**2. The ethics of Laudato si'**

#### **2.1 To protect the whole of creation is within the purview of the pope's function**

In his inaugural homily, Pope Francis made clear his personal commitment to ecology. The pope concluded: "…to protect the whole of creation, to protect each person, especially the poorest, to protect ourselves: this is a service that the Bishop of Rome is called to carry out, yet one to which all of us are called…" [7]. The spiritual leaders of the Orthodox Church have assumed the same responsibility for their Church at least since 1989 ([3], p. 69). The World Council of Churches, which regroups most Christian Churches including the Catholic one (membership limited to its Commission on Faith and Order), placed ecology as an integral part of the Churches' responsibility at its Vancouver meeting in 1983, i.e. 32 years before Laudato si' ([3], p. 60).

#### **2.2 Stewardship ethics versus care ethics**

Cardinal Turkson, the ghostwriter behind Laudato si', points out that "the word 'stewardship' only appears twice" [in the encyclical]. The word 'care' on the other hand, appears dozens of times. This is no accident, we are told. While stewardship speaks to a relationship based on duty, 'when one cares for something it is something one does with passion and love'" ([8], July 10). Being a steward is a job. Caring is a state of being.

I do not intend to spend time in this paper on stewardship ethics except to note that there is a tradition going back to the Greek natural philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, which considered nature as an organism which, in turn, had an intrinsic good of divine origin. The role of mankind was to understand the intrinsic goodness of the non-human world and to improve its relationship with the former towards greater harmony [9]. This is also the Jewish tradition of shalom ([10], p. 19).

#### *Laudato si', Six Years Later DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.104441*

The improved harmony is obtained through husbanding (and not through entrepreneurship) because only non-human nature creates wealth. This is the origin of the primacy of agriculture in economic thought, which persisted to the Physiocrats and may be traced back to Xenophon [9]. In opposition to this classical influence which leads to stewardship, under Hebrew influence Christianism "gets the idea that nature is a kind of enemy which has to submit itself to human and divine will. Humanity is explicitly entrusted to rule over the earth as God rules over it" ([11], p. 18).

I will add though, as pointed out by Willis Jenkins in relation to Karl Barth's creation theology, that stewardship in Christian theology means obedience to God and implies nothing about the value of non-human nature. The latter has no standing of its own and does not participate in the creative process. It is an outcome of creation ex nihilo according to Karl Barth as interpreted by Keller. Jenkins considers that this interpretation encourages the dominion of mankind. Humans are elected by the external covenant through which, according to Jenkins, they witness what God does with creation: "…God's command entirely determines the meaning of creation, and summons as its witness a correspondence in humans" ([12], p. 12).

Care ethics is the ethics of indigenous people, the feminists, and of Francis of Assisi and his disciple Bonaventure. The commonalities of care ethics with the ethics of Laudato si', virtue ethics, and with the ethics of relational values are striking (see infra). The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics characterizes the ethics of care as follows:

*Ethics of care highlight the affective [my emphasis] dimensions of morality, the inevitability of dependence and interdependence, the importance of caretaking and healthy attachments in the basic fabric of human well-being, and the relational and contextual nature of any ethical question or problem…. They [care ethics' followers] therefore reject the idea that caring and caretaking are trivial or irrelevant in "public" spheres. …they argue that women may therefore have significant epistemic insight concerning philosophical and practical understandings of care ethics ([13], p. 2).*

The care ethics followers underscore "the limitations of worldviews that deny reliance on nature". They emphasize the importance of caring for other humans, for more effective caring of nature, and, more generally, the importance of relationships that frame a moral problem.

*Environmental ethics that incorporate paradigms of caring conceive of environmental harms and the exploitation of nonhuman animals as failures to extend caring to worthy others and see those failures in relation to similar failures to care for other people ([13], p. 3).*

*They [relationships] have intrinsic value [my emphasis] as sources of identity, community, and spirituality but also instrumental value as sources of sustenance and usable knowledge that furnish guidance on caring for biodiversity and ecosystems. The relationships are morally weighty because they motivate responsibilities involving reciprocity, harmony, solidarity, and collectivity. The term "caring" is used to suggest a value foundational for justice and sustainability ([13], p. 5).*

The ethics of caring is the ethics of indigenous people.

