones become sometimes a place of folding back for troops of militants fighting against the neighboring government. Countries, such as Chad or the Central African Republic, suffer troubles linked to the civil conflicts devastating their neighbors Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Some states, such as Somalia, completely collapsed, giving the place to anarchy and insecurity. As a consequence of these conflicts, one can register today six million refugees in Africa and seventeen million displaced persons knowing very difficult conditions of life. So, the global situation in Africa can push many people to move to more peaceful and less poor places.

In spite of the high number of conflicts, the refugees represent only 13% of all the migrants in Africa (six million in 2020, according to Eurostat) [6]. The inside migrations are caused above all by economic factors. In this early twenty-first century, almost 17 million citizens of different countries in the south of the Sahara are living in a foreign land. It represents 3% of the global population of the continent, a rate slightly higher than the percentage of migrants referring to the whole world population. But the largest majority of them are living in a foreign African country. According to the world report about human development, dedicated in 2009 to migrations, only 2% of the migrants coming from the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are living in a country member of the OECD. 1% of them are living in Europe. A country, such as Mali, which appears as a typical country of emigration, registers 92% of its migrants in other African countries, 5% in a European country, and 3% in an Asian country (UNO, 2009).

However, we can identify a key period explaining the development of Sub-Saharan migratory movements toward Europe. From the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, fluxes intensified were renewed and diversified. Meanwhile, the memberstates of the European Union undertook a legislative race to control the entry and residence of foreigners.

From the 1990s, demand for highly skilled workers from poor to rich countries has become a new dynamic, assisted by globalization and aging populations. Even women, who in the past remained at home, now take advantage of their better education and skills to migrate independently of men. Thus, female doctors, nurses, and teachers from Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya, for example, have been recruited to work in Britain and Australia, quite often leaving their spouses and children behind (Koket & alii).

Migrants usually intend to return home on retirement and be buried among their ancestors. Thus, for example, many refugees voluntarily choose repatriation as soon as conditions back home return to normal. As part of the important process of keeping in contact with home, migrants regularly send money either to help sustain family members or pay for the building of a new house, purchase land for themselves or their relatives, or the education of family members. The formation of diasporas and home improvement associations together with the related individual or group financial remittances is another common feature of migrants. In this manner, migrants are able to keep alive links between themselves and their home country.

Probably the number of migrants inside Africa will continue to increase in the future. The statistic previsions expect that the African population being of an age to work will have an increase of 125% in 2050. At the same time, the evolutions would be + 26% in Latin America, +22% in Asia, and - 23% in Europe. So, the migrations to Europe that nowadays represent a little part of all the migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa will consequently continue to increase. However, a certain number of factors

*Sub-Saharan Migrations to Europe during the Three Last Decades DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107522*

contribute to limit the growth of Sub-Saharan migration in Europe. One of the most important is linked to the difficulties to reach the European continent. Few Sub-Saharan citizens enjoy a Schengen visa, allowing them a legal arrival in a country belonging to this space. The majority of migrants often have to use an illegal way to enter Europe.

#### **4. The routes to Europe**

The routes leading from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, by land and sea, are all dangerous and the travel is expensive.

Indeed, the undocumented migration routes are highly relevant in the context of African migration systems to the EU. The following map shows the routes used by illegal African migrants to enter in the EU [7]. They are still active today.

The main departure points are:


Since the death of Colonel Kadhafi in 2011, a big disorder exists in Libya and some migrants have been kidnapped by criminal groups and reduced to slavery [8]. According to the HCR, in 2021, 123000 persons tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Among them, 3231 died or disappeared.

It is difficult to know precisely the number of persons who died by crossing the desert and the sea to join Europe during the three last decades. According to the French NGO SOS Méditerranée, hundreds of thousands of migrants would be dead or disappeared since the creation of the Schengen system.

The policy of EU concerning migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa is above all repressive. The Frontex Agency intercept the boats loaded by illegal migrants and send them back to North Africa. Some North African countries, such as Morocco or Libya, are paid by EU to restrain the fluxes coming from the Sub-Saharan area. It is more difficult to expel undocumented migrants settled in Europe a long time ago. The question is politically sensitive. The fear of an invasion of Black African migrants is the favorite argument of many extreme-right-wing parties in the different European countries. However, the number of Sub-Saharan migrants in Europe increased slowly but constantly during the three last decades, and Black African diasporas are nowadays existing in Europe. It is particularly the case in France, the most concerned country by the Sub-Saharan migrations.

#### **5. Sub-Saharan migrants in France**

Migration to France from the African continent has been influenced by the ties linked during the colonial period. Today around 85% of the Sub-Saharan migrants settled in France come from a former French colony. The first important migration flows took place during the colonial period. At that time, the African countries ruled by France were organized into three federations: French Western Africa, French Central Africa, and the French territories in the Indian Ocean. Some sailors employed by the French merchant navy had the opportunity to come and work in Marseille and other harbors, but the main flows were organized by public authorities because of military motives.

During the First World War, 161000 men from the French colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa were enlisted in infantry in order to come and fight in Europe. 30000 of them died on the battle fields or in military hospitals, often because of tuberculosis. Some of these soldiers remained in France after the war and created associations and newspapers to claim French citizenship and racial equality because of the "blood debt" contracted by France toward the natives of the colonies. They were joined by students and intellectuals, such as Leopold Senghor from Senegal and Aimé Césaire from Martinique, who developed the concept of "negritude," affirming both the originality of the black civilizations and a desire for political equality inside the French Republic. After the Second World War, the number of African students in France increased. Those supporting independence become more numerous than those claiming political assimilation. The main part of African politicians who came into power in the sixties had studied and militated in Paris before [9].

After the independence, in the 1960s, migration of workers began to grow in the harbors of Marseille and Le Havre and in the Paris region. Most of them came from the Senegal River Valley and were citizens of Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. Belonging to ethnic groups, such as Peul and Soninké, they were often illiterate and unskilled. One other group came from the Comoros archipelago in the Indian Ocean. In Paris, they worked as street cleaners and garbage men and in the ports; they were dock workers. They organized them as communities of single men living often in old and damaged housing or in homes for celibates managed by humanitarian associations [10]. The main causes of this migration were economic. On one hand, the Senegal River Valley was a particularly poor area affected by dryness. On the other hand, during these years of exceptional prosperity, the French economy had important needs for unskilled workers and the African migrants were welcome. A system of rotation was organized by the communities allowing a certain number of men to be in their native countries dealing with their domestic problems, while their parents were in France, earning money and sending important sums to the villages [11].

This system was thwarted by a decision of the French government taken in 1974. Economic immigration was suspended with a few exceptions concerning some specific sectors of activity. So, the immigrants could not spend more than two months in their countries of origin else they risked to lose their right to stay in France. The increase in unemployment pushed also them to abandon the rotation system and the long time stays in their villages among their families. Many men decided consequently to let their wives and children join them in France.

#### **6. Main changes in the fluxes during the 1990s**

The profile of the Sub-Saharan population in France began to change at the end of the 1970s. The families became more numerous than single men. They encountered also many problems. Polygamy was frequent and the number of children was often very high, provoking difficulties in housing and scholarship. The pursuit in France of some traditions, such as excision, contributes to let these people appear as very difficult to integrate. Different laws were promoted in the 1990s to discourage this migration, without real success. The flows continued illegally.

At the same time, we assist in the development of migration of asylum seekers coming above all from central Africa, Angola, Congo, and Zaire (actually the Democratic Republic of Congo). These countries were concerned by civil wars, such as Angola, for a long time. Others, as the Former French Congo, were concerned by brief but violent troubles during the 1990s. The former Zaïre after the end of the dictatorship of Marshall Mobutu was affected by important disorders in its eastern provinces because of the rivalry between uncontrolled militias terrorizing civil populations.

A large number of people tried to flee these countries and organize illegal travels toward Europe, wherein they hope to obtain asylum. Some of these asylum seekers were really victims of political prosecution but many of them used this procedure because the other legal means to enter France became more and more restricted. Finally, a relatively low percentage of Sub-Saharan asylum seekers obtained the status of political refugee. For instance, in 2009, among 5780 asylum seekers coming from Africa were registered by the French Office for Refugees and stateless persons, 1952 (33%) have gained the status of political refugee. Many asylum seekers who have been dismissed stay in France illegally. Today, many African migrants are undocumented in France since a relatively long time. Some of them have finally obtained legal documents according to different reasons: illness, familial links, and prove of integration. It is impossible to know exactly how many African migrants are illegal but their number is probably significant. At the end of the 1990s, the number of Sub-Saharan migrants considerably increased; mainly because of the arrival of women and families. They were 393 289 according to the census of 1999, while they were 182 479 in 1990. In 2010 they were 705 388, and in 2019 they were 1 031749. So, the growth of the migrants coming from this area essentially took place during the three last decades. They appear nowadays as a young population with a high percentage of children and young persons. Children under 15 years represent 56,8% of the Sub-Saharan group versus 32,5% of all migrants. Young persons from 15 to 24 represent 21,5% of this group versus 15,1% of all the migrants. One counts also an important number of grandchildren born in France and enjoying French citizenship: 929000 [12]. The question of their integration into European society is an important one.

#### **7. Main characteristics of Sub-Saharan migration in France**

It should be noted that despite their recent increase, immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa only represent 11.63% of the total immigrant population. No country in sub-Saharan Africa has reached 100 000 citizens. The nation with the largest figure, Senegal, comes far behind the various nations of North Africa, Europe, and Asia [13].

#### **7.1 Gender**

The immigrant population of sub-Saharan Africans in France is notable for feminization and for becoming younger. The arrival of families after 1975 has contributed to a rapid rise in natives of African nations present in France. The clearest sign of the establishment of the kind of family patterns typical among African immigrants is the increase in the number of women, in total number, and as a percentage. Until 1975, the number of women was very low. In 1982, they numbered 62 172, 36.17% of the population. In 1990, this number had reached 117 382, 42.66% of the total Sub-Saharan African population. By 1999, they numbered 187 444 or 46.7%, and in 2019 they are 523340 representing 50,7%. Concerning African nations formerly under French rule, for whom there are more detailed figures, more women came to France than men between 1990 and 1999: 45648 women compared to 36129 men. The available figures also attest to the importance of young people. 21 326 people under the age of 19 came to France between 1990 and 1999, 26% of the total arriving in this period. Under 15s numbered 13 016, 15.9% of the total. The importance lies with adolescents rather than children. There have also been a lot of young adults, including many women: 12049 people aged 20–24 entering the country, of whom 7 098 were women, 15 499 people aged 25–29, 9 468 of them women, and 14 138 people aged 30–34, of whom 8 102 were women. Beyond these age brackets, the figures are less significant. The increase in the African population of France is therefore due mainly to the arrival of young people who give immigration a more family-oriented profile. People entering under family reunion laws are not of much significance: 1000–2000 per year on average since 1990. Most new arrivals are therefore either newly-arrived families, or most often adults or children and adolescents arriving individually. Thus, the recent increase in African immigrants is due principally to the arrival of young adults and adolescents, many of whom are women. We are looking mainly then at a new population, one that was under-represented until now and which is changing the face of African immigration. The feminization of Sub-Saharan African immigration reflects the wider progression of the immigrant population which is marked by its equal numbers of men and women in 2019.

#### **7.2 Nationalities**

All nations of the African continent are represented in France today. This is not new, as the range has always been very wide. What is new, is the considerable increase in numbers coming from countries previously very underrepresented. People coming from the Congo, who numbered 8 492 in 1982, numbered 35 449 in 1999, and in the third position just after Mali. People coming from the Ivory Coast went from 12 072 in 1982 to 29 885 in 1999. Natives of Madagascar numbered 10 940 in 1982. This number rose to 28 220 in 1999. These three countries have experienced

#### *Sub-Saharan Migrations to Europe during the Three Last Decades DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107522*

very difficult situations in recent years. The Congo has suffered two civil wars, in 1993 and 1997. Its geographical proximity to two countries with long-term troubled histories, Angola and Zaire, has also had an effect on the flow of departures. The Ivory Coast, despite a satisfactory economic situation, has for some years seen an increase in tensions between the populations of the north and the south, and hardening of antagonism between "authentic" Ivorians and descendants of immigrants. Madagascar, whose economy has been battered by Didier Ratsiraka's collectivizing experiments, has known political tensions for a long time, which threaten to slide the country into civil war.

The proportion of people who have acquired French nationality is higher in four groups: 26.65% from the Congo, 33.86% of people from Cameroon, 35.78% for people from the Ivory Coast, and 65.09% of people from Madagascar. For the total immigrant population from the African continent, the percentage of French people "by acquisition" is 30.16%. We find a higher percentage of people who gained French nationality amongst the groups where women are more numerous. This coincidence is particularly clear amongst people from Madagascar.

What are the factors that explain the similarities between these diverse populations? All of them come from countries that have known or are currently in conflict situations. They also come from countries where the French used to have a strong presence, which explains the strong tendency for people to acquire French nationality. Finally, from a cultural perspective, all these countries of origin are notable for systems of family organization that attribute an important economic role to women. Given the fairly high levels of schooling that you find in these countries, it is probable that a certain number of men and women have student status or held one on arrival in France.

#### **7.3 Faith**

France being a secular state, no sociodemographic survey can ask people about their religion. It is, therefore, not possible to know precisely the religions of African immigrants in France. All the same, we can attribute religions based on the dominant religion in their country of origin. The majority of people from West Africa are Muslim. We can regard a near totality of Malians and Mauritanians to be Muslim. In Senegal, we have counted an ethnic minority, the Manjak, as Catholic. Comorians are all Muslim. The majority of people from central Africa; Congo, ex-Zaire, and Cameroon, are Christian. The same goes for the Ivory Coast, Benin, and Togo. It is of course a matter of "sociological" membership of these religions. We have no way of measuring conviction or regularity of practice. Muslims from Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean are represented in the CFCM (Muslim Council of France) but only play a limited role due to their numerical inferiority to North Africans and Turks.

