**8. Results and discussion**

The startup composting business discussed in this chapter aimed to provide useable compost for the Guatemala City's municipal government (MUNI) who were using on an annual basis nearly 15,000 cubic meters of soil for landscaping the along the roads and parks. Because the base soil was of such poor quality, the mix of compost to soil would need to be 1:1, creating a demand for up to 7500 cubic meters each year. As stated earlier in this chapter, the 0.48-hectare site adjacent to the CENMA market was inadequately small and could not meet the needs of the City for soil amendment; a larger production workspace had to be provided. This study found that in order to produce 7500 cubic meters of useable compost each year, nearly 625 cubic meters would need to be generated each month, or approximately 30 cubic meters on a daily basis. To meet the demand for just the compost needed by the City government, the necessary site had to be nearly six times larger than that of the CENMA site, or approximately 2.6 hectares (6.4 acres). Interestingly enough, if one were to adopt the wind-row method for compost production, discussed earlier in this chapter, the area needed to meet the municipal demand is estimated to be approximately 1.6 hectares (4.0 acres) because windrows are more efficient in their use of space and production. Discussions with the head for public works in Guatemala City promised space for a larger scale production facility situated below (to the south) of CENMA; unfortunately, this expansion never occurred. Ironically, the City requested an even greater volume of compost from the startup company if it could be produced. The positive element here was that a broader market demand existed for the compost, and at that point in time, no one else was able to or willing to step up and make it.

Also ironic was the volume of organic waste trucked to the landfill each day, equaling roughly 138 cubic meters. When one considers that the initial small production space, or for that matter the 2.6 hectares site discussed above, both were incapable to accommodate all of the organic waste generated by the market assuming that it could be converted into useable compost; to do so would require a site of approximately 5.8 hectares. Unfortunately, production space limitations resulted in unacceptable shortfalls of the volume of compost that was produced, and as such, the project could not live up to its potential. Yet from a more positive perspective, the raw unprepared product was available—free of charge—with a willing client and *Compost, Social Sustainability, and Circular Economy in Guatemala DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.100280*

inexpensive labor, suggesting that the failure of the business idea was not due to a flawed business plan but rather necessary space. With some abandoned brownfield sites (former industrial manufacturing facilities) nearby, this could be readily overcome.

Referring back to the success and failures of this research projected mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the startup business was never able to meet the real demand for compost by the Municipal Government of Guatemala City; however, with a larger working production site, this could be achieved in the future. And with that, the ability to achieve the intended goal for a business that would demonstrate the principles of circular economy and social sustainability could be achieved.

Monitoring data conducted weekly at the two test cells that were constructed as a control experiment (**Table 2**) reveled that the high altitude and dry climate of Guatemala City caused much of the moisture in the newly mixed compost (cell A) to dry out prematurely, resulting in a very slow or even stalled rate of decomposition. This was unexpected and required altering the brown to green mix to increase the green organic volume during the initial mixing of the new compost piles in cell A.