*We [indigenous people] must look at the life that water supports (plants/medicines, animals, people, birds, etc.) and the life that supports water (e.g., the earth, the rain, the fish). Water has a role and a responsibility to fulfill, just as people do. We do not have the right to interfere with water's duties to the rest of Creation. Indigenous knowledge tells us that water is the blood of Mother Earth and that water itself is considered a living entity with just as much right to live as we have ([13], p. 7, citing McGregor).*

*…from an Aboriginal perspective justice among beings of creation is life-affirming ([13], p. 8, citing McGregor).*

*The Kari-Oca 2 declaration calls on "civil society" to respect indigenous "values of reciprocity, harmony with nature, solidarity, and collectivity," including "caring and sharing." The declaration also claims that the idea of saving "nature by commodifying its life-giving and life-sustaining capacities [is] a continuation of the colonialism that Indigenous Peoples and our Mother Earth have faced and resisted for 520 years …" ([13], pp. 7–8)*

*In the writings discussed here, we see "care" as referring to recognizing and learning from one's place in a web of diverse relationships and being drawn by the responsibilities that are embedded in such relationships. Indigenous movements emphasize the importance of specific relationships involving reciprocal, though not necessarily equal, responsibilities among participants who understand one another as relatives. Accepting responsibilities is constitutive of realizing healthy ecosystems that already include human communities ([13], p. 8).*

The interconnections between our relations with other people and our relations with non-human nature are clearly at the center of the Encyclical. The latter says:

*For them [indigenous people], land is not a commodity but rather a gift from God and from their ancestors who rest there, a sacred space with which they need to interact if they are to maintain their identity and values. When they remain on their land, they themselves care for it best ([2], para. 146).*

Note the connections between indigenous ethics and the nature rights movement [14]. The ethics of caring is also a feature of feminist ethics. The latter is characterized this way by the Oxford Handbook:

*In academic theory, a movement to claim care ethics as a distinct ethical approach was sparked by philosopher Sara Ruddick's articulation of 'maternal thinking' as an effective and pervasive form of moral reasoning focused on attentive caring for dependent others…([13], p. 10).*

Another perspective focused on appropriate caretaking and meeting responsibilities within specific relationships.

*Early studies indicated that these different approaches to ethics are linked to gender roles within patriarchy ([13], p. 10).*

*Caring labor is often assigned to and associated with females and subjugated peoples, whose social identities may be defined by self-sacrifice and service for others and whose options may be severely limited to those associations ([13], p. 10).*

*Feminist care ethics include moral orientations that (1) understand individuals, including human selves and other beings, as essentially embedded and interdependent, rather than isolated and atomistic, even if they also exercise some degree of autonomy; (2) take mutually beneficial caring relationships to be foundational and paradigmatic for ethics; (3) highlight the common association of care work with females and subjugated peoples; (4) emphasize the virtues, skills, and knowledge required for beneficial caring relationships to flourish; (5) are attentive to the contexts of moral questions and problems; and (6) recommend appropriate caring and caretaking as remedies for addressing histories of harm and injustice, and as necessary counterpoints to the overemphasis in some cultures on impersonal, abstract ethical judgments ([13], p. 9).*

Feminism had assimilated the inferior status of women to the one of non-human nature. Feminist theology rejects the patriarchal image of an omnipotent God, which is common in many religions, the mind–body dualism at the origin of women's inferior status, and the superiority of reason in favor of wisdom ([3], p. 76–77).

Of course, Francis of Assisi practiced care ethics with people, animals, and other elements of non-human nature to which he attached a familial connotation, a kinship. His spiritual vision was articulated by Bonaventure, "drawing on the ancient understanding of philosophy as love of wisdom" shared by Augustine among others including the Greek fathers of the Church. "Wisdom ought to take possession of the entire person, i.e. with respect to the intellect, the affective life, and the person's action" ([15], p. 3).

For Bonaventure, "since God is relational and God is present in all reality, all reality is relational" ([15], p. 3). This is the foundation of the metaphysics of the good. In Bonaventure,

"…We find the intuition and spirit of Francis translated into formal philosophy and systematic theology" ([15], p. 3)… "Both share a radically Christocentric spirituality, a belief that God is revealed through creation, and an understanding that all creation is essentially good and relational in character" ([15], p. 3)… "In God, all life originates, finds expression in the time and space of the created order, and discovers its ultimate destiny in return to God. The Trinity is the template for this circular movement" ([15], p. 4).

Bonaventure understood creation to have an essential role in salvation history. Creation is the language of God to mankind. But the book of creation has been rendered opaque by mankind's sin ([15], p. 7). Creation is a melody whose components are to be understood as well as the whole ([15], pp. 5–6). This points to the importance of the natural sciences in helping to understand the character of God.

In its fullest sense, salvation is the actualization of the deepest potential that lies at the heart of created reality by reason of the creative love of God. The theology of the return of creation to God is, in essence, the theology of history. Drawn from the Franciscan intellectual tradition that integrates effective inquiry and social engagement, knowledge alone is not adequate to guide the human to a balanced relationship with creation, nor to the sense of religious purpose God intends for all created reality. This is the deepest sense of what the Church understands to-day by "human ecology," an ecology that includes mankind, and by eco-theology.

