**3. Using the phenomenological method to understand psychological disorders**

The issues of diagnostic validity and medicalization emerge when the goal of scientific inquiry and treatment is law-governed explanation (*Erklären*). *DSM* reliance on neuroscience, brain imaging, and genetics is in service to explaining what constitutes a psychological disorder and, by extension, what causes each. Explaining phenomena is rooted in a Netwonian philosophy of science which views persons and things in their objectivity—that is, stripped of all qualities that cannot also be explained. Experimental procedures focus on identifying temporally and spatially proximal causes. This kind of knowledge is the goal of the natural sciences.

*Erklären* cannot reach human existence because existence is not divisible into objects. German philosopher Martin Heidegger [21] has argued that modern natural science has confused existence (i.e., *being*) with explanatory objects (i.e., beings). German philosopher Edmund Husserl, who inspired Heidegger, has also argued (1972) that modern natural science is incapable of understanding human experience. Husserl [22] has advocated for a humanistic science tasked with *understanding* human experience and proposed the phenomenological method for examining and describing the structure of human consciousness. This is in line with the methods of human science of 19th century German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) who emphasized *Verstehen* knowledge which focuses on meaning (*see* [23]).

*Verstehen* and *Erklären* are important for understanding psychological disorders because the latter are diagnosed through signs (objective behaviors) and symptoms (subjective experiences. Where *DSM-5* searches exclusively for physiological explanations for psychological disorders, it has either ignored the importance of understanding subjective experience (symptoms) or has confused symptoms with signs. To adequately address the breadth of psychological disorders, attention must be paid to understanding symptoms. This need has been identified for common psychological disorders [12] and advanced psychoses (*see* [24]). In the present article, the authors describe PCS with the goal of better understanding how it is experienced.

The descriptive phenomenological method begins, Giorgi explains, "by obtaining concrete descriptions of experiences from others who have lived through situations in which the phenomenon that the researcher is interested have taken place" [25]. These descriptions are the raw data of an empirical phenomenological analysis. This form of qualitative analysis follows three distinct steps: 1) Reading each protocol (that is, the raw data) for a sense of its whole. This means familiarizing oneself with the event as it has been described by each subject.

*Social Support, Identity, and Meaning: A Phenomenological Analysis of Post-Concussion… DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.95541*

2) A determination of meaning units within the protocol. In this step of the analysis, the investigator tries to note any affective, experiential, or other shifts that occur within the protocol. 3) Transforming the natural attitude expressions into phenomenologically psychologically sensitive expressions. That is, the *psychological insights regarding the phenomenon* can be discussed without *reducing* the phenomenon to its psychological description.
