**2. The dualistic approach**

For the dualistic paradigm, communication is based on the exchange of meaning-entities between the minds of the speaker and the listener. To refer to an object the speaker verbalizes his/her actual perception of it with a linguistic expression that carries an invisible label, enabling the listener to refer to the same object.

#### *Mind and Matter - Challenges and Opportunities in Cognitive Semiotics and Aesthetics*

But speaker and listener have different mental images of the same world fragment, the same object viewed from two perspectives generates different perceptions. How is it possible that the speaker transfers to the listener his/her mental image? Because there is an intermediary objective meaning-entity, the transfer of which enables the speaker and the listener to refer to the same object, although the individual perceptions of it might be different.

*"Die Bedeutung eines Eigennamens ist der Gegenstand selbst, den wir damit bezeichnen; die Vorstellung, welche wir dabei haben, ist ganz subjektiv; dazwischen liegt der Sinn, der zwar nicht mehr subjektiv wie die Vorstellung, aber doch auch nicht der Gegenstand selbst ist. Folgendes Gleichnis ist vielleicht geeignet, diese Verhältnisse zu verdeutlichen. Jemand betrachtet den Mond durch ein Fernrohr. Ich vergleiche den Mond selbst mit der Bedeutung; er ist der Gegenstand der Beobachtung, die vermittelt wird durch das reelle Bild, welches vom Objektivglase im Innern des Fernrohrs entworfen wird, und durch das Netzhautbild des Betrachtenden. Jenes vergleiche ich mit dem Sinne, dieses mit der Vorstellung oder Anschauung. Das Bild im Fernrohre ist zwar nur einseitig; es ist abhängig vom Standorte; aber es ist doch objektiv, insofern es mehreren Beobachtern dienen kann." ([1], p. 27)*

*"The reference of a proper name is the object itself which it denotes; the idea we have is entirely subjective; in between lies the meaning, which is no longer subjective like the idea, but is also not the object itself. The following parable is perhaps suitable to clarify these relationships. Someone is looking at the moon through a telescope. I compare the moon itself to meaning; it is the object of observation, which is mediated by the real image which is created by the objective glass inside the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. I compare the former with the senses, this with the idea or intuition. The image in the telescope is only one-sided; it depends on the location; but it is objective in so far as it can serve several observers."*

While Frege uses "Bedeutung" for reference and "Sinn" for meaning, Husserl in the Logical Investigations [2] uses "Bedeutung" (meaning) for the Fregean "Sinn" ([2], p. 58). The objective meaning-entity lies for Husserl in the logical content of a phenomenological act. Whereas the real content stands for the unrepeatable actual experience, the logical content captures—like a mental telescope—the abstract scheme that corresponds to the underlying propositional structure. The logical content of linguistic expressions is an instantiation of pre-existent, identical, eternal, shareable meaning-entities.

*"Es gibt also unzählige Bedeutungen, die im gewöhnlichen relativen Sinne des Wortes bloß mögliche Bedeutungen sind, während sie niemals zum Ausdruck kommen und vermöge der Schranken menschlicher Erkenntniskräfte niemals zum Ausdruck kommen können." ([2], p. 110)*

*"There are thus innumerable meanings which, in the ordinary relative sense of the word, are merely possible meanings, while they are never expressed and, by virtue of the limits of human cognitive faculties, can never be expressed."*

These meanings exist "before" they are instantiated in linguistic expressions in a third domain beyond res cogitans and res extensa, they cannot be grasped with the senses, but at the same time, they do not need to be carried by consciousness, as described by Frege for the thoughts associated with meanings.

*"Die Gedanken sind weder Dinge der Außenwelt noch Vorstellungen. Ein drittes Reich muß anerkannt werden. Was zu diesem gehört, stimmt mit den Vorstellungen darin überein, daß es nicht mit den Sinnen wahrgenommen werden kann, mit den Dingen aber darin, daß es keines Trägers bedarf, zu dessen Bewußtseinsinhalte es gehört." ([3], p. 43)*

*"Thoughts are neither things of the outside world nor ideas. A third empire must be recognized. What belongs to this has in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived with the senses, and with things that there is no need for a consciousness to which it belongs."*

These eternal meanings might not exist in God's mind ([2], p. 106), but are, nevertheless, universal truths that wait to be discovered like undiscovered planets ([3], p. 44). Of course, the prototype of these meanings is the mathematical truths; they are evident for all minds and can be accessed through abstraction. These inhabitants of the meaning domain are "allgemeine Gegenstände" (universal objects) that are instantiated in actual expressions.

*"Die Bedeutung verhält sich also zu den jeweiligen Akten des Bedeutens … wie etwa die Röte in specie zu den hier liegenden Papierstreifen, die alle diese selbe Röte "haben"". ([2], p. 106)*

*"The meaning is related to the respective acts of meaning-giving … as the redness in specie to the paper strips lying here, which all have "this same redness"."*

Communication is, therefore, possible, because a meaning-entity, which actualizes an instantiation of an eternal, universal, in the third domain pre-existing ideal meaning, is exchanged between the participants, enabling them to refer to the same objects and facts in the world.

However, in contrast to mathematical truths, linguistic expressions are contextsensitive; the meaning of indexicals can only be determined according to an actual situation. Meaning is anchored in the horizon of the phenomenological act, leading to a possible world semantics point of view, where meaning becomes a function from a possible to world to the corresponding extension.

The phenomenological horizon (*inner* as a further specification of the object in the focus of attention and *outer* as a gradually enlarging consideration of the context) completed with potential logically compatible perceptions describes a possible world [4]; an object seen from various perspectives leads to many different related perceptions with the same intentional content. But it is also possible to create alternative worlds, where the object is characterized by other features and contexts. The meaning of this object is then not a unique ideal entity, but a function from possible worlds to this object [5]. Thus, a relativization of truth takes place, because facts can be true in some worlds and false in others, whereas context-free truths, such as the mathematical ones, are true in all worlds, l-truth in the language of Carnap.

The meaning of an expression is now an invisible operation that associates with each actual or potential situation a logical content that corresponds to the extracted propositional structure. Either in the form of ideal, eternal entities or as functions from a domain of possible worlds to a codomain of logical descriptions, the dualistic approach presupposes something like a universal mind, where all these contents float. Humans can communicate because, by having individual access to this universal mind, they can identify identical transferable meanings.

Within this framework, paralinguistic signs and soliloquy do not have a meaning (as also Husserl is pointing out in the Logical Investigations), because these signs do not contribute to the logical content and during soliloquy, there is no transfer.