Amongst Christians, we have seen the vibrant success of evangelical churches and social networks based around places of worship. The belonging to Catholicism, still the main religion present in France, does not appear as a factor facilitating integration [14]. French Catholics are generally old persons with conservative opinions, while African believers are young and open-minded. In Africa, people like music and create a joyful atmosphere during the masses. In France, they think the ambiance of the mass is sad and mournful.

So, they rarely pray with French believers in the same church.

#### **7.4 Location and way of life**

Despite the changes that they have been concerned with over the last decade, the immigrant population of Sub-Saharan Africa remains massively centered around the Paris region at a rate of 65.4%, (percentage of the whole immigrant population in this region: 39.6%). Their presence in other regions is low: 4.88% in PACA (Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur), 4.31% in Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes, and 3.69% in Haute Normandie. The vast majority of African immigrants live in urban areas, and 160 118, 58% of the total, live in Greater Paris, that is to say, inner Paris itself and the three surrounding urban departments making up the "little crown": Hautsde-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, and Val-de-Marne. On a national level, the proportion of people living in suburbs is greater than that living in city centers (56.96% over 43.04%). The strong representation of African immigrants in city centers is not synonymous with affluence though. They often occupy the most run-down buildings that still exist in city centers, in particular in Paris. Because of their high numbers in heavily urbanized areas, African immigrants live in communal buildings in very large numbers. Households living in makeshift abodes are now a rarity. However, many are still badly housed: 4 085 households, 3.46% of the total, live in places with no mod cons, and 1.29% of homes have a very low standard of conveniences. All the national groups are affected by these problems at a fairly similar level. The percentage of owned properties is very low: 10.13% (31.88% overall for immigrant homes). There is a different distribution of owned properties according to country of origin. Mauritians, Malagasies, and Cameroonians are much more often owners of their own property than Malians and ex-Zaireans. The majority of tenants are in the private sector (55.93%). This varies according to the country of origin. Malians, Senegalese, and Congolese are more likely to live in HLMs (council blocks) than in privately rented properties. For all other national groups, it is the other way around.

In general, Sub-Saharan African immigrants live in conditions below the average for immigrant homes.

#### **7.5 Education and employment**

Families of African immigrants have more children than the average for the wider immigrant population. They stand out for their high instances of single-parent families: 11% over 7.5% of all immigrant homes, and 6.6% for all homes in France. According to the 2019 census, 30% of the Sub-Saharan households are headed by a single parent, a woman generally. Polygamous homes are most common amongst the population of Mali and Senegal. Since the passing of laws on family regrouping in 1993, it is forbidden for heads of polygamous families to live in France with more than one of their wives. In reality, polygamy persists, but the number of polygamous homes is difficult to evaluate.

According to the last census, Sub-Saharan Africans are employed mostly as nonqualified workers, particularly service personnel. They fall slightly below the average amongst manual workers, and well below average amongst shopkeepers/business owners. We see slightly below average proportions amongst the higher, intellectual professions, and average proportions in the intermediate professions. This suggests a relatively higher level of education. However, the levels of unemployment amongst Sub-Saharan Africans is in the order of 20%, below average for the total immigrant population, but higher than the average for most non-European groups [13].

#### **7.6 Asylum seekers and forced migration**

Actually, 39271 persons coming from Africa are considered in France as political refugees and 2665 enjoy humanitarian protection. The African refugees represent 26% of all the refugees living in France today. The most numerous come from the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaïre). They are 10673. The flows have been almost permanent since the end of the eighties until today. The Mauritanians are 4325. They came above all after the ethnic conflicts between Arabic and black people. Refugees from Angola (2968) came during the long civil war, which took place in this country from 1975 to 2002. Today, their country is considered secure and they obtain more rarely the status of refugee (OFPRA, report 20019). The number of demands is nowadays still high. According to the last report of OFPRA, in 2021, 40656 demands for protection concerning people from Sub-Saharan Africa have been registered. It represents 45,5% of all the demands [15]. The asylum seekers from Africa come mainly from the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, and Eritrea. The reasons for their demands are more linked to societal problems than to political prosecutions. They mention the fear of sexual mutilations of young girls, forced weddings, prosecutions against homosexuals, and witchcraft. So, they are few to obtain the status of refugee. In 2021, around 2000 persons obtain subsidiary protection, giving them the possibility to stay legally in France for one year. It means OFPRA considers they risk prosecution if they are expelled from their country of origin. Among them, we find 292 boys and girls under 18 who entered France without being accompanied by adults. They can stay in France until to be of age. The asylum seekers are an important part of the fluxes arrived in France since the beginning of the 1990s. Few of them obtained the status of refugee but many could finally regularize their administrative situation and avoid being expelled. In spite of the importance of illegal situations, Sub-Saharan migrants are more and more numerous to be settled in France for a long time. A new generation is nowadays present and a process of taking root is at work. The question of identity is relatively complex. The first generation of migrants is still linked to their countries of origin. They have a deep feeling of belonging to their ethnic group or their nation. Things are different with the young generations. They are not particularly interested in Africa. They consider they are French with an African ascent. So, they are much more sensitive than their parents to the discrimination. However, they do not claim a "black identity." They want to have a good place in French society by fighting discrimination and racism if necessary, but they do not want to become a specific group, such as the Afro-American people, in the United States. Some little groups of intellectuals develop an ideology funded by a radical separation between Black and Withes. This thesis is much discussed and has few influences on Sub-Saharan migrants and their children and grandchildren [16]. These ones look for social success in France above all. The policy of integration made by the different governments tried to promote some models of success among black Africans, such as the actor Omar Sy or the academic Pap Ndiaye, appointed Minister of education in 2022.

#### **8. Conclusion**

In spite of the links created in the past between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe by colonialism, the number of migrants coming from this area is a long time remained unimportant. It did not mean the Black African people were a fixed population. On the contrary, migrations were particularly important in this area from antiquity to the beginning of the twentieth century. The migrations in Europe really begin during the 1990s and continue to go on until today, leading to the building of an important diaspora. This is the result of the migratory fluxes of the three last decades. In the case of France, the migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa were around 100 000 persons in the 1970s, mainly single men and unskilled workers. According to the census of 2019, they are more than a million, with an important part of women and children, asylum seekers, refugees, students, skilled workers, and so on. In the future, migrations from Sub-Saharan Africa will probably continue to grow. However, the cost of migration will remain very high and those who will be able to arrive in France will be probably people more rich and educated than the migrants of the preceding decades. That will give them more possibilities for integration but they will also demand much more. Will the traditional French model of progressive assimilation remain still efficient?

#### **Author details**

Jacques Barou C.N.R.S Center national de la recherche scientifique, France

\*Address all correspondence to: jacques.barou@iepg.fr

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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[5] Barou J. In the aftermath of colonisation: Black Africans in France. In: Buecheler H, Buechler JM, editors. Migrants in Europe: The Role of Family, Labour and Politics. West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press; 1987. pp. 77-90

[6] EUROSTAT. International Migrations and Citizenship, Data Base. European Commission; 2020

[7] International Organisation of Migrations (Iom). Mapping exercise. 2006

[8] T.V 5 Monde. Marché aux esclaves en Libye. 2017

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[10] Barou J. Chapitre II: Les immigrations Africaines. In: David Assouline et Mehdi Lallaoui, editor. Un siècle d'immigration en France, Troisième période: 1945 à nos jours, du chantier à la citoyenneté. Paris: Syros; 1997. pp. 31-46

[11] Quiminal C. Gens d'ici, gens d'ailleurs. Paris: Bourgois; 1990

[12] INSEE. Les immigrés en France. Paris: INSEE Références; 2005

[13] INSEE, 2020, Les immigrés au recensement de. 2019

[14] Aubourg V, Barou J, Campergue C. Migrants catholiques en France: ancrages sociaux et religieux. Grenoble: P.U.G; 2022

[15] Office français pour les réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA). Rapport d'activité 2021. 2022

[16] Barou J. De l'Afrique à la France. D'une génération à l'autre. Paris: Armand Colin; 2011

#### **Chapter 7**

## The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia

*Abel Yonas Zekarias*

#### **Abstract**

International migration of Ethiopia is as old as the country itself. However, it only gained momentum in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The forceful overthrow of the long-lasting monarch in 1974 by a socialist military junta led to the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians in the late 1970s and 1980s, mainly to neighboring countries. The emigration during the post-socialist regimes is dominated by economic emigrants due to political stability, a rise in the volume of the labor force, and declining livelihood opportunities in the country. The recent shift from refugee-led to economic emigration shows its momentum to create new emigration destinations in Africa, such as South Africa and Middle East countries, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. Unlike international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and at the global level, the emigration of Ethiopia is dominated by women migrants. Women outnumber international migrants originating from Ethiopia in the Middle East, North America, and Europe. Ethiopian international migration is characterized by irregular migration to several destinations via eastern, southern, and northern migration routes. On the other hand, immigration in Ethiopia is dominated by refugees from neighboring countries which makes the country one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in Africa. Gambella, Somali, and Tigray are the regions that host three fourth of refugees living in Ethiopia.

**Keywords:** emigrants, immigrants, migration route, refugees, women migrants

#### **1. Introduction**

The international migratory flow from and to Ethiopia is not a new phenomenon. Both have gained momentum only in the recent five decades. Notably, large-scale international emigration from Ethiopia has tended to occur during periods of political repression and changes of government. The 1974 Ethiopian political revolution can be considered as defining event in the international migration of Ethiopia. This is mainly because it forced at least hundreds of thousands to flee the country and triggered continuous political instability in the country that brought a more repressive socialist military government to power which further forced millions to flee the country. The 1990s has slightly changed the drivers of international migration of Ethiopia from dominant refugee driven to economic ones because of relative stability in the country and faster growth of the labor force.

The immigration of Ethiopia could be dated back to the Sabaean (ancient people of South Arabia) migration and their settlement between the fourth and fifth century BC into the earliest kingdom of Damon latter Axumite kingdom (present-day Northern Ethiopia). It was one of the considerable migrations into the Ethiopian empire [1]. Following this unprecedented immigration, the migration of Israeli to Ethiopia also dates back more than 2000 years, following the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BC [2]. And immigration of Muhammad's first followers (the *Sahabah*) in the seventh century from Mecca, present-day Saudi Arabia [3], and the immigration of Portuguese missionaries, lay Christians, and military personnel in the seventeenth century [4] are the earliest migrations into Ethiopia. Nevertheless, recent international migration in the context of Ethiopia is dominated by its regional migration flows within the African continent and the Middle East. At the same time, international migration beyond the regional destination is reaching its climax in recent years. In this chapter, I elaborate on the recent international migration trends of Ethiopia by discussing emigration from Ethiopia, its migration routes and main destinations, and immigration and the sources of immigrants living in Ethiopia.

#### **2. Recent emigration of Ethiopian migrants**

The 1974 Ethiopian revolution resulted in the downfall of the long-lasting Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974) 1974 [5]. The trend of emigration before the downfall of Emperor Haile Selassie was insignificant in the volume of emigrants. For instance, according to [6] only 35 Ethiopians went to live in the west between 1876 and 1922. Between 1922 and 1935, 144 individuals were sent by the imperial regime to study abroad in western world universities with the mission of modernization of administration [7, 8]. Between 1941 and 1974, the volume of emigration had a slight gain, and an estimated 20,000 Ethiopians of an estimated population of 22 million left to complete their higher educations and fulfill diplomatic missions [6]. Interestingly, the rate of return of Western-educated migrants during this period was high, often because these returnees came back to fill important government positions. Comparatively, the number of refugees and asylum seekers was negligible, as the country was generally stable despite the emperor's political repression and limited freedom [9]. However, pre-1974 emigration was not only limited to western countries rather, but it had also been directed towards neighboring African countries such as Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, and Middle Eastern countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia as the main destinations in the 1960s and 1970s [10]. However, the exact number of emigrants during the imperial regime is beyond known figures due to the higher informal emigration. The patterns of emigration of Ethiopia in the 1960 and 1970s show that slightly 50% of Ethiopian emigrants' destinations were within the African continents. The main drivers of pre-1974 revolution emigrations are either economic and cultural factors or state-sponsored educational factors. The economic factors could include centuries-old trade, commerce, and cultural as well as religious relations with countries in the horn of Africa and the Middle East dominated by temporary emigration. On the other hand, state-sponsored educational emigrations targeted modernizing the country by sending young scholars who would serve the country upon the completion of their studies. The main destination for such emigrations were the United States and other developed western countries.

In 17 years of rules of the socialist military junta, the emigration of Ethiopians reached the registered peak in modern history. During this period, 1974–1991, 1 in

#### *The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108056*

20 Ethiopians left the country because of political turmoil and wide-scale drought [11]. The two prominent events that resulted in mass emigration during this period were the Ethio-Somalia war (1977–1978) and the 1984 drought. The Ethio-Somali war (1977–1978) alone resulted in 2.5 million of Ethiopia's 30 million citizens fleeing the country, mainly to neighboring Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. By the summer of 1980, nearly 750,000 migrated to Somalia [6]. The 1984 drought, and subsequent famine, displaced many hundreds of thousands within Ethiopia and sent many others into neighboring countries. As a result of the drought, an estimated 100,000 individuals migrated to Somalia as refugees, 10,000 to Djibouti, and more than 300,000 to Sudan as refugees [12]. Between the 1970s and 1980s, the conflicts and droughts in Ethiopia made the country the largest refugee sender in the horn of Africa. For instance, the Ethiopian refugees living in other Horn of Africa countries were 89.2% in 1977 and 83.5% in 1987 of the refugees residing in these regions. In early 1972 and 1982, more than 99% of refugees in the Horn of African region originated from Ethiopia [13]. However, the emigration during this period was not only taken place because of conflicts and drought. Other factors, such as the American passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, which was the first formal policy the United States adopted toward African refugees, increased the number of Ethiopians emigration to the United States. About 25,000–40,000 Ethiopians left for the United States early in the 1980s that making Ethiopian immigrants in the United States the largest voluntary African immigration group after the slave trade [14]. At the end of the socialist military regime in 1991, the number of Ethiopian migrants to the United States rose by an estimated 50,000–75,000 [15]. Another voluntary emigration that took place during this period was the emigration of Ethiopian Jewish decedents to the Israeli state. For instance, about 55,000 Ethiopian Jews, locally known as (Beta Israel) were airlifted to Israel in 1984 and 1991 [11]. During these periods, the destination of Ethiopian migrants was dominated by neighboring African countries, the Middle East, and the United States.

