**4. Two poles of stoic thought: a divergence around humanity's role in ecology: hierarchy and extraction versus holism and equilibrium**

Pliny's views are strikingly written, novel with regard to the recognition of extinction, and distinct in their ability to link together religion and ecology in a way that finds parallels in the modern world. Indeed, we will treat the latter parallels explicitly in our next section. But in the context of ancient Greco-Roman views around religion and ecology, Pliny's views highlight an interesting tension in the predominant religion-ecology nexus of the day, as found in ancient Stoicism.

#### *Ancient Greco-Roman Views of Ecology, Sustainability, and Extinction: Aristotle, Stoicism… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.104989*

Philosophically, Pliny is probably aligned closer to Stoicism than any other philosophy. We must caution that he was not a systematic and whole-hearted Stoic through and through [22]. But particularly his natural philosophy, that intersection between ecology and religion, was clearly and most strongly informed by Stoicism [23]. Sometimes specific aspects of his thought can even be traced with confidence to certain Stoic thinkers [24]. More broadly, he was not only familiar with foundational ideas from Stoicism and key texts and thinkers such as Zeno (4th-3rd century BCE, founder of Stoicism) [23], but also a variety of other philosophers from whom he freely drew [25]. So while we focus here on Pliny's Stoicism in light of other Stoic thought, it is important to remember that Pliny's use of ancient philosophy was not confined to Stoicism alone.

In Stoicism, however, there were notable differences of thought, with debate around subjects such as cosmology, ethics, and human nature. Despite core, shared ideas across different thinkers, Stoicism was no monolithic system of thought and it contains both disagreements between thinkers and changes over time and. We argue that one of these internal Stoic debates which has not yet been fully recognized or explored is the relationship of humanity to nature. In the language of our conclusions above regarding Pliny, Stoic thinkers varied in how they understood the relationship of religion and ecology.

We identify two general poles in Stoicism around the relationship of religion and ecology. One pole, which we have already explored above, generally follows the Platonic and Aristotelian view: Humanity was created as a higher order being in a hierarchically ordered universe, and it is therefore natural and in some sense good for humanity to make use of and even dominate the natural environment.

Stoic thought roughly contemporaneous to Pliny, in the first and second centuries CE, is full of these ideas, ranging from Epictetus to Seneca the Younger to Marcus Aurelius. Perhaps most famously, Marcus (2nd century CE, a century after Pliny) wrote in his *Meditations* that the "lower exists for the sake of the higher" (11.18) [26]. For Marcus, lower order forms were created providentially and according to some type of divine plan; it was therefore normal and necessary for higher order forms to make use of them. This was not only a statement about religion and ecology, but also a convenient political ideology for Marcus (one of the most relentlessly imperial emperors), who could use this Stoic ideology to help justify his campaigns against militarily weaker peoples; we see a similar link between (holistic) ecology and (equitable) politics found in the modern period in Alexander von Humboldt, discussed below.

More proximately to Pliny, meanwhile, we find similar ideas expressed by Epictetus and Seneca. Epictetus, in his *Discourses* compiled by his pupil Arrian in the early first century CE, writes:

*"For animals not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit for them to be made so as to need other things ... Nature has formed the animals which are made for service, all ready, prepared, and requiring no further care. So one little boy with only a stick drives the cattle." [27]*

Such a view aligns easily not only with Marcus and some of Pliny's comments but also the ecological-hierarchy view of Aristotle. Nature has some things ready made for others and humans are rightly in charge over cattle; hierarchy and the ruling of one organism over the other is natural and even good.

This notion of some organisms being naturally created for service to others finds clear parallel in Stoic views of the body. This is best espoused by Seneca the Younger (1st century CE), who writes:

*"I think that the Earth is controlled by nature, and on the model of our own bodies, in which there are both veins and arteries; the former are receptacles for blood, the latter for breath. In the Earth too, there are some passages through which water runs, others through which breath does; and nature has created such a resemblance to the human body … " (3.15.1) [28]*

The body makes for a ready parallel to nature, the micro in the macro, as individual elements of the body are created for and function in service to the whole. One would readily cut off a finger to save an entire organism, and as such there are clearly aspects of the body which are subservient to the whole and therefore relatively expendable.

Extending this view to a macro, cosmic scale, this metaphysical and religious view of our place in the universe underpins Stoic ethics, in particular the view that suffering and death are ultimately inconsequential. A single human life is to the universe as, perhaps, a fingernail is to an individual human. Just as the universe might see fit in its grand operations to destroy us individually or as a species, so too we should think nothing of cutting off and discarding a fingernail. In both cases these operations are natural and, in that Stoic sense, good. By the same logic, some organisms higher in the grand hierarchy of nature can and even should make use of others.