*[Saint] Francis launched a lay reform movement that emphasized devotion to the Incarnation, Eucharistic adoration, an inclusive, familial spirituality, and practical expressions of compassion within society ([15], p. 2; [16]).*

*Incarnation was not an afterthought, a remedial strategy. Rather, the Incarnation was conceived before the creation of the world as a means to unite humanity with God through love; it was not a discrete historical event, nor merely a precondition for the word to be preached to us; it was not necessitated by sin. Rather, the Incarnation is the highest expression of divine love ([16] citing Warner).*

*Because the Eucharist is incarnated in our lives and rooted in our soil, they [our lives and soil] bring the poor and their struggles and the rape of the earth to the center of the Eucharistic celebration ([16] citing Margaret Scott).*

*Adopting the kinship model demands a form of conversion. It involves a new way of seeing and acting. It involves extending the love of neighbor to embrace creatures of other species. It involves extending the love of the enemy to involve creatures that confront us as others and inspire fear in us. It involves loving and valuing others as God loves and values them. Ultimately, it is a God-centered (theocentric) view of an interconnected community of creatures that have their own intrinsic value ([11], citing Denis Edwards).*

#### **2.3 Virtue ethics**

Virtue ethics takes into account the context of moral agency as does feminist care ethics. Context gives an opportunity to the moral agent to exercise her virtues. Moral principles are interpreted by someone virtuous enough to implement them properly. Thus virtues of character are antecedents to principles. One has to distinguish between what virtue is needed by a person to be environmentally virtuous and a general theory of virtue that would explain why being environmentally virtuous is part and parcel of being virtuous. In the second theory, environmental humility, sobriety, esthetic appreciation and openness, planetary solidarity, stewardship, loyalty and goodwill, recognition of nature's excellence, being an impartial observer lead to humility and gratitude, and encourages our own pursuit of excellence. According to what virtues are needed to be environmentally virtuous, whoever wants to be virtuous wants the material basis of this virtue to be lasting. Robert Sandler considers that whoever recognizes the intrinsic value of something, will apply to it the virtues of compassion, respect, and justice. In other words, virtue ethics focus on the kind of moral agent one wants to be rather than on her actions ([2], par 217; [17, 18]).

In Jamieson's quest for ethics for the Anthropocene, virtue ethics is privileged:

*Ethics for the Anthropocene would, in my view, rely on nourishing and cultivating particular character traits, dispositions, and emotions: what I shall call "virtues." These are mechanisms that provide motivation to act in our various roles from consumers to citizens in order to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and to a great extent ameliorate their effects regardless of the behavior of others. They also give us the resiliency to live meaningful lives even when our actions are not reciprocated ([5], p. 185).*

According to Jamieson, humility and temperance would be candidate virtues as well as mindfulness, i.e., "In order to improve our behavior we need to appreciate the consequences of our actions that are remote in time and space." Cooperation is important for collective action. Respect for nature means giving up its domination and our hubris. Finally, global justice among individuals (rather than states) is certainly a goal to pursue when the poor is the victim and the rich is the perpetrator. Jamieson shows that what is required is not so much distributive justice among states as among

#### *Laudato si', Six Years Later DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.104441*

individuals. He uses the example of car ownership as a proxy indicator for per capita energy uses and thus carbon emissions in 2010.

*The broad and sometimes surprising distribution of car ownership is shown by the fact that only six of the top ten countries in automobile ownership are among those countries required to fund the climate change activities of developing countries under the UNFCCC [United-Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change], while some of the 24 countries that are required to fund these activities are not among the top 24 countries in car ownership. What this means is that rich people who live in countries such as China and Russia escape obligations that attach to poor people who live in countries such as Ireland and Spain ([5], p. 197).*

The poor suffer disproportionately from climate-related impacts, even in rich countries. "A picture that views individual people in their various roles and relationships as the primary bearers and beneficiaries of duties and obligations is one that comports more naturally with the climate change problem than a picture that views nations as fundamental" ([5], p. 200). Jamieson then comes back to virtue ethics as the last raft to hang on: "Climate change threatens a great deal but it does not touch what ultimately makes our lives worth living: the activities we engage in that are in accordance with our values" ([5], p. 200). This is definitely depressing for a policymaker! The encyclical pushes virtue ethics further than Jamieson: "Nevertheless, self-improvement on the part of individuals will not by itself remedy the extremely complex situation facing our world to-day…Social problems must be addressed by community networks and not simply by the sum of individual good deeds…"([2], par 219). "Love…is also civic and political…social love…encourage a "culture of care" which permeates all of society…this too is part of our spirituality" ([2], par 231).