The downfall of the socialist military regime in 1991 resulted in two important events in the last decade of the last century in Ethiopian international migration. First, the return of more than 970,000 Ethiopian refugees who fled to nearby countries under the socialist dictatorship. And secondly, continuous outmigration due to political repression, ethnic violence, and the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998–2000) [16]. Emigration in the 2000s and 2010s shows a shift from refugee-driven migration of the 1980s to different forms of labor migration, mainly due to the relative political stability and growing demands to change in livelihood situations [4]. Post-1990 resulted in an influx of both skilled and unskilled migrants to different destinations [16].

#### **3. Destinations of Ethiopian emigrants**

Although some sources estimate Ethiopian emigrants to be about three million, the latest reports of the UN Population Division estimate only one million. The primary destinations for Ethiopian emigrants are countries in North America, the Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Europe. From North American emigration, the United States remains the biggest historic destination for Ethiopian emigrants for the last five decades. The bulk of voluntary emigrants to the United States came after 1974, when a repressive regime toppled the ancient monarchy and took control of the Ethiopian government. Many refugees initially fled to settlement camps in neighboring Sudan before moving on to the United States [17]. The American passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, which was the first formal policy the United States adopted toward African refugees, increased the number of Ethiopians emigration to the United States; for instance, according to [18], in 1991, an estimated 50,000–75,000 Ethiopians migrated to the United States (see to **Figure 1** for details). The emigration of Ethiopians to the United States has grown rapidly in the last 40 years. It has grown from only 10,000 in the 1980s to over 251,000 by the 2010s [19].

Most Ethiopian migrants (about 60%) living in the United States arrived during or after 2000. By comparison, 36% of the overall United States foreign-born population arrived during this period. Most of the Ethiopian immigrants in the United States are productive young generations, i.e., 86% of first-generation Ethiopian immigrants were of working age (18–64), and 11% were under the age of 18. Although Ethiopianborn immigrants in the United States are the second biggest immigrant group from the Sub-Saharan Africa region, it only accounts for 0.5% of the total United States foreign-born population [19, 20]. The Washington region is home to the largest concentration of Ethiopians outside of Africa [21]. Other large communities are in Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Seattle, and Atlanta. In the context of migration to the United States, most Ethiopian immigrants come to the United States for educational purposes as part of the African country's immigration policy, the Diversity Visa Lottery—an immigration agreement with countries that have low immigration rates to the United States. The female population of Ethiopian immigrants in the United States has grown substantially since the 1990s, with the female population at 49.5% by 2007, only slightly outnumbered by the male population at 50.5% [18].

Canada is the second largest destination for Ethiopian emigrants in North America, next to the United States. However, the volume of Ethiopian immigrants in Canada is much smaller than in the United States, even though immigration in both countries has demonstrated the highest picks since the 1980s due to the political

#### **Figure 1.**

*Ethiopian emigration to the United States increased from 1930 to 2008. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008.*

*The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108056*

revolution and instability in Ethiopia since 1974. The 2016 census of Canada indicates that about 44,065 Ethiopian immigrants live in Canada. The 1976 Canadian *Immigration Act*, which recognizes Canada's international obligation to refugees, the displaced, and the persecuted, has played a key role in the high number of Ethiopian immigrants in the country [22]. The same source indicates that the largest group of Ethiopians in Canada is that of Toronto. As of 2016, approximately 15,990 people of Ethiopian descent live in Toronto, followed by Calgary (6355 immigrants), Edmonton (5210 immigrants), and Ottawa (2850 immigrants) in the same period. Census data of Canada also indicates that the volume of Ethiopian women immigrants outnumbers males in Canada.

Migration to European countries is not significant compared to destinations in North America, the Middle East, or the African continent. For example, according to [23], in 2016, about 15% of all Ethiopian emigrants (753,492) left for Europe and roughly one-third to Northern America, particularly the United States. According to [24], the top three destinations of Ethiopian migrants in the EU in 2016 were Sweden (17,944), Germany (18,425), and Italy (7772). According to [25], as of 2020, about 20,465 Ethiopian-born immigrants are living in Germany, which was only 10,980 seven years back in 2013 (see **Figure 2** for details). The 2020 report of the German statistical office shows that more slightly 75% of total Ethiopian immigrants living




#### **Figure 3.** *Ethiopian immigrants in Italy.*

in Germany are aged between 15 and 65 years [25]. Male immigrants have slightly started to dominate females since 2015 though women were larger in volume from 2007 to 2014 [26].

Ethiopian immigrants in Italy are slightly less than immigrants living in Germany. However, when comparing the share of female migrants to male migrants, Italy attracted more female migrants than Germany. Rome, Milano, and Parma are the Italian cities with the highest number of Ethiopian residents. But the size of Ethiopian immigrants living in Rome greatly outnumbers the size of immigrants in Milano and Parma combined. Nearly 30% of the Ethiopians residing in Italy live in Rome (**Figure 3**) [27].

Another top destination for Ethiopian migrants in Europe is Sweden. In 2016 about 17,944 Ethiopian migrants reached Sweden, and the average share of women immigrants was approximately 49% between (2006 and 2016) (**Figure 4**).

The Middle East, particularly oil-reach gulf countries and Israel, are growing and very significant destinations for Ethiopian migrants. The emigration to Israel can be understood as a special one as it has been widely sponsored by the state of Israel with the aim of taking Ethiopian Jews to the state of Israel since the establishment of the country in 1948. Since the state formation of Israel in 1948, the Israeli state-sponsored emigration of the Ethiopian Jew community, who are usually known as 'Beta Israel,' the descendant of Jews who immigrated and lived in ancient Ethiopia. between 1948 and 2017, about 92,199 Ethiopian Jews emigrated mainly by Israeli Government sponsorship (see **Figure 5**) [28]. However, these figures only capture formally registered migrants. Emigrations to the state of Israel are also known for unofficial arrivals through migration assisted by human traffickers via northern migration roots, particularly via the Sinai route.

*The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108056*


#### **Figure 4.**

*Ethiopian immigrants in Sweden.*


#### **Figure 5.**

*State-sponsored emigration from Ethiopia to Israel since 1948.*

The Ethiopian Jews community's emigration to the state of Israel continued, which increased the volume of Ethiopian immigrants in the country. The data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statics (CBS) indicate that at the end of 2020, the immigrants of Ethiopian origin in Israel numbered 159,500 residents. Of which approximately 88,500 were born in Ethiopia, and the remaining 71,000 were children of immigrants born in Israel whose fathers were born in Ethiopia. This number also includes 1080 immigrants who arrived in Israel from Ethiopia in 2020 [29]. The official data from the CBS also shows that approximately 63% of the population of Ethiopian origin lives in two major districts: about 38% live in the Central District, and roughly 25% live in the Southern District. At the end of 2020, the urban locality with the highest number of residents of Ethiopian origin was Netanya (approximately 12,200 persons). However, the highest percentage of residents of Ethiopian origin out of the total population in a locality was found in Qiryat Mal'akhi (15.8%).

Emigration to Middle East countries from Ethiopia is the largest by volume and has shown unprecedented growth in the last two decades. The region attracts low-skilled migrants and dominantly domestic female workers from Ethiopia. The primary motive behind migration is to move out of poverty and to improve family living standards through remittances. Migration to Arab countries has intensified due to social networks, the expansion of illegal agencies, and the cheaper (compared to other destinations such as Europe) migration costs [30]. The geographic proximity of the region has also contributed to the higher volume of the Ethio-Middle East migration corridor. Yemen is the country that serves as a transit for emigrants from Ethiopia and neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. As Yemen is economically a poor country, it attracts fewer migrants, but it is very crucial to channel migration from Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. For instance, about 334,000 migrants arrived in Yemen from Ethiopia between 2006 and 2013 [31]. The recent data from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals that more than 750,000 Ethiopians are living in Saudi Arabia, of which more than half (450,000) is without proper documents [32]. Nevertheless, migration to the Middle East encounters recurrent mass deportation of undocumented migrants by Saudi authorities. For instance, in 2013/14, more than 165,000 Ethiopians were deported over the course of only 4 months [33]. Similarly, in 2021, IOM registered 79,498 Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia, more than double the number of returns recorded in 2020 (36,632). The same source shows that over 425,000 migrants were returned to Ethiopia between May 2017 and December 2021 [34].

South Africa is among the top destinations for Ethiopian migrants on the African continent. The migration to South Africa from Ethiopia is attached to strong ethnic networks. While Ethiopia has more than 80 diversified ethnic groups, migration to South Africa is highly dominated by Kembata and Hadiya ethnic groups. This has made the Ethiopian–South African migration corridor dominated by these two ethnic groups, which only constitute 2.4 million of the more than 100 million Ethiopian population [35]. The idea of chain migration being started by a single event in 2000 has expanded and continued over a massive scale in the past two decades. Emigration to South Africa from these areas started with a single event when the Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa, originally from areas of these ethnic groups, formally took laborers from these areas to South Africa, which later triggered continuous emigration [36]. Of the estimated 120,000 Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa, more than 90% of Ethiopian arrivals in South Africa are irregular migrants, officially known as undocumented migrants. Irregular migration to South Africa involves crossing several African countries and entails high risks, including physical

and emotional stress, being imprisoned, deportation, and death [35]. Such irregular migration to South Africa is undertaken by the chain of smugglers stretched from source areas to the destination [36, 37].

Emigration from Ethiopia to neighboring countries such as Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia remains flexible due to instability in the region. It rises when man-made or natural disaster occurs in the region. The political instability and its associated armed conflicts change the volume and destination of emigrants who mainly seek refuge in neighboring countries. For instance, the armed conflict in northern Ethiopia from the end of November 2020 to May 2022 triggered the emigration of more than 73,000 individuals, mainly from conflict-affected areas of northern Ethiopia to Sudan [38].

However, the exact figure of emigrants originating from Ethiopia is unknown and expected to be more than official figures. This often results in conflicting figures on the volume of migrants originating from Ethiopia. This is mainly because of poor documentation of nationals leaving the country, the existence of large informal emigrational and cross-border mobilities, and the difficulty of documentation of Ethiopian emigrants at destinations due to "illegal" entries. Some authors estimate current Ethiopian emigrants are more than three million, which is more than double the official figures of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) [39]. Similar to the official figures for total emigration figures, there is also a huge difference in particular migration corridors. For instance, in 2020, UNDESA figures show only 44,000 Ethiopian emigrants in South Africa, while other studies such as [35] estimate about 120 thousand emigrants of Ethiopia in South Africa, which is almost 5 times greater than the official estimates of UNDESA figures. Some authors, for instance, [40] estimate that as much as 60–70% of labor migration from Ethiopia is irregular.

#### **4. Nature of Ethiopian emigration**

According to [41], the number of Ethiopian international migrants reached 1.3 million, which constitutes more than 1.1% of the total population of the country in 2019. This share of international migration of the native population was lower than the share of Sub-Saharan Africa international migrants to the population of the region, which was 2.2%, and the share of international migrants to the world population (3.5%) in 2019 [41, 42]. The Data of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UNDESA) indicate that nearly half, about 49.1% of Ethiopian emigrants were women migrants, which is greater than the women migrant share in Sub-Saharan Africa (47.5%) and women migrant at international level (47.9%) in 2019. Some Sources show that earlier out-migration of Ethiopia was dominated by males. For instance, according to the 1992 Office of Refugee Resettlement data, most Ethiopians that were admitted to the United States were males (62%). The primary reason males far outnumber females pertains to the patriarchal social structure that exists in many African countries [18]. However, in the recent trend in Ethiopian emigration, women emigrants have dominated in some destinations due to gender-sensitive labor opportunities. The feminization of migration is also highly evident in Ethiopia, as 60% of total migrants are female. Migration to the Middle East is most significantly a female phenomenon and is motivated by gender-specific domestic work opportunities in the region [41].

Some authors, for example, [43] argue that existing migration frameworks often fail to capture the nature of migration in today's world, particularly precarious forms of migration where migrants knowingly subject themselves to great risk in pursuit of a better future. Women's out-migration in Ethiopia is strongly related to this notion as many women risk themselves to various inhuman cases of abuse on their migration journey, mainly to the Middle East, hoping to change their inferior livelihood at home. The Ethiopian women migration is highly dominated by domestic work in Arab countries. This migration to Arab countries has intensified due to social networks, the expansion of illegal agencies, and the relative fall in migration costs. This movement, according to [44], is also the result of a shift in demand away from Asian domestic workers who tend to seek higher wages to cheap labor sources in countries such as Ethiopia. Some reports like [45] estimate that roughly 1000 Ethiopian women were leaving the country each day to seek domestic work abroad in 2013. In addition to the economic factors, illegal smugglers also play a key role in motivating women to emigrate to Arab countries with deceptive promises. A study by [46] on Ethiopian returnees from Arab counties found that about 60% of women migrants indicated that they had used smugglers once they departed for their migration. The same study found that the business of smuggling Ethiopian women along the Eastern Route from Ethiopia to Yemen was worth more than USD 15 million in 2019.

According to figures from Ethiopia's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), in 2012, around 200,000 Ethiopian women migrated to the Middle East seeking employment in the domestic work industry using regular routes. The number of women migrating using irregular routes is estimated to double that figure. The top destination countries in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Lebanon, and, more recently, Sudan, which is usually used as a transit country [47]. Studies found that women migrants face different challenges than male ones during their precarious migration trips and their stay at their esteemed destination. For instance, in Arab countries, Ethiopian women migrants are reportedly being exploited at the hands of their employers. Passport confiscation and inadequate wage, physical, sexual, various forms of racialized, gendered, and economic exploitation, as well as emotional abuse, are common challenges faced by Ethiopian migrants in the region [45, 48].