There is a second pole of Stoic thought, however, that speaks to how humanity should not simply exploit and extract and dominate, but rather exercise our reason to live in harmony. This view is also, in fact, derived partly from Platonic and Aristotelian views privileging the rational mind of humanity. Yet instead of seeing humans at the top of a hierarchy and justifying domination, our place at the top of the created hierarchy results from reason, which – when properly exercised according to Stoic principles – results not in violence but in harmony. Thus, Epictetus can write the following too:

*"Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of his works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a* way of life conformable to nature*." (ch. 6) [27]*

While the first part of this passage seems to reflect the more extractive, dominating view seen in our first pole of Stoic thought, here the conclusion is notably different. It is indeed "shameful" for humans to do what animals do, presumably fight, suffer, and struggle over narrow and instinctual concerns. Instead, humanity's rational nature calls us to a higher purpose as our "nature ends in contemplation and understanding", an echo of Platonic influence. Conforming to nature does not simply involve participating in a violent, exploitative hierarchy of being, but rather this "life conformable with nature" is one that is aware of, and attentive to, one's effects on others. 'Conforming' denotes adaptation and accommodation, not bending others to one's own will, whim, or preference.

We see this second, accommodating pole of Stoic ecological thinking voiced severally by Seneca. Seneca writes that the proper operation of nature has to do with the notion of sufficiency:

*Ancient Greco-Roman Views of Ecology, Sustainability, and Extinction: Aristotle, Stoicism… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.104989*

*"All things by nature seize enough for their own nourishment, and the world has appropriated as much as it needed for eternity. I shall offer you a tiny illustration of this important fact: eggs contain enough liquid to generate the creature that will emerge." (2.5.2) [28]*

The proper functioning of nature manifests an ecology in a state of equilibrium. Of course, some things naturally make use of other things (the creature in the egg and the liquid within), which well matches the first pole of Stoic thought, but this 'making use' reflects *only* the particular amount that the Earth needs. This amount is tremendous, sufficing forever, but only insofar as organisms within a species exist and behave according to their natural needs; so is the case of the chick emerging from the egg. The egg provides liquid for emergence, the natural need, but nothing more that might reflect preference, desire, or (in human terms) greed.

Indeed, Seneca understands the world in terms of a balanced reciprocity according to natural need and consequent use:

*"Nothing is exhausted if it returns to itself. There are reciprocal exchanges between all the elements: whatever one loses turns into another, and nature weighs its parts as if they were placed on a pair of scales, to make sure that the world does not become unbalanced because the equality of its components is disturbed." (3.10.3) [28]*

Nature operates in a balance and the natural operation of its parts maintain that balance. If humans take a natural amount – such as for their natural "nourishment" per the earlier quote above – then the Earth will reciprocally take and in turn provide this nourishment. However, moving beyond what is natural – to take more than what is necessary for mere nourishment – will upset this balance:

*"Any deviation by nature from the present state of affairs is sufficient for the destruction of mortals. So when that inevitable moment arrives, fate sets in motion many causes at once; for such a change cannot occur without the world being shaken." (3.27.3) [28]*

Nature provides if its constituent parts behave accordingly. If the parts do not behave according to their nature (e.g., nourishment alone) then what follows is inevitably "destruction". Crucially, this destruction will occur via violence amid the world itself ("such a change cannot occur without the world being shaken"). Deviations from nature will invite consequences that will convulse the world and punish humanity as a result, for indeed we are a part of nature. To continue our body analogy from earlier, if a finger ceases to operate properly by harming the body, it will be subject to inevitable destruction. This destruction will harm the greater whole (body = nature) but will certainly punish the offending part (= organism/species).

This line of metaphysical thinking aligning religion and ecology readily reflects widely held Stoic understandings of ethics. In Stoicism, one should behave according to one's general nature as a species (which Stoics call 'a good') and even according to one's individual desires (which Stoics label a 'preferred indifferent', being neither good nor bad). A human can therefore be justified in using violence to defend their life because of an organism's basic biological rights and nature directed toward survival, but not justified in using violence simply to get what one desires.

Indeed, Stoic ethics generally do not espouse violence but rather acquiescence; not domination but rather peaceful differences; and not extraction for excess but rather

making do with the bare minimum. This is not only a metaphysical view about the ideal 'Stoic sage' and our relationship to the cosmos but also has clear applications to our micro-cosmos too, namely our ecological environment. Just as Stoics argued we should generally accept our lot in life and seek no more than demanded by nature for sufficiency, by extension so too should we use nature and other organisms where necessary but never to a point of excess. One must eat, but never feast; one must kill to survive, but never for sport; one might need to extract resources to build a house to survive the winter, but this does not mean one is justified in extracting resources for ornamentation.

Furthermore, deviating beyond what is necessary for mere "nourishment", to again use Seneca's term, is ultimately a recipe for destruction. Firstly, it results in the forfeit of one's individual virtue and thereby doing oneself violence – Stoics label as 'bad' anything that undermines virtue. But secondly, it also harms the wider environment (nature/god itself) which in the Stoic metaphysical and religious view is ultimately aligned with the self, just as the finger is identified with the body but should never be privileged before it. Any wider damaging of nature/god disturbs natural order, and this disturbance is not only bad for nature/god (a metaphysical and religious ill) but will also ultimately result in partial or complete self-destruction. For this line of Stoic thinking, ecology *is* religion and therefore sustainability constitutes proper ethics.
