**Abstract**

In this article, I consider images from a philosophical point of view, starting from its definition and its relation to thinking. Some analogies with imagetic signs and words are established. And in doing this, I try to value seeing, not to the expense of saying or thinking, but as a way of getting in touch with images that privilege a certain way of knowing.

**Keywords:** images, language, thinking, perception, fantasy

## **1. Introduction**

When considering images, the first problem is to identify the theory of images that best define them. That is something often difficult to establish because such theories lead us to articulate discourse and image. In addition, in an attempt to explain them, the discourse overlaps the images. However, do they need an explanation?

One of the issues at hand when tackling the possibility of discourse on images is their relationship with thought and with seeing or looking. For an image presents us with something to be seen and looked at, about which we formulate a thought. Barthes ([1], p. 32) wonders if an image is not a simple agglutination of symbols or if it produces a system of signs. If we consider that the language-based thought system operates differently from image reading, we will come to think of that question as not valid. However, in semiotics, language is just spoken or written language because of the way in wich it is articulated. Images, on the other hand, seem to form a rudimentary system that resists meaning. If meaning is intrinsic to images, how is it added into it? Marie-Jose Mondzain states (in [2], p. 23) that thought, in paintings, is within images. We learn from images, though it is necessary to distinguish between seeing and looking. Visibility cannot be reduced to what is merely apparent, since it is also related to invisibility.

Didi-Huberman [3] explores this theme in *Devant l'image. Questions posées aux fins d'une histoire de l'art*. When presenting the issue that prompted him to write this book, the author refers to the experiences of whoever lays eyes on a work of art: the experience is that of a paradox because, despite unclear and indistinct, what we see is simultaneously evident. Nevertheless, those unsatisfied with this paradoxical experience need an explanation. Such an explanation comes in the form of a speech – that is the historian's or art critic's discourse, the one who sets himself up as the knower of art. However, what prompts us to rise to this level of certainty regarding this object that gives us this paradoxical experience? Elkins ([2], p. 41) concedes to feeling the attraction to what we call the ontology of the image – meaning the idea that the

image has something non-linguistic that is beyond logic and language. It is possible to identify in this statement some of the problems we face when seeking to define the image and, thus, find a field to understand it: we end up placing the discussion in binary distinctions that come from language, such as rational and irrational, logical and illogical. Whenever we want to understand them through concepts from other areas, we lose sight of them. Every time we establish codes or references, we realize that they cannot fully account for the image. Barthes ([4], pp. 68–69) realizes that the photographic image cannot be reduced to the object portrayed or to the image of the person reproduced. The concept of "*punctum*", which can be approximated to Walter Benjamin's idea of aura, refers to something beyond the image. Elkins recognizes that some of the positions taken in this discussion are pragmatic, like Goodman's or even his ones. He also argues that non-Western concepts could have a more central place in the discussion about image1 . Initially I will present Georges Didi-Hubermann's and Roland Barthes's positions on this debate.