The rise in female emigration occurs mainly because of the rise in domestic job opportunities in Middle Eastern countries, which is the largest destination for Ethiopian emigrants. The Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs issued 21,256 employment contracts for Ethiopians to work in the Middle East from July 2008 to July 2009 [49]. Eighty-two percent of these work permits were for females. The primary countries for the work permits were Saudi Arabia (61.9%), Kuwait (33.16%), and Bahrain (3.22%). In an attempt to regularize irregular or undocumented migration flows to the Middle East, employment agencies involved officially require a license issued by the MOLSA to provide employment contracts. However, most of the migration to the Middle East remains dominantly irregular. The UNDP estimates that up to half a million females migrate from Ethiopia to the Middle East each year [50]. Like the Middle East, the number of female Ethiopian emigrants dominates their male counterparts in main destinations in the European Union [27].

#### **5. Migration routes and Ethiopians emigrants**

Migration routes are a crucial factor that determines trends of Ethiopian migration as much of the migration takes place in an irregular manner. Migration routes in the context of Ethiopian emigrants relate to the destinations of the migrants. Emigration,

apart from formal means, mostly takes place on three active migration routes. These include the eastern route, southern route, and northern route.

#### **5.1 Eastern route**

Migration from Ethiopia to the Middle East has been ongoing at a high rate since the early 1990s. This route is the busiest route for channeling large irregular or undocumented migrants who aim to reach Middle East countries. For instance, approximately 1.5 million Ethiopians traveled to the Middle East via irregular channels between the years 2008 and 2014 [16]. Despite the unknown figures on the scale of the migration flow in this route, the migration is dominated by women emigrants. [51] estimate that up to half a million women emigrate annually to this region. Djibouti and Yemen are the main transit countries in the eastern route for Ethiopians and horn of African emigrants that aim to reach oil-rich gulf countries. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and strict border restrictions, migration to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seems to continue from Ethiopia via this route [52].

#### **5.2 Northern route**

The Northern Route has two branches 'Central Mediterranean Route,' which is used by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa and other parts of Africa to get to Europe, crossing the Mediterranean Sea via Libya. There is also the Sinai route which is utilized by migrants aimed to reach Israel as their main destination via Egypt. In this migration route, migrants from Ethiopia and other countries from the Horn of Africa use the Sudan, Egypt, and Libya as transit countries [53]. Since 2012 the number of migrants using the Sinai Route route has significantly decreased, to the point of it being almost inoperative. This is the result of restrictive migration policies by both Egypt and Israel [16].

The northern migration route has received significant media and political attention, partly because of the harsh conditions in Libya, the dangers of crossing the Mediterranean, and restrictive policies in Europe. For instance, some 3500 Ethiopians irregularly submitted to Europe in 2015, mostly via this route [54].

#### **5.3 Southern route**

This migration route broadly connects the East and Horn of Africa to South Africa, with Kenya as one of the main transit countries. Other transit countries on the route include Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. The route is predominantly used by Ethiopian and Somali emigrants who wish to reach South Africa. For instance, by 2009 estimated 17,000–20,000 migrants, mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia, entered South Africa; more recent estimates show that it is now between 13,400 and 14,050 individuals annually [55].

#### **6. Recent immigration into Ethiopia**

Ethiopia is known for hosting immigrants for centuries from several foreign nations. Following the ancient time's immigration of Israeli Jew people in the sixth century BC and seventh century, early Islamic followers from Mecca, the percent day Saudi Arabia, the early modern time immigration of Portuguese lay people and missionary into the Ethiopian kingdom in the sixteenth century was prominent in immigration history of foreign nationals to Ethiopia. In the early modern ages, the negotiation for an alliance between Ethiopia and Portugal (1508–1526) resulted in the immigration of Portuguese missionaries and military personnel who later settled in different parts of the country [56]. The number of Portuguese immigrants was estimated between 1000 and 3000, which was a combination of Jesuit missionaries, lay Christians, and military personnel in the seventeenth century [4].

Another important migration history in Ethiopia that occurred in the modern period includes Somali migration into Ethiopia in the 1540s due to the occupation of parts of the Ethiopian Empire by Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi "the Conqueror" (the Imam and General of the Adal Sultanate1527–1543) [57]. End of the nineteenth century, many foreigners were already living in Ethiopia; for instance, in 1887, according to [58], out of 60,000 residents of Addis Ababa City, some 1905 were immigrants who came from different Asian and European countries, including 334 Greeks, 227 Arabs, 149 Indians, 146 Armenians, 63 French, 42 Italians, 20 Germans, 13 Hungarians, 15 Turks, 13 Swedes, 13 English, 11 Egyptians, 10 Syrians and Lebanese, 8 Afghanis, 7 Portuguese, 6 Russians and Bulgarians, 6 Cawkas, 5 Americans, 3 Australians, 2 Belgians and 1 Georgian. According to Ruiz [12], estimated 205,000 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia; and 15,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia. The latest report of UNHCR shows that Ethiopia shelters about 785,322 registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of 30 June 2021, which makes Ethiopia the third biggest refugee host country in Africa in the same period. The overwhelming majority originate from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan (see **Figure 6** for details, UNHCR, 2022).

The refugees and asylum seekers are mainly sheltered in 24 refugee camps established in five regional states. But there is a sizeable group of refugees and asylum seekers living out of camp, including over 50,000 people in the capital Addis Ababa. The refugees are concentered in UNHCR-managed refugee camps predominately located in regions like Gambella, Somali, and Tigray, which comprise more than three fourth of refugees living in Ethiopia. The rest of the refugees are dispersed in almost all regions of Ethiopia (see **Figure 7**) [60].

**Figure 6.** *Immigrants in Ethiopia. Source: [59].*

*The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108056*

**Figure 7.** *Refugees and Refugee-Hosting Regions in Ethiopia (number and percentage of the total, as of 30 March 2020). Source: UNHCR's "Operational Portal Ethiopia" at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/eth.*

Unlike the recent emigration of Ethiopians, which is based on escaping poverty and finding employment, immigration into Ethiopia is mostly undertaken in search of protection from political instability and conflicts in the region. The main cause for the immigration into Ethiopia from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea was the armed conflicts within and across the cross border of these countries. Ethiopia attracts low economic international migrants due to its low economic performance and its own political instability, which often triggers armed conflicts in the country. Nevertheless, it is assumed that economic immigrants live in the country despite the lack of data in this regard. Unlike refugees, economic migrants such as seasonal or temporary migrants across borders are under-studied in the context of Ethiopia. The strong ethnic and social bonds between communities living at borders such as Ethio-Kenya, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Sudan are very strong and believed to result in cross-border livelihood activities despite the existence of national borders. This could outnumber the formally registered refugee volume in Ethiopia, which makes Ethiopia one of the top immigration countries in the Horn and the African continent.

#### **7. Concluding remarks**

In this chapter, I elaborated on the emigration of Ethiopians in recent decades. I also highlighted historic emigration, and I focused on the emigration since the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, which has triggered waves of emigration. In the chapter, I indicated the United States and Canada as the main destinations for Ethiopian migrants in North America; Sweden, Germany, and Italy as the top three destinations in Europe; Israel and Saudi Arabia as major destinations in the Middle East; and Sudan, Kenya, and South Africa as the main destination of the African continent. I also showed that women emigrants outnumber males, opposing the international migration trends in the region and at the international level. In the chapter, I also discussed the main migration routes in which most irregular or undocumented emigration takes place. In the last section, I discussed immigration into Ethiopia. In this section, I showed that immigration into Ethiopia is refugee driven and dominated by refugees from neighboring countries.

### **Author details**

Abel Yonas Zekarias Sociology, Bielefeld University, Germany

\*Address all correspondence to: abel.zekarias@uni-bielefeld.de

© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

*The Nature and Patterns of International Migration of Ethiopia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.108056*

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#### **Chapter 8**

## Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria

*Molobe Ikenna Daniel, Odukoya Oluwakemi and Yesufu Victoria Oluwasola*

#### **Abstract**

Background: This study examined the context of drug use and trafficking in irregular migration among identified Nigerian-returned migrants from Libyan detention centers in the transit or destination along the Mediterranean irregular migratory route. Method: Population of study utilized sample size of 382 (238 males and 144 females). Participants' recruitment employed the use of snowballing and judgmental sampling. Data were collected with interviewer-administered questionnaire, and supplemented through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and case study. Result: The summary of the findings revealed that most participants were smuggled (97.9%) and trafficked (96.6%). Drug use in migration was 61.3% prevalent among the participants. Frustration and trauma were the leading cause of drug use among migrants. About 15.7% of the participants trafficked drugs on migration and 28% among those that trafficked drugs had experience of arrest for drug trafficking (in Libya). The study also discovered that some of the migrants who got into drug trafficking were to raise money for survival, while some were compelled into the business. Conclusion: Drug use and drug trafficking are prevalent in irregular migration. The findings of this study draw attention to evaluate interventions to reduce drug use and trafficking among irregular migrants.

**Keywords:** irregular migration, drug use, drug trafficking, Libya, Nigeria

#### **1. Introduction**

The increasing rate of unemployment, political instability and conflicts in Nigeria resulting to irregular migration of both young men and women has become a worrying concern. Unemployment rate in Nigeria increased to 18.80% in the third quarter of 2017 from 16.20% in the second quarter of 2017. Unemployment rate in Nigeria averaged 10.63% from 2006 until 2017 [1, 2]. Of concern is the linkage between the high unemployment rate of Nigerians between the ages of 18–30 and the high rate of poverty and social malaise presently affecting the nation.

Young men and women are misinformed for opportunity of getting better job outside the country. These young people end up in the wrong hands of organized recruiters who facilitate their business outside the country [3]. In Nigeria, irregular migrants heading north were overwhelmingly male and in the 20 to 30 year age bracket. Although the proportion of women is generally considerable (about 40% female/60% male), most were single, and some had completed secondary schooling, while about 12.5% were college graduates [3]. Faced with limited channels to migrate regularly, migrants and asylum seekers often embark on irregular and dangerous journeys, during which they often become extremely vulnerable [3, 4]. Some of these migrants are introduced into drug trafficking while most of them face hardship in transit or final destination [5–8].

Europe has become one of the major continents with high rate of irregular migrants from Nigeria [7, 8]. The reasons for which these migrants enter the European Union are various and complex: to flee conflict, political instability, violence and/or persecution; poverty; in search of study or work opportunities; or out of a desire to reunite with family members who are already in the European Union [3].

Based on the International Organization for Migration (IOM) report [3], over 1 million migrants entered Europe in 2015 through the Mediterranean Sea and the journey has been far from safe, and there are reports of worsening exploitation and abuse during migrant journeys, particularly in Libya which also informed this research to address return-migration from Libya. The demographics of migrant flows to Europe are also changing, with a greater representation of more vulnerable groups such as women and children [3].

Irregular migrants may be at risk for substance use for reasons including coping with traumatic experiences, pre-and post-migration stress, co-morbid mental health disorders, acculturation challenges, and social and economic inequality [9, 10].

In transnational migration, irregular migrants and drug trafficking organizations are contributing to a growing drug problem in the society. Irregular migrants including the returning immigrants can be introduced to drugs and drug use practices, and contributes to the creation of a drug use culture within these communities. The drug cartels have aggressively targeted these communities because of availability of money, existing drug use, a drug use culture, and the breakdown of traditional deterrents to substance abuse [6].

This study assessed the returned migrants from Edo and Delta states of Nigeria who have returned from Libya. and their irregular migration experiences, involvement in drug use and drug trafficking, and the prevalence of drug use and drug trafficking among this community.

#### **2. Study method**

#### **2.1 Description of the study population**

This study is a cross-sectional descriptive study which was conducted among identified returned migrants residing in Edo and Delta states of Nigeria. The study population is restricted and limited to returned migrants from Libya. Thus, Libyan returnees were the main subject and focus of the study, and these are returned migrants from Libyan detention centers and urban areas in the transit or destination along the Central Mediterranean irregular migratory route. The participants selected were those who returned from Libya to Nigeria between May 2017 and April 2018, and have had reunion with their families or undergone reintegration program.

#### **2.2 Sampling technique**

The research sampling technique adopted the use of judgemental sampling and snowball sampling method. The participants were recruited in Edo and Delta State where there are high populations of returned migrants according to International Organization for Migration (IOM) [11] report. The questionnaire was administered to 382 subjects derived from sample size estimation of this study.

#### **2.3 Data collection and procedure**

The study employed mixed method of quantitative and qualitative data collection. The participants were interviewed for quantitative data with a structured anonymous questionnaire designed by the author for collection of information which was administered directly by trained enumerators. Through non-probabilistic purposeful sampling, 10 volunteer returned migrants who have been involved in drug use/trafficking were interviewed and it was ensured that important elements were selected to participate in the interview. Attention was focused in selecting participants from diverse groups that represent the community, such as irregular migrants, smuggled migrants, and trafficked persons. Case study was conducted where the study examined 10 cases of selected irregular migrant victims (anonymous volunteers) who have diverse and deeper revealing stories and experiences as a person who uses drugs and is or was a drug trafficker/peddler. Snowball technique was employed in selection of the subjects (5 volunteers for drug trafficking and 5 volunteers for drug use). For this study, the definition of a case is "any migrant returnee who has been a victim of irregular migration with drug trafficking or drug use during their migration period". However, stories that were best fitted and relevant to the objectives of the study were selected for this report. Focus group discussions were conducted for selected identified returned migrants who are or have been victims of drug use and drug trafficking in irregular migration. A total of four focus group discussion sessions were conducted; two male sessions and two female sessions in the Edo and Delta states.

### **3. Study results**

#### **3.1 Socio-demographics of the study participants**

Male persons constitute the highest of the study participants representing 62.3%. In other words, most of the migrant participants in the study were males while 37.7% participants were female returned migrants. Educationally most of the participants (67.8%) had only secondary school level education. It is of interest to know that those with higher educational level account for 14.9% of the study population of which 5% were graduates. Marital status shows that most of the returned migrants (59.2%) were single while others were married (28%), separated (9.4%), divorced (2.1%) or widowed (1.3%). The average age of the returned migrants (participants) for this

survey is approximately 30 years with a standard deviation of 5.973 while the age group 26–30 years was the most dominant among the study population.