#### **2.4 Ethics of relational values**

Relational values are a relatively new category of value articulation, aimed at enriching the dichotomy between intrinsic values and instrumental values and eventually widening the consensus in environmental ethics ([19], p. 1). More precisely, relational values constitute an analytical framework to assess the ways people articulate the importance of ecosystem services in their specific, socio-culturally embedded language of valuation. The concept is based on the Heideggerian intuition that's entities are conditioned by relationships to the point one cannot tell which is the chicken and which is the egg. Actually, Muraca enlarges the category which includes instrumental values to one of relational values, i.e., values that lie in—and are not assigned to—relations. Humans can simply acknowledge or explicit these values. Relations are either functional between pre-existing entities or fundamental, i.e., constitutive of these entities and process-like. For example, land for indigenous people stands for the whole relationship system and has moral value. Fundamental relations are now members of the moral community. They hold the moral significance of entities holding inherent moral values but are not worthy of moral obligation. Instrumental values are functional relational while esthetic and spiritual values are intrinsic-eudemonistic because they are valued as constitutive of the good life and thus fundamental. Fundamental values are basic conditions for people to define themselves. They are not reducible to the benefits and services that they deliver as means like the instrumental values. What characterizes instrumental values is their substitutability ([20], p. 388).

The question arises about whether the encyclical considers relational values in an informal sense since an encyclical is not a contribution to philosophy, theology, ethics, or value articulation. Certainly, the encyclical is about relations. It deals with relations among humans, between humans and non-human nature, between humans and God, and even among persons within the Trinity ([3], p. 116). This is what constitutes integral ecology. The source of value is essentially God present in humans as well as in non-humans and vice-versa (panentheism). For Bonaventure, creation (persons, non-human nature animated or not) is the language of God. Since language is a means to relate to others, creation is relational in a fundamental way. For Bonaventure, since God is relational and God is present in all reality, all reality is relational. So all reality holds moral value. The remaining question is whether all reality is worthy of moral obligation; obviously, not all to the same degree. Certainly, the command "thou shalt not kill" does not apply in the same way to a human and to a spider. But a spider has, nevertheless, moral standing. I may not kill the former gratuitously even though I am allowed to kill it if it scares me (because for me, it does not hold esthetic or eudemonistic value).

*People also consider the appropriateness of how they relate with nature and with others, including the actions and habits conducive to a good life, both meaningful and satisfying. In philosophical terms, these are relational values (preferences, principles, and virtues associated with relationships, both interpersonal and as articulated by policies and social norms)… These include "eudaimonic" values, or values associated with a good life… ([21], p. 1462).*

*Many people believe that their cultural identity and well-being are derived from their relationships with human and nonhuman beings, mediated by particular places… Cultural services are thus better understood as the filters of value through which other ecosystem services and nature derive importance… Cultural considerations fit poorly into the instrumental framing of ecosystem services because they are inherently relational: cultural services are valued in the context of desired and actual relationships… ([21], pp. 1463–1464).*

*…the relational notion of eudaimonia ("flourishing") entails reflection on the appropriateness of preferences, emphasizing that value is derived from a thing's or act's contribution to a good life, including adhering to one's moral principles and maintaining the roots of collective flourishing…([21], p. 1464).*

*Conservation is still often thought of as something imposed on local peoples by outsiders; it must instead be seen as something we all negotiate collectively as good stewardship… environmental initiatives could solidify and adapt home-grown stewardship by leveraging social relationships ([21], p. 1464).*

IPBES [Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services] has included relational values in its methodology ([20], p. 1).

Muradian and Pascual ([22], p. 12) identify 7 Relational Models (RM), each characterized by a set of specific social conventions, which can be briefly described as follows: detachment (nature as decor), devotion (non-human nature as superior to humans; deep ecology), domination (non-human nature as subordinate to humans; anthropocentrism), stewardship (humans sharing with non-human nature but also developing the latter), wardship (non-human nature as separate from humans but

with intrinsic value; biosphere reserves), utilization (non-human nature as separate from humans but without intrinsic value; utilitarian model), and ritualized exchange (nature as equal; native religions). Identifying the relevant RM is important because "RMs influence not only how problems are perceived, but also the notion of justice held, as well as the considered policy options and discourses for social mobilization" ([22], p. 13). These RM's may be incommensurable and constrain trade-offs when various RM's are held within a social group." The main goal of valuation should be to identify and disentangle the (not always explicit) RMs involved in socio-environmental conflicts" ([22], p. 13).

Whichever ethics one wishes to adopt, it is clear that the stewardship ethics is insufficient to the task of caring for next of kin, whether human, animate or inanimate.