#### **4. Irregular migration context**

#### **4.1 Route of migration**

As the study revealed, the road was the main route of migration by all of the participants. Forty percent (40.1%) had already entered the Mediterranean Sea but were either stranded or caught on the sea and consequently could not cross to Europe or conclude their journey to their anticipated country of destination. None of the participants used air as a means in their travel.

#### **4.2 Participants anticipated country of destination**

In terms of the country to which the participants anticipated to migrate for a new living, this study revealed several countries in Europe and a few countries in North Africa. Italy was the most frequent with 36.9% among the participants followed by Libya (23.6%). Germany (18.1%) and France (11.3%) also recorded high response among the participants.

#### **4.3 Transit countries**

It was observed that Niger was a major route and transit country for illegal migration. All of the study participants passed through the Niger boarder and also had a stopover in Niger. The major stopover cities in Niger were Agadez and Zinder along the desert area. Other major transit country discovered in the study was Chad (35.1%). Libya (78%) was the major transit for those traveling to Europe.

*Citation from in-depth interview;*

*I traveled for the first time through Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali to Morocco and was caught in Morocco when I wanted to cross to Europe, and I came back and passed through Niger to Libya and was caught in Libya before I was brought back to Nigeria – female respondent.*

#### **4.4 Migration status of the study participants**

Most of the study participants (96.3%) did not possess legal travel documents while crossing the boarders illegally. Most were smuggled (97.9%) and trafficked (96.6%) into other countries during the migration: as the study participants revealed, most of those smuggled from one country to another were also trafficked at some point during their migration. Those smuggled were migrants for whom their network recruiters illegally facilitated their entry into another country, while those trafficked were exploited by traffickers for the purpose of force labor or commercial exploitation.

*Citation from in-depth interview;*

*I do not have the legal papers to travel, we were subjected to all kinds of hardship because we were not properly prepared for the travels because there was no document – male participant.*

*Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

#### **5. Migrants and drug use**

The study participants' views were assessed to know if they believe that irregular migrants can get involved in drug use during their migration. Most of the participants (370) (96.9%) had the belief that migration circumstances and settings can influence someone to use and abuse drugs. In other words, most of the returned migrants are of the opinion that drug use and abuse could be consequences emanated from conditions of irregular migration and irregular migrants can be at high risk of drugs or substance use. The study further revealed that 234 (61.3%) of the respondents have used drugs during their migration while 38.7% were not involved in any drug use on their migration. Drug use was predominant among migrants in the age group (26–30) accounting for 24.9% of the total study participants. Of the total 234 respondents (61.3%) who reported to have engaged in drug use during migration, about 35 (15%) of them were reported to have been engaged in drug use before leaving the shores of Nigeria. This indicates that a high percentage of the migrants used drugs during their migration.

In terms of educational level, the findings from the study showed that among the total 61.3% of the study participants that engaged in drug use, the majority of them (43%) had secondary education. Only 10% are reported to have primary education, while about 8% of them have tertiary education. The test of significance provides enough statistical evidence to conclude that the level of education is not significantly associated with drug use among participants. (χ<sup>2</sup> = 9.621, df = 4, p-value = 0.522).

Among the participants 234 (61.3%) that use drugs, 124 (52.99%) responded that they became problematic drug users or drug dependent. Only 38 of these 124 persons (30.64%) obtained help in Libya. 10.49% sought professional treatment/psychotherapy while 20.15% discussed their drug use problem with their friends. On further probe the respondents were of the view that addiction help or treatment seeking could not be easy for the irregular migrants and most were held hostage in the transit countries.

#### **5.1 Gender and drug use**

The study revealed that among male participants, more than three quarter (71%) of them are involved in drug use, while about 44% among female participants also engaged in drug use. The study further revealed that about 29% of female participants that engaged in drug use are single while their married counterparts accounted for just 6% among the total female participants. Another 9% is reported to be those separated/divorced from their spouses.

#### **5.2 Reasons for drug use in migration**

The participants when asked the reason for their drug use during migration, among the 234 respondents that have used drugs, most (49.5%) mentioned 'frustration' as the leading cause of their drug use followed by being 'stranded' which account for 28.5% response and 'trauma' accounting for 24.9% among the participants. Few of the respondents revealed that eagerness to continue the journey (9.4%), peer pressure (6.5%), no employment in the country of migration (3.7%), and introduction to drug business (3.4%) as the factors that led to their drug use. Some participants who shared their experiences stated that they use drugs to make them feel less hungry while some were compelled to use these drugs. Access to drugs was noted to also contribute to the

reason for the drug use among the participants. Complementary information from the focus group discussion revealed that these drugs are sold in the camp or prison in Libya. Examples of these drugs include marijuana, hashish, shisha and tramadol.

Case Study 1: We had a lot of family problems, my father was afflicted with sickness, I had nobody to help me, my mother gave birth to seven children, of whom I am the second. I did not go further with my education; I stopped in primary 6 against all odds and hardship. So owing to the dearth of help I took a decision. I sold my mother's big land so that I could use the proceeds from it to travel. I first traveled to Burkina Faso, but things did not work well for me in that country, so I came back home to meet my family, with nothing to show for my journey. The house my parents lived in collapsed, so we went to live with a family friend, during which we were subjected to all kinds of insults from them. So bad was it that even feeding became a problem. So I decided to migrate to Libya, and from there I embarked on another journey to Italy. It was on top of the Mediterranean Sea that they brought me back to Libya. I was even shot at in Libya by the Arab people, that is why you see me limping. I still feel the pain on my legs, but it is gradually healing. When I was repatriated from the Mediterranean Sea, I was put in prison for 4 months, people were dying, suffering in the prison, no good condition, no good water, nothing. Because of these challenges, they came to help me by bringing me back to Nigeria. In response to my use of drugs, I was not born into the world to start smoking or taking drugs, but it was because of the situation I saw my mother, she is currently blind. In Libya, I smoked different things, from Cigar, to hashish, to marijuana. I was mixing magi (marijuana) with cigar in Libya, to give me inspiration because of the hardship I had been through. I got into drugs because I was frustrated, no good condition, no money and I have children, no house of my own, and no good job. I sold all my things before I went to Libya. I sold my mother's land, and after everything, I have nothing to show for it. So because of too much thinking I take marijuana to cool off all the time. I came back to Nigeria on January 7th 2018, I still take hard drugs such as marijuana because I have no job. I am currently squatting with a friend, I sleep on their chair, despite that I still receive insults from him. My mother is living with one of my in-laws and he is the one paying for my children's school fees, so anytime I remember all these, I indulge more in drugs, but I cannot kill or steal from someone. I cannot allow the influence of the drugs to make me misbehave. Before I left for Libya, I smoked only cigarettes, but I started taking hard drugs when I got to Niger and Libya - [Case Study male participants].

Case Study 2: Right now as I talk to you, I still feel some pain in my chest because of the drugs and smoking and everything. I was frustrated in Nigeria, so I decided to travel to Germany for greener pasture. I began to take drugs from Agadez, these drugs included marijuana, hashish and codeine. After about 1 month and 2 weeks in Agadez, I was taken to Libya. When I got to Libya, I continued taking drugs because I was thinking about so many things in respect of my life, each time I took these drugs I forgot my problems for about 2 hours, but the thinking always returned after a while: I thought about not having money, because I do not want to live in poverty, that was why I decided to leave my country for Germany in search of money, so that I could set up a good business upon my return to Nigeria. Unfortunately, I could not get to Germany, rather I was kidnapped in Libya for 4 months before my family had to look for money and sent to me in Libya. Up till now, we have not been able to pay back that money. After I was released, I started hustling before I entered the Mediterranean Sea. After 14 hours on the Sea, no Italian or German Rescue Team came, but the

*Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

Libyan Rescue Team came and took us back to deportation camp; this happened in January 2015. In camp they were bringing drugs like codeine for us to take because of the cold. I became addicted to these drugs after my return to Nigeria, and I still go to buy them whenever I want. Sometimes when I take these drugs I do not get to know where I am, I may even sleep on the road. When I remember all these things, the time wasted, money spent, I become frustrated the more. I came back to Nigeria on February 1st 2018. I do not know who made the arrangement; whether IOM or Federal Government of Nigeria, all I know is that they picked my name in Port Harcourt. I entered Port Harcourt on February 1st and entered Edo on February 4th. I still use these drugs in Nigeria because I cannot do without them. I do not have the money to start up a new business; I am totally frustrated as I am talking to you now. In Nigeria, I take weed, codeine, tramadol. Nobody involved me into drug use, it's just the situation I found myself that made me use drugs. Since I started using these drugs, if I do not take tramadol 500 mg a day, I will not be able to sleep. – [Case Study male participants].

#### **5.3 Migration and illegal activities**

Analysis on illegal activities during migration shows that 129 (33.8%) of the participants among the 382 study population were involved in illegal activities during their journey or in the transit countries. Further probe revealed various illegal activities or crime engaged by the participants during migration. Among this, drug business accounts for 50.8% which is the highest in frequency among the illegal activities by the participants, prostitution (among women) and stealing account for 40.7 and 8.5% respectively. Other information gathered during the focus group discussion reaveled that some migrants were involved in kidnapping in cooperation with the Libyans and negotiating a ransom with the captives. Most illegal business actitivies were performed in Libya by the Nigerian migrants. While some engaged in these activities as a means of survival, some were forced into it through trafficking. A respondent said, "As a result of these drugs migrant are recalcitrant, hostile to people, they send us on a mission like to go and rob, but because of the influence of these drugs, we don't see going to rob or other kinds of criminal act as anything because we are on drugs" (*FGD, male participant*). Among the participants involved in illegal business activities or crime during migration, 22% of the participants' illegal businesses have a link to drug use. It should be noted that not all migrant returnees involved in drug business also use drugs as large number of them were forced into drug business and some only do this to raise money and have no interest in taking drugs. On further exploration, the participants talk about drugs being given to them by the traffickers before they embark on stealing or prostitution. But overall there can be no doubt that drug business led some into drug use while possessing the drugs.

Case Study 3: Actually, after finishing school for 4 years in the National Teacher's Institute, I could not get a good job, but I had to be patient with the one I had. I was being paid N5,000 (\$13) and there was nothing to show for it. I have younger ones, I am the second in a family of 8, my mother had just one boy and because I am their elder, I had to assist in the schooling of my younger ones. My father is a tailor, while my mother is a tomato seller. Since I was able to finish, they were hoping for me to assist them but that was not forthcoming, so I had to look for a way to make sure my family was stable, When I went to look for work they asked me to pay N200,000 (\$555) to fix me in a Government job, but I did not have such money so they asked

me to sleep with them, but I said to myself I rather travel out of the country than do that. That was how I left the country. I had an ECOWAS passport that was given to us to get out of Niger, the name on the passport wasn't ours, we had to bear the name on the passport, which was retrieved from us, so it was a false document. I traveled by road and sea. Actually my plan was to travel to Europe either Germany or Italy, but I was captured on the Blue Sea, we had not gotten to the main sea, the boat was leaking, we had no option on whether to continue or to go back because the boat was just floating and expanding, though nobody died. When we called the rescue team it was the Libyan team that came and I was taken to prison in Libya, because the place was not looking like a deportation camp. At night when the leaders were not there, the Libyan guards would ask us to follow them, of course we could not disobey, and over there they do not use protective materials such as condom, so they had sex with us unprotected. My drug use started when I got to Tripoli, because my connection man (migrant smuggler) whom I was living in his house handed me over to some people and he was no longer in control of me. When we got to Sabratha, a fight broke out. During the gun duel, they killed a Gambian man. I was lucky the bullet did not hit me. I escaped and ran to another ghetto, but I did not know it was a connection house (smuggler's camp). They refused to let me go, and said that I was going to be of great importance to them. I was beaten up until I did what they asked me to do. So I started working there as a prostitute. They put drugs even in the food they gave me. I took such drugs as Magi (marijuana), Hashish and Tramadol. I got addicted to these drugs, so that there were times when if I had not taken them, it would seem as though I was shivering, but I hid it from my parents when I came back to Nigeria. I do go to buy these drugs and once I take them, I will just take tom-tom (candy). I still use drugs after my reintegration in Nigeria. I have not been involved in a treatment program specifically related to my drug use. When my neighbors found out I was taking drugs, they began to make mockery of me, threatening to tell my parents and they looked at me like a prostitute because I came back from Libya, I had to relocate to stay with someone. I am just praying that I overcome my addiction problem, because as a woman I am not supposed to be taking drugs so that my children do not develop a bad impression about me when I get married. In addition, if the Government can give us something tangible to do, then we will not like to go back, but Nigeria is very frustrating. I feel like going back to Libya, that country is good, but it is Nigerians who spoilt it because of their selfish benefits. So I prefer going back because since I came back I have not been able to get a job. – [Case Study female participant].

#### **6. Migrants and drug trafficking**

The result of this analysis shows that larger percentage (93%) of the returned migrants that participated in the survey are aware that drug trafficking/peddling is illegal and a crime punishable under the law. Out of the total population of 382 that participated in the survey only 60 (15.7%) of the participants claimed that they trafficked drug during their migration (in Libya or other transit countries) and among them were 40 (10.5%) that also carry these drugs on their way through the journey. In further analysis, it was revealed that 6.3% of the total participants who are in the age group 26–30 years where the most involved in drug trafficking. However, least (1.0%) of the total participants in the age group (41–50 years) are reported to be involved in drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is prevalent among those with secondary

*Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

educational level (11%). Though, the test of significance provides enough statistical evidence to conclude that level of education is not significantly associated with drug trafficking among study participants (χ<sup>2</sup> = 2.149, df = 4, p-value = 0.684). Further probes looked into how the migrant trafficked this illegal product across boarder, the participants revealed that the majors ways of doing this is to boycott boarder check through alternative (secret) route or to hide it in a secret place in the migrant luggage, cloths, underwear or bread as many of the participants also claim that they kept this in their body by swallowing the drug while others said they settle for bribing the officer.

#### *Citation from in-depth interview;*

*Someone that took me from Nigeria to Agadez, the drug he was carrying was too much for him, so he asked me to help him, the drug was wrapped and he asked me to swallow it, which I did, we traveled with it along the way. Until we got to Libya, from time to time if I want to defecate, he will follow me to the toilet and the wrapped drug will come out with my excreta, which he will wash and I will swallow it again, it actually gave me problems in my body system until we got to Libya, I gave the drugs back to him, he did not even compensate me. After spending some weeks with him, he handed me to someone else to continue my journey because he is not traveling to Europe, he only sells drugs in Libya male participant.*

#### **6.1 Gender and drug trafficking**

The result shows that among female participants, 4% of them are reported to be involved in drug trafficking, while 23% among their male counterparts are reported to be involved in drug trafficking. The analysis of percentage of female in drug trafficking by marital status revealed that about 1% of total married female participants engaged in drug trafficking. Findings also revealed that not less than 4% of the total female participants that engaged in drug trafficking are separated with their spouses.

Case study 4: In the year 2015, I met a friend who introduced me into drugs, so I started selling Indian hemp and I saw huge profit from the sale of the Indian hemp here in Benin, Nigeria. From there I gathered money to travel to Europe. When I got to Libya, I did not have any more money, I was stranded, so I started selling drugs again through my friend with whom I traveled. But I was caught and deported back to Nigeria. When I came back to Nigeria, I did not quit the business, but I was arrested last month and I had to bail myself. Up till now, I still sell drugs and I also use the drugs. I am looking for a way to do another business that will make me stop the drug business, because I know that drug business is dangerous, I do not know how I can get help to quit selling drugs. I sell Indian hemp, Rophynol, Tramadol and codeine. In Libya, I took these drugs to different ghettos, different camps, and they readily bought them. I stayed in Libya for 1 year and 8 months, before the Government of Nigeria brought me back in February 2018. In Nigeria, whenever they need the drug, they call me on phone and I deliver the drugs for them or they come to my house. My friend who introduced me to drugs traveled to Ghana 3 months ago. Since I came back to Nigeria, I do not know what to do, so I started drug business again, because there are no jobs yet I have to survive.- [Case study male participants].

Case study 5: First of all, my journey to Libya was a case of a friend who introduced me into the idea. While I was in Nigeria he told me his friends went through that route and they succeeded in getting to Europe. I am a father of three children, but I lost one of my sons when I embarked on my journey because of hardship and no job. In

Nigeria, I was trying to get an education and during my National Diploma in 2007 my father died, so I intended to raise money for my education, but that proved abortive, so I could not further my education. So, when my friend came up with the idea of going to Europe, I embraced it, not knowing the risk that was involved. Eventually, I embarked on the journey. When I got to Niger, we were told that a vehicle was coming to take us to Agadez. When I got to Agadez, which took about 2 days, because sometimes we would be in the bush for hours and days. After about 1 week in Agadez, some persons were talking about drugs, so I asked what it was about and they told me it was expensive in Libya when sold. Though I was not interested, but in the desert they told us to get hold of the drugs, and that while the traffickers would be suspected, there would be no security checks for we the passengers. We were told that if we do not do it, we would be left in the desert to die. I had to embrace it because I was not okay financially, so I told myself that if I get involved in the drug business I would be able to raise money to continue my journey, also because of my family that I left at home, at least to put a smile on their faces, give my children a good education and take care of my wife. In the place I found myself in Libya, if you do not sell drugs for the man, you will be in trouble. When I was in the desert, they gave me tramadol and amphetamine to hold inside my bag, and when I got to Libya, I was kept in an uncompleted building for 2 days, no food, and was told that somebody was coming to carry me and collect those drugs from me, without knowing the penalty. When the person came, he was an Arab man, he came with someone who speaks English, so I gave the drugs to him, he told me I would be staying with him for some time until my burger (migrant smuggler) representative comes to take me. I spent about 6 months with him, and nobody came. So, it became a routine, he would give me hashish, tramadol, ogogoro (local gin) to take to a particular spot where people would come and buy. I tried to learn the Arab language at the time so as to communicate well. Sometimes some hoodlums would come and create confusion in the place. On one occasion, I was caught, got terribly beaten and had my ribs dislocated. I still feel pains in my ribs because the injuries have not been properly treated. I trafficked drugs in Libya for about 9 months under duress because I had no money to take care for my needs like: feeding, sending money down to Nigeria, etc. I spent 1 year and 8 months in Libya. It was when my son died that my wife started crying, complaining that I should come back if I cannot get to Europe, but I said to myself if I went back what will I fall back on? I did not have anything. Some of my friends then told me about IOM, that they had a package to help migrants, but I ignored that and gathered some money and went for pushing to Europe, that is crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and this required the sum of about 170,000 Naira, which I paid. After the payment my burger abandoned me and refused to refund my money. I was one of the two people he was supposed to smuggle and the total sum we gave him was about 1.5 million Naira. I am still waiting for him to return my money. When I was pushed to cross the Mediterranean Sea, I spent about 11 hours on the sea before the Libyan Coast Guards came to arrest us as we were waiting for the European Rescue Team, because we were told that when we get into the Mediterranean Sea, the European Rescue Team would come, but we do not know why they did not come after spending 11 hours on the sea. The floater we were using was already weak, but thank God the Libyan Coast Guard came to our rescue and took us to prison. I was in the prison for 3 months and my illegal drug business was still going on. The guy for whom I was selling before I went to the Mediterranean Sea told me he was coming to bail me, but he did not come. So I was neglected, abandoned, until IOM came and asked us if we were willing to go back to our country. I have passed

#### *Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

through pain and hell. I lost my son and I lost the interest of going to Europe. I was missing my family so I had to come back, but here, even the money the government promised us since the 4th of May has not been given to us. It was even my wife who gave me transport this morning. I thank God she is a graduate and doing a menial job. One of my friends died as a result of no proper medical care. My wife and I quarrel everyday because I have no money to run the home. So I am begging the authority to come to my aid, if they do not want to give me the money they promised, they should hand it to my wife, because I do not want to go into any crime. I do not traffick drugs since my return but I take drugs. I can finish two or three packs of marijuana and alcohol in a day, though I know these drugs are harmful to my health but what will I do? I have no option. People died in my presence. - [Case study male participant].

#### **6.2 Reasons for migrants in drug business**

The reasons for being involved in illicit drug business during migration were mentioned by the participants in the study who were directly involved in drug business, the most reason stated was to raise money (33%) for their journey followed by compulsion or being forced into drug business (32%) as this was supported by information gotten from the focused group discussion in which many of the migrant claimed that their camp officers and human traffickers put them under threats and compulsion to the drug business. Other major reason for the participants' engagement in drug business was as a result of frustration (3%) and solely for survival i.e. to earn a living (15%). The other remaining participants (17%) involved in the drug business did not give any tangible reasons for their involvement in drug business.

*Citation from focus group discussions;*

*Some of this network recruiters will approach you that they can help you go to Europe, they will charge you 700,000 Naira and you will pay them, but once you get to Agadez in Niger, there will be a disconnect, these recruiters phone numbers will be switched off, then other recruiters will come in and approach you to carry drugs for them, since you do not have money with you, you will agree to do it, poverty, frustration are responsible for drug trafficking, sometimes these recruiters force it on you – male participant.*

*I deal on drugs, I sell drug to gather money, to travel to Libya, when I got to Libya I continued selling drugs to survive, even after returning to Nigeria, I still deal on drugs even now, just for me to survive - male participant.*

#### **6.3 Migrants and category of drug business**

In the analysis of the study participants who were involved in illicit drug business, 68% were drug retailers and operate as a small business, 7% were wholesaler and 25% were just carrier in drug business. Most of the participants (70%) do drug business for other people and only get commissions on sales they made and those fall under any of the three category of business (carrier, wholesaler or retailer) while 30% were participants well established in the drug business as owners and make their money for themselves during their migration.

*Citation from in-depth interview;*

*Some of these illegal migrants, their intention is not to cross to Libya but to carry these drugs and get to Libya, sell them and return back to Nigeria. They also recruit boys that want to travel to Europe, but these ones do not know they are into drug business – male participants.*


#### **Table 1.**

*Price of identified drugs in the illicit market.*

#### **6.4 Involvement of law enforcement agents or migrant smugglers/human traffickers in the illicit drug business**

Among the study population (382 participants); the analysis of the participants' opinion on the involvement of law enforcement agents in illicit drug trafficking shows that 194 (50.8%) participants were of the opinion that some law enforcement agents (of Nigeria, Niger and Libya) were involved in illicit drug trafficking, while involved in the network recruiters/migrant smugglers/human traffickers in drug 179 (46.9%) participants were of the opinion that network recruiters/human traffickers are involved in drug trafficking. Based on the responses from the focus group discussion the majority of the participants who testify on the involvement of the law enforcement agents in drug trafficking claimed that this was made possible through connection with drug dealers and bribery most especially at the border. However, some of the returned migrants interviewed claimed that they were introduced to drugs by human traffickers and that this was the reason why they disclosed the information while others attest that migrant smuggler are the main people behind drug trafficking. The information gathered from participants portrays that some network recruiters/migrant smugglers/human traffickers bribe law enforcement agents, boycott border check, make use of charm or connection with powerful people in government.

The above table shows the identified prices of the drugs in the illicit market. The price depends on the available market which is within the range as reported in the **Table 1** above.

#### **7. Discussion**

The broad objective of this research was to assess drug use and trafficking among returned migrants from Libyan detention centers in the transit or destination along the Mediterranean irregular migratory route. In terms of socio-demographics, this study identified the age bracket 26–30 to constitute the bulk number of participants observed in the study population who also account for most that involved in drug use and drug trafficking in irregular migration. The International Organization for Migration also perceived same age bracket among the irregular migrants population from Nigeria and also identified unemployment and poverty among the push factors in irregular migration of these young persons [3]. The report of the Trade Economics [2] and National Bureau of Statistics [1] established that young people age 18–30 are most affected in unemployment rate of Nigerians and as such, creating social malaise affecting the nation [2].

#### *Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

The findings on drug use in irregular migration indicate that the migrants most of the time get involved into drug use due to frustration and traumatic experience. The findings of Horynaiak et al. [9] and Kennedy [10] buttress on the fact that irregular migrants are vulnerable and thereby may be at risk for drugs and substance use for reasons including coping with traumatic experiences, pre-and post-migration stress, acculturation challenges, and social and economic inequality. In addition, irregular migrants usually witnessed or personally experienced torture, loss of livelihoods and depression [12] which could lead to frustration and trauma, as revealed in this study. As such, the above factors make them vulnerable to drugs and substance abuse, and it is no surprise that the prevalence of drug use is high among this population. As identified in most social research, drug use and drug seeking behaviors could be developed in individuals exposed to frustration and adversity [13] same as faced by irregular migrants. In the perspective of vulnerability, these migrants are undocumented and most were trafficked victims which exposed them to adversity and migration challenges. García [14] and Cook [15] identified in their migration studies that drug trafficking organizations and networks also target at-risk young migrant population turning them into drug consumers, as this study also discovered that some of the migrants got into drug use through involvement in drug business of which they revealed that their recruiters, human traffickers and migrant smugglers were those that introduce them into drug business and these groups also constitute the drug network in the transnational organize crime business.

In relation to the findings on drug trafficking in irregular migration, this study discovered that the migrants also get involved into trafficking or peddling as well as other related crimes during their migration as this occurs through exposure and socialization with fellow migrants who are already used to it before their migration and a large number of the migrant engage in drugs to survive during their mysterious journey. Our findings on returned migrants' involvement in drug peddling or trafficking compliment past researchers' findings indicating relational significance for victims of irregular migration involvement in drug peddling or trafficking. Of particular concern, we found some of the migrants trafficked drug either because of threat or for survival. Findings from our study compliment Palacios [16] in his research work titled 'from victims of trafficking to felons' who identify that people who engaged in irregular migration and human trafficking also abuse drug and they are highly involved in drug peddling through the migrant smuggling network. The high poverty level and low standard of living in Nigeria are among the causes resulting in young people to embark on the illegal migration in searching for greener pastures as findings of this research identified. Our results are similar to the findings of past research by the International Organization for Migration [17] entitled 'Migration in Nigeria: A country profile 2009' as well as research paper of Li, Liddell and Nickelson [18] in their research titled 'Relationship between post-migration stress and psychological disorder in refugee and asylum seeker', and the research work of Halili and Ibrahim [19] in their research work titled 'Causes of irregular migration crises, who all have one thing in common as to the causes of irregular migration which are a failure in economic and legal reform, that is the desire for a better standard of living among migrant, to alleviate unemployment and poverty. The finding in this research compliment the findings of past researchers who worked on UNODC [7, 8] research paper titled 'The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrant from west Africa to the European Union', as they concluded that fostering of socio-economic development in the countries experiencing irregular migration such as Nigeria would

help to further reduce demand for smuggling service. Improved border securities and cooperation with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and international border control to reduce security threat and corruption, as well as adopting sustainable measures to amend the lapses on borders such as bribery and smuggling. Overall, emphasis should be to promote regular legal migration. Supporting legal entry into any country ensures safety, worthy livelihood and entitles health benefits or coverage to migrants.

#### **8. Conclusion**

In summary, findings from this study show high prevalence of drug use among the irregular migrant population which draws attention to the need to understand the epidemiology of drugs and substance use particularly among persons who fall victim to deception, coercion, human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Experience of migration stress, trauma and frustration were among the factors that contribute to drug use. The study also discovered that some of the migrants get in to the drug business mainly to raise money for survival while some are forced in to the business. Findings shows that most persons involved in drug business were either introduced or influenced either by the migrant smuggler or the human trafficker as most of the returned irregular migrants operated as a retailer or carrier in the drug business which means that they are doing business for other strong stakeholders. Some of the returned irregular migrants also claimed the involvement of human recruiter, human trafficker and law enforcement agent in illicit drug peddling/trafficking and drug business. Efforts to develop and evaluate interventions to reduce drug trafficking and related issues among irregular migrants within the study route should be of priority importance.

#### **Acknowledgements**

The study was supported by a grant from UNODC Academic Research NGAV16 project under European Union funded project entitled, "Response to Drugs and Related Organized Crime in Nigeria."

*Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

#### **Author details**

Molobe Ikenna Daniel1 \*, Odukoya Oluwakemi2 and Yesufu Victoria Oluwasola1

1 Unified Initiative for a Drug Free Nigeria, Lagos, Nigeria

2 Department of Community Health and Primary Care, College of Medicine, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria

\*Address all correspondence to: danike1@yahoo.com

© 2022 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **References**

[1] National Bureau of Statistics. Labour force, employment and employment status report. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2018

[2] Trade Economics. Available from: https://tradingeconomics.com/ nigeria/unemployment-rate. Retrieved from: Trade Economics. 2018

[3] International Organization for Migration. Assessing the risks of migration along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Routes: Iraq and Nigeria as case study, Geneva. 2016

[4] International Organization for Migration Missing Migrants Project. 2016. Available from: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/

[5] Borges G, Rafful C, Benjet C, Tancredi DJ, Saito N, Aguilar-Gaxiola S, et al. Mexican immigration to the US and alcohol and drug use opportunities: Does it make a difference in alcohol and/or drug use? Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 2012:**125**(Suppl. 1):S4-11. DOI: 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2012.05.007 PMID: 22658285

[6] García V, Laura L. Labor migration, drug trafficking organizations, and drug use: Major challenges for transnational communities in Mexico. Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development. 2009, 2009;**38**(2-4):303-344

[7] UNODC. The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to European Union. 2011a

[8] UNODC. The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from West Africa to the European Union. Vienna: United Nation Office on Drug and Crime; 2011b

[9] Horyniak D, Melo JS, Farrell RM, Ojeda VD, Strathdee SA. Epidemiology of substance use among forced migrants: A global systematic review. PLoS One. 2016;**11**(7):e0159134. DOI: 10.1371/ journal.pone.0159134

[10] Kennedy S, Kidd MP, McDonald JT, Biddle N. The healthy immigrant effect: Patterns and evidence from four countries. Journal of International Migration and Integration. 2015;**16**:317-332

[11] International Organization for Migration. Presentation of the EU-IOM Initiative for Migration Governance and Integration in Nigeria at the Meeting of the Working Group on Reintegration, Abuja, 12th April, 2018. 2018

[12] Fazel M, Wheeler J, Danesh J. Prevalence of serious mental disorder in 7000 refugees resettled in western countries: A systematic review. Lancet. 2005;**365**:1309-1314

[13] Shea P, Shern D, with contribution from Tlumac, Tracy. Understanding and Addressing Adversity as a Risk Factor for Substance Abuse in Young People: An Informational Guide for Prevention-oriented Professionals. 2014. Alexandria, VA: National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors Trade Economics: Available from: https://tradingeconomics.com/ nigeria/unemployment-rate. Retrieved from: Trade Economics: (2018)

[14] García V. Meeting a bi-national research challenge: Substance abuse among transnational Mexican

*Irregular Migration, Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa – Libya and Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107521*

farmworkers in the United States. Journal of Rural Health. 2008;**23**(Fall):61-67

[15] Cook CW. Mexico's drug cartels. CRS Report for Congress, L34215, Washington, DC. 2007

[16] Palacios SPI. From victims of traficking to felons: Migrant smugglers recruited by Mexican cartels. Estudios fronterizos. 2017;**18**(37):41-60

[17] International Organization for Migration. Migration in Nigeria: A country profile 2009 report. 2009

[18] Li SSY, Liddell BJ, Angela N. The relationship between post-migration stress and psychological disorders in refugees and asylum seekers. Current Psychiatry Reports. 2016;**18**:82

[19] Halili X, Ibrahimi A. Causes for the irregular migration crises: Case of Kosovo. Scientific Journal of the Croatia Defense Academy - Strategos. 2017;**1**(2):79-98

#### **Chapter 9**

## Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries

*Dulo Nyaoro*

#### **Abstract**

The current migration of Africans to Europe and North America evokes trepidation and fear among citizens of European countries and their counter parts in the Americas. Despite clear lack of objectivity the migration discourses, continue to frame and condition migration policy responses and governance. What Landau calls "moral panic" at the foundation of this discourse. While it is true, a sizable number of Africans are fleeing political persecution and violence in their home countries, a big proportion is perceived to be looking for economic opportunities (greener pastures) to better their lives and that of their kin. The dominant narratives of failed states and debilitating poverty as the drivers of migration ignore the possibilities that it could be similar economic and social transformations that caused European migration to Africa and other parts of the World in the 19th Century. Here in we argue that a simplistic conclusion about poverty as the main driver of African migration does not reflect the complete reality, that socio-economic transformation and not poverty per se are the main drivers of African emigration not dissimilar to what Europe went through in the 19th Century.

**Keywords:** migration, Africans, Europe, transformations, policies

#### **1. Introduction**

#### **1.1 Conceptualizing migration**

While there is a general consensus that migration involves movement and crossing of borders there is no agreement on the time frame which marks the end of migration. For this reason, migration is conceptualized from different lenses depending on the dominant interests. International Organization for Migration (IOM) contends that migration refers to the movement of a person or people from their place of usual residence whether within a country or across international borders, either temporarily or permanently for various reasons. This definition of course opens many avenues for contentious debates. It assumes that we agree on what international borders are and whether they can be readily identified which is not often the case. The other doubtful assertion is the place of usual residence. In our transnational existence it has become debatable to what one would define as usual residence. Again when we examine

reasons for migration, some people would object that some reasons and not ground for migration ([1], ([2], p. 4), [3], ([4], p. 167)).

Migration can be conceptualized and analyzed from different perspective. First it seen as a human mobility that transcends some forms of boundaries whether such boundaries are political, administrative or even ethnic. We can choose to look at migration from the causes and drivers of migration in which case there will be economic and labour migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, expatriates and others. From a legal perspective we would have legal and illegal migrants. That is people whose movement is approved by the state and those whose movement is not accepted. In our present world there are so many cleavages when conceptualizing migration that we cannot fit all of them in any assay [5]. For our purposes here, we look at African-European migration nexus from both a historical perspective and as a function of past and present political economy of different states. Of necessity such a discussion will privilege the role of the state without ignoring salient issues of nationalism, race and religion.

#### **2. Theorizing international migration**

For better understanding of international migration generally and Africa migration to Europe we will refer to the world systems theory as espoused by [6] which views migrations as obvious consequences of agricultural economic globalization driven by capitalism and segmented labour market theory [7].

#### **2.1 World systems theory**

This theory is attributed to Wallerstein [6] and offers a macro level-analysis and explanation of international migration based on agricultural capitalism. Wallerstein viewed the globe as an economic system. His major concern is with the unequal political and economic distributions which results in stratified economic system. The world systems theory holds that the penetration of capitalist agricultural economy fundamentally transforms non-capitalist agricultural economies in several ways.

The system divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries and the periphery countries. Core countries are characterized by capital intensive production and the rest of the world focus on low capital and labour production and extraction of raw material. Because of the inequality in the global economic systems poor countries are trapped in their disadvantaged positions within unequal geopolitical structure which compounds their poverty. The forces of globalization have exacerbated underdevelopment within the countries in the periphery.

The penetration of capitalist economic relations into non capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate. Motivated by the need for higher profits and greater wealth, owners of capital in core countries venture into poorer nations in the periphery of the world economy in search of land, raw materials, labour, and consumer markets. During the mercantile and industrial capitalism colonial administrations aided these ventures.

The expansion of commercial agriculture requires land consolidation and different land tenure system which entails displacement of population. Agricultural production requires labour inputs such as fertilizers and pesticide, such a system displace people and transform established forms of subsistence forms of economic production and social relationships. Introduction of cash crops destroys social and economic

#### *Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109348*

relations based on subsistence. Instead of reciprocity, collective labour and social trust, transactional relationship are established and social ties severed which results in uprooted population who are likely to move in search of wage employment because core countries encourage private capital to invest in these developing countries they seek to protect such capital through deploying of military forces resulting into proxy wars and displacement, these often triggers migration into different directions.

The same logic applies to extraction of raw materials that requires industrial methods that rely on paid labour. This creates labour markets based on new conceptions of individualism, private gain and social change. Establishment of foreign owned factories triggers rural urban migration as it undermines locally produced goods. The displaced labour becomes mobile and likely to move in search of employment. The same process economic processes attract workers to migrate to developed economies. The migration of Europeans to other parts of the World can be partially explained by the transformation that took place when common lands were consolidated and privatized. The same case applies to the economic transformations in Africa and the subsequent deployment of global economic structure.

#### **2.2 Segmented labour market theory**

This theory was propounded by Michael Piore [7] who unlike the systems theory and neoclassical theorist sought to explain the pull rather than push factors of migration. He argues that international migration actual stems from the internal labour demands of modern industrial societies. While acknowledging that there may be push factors such as low wages and high unemployment in sending countries, Piore points out that migration is only possible because of pull factors such as the need for low wage workers in receiving countries which is attributed to four related reasons, including structural inflation, structural motivation, duality of labour and ethnic economic enclaves.

#### *2.2.1 Structural inflation*

It is argued that wages not only reflect condition of supply and demand but confers status and social prestige. There are perceptions of social qualities that exist in jobs that wages are attached. In different social and labour context people tend to believe that wages should reflect social status, meaning that a majority of people there is a correlation between occupational status and wages or salaries. As a result, wages paid by employers are not entirely free to respond to fluctuations in the supply of labour. A combination of domestic social expectations and formal institutions such as labour unions, civil societies, labour laws and job classifications ensure that pay corresponds to the social status that people perceive and expect. Belaid and Slany [8] have discussed structural transformations in Africa and migration [9].

Employers for example cannot simply raise wages in order to attract unskilled workers at the bottom of occupational hierarchy. This due to the fact that raising wages would upset socially defined relationships between status and remuneration. It therefore follows that increasing wages for those at the bottom of the employment ladder would also entail increasing wages proportionately for those above to maintain this relationship which is Piore [7] calls *structural inflation*. This is costly and disruptive for employers and often they are unwilling to do it. Cheaper alternative is therefore to import or accept migrant workers who may be willing to accept low wages.

#### *2.2.2 Structural motivation*

Structural motivation concept is related to structural inflation because of social construction of jobs and wages. People not only work to get income but also to achieve certain degree of social status. The unskilled jobs at the bottom of job hierarchies result into motivational problems because there is no social status to be accumulated or maintained. The fact that the motivation problem cannot be removed makes a structural issue because even mechanization which may eliminate the lowest and least desirable class of jobs simply creates another bottom class. This then compels employers to look for workers who are looking for jobs to get income rather than accumulate social status. Migrants who are mostly target earners meet employers' requirement for lower wages. Given the difference in living standards in developed and developing countries, low wages in developed countries are often significant income in home countries and make social and economic difference. Because migrant workers are not socially embedded in the host countries they are willing to take these low paying jobs. As members of their own communities back at home remittances sent carry honor and prestige [7]. This argument applies to African migrants as much as it applies to migrants from other developing countries to Western Europe, the Oil rich Gulf States and North America.

#### *2.2.3 Duality of labour and capital*

The duality of labour and capital is attributed to the fact that capital is a fixed factor of production that can be idled during lower demands but cannot be laid off which compels owners of capital to bear the cost of idleness [7, 10]. Labour on the other hand is a variable factor which can be laid off when demand declines. Workers are ultimately forced to bear the cost of their own idleness. In economic terms, this means that capital intensive methods of production are used to meet basic demands while labour intensive methods are used to meet fluctuating demands [11].

Piore opines that this duality creates distinction among workers because those in the capital intensive primary sector get stable and skilled jobs, working with best technology and tools. Employers often consider such cadre of workers as part of capital because of their skill and knowledge. Furthermore, such workers tend to belong to labour unions or have contracts that compel employers to meet the cost of idleness. It is therefore expensive to lay them off. In the labour intensive sector, workers occupy unstable and unskilled jobs with low wages. These are the jobs that are often referred to as triple 'D' jobs (Dirty, Degrading and Dangerous). Such workers can be laid off any time with minimal or no cost at all. This results in a segmented labour market where you have native workers who are drawn to the capital intensive sector where there are better wages, secure terms of employment and social status. The secondary segment has low wages, unstable conditions and lack of mobility that do not attract native workers. Meet the short fall created in the secondary sector; employers often turn to migrant workers.

#### **2.3 Ethnic enclave economies**

Ethnic enclaves are economic zones created by pioneer migrants, which are often in the secondary sector of labour market. They are characterized low status jobs, low pay, instability and wretched working conditions. Such jobs are avoided by native workers but provide immigrants with much needed economic returns, education,

#### *Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109348*

experience and entry into the labour market. Enclave economies are likely to grow if pioneer migrants have significant financial, social and cultural capital. If their businesses are successful they are likely to attract immigrants from their home countries who do not mind engaging in low paying jobs. In addition, it is observed that concentration of co-ethnics creates demand for specialized cultural products and ethnic migrants are often in a better position to provide such products and services.

Initially the duality of labour and capital, structural inflation and structural motivation was off-set by the employment of teenagers, women and newly arrived rural–urban migrants. This is because for a long time women were not viewed as primary bread winners so their social status was not based on the jobs they had but that of their families. However, this has changed and now many women are employed on their own rights. Teenagers took such jobs because they were considered temporary employment. They expected to get better jobs after finishing school or college. Moreover, teenagers derive their social status from their parents. Four interrelated factors have all but wiped away this supply of labour in developed countries. First urbanization has eliminated rural urban migration, decline in birth rates and the rise in female labour. This has significantly created demand for immigrant labour in developed countries.

These theories speak to some of the drivers of migration all though not single one can completely explain the complex phenomenon of migration. While world system theory is a macro explanation of economic transformation that takes place in the cause of expansion of capitalism, it fails to explain individual choices that people make when migrating. It also does not explain the pull factors of migration. Segmented labour market theory is quite strong on pull factors but is sketchy on push factors that enable migration. For these reasons, this chapter make use of both the theories to explain the different aspect of international migration.

#### **3. Major migration epochs**

When discussing current migration trends, commentators both in the academy and policy circles, present it as a new phenomenon that the need new and creative ways to manage. Yet migration is as old as human beings [12]. Humans have come to populate different parts of the world simply because of the ability to migrate from time to time and to adapt to new geographical and climatic conditions. While European migration to Africa during colonial period was different, historical accounts show that it was not new and that Europeans migrated to North Africa running away from poverty, overcrowding and conflicts. North Africa and the Maghreb offered sanctuary where they lived and traded for many years long before colonial capitalism [13].

The mercantile and colonial related migration of Europeans was however different. European migration to Africa and Africans forced migration to America and Europe from the 16th century was purely function of various forms of capitalism ranging from plantation/agrarian to post-industrial capitalism. Authors notably Douglas Massey [10], Castles et al. [14] have pointed out that modern history of international migration can be divided into four discernible periods including: The mercantile period (1500–1800); Industrial revolution period (1845–1924) Economic globalization (1800–1929), Post-industrial migration 1960s. An analysis of each of these periods supports the claims we make here that capitalism was and is still central to migration trends and the attempts at managing and governing international migration.

#### **3.1 The mercantile period**

This period lasted for about 300 years was characterized by out flows of migrants from Europe and Africa related to processes of colonization and economic growths under mercantile capitalism [15]. Mercantilism was based on the idea that a nation's prosperity and was best served by increasing by increasing export and reducing imports. The underlying assumption was that the global wealth is static and a nation's strength will be based on the ability to supply capital [16]. Because of the nationalistic nature of mercantilism nations frequently used military interventions to further their own interests. Given the long period of mercantile capitalism and development in maritime transport, Europeans managed to occupy large parts of Americas. Although accurate number does not exist, the outflows was signification enough to allow European to establish domination over large parts of the world. At this time, European migrants were composed of agrarian settlers, administrators, artisans and entrepreneurs who founded plantations as well as convicts sent to penal colonies [10].

These entrepreneurs founded plantations which had profound impact of Africa's migration out of the Africa continent. This because the most important source of plantation labour was the forced migration of Africa slaves [17, 18]. It is estimated that in excess of 10million African slaves were transported to different parts of Americas to provide labour.

The point to be made here is that economic and social transformation was driving the emigration of European. Changing land tenure and usucruf which caused the enclosure protests was part of the reason people were leaving. The disruptions caused by these transformations account for crop production failures and the concomitant search for new lands and economic opportunities by European peasants. For example, over 1 million Irish moved out of Ireland during the potato famine. Social relations and people relations with property were breeding a new class of people (land barons) while disenfranchising others. Of course this is characteristic of capital accumulation. However, for those who ventured outside Europe and founded plantations in the Americas, they were compelled to search for cheap labour that could only be provided by the crudest form of capitalism, the forced enslavement of Africans while disseminating native population.

#### **3.2 The industrial revolution period**

Massey [10] estimates that at the beginning of industrial revolution which overlapped with mercantile period (1846–1924) 48 million people moved out of Europe with Britain alone sending 41% of its population out followed by Norway at 36%, and Portugal30%. Lucassen [19] estimates that about 60 million people left Europe during this period. It is noteworthy that among the European countries with highest economic growth sent 41% of its population. Emigration was therefore not necessarily a negative process. Industrialization changed modes of production, previous relationships that were structure around land owners and tenants and motivated young people to move to urban areas and to coal mines. People who could not adjust to the quickly transforming modes of production sought to replicate what they knew else. In part of East and Southern Africa, Europeans were actively encouraged to transfer their farming knowledge, thus a sizable number of European settlers occupied Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia.

*Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109348*

#### **3.3 First phase of economic globalization**

The period from around 1800 to 1929, marked the first phase of economic globalization whose central features was the massive flows of capital, raw materials and goods between different continents including Europe, the Americas and Asia [10]. The incorporation of nations in this expanding global economy also created structures and motivation for large scale human movement. Although many European migrants did not come to Africa, but the very economic transformation caused them to emigrate to the America, Australia, Canada and Argentina.

Three events disrupted this European emigration. The First World War that continued up to 1920, followed by the great depression of 1929/30 and finally the outbreak of WWII. These events had profound effect on economic globalization and nationalism. For example the WWII split the world into two competing ideological and economic spheres.

#### **3.4 Post industrial migration**

This phase of international migration is different from the above three. Beginning in the 1960s Europeans no longer dominated international migration as reverse flows commenced with migrants coming from developing countries to industrialized countries of European, people were moving from less industrialized and less populated areas into industrialized and highly derange spaces ([10], p. 5) even though there were cases of people fleeing conflicts international migrants was dominated by migrants from rapidly developing countries including Mexico, China, Pakistan and the Philippines.

#### **3.5 Second globalization phase**

Currently the world has witnessed extensive flows of capital goods, raw materials and formats permitted by the end of the cold war and the integration of a significant segment of world population in the global market place, this is particularly true of china Russia and African countries: the later having been embroiled in cold war contests as satellite status. However as will be explained later globalization under pined by capitalism and supported by deliberation had a structural effect on internal migration on very restrictive terms.

#### **4. African migration, myths versus facts**

As we mentioned at the beginning African migration is coached in myths, sensationalism which also serves to criminalize and degrade migration which in our argument is a very normal human process [12]. The first myth that characterizes the present African migration to Europe is that there is mass movement of Africans swamping Europe. In reality this is not the position. First; the global migration trend has not shown any considerable hike in the period 1990–2020 in global migration leave alone that of Africans. The population of migrants only increased from 2.9% to 3.6% as share of world population of 7 billion people. This translates to just about 270 million people while African population estimated at 1.2 billion. It is also estimated that only 3.0% of African population live outside their home countries compared to 8.5% of European population [20]. This is no way paints the picture of mass migration as claimed by the media and hysterical right wing politicians in Europe.

While there is an increase of migration by Africans, much of it is dominated by intra-Africa migration. It is recorded that since 2010 Intra African migration has increased by 43.6% compared to 26% of Africans migrating to Europe. The total number of African migrants by 2020 is estimated to be 40.6 million which is only 14.5% of the global migrants' population. Asia for example accounts for 41% of global migrant population while Europeans accounts for 22.5% much higher than African migrants [20].

Just like many European migrants in the earlier part of the 19th century who migrated for search of better economic prospects, most African moving to Europe are looking for better economic opportunities, they are not looking for welfare as is widely believed. The profile of those Africans reaching Europe attests to this reality. They are young people educated and skilled looking for jobs not handouts. It is estimated that 50% of such migrants from Africa are young educated women.

The perception that all African refugees and asylum seekers are headed to Europe is also not true. Only 27% of the world refugees arrive in Europe and Africans constitute only 7.2% of this figure. Most African migrants actually tend to remain in their regions; this is why Uganda Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan hosts almost 3.5 million refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi [21].

#### **4.1 Irregular verses regular migration**

It is worth noting that unlike most European citizens believe, 80% of African migrant population to Europe use regular means. Even though diminishing regular migration channels drive some Africans to undertake dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea, most migrations from Africa to Europe remain regular and safe. Froatex, the European border agency recorded 40,000 irregular migrants from Africa in 2019–2020 but this contributed less than 10% of regular migration to Europe during the same period. This contradicts the perception that most Africans reaching Europe use only irregular means. This also implies that there are good reasons which permit African migrants to get visas and other migration documents from European governments.

#### **4.2 Africans migrants as pests**

It is widely perceived that African migrants are a burden to social services in their host countries such as health care and housing. Facts do not confirm this position, going back to our earlier explanation on segmented labour; African migrants provide critical labour to some of the important sector. European aging population and social perception above certain jobs create room for migrant labour. In many European countries for example African migrants constitute significant proportion of health care work force as well as in the service industry.

#### **4.3 Migration as a zero-sum game**

In popular discourse, migration of Africans to Europe is presented as a zero sum game where Africans stand to gain while Europeans have everything to lose. Emotive issues such socio-social welfare benefits, jobs, housing, education opportunities are fronted as those that Africans will gain from. But subjective matters such as race, identity and diversity and cultural preferences are never far away. However, reality

#### *Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109348*

is not that linear. There are losses and gains on both sides. Given that many African migrants reaching Europe are young, educated and skilled, there is a problem of brain-drain in sending countries even if such people tend to send significant sums of money as remittances back home. Study of data from 50 African countries by Belaid and Slany [8] confirms that skilled labour contributes to the development of hosting and receiving countries.

The case of health care in Germany is illustrative of how receiving countries gain. In 2020 (13.7%) of all doctors in Germany were migrants with Africans accounting for (8%). African migrants are therefore not just a burden to social services but active contributors. What sending countries forgo in human resources is also replaced in terms of remittances. For example, in countries such as Cote-de Voire, Rwanda and South Africa, migrants contribute over 10% to the GDP, with Cote de Voire (19%) Rwanda (13%) and South Africa (10%). This underscores the point that given opportunities to migrate formally migrants can contribute even more towards the host country economy and that of the country of origin.

#### **4.4 Economic status in Africa**

Africa has a very young population which is not matched by employment opportunities and better economic prospects. The neo liberal global economic systems constrain economic growth in many African countries. Africa still remains producer of raw materials and it is no wonder the youth are following these raw, materials to participate in the processing in European capitals [22, 23].

It is estimated that around 60% of Africa's population is younger than 25 years of age, a scenario to that UNDESA projects is likely to contribute for above 30 years on the other hang European youth are declining by 24.7% which means European will require migrant labour to fill this gap [24].

#### **5. European response**

Because of the 'moral panic' about Africans migration to Europe, European governments have developed an array of responses including moral exclusion, externalization of European boundaries, sponsoring containment programmes including attempts to economic development countries that are perceived to major senders. However, there is no evidence that all these actions are bearing fruits.

#### **5.1 Moral exclusion**

European countries have adopted both soft and hard forms of exclusion. Moral exclusion is the most potent of all of them where African migrants. Moral exclusion starts by the development of exclusive moral economies which entails the 'production, distribution, circulation and use of moral sentiments, emotions and values and norms and obligations in the social space' ([25] in [26], p. 5).

Within the moral economy framework, rules of fairness condition the general conduct of people towards each other [26, 27]. On the basis of the prevailing moral economy there are those included and those excluded. In moral economy, moral inclusion those who are inside and are therefore deserving of just and fair treatment [27]. This then frames how those included should be treated and those excluded should fair.

Moral exclusion on the other hand connotes those who are outside the boundaries of fairness and considerate treatment. Those excluded from fair treatment are therefore outside everyday moral concerns and can be subjected to deprivation, exploitation, harassment and other inhuman and degrading treatment. When such treatments are meted to outsiders are seen as justified as normal and can either be ignored or tolerated [26]. African migrants in Europe largely belong to the people who are actively being excluded from the moral economy of inclusion. First, they are labeled as people fleeing poverty or failed states who only have their governments to blame and not seek sanctuary in Europe. Terms such as bogus asylum seekers, illegal migrants and economic migrants are used to justify exclusion. This is then fortified by actions such as denial of visas, refugee status or deportation which then completes the exclusion.

#### **5.2 Epistemic exclusion**

Related to the above moral exclusion there is an on-going epistemic exclusion of African migrants from. Epistemic framing of Africans in Europe has acquired exclusionary undertones both public domain and policy domains. According to Landau [4] there is epistemological reorientation which portrays African as migratory threat to European and African states sovereignty and control. While African states meekly accept this situation, their European counter parts has responded by adopting strategies that that disconnect Africans from global imagination while localizing their desires ([4], p. 170). Development in Africa has now assumed new meaning. Rather than development to be seen as a bettering people's lives it is now seen as deterrence to migration to Europe. Due to the desire by Europeans states to exclude Africans from global mobility, they are in effect excluding Africans from global membership and political freedoms. This has allowed European governments to externalize migration policies without facing any political backlash at home.

#### **5.3 Deterrence development**

Since there is widespread belief that it is poverty that is the root cause of Africans migration to Europe, the only way to halt the mass movement is to help African governments to reduce poverty. This can only be done by developing those poor African countries. So instead of Africans being attracted to Europe which is already developed, development should be taken to the potential African migrants are [4]. Landau opines that this deterrence development which includes now frames how the two continents relate [4]. Joint initiatives including cooperation agreements, new funding instruments and conditionalities are spearheaded and financed by European Union geared towards stopping Africans from going to Europe. The containment initiative has three parts. First is the direct conditionalities given to African governments if they collaborate in stopping irregular migration. The second part is the redefinition of what successful development is. Success of development is not measured in terms of GDP or per capita income but addressing the causes of migration to Europe. Thirdly assistance to African is now premised on stopping all mobility from the continent. This thinking is grossly misplaced. Countries that contribute the highest number of African migrants such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana South Africa are relatively developed. Indeed, Nigeria and South Africa are the two biggest economy in the continent while Kenya and Ghana are considered low middle income countries. These countries also top the continent in terms of education and skills training.

*Comparison of African Migration to Europe and European Migration in the Last Two Centuries DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.109348*

#### **6. Conclusion**

Past migration accounts demonstrate how migration is largely linked to economic and social transformations in both sending and receiving countries. While European economies are developed and able to meet most of the basic needs of her citizens, the aging population has to be complemented by migrant labour but this could create both racial and cultural composition of European countries. Although international migration will remain emotive for the foreseeable future, this piece contends that it will likely continue given the propensity of human beings to move for economic reasons or for leisure or simply to run away from life threatening circumstances. Migration theories have attempted to explain the pull and push factors the frame migration, yet we still do not really understand the complexities and consideration that go into migration decision making. Finally, we have tried to demonstrate here that African migration to Europe is not unique or new. The reasons that drove millions out of Europe are being experienced by African countries. The response by European countries may stem migration in the short run but in the long run it will not stop population movement.

#### **Author details**

Dulo Nyaoro Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya

\*Address all correspondence to: dnyaoro@gmail.com

© 2023 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Section 4
